#### Permutation embrace the negative’s epistemological standpoint as a furthering of deconstruction that problematizes status quo epistemology. The friction between the 1AC and 1NC methodologies are able to induce new tropes of political reality via deconstructive juxtaposition.

Spivak ‘97 [an Indian theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, where she is a founding member of the school's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, “Jacques Derrida OF GRAMMATOLOGY” Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” <http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1_3997.pdf>]

Speaking of the hymen, Derrida emphasizes the role of the blank spaces of the page in the play of meaning. Analogically, Derrida himself often devotes his attention to the text in its margins, so to speak. He examines the minute particulars of an undecidable moment, nearly imperceptible displacements, that might otherwise escape the reader’s eye. Reading Foucault, he concentrates on three pages out of 673. Reading Rousseau, he chooses a text that is far from “central.” Reading Heidegger, he proceeds to write a note on a note to Sein and Zeit. His method, as he says to Jean-Louis Houdebine, perhaps a little too formulaically, is reversal and displacement. It is not enough “simply to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics.” We must recognize that, within the familiar philosophical oppositions, there is always “a violent ((lxxvii)) hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first .. . to overthrow [renverser] the hierarchy.” (Pos F 57, Pos E. I. 36) To fight violence with violence. In the Grammatology this structural phase would be represented by all those pages where, all apologies to the contrary, the polemical energy seems clearly engaged in putting writing above speech. But in the next phase of deconstruction, this reversal must be displaced, the winning term put under erasure. The critic must make room for “the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept,’ a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms of the previous regime [system of oppositions].” In terms of our book, this would be the aspect that “allows for the dissonant emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the received order and invading the whole sphere of speech” (Pos E I. 36). To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. Deconstruction in a nutshell. But take away the assurance of the text’s authority, the critic’s control, and the primacy of meaning, and the possession of this formula does not guarantee much. Why should we undo and redo a text at all? Why not assume that words and the author “mean what they say?” It is a complex question. Here let us examine Derrida’s most recent meditation upon the desire of deconstruction. Derrida acknowledges that the desire of deconstruction may itself be-come a desire to reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it “does not know.” And as she deconstructs, all protestations to the contrary, the critic necessarily assumes that she at least, and for the time being, means what she says. Even the declaration of her vulnerability must come, after all, in the controlling language of demonstration and reference. In other words, the critic provisionally forgets that her own text is necessarily self-deconstructed, always already a palimpsest. The desire of deconstruction has also the opposite allure. Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality —by thus “placing in the abyss” (mettre en abîme), as the French expression would literally have it—it shows us the lure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom.Thus a further deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the search for a foundation (the critic behaving as if she means what she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless. The tool for this, as ((lxxviii)) indeed for any deconstruction, is our desire, itself a deconstructive and grammatological structure that forever differs from (we only desire what is not ourselves) and defers (desire is never fulfilled) the text of our selves. Deconstruction can therefore never be a positive science. For we are in a bind, in a “double (read abyssal) bind,” Derrida’s newest nickname for the schizophrenia of the “sous rature.” 81 We must do a thing and its opposite, and indeed we desire to do both, and so on indefinitely. Deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhabited by differance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or deconstructed. Yet the critic provisionally musters the metaphysical resources of criticism and performs what declares itself to be one (unitary) act of deconstruction. As I point out on pages Ixxxi–lxxxii, the kinship with Freud’s interminable and terminable analysis, involving both subject and analyst, is here not to be ignored.

#### Unconditional acceptance of the other is a precondition to any ethics and politics.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 158-159]

