#### Justice towards the other is the only non-deconstructable impact. Justice is the foremost concern for the policymaker, to pay respect to the otherness of the other.

Mcquillan 08 (Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

Again to be for Justice is to be in favour of breathing and given the way that this term is routinely abused and appropriated it is no doubt necessary to take care around this word. However, Derrida is moved to tell us that 'justice is the undeconstructable condition of any deconstruction' (Derrida 1994, 28). This is a syntagm with which I have wrestled for some time, given that any metaphysical concept can in principle be deconstructed and that 'justice' is surely a metaphysical concept politically and philosophically inscribed. To be too hasty in my commentary, the notion of justice that Derrida is invoking here is of course catachrestic and quasi-transcendental, whereby the idea of 'justice' refers to the act of deconstruction which does justice to the otherness of the event by enabling that otherness to speak, the undeconstructable (irreducible) condition of any deconstruction would be to articulate such otherness. The present importance of this is that in doing justice to policy one must take account of the difficulty of what is referred to by Derrida by the twin names of the 'undecideablity' and 'responsibility' of such an event. One the one hand, the policy maker should take account of the injustice of his/her own policy formation, which as a textual inscription, will inevitably fail to do justice to the possibilities of otherness within itself and will simultaneously and constantly be in the process of disarticulating itself from within as a consequence of this otherness, rendering itself unstable and radically undecideable. Taking account of this scenario will require the self-aware policy maker to act responsibly with respect to the task of policy making by taking time to reflect judiciously on the event of alterity (which will be forever undecideable) and at the same time acting responsibly with the respect to the other by doing justice to that other and acting quickly (or formulating policy quickly) which will respond to the immediate urgency in the here and now of the needs of the other. This is to say, once again that policy, properly understood, is beginning to look more and more like an untenable prospect from a "deconstructive" point of view. Some would say that it would be entirely typical of 'the Derrida Party' to have a policy of having no policies. However, this would be a crude reduction. I think the more considerable difficulty here is that it may not be possible for deconstruction ever to produce an inaugural or generative political discourse outside of an act of reading or critical intervention. From the point of view of a faithfulness to a certain manner of reading the world, there could be no political discourse worthy of the name of deconstruction which was generated outside of or anterior to a singular act of 'reading' a unique event. This is not to say that deconstruction would be for ever condemned to read and reread the texts of the political canon as a route to articulating the alterity repressed within them by the logocentric model of western political discourse (as if this were merely or simply a secondary, supplementary or weaker task than, say, policy making). Rather, with the reading (as critical intervention) of singular events comes the requirement to affirm a position with respect to that event and in so doing negotiate between that necessarily material and institutional position (counter-institutions are also institutions) and the risk to that position incurred by the affirmation of the unpredictable effects of otherness. Every policy then needs to be open to the risk of its own deconstruction by the very political conditions it puts in play. It is of course not the role of deconstruction to offer reassuring and easily appropriable policies to policy-makers. However, risk and policy are uneasy companions; we live in an age of 'risk management', in which policies are formulated to predict the unpredictable consequences of risk. Risk can be neutralised by techne, such is the dream of the death cult of contemporary managerialism.

Our affirmation is key to creating a political space for alterity because it engages in a politics of free being.

Mules Senior Lecturer in Cultural Studies at Central Queensland University and Adjunct Senior Lecturer in the School of English, Media Studies and Art History, The University of Queensland 2010 Warwick Derrida Today 3.1 http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3366/drt.2010.0007

A politics of free being (as distinct from a politics of being free) entails both a withdrawal and an afﬁrmation. To be free in free being is not to assert one’s freedom as a right or possession, but to open oneself freely to otherness. To do this, one must proceed, as Nancy writes, by ‘placing the “self” in the position of taking the measure of its existence’ (Nancy 1993, 71). That is, by taking the measure of its existence, one must critically reﬂect on oneself without measure (to measure one’s existence in the strictest sense is to measure it without relating it to anything else; to relate it absolutely). To do this requires a withdrawal from the self (in its self-identity as a democratic self; a self that shares the property of democracy with others) thereby afﬁrming free being (being without relation) as the very chance of democracy. Nancy writes of various modalities of free being, including a certain kind of resistance, but also in terms of the virtues of ‘serenity, grace, forgiveness, or surprises of language, and other still’ (Nancy 1993, 71) that exceed measure (the incommensurable), which are the very measure of what it is ‘to be common’ (Nancy 1993, 72). A politics of free being must therefore be one based on virtue, as I have described it earlier in this paper, understood as the giving, not of what one has, but of what one doesn’t have: free being. To give free being, is to be free by afﬁrming freedom as that which opens being as other; at the same time it is to withdraw from what one is, to resist self-identity. A politics of free being is therefore a praxis that opens the closed spaces of generic democracy through the exercise of common virtues; a praxis which, by its very act, gives birth to democracy in the ‘each time’ of singular events; in the decision to be democratic. As a doing that does what it says, praxis makes political space exist. For political space to exist it cannot be anything but itself (for instance, it cannot be democratic if by being democratic means conforming to some rule or calculation of what it means to be democratic). What political space is, then, is the spacing of being-without-relation (the space of singularities), and hence the giving-sharing of freedom. Political space, as Hannah Arendt has outlined, gives freedom to be in terms of the ‘I-can’, in terms of what is possible; in terms of how one can be in relation to others, thought strictly without relation.

