## 1AC Rd 2 NDT

#### Drones have gotten a bad rap in the debate community so far. Conservative teams would have you believe that drones need to be reined in but have minimal collateral damage and are the best tool to keep democratic citizens safe, while liberal teams would have you believe that the U.S. is drunk with power in its usage of drones, slaughtering babies to hit the cell phone of a terrorist leader. Both and neither of these realities are true. Ignored from these conversations has been the intensification of the intimate forms of violence that drone pilots and their targets experience, commanded from afar by policy makers, drone pilots watch their targets die closer than ground troops did in Iraqi during combat. The human experience of war from the conversation has been ignored.

Holmqvist, 2013. (Caroline, Holmqvist. Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics, UK Swedish National Defense College, Sweden. Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare. May 1, 2013. <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/early> )

No doubt, drone warfare is infinitely more real for the populations amongst whom attacks take place, who risk being killed, losing loved ones or having their homes destroyed. Yet, while such arguments have understandable appeal, close study of drone operators’ activity yields a more complicated picture. Derek Gregory’s study of drone operators’ experience focuses on the ‘scopic regime’ that enables drone warfare in the first place and closely examines the different types of vision and imaging that drone operators are exposed to, from wide area airborne surveillance to the macro-field of micro-vision.24 These visibilities are conditional and conditioning because they are not merely technical feats but ‘techno-cultural accomplishments’.25 Rather than any straight- forward abstracting of war into a video game, the abstracting that takes place is convoluted and paradoxical. Contrary to common perception, drone warfare is ‘real’ also for those staring at a screen and, as such, the reference to video games is often simplistic. It s the *immersive* quality of video games, their power to draw players into their virtual worlds, that make them potent – this is precisely why they are used in pre-deployment training.26 The video streams from the UAV are shown to have the same immersive qual- ity on the drone operator – they produce the same ‘reality-effect’.¶ Virtual war, it seems, is less virtual than would appear at first glance. This conclusion is strengthened by the growing realisation that drone operators suffer as high, and possibly higher, rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as soldiers engaged in battle as a result of exposure to high-resolution images of killing, including the details of casualties and body parts that would never be possible to capture with the human eye.27 In other words, drone operators see *more* than soldiers in theatre. This is not to imply any trivialising parallels between operating drones from afar and physical engagement in battle, however. The view of the ‘hunter-killer’ is, in Gregory’s words, still privileged as the drone operator empathises with his fellow comrades on the ground in Afghanistan and feels compelled to ‘protect’ and ‘help’ them by instructing to shoot.28 Ultimately, the ‘drone stare’ still furthers the subjuga- tion of those marked as Other.29 What is of interest to us in examining the interaction of the virtual, material and human here, however, is that this occurs not through the experience (on the part of the drone operator) of distance, remoteness or detachment, but rather through the ‘sense of proximity’ to ground troops inculcated by the video feeds from the aerial plat- forms.30 The relationship between the fleshy body of the drone operator and the steely body of the drone and its ever-more sophisticated optical systems needs to be conceptualised in a way that allows for such paradoxes to be made intelligible.¶ Moreover, there is clearly a need to think of the study of the experience of war in new ways: if drone operators are not as shielded from the realities of war as is gener- ally assumed, what might they be bringing into the wider communities of which they are part? To what extent are their experiences theirs alone, and to what extent do we see them seeping out in a wider social corpus? In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, can we see the body (of the drone operator) ‘literally incarnating’ material capacities for agency, and thereby affecting the political disposition of a wider community?31 It is well estab- lished that soldiers returning from service run a higher risk of committing domestic violence, and the US military has an established programme for combating domestic violence.32 The high rate of PTSD amongst drone operators points to the need for follow-up studies of how these individuals behave in their home communities. By extension, this suggests that those interested in the experience of war need to include consideration also of the experience of – in this case – Nevada communities amidst which drone operators live. What such studies might yield we can only guess; yet it seems reasonable to suspect that the complex assemblage of virtual and material experiences that drone warfare produces might have its very own repercussions for processes and dynamics of societal militarisation and other manifestations of members’ violent experiences set in motion by, but far exceeding, war itself. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the human body is not separate from things, matter or representation; rather, ‘the flesh (of the world or my own) is ... a texture that returns to itself and conforms to itself’.33 Human bodies are ‘beings-in-the-world’,34 and the material ‘reality’ of robotic warfare, like the flesh of human bodies, is irredeemably generative. The fol- lowing section will expand on how.¶ Agentic Capacities of Material Objects¶ The targeting logic of drone warfare relies on a clear objectification of people, marking and classifying them as ‘targets’ of different ‘value’, with ‘high-value targets’ most hotly sought for capture or death, and the more recent expansion of targeting regimes to cover what are referred to as ‘low level fighters’.35 Advocates of decapitation strategies using drone warfare often rely on precisely such objectification of people.36 This is interesting in terms of what is revealed of the ethical relation between real people – in this case, seemingly allowing for the eschewal of any real encounter involving mutual recognition and recognisability37 – and raises interesting questions about the way in which that rela- tion is mediated by technology.

#### Today’s civilian is tomorrow’s terrorist, and today’s terrorist is tomorrow’s civilian. If the literature on targeted killing is teaching us anything it’s that these divisions are malleable. The idea that we can fly planes into a foreign country and rain death from the sky, without any way for affected populations to contest such violence, continually reproduces the need for strikes.

Schmidt 08 (Dennis J. Schmidt Who Counts? On Democracy, Power, and the Incalculable Research in Phenomenology 38 (2008) 228–243)

In place of any possible sovereign power, today we find the final possible alternative to the present shape of power. What is left as such an alternative is the power of individuals who stand completely apart from sovereignty and the turnover of power. We call such individuals “terrorists”—those whose power is terrible, terrifying, and monstrous—simply because the form of the power they express is outside that which has no outside. What is left, what is expressed by such power, is the assertion of unreason and real powerlessness in the form of the individual.30 What is left is irrational, incalculable, inefficient, non- sense. Such is the only remaining outside of power, and so long as there are no alternatives, such explosive expressions of powerlessness will not cease. Efforts to step outside the static tyranny of the new form of power as it is figured by globalized technology will always have something of desperation about them, something of nihilism, since it is a form of power that will not turn itself over. When the locus of power is no longer able to be contested, when power has calcified and become total leaving no alternative political power, then simple violence, naked brutality, is all that remains as a means of contesting the established power. There has always been political brutality and unspeakable violence; our age did not invent terror and horror. But our age has witnessed an intensification of certain dimensions of violence, an intensification changing the landscape of every exercise of power and turning the attempt to contest power into violence of a new order: open, public spaces can now be dangerous, no one is considered innocent, children have become weapons as well as targets, strangers are threatening, the material shapes of everyday life— airplanes, envelopes, shoes—are turned back upon individuals as weapons. Sovereign nations are not attacked, individuals are attacked. In short, the old forms by which those in power were confronted and power was contested have taken a new form, namely the form of raw violence, and the reason for this is that the power in power is itself a fundamentally new form. Or, so Heidegger would argue.¶ In the Greek world of its beginnings, democracy rested upon two sets of necessary conditions. The first of these conditions took the form of a prior agreement, the consent of all who would be citizens, to abide by the rule of the majority. This condition is met by individuals prior to any sense that there is a ␣␣␣␣␣. It is something of a pledge in which each person agrees to abide by a count, by numbers, that has yet to be tabulated. The second of the conditions requisite for democracy is, as Aristotle argued, the freedom of every individual, the absence of any coercion in matters of the democratic process, in the voice one has, and equally, the equality of all individuals when it comes to the matter of counting.31 These conditions are, of course, at odds: the first requires that each citizen be recognized as a singular being, an end unto him/herself, the second requires a reduction of each citizen to an abstract equality in which no one is different. If Heidegger’s claims about the present historical juncture are right, if we do indeed live in an age in which a sort of reduction to what is calculable is definitive, an age in which singularity is effaced, if not erased, then one can see how it is that the conditions of democratic life are in jeopardy. Despite the glaring inequities in the world, a curious equalization of everyone as an abstraction, as a simple number, is being achieved today, and at the same time, the singularity that is the locus of freedom seems more than ever to be alienated. Facing a form of power that will not turn over, the source of which will not change, any people, all peoples, seem to be in the strange condition of being outsiders.¶ If Heidegger’s argument about the nature of technological reason, the Gestell and Machenschaft, is right, then the possibilities of democracy in our time must indeed be considered in the light of the challenges of technological reason and the globalization that such rationality makes possible. Above all, one must ask how it is that we can preserve—or perhaps recover—an openness permitting the appearance of individuals in their singularity, that is, in their difference from others. One must also ask, just as urgently, how it is that power can transfer itself and not be calcified into one form. In other words, how it might be possible for history to begin again. Heidegger expressed a sense of helplessness before this question: “only a god can save us,” he said.32 That comment is not a declaration of faith; it is rather a statement of despair and hopelessness: we are powerless, only an outside, something beyond our understanding, can introduce change and set history into motion anew. It is not difficult to see the reasons for such a claim: globalization has, by virtue of the technologies that drive it and render it possible, shown itself to be a homogenization of the world and a shrinking of the spaces of political life, the spaces, that is, of differences. Nonetheless, one can still ask if this totalization and closure of the space of political life is indeed so seamless.