The history of the concept reveals that tolerance “is always on the side of the ‘reason of the strongest,”’ firmly tied to the figure of the sov­ereign that Habermas also mentions in our dialogue. From this point of view, being tolerant is not going to make those who feel excluded any more included or understood. This was certainly a blunt statement to make in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, when Western countries were relying on tolerance as their unifying moral commit­ment. While in Derrida’s mind there is no way to overcome the one-sid­edness of tolerance, hospitality is a much more flexible concept. “If I think I am being hospitable because I am tolerant, it is because I wish to limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control over the lim­its of my ‘home,’ my sovereignty, my ‘I can’ (my territory, my house, my language, my culture, my religion, and so on).” Tolerance is “a scruti­nized hospitality, always under surveillance, parsimonious and protec­tive of its sovereignty. In the best of cases, it’s what I would call a con­ditional hospitality, the one that is most commonly practiced by indi­viduals, families, cities, or states.”34 The advantage of hospitality over tolerance is that it lends itself, as forgiveness does, to being posited in the double register of the condi­tional and the unconditional. In fact, tolerance is, for Derrida, condi­tional hospitality. By being tolerant one admits the other under one’s own conditions, and thus under one’s authority, law, and sovereignty. Derrida hopes instead for a new conception of hospitality that is, in a sense, much more tolerant than tolerance. Surprisingly for those who believe that Derrida is a counter-Enlightenment thinker, Kant is his point of reference. Derrida’s articulation of unconditional hospitality hinges on Kant’s distinction between two kinds of rights: right of invi­tation and right of visitation. But pure or unconditional hospitality does not consist in such an invita­tion (“I invite you, I welcome you into my home, on the condition that you adapt to the laws and norms of my territory, according to my lan­guage, tradition, memory, and so on”). Pure and unconditional hospital­ity, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance open to someone who is nei­ther expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other. I would call this a hospitality of visitation rather than invi­tation. The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must not ig­nore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality? As no sense of forgiveness would exist without unconditional forgive­ness, no sense of true hospitality and openness to the other would exist without unconditional hospitality.

#### Doesn’t solve the aff – they posit ethics as conditional. Decision is the utmost ethical responsibility and must be made unconditionally.

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The fact of democracy is the breaching of democracy’s closure in all forms of totalisation and calculation; its openness to the other as absolute. In this case, the democratic relation is not given in advance, but must issue out of a decision that is freely made. We may decide to do something, but the decision itself, in its very act, is that which exceeds all motivation and purpose. Decisions must decide absolutely, where what one decides upon might not be. Decisions are not even reducible to chance or the dice throw, since these presume a state of affairs that can be calculated. Decisions are existential risks, if you like, the risking of the fact that what is, is as it is. Decisions are thus responsibilities that we have in existing, in the face of undecidable otherness. As Derrida puts it, the exposure of undecidability does not mean that we cannot decide; rather that we must decide, but decide on the basis of the undecidability of that about which we decide: ‘if I speak so often of the incalculable and the undecidable it’s not out of a simple predilection for play nor in order to neutralise decision: on the contrary, I believe there is no responsibility, no ethico-political decision, that must not pass through the proofs of the incalculable or the undecidable. Otherwise, everything would be reducible to calculation, program, causality’ (Derrida 1995, 273). The imperative of the decision is not a matter of deciding for something, but of invoking the power to decide as absolutely essential to an existence in such a way that does not immediately surrender it to calculation, prediction and the already decided. To decide in this way (but is there any other way?) is to invoke a power that exceeds self reﬂection, the power of critique as praxis: a way of doing that is itself the very thing that it enacts. 10 As a praxis, freedom enacts itself in the decision to be free. As Nancy puts it, we cannot decide for freedom since we are already free in our capacity to decide (Nancy 1993, 142 ff.). A decision is free insofar as it is a ‘letting being be in its ﬁnite singularity’ (Nancy 1993, 142). As a decision for existence, the decision does not make us good or morally right, but ‘frees us for duty and right, and for the perversion of the one and the other’ (Nancy 1993, 143). 11 It is rendering us capable of morality, rather than an act of being moral. The decision has to be thought in terms other than freedom as a simple self-positing of virtue. How then do we decide if we cannot decide for democracy in the name of freedom?

#### Al-Qaeda is the phantom enemy who must be exterminated, regardless of cost. The callous disregard for ‘collateral damage’ or (human life) along the way is part and parcel of the permanent state of war on terror. The precautionary logic that demands strikes to keep us safe fuels the fires of enemy construction and ensures pre-emptive war.