#### Their scholarship is BS—it’s influenced by profit motive over fact.

Greenwald 12 [Glenn, was named by The Atlantic as one of the 25 most influential political commentators in the nation. He is the recipient of the first annual I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism, and is the winner of the 2010 Online Journalism Association Award for his investigative work on the arrest and oppressive detention of Bradley Manning former Constitutional and civil rights litigator and is the author of three New York Times Bestselling books, Salon AUG 15, 2012 http://www.salon.com/2012/08/15/the\_sham\_terrorism\_expert\_industry/]

Many of the benefits from keeping Terrorism fear levels high are obvious. Private corporations suck up massive amounts of Homeland Security cash as long as that fear persists, while government officials in the National Security and Surveillance State can claim unlimited powers, and operate with unlimited secrecy and no accountability. In sum, the private and public entities that shape government policy and drive political discourse profit far too much in numerous ways to allow rational considerations of the Terror threat. \* \* \* \* \* But there’s a very similar and at least equally important (though far less discussed) constituency deeply vested in the perpetuation of this fear. It’s the sham industry Walt refers to, with appropriate scare quotes, as “terrorism experts,” who have built their careers on fear-mongering over Islamic Terrorism and can stay relevant only if that threat does. These “terrorism experts” form an incredibly incestuous, mutually admiring little clique in and around Washington. They’re employed at think tanks, academic institutions, and media outlets. They can and do have mildly different political ideologies — some are more Republican, some are more Democratic — but, as usual for D.C. cliques, ostensible differences in political views are totally inconsequential when placed next to their common group identity and career interest: namely, sustaining the myth of the Grave Threat of Islamic Terror in order to justify their fear-based careers, the relevance of their circle, and their alleged “expertise.” Like all adolescent, insular cliques, they defend one another reflexively whenever a fellow member is attacked, closing ranks with astonishing speed and loyalty; they take substantive criticisms very personally as attacks on their “friends,” because a criticism of the genre and any member in good standing of this fiefdom is a threat to their collective interests.

#### TKs cause more terrorism—Hydra effect and local backlash

Gabriella Blum 10, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and Philip Heymann, the James Barr Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, June 27, 2010, “Law and Policy of Targeted Killing,” Harvard National Security Journal, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol-1\_Blum-Heymann\_Final.pdf

An immediate consequence of eliminating leaders of terrorist organizations will sometimes be what may be called the Hydra effect, the rise of more—and more resolute—leaders to replace them. The decapitating of the organization may also invite retaliation by the other members and followers of the organization. Thus, when Israel assassinated Abbas Mussawi, Hezbollah‘s leader in Lebanon, in 1992, a more charismatic and successful leader, Hassan Nassrallah, succeeded Mussawi. The armed group then avenged the assassination of its former leader in two separate attacks, blowing up Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires, killing over a hundred people and injuring hundreds more. Targeted killing may also interfere with important gathering of critical intelligence. The threat of being targeted will drive current leaders into hiding, making the monitoring of their movements and activities by the counterterrorist forces more difficult. Moreover, if these leaders are found and killed, instead of captured, the counterterrorism forces lose the ability to interrogate them to obtain potentially valuable information about plans, capabilities, or organizational structure. The political message flowing from the use of targeted killings may be harmful to the attacking country’s interest, as it emphasizes the disparity in power between the parties and reinforces popular support for the terrorists, who are seen as a David fighting Goliath. Moreover, by resorting to military force rather than to law enforcement, targeted killings might strengthen the sense of legitimacy of terrorist operations, which are sometimes viewed as the only viable option for the weak to fight against a powerful empire. If collateral damage to civilians accompanies targeted killings, this, too, may bolster support for what seems like the just cause of the terrorists, at the same time as it weakens domestic support for fighting the terrorists. When targeted killing operations are conducted on foreign territory, they run the risk of heightening international tensions between the targeting government and the government in whose territory the operation is conducted. Israel’s relations with Jordan became dangerously strained following the failed attempt in September 1997 in Jordan to assassinate Khaled Mashaal, the leader of Hamas. Indeed, international relations may suffer even where the local government acquiesces in the operation, but the operation fails or harms innocent civilians, bringing the local government under political attack from domestic constituencies (recall the failed attack in Pakistan on Al-Zawahiri that left eighteen civilians dead). Even if there is no collateral damage, targeted killings in another country’s territory threatens to draw criticism from local domestic constituencies against the government, which either acquiesced or was too weak to stop the operation in its territory. Such is the case now in both Pakistan and Yemen, where opposition forces criticize the governments for permitting American armed intervention in their countries. The aggression of targeted killings also runs the risk of spiraling hatred and violence, numbing both sides to the effects of killing and thus continuing the cycle of violence. Each attack invites revenge, each revenge invites further retaliation. Innocent civilians suffer whether they are the intended target of attack or its unintentional collateral consequences. Last but not least, exceptional measures tend to exceed their logic. As in the case of extraordinary detention or interrogation methods, there is a danger of over-using targeted killings, both within and outside of the war on terrorism. A particular danger in this context arises as the killing of a terrorist often proves a simpler operation than protracted legal battles over detention, trial, extradition, and release.

