## Case

#### Unconditional hospitality giving without return, cuts deep into the psyche removing the concept of the self-interested liberal subject.

Caputo 2003 (WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY, WITHOUT BEING: UNCONDITIONALITY, THE COMING GOD AND DERRIDA’S DEMOCRACY TO COME Extracts of this article have previously been published in France Today, the Journal of French Travel and Culture, <http://www.francetoday.com/>.)

The question, is there something that lays claim to us unconditionally but without power or force, is directed at “us,” all of us—Americans and Europeans, democrats and theologians, Westerners and non-Westerners—anyone who is associated with the cruel logic of sovereignty. The democracy to come calls for a new revolution, another and still more radically democratic revolution, a revolution in the name of the democracy to come, in which we will break more decisively still with the ancien régime of sovereignty itself, dreaming of the incalculable possibility of the impossible, of a democracy without sovereignty. Dreaming of the incalculable, but also calculating, because one must count very carefully and carefully devise ways of counting how the member voices of the democratic assembly will count, who will be allowed to vote, at what age, with what status, etc. (V, 63). That revolution that is being called for will also cut deeply into our psyche and our psychology, because it will force us to reconceive the self, that famous liberal individual, in terms of the other one who lays claims to me, even as it will cut into our theology, because it will force us to reimagine God without sovereignty. God forbid! What is called for in and by the democracy to come is the unconditional gift, which does not seek a return on one’s investment, the gift, in which the self gives up its power, the power of the “I can,” the power of the possible, which is what constitutes a self. What we have asked of the king, we now must ask of ourselves: to give up power, to share and divide it. What is called for is a self that shares its power in a gift without return, a self without ipseity. What is called for is unconditional hospitality to the other, to the stranger and the immigrant, to the tired, the hungry and huddled masses. What is called for is a transforming and transfixing revolution in which the self turns itself inside out and lets itself by claimed by the other.

## A2: Fullerton RS

#### The 1nc engages in dangerous politics of prioritizing methodology and assigning intellectual prerequisites political strategy. Their use of the experience of oppression as the status that defines those who should guide politics harms progressive political strategies. Their particular strategy is part of a larger discourse of recapturing agency through privileging experience as the basis for politics.

Craig IRELAND American Culture @ Bilkent ‘02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002p.87-88

" Once an arcane philosophical term, experience over the last three decades has become a general buzzword. By the 1970s, experience spilled over into the streets, so to speak, and it has since then become the stuff of programmatic manifestos and has been enlisted as the found from which microstrategies of resistance and subaltern counterhistories can be erected. But for all the blows and counterblows that have carried on tor over"\*three decades between those who appeal to the counterhegemonic potential of experience and those who see such appeals as naive voluntarism, such debates show no signs of abating. On the contrary, they have become yet more strident, as can be seen by Michael Pickering's recent attempt to rehabilitate the viability of the term "experience" for subaltern historiography by turning to E. P. Thompson and Dilthey and, more recently still, by Sonia Kruks's polemical defense of experience for subaltern inquiry by way of a reminder that poststructuralist critics of experience owe much to those very thinkers, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, whom they have debunked as if in oedipal rebellion against their begetters. Such debates over experience have so far gravitated around issues of epistemology and agency, pitting those who debunk experience as the stuff of an antiquated philosophy of consciousness against those who argue that subaltern experience provides an enclave against strong structural determination. Lost in such debates, however, have been the potential consequences of appeals to immediate experience as a ground for subaltern agency and specificity. And it is just such potential consequences that will be examined here, These indeed demand our attention, for more is at stake in the appeal to experience than some epistemological faux pas. By so wagering on the perceived immediacy of experience as the evidence for subaltern specificity and counterhegemonic action, appeals to immediate experience, however laudable their goal, end up unwittingly naturalizing what is in fact historical, and, in so doing, they leave the door as wide-open to a progressive politics of identity as to a retreat to neoethnic tribalism. Most alarming about such appeals to experience is not some failure of epistemological nerve – it is instead their ambiguous political and social ramifications. And these have reverberate beyond academia and found an echo in para-academia – so much so that experience has increasingly become the core concept or key word of subaltern groups and the rallying call for what Craig Calhoun calls the “new social movements” in which “experience is made the pure ground of knowledge, the basis of an essentialized standpoint of critical awareness” (468 n.64). The consequences of such appeals to experience can best be addressed not by individually considering disparate currents, but by seeking their common denominator. And in this regard, E.P. Thompson will occupy the foreground. It is safe to say that what started as an altercation between Thompson and Althusser has since spawned academic and para-academic "histories from below" and subaltern cultural inquiries that, for all their differences, share the idea that the identities and counterhistories of the disenfranchised can be buttressed by the specificity of a group's concrete experiences. Much theorizing on experience by certain cultural and historiographical trends, as many have already pointed out, has been but a variation on a persistent Thompsonian theme in which Thompson's "kind of use of experience has the same foundational status if we substitute 'women's' or 'black' or 'lesbian' or 'homosexual' for 'working class'" (Scott, 786)

