# 1AC

### 1AC Rd 4 NDT

#### Drones have gotten a bad rap in the debate community so far. Conservative teams would have you believe that drones need to be reined in but have minimal collateral damage and are the best tool to keep democratic citizens safe, while liberal teams would have you believe that the U.S. is drunk with power in its usage of drones, slaughtering babies to hit the cell phone of a terrorist leader. Both and neither of these realities are true. Ignored from these conversations has been the intensification of the intimate forms of violence that drone pilots and their targets experience, commanded from afar by policy makers, drone pilots watch their targets die closer than ground troops did in Iraqi during combat. The human experience of war from the conversation has been ignored.

Holmqvist, 2013. (Caroline, Holmqvist. Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics, UK Swedish National Defense College, Sweden. Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare. May 1, 2013. <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/early> )

No doubt, drone warfare is infinitely more real for the populations amongst whom attacks take place, who risk being killed, losing loved ones or having their homes destroyed. Yet, while such arguments have understandable appeal, close study of drone operators’ activity yields a more complicated picture. Derek Gregory’s study of drone operators’ experience focuses on the ‘scopic regime’ that enables drone warfare in the first place and closely examines the different types of vision and imaging that drone operators are exposed to, from wide area airborne surveillance to the macro-field of micro-vision.24 These visibilities are conditional and conditioning because they are not merely technical feats but ‘techno-cultural accomplishments’.25 Rather than any straight- forward abstracting of war into a video game, the abstracting that takes place is convoluted and paradoxical. Contrary to common perception, drone warfare is ‘real’ also for those staring at a screen and, as such, the reference to video games is often simplistic. It s the *immersive* quality of video games, their power to draw players into their virtual worlds, that make them potent – this is precisely why they are used in pre-deployment training.26 The video streams from the UAV are shown to have the same immersive qual- ity on the drone operator – they produce the same ‘reality-effect’.¶ Virtual war, it seems, is less virtual than would appear at first glance. This conclusion is strengthened by the growing realisation that drone operators suffer as high, and possibly higher, rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as soldiers engaged in battle as a result of exposure to high-resolution images of killing, including the details of casualties and body parts that would never be possible to capture with the human eye.27 In other words, drone operators see *more* than soldiers in theatre. This is not to imply any trivialising parallels between operating drones from afar and physical engagement in battle, however. The view of the ‘hunter-killer’ is, in Gregory’s words, still privileged as the drone operator empathises with his fellow comrades on the ground in Afghanistan and feels compelled to ‘protect’ and ‘help’ them by instructing to shoot.28 Ultimately, the ‘drone stare’ still furthers the subjuga- tion of those marked as Other.29 What is of interest to us in examining the interaction of the virtual, material and human here, however, is that this occurs not through the experience (on the part of the drone operator) of distance, remoteness or detachment, but rather through the ‘sense of proximity’ to ground troops inculcated by the video feeds from the aerial plat- forms.30 The relationship between the fleshy body of the drone operator and the steely body of the drone and its ever-more sophisticated optical systems needs to be conceptualised in a way that allows for such paradoxes to be made intelligible.¶ Moreover, there is clearly a need to think of the study of the experience of war in new ways: if drone operators are not as shielded from the realities of war as is gener- ally assumed, what might they be bringing into the wider communities of which they are part? To what extent are their experiences theirs alone, and to what extent do we see them seeping out in a wider social corpus? In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, can we see the body (of the drone operator) ‘literally incarnating’ material capacities for agency, and thereby affecting the political disposition of a wider community?31 It is well estab- lished that soldiers returning from service run a higher risk of committing domestic violence, and the US military has an established programme for combating domestic violence.32 The high rate of PTSD amongst drone operators points to the need for follow-up studies of how these individuals behave in their home communities. By extension, this suggests that those interested in the experience of war need to include consideration also of the experience of – in this case – Nevada communities amidst which drone operators live. What such studies might yield we can only guess; yet it seems reasonable to suspect that the complex assemblage of virtual and material experiences that drone warfare produces might have its very own repercussions for processes and dynamics of societal militarisation and other manifestations of members’ violent experiences set in motion by, but far exceeding, war itself. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the human body is not separate from things, matter or representation; rather, ‘the flesh (of the world or my own) is ... a texture that returns to itself and conforms to itself’.33 Human bodies are ‘beings-in-the-world’,34 and the material ‘reality’ of robotic warfare, like the flesh of human bodies, is irredeemably generative. The fol- lowing section will expand on how.¶ Agentic Capacities of Material Objects¶ The targeting logic of drone warfare relies on a clear objectification of people, marking and classifying them as ‘targets’ of different ‘value’, with ‘high-value targets’ most hotly sought for capture or death, and the more recent expansion of targeting regimes to cover what are referred to as ‘low level fighters’.35 Advocates of decapitation strategies using drone warfare often rely on precisely such objectification of people.36 This is interesting in terms of what is revealed of the ethical relation between real people – in this case, seemingly allowing for the eschewal of any real encounter involving mutual recognition and recognisability37 – and raises interesting questions about the way in which that rela- tion is mediated by technology.