#### Decapitation strategies fail—organizational structures.

Cronin ’13 Audrey Cronin, Professor at the US National War College and Senior Research Fellow at Oxford University, Foreign Affairs 92.4, Jul/Aug 2013, “Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy”, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1411622618 //jchen

AL QAEDA's RESILIENCE At least since 9/11, the United States has sought the end of al Qaeda-not just to set it back tactically, as drones have surely done, but also to defeat the group completely. Terrorist organizations can meet their demise in a variety of ways, and the killing of their leaders is certainly one of them. Abu Sayyaf, an Islamist separatist group in the Philippines, lost its political focus, split into factions, and became a petty criminal organization after the army killed its leaders in 2006 and 2007. In other cases, however, including those of the Shining Path in Peru and Action Directe in France, the humiliating arrest of a leader has been more effective. By capturing a terrorist leader, countries can avoid creating a martyr, win access to a storehouse of intelligence, and discredit a popular cause. Despite the Obama administration's recent calls for limits on drone strikes, Washington is still using them to try to defeat al Qaeda by killing off its leadership. But the terrorist groups that have been destroyed through decapitation looked nothing like al Qaeda: they were hierarchically structured, characterized by a cult of personality, and less than ten years old, and they lacked a clear succession plan. Al Qaeda, by contrast, is a resilient, 25-year-old organization with a broad network of outposts. The group was never singularly dependent on Osama bin Laden's leadership, and it has proved adept at replacing dead operatives. Drones have inflicted real damage on the organization, of course. In Pakistan, the approximately 350 strikes since 2004 have cut the number of core al Qaeda members in the tribal areas by about 75 percent, to roughly 50-100, a powerful answer to the 2001 attacks they planned and orchestrated nearby. As al Qaeda's center of gravity has shifted away from Pakistan to Yemen and North Africa, drone strikes have followed the terrorists. In September 2011, Michael Vickers, the U.S. undersecretary of defense for intelligence, estimated that there were maybe four key al Qaeda leaders remaining in Pakistan and about ten or 20 leaders overall in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Drones have also driven down the overall level of violence in the areas they have hit. The political scientists Patrick Johnston and Anoop Sarbahi recently found that drone strikes in northwestern Pakistan from 2007 to 2011 resulted in a decrease in the number and lethality of militant attacks in the tribal areas where they were conducted. Such strikes often lead militants simply to go somewhere else, but that can have value in and of itself. Indeed, the drone threat has forced al Qaeda operatives and their associates to change their behavior, keeping them preoccupied with survival and hindering their ability to move, plan operations, and carry them out. The fighters have proved remarkably adaptable: a document found leftbehind in February 2013 by Islamist fighters fleeing Mali detailed 22 tips for avoiding drone attacks, including using trees as cover, placing dolls and statues outside to mislead aerial intelligence, and covering vehicles with straw mats. Nonetheless, the prospect of living under the threat of instant death from above has made recruitment more difficult and kept operatives from establishing close ties to local civilians, who fear they might also be killed. But the benefits end there, and there are many reasons to believe that drone strikes are undermining Washington's goal of destroying al Qaeda. Targeted killings have not thwarted the group's ability to replace dead leaders with new ones. Nor have they undermined its propaganda efforts or recruitment. Even if al Qaeda has become less lethal and efficient, its public relations campaigns still allow it to reach potential supporters, threaten potential victims, and project strength. If al Qaeda's ability to perpetuate its message continues, then the killing of its members will not further the long-term goal of ending the group. Not only has al Qaeda's propaganda continued uninterrupted by the drone strikes; it has been significantly enhanced by them. As Sahab (The Clouds), the propaganda branch of al Qaeda, has been able to attract recruits and resources by broadcasting footage of drone strikes, portraying them as indiscriminate violence against Muslims. Al Qaeda uses the strikes that result in civilian deaths, and even those that don't, to frame Americans as immoral bullies who care less about ordinary people than al Qaeda does. And As Sahab regularly casts the leaders who are killed by drones as martyrs. It is easy enough to kill an individual terrorist with a drone strike, but the organization's Internet presence lives on.

