## Case

#### Weighing rights against the lives of others inevitably leads to genocide.

Dillon, ’99 [Michael; Professor Politics, University of Lancaster, Political Theory, April 99, Vol. 27 Issue 2, p155, 21p “Another Justice”]

Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself.([n33](http://web16.epnet.com/#bib33)) It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.([n34](http://web16.epnet.com/#bib34)) They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.(n35) Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value--rights--may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."(n36) But how does that necessity present itself?. Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

## A2: Framework

#### Demanding a plan text and forcing us to be coherent, logical and packaged is violent policing of our expression that has no basis in the resolution.

Butler ‘4 [2004, Judith Butler is a Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at U.C. Berkeley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence”, pg. xix-xxi]

Dissent and debate depend upon the inclusion of those who maintain critical views of state policy and civic culture remaining part of a larger public discussion of the value of policies and politics. To charge those who voice critical views with treason, terrorist-sympathizing, anti-Semitism, moral relativism, postmodernism, juvenile behavior, collaboration, anachronistic Leftism, is to seek to destroy the credibility not of the views that are held, but of the very persons who hold them. It produces the climate of fear in which to voice a certain view is to risk being branded and shamed with heinous appellation. To continue to voice one’s views under those conditions is not easy, since one must not only discount the truth of appellation, but brave the stigma that seizes up from the public domain. Dissent is quelled, in part, through threatening the speaking subject with an uninhabitable identification. Because it would be heinous to identify as treasonous, as a collaborator, one fails to speak, or one speaks in throttled ways, in order to sidestep the terrorizing identification that threatens to take hold. This strategy for quelling dissent and limiting the reach of critical debate happens not only through a series of shaming tactics which have a certain psychological terrorizations as their effect, but they work as well by producing what will and will not count as a viable speaking subject and a reasonable opinion within the public domain. It is precisely because one does not want to lose one’s status as a viable speaking being that ones does not say what one thinks. Under social conditions that regulate identifications and the sense of viability to this degree, censorship operates implicitly and forcefully. The line that circumscribes what is speakable and what is livable also function as an instrument of censorship. To decide what views will count as reasonable within the public domain, however, is to decide what will and will not count as the public sphere of debate. And if someone holds vies that are not in line with the nationalist norm, that person comes to lack credibility as a speaking person, and the media is not open to him or her (though the internet, interestingly, is). The foreclosure of critique -empties the public domain of debate and democratic contestation itself, so that debate becomes the exchange of views among the like-minded, and criticism, which ought to be central to any democracy, becomes a fugitive and suspect activity. Public Policy, including foreign policy, often seeks to restrain the public sphere from being open to certain forms of debate and the circulation of media coverage. One way a hegemonic understanding of politics is achieved is through circumscribing what will and will not be admissible as part of the of the public sphere itself. Without disposing populations in such a way that war seems good and right and true, no war can claim popular consent, and no administration can maintain popularity. To produce what will constitute the public sphere, however, it is necessary to control the way in which people see, how they hear, what they see. The constraints are not only on content—certain images of dead bodies in Iraq, for instance, are considered unacceptable for public visual consumption—but on what “can” be heard, read, seen, felt, and known. The public sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as reality, and what will not. It is also a way of establishing whose lives can be marked as lives, and whose deaths will count as deaths. Our capacity to feel and to apprehend hangs in the balance. But so, too, does the fate of the reality of certain lives and deaths as well as the ability to think critically and publicly about the effects of war.

#### No topical version – Deconstruction is the opposite of policy.

Mcquillan 08 (Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

One definition of policy might be that policy is not reading. It is the very opposite of deconstruction, if deconstruction can have opposites. Nothing could be more inimical to the patient and scholarly treading of the texts of the other by Jacques Derrida than the pre-ordained, one-size- fits-all, programme-for-tomorrow ambitions of policy or the relationship implied between the academic and the so-called political process in this arrangement. This is not the same as saying that one cannot or should not have an idea what one might do as a political person with respect to schools and hospitals and foreign wars, given the chance. Rather, I think it is revealing of a certain truth about deconstruction, namely that deconstruction is truly a critical nihilism. By this, I do not mean that is anarchistic or destructive, rather in the Nietzschean sense it is a type of reflection and utterance that requires an effort of intelligence and an exercise of reason as a practical, counter-cultural engagement. I for one would like to see the inauguration of an International Forum for Philosophy and Policy as a deconstructive 'counter'-Think Tank. It might be distinguished from existing organisations by the formula: more think, less tank. It would adopt a relation to policy of intervention rather than a preparation. Not in order to outflank public policy through a strategy of negation and transcendental position taking (or posturing) but in order to provide critical readings of singular events as they arrived misshapen and monstrous in the present. Such open and reflective institutions will be absolutely necessary if the future of thought itself is to stand a chance and if it is to continue to confront power with truth.

#### They say we kill political change – deconstruction is an engagement of the political because discourse and text construct reality.