#### Today’s civilian is tomorrow’s terrorist, and today’s terrorist is tomorrow’s civilian. If the literature on targeted killing is teaching us anything it’s that these divisions are malleable. The idea that we can fly planes into a foreign country and rain death from the sky, without any way for affected populations to contest such violence, continually reproduces the need for strikes.

Schmidt 08 (Dennis J. Schmidt Who Counts? On Democracy, Power, and the Incalculable Research in Phenomenology 38 (2008) 228–243)

In place of any possible sovereign power, today we find the final possible alternative to the present shape of power. What is left as such an alternative is the power of individuals who stand completely apart from sovereignty and the turnover of power. We call such individuals “terrorists”—those whose power is terrible, terrifying, and monstrous—simply because the form of the power they express is outside that which has no outside. What is left, what is expressed by such power, is the assertion of unreason and real powerlessness in the form of the individual.30 What is left is irrational, incalculable, inefficient, non- sense. Such is the only remaining outside of power, and so long as there are no alternatives, such explosive expressions of powerlessness will not cease. Efforts to step outside the static tyranny of the new form of power as it is figured by globalized technology will always have something of desperation about them, something of nihilism, since it is a form of power that will not turn itself over. When the locus of power is no longer able to be contested, when power has calcified and become total leaving no alternative political power, then simple violence, naked brutality, is all that remains as a means of contesting the established power. There has always been political brutality and unspeakable violence; our age did not invent terror and horror. But our age has witnessed an intensification of certain dimensions of violence, an intensification changing the landscape of every exercise of power and turning the attempt to contest power into violence of a new order: open, public spaces can now be dangerous, no one is considered innocent, children have become weapons as well as targets, strangers are threatening, the material shapes of everyday life— airplanes, envelopes, shoes—are turned back upon individuals as weapons. Sovereign nations are not attacked, individuals are attacked. In short, the old forms by which those in power were confronted and power was contested have taken a new form, namely the form of raw violence, and the reason for this is that the power in power is itself a fundamentally new form. Or, so Heidegger would argue.¶ In the Greek world of its beginnings, democracy rested upon two sets of necessary conditions. The first of these conditions took the form of a prior agreement, the consent of all who would be citizens, to abide by the rule of the majority. This condition is met by individuals prior to any sense that there is a ␣␣␣␣␣. It is something of a pledge in which each person agrees to abide by a count, by numbers, that has yet to be tabulated. The second of the conditions requisite for democracy is, as Aristotle argued, the freedom of every individual, the absence of any coercion in matters of the democratic process, in the voice one has, and equally, the equality of all individuals when it comes to the matter of counting.31 These conditions are, of course, at odds: the first requires that each citizen be recognized as a singular being, an end unto him/herself, the second requires a reduction of each citizen to an abstract equality in which no one is different. If Heidegger’s claims about the present historical juncture are right, if we do indeed live in an age in which a sort of reduction to what is calculable is definitive, an age in which singularity is effaced, if not erased, then one can see how it is that the conditions of democratic life are in jeopardy. Despite the glaring inequities in the world, a curious equalization of everyone as an abstraction, as a simple number, is being achieved today, and at the same time, the singularity that is the locus of freedom seems more than ever to be alienated. Facing a form of power that will not turn over, the source of which will not change, any people, all peoples, seem to be in the strange condition of being outsiders.¶ If Heidegger’s argument about the nature of technological reason, the Gestell and Machenschaft, is right, then the possibilities of democracy in our time must indeed be considered in the light of the challenges of technological reason and the globalization that such rationality makes possible. Above all, one must ask how it is that we can preserve—or perhaps recover—an openness permitting the appearance of individuals in their singularity, that is, in their difference from others. One must also ask, just as urgently, how it is that power can transfer itself and not be calcified into one form. In other words, how it might be possible for history to begin again. Heidegger expressed a sense of helplessness before this question: “only a god can save us,” he said.32 That comment is not a declaration of faith; it is rather a statement of despair and hopelessness: we are powerless, only an outside, something beyond our understanding, can introduce change and set history into motion anew. It is not difficult to see the reasons for such a claim: globalization has, by virtue of the technologies that drive it and render it possible, shown itself to be a homogenization of the world and a shrinking of the spaces of political life, the spaces, that is, of differences. Nonetheless, one can still ask if this totalization and closure of the space of political life is indeed so seamless.