#### 11—Counternarratives to violence will end terrorism—stopping strikes necessary to solve.

Williams 10/10/13, Carol J. Williams, foreign correspondent for the LA times, LA Times, Pulitzer finalist for reporting, 18 years abroad for the new York times, BA from UWashington, “How the West can fight terrorism without provoking more of it,” <http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-west-fighting-terrorism-20131009,0,7702284.story>

"The more we make it a one-on-one fight [with the United States], the more likely they are to come back at us," she said of foreign-based terrorist groups. She pointed to U.S.-orchestrated operations against the Yemeni group Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, thought to have spurred several attempted attacks on U.S. targets, including the failed 2010 plot to bomb New York's Times Square. Seth Jones, a former planning officer with U.S. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan now teaching at Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies, agrees that Washington needs to be wary of intervening in regional disputes that make the United States a target for retaliation. Northern and Eastern Africa are awash with militant groups taking advantage of internal uprisings, weak governments and sectarian divisions, he said. "These operations are more decentralized than we've ever seen. The command and control mode in Pakistan has been severely weakened and there is a lot more autonomy in the local groups," Jones said. "I think the United States has got to be careful, as these groups are not targeting the U.S. homeland." To keep foreign counter-terrorism at arm's length, the United States needs to build up security forces in friendly countries through "soft partnering," Jones said. He referred to the benefit of training, arming and even accompanying foreign police or troops to a target but leaving it to the locals to "pull the trigger." Ed Husain, senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, says moderate Muslim organizations committed to countering the hostile message of Islamic extremists are proliferating in the United States and Europe. They are using social media to challenge conspiracy theories and the militants' narrative that Muslims are victims of the West, he said. He proposes a coordinated worldwide effort to build on the State Department's [Global Counterterrorism Forum](http://www.state.gov/j/ct/gctf/) aiming to change hearts and minds to defeat radical Islam. "Done properly," Husain insisted in an [essay](http://www.cfr.org/radicalization-and-extremism/global-venture-counter-violent-extremism/p30494) last month, "within eight to 10 years Al Qaeda's theology and ideology can become as unattractive among young Muslims as communism became to East Germans."

#### Permutation do both – The friction between the 1AC and 1NC methodologies are able to induce new tropes of political reality via deconstructive juxtaposition.

Spivak ‘97 [an Indian theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, where she is a founding member of the school's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, “Jacques Derrida OF GRAMMATOLOGY” Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” <http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1_3997.pdf>]