#### Drone pilots are confronted with the fluidity of the distinction between civilian and terrorist. The U.S. desire to pinpoint an inherently violent Other has triggered an autoimmune response where the war on terror has transformed into a war on alterity. The attempt to proscribe a response to the presencing of beings in zones of conflict makes violent political response inevitable.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 148-150]

In Derrida’s reading, 9/11 is the symptom of an autoimmune crisis oc­curring within the system that should have predicted it. Autoimmune conditions consist in the spontaneous suicide of the very defensive mechanism supposed to protect the organism from external aggres­sion. This is a mechanism by which, as Derrida noted, a living organ­ism “works to destroy its own protection, to immunize itself against its ‘own’ immunity.” Derrida counted three phases (temps) in the autoimmune crisis of which 9/11 is a symptom. The first phase is the Cold War, a war that was fought “in the head” more than on the ground or in the air. If we look at 9/11 from the standpoint of its continuity with the Cold War, it is easy to see that the hijackers who turned against the United States had been trained by the United States during the era of the Soviet inva­sion of Afghanistan. American weapons and intelligence have made an essential contribution to the Islamic Afghan fighters since the early 1980s, some of whom became the Taliban political elite that ruled Afghanistan under perhaps the most extreme implementation of shari‘a ever advanced. Possibly, said Derrida, 9/11 could be interpreted as the implosive finale of the Cold War, lulled by its own convolutions and contradictions. The second phase of the autoimmune crisis is what Derrida calls “worse than the Cold War” both historically and psychologically. While the Cold War was characterized by the possibility of balance be­tween two superpowers, it is impossible to build a balance with terror­ism because the threat does not come from a state but from incalculable forces and incalculable responsibilities. The dissemination of the nu­clear arsenal and the relative availability of bacteriological and chemical weapons is the reality on which terrorism impinges. George W. Bush’s proclamation that all the nations he accuses of harboring terrorism constitute an “axis of evil” speaks to the United States’ denial of the elusiveness of the forces of terror. Psychologically, “what is worse than the Cold War” foregrounds the temporality of trauma, which is oriented toward the future. Any traumatic experience wounds the future as much as the present. Play­ing on the French word for future, avenir, Derrida claims that since the threat haunts the future, in a sense, it is still to come (a venir). This pointing to the temporality of trauma is a direct follow-up to his dis­cussion of the significance of the choice of 9/11 as a name for the at­tacks. Like the fourth of July, recognized as Independence Day in the United States, or the first of May, recognized as Labor Day in Europe as well as in most countries around the world, 9/11 has the scope of monumentalizing the attacks. Since this monumentalization is in the interest of both the Western media and the terrorists, it adds another fold to the autoimmune reaction. This second phase of autoimmunity displays another important feature. By monumentalizing the terrorist attacks, the date 9/11 also de­clares that they are over. In so doing, it denies precisely the futurity of the threat, the possibility that the worst might still be to come. For Der­rida, the massive media reporting acted in sync with the naming of the attacks as 9/11. As the tragedy was still unfolding, he said, calling it 9/11 revealed the illusion that it was already over. The third and last phase of the autoimmune crisis is what Derrida calls “the vicious circle of repression.” It is the most obviously suicidal of the three because it describes the way in which, by declaring war against terrorism, the Western coalition engenders a war against itself. One function of the concept of autoimmunity is to act as a third term between the classical opposition of friend and foe. As we have seen, to identify a third term is a characteristically deconstructive move aimed at displacing the traditional metaphysical tendency to rely on ir­reducible pairs. Although the explicit discussion of autoimmunity is limited to three, it implicitly continues as Derrida sets out to call into question the distinction between war and terrorism. Wars have always been contaminated by terrorism through the in­timidation of civilians. Yet, even at the theoretical level, the distinction is impossible to draw. Suppose, he said in reference to Carl Schmitt, the German legal scholar,17 that a war can only be declared between two states, whereas terrorism is a conflict between forces other than a sovereign state. The political history of the term “terrorism” would easily contradict this definition, since terror has always been inflicted by sovereign states on their population or other populations, in peace­time as well as in wartime. The current usage of the term “terrorism” derives from the late phase of the French Revolution, when Robe­spierre’s Reign of Terror engaged in mass executions and purges of civilians. Robespierre inflicted terror in the name of a sovereign state; also, given that his declared objective was to rid France of all its inter­nal enemies, this early instance of terrorism seems to point precisely to the autoimmune element theorized by Derrida. This is not to deny that the terrorists justify themselves by presenting their attacks as responses to previous acts of terrorism conducted against them by a state. “Every terrorist in the world,” Derrida observed, “claims to be responding in self-defense to a prior terrorism on the part of a state, one that simply went by other names and covered itself with all sorts of more or less credible justifications.” To complicate the matter further, terrorists can be liberation fight­ers in one context and plain criminals in the veiy same context at a dif­ferent point in time. The Islamic guerrillas who fought against the So­viet invasion in the 1980s and became the new political leaders is an example. Another is the recent history of Algeria, Derrida’s home for the first nineteen years of his life. No one can deny that there was state terrorism during the French repres­sion in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. The terrorism carried out by the Al­gerian rebellion was long considered a domestic phenomenon insofar as Algeria was supposed to be an integral part of French national territory, and the French terrorism of the time (carried out by the state) was pre­sented as a police operation for internal security. It was only in the 1990s, decades later, that the French Parliament retrospectively conferred the status of “war'” (and thus the status of an international confrontation) upon this conflict so as to be able to pay the pensions of the “veterans” who claimed them. In Derrida’s mind, it is impossible to draw any distinctions regarding terrorism—between war and terrorism, state and nonstate terrorism, terrorism and national liberation movements, national and interna­tional terrorism. If it is so hard to meaningfully attach any predicates to it, it simply means that terrorism is irreducibly ineffable and enigmatic. This truth is hard to accept but even more dangerous to reject.

#### Daniel and I think that we should not targeted kill civilian(terrorists).

#### The juxtaposition of the terrorist(civilian) is an ethical response that fosters openness and refuses to impose order, containment, and domination onto such others. It problematizes the current order of politics by blurring the lines of identification. This aporia is the only way to move towards justice and is a precondition to ethics.

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In an unusually direct moment in his article, "Force of Law: The `Mystical Foundation of Authority'," Derrida makes the statement, "deconstruction is justice" (Derrida, 1992, 15). The question of the relationship between deconstruction and politics returns continuously to this claim. It also, of necessity, begs the question of what then is "deconstruction." In Spectres of Marx, Derrida describes deconstruction as "a motif." As well, in a comparison with Marxist philosophy he suggests that what he is doing is "a performative interpretation": "An interpretation that transforms what it interprets is definitive of the performative as unorthodox with regard to speech act theory as it is with regard to the 11 th Thesis on Feuerbach ( `The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however is to change it')" (Derrida, 1994, 51). Elsewhere, in the same text, Derrida uses the term "infinite critique" to describe his approach: A deconstructive thinking, the one that matters to me here, has always pointed out the irreducibility of affirmation and therefore of the promise, as well as the undeconstructibility of a certain idea of justice.... Such a thinking cannot operate without justifying the principle of a radical and interminable, infinite (both theoretical and practical, as one used to say) critique. This critique belongs to the movement of an experience open to the absolute future of what is coming, that is to say, a necessarily indeterminate, abstract, desert-like experience that is confided, exposed, given up to its waiting for the other and for the event. (Derrida, 1994, 90.) What this experience of "infinite critique" or this "motif" of deconstruction appears as, is a series of maneuvers performed on texts. These maneuvers seem designed to interrupt our confidence in meaning, and in the categories through which we organize meaning, by making these apparent, by playing with them, and by indicating the arbitrariness of their boundaries or oppositions. Deconstructive practices consist in a combination of wordplay, of play on metaphors, of taking things "to extremes," of introducing apparently unrelated texts as parallel to the central one and reading them alongside it, interweaving the multiple texts until meanings become jumbled, and new and unexpected meanings begin to emerge. The overall effect is to unsettle a text, to disturb any straightforward reading of it, to eventually abandon questions about authorial intention, to set the text adrift, as it were. And why is this "justice"? First, because of the "aporia" that it introduces - the sense of confusion that is in fact the "true" or "honest" and "ethical" response to and perception of the world. I use the word "honest" because what is other is truly other, and therefore finally unknowable - one is only being honest in an acknowledgment of this. And second, this is "ethical" because categories of meaning, it would seem, are imposed by us, onto others and otherness as a way of ordering, containing, and therefore dominating what is "other to ourselves." Language is a necessary violence for which deconstruction is the just or ethical response. What is true, then (in the understanding of the world that Derrida provides through deconstruction), is inadequation, non-commensurability, disjointedness. The ethical response is a recognition of this unknowability, a suspicion of all self-certainty. The political response is one of a corresponding openness, a promise of "democracy-tocome" (a promise which Derrida also assures us can never be wholly realizable in the present, in any present). At stake here is the very concept of democracy as concept of a promise that can only arise in such a diastema (failure, inadequation, disjunction, disadjustment, being "out of joint"). That is why we always propose to speak of a democracy to come, not of future democracy in the future present, not even of a regulating idea, in the Kantian sense, or of a utopia - at least to the extent that their inaccessibility would still retain the temporal form of a future present, of a future modality of a living present (Derrida, 1994, 64-5.)

