Our affirmation is key to creating a political space for alterity because it engages in a politics of free being.

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A politics of free being (as distinct from a politics of being free) entails both a withdrawal and an afﬁrmation. To be free in free being is not to assert one’s freedom as a right or possession, but to open oneself freely to otherness. To do this, one must proceed, as Nancy writes, by ‘placing the “self” in the position of taking the measure of its existence’ (Nancy 1993, 71). That is, by taking the measure of its existence, one must critically reﬂect on oneself without measure (to measure one’s existence in the strictest sense is to measure it without relating it to anything else; to relate it absolutely). To do this requires a withdrawal from the self (in its self-identity as a democratic self; a self that shares the property of democracy with others) thereby afﬁrming free being (being without relation) as the very chance of democracy. Nancy writes of various modalities of free being, including a certain kind of resistance, but also in terms of the virtues of ‘serenity, grace, forgiveness, or surprises of language, and other still’ (Nancy 1993, 71) that exceed measure (the incommensurable), which are the very measure of what it is ‘to be common’ (Nancy 1993, 72). A politics of free being must therefore be one based on virtue, as I have described it earlier in this paper, understood as the giving, not of what one has, but of what one doesn’t have: free being. To give free being, is to be free by afﬁrming freedom as that which opens being as other; at the same time it is to withdraw from what one is, to resist self-identity. A politics of free being is therefore a praxis that opens the closed spaces of generic democracy through the exercise of common virtues; a praxis which, by its very act, gives birth to democracy in the ‘each time’ of singular events; in the decision to be democratic. As a doing that does what it says, praxis makes political space exist. For political space to exist it cannot be anything but itself (for instance, it cannot be democratic if by being democratic means conforming to some rule or calculation of what it means to be democratic). What political space is, then, is the spacing of being-without-relation (the space of singularities), and hence the giving-sharing of freedom. Political space, as Hannah Arendt has outlined, gives freedom to be in terms of the ‘I-can’, in terms of what is possible; in terms of how one can be in relation to others, thought strictly without relation.

#### Their scholarship is BS—it’s influenced by profit motive over fact.

Greenwald 12 [Glenn, was named by The Atlantic as one of the 25 most influential political commentators in the nation. He is the recipient of the first annual I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism, and is the winner of the 2010 Online Journalism Association Award for his investigative work on the arrest and oppressive detention of Bradley Manning former Constitutional and civil rights litigator and is the author of three New York Times Bestselling books, Salon AUG 15, 2012 http://www.salon.com/2012/08/15/the\_sham\_terrorism\_expert\_industry/]

Many of the benefits from keeping Terrorism fear levels high are obvious. Private corporations suck up massive amounts of Homeland Security cash as long as that fear persists, while government officials in the National Security and Surveillance State can claim unlimited powers, and operate with unlimited secrecy and no accountability. In sum, the private and public entities that shape government policy and drive political discourse profit far too much in numerous ways to allow rational considerations of the Terror threat. \* \* \* \* \* But there’s a very similar and at least equally important (though far less discussed) constituency deeply vested in the perpetuation of this fear. It’s the sham industry Walt refers to, with appropriate scare quotes, as “terrorism experts,” who have built their careers on fear-mongering over Islamic Terrorism and can stay relevant only if that threat does. These “terrorism experts” form an incredibly incestuous, mutually admiring little clique in and around Washington. They’re employed at think tanks, academic institutions, and media outlets. They can and do have mildly different political ideologies — some are more Republican, some are more Democratic — but, as usual for D.C. cliques, ostensible differences in political views are totally inconsequential when placed next to their common group identity and career interest: namely, sustaining the myth of the Grave Threat of Islamic Terror in order to justify their fear-based careers, the relevance of their circle, and their alleged “expertise.” Like all adolescent, insular cliques, they defend one another reflexively whenever a fellow member is attacked, closing ranks with astonishing speed and loyalty; they take substantive criticisms very personally as attacks on their “friends,” because a criticism of the genre and any member in good standing of this fiefdom is a threat to their collective interests.