#### Experience as manifest destiny. The 1ac's description of unalienated experience turns into a new form of authoritarian pedagogy. Presenting the self as evidence prevents a critical inquiry into what authorities experience itself. The discourse of experience becomes a trump card-a fascist prohibition on what can be criticized and what stands as absolute.

Rey CHOW Modern Culture and Media @ Brown ’98 Ethics After Idealism

In the foregoing pages, I have tried to argue that fascism needs to be understood not only in its negative but more importantly in its positive aspects, and that fascism's production of idealism is a projectional production of luminosity-as-self-evidence, "In an essay entitled "The Evidence of Experience," which does not at first seem to have anything to do with the topic of fascism, Joan Scott has made comparable observations about the use of “experience” in the North American academy today. In the general atmosphere of a felt need to deconstruct universalist: claims about human history, Scott writes, scholars of various disciplines have increasingly turned to personal experience as a means of such deconstruction. However, she argues, by privileging experience as the critical weapon against univeralisms, we are leaving open the question as to what authorizes experience itself. Scott charges that the appeal to experience “as uncontestable evidence and as an originary point of explanation” for historical difference has increasingly replaced the necessary task of exploring “how difference is established, how it operates, now, and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world.” For me, what is especially interesting is the manner in which Scott emphasizes the role of vision and visibility throughout her essay. Beginning her discussion with Samuel R. Delany's autobiographical meditation, The Motion of Light in Water, Scott notes that "a metaphor of visibility as literal transparency is crucial to his project." She concludes that, for Delany, "knowledge is gained through vision; vision is a direct apprehension of a world of transparent objects."41 What Scott articulates here is the other side of Virilio's argument about the coterminous nature of visual perception and destruction – that is, the coterminous nature of visual perception and knowledge: "Seeing is the origin of knowing.” While the technology of seeing, or seeing-as-technology, has become an inalienable part of the operation of militarism and fascist propaganda, Scott shows how it has also come to dominate our thinking about identity so much so that visibility and luminosity are the conditions toward which accounts of difference and alternative histories derived from personal experience” now aspire.

This kind of aspiration, Scott implies, is an aspiration toward the self-evidence of the self’s (personal) experience. The self as evidence this means that the self, like the Stalin myth in Soviet cinema, is so transparent, so shone through with light, that it simply is without need for further argument about its history or what Scott calls its “discursive character.”

#### The 1nc begins with the appeal to bodily experience and materiality as the basis for political action. This becomes the basis for an authentic and unideological experience that questions dominant narrative. Treating this body as the corrective to ideology reduces everyone to a purely biological identity. Instead of exchange and transgression we end up with a static politics and pedagogy.