#### We think debate matters, that debate is a unique political space. It is here that we see an intersection of citizenship, politics, law, and democracy. Debate gestures towards democracy to come, an open hospitable environment characterized by radically different views of what matters. How we conceptualize polarized others in this space matters, the openness to terrorism has the possibility of a different conceptualization of difference outside of the rubric of security and extermination.

Kuswa and Walsh ’07 (Arguing War in an Era of Terrorism: “Democracy to Come” and Critical Pedagogy Kevin Kuswa and Briann Walsh (CONTROVERSIA Volume 5 Issue 2 <http://www.idebate.org/resources/publications/controversia.php> )

Our argument updates the insights of critical pedagogy by re-thinking the way the Other is conceived during times of conflict. Most importantly, the emerging era of terrorism and security intensifies the importance of reinvigorating our educational priorities, striving to achieve space for cultural difference and dissent, an interdisciplinary perspective, a critique of a polarized and pre-existing Other, and citizenship built on critical thinking. As might be expected, critical pedagogy comes full circle back to Derrida’s defense of democracy. Education is one place where opportunities are generated, conceivably the most significant place where citizenship, the law, the nation-state, and even the political are hatched and developed. Derrida, in a rare moment where he advocates political action, discusses a notion of democracy outside sovereignty, in a place where subjects are not pre-defined by citizenship, the law, the nation-state, or even world-citizenship. This move requires rethinking what politics is about, broadening our roles as teachers and students: This is no small task...What I call ‘democracy to come ’ would go beyond the limits of cosmopolitanism, that is, of a world citizenship. It would be more in line with what lets singular beings (anyone)‘live together.’...That said, and because all of this will remain for some time out of reach, I believe that everything must be done to extend the privilege of citizen- ship in the world. (130) To continue the necessary resuscitation of democracy in Derrida’s sense, a critical pedagogy in an era of conflict and terrorism demands another look. The aim of articulating a non-mediating rhetoric is to resist deployments of education that would craft an expansive and violent Other under the signs of security and counter-terrorism. Our argument ends and begins from the position that practices of critical pedagogy in an argumentation studies setting (“What is terrorism?”) mark a potential response to violence and a polarized Other. The stakes are large in that the underlying issue is how to address local and global strategies of fear, oppression, control, annihilation, and extermination. An open-ended critical pedagogy informed by Derrida’s concept of a “democracy to come” and Dewey’s advocacy of a politics “against war” can work toward expressive engagements between selves and Others. Our era of fear and war based on terrorism and counter-terrorism requires a vision of a radical, even if impossible, democracy. More specifically, the abandonment of war in certain instances becomes a call symbolizing the need to encounter the Other without judgment or mediating rhetoric, a critical connection to teaching and learning that argues war to transcend.

#### Politics has been ceded to the think tanks, tested in focus groups than formulated into law. The entire system would be laughable if it wasn’t our current political context. This engagement with stupidity begs for deconstruction. Our politics is one that is allergic to policy itself, an issue for the public as well as the policy maker. This difference from policy is exactly what makes democracy thinkable it is a politics that lends way to agency.

Mcquillan 08 (Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

In order for politics to be thinkable there must be some moment at which thought moves over into politics. Now, one could pick at this opening sentence for some time, books could be written and research projects designed to interrogate whether it is true or not. Its truth or otherwise will certainly depend upon what one means here by 'politics' (twice and non-identically), 'thinkable', 'some moment', 'thought', 'moves over', and indeed 'into', none of this is without consequence for either deconstruction or truth. However, allow me momentarily to place my own opening sentence in inverted commas, as if it had been spoken by someone else and with the authority of a someone else. Allow me the In order for politics to be thinkable there must be some moment at which thought moves over into politics. Now, one could pick at this opening sentence for some time, books could be written and research projects designed to interrogate whether it is true or not. Its truth or otherwise will certainly depend upon what one means here by 'politics' (twice and non-identically), 'thinkable', 'some moment', 'thought', 'moves over', and indeed 'into', none of this is without consequence for either deconstruction or truth. However, allow me momentarily to place my own opening sentence in inverted commas, as if it had been spoken by someone else and with the authority of a someone else. Allow me the considerable license of taking this quotation as axiomatic for what is to follow even if both you and I do not believe it as a statement of fact, or at least even if you and I do not quite believe it as a statement of fact because we are more than capable of acting upon it in good faith as if it were fact. Such a statement is a seduction to short-circuit thinking. It asks us not to look at it - do not question me, take me as 'read.' In this sentence, one can find a concentrated example of the logo-rhetorical illusion that is the predicate of politics, in which politics and thought separate themselves into conceptual spheres just as these spheres emerge from the mediated, supplatory conceptualisation in which thought and politics are inextricably bound one to the other. However, today I am in the mood to be seduced and there are ways in which one can, more or less, give oneself up strategically to such overtures. Imagine for a moment that both thought and politics were imaginable outside of mediation and that one followed the other as day follows night and that one could be translated into the other by some alchemical process. Then imagine the consequences of this for politics. If one were able to momentarily suspend all this disbelief (as if 'deconstruction' and centuries of politics had never happened) then we would find ourselves in the position of the policy maker. This is not a new position to be in but one that has a certain visibility today in the technocratic space of liberal democracies. Today, 'policy making' is out- sourced to so-called 'think tanks' where policy is formulated and road- tested on 'focus groups' before being adopted (or paid for) by political parties, diluting to taste. 'Policy' is one of those obscure words of the modern political lexicon; nothing could be more vague or less well understood than this term, which of course means that it is invoked ubiquitously without reflection. The basic assumption of policy, as an idea, is the logo-rhetorical illusion par excellence that theory translates (and is translate-able in principle) into practice. Policy then becomes law, as if the transmission of the law were itself a straightforward and transparent thing. One might laugh at such a naive, 'un-deconstructed' notion, if it were not for the fact that this is how the world is run. The comedian Ken Dodd says of Freud's formulation of laughter as a release of psychic energy: 'the problem with Freud is that he never played the Glasgow Empire.' Equally, the problem with the deconstruction of policy might be that the White House has yet to open itself to a policy of deconstruction. I want to ask in this essay, what would such a policy or set of policies look like, if they were imaginable? This is not to suggest that, after his death, the writing of Derrida might give rise to a set of 'practical' political policies, as the texts of Marx and Lenin were 'read' as the biblical revelation of an onto-theo-politics. Rather, it is to accept Roland Barthes' caution that one cannot simply exclude oneself from the discourse of stupidity. 'I don't mean that one can't be innocent of it', he told Jean-Jacques Brochier in 1975, 'that would be bad faith, but one can't be innocent of it *simply .* .. In any case, stupidity's mode of being is triumph. One can do nothing against stupidity. One can only internalize it, take a small homeopathic dose of it - but not too much' (Barthes 1985, 224). Think of this then as a hypothesis, what analytic philosophy would call a thought experiment. It is certainly not a bid for interpretative rights to the text of Derrida or the political futures of deconstruction, whatever such a word continues to mean. I am also reminded here of another caution, that of Edward Said who had little time for what he called 'travelling theory' (Said 1994, 389 and Said 1991, 226-47), whereby specialization as a mode of professionalisation within the academy comes to serve the interests of policy makers. His complaint is against the professional production of specialists on the 'Orient' who sell their expertise to the government and media while having their appearance in the government or media affirm their expertise. While the very idea of 'policy' no doubt marks an important, and not easily dismissed, transformation in the arena of competency of both party politicians and academics, it calls out for deconstruction. That is a deconstruction of its very premises as the dialectical-complex and unholy alliance between the techno-scientific, global economy and the technocratic university of specialisation in relation to a mediatic space, which presents one through the explanation of the other in terms of pragmatism, expediency, compromise or 'realism'. Here I am talking about a certain culture that we call politics, the properly political (the discourse of parties and politicians in governmental power across the world). As Derrida points out in *Specters of Marx,* in this culture 'virtually everywhere Western models prevail' (Derrida 1994, 52). This culture has always been bound to the culture of tele-technology, to mediation and representation. However, today, this relation is accelerated in an unprecedented fashion according to the rhythm of so-called 'communications' as the 'selective and hierarchized production of "information'" (Derrida 1994, 52) and its auto-immunised interpretation. The academic discourse of the technocratic university is welded to this apparatus in an indissociable way. It is almost impossible to watch a news programme without the appearance of an academic witness who provides the most banal and unscholarly of comments to justify or exemplify the content of a news item. Whole news items are nothing more than the appearance of academics to promote their 'research findings' or latest reports; entire university research strategies are written around the stated desire for such appearances. Which university does not now have a press office? In my institution at least half of the Faculties of the university (those that can afford them) have contracts with media consultants who are employed to write 'accessible' accounts of research activities with a view to placing stories in the media or promoting individuals to the level of media figure, talking head or guru. There is no point at whichh it is thought that academic research (another obscure term which we will need to tackle on another day) is inimical to this form of reductionism or that certain forms of thought might be allergic to passing through a me ia culture in this way. At any rate the idea of policy is related, in no doubt complex and over-determined, ways to this mutation in the channels which run between the academic and public spaces, which have more or less neutralised the notion of the public intellectual (another term we might caution against today given its historical relation to closely policed questions of propriety, gender, race and sexuality). A thinking of the relationship between the text of Derrida and the articulation of policy will necessarily involve a new thinking of the ground of policy and its relation to the media-political culture of today. What if it were possible to imagine something like a 'counter-policy', a thinking of policy as an intervention in the world that neither separated theory from practice nor accepted the easy place of the academic in the political-mediatic apparatus? What if it were possible to set policy- making against itself, to make policies to which policy was itself allergic? This would be an impossible policy, policy which understood the idea of policy to be impossible: policy without telos, policy without policy, policy no longer able to accept the name of policy but the only policy to be worthy of the name as an action in the material world. In imaging such a decentring of policy, one might also pertinently ask, does politics as such always imply an idea of policy in the same way that it always implies an idea of the human? That is to say does policy itself (as the pretext, off-spring and crafting of the moment of political antagonism) imply or assume an inherited idea of the human? Given the location of policy, in its modern sense, within the topography of contemporary political culture, in which policy precedes and enables the agency of political man then the answer is surely yes and a rethinking of policy would be nothing less than an entire disarticulation of this logo-anthro- onto-pological schema. Such a thinking of policy would then require the inauguration of a counter-culture as well as a counter-policy, with its own counter-institutions and spaces of articulation that would of course have their own vexed relation to channels of communication and the new technologies of the digital epoch as an exercise of public critical reason. One should also say that it is undoubtedly the case that such cultural transformations are already under way in spaces not visible to the academic-anthropological or mediatic gaze, across the hinterlands of the world wide web, cyber activism and in corners of the thinking world un-compromised by the funded research culture of the transnational university. However, in this text I am only proposing to take a position not to do the work that the sustainability of such a position would require. I am also talking about a relation between philosophy and policy that would be, unlike other articulations of militancy currently to be found in cyber-space, both properly philosophical and properly a 'political science', if such a thing exists.