#### Only by considering the spectral Other can we move towards justice.

Derrida ‘93 [Jacques Derrida, “Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International” 1993 pg.xviii]

If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts, inheritance, and generations, generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others who are not present, nor presently living, either to us, in us, or outside us, it is in the name of justice. of justice where it is not yet, not yet there, where it is no longer, let us understand where it is no longer present, and where it will never be, no more than the law, reducible to laws or rights.3 It is necessary to speak of the ghost, indeed to the ghost and with it, from the moment that no ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does not recognize in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for those others who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born. No justice-let us not say no law and once again we are not speaking here oflaws4-seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism. Without this non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present, without that which secretly unhinges it, without this responsibility and this respect for justice concerning those who are not there, of those who are no longer or who are not yet present and living, what sense would there be to ask the question "where?" "where tomorrow?" "whither?"

#### Their interpretation is an attempt to create pure community but lots of teams fall outside their interpretation. Because of that unbridgeable gap the idea of a community is autoimmune. Turning debate into a community reduces alterity by herding difference making ethics impossible.

Miller ‘9 [J. Hillis Miller, American literary critic, “For Derrida” 2009 Fordham University Press pg. 130-131]

On the next page Derrida claims we would not say we want to belong to the family or community if we really did belong to one or the other: "The desire to belong to any community whatsoever, the desire for be-longing tout court, implies that one does not belong" (TS, z8). This is our happy chance, since my only road to responsible ethical relations to my neighbor, the "wholly other," is by detaching myself from family or com-munity, or by recognizing that I am always already and for good detached, enisled. I must detach myself from the herd, or appropriate my detach-ment, in order to escape the doom of autoimmune self-destruction that always awaits such deconstructible agglomerations. I must come to know that I am detached, and that it's a good thing too. The different concepts of being with represented by Derrida and by all those modern thinkers of being with I began by identifying are incompati-ble. They cannot be synthesized or reconciled. II Put choisir Which do I choose? I wish with all my heart I could believe in Williams's ideal of a happy, classless community or in Hidegger's assumption that Mitsein is a fundamental aspect of being human, but I fear that each man or woman may be an island unto himself or herself, and that real communities are more like the communities of self-destructive autoimmunitv Derrida de-scribes. Certainly the United States these days, if you can dare to think of it as one immense community, is a better example of Derrida's self-destructive autoimmune community than of Williams's community of kindness and mutuality. I claim, moreover, to have confirmed through several examples the tri-ple hypothesis with which I started: (I) that the concept of community, in a given thinker, is consonant with his or her concept of relations between self and other; (2) that you cannot get from Dasein to Mitsein unless you assume from the start that Damn, is Mitsein; (3) that Derrida in his last seminars, almost uniquely among modern philosophers and theorists, af-firms the fundamental and irremediable isolation of each Dasein. For Der-rida, no isthmus, no bridge, no road, no communication or transfer connects or can ever connect my enisled self to other selves. There is no common world. There are only islands. Any community is an artificial, deconstructible, construct fabricated out of words or other signs. Any community, moreover, is self-destructively autoimmunitary to boot. One should not underestimate the consequences of holding that each human being is, throughout his or her lifetime, enisled.

#### Justice outweighs the small risk of the limits disad – Any condition imposed onto accepting the Other lends itself to a politics of tolerance and scrutinized hospitality. Unconditional acceptance of the other is a precondition to any ethics and politics.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 158-159]