Speaking of the hymen, Derrida emphasizes the role of the blank spaces of the page in the play of meaning. Analogically, Derrida himself often devotes his attention to the text in its margins, so to speak. He examines the minute particulars of an undecidable moment, nearly imperceptible displacements, that might otherwise escape the reader’s eye. Reading Foucault, he concentrates on three pages out of 673. Reading Rousseau, he chooses a text that is far from “central.” Reading Heidegger, he proceeds to write a note on a note to Sein and Zeit. His method, as he says to Jean-Louis Houdebine, perhaps a little too formulaically, is reversal and displacement. It is not enough “simply to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics.” We must recognize that, within the familiar philosophical oppositions, there is always “a violent ((lxxvii)) hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first .. . to overthrow [renverser] the hierarchy.” (Pos F 57, Pos E. I. 36) To fight violence with violence. In the Grammatology this structural phase would be represented by all those pages where, all apologies to the contrary, the polemical energy seems clearly engaged in putting writing above speech. But in the next phase of deconstruction, this reversal must be displaced, the winning term put under erasure. The critic must make room for “the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept,’ a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms of the previous regime [system of oppositions].” In terms of our book, this would be the aspect that “allows for the dissonant emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the received order and invading the whole sphere of speech” (Pos E I. 36). To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. Deconstruction in a nutshell. But take away the assurance of the text’s authority, the critic’s control, and the primacy of meaning, and the possession of this formula does not guarantee much. Why should we undo and redo a text at all? Why not assume that words and the author “mean what they say?” It is a complex question. Here let us examine Derrida’s most recent meditation upon the desire of deconstruction. Derrida acknowledges that the desire of deconstruction may itself be-come a desire to reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it “does not know.” And as she deconstructs, all protestations to the contrary, the critic necessarily assumes that she at least, and for the time being, means what she says. Even the declaration of her vulnerability must come, after all, in the controlling language of demonstration and reference. In other words, the critic provisionally forgets that her own text is necessarily self-deconstructed, always already a palimpsest. The desire of deconstruction has also the opposite allure. Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality —by thus “placing in the abyss” (mettre en abîme), as the French expression would literally have it—it shows us the lure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom.Thus a further deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the search for a foundation (the critic behaving as if she means what she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless. The tool for this, as ((lxxviii)) indeed for any deconstruction, is our desire, itself a deconstructive and grammatological structure that forever differs from (we only desire what is not ourselves) and defers (desire is never fulfilled) the text of our selves. Deconstruction can therefore never be a positive science. For we are in a bind, in a “double (read abyssal) bind,” Derrida’s newest nickname for the schizophrenia of the “sous rature.” 81 We must do a thing and its opposite, and indeed we desire to do both, and so on indefinitely. Deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhabited by differance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or deconstructed. Yet the critic provisionally musters the metaphysical resources of criticism and performs what declares itself to be one (unitary) act of deconstruction. As I point out on pages Ixxxi–lxxxii, the kinship with Freud’s interminable and terminable analysis, involving both subject and analyst, is here not to be ignored.

#### Doesn’t solve the aff – Any precondition imposed onto accepting the Other lends itself to a politics of tolerance and scrutinized hospitality.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 158-159]

The history of the concept reveals that tolerance “is always on the side of the ‘reason of the strongest,”’ firmly tied to the figure of the sov­ereign that Habermas also mentions in our dialogue. From this point of view, being tolerant is not going to make those who feel excluded any more included or understood. This was certainly a blunt statement to make in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, when Western countries were relying on tolerance as their unifying moral commit­ment. While in Derrida’s mind there is no way to overcome the one-sid­edness of tolerance, hospitality is a much more flexible concept. “If I think I am being hospitable because I am tolerant, it is because I wish to limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control over the lim­its of my ‘home,’ my sovereignty, my ‘I can’ (my territory, my house, my language, my culture, my religion, and so on).” Tolerance is “a scruti­nized hospitality, always under surveillance, parsimonious and protec­tive of its sovereignty. In the best of cases, it’s what I would call a con­ditional hospitality, the one that is most commonly practiced by indi­viduals, families, cities, or states.”34 The advantage of hospitality over tolerance is that it lends itself, as forgiveness does, to being posited in the double register of the condi­tional and the unconditional. In fact, tolerance is, for Derrida, condi­tional hospitality. By being tolerant one admits the other under one’s own conditions, and thus under one’s authority, law, and sovereignty. Derrida hopes instead for a new conception of hospitality that is, in a sense, much more tolerant than tolerance. Surprisingly for those who believe that Derrida is a counter-Enlightenment thinker, Kant is his point of reference. Derrida’s articulation of unconditional hospitality hinges on Kant’s distinction between two kinds of rights: right of invi­tation and right of visitation. But pure or unconditional hospitality does not consist in such an invita­tion (“I invite you, I welcome you into my home, on the condition that you adapt to the laws and norms of my territory, according to my lan­guage, tradition, memory, and so on”). Pure and unconditional hospital­ity, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance open to someone who is nei­ther expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other. I would call this a hospitality of visitation rather than invi­tation. The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must not ig­nore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality? As no sense of forgiveness would exist without unconditional forgive­ness, no sense of true hospitality and openness to the other would exist without unconditional hospitality.

#### Doesn’t solve the aff – they posit ethics as conditional. Decision is the utmost ethical responsibility and must be made unconditionally.

Mules ‘10 Senior Lecturer in Cultural Studies at Central Queensland University and Adjunct Senior Lecturer in the School of English, Media Studies and Art History, The University of Queensland 2010 Warwick Derrida Today 3.1 http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3366/drt.2010.0007