#### Debate depends on the inclusion of those who maintain critical views of state policy. The foreclosure of critique and dissent marks debate as a fugitive activity by effacing alterity and counter-hegemonic discourses. Deconstruction is necessary to invoke new tropes of political dissent.

Butler ‘4 [2004, Judith Butler is a Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at U.C. Berkeley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence”, pg. xix-xxi]

Dissent and debate depend upon the inclusion of those who maintain critical views of state policy and civic culture remaining part of a larger public discussion of the value of policies and politics. To charge those who voice critical views with treason, terrorist-sympathizing, anti-Semitism, moral relativism, postmodernism, juvenile behavior, collaboration, anachronistic Leftism, is to seek to destroy the credibility not of the views that are held, but of the very persons who hold them. It produces the climate of fear in which to voice a certain view is to risk being branded and shamed with heinous appellation. To continue to voice one’s views under those conditions is not easy, since one must not only discount the truth of appellation, but brave the stigma that seizes up from the public domain. Dissent is quelled, in part, through threatening the speaking subject with an uninhabitable identification. Because it would be heinous to identify as treasonous, as a collaborator, one fails to speak, or one speaks in throttled ways, in order to sidestep the terrorizing identification that threatens to take hold. This strategy for quelling dissent and limiting the reach of critical debate happens not only through a series of shaming tactics which have a certain psychological terrorizations as their effect, but they work as well by producing what will and will not count as a viable speaking subject and a reasonable opinion within the public domain. It is precisely because one does not want to lose one’s status as a viable speaking being that one does not say what one thinks. Under social conditions that regulate identifications and the sense of viability to this degree, censorship operates implicitly and forcefully. The line that circumscribes what is speakable and what is livable also function as an instrument of censorship. To decide what views will count as reasonable within the public domain, however, is to decide what will and will not count as the public sphere of debate. And if someone holds views that are not in line with the nationalist norm, that person comes to lack credibility as a speaking person, and the media is not open to him or her (though the internet, interestingly, is). The foreclosure of critique empties the public domain of debate and democratic contestation itself, so that debate becomes the exchange of views among the like-minded, and criticism, which ought to be central to any democracy, becomes a fugitive and suspect activity. Public Policy, including foreign policy, often seeks to restrain the public sphere from being open to certain forms of debate and the circulation of media coverage. One way a hegemonic understanding of politics is achieved is through circumscribing what will and will not be admissible as part of the of the public sphere itself. Without disposing populations in such a way that war seems good and right and true, no war can claim popular consent, and no administration can maintain popularity. To produce what will constitute the public sphere, however, it is necessary to control the way in which people see, how they hear, what they see. The constraints are not only on content—certain images of dead bodies in Iraq, for instance, are considered unacceptable for public visual consumption—but on what “can” be heard, read, seen, felt, and known. The public sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as reality, and what will not. It is also a way of establishing whose lives can be marked as lives, and whose deaths will count as deaths. Our capacity to feel and to apprehend hangs in the balance. But so, too, does the fate of the reality of certain lives and deaths as well as the ability to think critically and publicly about the effects of war.

#### Deconstructing terrorism is the only responsible course of action. This does not mean we do not come to a decision, but rather choose the action which least imposes onto alterity.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. xiii]

Derrida claims that the deconstruction of the notion of terrorism is the only politically responsible course of action because the public use of it, as if it were a self-evident notion, perversely helps the terrorist cause. Such deconstruction consists, as if it were a self-evident notion, in showing that the sets of distinctions within which we understand the meaning of the term terrorism, are problem-ridden. In his mind, not only does war entail the intimidation of civilians, and thus elements of terrorism, but no rigorous separation can be drawn between different kinds of terrorism, such as national and international, local and global. By rejecting the possibility of attaching any predicates to the supposed substance of terrorism, we obviously deny that terrorism has any stable meaning, agenda, and political content. In addition, Derrida exhorts us to be vigilant about the relation­ship between terrorism and the globalized system of communication. It is a fact that, since the attacks of 9/11, the media have been bombarding the world with images and stories about terrorism. Derrida feels that this calls for critical reflection. By dwelling on the traumatic memory, victims typically try to reassure themselves that they can withstand the impact of what may repeat itself. Since 9/11, we have all been forced to reassure ourselves, with the result that terror appears less a past event than a future possibility. Indeed, Derrida is stunned at how naively the media contributed to multiplying the force of this traumatic experi­ence. Yet, at the same time, he is also disconcerted at how real is the threat that terrorism might exploit the technological and information networks. Despite all the horror that we witnessed, he told me, it is not unfeasible that one day we will look back at 9/11 as the last example of a link between terror and territory, as the last eruption of an archaic the­ater of violence destined to strike the imagination. For future attacks— as would be the case with chemical and biological weapons or simply major digital communication disruptions—may be silent, invisible, and ultimately unimaginable.

## 2AC CAP K

#### Perm do both – Adding the ethos of deconstruction takes the alt from a teleological process to an open process of delimitation.

Cheah ‘8 Professor of Rhetoric UC-Berkeley 2008 Pheng diacritics 38.1-2 project muse

In dialectical materialism, the process of actualizing material reality is part of the epigenesis, auto-production, and auto-maintenance of the human corporeal organism as it creates the means of its own subsistence. The proletarian revolution is precisely creative labor’s teleological process of appropriative return writ large on a world-historical stage. Deconstructive materialism is a delimitation of organismic vitalism and its teleological understanding of history. By attending to the machinic and spectral effects of iterability, it accounts for the possibility of the supplementation of organic life by techne and the contamination of living actuality by commodification, ideology etc.5 Indeed, Derrida argues that the key concepts of dialectical materialism are no longer adequate for understanding the rhythms and speeds of contemporary technomediated reality because they deconstruct the opposition between the actual and the ideal or virtual. The deconstruction of dialectical materialism is “demonstrated today better than ever by the fantastic, ghostly, ‘synthetic,’ ‘prosthetic,’ virtual happenings in the scientific domain and therefore the domain of techno-media and therefore the public or political domain. It is also made more manifest by what inscribes the speed of a virtuality irreducible to the opposition of the act and the potential in the space of the event, in the event-ness of the event” [SM 63]. Yet, despite the scarring, dislocation, and tearing that it inflicts on presence, materiality in the deconstructive sense has a rigorously affirmative and generative character. Because it refers us to the radically other, materiality is also the opening of an unforeseeable future, an à-venir (to-come) that cannot be anticipated as a form of presence. Despite his insistence that there was no ethico-political turn in his work, Derrida explored the ethico-political implications of this messianic dimension of materiality as absolute alterity in his writings from the 1990s onward [“As If It Were Possible” 360]. Simply put, since the other is that from which time comes, the experience of absolute alterity, however disruptive, must be affirmed because without it nothing could ever happen. An understanding of materiality in terms of negativity effaces this messianic dimension because by positing the other as the same, it closes off the experience of radical alterity.

#### Turn: The recognition of value is a precondition for a commodity’s exchangeability and use-value. Only a deconstruction of value can prevent the reification of capital.