#### Drone pilots are confronted with the fluidity of the distinction between civilian and terrorist. The U.S. desire to pinpoint an inherently violent Other has triggered an autoimmune response where the war on terror has transformed into a war on alterity. The attempt to proscribe a response to the presencing of beings in zones of conflict makes violent political response inevitable.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 148-150]

In Derrida’s reading, 9/11 is the symptom of an autoimmune crisis oc­curring within the system that should have predicted it. Autoimmune conditions consist in the spontaneous suicide of the very defensive mechanism supposed to protect the organism from external aggres­sion. This is a mechanism by which, as Derrida noted, a living organ­ism “works to destroy its own protection, to immunize itself against its ‘own’ immunity.” Derrida counted three phases (temps) in the autoimmune crisis of which 9/11 is a symptom. The first phase is the Cold War, a war that was fought “in the head” more than on the ground or in the air. If we look at 9/11 from the standpoint of its continuity with the Cold War, it is easy to see that the hijackers who turned against the United States had been trained by the United States during the era of the Soviet inva­sion of Afghanistan. American weapons and intelligence have made an essential contribution to the Islamic Afghan fighters since the early 1980s, some of whom became the Taliban political elite that ruled Afghanistan under perhaps the most extreme implementation of shari‘a ever advanced. Possibly, said Derrida, 9/11 could be interpreted as the implosive finale of the Cold War, lulled by its own convolutions and contradictions. The second phase of the autoimmune crisis is what Derrida calls “worse than the Cold War” both historically and psychologically. While the Cold War was characterized by the possibility of balance be­tween two superpowers, it is impossible to build a balance with terror­ism because the threat does not come from a state but from incalculable forces and incalculable responsibilities. The dissemination of the nu­clear arsenal and the relative availability of bacteriological and chemical weapons is the reality on which terrorism impinges. George W. Bush’s proclamation that all the nations he accuses of harboring terrorism constitute an “axis of evil” speaks to the United States’ denial of the elusiveness of the forces of terror. Psychologically, “what is worse than the Cold War” foregrounds the temporality of trauma, which is oriented toward the future. Any traumatic experience wounds the future as much as the present. Play­ing on the French word for future, avenir, Derrida claims that since the threat haunts the future, in a sense, it is still to come (a venir). This pointing to the temporality of trauma is a direct follow-up to his dis­cussion of the significance of the choice of 9/11 as a name for the at­tacks. Like the fourth of July, recognized as Independence Day in the United States, or the first of May, recognized as Labor Day in Europe as well as in most countries around the world, 9/11 has the scope of monumentalizing the attacks. Since this monumentalization is in the interest of both the Western media and the terrorists, it adds another fold to the autoimmune reaction. This second phase of autoimmunity displays another important feature. By monumentalizing the terrorist attacks, the date 9/11 also de­clares that they are over. In so doing, it denies precisely the futurity of the threat, the possibility that the worst might still be to come. For Der­rida, the massive media reporting acted in sync with the naming of the attacks as 9/11. As the tragedy was still unfolding, he said, calling it 9/11 revealed the illusion that it was already over. The third and last phase of the autoimmune crisis is what Derrida calls “the vicious circle of repression.” It is the most obviously suicidal of the three because