The fact of democracy is the breaching of democracy’s closure in all forms of totalisation and calculation; its openness to the other as absolute. In this case, the democratic relation is not given in advance, but must issue out of a decision that is freely made. We may decide to do something, but the decision itself, in its very act, is that which exceeds all motivation and purpose. Decisions must decide absolutely, where what one decides upon might not be. Decisions are not even reducible to chance or the dice throw, since these presume a state of affairs that can be calculated. Decisions are existential risks, if you like, the risking of the fact that what is, is as it is. Decisions are thus responsibilities that we have in existing, in the face of undecidable otherness. As Derrida puts it, the exposure of undecidability does not mean that we cannot decide; rather that we must decide, but decide on the basis of the undecidability of that about which we decide: ‘if I speak so often of the incalculable and the undecidable it’s not out of a simple predilection for play nor in order to neutralise decision: on the contrary, I believe there is no responsibility, no ethico-political decision, that must not pass through the proofs of the incalculable or the undecidable. Otherwise, everything would be reducible to calculation, program, causality’ (Derrida 1995, 273). The imperative of the decision is not a matter of deciding for something, but of invoking the power to decide as absolutely essential to an existence in such a way that does not immediately surrender it to calculation, prediction and the already decided. To decide in this way (but is there any other way?) is to invoke a power that exceeds self reﬂection, the power of critique as praxis: a way of doing that is itself the very thing that it enacts. 10 As a praxis, freedom enacts itself in the decision to be free. As Nancy puts it, we cannot decide for freedom since we are already free in our capacity to decide (Nancy 1993, 142 ff.). A decision is free insofar as it is a ‘letting being be in its ﬁnite singularity’ (Nancy 1993, 142). As a decision for existence, the decision does not make us good or morally right, but ‘frees us for duty and right, and for the perversion of the one and the other’ (Nancy 1993, 143). 11 It is rendering us capable of morality, rather than an act of being moral. The decision has to be thought in terms other than freedom as a simple self-positing of virtue. How then do we decide if we cannot decide for democracy in the name of freedom?

#### Nuclear war is a text – its reference is what makes it a threat.

Derrida ’84 Jacques Derrida; Catherine Porter; Philip Lewis, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)” Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism. (Summer, 1984), pp. 20-31

Third reason. In our techno-scientitico-mifitaro-diplomatic incompetence, we may con-sider ourselves, however, as competent as others to deal with a phenomenon whose essen-tial feature is that of being fabulously textual, through and through. Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, Including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it. You will say, perhaps: but it is not the first time; the other wars, too, so long as they hadn't taken place, were only talked about and written about. And as to the fright of imaginary anticipation, what might prove that a European in the period following the war of 1870 might not have been more terrified by the "technological" image of the bombings and exterminations of the Second World War (even supposing he had been able to form such an image) than we are by the image we can construct for ourselves of a nuclear war? The logic of this argument is not devoid of value, especially if one is thinking about a limited and "clean" nuclear war. But it loses its value in the face of the hypothesis of a total nuclear war, which, as a hypothesis, or, if you prefer, as a fantasy, or phantasm, conditions every discourse and all strategies. Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text. At least today apparently. And that sets us to thinking about today, our day, the presence of this present in and through that fabulous textuality. Better than ever and more than ever. The growing multiplication of the discourse— indeed, of the literature — on this subject may constitute a process of fearful domestication, the anticipatory assimilation of that unanticipatable entirely-other. For the moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not occurred; it has exis-tence only through what is said of it, only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm, are inventions. It may also be called a speculation, even a fabulous specularization. The breaking of the mirror would be, finally, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? dreaming of it, desiring it? You will perhaps find it shock-ing to find the nuclear issue reduced to a fable. But then I haven't said simply that. I have recalled that a nuclear war is for the time being a fable, that is, something one can only talk about But who can fail to recognize the massive "reality “ of nuclear weaponry and of the ter- rifying forces of destruction that are being stockpiled and capitalized everywhere, that are corning to constitute the very movement of capitalization. One has to distinguish between this "reality" of the nuclear age and the fiction of war. But, and this would perhaps be the imperative of a nuclear criticism, one must also be careful to interpret critically this critical or diacritical distinction. For the "reality" of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war are perhaps distinct, but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other words the (able) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through al the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human socius today, everything that is named by the old words culture, civilization, aihriung, schofe, pandeia. "Reality," let's say the encom-passing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an event that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at alp, an event of which one can only speak, an event whose advent remains an invention by men (in all the senses of the word "invention") or which, rather, remains to be invented. An invention because it depends upon new technical mechanisms, to be sure, but an invention also because it does not exist and especially because, at whatever point it should come into existence, it would be a grand premiere appearance. Fourth reason. Since we are speaking of fables, of language, of fiction and fantasy, writing and rhetoric, let us go even further. Nuclear war does not depend on language just because we can do nothing but speak of it — and then as something that has never occurred. It does not depend on language just because the "incompetents" on all sides can speak of it only in the mode of gossip or of doxa (opinion) — and the dividing line between doxa and episteme starts to blur as soon as there is no longer any such thing as an absolutely legitimizable competence for a phenomenon which is no longer strictly techno-scientific but techno-miktaro-politico-diplomatic through and through, and which brings into play the doxa or incompetence even in its calculations. There is nothing but doxa, opinion, "belief." One can no longer oppose belief and science, doxa and episteme, once one has reached the decisive place at the nuclear age, in other words, once one has arrived at the critical place of the nuclear age. In this critical place, there is no more room for a distinction between belief and science, thus no more space for a "nuclear criticism" strictly speaking. Nor even for a truth in that sense. No truth, no apocalypse. (As you know. Apocalypse means Revelation, of Truth, Un-veiling.) No, nuclear war is not only fabulous because one can only talk about it, but because the extraordinary sophistication of its technologies—which are also the technologies of delivery, sending, dispatching, of the missile in general, of mission, missive, emission, and transmission, like all techne — the extraordinary sophistication of these technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and the most cursory, the most archaic, the most crudely opinionated psychagogy, the most vulgar psychology. We can therefore consider ourselves competent because the sophistication of the nuclear strategy can never do without a sophistry of belief and the rhetorical simulation of a text.