The history of the concept reveals that tolerance “is always on the side of the ‘reason of the strongest,”’ firmly tied to the figure of the sov­ereign that Habermas also mentions in our dialogue. From this point of view, being tolerant is not going to make those who feel excluded any more included or understood. This was certainly a blunt statement to make in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, when Western countries were relying on tolerance as their unifying moral commit­ment. While in Derrida’s mind there is no way to overcome the one-sid­edness of tolerance, hospitality is a much more flexible concept. “If I think I am being hospitable because I am tolerant, it is because I wish to limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control over the lim­its of my ‘home,’ my sovereignty, my ‘I can’ (my territory, my house, my language, my culture, my religion, and so on).” Tolerance is “a scruti­nized hospitality, always under surveillance, parsimonious and protec­tive of its sovereignty. In the best of cases, it’s what I would call a con­ditional hospitality, the one that is most commonly practiced by indi­viduals, families, cities, or states.”34 The advantage of hospitality over tolerance is that it lends itself, as forgiveness does, to being posited in the double register of the condi­tional and the unconditional. In fact, tolerance is, for Derrida, condi­tional hospitality. By being tolerant one admits the other under one’s own conditions, and thus under one’s authority, law, and sovereignty. Derrida hopes instead for a new conception of hospitality that is, in a sense, much more tolerant than tolerance. Surprisingly for those who believe that Derrida is a counter-Enlightenment thinker, Kant is his point of reference. Derrida’s articulation of unconditional hospitality hinges on Kant’s distinction between two kinds of rights: right of invi­tation and right of visitation. But pure or unconditional hospitality does not consist in such an invita­tion (“I invite you, I welcome you into my home, on the condition that you adapt to the laws and norms of my territory, according to my lan­guage, tradition, memory, and so on”). Pure and unconditional hospital­ity, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance open to someone who is nei­ther expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other. I would call this a hospitality of visitation rather than invi­tation. The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must not ig­nore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality? As no sense of forgiveness would exist without unconditional forgive­ness, no sense of true hospitality and openness to the other would exist without unconditional hospitality.

#### Epistemology DA – Western representations of the world normalize colonial practices. A critical examination of state politics creates a starting point to challenge homogenous ways of thinking.

Trofanenko 2k5 Research Chair in Education, Culture and Community @ Acadia University 2k5 Brenda-; On Defense of the Nation; THE SOCIAL STUDIES, 96.5 (2005): 193+; [http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA139957613&v=2.1&u=bingul&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w](http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7cA139957613&v=2.1&u=bingul&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w) Toward a More Global Sense of the Nation

Knowing how history is a site of political struggle, how we engage with social studies education means emphasizing how power, processes, and practices bear tangible effects on forging a national (and common) history by reproducing and vindicating inclusions and exclusions. Such a critique requires questioning how a singular, fixed, and static history celebrates the U.S. nation and its place in the world as that "common base of factual information about the American historical and contemporary experience"(27) argues for in the Fordham report. Our world history courses are central to defining, understanding, and knowing not only other nations but also the position of each nation in relation to the United States. The centrality that the west holds (notably the United States as an imperial power) is ingrained and willful in framing specific representations of the west that normalize the imperial practices that established this nation. The role that the United States holds on the world stage frequently remains unquestioned in social studies classrooms. Certainly, we engage with various images and tropes to continue to advance how the colonialist past continues to remain present in our historical sensibilities. Moreover, the increasing number and choices of archival sources function as a complement to further understanding the nation. If students are left to rely on the variety of historical resources rather than question the use of such resources, then the most likely outcome of their learning will be the reflection on the past with nostalgia that continues to celebrate myths and colonial sensibility. To evaluate the history narrative now is to reconsider what it means and to develop a historical consciousness in our students that goes beyond archival and nostalgic impulses associated with the formation of the nation and U.S. nation building. We need to insist that the nation, and the past that has contributed to its present day understanding, is simultaneously material and symbolic. The nation as advanced in our histories cannot be taken as the foundational grounds. The means by which the nation is fashioned calls for examining the history through which nations are made and unmade. To admit the participatory nature of knowledge and to invite an active and critical engagement with the world so that students can come to question the authority of historical texts will, I hope, result in students' realizing that the classroom is not solely a place to learn about the nation and being a national, but rather a place to develop a common understanding of how a nation is often formed through sameness. We need to continue to question how a particular national history is necessary as an educational function, but especially how that element has been, and remains, useful at specific times. My hope is to extend the current critique of history within social studies, to move toward understanding why history and nation still needs a place in social studies education. In understanding how the historicity of nation serves as "the ideological alibi of the territorial state" (Appadurai 1996, 159) offers us a starting point. The challenge facing social studies educators is how we can succeed in questioning nation, not by displacing it from center stage but by considering how it is central. That means understanding how powerfully engrained the history of a nation is within education and how a significant amount of learning is centered around the nation and its history. History is a forum for assessing and understanding the study of change over time, which shapes the possibilities of knowledge itself. We need to reconsider the mechanisms used in our own teaching, which need to be more than considering history as a nostalgic reminiscence of the time when the nation was formed. We need to be questioning the contexts for learning that can no longer be normalized through history's constituted purpose. The changing political and social contexts of public history have brought new opportunities for educators to work through the tensions facing social studies education and its educational value to teachers and students. Increasing concerns with issues of racism, equality, and the plurality of identities and histories mean that there is no unified knowledge as the result of history, only contested subjects whose multilayered and often contradictory voices and experiences intermingle with partial histories that are presented as unified. This does not represent a problem, but rather an opportunity for genuine productive study, discussion, and learning.