Derrida ‘93 [Jacques Derrida, “Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International” 1993 pg. 201-203]

Without disappearing, use-value becomes, then, a sort of limit, the correlative of a limit-concept, of a pure beginning ~o which no object can or should correspond, and which therefore must be complicated in a general (in any case more general) theory of capital. We will draw from this only one consequence here, among all the many other possible ones: if it itself retains some use-value (namely, of permitting one to orient an analysis of the "phantasmagoric" process beginning at an origin that is itself fictive or ideal, thus already purified by a certain fantastics), this limit-concept of use-value is in advance contaminated, that is, pre-occupied, inhabited, haunted by its other, namely, what will be born from the wooden head of the table, the commodity- form, and its ghost dance. The commodity-form, to be sure, is not use-value, we must grant this to Marx and take account of the analytic power this distinction gives us. But if the commodity-form is not, presently, use-value, and even if it is not actually present, it affects in advance the use-value of the wooden table. It affects and bereaves it in advance, like the ghost it will become, but this is precisely where haunting begins. And its time, and the untimeliness of its present, of its being "out of 202 SPECTERS OF MARX joint." To haunt does not mean to be present, and it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of every concept, beginning with the concepts of being and time. That is what we would be calling here a hauntology. Ontology opposes it only in a movement of exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration. The "mystical character" of the commodity is inscribed before being inscribed, traced before being written out letter for letter on the forehead or the screen of the commodity. Everything begins before it begins. Marx wants to know and make known where, at what precise moment, at what instant the ghost comes on stage, and this is a manner of exorcism, a way of keeping it at bay: before this limit, it was not there, it was powerless. We are suggesting on the contrary that, before the coup de theatre of this instant, before the "as soon as it comes on stage as commodity, it changes into a sensuous supersensible thing," the ghost had made its apparition, without appearing in person, of course and by definition, but having already hollowed out in use-value, in the hardheaded wood of the headstrong table, the repetition (therefore substitution, exchangeability, iterability, the loss of Singularity as the experience of singularity itself, the possibility of capital) without which a use could never even be determined. This haunting is not an empirical hypothesis. Without it, one could not even form the concept either of use-value, or of value in general, or inform any matter whatsoever, or determine any table, whether a wooden table--useful or saleable--or a table of categories. Or any Tablet of commandments. One could not even complicate, divide, or fracture sufficiently the concept of usevalue by pointing out, as Marx does for example, this obvious fact: for its first presumed owner, the man who takes it to market as use-value meant for others, the first use-value is an exchangevalue. "Hence commodities must be realized as values before they can be realized as use-values" (p. 179). And vice versa, which makes the diachrony circular and transforms the distinction into a APPARITION OF THE INAPPARENT 203 co-implication. "On the other hand, [commodities] must stand the test as use-values before they can be realized as values." Even if the transforma.tion of one commodity into use-value and some other into money marks an independent stopping point, a stasis in circulation, the latter remains an infinite process. If the total circulation C-M-C is a "series without beginning or end, as the Critique of Political Economy constantly insists,29 it is because the metamorphosis is possible in all directions between the usevalue, the commodity, and money. Not to mention that the usevalue of the money-commodity (Geldware) is also itself "dual": natural teeth can be replaced by gold prostheses, but this usevalue is different from the one Marx calls "formal use-value" which arises out of the specific social function of money. 30

#### The conceptual economy of use value and exchange value must be deconstructed at logo-centric level.

Jay ‘88 [Gregory Jay, Professor of English, “Values and Deconstructions: Derrida, Saussure, Marx” Cultural Critique,

No. 8 (Winter, 1987-1988), pp. 153-196]

The relation of Marxism to deconstruction, and of both to the do-main of Saussure's semiotics, concerns the production and circulation of values, a system of relations figured in the recurrent metaphorical analogy between language and money.6 Today the task is not to expli-cate that analogy once more, but to subject it (and analogy in general) to a critique of its own conceptual economy, a critique already under-way in the writings of Marx and Derrida on the mystifying strategies of equivalence central to the genealogy of value signs, be they monetary or linguistic. As Jean Baudrillard has summarized the project: It is a question of decoding the birth of the sign form in the same way that Marx was able to uncover the birth of the commodity form in the Critique of Po lit iv; 1 Economy. In consumption generally, economic exchange value (money) is converted into sign exchange value (prestige, etc.); but this operation is still sustained by the ali-bi of use value.... At this point, the field of political economy, ar-ticulated only through exchange value and use value, explodes and must be entirely reanalyzed as genenatud political economy, which implies the production of sign exchange value in the same way and in the same movement as the production of material goods and of economic exchange value. The analysis of the pro-duction of signs and of culture thus does not impose itself as exte-rior, ulterior, and "superstructural" in relation to that of material production; it imposes itself as a revolution (political economy itself, generalized by the theoretical and practical irruption of the politi-cal economy of the sign.' Drawing upon semiotics, deconstruction (and here I include Baud-rillard, though his work traffics in its own unquestioned essences) in-terrogates the conceptual economy of the use value/exchange value opposition, and with lithe ontology of such terms as materialism, histo-ry, circulation, and production. The solidity of the economic base 'sill be dissolved by the dissemination of such fetishized concepts as natural util-ity, universal needs, property, and the object as a thing-in-itself. These terms and concepts belong to a nature/culture hierarchy—shared by the signifier/signified split—still informing much of Marx's discourse. De-construction reads the history and mode of this vocabulary's production, and Derrida will display the ancient common genealogy of these terms and concepts in the interdependent discourses of economics and meta-physics. The critique of logocentrism, then, is inextricable from the cri-ague of ideology, though the latter term may not survive the dissemi- nation of its orthodox conceptual apparatus. Semiotics, in turn, loses its discursive provinciality during the unfolding of the undecidability be-tween commodity and sign transactions. Derrida's deconstructions of classical sign theory and classical notions of ideology are thus tendered together in a single negotiation. His critique of Saussure's logocen-trism in Of Grammatolov (1967) can be seen, then, as a demonstration of Derrida's assertion that his own work has long been, in a certain way, focused on political and institutional concerns. At least since Marx, ideology has been analyzed as a representation-al practice, so that Althusser can summarily write that "ideology is a system (with its own logic and rigour) of representations (images, myths, ideas, or concepts, depending on the case) endowed with a his-torical existence and role within a given society." Ideology legislates the domain of truth and reference, adjudicating the value of objects and subjects. The intervention of Saussurean and poststructural language theory, insofar as it defers the closure of sign and reference that ideologi-cal representation aims towards, participates in the same radical break initiated by The German Ideology when it disputes the claims to divine or natural authorship made by the ideologies of church, state, and philos-ophy. Marx promoted a deconstructive inversion that decoded the so-cial production of supposedly eternal truths: they had been written un-der the sign of material, historical, and class straggles. Caught up with-in the material conditions evolving under early capitalism, Gemian Idealism sublated matter into sense, history into spirit, the production of writing into the mimesis of the transcendental signified. The histori-cal specificity of this idealism, however, is challenged by deconstruction, which subverts the difference between ideology and truthful representa-tion by insisting upon the logooentrisms that underwrite discourse in every period. "What we call ideology," notes Paul de Man, "is precisely the confu-sion of linguistic with natural reality, of reference with phenome-nalism." The study of linguistics and literariness, he concludes, may tell us "more than any other mode of inquiry, including economics," about the workings of ideology.' The critique of referential logo-centrism, then, does not entail the separation of language from history, or of writing from politics. On the contrary, it intends to map how such separations have been managed by various textual strategies. A text's manifest idealism or pronounced materialism contains the meta-physical work and political effects of their latent structuralities. "What is produced in the current trembling," Derrida responds, "is a reeval-uation of the relationship between the general text and what was be-lieved to be, in the form of reality (history, politics, economics, sexuali-ty, etc.), the simple, referable exterior of language or writing, the belief that this exterior could operate from the simple position of cause or accident."0

## A2: Mignolo K

#### Permutation embrace the negative’s epistemological standpoint as a furthering of deconstruction that problematizes status quo epistemology. The friction between the 1AC and 1NC methodologies are able to induce new tropes of political reality via deconstructive juxtaposition.

Spivak ‘97 [an Indian theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, where she is a founding member of the school's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, “Jacques Derrida OF GRAMMATOLOGY” Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” <http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1_3997.pdf>]

Speaking of the hymen, Derrida emphasizes the role of the blank spaces of the page in the play of meaning. Analogically, Derrida himself often devotes his attention to the text in its margins, so to speak. He examines the minute particulars of an undecidable moment, nearly imperceptible displacements, that might otherwise escape the reader’s eye. Reading Foucault, he concentrates on three pages out of 673. Reading Rousseau, he chooses a text that is far from “central.” Reading Heidegger, he proceeds to write a note on a note to Sein and Zeit. His method, as he says to Jean-Louis Houdebine, perhaps a little too formulaically, is reversal and displacement. It is not enough “simply to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics.” We must recognize that, within the familiar philosophical oppositions, there is always “a violent ((lxxvii)) hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first .. . to overthrow [renverser] the hierarchy.” (Pos F 57, Pos E. I. 36) To fight violence with violence. In the Grammatology this structural phase would be represented by all those pages where, all apologies to the contrary, the polemical energy seems clearly engaged in putting writing above speech. But in the next phase of deconstruction, this reversal must be displaced, the winning term put under erasure. The critic must make room for “the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept,’ a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms of the previous regime [system of oppositions].” In terms of our book, this would be the aspect that “allows for the dissonant emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the received order and invading the whole sphere of speech” (Pos E I. 36). To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. Deconstruction in a nutshell. But take away the assurance of the text’s authority, the critic’s control, and the primacy of meaning, and the possession of this formula does not guarantee much. Why should we undo and redo a text at all? Why not assume that words and the author “mean what they say?” It is a complex question. Here let us examine Derrida’s most recent meditation upon the desire of deconstruction. Derrida acknowledges that the desire of deconstruction may itself be-come a desire to reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it “does not know.” And as she deconstructs, all protestations to the contrary, the critic necessarily assumes that she at least, and for the time being, means what she says. Even the declaration of her vulnerability must come, after all, in the controlling language of demonstration and reference. In other words, the critic provisionally forgets that her own text is necessarily self-deconstructed, always already a palimpsest. The desire of deconstruction has also the opposite allure. Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality —by thus “placing in the abyss” (mettre en abîme), as the French expression would literally have it—it shows us the lure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom.Thus a further deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the search for a foundation (the critic behaving as if she means what she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless. The tool for this, as ((lxxviii)) indeed for any deconstruction, is our desire, itself a deconstructive and grammatological structure that forever differs from (we only desire what is not ourselves) and defers (desire is never fulfilled) the text of our selves. Deconstruction can therefore never be a positive science. For we are in a bind, in a “double (read abyssal) bind,” Derrida’s newest nickname for the schizophrenia of the “sous rature.” 81 We must do a thing and its opposite, and indeed we desire to do both, and so on indefinitely. Deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhabited by differance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or deconstructed. Yet the critic provisionally musters the metaphysical resources of criticism and performs what declares itself to be one (unitary) act of deconstruction. As I point out on pages Ixxxi–lxxxii, the kinship with Freud’s interminable and terminable analysis, involving both subject and analyst, is here not to be ignored.