#### Their interpretation is an attempt to create pure community but lots of teams fall outside their interpretation. Because of that unbridgeable gap the idea of a community is autoimmune. Turning debate into a community reduces alterity by herding difference making ethics impossible.

Miller ‘9 [J. Hillis Miller, American literary critic, “For Derrida” 2009 Fordham University Press pg. 130-131]

On the next page Derrida claims we would not say we want to belong to the family or community if we really did belong to one or the other: "The desire to belong to any community whatsoever, the desire for be-longing tout court, implies that one does not belong" (TS, z8). This is our happy chance, since my only road to responsible ethical relations to my neighbor, the "wholly other," is by detaching myself from family or com-munity, or by recognizing that I am always already and for good detached, enisled. I must detach myself from the herd, or appropriate my detach-ment, in order to escape the doom of autoimmune self-destruction that always awaits such deconstructible agglomerations. I must come to know that I am detached, and that it's a good thing too. The different concepts of being with represented by Derrida and by all those modern thinkers of being with I began by identifying are incompati-ble. They cannot be synthesized or reconciled. II Put choisir Which do I choose? I wish with all my heart I could believe in Williams's ideal of a happy, classless community or in Hidegger's assumption that Mitsein is a fundamental aspect of being human, but I fear that each man or woman may be an island unto himself or herself, and that real communities are more like the communities of self-destructive autoimmunitv Derrida de-scribes. Certainly the United States these days, if you can dare to think of it as one immense community, is a better example of Derrida's self-destructive autoimmune community than of Williams's community of kindness and mutuality. I claim, moreover, to have confirmed through several examples the tri-ple hypothesis with which I started: (I) that the concept of community, in a given thinker, is consonant with his or her concept of relations between self and other; (2) that you cannot get from Dasein to Mitsein unless you assume from the start that Damn, is Mitsein; (3) that Derrida in his last seminars, almost uniquely among modern philosophers and theorists, af-firms the fundamental and irremediable isolation of each Dasein. For Der-rida, no isthmus, no bridge, no road, no communication or transfer connects or can ever connect my enisled self to other selves. There is no common world. There are only islands. Any community is an artificial, deconstructible, construct fabricated out of words or other signs. Any community, moreover, is self-destructively autoimmunitary to boot. One should not underestimate the consequences of holding that each human being is, throughout his or her lifetime, enisled.

#### Justice outweighs the small risk of the limits disad – Any condition imposed onto accepting the Other lends itself to a politics of tolerance and scrutinized hospitality. Unconditional acceptance of the other is a precondition to any ethics and politics.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 158-159]