Erickson 08 (Ericsonwas Professor and Director, Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, Canada, “Risk and the War on Terror”, <http://www.didierbigo.com/students/readings/IPS2011/12/Risk_and_the_War_on_Terror.pdf#page=40>)

Terrorism makes precautionary logic obvious. Following 9/11, political speech in the U.S. took a dramatic turn aimed at making precautionary logic part of everyday life. President Bush hit home in various sound-bites the need to preempt the terrorist threat ‘‘before it fully materializes.’’ His then National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, declared that extraordinary police and military mobilization against terrorism is necessary before the ‘‘smoking gun becomes a mushroom cloud’’ (Janus 2004: 577–8).¶ Investigations of the failure to prevent the events of 9/11 focused on the problems of bureaucracy, communication, and tunnel vision in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CIA, and other security agencies, and stressed the need to exercise the catastrophic imagination as a crucial ingredient of future security. The 9/11 Commission Report (Kean and Hamilton 2004: 339) said the 9/11 attacks reﬂected security agencies’ failure of ‘‘imagination – the lack of organisational capacity to imagine such an attack’’ (see also Salter, this volume). Ironically, it recommended efforts to bureaucratize imagination: ‘‘It is therefore crucial to ﬁnd a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination’’ (ibid: 334). While a bureaucratized imagination seems paradoxical, what is being recommended is the embedding of precautionary logic in the security systems of organizations.¶ In all of their planning, strategies, and practices, security agents are to imagine a kind of sea monster intent on leaving tsunami-like destruction in its wake.¶ Precautionary logic has become central to the U.S. politics of risk and security, feeding into and fed by other features of its political culture. There is a concerted effort to conﬂate the need for preemption at home with preemptive strikes against terrorism abroad. This conﬂation was a key feature of Bush’s strategy in the 2004 presidential election, continuing the post-9/ 11 campaign to simultaneously terrorize the American population into the preemptive policies of homeland security, and populations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East through preemptive attacks.¶ This conﬂation of security at home with aggression abroad is effected through the view that the U.S. is at war with terrorists however deﬁned. The U.S. has long used ‘‘war on’’ metaphors to identify suitable enemies and justify extreme security measures against them: ‘‘the war on crime,’’ ‘‘the war on drugs,’’ even ‘‘the war on poverty’’ when welfarism had a glimmer of hope in the American political culture of the 1960s (see also Simon, this volume). ‘‘The war on terrorism’’ in some respects encapsulates all of these ‘‘war on’’ campaigns because it is not only directed at foreign enemies and global security, but also at enemies within, blurring into preemptive approaches to domestic crime, drugs, welfare fraud, and anything else signifying moral degeneracy (Barak 2005).¶ Agamben (2005) links the pervasiveness of ‘‘war on’’ metaphors in American culture to the fact that the sovereign power of the president is based in declared emergency linked to a state of war.¶ [O]ver the course of the twentieth century the metaphor of war becomes an integral part of the presidential political vocabulary whenever decisions considered to be of vital importance are being imposed. Thus, in 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to assume extraordinary powers to cope with the Great Depression by presenting his actions as those of a commander during a military campaign ... President Bush’s decision to refer to himself constantly as the ‘‘Commander in Chief of the Army’’ after September 11, 2001, must be considered in the context of this presidential claim to sovereign powers in everyday emergency situations. If, as we have seen, the assumption of this title entails a direct reference to the state of exception, then Bush is attempting to produce a situation in which emergency becomes the rule, and the very distinction between peace and war (and between foreign and civil war) becomes impossible. Agamben (2005: 21–2)¶ Richard Clarke, a former member of the U.S. Security Council, even argues that al-Qaeda is a ‘‘phantom enemy’’ manufactured through the precautionary logic of instrumental politicians: ‘‘those with the darkest imaginations become the most powerful’’ (Clarke 2004). Raban (2005: 22) observes there is now ‘‘a world of chronic blur, full of slippery words that mean something different from what they meant before September 2001.’’ It is the blur of a war on everything, envisaged by U.S. military ofﬁcials long before 9/11: In broad terms, fourth generation warfare [involving a nation-state in conﬂict with a non-state actor] seems to be widely dispersed and largely undeﬁned; the distinction will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no deﬁneable battleﬁelds or fronts. The distinction between ‘‘civilian’’ and ‘‘military’’ may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity.

#### **Relations collapsing now—Iran and Syria**

*Zaki* ***Shalom*** *, Yoel* ***Guzansky*** *’14, 1/1, http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/60194*

On December 17, 2013, Mohammed bin Nawaf, the Saudi ambassador to Great Britain, published an exceptionally harsh op-ed in the New York Times about the policy of the Obama administration toward Iran and Syria. Until recently, signs of Saudi dissatisfaction with the administration’s Middle East policy came primarily from reports and news analyses. Of late, however, the Saudi government has become much less cautious about its public criticism of the United States.