Mcquillan 08 (Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

There was a moment in the early 1990s when the reception of the text of Derrida entered Law Schools in the United States. This might have been the moment when deconstruction moved from a discursive and philosophical sphere to the realm of practice. It has never quite happened. This is not because lawyers and theoreticians of the law are failing to progress Derrida's writing on the law into a more general axiomatics of legal practice. Rather, it is because if one were to attempt to do such a thing the very idea of a generally axiomatic legal practice would not be tenable (for example, consider the aporia between universality and singularity, the relation of law to an economy of violence, the injustice of judgement, the recognition of the unconscious as a principle in legal trials, and so on). Given that it is in the interests of power (not a word Derrida uses very often, granted its own obscurities) to maintain the logo-rhetorical illusion of a practice of the law that was universal (with sovereign exceptions) then it is not surprising that the effects of reading Derrida in American law schools are yet to be felt in any great degree outside of those law schools. Although it will without doubt be the task of such thinking to mobilise the tropes of deconstruction in a future thinking of International Law and its sovereign jurisdiction. Similarly, there cannot be a deconstructive political practice, as that term has been hitherto understood. It is not that deconstruction is inadequate to politics but that the entire political culture of the west is inadequate to deconstruction. A deconstructive political practice must follow an altogether different and as yet unknowable and unpredictable path, which is not to say that it will never come into existence because existence takes place regardless of aporia and no doubt is taking place and has taken place in the absence of a knowledge of the term 'deconstruction.' This then is a further double bind for the would-be deconstructive policy maker, namely that politics and policy is always already in deconstruction and never has the relationship of anteriority or precedence to deconstruction that policy would require of it. Deconstruction presents power with the challenge of unconditionality (hence the clamour to denounce it as overly complex and elitist, the pot calling the kettle black) power responds with the illusion of its own sovereignty but no injustice can last forever.

## A2: Terror DA

#### Their simplification of terrorism perpetuates the harms by oversimplifying a complex event—exploiting fears of future strikes is a self-destructive process that ultimately risks seeking such strikes to justify future violence.

Derrida ‘3  
Jacques, the original postmodernist, Philosophy in a Time of Terror p 107-9

The most terrorist? This question is at once necessary and destined to remain without any answer. Necessary because it takes into account and essential fact: all terrorism presents itself as a response in a situation that continues to escalate. It amounts to saying “I am resorting to terrorism as a last resort, because the other is more terrorist than I am; I am defending myself, counterattacking; the real terrorist, the worst, is the one who will have deprived me of every other means of responding before presenting himself, the first aggressor as a victim.” It is in this way that the United States, Israel, wealthy nations and colonial or imperialist powers are accused of practicing state terrorism and thus of being more terrorist than the terrorist of whom they say they are the victims. The pattern is well known, so I won’t belabor it. But it is difficult to write it off purely and simply, even if it is sometimes applied in a simplistic and abusive fashion. Yet the question you are asking, that of a more or less in terrorism should also not be settled through a purely objectively quantitative logic. For this question can give rise to no such formal evaluation. Terrorist acts try to produce psychic effects (conscious or unconscious) and symbolic or symptomatic relations that might take numerous detours an incalculable number of them, in truth. The quality or intensity of the emotions is provoked (whether conscious or unconscious) is not always proportionate to the number of victims or the amount of damage. In situations and cultures where the media do not spectacularize the event, the killing of thousands of people in a very short period of time might provoke fewer psychic and political effects than the assassination of a single individual in another country, culture, or nation-state with highly developed media resources. And does terrorism have to work only through death? Can’t one terrorize without killing? And does killing necessarily mean putting to death? Isn’t it also a “letting die”? Can’t “letting die”, “not wanting to know that one is letting others die”—hundreds of millions of human beings, from hunger, AIDS, lack of medical treatment, and so on—also be part of a more or less conscious and deliberate terrorist strategy? We are perhaps wrong to assume so quickly that all terrorism is voluntary, sonscious, organized, deliberate, intentionally calculated” there are historical and political situations where terror operates, so to speak as if by itself, as the simple result of some apparatus, because of the relations of force in place, without anyone, any conscious subject, any person any “I”, being really conscious of it or feeling itself responsible for it. All situations of social or national structural oppression produce a terror that is not natural (insofar as it is organized, institutional), and all these situations depend on this terror without those who benefit from them ever organizing terrorist acts or ever being treated as terrorists. The narrow, too narrow meaning commonly given today to the word “terrorism” gets circulated in various ways in the discourse that dominates the public space, and first of all through the technoeconomic power of the media. What would September 11 have been without television? This question has already been asked and explored, so I will not insist on it here. But we must recall that maximum media coverage was in the common interest of the perpetrators of September 11, the terrorist, and those who, in the name of the victims, wanted to declare war on terrorism. Between these two parties, such media coverage was, like the good sense of which Descartes speaks, the most widely shared thing in the world. More than the destruction of the Twin Towers or the attack on the Pentagon, more than the killing of thousands of people the real terrorism consisted of and in fact, began by exposing and exploiting, having exposed and exploited, the image of this terror by the target itself. This target (the United States, let’s say and anyone who supports or is allied with them in the world, and this knows almost no limits today) had it in its own interest (the same interest it shares with its sworn enemies) to expose its vulnerability, to give the greatest possible coverage to the aggression against which it wishes to protect itself. This is again the same autoimmunitary perversion. Or perhaps it would be better to say “pervertibility” so as to name a possibility, a risk, or a threat whose virtuality does not take the form of an evil intention, an evil spirit or a will to do harm. But this virtuality alone is enough to frighten, even terrify. It is the ineradicable root of terror and thus of a terrorism. Implacably. Endlessly. Let me add her e a reminder: there is nothing purely modern in this relation between media and terror, in a terrorism that operates by propagating within the public space images or rumors aimed at terrifying the so called civilian population. It is true, of course, that with radio and television what is called organized propaganda” something that is in fact relatively modern has, in the last century, and already during WWI, played an essential role in “declared” war. It will have gone hand in hand with bombing campaigns (whether conventional or atomic) that could not differentiate between civilian and military any more than the resistance movements and the oppressions of those movements could. It was thus already impossible during the two world wars to distinguish rigorously between war and terrorism.