The history of the concept reveals that tolerance “is always on the side of the ‘reason of the strongest,”’ firmly tied to the figure of the sov­ereign that Habermas also mentions in our dialogue. From this point of view, being tolerant is not going to make those who feel excluded any more included or understood. This was certainly a blunt statement to make in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, when Western countries were relying on tolerance as their unifying moral commit­ment. While in Derrida’s mind there is no way to overcome the one-sid­edness of tolerance, hospitality is a much more flexible concept. “If I think I am being hospitable because I am tolerant, it is because I wish to limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control over the lim­its of my ‘home,’ my sovereignty, my ‘I can’ (my territory, my house, my language, my culture, my religion, and so on).” Tolerance is “a scruti­nized hospitality, always under surveillance, parsimonious and protec­tive of its sovereignty. In the best of cases, it’s what I would call a con­ditional hospitality, the one that is most commonly practiced by indi­viduals, families, cities, or states.”34 The advantage of hospitality over tolerance is that it lends itself, as forgiveness does, to being posited in the double register of the condi­tional and the unconditional. In fact, tolerance is, for Derrida, condi­tional hospitality. By being tolerant one admits the other under one’s own conditions, and thus under one’s authority, law, and sovereignty. Derrida hopes instead for a new conception of hospitality that is, in a sense, much more tolerant than tolerance. Surprisingly for those who believe that Derrida is a counter-Enlightenment thinker, Kant is his point of reference. Derrida’s articulation of unconditional hospitality hinges on Kant’s distinction between two kinds of rights: right of invi­tation and right of visitation. But pure or unconditional hospitality does not consist in such an invita­tion (“I invite you, I welcome you into my home, on the condition that you adapt to the laws and norms of my territory, according to my lan­guage, tradition, memory, and so on”). Pure and unconditional hospital­ity, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance open to someone who is nei­ther expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other. I would call this a hospitality of visitation rather than invi­tation. The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must not ig­nore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality? As no sense of forgiveness would exist without unconditional forgive­ness, no sense of true hospitality and openness to the other would exist without unconditional hospitality.

#### Epistemology DA – Western representations of the world normalize colonial practices. A critical examination of state politics creates a starting point to challenge homogenous ways of thinking.

Trofanenko 2k5 Research Chair in Education, Culture and Community @ Acadia University 2k5 Brenda-; On Defense of the Nation; THE SOCIAL STUDIES, 96.5 (2005): 193+; [http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA139957613&v=2.1&u=bingul&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w](http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7cA139957613&v=2.1&u=bingul&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w) Toward a More Global Sense of the Nation

Knowing how history is a site of political struggle, how we engage with social studies education means emphasizing how power, processes, and practices bear tangible effects on forging a national (and common) history by reproducing and vindicating inclusions and exclusions. Such a critique requires questioning how a singular, fixed, and static history celebrates the U.S. nation and its place in the world as that "common base of factual information about the American historical and contemporary experience"(27) argues for in the Fordham report. Our world history courses are central to defining, understanding, and knowing not only other nations but also the position of each nation in relation to the United States. The centrality that the west holds (notably the United States as an imperial power) is ingrained and willful in framing specific representations of the west that normalize the imperial practices that established this nation. The role that the United States holds on the world stage frequently remains unquestioned in social studies classrooms. Certainly, we engage with various images and tropes to continue to advance how the colonialist past continues to remain present in our historical sensibilities. Moreover, the increasing number and choices of archival sources function as a complement to further understanding the nation. If students are left to rely on the variety of historical resources rather than question the use of such resources, then the most likely outcome of their learning will be the reflection on the past with nostalgia that continues to celebrate myths and colonial sensibility. To evaluate the history narrative now is to reconsider what it means and to develop a historical consciousness in our students that goes beyond archival and nostalgic impulses associated with the formation of the nation and U.S. nation building. We need to insist that the nation, and the past that has contributed to its present day understanding, is simultaneously material and symbolic. The nation as advanced in our histories cannot be taken as the foundational grounds. The means by which the nation is fashioned calls for examining the history through which nations are made and unmade. To admit the participatory nature of knowledge and to invite an active and critical engagement with the world so that students can come to question the authority of historical texts will, I hope, result in students' realizing that the classroom is not solely a place to learn about the nation and being a national, but rather a place to develop a common understanding of how a nation is often formed through sameness. We need to continue to question how a particular national history is necessary as an educational function, but especially how that element has been, and remains, useful at specific times. My hope is to extend the current critique of history within social studies, to move toward understanding why history and nation still needs a place in social studies education. In understanding how the historicity of nation serves as "the ideological alibi of the territorial state" (Appadurai 1996, 159) offers us a starting point. The challenge facing social studies educators is how we can succeed in questioning nation, not by displacing it from center stage but by considering how it is central. That means understanding how powerfully engrained the history of a nation is within education and how a significant amount of learning is centered around the nation and its history. History is a forum for assessing and understanding the study of change over time, which shapes the possibilities of knowledge itself. We need to reconsider the mechanisms used in our own teaching, which need to be more than considering history as a nostalgic reminiscence of the time when the nation was formed. We need to be questioning the contexts for learning that can no longer be normalized through history's constituted purpose. The changing political and social contexts of public history have brought new opportunities for educators to work through the tensions facing social studies education and its educational value to teachers and students. Increasing concerns with issues of racism, equality, and the plurality of identities and histories mean that there is no unified knowledge as the result of history, only contested subjects whose multilayered and often contradictory voices and experiences intermingle with partial histories that are presented as unified. This does not represent a problem, but rather an opportunity for genuine productive study, discussion, and learning.