Craig IRELAND American Culture @ Bilkent ’02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002, 91-96

It was precisely in response to this turn or events that the culturalist strain in British Marxism, as well as subsequent strands in subaltern studies, came to see experience as that which, by virtue of its prediscursive immediacy, radically demarcates itself from and therefore evades discursive or ideological mediation and determination. Because the imposition of state ideology, as Thompson saw it, "cannot succeed unless there is congruence between the imposed rules and view of life and the necessary business of living in a given mode of production" {Poverty of Theory, 367), something was needed that might sabotage such a congruence and, in so doing, bypass strong structural determination. Of the possible candidates, the perceived nonmediatedness, or immediacy, or experience proved to be particularly seductive. Indeed, because of its seemingly immediate, that is, its nondiscursive or nonideological contact with environing social being, experience represented just that sort of untainted raw materials (to use Thompson’s expression) that, in order to congeal into class or group self-consciousness and agency needed but to be articulated by a regionalized culture sufficiently specific to those sharing particular experiences. Experience, in short, represented the stuff (in the sense of its Germanic cognate, Stoff, that is, resistant material) that, impervious as it appeared to be to ideological tampering, might furnish the material building blocks from which counterhistories could be constructed and subaltern cultures reinforced. Such perceptions of the counterhegemonic potential of experience were encouraged by the connotations the word had acquired in the Anglo-American world. From a term that from the seventeenth to the early eighteenth century implied knowledge gained through both a reliance on the past as well as through observation untainted, as Francis Bacon would say, by church dogma, superstition, and other obscurantist idols, the concept of experience semantically shifted by the midto late eighteenth century not only to that which opposed reason, but also to that which is "full and active awareness" of both feeling and thought and, as such, assumed an aura of authenticity with which reasoning and ideas could not dispense (Williams, 126). The German equivalents of experience, whether as Erfahrung or as the early nineteenth-century neologism Erlebnis, are likewise informed by a conceptual and etymological history that encouraged the association of experience with notions of counterhegemonic resistance, as can be seen in the recourse to Erfahrung, by certain members of the Frankfurt School and by certain phenomenologists as a means of countering given or dominant horizons of understanding and, as can also be seen in the recourse by Lebensphilosophie to Erlebnis, as a means of opposing the mediacy of abstract reason with the immediacy of the concretely lived. Thompson's notion of experience, however, does not seek to rehabilitate the "other" of reason in the manner that Erlebnis had in certain popularizations of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Lebensphilosophie; instead, it wagers on the "other" of the perceived immateriality of signification – the immediacy of experience is opposed to the mediacy of ideology as the material is to the immaterial. If experience plays a central role in certain theories hoping to vindicate subaltern agency, it is because of its assumed unmediated proximity with materiality. Because of its corporeal resistance to external tampering, materiality appears as less malleable and thus less amenable to ideological mediation much as for Locke the qualities or material spatial extension, lending themselves as they do to palpable verification and thus less prone to perceptual distortion, are seen as qualities more primary than the pliable and fickle secondary qualities of sight or sound. It is true that, in order to avoid both naive empirical positivism and strong structural determinism, Thompson proposed that experience be understood less as binarily opposed to structure than as a mediating third term between "conditioning" and "agency" and at the "intersection between determination and self activity" (Poverty of Theory, 225, 228); it nevertheless remains that his notion of experience is imbued with material properties: 'Thus change takes place in social being which then gives rise to change in experience," Thompson explains,"... and this experience exerts pressure on existent social consciousness, raises questions, and furnishes the material for intellectual elaboration” (200; my emphasis). As raw material and in the manner of a Gegenstand, Thompson's notion of experience stands against and exerts pressure on consciousness, and although dependent on its retrospective mediation within a local culture, this experience nevertheless has all the makings of the spatially extended solidity of matter – matter that, by presumably circumventing ideological determination, can serve as the ground from which resistance can be mustered and alternative sociability constructed. This Thompsonian notion of experience, as many have already pointed out, has found its way in numerous strains of Anglo-American feminist epistemologies and subaltern studies. And rooted as it is in prediscursive materiality, it is hardly surprising that it should have lately migrated to what is considered by many to be the last enclave of resistance against ideological contamination – the perceived nondiscursive material immediacy of the body itself. Certain North American feminist strands propose "experience, qua women's experience of alienation from their own bodies, as the evidence of difference" (Bellamy and Leontis, 167); while others, by contending that the materiality of social practice