#### Deconstruction is decolonization – destabilizing Eurocentrism is a prerequisite for engaging in questions of colonialism.

Drabiniski ’13 [John E. Drabinski, Professor of Black Studies in the [Department of Black Studies](https://www.amherst.edu/academiclife/departments/black_studies) at Amherst College, “Derrida, Eurocentrism, decolonization” December 21, 2013][http://jdrabinski.wordpress.com/2013/12/21/derrida-eurocentrism-decolonization/ - respond](http://jdrabinski.wordpress.com/2013/12/21/derrida-eurocentrism-decolonization/#respond)

While I am not the biggest advocate of Aimé Césaire’s work, I’ve always been taken in – in ways that would take more words than I write below to explain – by his comment at the beginning of Discourse on Colonialism that European culture issick. That bit from Césaire came to mind when I came across [this short piece by Simon Glendinning](http://blog.oup.com/2012/04/derrida-european-philosophy-eurocentrism/" \t "_blank) the other day, which discusses Jacques Derrida’s work on Europe, Eurocentrism, and deconstructive critique. Glendinning’s piece is short, so I don’t want to subject it to too rigorous a reading, but it does make clear and explicit declarations, and it underscores an important difference, for me, between the rhetoric of “Eurocentrism” and of “decolonization.” In a certain sense, the two terms share an important family resemblance in antagonism. Glendinning here characterizes Eurocentrism as the view that Europe is the model, the avant garde, and therefore “the best example.” That’s true, and I’d summarize such a view, borrowing from Fanon’s early work, as “taking itself as its own measure.” In that sense, Eurocentrism is a key component of colonialism not just as a political and economic relation, but as a cultural project: taking itself as its own measure, Europe could do its violent work across the globe without ever being put in question by the victims. Further, and doubling the violence, taking itself as its own measure underpinned the missionary relation as civilizing force that figured as central to global domination after conquest and enslavement. Conversion to European languages and values (in the broadest sense) becomes equivalent to installing civilization where none previously existed. Derrida’s work (Glendinning’s focus), as the thinker himself came to articulate clearly late in his career, ought to be read as a contestation of this centrism. By reading the tradition against itself, the European tradition is destabilized and, I gather (I’ve never quite understood this last moment), shifted away from the self-assigned privilege of being the measure of the world. Because that’s what, on Glendinning’s interpretation, Eurocentrism is all about: the measure of the world. You can’t separate Eurocentrism from colonialism and imperial domination. Perhaps, then, there is (or wants to be) an implicit connection between critiquing Eurocentrism and contesting colonialism in all of its forms. Glendinning co-signs to this project. He does make a juxtaposition, however, that I want to question. Against the critique of Eurocentrism, Glendinning opposes anti-Eurocentrism, which he characterizes in a general way, with Derrida’s words, as a “critical fury” that “condemns” and “rejects” Eurocentrism and replaces it with (self-) loathing. I find that turn in Glendinning’s and Derrida’s analysis interesting and troubling, initially because it pathologizes critique at the affective level. Critics suffer from rage and loathing. And what could be healthy about that? I would say that rage and loathing are completely reasonable responses to multiple centuries of conquest, domination, enslavement, and waging war. So, it’s not clear to me why fury, condemnation, and rejection are problematic. But that’s not my point. What I think Glendinning’s and Derrida’s critical orientation reveals is an important difference between criticizing Eurocentrism and engaging in the work of decolonizing thought. The former wants to de-emphasize and relativize the European tradition by acknowledging excess and, perhaps, pathologizing the erotic relation Western intellectuals often have to European history and thought. I like that. But it doesn’t go nearly far enough. The latter, decolonizing thought, asks more destabilizing questions. What is the relationship between foundational insights and claims in a tradition (or a given thinker) and practices of colonial domination? How is the subconscious of the European tradition (or a given thinker) structured by the desire to take one’s self as measure, and so desire a kind of domination of the interior life of Europe’s others? And of course [what I noted in a previous post](http://jdrabinski.wordpress.com/2013/12/09/on-decolonizing-the-colonizer/" \t "_blank): where are all the non-European thinkers in the texts of the European tradition, especially the allegedly radical tradition in Europe? This is key. Decolonizing thought means not simply letting Europeans question Europe – a gesture that seems as casually colonial as any other – but rather unleashing the often destructive force of a thought from the other inside the European text. What would it mean, for example, to read The Wretched of the Earth inside of Totality and Infinity, both of which were released in 1961? Totality and Infinity is not the same. That is for sure. And this is a very different kind of deconstruction than one that wants to protect Europe from being consumed by its own crimes. Look, I love Derrida’s work. The truth is, for all of my writing on Levinas early in my writerly career through the present, my thinking (and my imagination of Levinas) has always been very close to Derridean deconstruction. It is an important approach, and Glendinning shows in this brief piece how Derrida’s critical engagement is never polemical. I wouldn’t go so far as to imagine that deconstruction means, as Glendinning puts it, “[t]his European legacy of responsible and relentless self-critique is what Derrida wanted to save, to preserve, and to radicalise.” Except that Derrida’s practice, and Glendinning provides the key quotation here, wants to protect Europe from being “defined only by its crimes.” So maybe in the hands of Europeans directing discourse back to Europe, it is just this fantasy of self-critique. Where does that desire come from? Why, from the outset, ought we presume that crimes are somehow at critical distance from the methods and content of the tradition? Why not begin with the presumption that the tradition is intimately involved with the crimes, both as effective agents and as modes of justification? After all, plenty of work has been done over the past two decades exploring how the formerly characterized as “occasional pieces or comments” by folks like Locke or Kant or Hegel are absolutely central to the broader projects of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. If we entangle the very marrow of tradition, as it were, with the crimes of Europe, then we aren’t so well-positioned to declare at the outset that the European tradition is fundamentally good and just in its striving. In fact, we might discover the opposite. Or even just something different. All of this is to say, if a critique of Eurocentrism is undertaken without attention to the entanglement of foundational questions with the multi-centuries crimes of the region called Europe, then something fundamental about colonialism is never questioned – namely, the privilege, always self-assigned, of being the measure of yourself. One cannot decide the relation to crimes from the outset – who has shown us better than Derrida how such decisions are repetitions and doublings of violence? As well, Derrida’s own conception of the supplement is helpful here: an other (here, perhaps, the colonized) identified at the heart of a text (here, perhaps, the European tradition) that renders the text so unstable that it can no longer justify rights to its former name. After that instability? We cannot know before the work of critique is done. To assign the name and meaning to Europe and its tradition ahead of time – clinging to this myth of “relentless self-critique” that has never actually implicated itself in conquest and colonial domination – is to undertake no critique at all.

#### The presencing of the Native subject is a precondition for the production of American identity. Exposing how power constitutes the American narrative is a prerequisite to action.