it describes the way in which, by declaring war against terrorism, the Western coalition engenders a war against itself. One function of the concept of autoimmunity is to act as a third term between the classical opposition of friend and foe. As we have seen, to identify a third term is a characteristically deconstructive move aimed at displacing the traditional metaphysical tendency to rely on ir­reducible pairs. Although the explicit discussion of autoimmunity is limited to three, it implicitly continues as Derrida sets out to call into question the distinction between war and terrorism. Wars have always been contaminated by terrorism through the in­timidation of civilians. Yet, even at the theoretical level, the distinction is impossible to draw. Suppose, he said in reference to Carl Schmitt, the German legal scholar,17 that a war can only be declared between two states, whereas terrorism is a conflict between forces other than a sovereign state. The political history of the term “terrorism” would easily contradict this definition, since terror has always been inflicted by sovereign states on their population or other populations, in peace­time as well as in wartime. The current usage of the term “terrorism” derives from the late phase of the French Revolution, when Robe­spierre’s Reign of Terror engaged in mass executions and purges of civilians. Robespierre inflicted terror in the name of a sovereign state; also, given that his declared objective was to rid France of all its inter­nal enemies, this early instance of terrorism seems to point precisely to the autoimmune element theorized by Derrida. This is not to deny that the terrorists justify themselves by presenting their attacks as responses to previous acts of terrorism conducted against them by a state. “Every terrorist in the world,” Derrida observed, “claims to be responding in self-defense to a prior terrorism on the part of a state, one that simply went by other names and covered itself with all sorts of more or less credible justifications.” To complicate the matter further, terrorists can be liberation fight­ers in one context and plain criminals in the veiy same context at a dif­ferent point in time. The Islamic guerrillas who fought against the So­viet invasion in the 1980s and became the new political leaders is an example. Another is the recent history of Algeria, Derrida’s home for the first nineteen years of his life. No one can deny that there was state terrorism during the French repres­sion in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. The terrorism carried out by the Al­gerian rebellion was long considered a domestic phenomenon insofar as Algeria was supposed to be an integral part of French national territory, and the French terrorism of the time (carried out by the state) was pre­sented as a police operation for internal security. It was only in the 1990s, decades later, that the French Parliament retrospectively conferred the status of “war'” (and thus the status of an international confrontation) upon this conflict so as to be able to pay the pensions of the “veterans” who claimed them. In Derrida’s mind, it is impossible to draw any distinctions regarding terrorism—between war and terrorism, state and nonstate terrorism, terrorism and national liberation movements, national and interna­tional terrorism. If it is so hard to meaningfully attach any predicates to it, it simply means that terrorism is irreducibly ineffable and enigmatic. This truth is hard to accept but even more dangerous to reject.

#### Deep and I think we should not targeted kill civilian (terrorists).

#### The juxtaposition of the civilian(terrorists) is an ethical response that fosters openness and refuses to impose order, containment, and domination onto such others. It problematizes the current order of politics by blurring the lines of identification. This aporia is the only way to move towards justice and is a precondition to ethics.