somehow institutes a disruptive fissure within dominant discursive regimes, have retreated, as Joan W. Scott notes, to "the biological or physical 'experience' of the body" itself (787-88). Others have gone so far as to see the body as the last enclave of resistance where the nonmediated specificity of experience is “registered" or "inscribed” in the manner of Kafka's penal colony, as so many body piercings testifying to the irreducibly singular, telling us, as does Chantal Maille, that "our body is becoming a new locus of struggle, which lays claim to its difference through actions such as body piercing" (quoted in Houde, 6). Such a stance is, of course, beset by numerous problems that have already been repeatedly pointed out by others and that need not be rehearsed here. Suffice it to say, as does Fredric Jameson, that “we must be very suspicious of the reference to the body as an appeal to immediacy (the warning goes back to the very first chapter Hegel's Phenomenology); even Foucault s medical and penal work can be read as an account of the construction of the body which rebukes premature immediacy" ("On 'Cultural Studies,’" 44). The recent obsession with the material body is, of course, hardly in a position to vindicate the historical materialism with which, as if to appease Bourdieu, it often fancies itself allied – Materialism is scarcely achieved by a litany of the body," Jameson rightly notes, and the materialism of the body "should not be confused with a historical materialism that turns on praxis and on the mode of production" (ibid.). But at stake in the recent obsession with the materiality of bodily experience is not just an attempt to redeem historical, let alone dialectical, materialism – something that an exclusive reliance on immediate material experience, bodily or otherwise, is hardly in a position to accomplish anyway; at stake is instead the condition of possibility of an active subject and of a ground from which can be erected strategies of resistance (to use the jargon of the 1980s) and a politics of identity (to use the slogan of the 1990s) that might evade the hegemony, as current parlance phrases it, of dominant discursive formations. It is in the name of agency and cultural specificity that, to this day, appeals are made to immediate and materially grounded experience by those currents in subaltern studies that presuppose a nonmediated homology or correlation between one's structural position, one's socioeconomic interests, one's propensity for certain types of experiences, and certain forms of consciousness or awareness. It is, of course, unlikely that Thompson would endorse some of the uses to which his notion of experience has been put. But that is beside the point. Regardless of Thompson's motivations, this turn to the material immediacy of bodily experiences is but the logical unfolding of his argument that, for all its cautious disclaimers, attempts to ground group specificity and agency in the nondiscursive and the immediate. Since for the Thompsonian notion of experience all forms of mediation are considered fair game for ideological penetration, the turn to the immediate is to be expected, and the migration toward material immediacy is but an extrapolation of such a turn. But what are the potential consequences of such a turn? THE SPECTER OF NEOETHNIC TRIBALISM More is involved here than some epistemological blunder. In their bid to circumvent ideological mediation by turning to the presumed immediacy of experience, Thompsonian experience-oriented theories advance an argument that is not so much theoretically specious as it is potentially dangerous: there is nothing within the logic of such an argument that precludes the hypostatization of other nondiscursive bases for group membership and specificity – bases that can be as readily be those of a group’s immediate experiences as they can be those of a group’s presumed materially immediate biological characteristics or physical markers of ethnicity and sexuality. If the criterion for the disruptive antihegemonic potential of experience is its immediacy, and if, as we have just seen, such a criterion can readily lead to a fetishization of the material body itself, then what starts out as an attempt to account for a nonmediated locus of resistance and agency can end up as a surenchere of immediacy that by but a nudge of a cluster of circumstances can propel toward what Michael Piore's Beyond Individualism calls ''biologism'’ – an increasingly common trend whereby "a person's entire identity resides in a single physical characteristic, whether it be of blackness, of deafness or of homosexuality: (quoted in Gitlin, 6). Blut und Boden seem but a step away. The step from a wager on immediate experience, whether from theories hoping to account for agency or from groups struggling for cultural recognition, to rabid neoethnic fundamentalisms is only a possible step and not a necessary one', and the link between these two" trends as certainly not one of enmity, and still less one of causality. What the parallelism between the two does suggest, however, is that in spite of their divergent motivations and means, they both attempt to ground group specificity by appealing to immediacy – by appointing, in other words, to something that is less a historical product or a mediated construct than it is an immediately given natural entity, whether it be the essence of a Volk, as in current tribalisms, or the essence of material experiences specific to groups, as in strains of Alltagsgeschichte and certain subaltern endeavors. If a potential for biologism and the specter of neoethnic tribalism are close at hand in certain cultural theories and social movements, it is because the recourse to immediate experience opens the back door to what was booted out the front door – it inadvertently naturalizes what it initially set out to historicize.