Two days before the bin Nawaf article, the New York Times quoted Prince Turki al-Faisal - former Saudi ambassador to the United States and former head of Saudi intelligence - who has a senior unofficial status in the Saudi government, on the collapse of the red lines set by President Obama last year. According to al-Faisal, when the leader of the United States gives an assurance concerning red lines, the kingdom expects him “to stand by it,” particularly as “there is an issue of confidence.” The failure of the international community to stop the war in Syria is “almost a criminal negligence.” The prince referred explicitly to the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, noting that “if the president retreats from his position on compromise along the 1967 borders, as he did on his red line on use of chemical weapons by Assad, then the whole enterprise of peace between the Arabs and Israel will evaporate.”

In his op-ed, bin Nawaf asserts that Saudi Arabia believes that Western policy toward Iran and Syria endangers the stability and security of the Middle East. He notes that “this is a dangerous gamble,” and therefore his country “cannot remain silent, and will not stand idly by.” According to the ambassador, the crisis in Syria continues, with more than 100,000 civilians killed thus far. Even though the international community has made efforts to deprive the murderous regime of Bashar al-Assad of weapons of mass destruction, the West must understand that the regime itself is the greatest source of mass murder: chemical weapons are only a small part of the Assad regime’s killing machine, and while Assad appears to be cooperating with international initiatives to bring the crisis to an end, the regime will in fact continue to work to the best of its ability to prevent a serious solution to the crisis.

#### Nuclear war is a text – its reference is what makes it a threat.

Derrida ’84 Jacques Derrida; Catherine Porter; Philip Lewis, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)” Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism. (Summer, 1984), pp. 20-31

Third reason. In our techno-scientitico-mifitaro-diplomatic incompetence, we may con-sider ourselves, however, as competent as others to deal with a phenomenon whose essen-tial feature is that of being fabulously textual, through and through. Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, Including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it. You will say, perhaps: but it is not the first time; the other wars, too, so long as they hadn't taken place, were only talked about and written about. And as to the fright of imaginary anticipation, what might prove that a European in the period following the war of 1870 might not have been more terrified by the "technological" image of the bombings and exterminations of the Second World War (even supposing he had been able to form such an image) than we are by the image we can construct for ourselves of a nuclear war? The logic of this argument is not devoid of value, especially if one is thinking about a limited and "clean" nuclear war. But it loses its value in the face of the hypothesis of a total nuclear war, which, as a hypothesis, or, if you prefer, as a fantasy, or phantasm, conditions every discourse and all strategies. Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text. At least today apparently. And that sets us to thinking about today, our day, the presence of this present in and through that fabulous textuality. Better than ever and more than ever. The growing multiplication of the discourse— indeed, of the literature — on this subject may constitute a process of fearful domestication, the anticipatory assimilation of that unanticipatable entirely-other. For the moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not occurred; it has exis-tence only through what is said of it, only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm, are inventions. It may also be called a speculation, even a fabulous specularization. The breaking of the mirror would be, finally, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? dreaming of it, desiring it? You will perhaps find it shock-ing to find the nuclear issue reduced to a fable. But then I haven't said simply that. I have recalled that a nuclear war is for the time being a fable, that is, something one can only talk about But who can fail to recognize the massive "reality “ of nuclear weaponry and of the ter- rifying forces of destruction that are being stockpiled and capitalized everywhere, that are corning to constitute the very movement of capitalization. One has to distinguish between this "reality" of the nuclear age and the fiction of war. But, and this would perhaps be the imperative of a nuclear criticism, one must also be careful to interpret critically this critical or diacritical distinction. For the "reality" of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war are perhaps distinct, but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other words the (able) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through al the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human socius today, everything that is named by the old words culture, civilization, aihriung, schofe, pandeia. "Reality," let's say the encom-passing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an event that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at alp, an event of which one can only speak, an event whose advent remains an invention by men (in all the senses of the word "invention") or which, rather, remains to be invented. An invention because it depends upon new technical mechanisms, to be sure, but an invention also because it does not exist and especially because, at whatever point it should come into existence, it would be a grand premiere appearance. Fourth reason. Since we are speaking of fables, of language, of fiction and fantasy, writing and rhetoric, let us go even further. Nuclear war does not depend on language just because we can do nothing but speak of it — and then as something that has never occurred. It does not depend on language just because the "incompetents" on all sides can speak of it only in the mode of gossip or of doxa (opinion) — and the dividing line between doxa and episteme starts to blur as soon as there is no longer any such thing as an absolutely legitimizable competence for a phenomenon which is no longer strictly techno-scientific but techno-miktaro-politico-diplomatic through and through, and which brings into play the doxa or incompetence even in its calculations. There is nothing but doxa, opinion, "belief." One can no longer oppose belief and science, doxa and episteme, once one has reached the decisive place at the nuclear age, in other words, once one has arrived at the critical place of the nuclear age. In this critical place, there is no more room for a distinction between belief and science, thus no more space for a "nuclear criticism" strictly speaking. Nor even for a truth in that sense. No truth, no apocalypse. (As you know. Apocalypse means Revelation, of Truth, Un-veiling.) No, nuclear war is not only fabulous because one can only talk about it, but because the extraordinary sophistication of its technologies—which are also the technologies of delivery, sending, dispatching, of the missile in general, of mission, missive, emission, and transmission, like all techne — the extraordinary sophistication of these technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and the most cursory, the most archaic, the most crudely opinionated psychagogy, the most vulgar psychology. We can therefore consider ourselves competent because the sophistication of the nuclear strategy can never do without a sophistry of belief and the rhetorical simulation of a text.