Trapani, 2002 (William, Asst. Professor in Department of Communication Studies (Rhetorical Theory and Criticism, Critical and Cultural Theory, and the Rhetoric of Visual Culture) @ Wayne State University, Winter, “RE/COGNIZING NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF MANIFEST MANNERS,” The Journal of Law in Society, Lexis)

Far from resolving these questions, the Hearing restaged the primacy and complexity of these concerns. On the one hand, Rose's faith in a secular epistemology was rebuffed by the bill's eventual defeat as well as by the votes' implicit statement that the process of seeing and recognizing the Other is never as transparent as it seems**.** Indeed, as James Clifford astutely noted in his ethnographic account of the Mashpee Indians' own recognition trial:[P]owerful ways of looking thus became inescapably problematic. The trial was less a search for the facts of Mashpee Indian culture and history than it was an experiment in translation, part of a long historical conflict and negotiation of 'Indian' and 'American' identities. n6 Representation, or ways of looking, is always more opaque than we can imagine, clouded by attachments that may not be readily apparent to even the most astute of observers. Moreover, because representations are "employed as a truth-effect for the establishment of discursive and representational notions of the real," n7 they are never devoid of the types of relations that seek to maintain power for the one representing against the one being represented. On the other hand, Campbell's capitulation warns of another aspect of recognition and representation. There is an inherent danger for marginalized subjects when inhabiting recognizable spaces even when comporting with what is thought of as self-identity. This is so because [\*4] that subject position may be authored by a dominant political order seeking to restrict the subject's agency. […] The recognition process, and the faithful participation in it by many tribes seeking recognition, may induce a dangerous complacency. The danger is that self- proximity of the subject's identity is fixed so exclusively to federal acknowledgement that the political freedom it allows comes to be seen as an end in itself. As such, recognized tribes may be indebted to the Anglo-Euramerican order in ways preventing the opportunity to challenge those very structures placing them at a material and cultural disadvantage.The Lumbee are unique among most American Indian peoples in that they have yet to succeed in their petition for legal recognition as a tribe. Nevertheless, they share one characteristic common to all Native Americans. They are recognizable as Native Americans only to the degree that they conform to representations of the proper Indian subject constructed by the present Anglo-Euramerican cultural order. "[T]he Indian is the simulation of a logocentric other." n21 However, the more redolent implication is that the American Indian has internalized the paleonymic codes so that they are recognizable to themselves only when they comport to that simulation. n22Gayatri Spivak has persuasively argued that the space afforded to colonized subjects is fraught with problematic and indecipherable politics. n23 In the effort to be seen as they "really are," or to be finally "heard," marginalized subjects may advance the dominant political order by inhabiting manageable subject positions that constrict their sovereignty. n24 […] As I will demonstrate in the next section, the federal recognition process relies upon an effort to establish fidelity to an "originary" identity in a manner that contains the Native subject as the tragic victim of the dominant national character**.** For essential reasons, this character depends on the existence of the authentically "pure" Indian as its pre- condition.Governmentality is forever trying to create a united populace under the idea of sovereignty, but to be practical about this it must divide that nominally unitary group into separate problems and powers. Its apparent ideological running mate, a national identity, is increasingly troubled by this very problem: "we" need to be more unified because of the effects of globalization on both demographics and representation, so "we" need to call on a shared [\*11] heritage. But that heritage is invented, again and again, in reaction to these contemporary difficulties. n26Contrary to our modern readings of frontier narratives, Gerald Vizenor argues, the early contacts between Indians and Anglo-Euramerican explorers/colonizers were not marked by the latter's fear of stumbling across some wild and threatening Indians, but by the desire for their presence. n27 Indeed, the diaries of early colonizers like Lewis and Clark reveal how the very success of the colonizing mission depended on the presence of natives seeing the explorers as they made their way through the land. Lewis wrote, "we begin to feel considerable anxiety with respect to the Snake Indians, if we do not find them or some other nation who have horses I fear the successful issue of our voyage will be very doubtful." n28 And, "I was overjoyed at the sight of this stranger and had no doubts of obtaining a friendly introduction to his nation provided I could get near enough to him to convince him of our being whitemen." n29As Larzer Ziff noted:[T]he greatest danger the Indians could pose for Lewis and Clark arose from their absence rather than their presence.What was later to be a cliche in Western adventure fiction, the white man's seeing Indians and taking care to remain unseen by them, was reversed as they strained to see the Indians who they knew were seeing them in order to enter into dealings with them.Ziff's words describe one of the fundamental characteristics of the Anglo- Euramerican's relationship with the "Indian:" in order to define [\*12] itself, the Anglo-Euramerican order has insisted on establishing the presence or "presencing," of the Indian subject. The order required a recognizable Native figure by which it may be seen.Why would the Anglo-Euramerican and the American nation need to be seen via a Native American subject? Susan Scheckel has suggested that the American nation has insisted upon the "Indian" figure as a way of tying itself to the continent, of grounding the new democracy and social experiment in a set of values that could then be described as uniquely American. In other words, to justify both the revolutionary violence that founded the nation and to quell the possibility of an endless cycle of revolutions if discontent arose, the American experience had to be narrativized in such a way that it appeared both natural and timeless. The "Indian" provides such an opportunity.As Scheckel argues:Indians were often proposed as the perfect subject matter for a national literature. On a purely aesthetic level, the association of the Indians with the distant past, together with popular conceptions of their status as a dying race, made them an appealingly romantic subject. More important, Indians were a uniquely American subject..Indians could be claimed as America's Gauls and Goths; they represented the pre-history of the nation, offering the means to locate the origins of the nation in a distant, almost mythic past.[B]y claiming Indians, with their long history and mysterious origins, as part of their own national story, nineteenth- century Americans found a way to ground national identity in the distant, inaccessible, 'immemorial past.' n30None of this should suggest that the Anglo-Euramerican representation(s) of Native American figures are a singular and univocal identity. Indeed, part of the power and utility in the "invented Indian" lies in the complex ambivalence coded into the various representations of Native American figures. The literature and public debate concerning the "Indian problem" could veer between depictions of the noble (not quite civilized) Indian and the savage killer and still preserve the value [\*13] of the Native figure precisely because Indians were such liminal figures. White culture writes what is needed for its own preservation into the Native American representation(s). As Aimee Carillo Rowe has suggested, "the primitive body performs the functions that are necessary for whiteness to remain disembodied. The complex and contradictory affect associated with the primitive body - the fear and loathing, the excessive sexuality, the erotic, the exotic -formulate this body as a powerful interpellative site for the white subject." n31 Writing the nation upon the marked primitive body served **(**serves) to power the nation with an endless supply of "inherently American" qualities**.** As it was with Lewis and Clark's expedition, the presencing of the Indian subject became a precondition for the production of the American citizenry: alternatively fetishized and disavowed, the "recognizable Indian" became the conduit by which Americans would come to define themselves.

#### Deconstruction solves – problematizes the homogeneity of Anglo-Euroamerican culture.

Trapani, 2002 (William, Asst. Professor in Department of Communication Studies (Rhetorical Theory and Criticism, Critical and Cultural Theory, and the Rhetoric of Visual Culture) @ Wayne State University, Winter, “RE/COGNIZING NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF MANIFEST MANNERS,” The Journal of Law in Society, Lexis)

The "serious consequences" discussed are the possibility that an impure and potentially uncontrollable Native population might run rampant, disrupting the guardian/ward, or, perhaps worse, the potential vanishing of real or "proper" Indians. Vizenor's claim that the Anglo-Euramerican sense of plenitude needs a witness or the presencing of the Other appears particularly pertinent here. n39 From the first contacts between the indigenous people of the continent and the Anglo-Euramerican, the primitive body (politic) of the Indian has been used as that witness. But, in important ways, the eroticization and abjection of the Native American cannot serve as a technology of dominance if the distinct and discernible "Indian" has disappeared or been eroded by Anglo-Euramerican colonization. Thus, the possibility that the Anglo-Euramerican would be denied the opportunity to resource the primitive because there are no more "pure primitives" results in a crisis.Jacques Derrida noted that the center of a "sign" structure is that very thing which escapes notice because all others revolve around it in Copernican fashion. n40 The institutionalization of the sign "Indian," preserves a legal sovereign authority (the Anglo-Euramerican arbiter of "fact") and ensures that departures from the standard are denigrated in the name of the sanctity of the archive. Even as the recognition records are guarded by the Anglo-Euramerican agents, it is done in a way made to appear natural and without interference because the original assumption, the pre-condition for the existence of the archive, is effaced. In an absolute manner, anything that threatens the homogeneity of the archive also threatens the invisibility of the center. In this case the threat is the presumption of Anglo-Euramerican plenitude because it might reveal the interested and essential act of violence by which the archive is "housed." By excluding the "inauthentic" from the archive**,** [\*19] the assumptions of (racial) Anglo-Euramerican superiority are elided and made to disappear in the technocratic determination of the (Indian) Proper name.Given all of this, what is at stake for Native Americans in the federal recognition process, and what is the likelihood that recognition offers the "redemption" non-recognized tribes increasingly appear to be ascribing to it? In her essay, Scattered Speculations on the Question of Cultural Studies, Gayatri Spivak urges caution to those that equate constitutional acts with a concomitant level of justice even though those acts might be done "in their name." Indeed, she suggests, it is because constitutions can only operate by coding a person "intoa rational abstraction manipulable according to the principle of reason" that they operate at a level apart from the subject, or the universal-in-singular ethical agent." n41 Put differently, while legislative acts, and in particular the "highest" of those acts - which appeal to the spirit of "The People" - might offer the promise of the legitimation of their recipient, they do so in name only. Furthermore, they may not alter the material conditions which positioned the subject in need of redress in the first place.Like a computer program, these constitutional moments code the intended benefactor along the model of simulated persons so that to qualify for the right or privilege extended, the subject must conform to the abstraction**.** Moreover, the codes work by abstracting the critical differences between the petitioning group and the authorizing agent, so that even as they may "succeed" in garnering legal "cover" in one arena, they are also constituted as a vulnerable and radically Other that depends on a potentially capricious dominant authority for protection.How might such a "coding" be operative in the Native American case? First, because the recognition criteria presume models of governmentality "recognizable" and akin to the Anglo-Euramerican model, potential applicants must demonstrate that they match a particular form of tribal organization. There must be a centralized leadership, indeed, an "autonomous" one according to the code, which has existed over time. That organizing body must "behave" in ways roughly analogous to the Anglo- Euramerican model: it must register its [\*20] "citizen-members," it must detail and record their ancestry and life practices in a similar way to the dominant society (e.g. record births, deaths, marriages, etc.), and it must strive to maintain a sense of continuous coherence from the moment of European contact. In other words, the code can only "recognize" Native Americans because they are already recognizable. As such, historically embedded notions of what a proper tribe may "look like" provides privilege for some tribes while denigrating others.