Deconstruction reconstitutes the world.

Spivak ‘97 [an Indian theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, where she is a founding member of the school's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, “Jacques Derrida OF GRAMMATOLOGY” Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” <http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1_3997.pdf>]

Speaking of the hymen, Derrida emphasizes the role of the blank spaces of the page in the play of meaning. Analogically, Derrida himself often devotes his attention to th text in its margins, so to speak. He examines the minute particulars of an undecidable moment, nearly imperceptible displacements, that might otherwise escape the reader’s eye. Reading Foucault, he concentrates on three pages out of 673. Reading Rousseau, he chooses a text that is far from “central.” Reading Heidegger, he proceeds to write a note on a note to Sein and Zeit. His method, as he says to Jean-Louis Houdebine, perhaps a little too formulaically, is reversal and displacement. It is not enough “simply to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics.” We must recognize that, within the familiar philosophical oppositions, there is always “a violent ((lxxvii)) hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first .. . to overthrow [renverser] the hierarchy.” (Pos F 57, Pos E. I. 36) To fight violence with violence. In the Grammatology this structural phase would be represented by all those pages where, all apologies to the contrary, the polemical energy seems clearly engaged in putting writing above speech. But in the next phase of deconstruction, this reversal must be displaced, the winning term put under erasure. The critic must make room for “the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept,’ a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms of the previous regime [system of oppositions].” In terms of our book, this would be the aspect that “allows for the dissonant emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the received order and invading the whole sphere of speech” (Pos E I. 36). To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. Deconstruction in a nutshell. But take away the assurance of the text’s authority, the critic’s control, and the primacy of meaning, and the possession of this formula does not guarantee much. Why should we undo and redo a text at all? Why not assume that words and the author “mean what they say?” It is a complex question. Here let us examine Derrida’s most recent meditation upon the desire of deconstruction. Derrida acknowledges that the desire of deconstruction may itself be-come a desire to reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it “does not know.” And as she deconstructs, all protestations to the contrary, the critic necessarily assumes that she at least, and for the time being, means what she says. Even the declaration of her vulnerability must come, after all, in the controlling language of demonstration and reference. In other words, the critic provisionally forgets that her own text is necessarily self-deconstructed, always already a palimpsest. The desire of deconstruction has also the opposite allure. Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality —by thus “placing in the abyss” (mettre en abîme), as the French expression would literally have it—it shows us the lure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom.Thus a further deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the search for a foundation (the critic behaving as if she means what she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless. The tool for this, as ((lxxviii)) indeed for any deconstruction, is our desire, itself a deconstructive and grammatological structure that forever differs from (we only desire what is not ourselves) and defers (desire is never fulfilled) the text of our selves. Deconstruction can therefore never be a positive science. For we are in a bind, in a “double (read abyssal) bind,” Derrida’s newest nickname for the schizophrenia of the “sous rature.” 81 We must do a thing and its opposite, and indeed we desire to do both, and so on indefinitely. Deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhabited by differance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or deconstructed. Yet the critic provisionally musters the metaphysical resources of criticism and performs what declares itself to be one (unitary) act of deconstruction. As I point out on pages Ixxxi–lxxxii, the kinship with Freud’s interminable and terminable analysis, involving both subject and analyst, is here not to be ignored.

#### The simplification of terrorism perpetuates the harms by oversimplifying a complex event—exploiting fears of future strikes is a self-destructive process that ultimately risks seeking such strikes to justify future violence.