#### Their scholarship is BS—it’s influenced by profit motive over fact.

Greenwald 12 [Glenn, was named by The Atlantic as one of the 25 most influential political commentators in the nation. He is the recipient of the first annual I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism, and is the winner of the 2010 Online Journalism Association Award for his investigative work on the arrest and oppressive detention of Bradley Manning former Constitutional and civil rights litigator and is the author of three New York Times Bestselling books, Salon AUG 15, 2012 http://www.salon.com/2012/08/15/the\_sham\_terrorism\_expert\_industry/]

Many of the benefits from keeping Terrorism fear levels high are obvious. Private corporations suck up massive amounts of Homeland Security cash as long as that fear persists, while government officials in the National Security and Surveillance State can claim unlimited powers, and operate with unlimited secrecy and no accountability. In sum, the private and public entities that shape government policy and drive political discourse profit far too much in numerous ways to allow rational considerations of the Terror threat. \* \* \* \* \* But there’s a very similar and at least equally important (though far less discussed) constituency deeply vested in the perpetuation of this fear. It’s the sham industry Walt refers to, with appropriate scare quotes, as “terrorism experts,” who have built their careers on fear-mongering over Islamic Terrorism and can stay relevant only if that threat does. These “terrorism experts” form an incredibly incestuous, mutually admiring little clique in and around Washington. They’re employed at think tanks, academic institutions, and media outlets. They can and do have mildly different political ideologies — some are more Republican, some are more Democratic — but, as usual for D.C. cliques, ostensible differences in political views are totally inconsequential when placed next to their common group identity and career interest: namely, sustaining the myth of the Grave Threat of Islamic Terror in order to justify their fear-based careers, the relevance of their circle, and their alleged “expertise.” Like all adolescent, insular cliques, they defend one another reflexively whenever a fellow member is attacked, closing ranks with astonishing speed and loyalty; they take substantive criticisms very personally as attacks on their “friends,” because a criticism of the genre and any member in good standing of this fiefdom is a threat to their collective interests.

#### Their interpretation is an attempt to create pure community but lots of teams fall outside their interpretation. Because of that unbridgeable gap the idea of a community is autoimmune. Turning debate into a community reduces alterity by herding difference making ethics impossible.