#### There can be no separation from reason – only a deconstruction of rationality and freedom can appropriate those concepts in a counter-hegemonic manner.

Derrida ‘3 [Jacques Derrida, THE “WORLD” OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO COME (EXCEPTION, CALCULATION, SOVEREIGNTY)\* 2003 Pg. 43-44]

What must be thought here, then, is this inconceivable and unknowable thing, a freedom that would no longer be the power of a subject, a freedom without autonomy, a heteronomy without servitude, in short, something like a passive decision. We would thus have to rethink the philosophemes of the decision, of activity and passivity, as well as potentiality and actuality. It is thus rational, legitimately rational, to interrogate or deconstruct—without however discrediting—the fertile distinction between constative and performative. Similarly, beyond law, debt, and duty, it would be necessary to rethink rationally a hyperethics or hyper-politics that does not settle for acting simply “according to duty ( pichtmässig)” or even (to take up the Kantian distinction that founds practical reason) “from duty” or “out of pure duty (eigentlich 44 jacques derrida aus Picht, aus reiner Picht).”12 Such a hyper-ethics or hyper-politics would carry us unconditionally beyond the economic circle of duty or of the task (Picht or Aufgabe), of the debt to be reappropriated or annulled, of what one knows must be done, of what thus still depends on a programmatic and normative knowledge that need only be carried out. The hiatus between these two equally rational postulations of reason, this excess of a reason that of itself exceeds itself and so opens onto its future, its to-come, its becoming, this exposition to the incalculable event, would also be the irreducible spacing of the very faith, credit, or belief without which there would be no social bond, no address to the other, no uprightness or honesty, no promise to be honored, and so no honor, no faith to be sworn or pledge to be given. This hiatus opens the rational space of a hypercritical faith, one without dogma and without religion, irreducible to any and all religious or implicitly theocratic institutions. It is what I’ve called elsewhere the awaiting without horizon of a messianicity without messianism. It goes without saying that I do not detect here even the slightest hint of irrationalism, obscurantism, or extravagance. This faith is another way of keeping within reason [raison garder], however mad it might appear. If the minimal semantic kernel we might retain from the various lexicons of reason, in every language, is the ultimate possibility of, if not a consensus, at least an address universally promised and unconditionally entrusted to the other, then reason remains the element or very air of a faith without church and without credulity, the raison d’être of the pledge, of credit, of testimony beyond proof, the raison d’être of any belief in the other, that is, of their belief and of our belief in them—and thus also of any perjury. For as soon as reason does not close itself off to the event that comes, the event of what or who comes, assuming it is not irrational to think that the worst can always happen, and well beyond what Kant thinks under the name “radical evil,” then only the infinite possibility of the worst and of perjury can grant the possibility of the good, of veracity and sworn faith. This possibility remains infinite, but as the very possibility of an auto-immunitary finitude.

#### Mignolo’s search for truth and structure reifies the exclusionary framework he contests.

Alcoff 7 [Linda Martín Alcoff Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 7, Number 3, Winter 2007, pp. 79-101 (Article) Published by Michigan State University Press DOI: 10.1353/ncr.0.0008]

But I would press Mignolo on two points. Th e first concerns his notion of truth. Mignolo rejects the project of reclaiming epistemology and advocates for the shift to gnoseology, because he sees epistemology as fundamentally a project that is pursuant of truth, and because he sees truth as necessarily imperial, territorial, and denotative. But it is difficult to interpret Mignolo’s own project in any way other than as a project concerned with truth and with the way in which the colonial systems of knowing inhibited and precluded both the understanding and the identification of truth. Th e denotative approach might have limited application to the shift he has in mind, but there is still an epistemically based normative distinction operating in his critique of the coloniality of power. Take for example Mignolo’s use of Glissant’s concept of diversality, a concept he contrasts to universality but also to plurality in which alternatives are not in active integration or interaction. Diversality maps diff erences as coconstitutive and as potentially integrated, in the way that a bicultural identity can shift between multiple frames of reference without collapsing the diff erences but also without organizing them into hierarchies. As opposed to imperial resolutions, Glissant wants to maintain the fundamental ambiguity of colonial identity, that doubled reality that is alive to more than one “here and now.” Th is is not merely an ethically or politically motivated alternative to universality, I want to suggest, but a metaphysically motivated one. It is an alternative model for conceptualizing subjectivity and knowledge that might make sense of the existence of many worlds as well as to make visible their interrelationality and connectedness. Th is surely has political advantages, but it also can make possible an advance in descriptive adequacy for pluritopic horizons. Th us I would contest Mignolo’s claim that truth is out of the picture. And I would argue against the shift from epistemology to gnoseology (rather than redefining epistemology) if it is mainly motivated by a desire to dispense with truth. However, what is important here is not the word we use for the project so much as retaining the normative epistemic content to the project of critique and reconstruction that Mignolo and other postcolonialists want to pursue. If gnoseology can retain the critical and normative dimensions that aim to improve our understanding of truth, as well as the more inclusive aims in regard to forms of knowing, then I am on board.

#### Memory is not about preserving the past but turning towards the future. Reorienting the memory of the Enlightenment through deconstruction problematizes colonialism.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 170-172]

Derrida’s reflection on the Europe-to-come began in 1990 when he was asked by the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo to respond to the question of European cultural identity. It was just a few months after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Surprisingly, given his usual tendency to refrain from axiomatic statements, on that occasion Derrida did offer one: “What is proper to a culture is not to be identical with itself.”43 This assertion confirms his belief in the ethical value of heterogeneity and difference, which I addressed by discussing the exclusive and in­clusive function of geographical boundaries, including the Berlin Wall, in the second section of this essay. For Derrida, identity entails internal differentiation or, in his formulation, “difference with itself.” Indeed, self-relation produces culture; but there is no culture without a relation to the other. No culture has a single origin: it is in the very nature of culture to explore difference and to develop a systematic openness to­ward others within one’s culture as well as in other cultures. On the one hand, European cultural identity cannot be dispersed ... It cannot and must not be dispersed into a myriad of provinces, into a mul­tiplicity of self-enclosed idioms or petty little nationalisms, each one jeal­ous and untranslatable. It cannot and must not renounce places of great circulation or heavy traffic, the great avenues or thoroughfares of transla­tion and communication, and thus, of mediatization. But, on the other hand, it cannot and must not accept the capital of a centralizing authority that, by means of its trans-European mechanisms ... would control and standardize.44 Beyond Eurocentrism and anti-Eurocentrism, two programs that Der­rida characterizes as “unforgettable” but “exhausted,” what is the cul­tural identity that we are responsible for? What memory and what promise does the name Europe evoke? For whom and before whom are we responsible? Derrida lists two kinds of responsibility. There is responsibility toward memory and responsibility toward oneself. While responsibility toward oneself underlines die need for a personal and unconditional commitment to the process of decision-making, re­sponsibility towards memory calls for a historical self-understanding based on difference and heterogeneity.44 To be responsible for this memory of Europe, we need to transform it to the point of reinventing it. In this way, we won’t simply either repeat or abhor its name. This transformation will occur only if we accept the possibility of an impos­sibility, the experience of aporia. It is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of a difference of Europe, but of a Europe that consists precisely in not clos­ing itself off in its identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way to­wards what it is not, toward the other heading or the heading of the other.46 The notion of capital features in the title that Derrida gave to his short book on Europe: The Other Heading. The book is meant to respond to the political promise of a unified Europe by taking responsibility for Europe’s past—a past that Derrida hopes will both protect and redirect Europe to another heading, another destination. Geographically, Eu­rope has understood itself as a promontory, a cape or a headland: the extreme portion of Eurasia and the point of departure for discoveries and colonization. Even though the need for a physical capital, a single metropolis that has the function of the heart of a nation, has consider­ably aged, the “discourse of the capital” is still intact. This discourse is intertwined with the question of European identity. European culture is responsible for the emergence of the ideal of the nation-state “headed” by a capital city. Paris, Berlin, Rome, Brussels, Amsterdam, Madrid, are all capitals in this very strong sense. The word capital comes from the Latin for head, caput, which also appears in a variety of other expressions, such as the headlines of a newspaper or the head­ing, the title, of a book. Europe, for Derrida, is the name for the head­ing of culture, the exemplary heading of all cultures. Taking responsibility for Europe means responding to the com­plexity constituting its past, present, and future, and reinventing their relations. Sovereignty, which Derrida renames “discourse of the capi­tal” is first on the list. In order to reinvent Europe and, at the same time, taking responsibility for its heritage, we need to believe in paradoxical contaminations, such as “the memory of a past that has never been present,” or “the memory of the future.” After all, Derrida points out, the movement of memory is not necessarily tied to the past. Memory is not only about preserving and conserving the past, it is always already turned toward the future, “toward the promise, toward what is coming, what is arriving, what is happening tomorrow.”47 This other heading is the direction in which Europe, the actual Europe, should be traveling. This is also the direction toward a new form of sovereignty, urgently demanded if cosmopolitanism is to be­come a political reality in the post-9/11 world. This destination is nei­ther new nor old but the memory of a past that has never been present. This is the memory of the promise of the Enlightenment: freedom and equality for all.