Derrida ‘3  
Jacques, the original postmodernist, Philosophy in a Time of Terror p 107-9

The most terrorist? This question is at once necessary and destined to remain without any answer. Necessary because it takes into account and essential fact: all terrorism presents itself as a response in a situation that continues to escalate. It amounts to saying “I am resorting to terrorism as a last resort, because the other is more terrorist than I am; I am defending myself, counterattacking; the real terrorist, the worst, is the one who will have deprived me of every other means of responding before presenting himself, the first aggressor as a victim.” It is in this way that the United States, Israel, wealthy nations and colonial or imperialist powers are accused of practicing state terrorism and thus of being more terrorist than the terrorist of whom they say they are the victims. The pattern is well known, so I won’t belabor it. But it is difficult to write it off purely and simply, even if it is sometimes applied in a simplistic and abusive fashion. Yet the question you are asking, that of a more or less in terrorism should also not be settled through a purely objectively quantitative logic. For this question can give rise to no such formal evaluation. Terrorist acts try to produce psychic effects (conscious or unconscious) and symbolic or symptomatic relations that might take numerous detours an incalculable number of them, in truth. The quality or intensity of the emotions is provoked (whether conscious or unconscious) is not always proportionate to the number of victims or the amount of damage. In situations and cultures where the media do not spectacularize the event, the killing of thousands of people in a very short period of time might provoke fewer psychic and political effects than the assassination of a single individual in another country, culture, or nation-state with highly developed media resources. And does terrorism have to work only through death? Can’t one terrorize without killing? And does killing necessarily mean putting to death? Isn’t it also a “letting die”? Can’t “letting die”, “not wanting to know that one is letting others die”—hundreds of millions of human beings, from hunger, AIDS, lack of medical treatment, and so on—also be part of a more or less conscious and deliberate terrorist strategy? We are perhaps wrong to assume so quickly that all terrorism is voluntary, sonscious, organized, deliberate, intentionally calculated” there are historical and political situations where terror operates, so to speak as if by itself, as the simple result of some apparatus, because of the relations of force in place, without anyone, any conscious subject, any person any “I”, being really conscious of it or feeling itself responsible for it. All situations of social or national structural oppression produce a terror that is not natural (insofar as it is organized, institutional), and all these situations depend on this terror without those who benefit from them ever organizing terrorist acts or ever being treated as terrorists. The narrow, too narrow meaning commonly given today to the word “terrorism” gets circulated in various ways in the discourse that dominates the public space, and first of all through the technoeconomic power of the media. What would September 11 have been without television? This question has already been asked and explored, so I will not insist on it here. But we must recall that maximum media coverage was in the common interest of the perpetrators of September 11, the terrorist, and those who, in the name of the victims, wanted to declare war on terrorism. Between these two parties, such media coverage was, like the good sense of which Descartes speaks, the most widely shared thing in the world. More than the destruction of the Twin Towers or the attack on the Pentagon, more than the killing of thousands of people the real terrorism consisted of and in fact, began by exposing and exploiting, having exposed and exploited, the image of this terror by the target itself. This target (the United States, let’s say and anyone who supports or is allied with them in the world, and this knows almost no limits today) had it in its own interest (the same interest it shares with its sworn enemies) to expose its vulnerability, to give the greatest possible coverage to the aggression against which it wishes to protect itself. This is again the same autoimmunitary perversion. Or perhaps it would be better to say “pervertibility” so as to name a possibility, a risk, or a threat whose virtuality does not take the form of an evil intention, an evil spirit or a will to do harm. But this virtuality alone is enough to frighten, even terrify. It is the ineradicable root of terror and thus of a terrorism. Implacably. Endlessly. Let me add her e a reminder: there is nothing purely modern in this relation between media and terror, in a terrorism that operates by propagating within the public space images or rumors aimed at terrifying the so called civilian population. It is true, of course, that with radio and television what is called organized propaganda” something that is in fact relatively modern has, in the last century, and already during WWI, played an essential role in “declared” war. It will have gone hand in hand with bombing campaigns (whether conventional or atomic) that could not differentiate between civilian and military any more than the resistance movements and the oppressions of those movements could. It was thus already impossible during the two world wars to distinguish rigorously between war and terrorism.