Miller ‘9 [J. Hillis Miller, American literary critic, “For Derrida” 2009 Fordham University Press pg. 130-131]

On the next page Derrida claims we would not say we want to belong to the family or community if we really did belong to one or the other: "The desire to belong to any community whatsoever, the desire for be-longing tout court, implies that one does not belong" (TS, z8). This is our happy chance, since my only road to responsible ethical relations to my neighbor, the "wholly other," is by detaching myself from family or com-munity, or by recognizing that I am always already and for good detached, enisled. I must detach myself from the herd, or appropriate my detach-ment, in order to escape the doom of autoimmune self-destruction that always awaits such deconstructible agglomerations. I must come to know that I am detached, and that it's a good thing too. The different concepts of being with represented by Derrida and by all those modern thinkers of being with I began by identifying are incompati-ble. They cannot be synthesized or reconciled. II Put choisir Which do I choose? I wish with all my heart I could believe in Williams's ideal of a happy, classless community or in Hidegger's assumption that Mitsein is a fundamental aspect of being human, but I fear that each man or woman may be an island unto himself or herself, and that real communities are more like the communities of self-destructive autoimmunitv Derrida de-scribes. Certainly the United States these days, if you can dare to think of it as one immense community, is a better example of Derrida's self-destructive autoimmune community than of Williams's community of kindness and mutuality. I claim, moreover, to have confirmed through several examples the tri-ple hypothesis with which I started: (I) that the concept of community, in a given thinker, is consonant with his or her concept of relations between self and other; (2) that you cannot get from Dasein to Mitsein unless you assume from the start that Damn, is Mitsein; (3) that Derrida in his last seminars, almost uniquely among modern philosophers and theorists, af-firms the fundamental and irremediable isolation of each Dasein. For Der-rida, no isthmus, no bridge, no road, no communication or transfer connects or can ever connect my enisled self to other selves. There is no common world. There are only islands. Any community is an artificial, deconstructible, construct fabricated out of words or other signs. Any community, moreover, is self-destructively autoimmunitary to boot. One should not underestimate the consequences of holding that each human being is, throughout his or her lifetime, enisled.

#### Epistemology DA – Western representations of the world normalize colonial practices. A critical examination of state politics creates a starting point to challenge homogenous ways of thinking.

Trofanenko 2k5 Research Chair in Education, Culture and Community @ Acadia University 2k5 Brenda-; On Defense of the Nation; THE SOCIAL STUDIES, 96.5 (2005): 193+; [http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA139957613&v=2.1&u=bingul&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w](http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7cA139957613&v=2.1&u=bingul&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w) Toward a More Global Sense of the Nation

Knowing how history is a site of political struggle, how we engage with social studies education means emphasizing how power, processes, and practices bear tangible effects on forging a national (and common) history by reproducing and vindicating inclusions and exclusions. Such a critique requires questioning how a singular, fixed, and static history celebrates the U.S. nation and its place in the world as that "common base of factual information about the American historical and contemporary experience"(27) argues for in the Fordham report. Our world history courses are central to defining, understanding, and knowing not only other nations but also the position of each nation in relation to the United States. The centrality that the west holds (notably the United States as an imperial power) is ingrained and willful in framing specific representations of the west that normalize the imperial practices that established this nation. The role that the United States holds on the world stage frequently remains unquestioned in social studies classrooms. Certainly, we engage with various images and tropes to continue to advance how the colonialist past continues to remain present in our historical sensibilities. Moreover, the increasing number and choices of archival sources function as a complement to further understanding the nation. If students are left to rely on the variety of historical resources rather than question the use of such resources, then the most likely outcome of their learning will be the reflection on the past with nostalgia that continues to celebrate myths and colonial sensibility. To evaluate the history narrative now is to reconsider what it means and to develop a historical consciousness in our students that goes beyond archival and nostalgic impulses associated with the formation of the nation and U.S. nation building. We need to insist that the nation, and the past that has contributed to its present day understanding, is simultaneously material and symbolic. The nation as advanced in our histories cannot be taken as the foundational grounds. The means by which the nation is fashioned calls for examining the history through which nations are made and unmade. To admit the participatory nature of knowledge and to invite an active and critical engagement with the world so that students can come to question the authority of historical texts will, I hope, result in students' realizing that the classroom is not solely a place to learn about the nation and being a national, but rather a place to develop a common understanding of how a nation is often formed through sameness. We need to continue to question how a particular national history is necessary as an educational function, but especially how that element has been, and remains, useful at specific times. My hope is to extend the current critique of history within social studies, to move toward understanding why history and nation still needs a place in social studies education. In understanding how the historicity of nation serves as "the ideological alibi of the territorial state" (Appadurai 1996, 159) offers us a starting point. The challenge facing social studies educators is how we can succeed in questioning nation, not by displacing it from center stage but by considering how it is central. That means understanding how powerfully engrained the history of a nation is within education and how a significant amount of learning is centered around the nation and its history. History is a forum for assessing and understanding the study of change over time, which shapes the possibilities of knowledge itself. We need to reconsider the mechanisms used in our own teaching, which need to be more than considering history as a nostalgic reminiscence of the time when the nation was formed. We need to be questioning the contexts for learning that can no longer be normalized through history's constituted purpose. The changing political and social contexts of public history have brought new opportunities for educators to work through the tensions facing social studies education and its educational value to teachers and students. Increasing concerns with issues of racism, equality, and the plurality of identities and histories mean that there is no unified knowledge as the result of history, only contested subjects whose multilayered and often contradictory voices and experiences intermingle with partial histories that are presented as unified. This does not represent a problem, but rather an opportunity for genuine productive study, discussion, and learning.