#### The War on Terrorism is a never ending war against alterity. This infinite war culminates in extinction.

Machowski 2010 (Mattehew http://www.matthewmachowski.com/2010/09/derrida-islam-9-11.html)

The global politics have since become increasingly multipolar, whereas the Western public has grown to be more acutely aware of the world’s cultural and civilisational heterogeneity.[3] But above all, the past nine years have witnessed a momentous return of Islam to the fore of the political discourse. Islam has even been purported to play a more profound role in shaping the twenty-first century Europe than any other major force, including the US, Russia, or even the European Union.[4] Similarly, Derrida argued that the challenge between Islam and the Western democracy is “perhaps the greatest, if not the only, political issue of the future.”[5] Islam, in the post-9/11 world, has numerously been associated with Islamism and terrorism. The contemporary European public discourse is replete with frequent warnings against the ‘Islamic threats’ to our security and culture. Both the recent ‘burka’ controversy in Belgium or France, and the dispute over the constructions of minarets in Switzerland perfectly exemplify the European unwariness with their Muslim population.[6] The Mohammedan faith is meant to become the ‘new threat’ and the new ‘other’ that would supposedly define the European identity by “invoking a kind of societal cold war between Europe and Islam.” This article therefore attempts to deconstruct these ideas and indicate a variety of possible ‘readings’ of Islam through the Derridean philosophy. It is hereby argued that not only does Derrida allow for a new reinterpretation and a clearer, more authentic understanding of Islam as ‘the other’, but also reminds the Muslims of the essential plurality of their religion. Moreover, it enables us to do away with much of the propaganda surrounding the 9/11 and reminds us of two fundamentally crucial human mechanisms, i.e. the act of forgiveness and of hospitality, that will arguably lead to a better more humane future, where Islam and the West will not stand as two distant poles but rather two indispensible, cross-culturally fertilising ingredients of our common civilisation. Providing an answer to the above-stated research question requires a pursuit of a truly Derridean project of deconstructing the main aspects of the discussed problématique. It is argued here that an identification of some of the significant power relations and interests connoted through the concept of the ‘other’, with all its implications for the present-day Islam, will provide for a greater appreciation of the politico-theological characteristics popularly attributed to this religion. This process will also uncover the inherent complexity of the Islamic religious pluralism and its organic links to other Abrahamic religions – Judaism and Christianity; a link so often suppressed. Moreover, the Derridean deconstruction, understood here, after Newman, as a “way of reading texts with the intention of making these texts question themselves,”[7] enables us to stipulate the inherent contradiction between the Islamist pursuit of claiming the Quran’s singularity and its true heterogeneity of meanings.[8] Finally, a deconstruction of the meanings of the 9/11 attacks, its origins, its ‘autoimmunitary nature’, and its significance for the Western media and governmental propaganda of the early 21st century will provide for a more accurate, even if still ambiguous, reading of Islam in the West.

#### Take the position of the other, as any of the nameless victims of the so-called smart bombs, this is the only way to determine ethical action.

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To be virtuous is to give thought to the other, thereby risking the certainty of the self in the openness of absolute existence. To put this in terms of democracy, democratic virtue cannot be presumed to ﬂow from an already constituted subject (the citizen), but must be that which emerges in the event of democracy itself, in the fact of democracy as something freely given. The virtues of democracy cannot be presupposed, but must be discovered in the event itself: in its singular happening as fact. Freedom comes in what is done, in what is enacted in a speciﬁc sense, rather than in the self-evident expression of something dwelling in the citizen. This requires a certain decisiveness, in which the capacity to decide involves the risk of not being as one is; of risking what one is in the contingency of the event. This is not to risk one’s being in the sense that one might not be at all, since being, that is, being-as-existing, is the fact of existence, and hence, that which cannot be avoided. Rather, it means risking the mode in which one is. It means beginning again in the decision to be other than what one is, in the being-with of otherness. The sense of democracy is this discovery of virtue in the decision to be free, which, in today’s globalised world, can only be experienced in terms of having to be won back or resumed from its colonisation by the logic of efﬁciency and calculation