#### Political action occurs in critique. Deconstruction instigates political action while holding it to a higher standard of responsibility.

Sokoloff ‘5 [Political Research Quarterly Vol. 58, No. 2 (Jun., 2005) “Between Justice and Legality: Derrida on Decision” William W. Sokoloff pp. 341-352]

Derrida places imperatives of paradox in the heart of the legal order in order to connect political action to a higher conception of responsibility but without abandoning the need for political action today. For Derrida, politics does not happen when one follows a program or when one dreams about an impossible notion of justice but in the non-programmatic interface between justice and legality. His re-conceptualization of decision is a strategy intended to make political decisions more difficult but without abandoning the call for more responsible modes of political action. He prevents us from deciding too quickly but also rules out as irresponsible the deferral of decision. He breaks the unhelpful opposition between premature action and irresponsible indifference in the name of more responsible modes of engagement. Even if I have somewhat arbitrarily brought Derrida and Rawls's work into contact in this essay; Derrida attempts to rescue the word politics from the paralyzing malaise that has resulted from the cramped political imagination and narrow view of citizenship that we can see in Rawls. Signs at the exhaustion of politics are the signs of our time: a narrowing of credible political alternatives that have rendered elections almost irrelevant, the corporate domination of the political sphere that casts an ominous shadow over the voter, the disappearance of substantive dialogue, the gag order on dissent, widespread apathy, dubious unilateral foreign ventures, a crisis in education and health care, public contempt for politicians; and little faith that anything can be done to address this. Interpreted affirmatively, decision is a strategy of political renewal. It creates an extralegal ethical space from which one can launch a permanent critique of the legal order. This permanent critique appears as a spontaneous politics that cannot be represented by a party or a leader. Like Socrates in Apology (Plato 200:3) it is annoying, defiant, and it stings; but unlike him in Crito (Plato 2003) it never passively submits to state power. This spontaneous politics is the scourge of tyrants and their flatterers. As Sheldon Wolin (1996. 37) reminds us, citizenship is more than merely following the rules of a particular legal order; for him, "democracy is born in transgressive acts."

#### No topical version – Deconstruction is the opposite of policy.

Mcquillan 08 (Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

One definition of policy might be that policy is not reading. It is the very opposite of deconstruction, if deconstruction can have opposites. Nothing could be more inimical to the patient and scholarly treading of the texts of the other by Jacques Derrida than the pre-ordained, one-size- fits-all, programme-for-tomorrow ambitions of policy or the relationship implied between the academic and the so-called political process in this arrangement. This is not the same as saying that one cannot or should not have an idea what one might do as a political person with respect to schools and hospitals and foreign wars, given the chance. Rather, I think it is revealing of a certain truth about deconstruction, namely that deconstruction is truly a critical nihilism. By this, I do not mean that is anarchistic or destructive, rather in the Nietzschean sense it is a type of reflection and utterance that requires an effort of intelligence and an exercise of reason as a practical, counter-cultural engagement. I for one would like to see the inauguration of an International Forum for Philosophy and Policy as a deconstructive 'counter'-Think Tank. It might be distinguished from existing organisations by the formula: more think, less tank. It would adopt a relation to policy of intervention rather than a preparation. Not in order to outflank public policy through a strategy of negation and transcendental position taking (or posturing) but in order to provide critical readings of singular events as they arrived misshapen and monstrous in the present. Such open and reflective institutions will be absolutely necessary if the future of thought itself is to stand a chance and if it is to continue to confront power with truth.