#### No topical version – The one size fits all preordained policy option opposes deconstruction.

Mcquillan 08 (Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

One definition of policy might be that policy is not reading. It is the very opposite of deconstruction, if deconstruction can have opposites. Nothing could be more inimical to the patient and scholarly treading of the texts of the other by Jacques Derrida than the pre-ordained, one-size- fits-all, programme-for-tomorrow ambitions of policy or the relationship implied between the academic and the so-called political process in this arrangement. This is not the same as saying that one cannot or should not have an idea what one might do as a political person with respect to schools and hospitals and foreign wars, given the chance. Rather, I think it is revealing of a certain truth about deconstruction, namely that deconstruction is truly a critical nihilism. By this, I do not mean that is anarchistic or destructive, rather in the Nietzschean sense it is a type of reflection and utterance that requires an effort of intelligence and an exercise of reason as a practical, counter-cultural engagement. I for one would like to see the inauguration of an International Forum for Philosophy and Policy as a deconstructive 'counter'-Think Tank. It might be distinguished from existing organisations by the formula: more think, less tank. It would adopt a relation to policy of intervention rather than a preparation. Not in order to outflank public policy through a strategy of negation and transcendental position taking (or posturing) but in order to provide critical readings of singular events as they arrived misshapen and monstrous in the present. Such open and reflective institutions will be absolutely necessary if the future of thought itself is to stand a chance and if it is to continue to confront power with truth.

#### Unconditional hospitability can never have a political or juridical status but must always be pushed to its limits.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 159-160]

Conditional hospitality, or tolerance, is fundamentally the right of invi­tation and as such lays the conditions for international and cosmopoli­tan conventions. Unconditional hospitality, by contrast, corresponds to the right of visitation. As such, it exposes the host to the maximum risk, as it does not allow for any systematic defense or immunity against the other. Derrida admits that unconditional hospitality cannot have a political or juridical status. States cannot include it in their laws, be­cause hospitality without conditions is irreconcilable with the very idea of a sovereign state. And yet, it is only from the standpoint of uncondi­tional hospitality, or the right of visitation, that we gain a critical per­spective on die limits of cosmopolitan right, tolerance, conditional hospitality, and the right of invitation. I11 his treatise Perpetual Peace, Kant backs the idea of cosmopoli­tan right without the support of a world government. Not only, since World War I, did international institutions operate in line with Kant’s legacy, but this is Derrida’s as well as Habermas’s political dream. However, while Habermas sees it as a program, Derrida understands it as an ideal that can best be pursued by continually having it face its lim­its. For, as we have seen, cosmopolitanism expresses only conditional hospitality, or what Kant calls the right of invitation. For Derrida, the ideal of democracy lies beyond cosmopolitanism and world citizenship, over and beyond the economy of sovereignty, politics, and jurisdiction. Cosmopolitanism applies to a world viewed as cosmos, which since the Greeks means an orderly whole regulated by principles and laws. Even though Derrida explicitly stands by cos­mopolitanism and world citizenry, he feels that commitment to justice cannot be fully exercised within the boundaries of law and cosmopoli­tanism. For justice, as well as democracy, is not just about our conduct within the framework of the state or under the obligations of citizen­ship but also in the face of a stranger. I want to underline that Derrida’s belief that room needs to be left for something located somewhere beyond politics and law, cosmopoli­tanism and world citizenry, is firmly anchored in a formal scheme: the distinction between the conditional and unconditional registers. The conceptual formalism of this gesture allows him to avoid reactionary and nostalgic revivals as well as an essentialist reading of tradition and identity. The quality of what is beyond politics and law is never spelled out in terms of any specific content or value but simply indi­cated as the condition of possibility for what politics and law articu­late.35 As forgiveness in the hands of politics and the juridical domain be­comes a therapy of reconciliation, and hospitality in the hands of cos­mopolitanism becomes the simple right of invitation, justice in the hands of law is reduced to law’s simple enforceability. Applicability, “enforceability,” is not an exterior or secondary possibility that may or may not be added as a supplement to law. It is the force es­sentially implied in the very concept of justice as law (droit), of justice as it becomes droit, of the law as “droit” (for I want to insist right away on reserving the possibility of a justice, indeed of a law that not only exceeds or contradicts “law” (droit) but also, perhaps, has no relation to law, or maintains such a strange relation to it that it may just as well command the “droit” that excludes it). The word enforceability reminds us that there is no such thing as law (droit) that doesn’t imply in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility of being “enforced,” applied by force.36

#### Spectatorship DA – Roleplaying as policymakers upholds a spectator mentality that distances debaters from their content. Debaters are taught to be objective and rational which reifies the contemporary practices of power that maintain oppression.

Reid-Brinkley 2k8 [Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, "THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE"page 15]

Genre Violation Four: Policymaker as Impersonal and the Rhetoric of Personal Experience. Debate is a competitive game. 112 It requires that its participants take on the positions of state actors (at least when they are affirming the resolution). Debate resolutions normally call for federal action in some area of domestic or foreign policy. Affirmative teams must support the resolution, while the negative negates it. The debate then becomes a “laboratory” within which debaters may test policies. 113 Argumentation scholar Gordon Mitchell notes that “Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach students witness argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse to directly participate or alter the course of events.” 114 Although debaters spend a great deal of time discussing and researching government action and articulating arguments relevant to such action, what happens in debate rounds has limited or no real impact on contemporary governmental policy making. And participation does not result in the majority of the debate community engaging in activism around the issues they research. Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.” 115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original). 116 The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policyoriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

#### Political action occurs in critique. Deconstruction instigates political action while holding it to a higher standard of responsibility.

Sokoloff ‘5 [Political Research Quarterly Vol. 58, No. 2 (Jun., 2005) “Between Justice and Legality: Derrida on Decision” William W. Sokoloff pp. 341-352]

Derrida places imperatives of paradox in the heart of the legal order in order to connect political action to a higher conception of responsibility but without abandoning the need for political action today. For Derrida, politics does not happen when one follows a program or when one dreams about an impossible notion of justice but in the non-programmatic interface between justice and legality. His re-conceptualization of decision is a strategy intended to make political decisions more difficult but without abandoning the call for more responsible modes of political action. He prevents us from deciding too quickly but also rules out as irresponsible the deferral of decision. He breaks the unhelpful opposition between premature action and irresponsible indifference in the name of more responsible modes of engagement. Even if I have somewhat arbitrarily brought Derrida and Rawls's work into contact in this essay; Derrida attempts to rescue the word politics from the paralyzing malaise that has resulted from the cramped political imagination and narrow view of citizenship that we can see in Rawls. Signs at the exhaustion of politics are the signs of our time: a narrowing of credible political alternatives that have rendered elections almost irrelevant, the corporate domination of the political sphere that casts an ominous shadow over the voter, the disappearance of substantive dialogue, the gag order on dissent, widespread apathy, dubious unilateral foreign ventures, a crisis in education and health care, public contempt for politicians; and little faith that anything can be done to address this. Interpreted affirmatively, decision is a strategy of political renewal. It creates an extralegal ethical space from which one can launch a permanent critique of the legal order. This permanent critique appears as a spontaneous politics that cannot be represented by a party or a leader. Like Socrates in Apology (Plato 200:3) it is annoying, defiant, and it stings; but unlike him in Crito (Plato 2003) it never passively submits to state power. This spontaneous politics is the scourge of tyrants and their flatterers. As Sheldon Wolin (1996. 37) reminds us, citizenship is more than merely following the rules of a particular legal order; for him, "democracy is born in transgressive acts."