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In an unusually direct moment in his article, "Force of Law: The `Mystical Foundation of Authority'," Derrida makes the statement, "deconstruction is justice" (Derrida, 1992, 15). The question of the relationship between deconstruction and politics returns continuously to this claim. It also, of necessity, begs the question of what then is "deconstruction." In Spectres of Marx, Derrida describes deconstruction as "a motif." As well, in a comparison with Marxist philosophy he suggests that what he is doing is "a performative interpretation": "An interpretation that transforms what it interprets is definitive of the performative as unorthodox with regard to speech act theory as it is with regard to the 11 th Thesis on Feuerbach ( `The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however is to change it')" (Derrida, 1994, 51). Elsewhere, in the same text, Derrida uses the term "infinite critique" to describe his approach: A deconstructive thinking, the one that matters to me here, has always pointed out the irreducibility of affirmation and therefore of the promise, as well as the undeconstructibility of a certain idea of justice.... Such a thinking cannot operate without justifying the principle of a radical and interminable, infinite (both theoretical and practical, as one used to say) critique. This critique belongs to the movement of an experience open to the absolute future of what is coming, that is to say, a necessarily indeterminate, abstract, desert-like experience that is confided, exposed, given up to its waiting for the other and for the event. (Derrida, 1994, 90.) What this experience of "infinite critique" or this "motif" of deconstruction appears as, is a series of maneuvers performed on texts. These maneuvers seem designed to interrupt our confidence in meaning, and in the categories through which we organize meaning, by making these apparent, by playing with them, and by indicating the arbitrariness of their boundaries or oppositions. Deconstructive practices consist in a combination of wordplay, of play on metaphors, of taking things "to extremes," of introducing apparently unrelated texts as parallel to the central one and reading them alongside it, interweaving the multiple texts until meanings become jumbled, and new and unexpected meanings begin to emerge. The overall effect is to unsettle a text, to disturb any straightforward reading of it, to eventually abandon questions about authorial intention, to set the text adrift, as it were. And why is this "justice"? First, because of the "aporia" that it introduces - the sense of confusion that is in fact the "true" or "honest" and "ethical" response to and perception of the world. I use the word "honest" because what is other is truly other, and therefore finally unknowable - one is only being honest in an acknowledgment of this. And second, this is "ethical" because categories of meaning, it would seem, are imposed by us, onto others and otherness as a way of ordering, containing, and therefore dominating what is "other to ourselves." Language is a necessary violence for which deconstruction is the just or ethical response. What is true, then (in the understanding of the world that Derrida provides through deconstruction), is inadequation, non-commensurability, disjointedness. The ethical response is a recognition of this unknowability, a suspicion of all self-certainty. The political response is one of a corresponding openness, a promise of "democracy-tocome" (a promise which Derrida also assures us can never be wholly realizable in the present, in any present). At stake here is the very concept of democracy as concept of a promise that can only arise in such a diastema (failure, inadequation, disjunction, disadjustment, being "out of joint"). That is why we always propose to speak of a democracy to come, not of future democracy in the future present, not even of a regulating idea, in the Kantian sense, or of a utopia - at least to the extent that their inaccessibility would still retain the temporal form of a future present, of a future modality of a living present (Derrida, 1994, 64-5.)

#### We think debate matters, that debate is a unique political space. It is here that we see an intersection of citizenship, politics, law, and democracy. Debate gestures towards democracy to come, an open hospitable environment characterized by radically different views of what matters. How we conceptualize polarized others in this space matters, the openness to terrorism has the possibility of a different conceptualization of difference outside of the rubric of security and extermination.

Kuswa and Walsh ’07 (Arguing War in an Era of Terrorism: “Democracy to Come” and Critical Pedagogy Kevin Kuswa and Briann Walsh (CONTROVERSIA Volume 5 Issue 2 <http://www.idebate.org/resources/publications/controversia.php> )

Our argument updates the insights of critical pedagogy by re-thinking the way the Other is conceived during times of conflict. Most importantly, the emerging era of terrorism and security intensifies the importance of reinvigorating our educational priorities, striving to achieve space for cultural difference and dissent, an interdisciplinary perspective, a critique of a polarized and pre-existing Other, and citizenship built on critical thinking. As might be expected, critical pedagogy comes full circle back to Derrida’s defense of democracy. Education is one place where opportunities are generated, conceivably the most significant place where citizenship, the law, the nation-state, and even the political are hatched and developed. Derrida, in a rare moment where he advocates political action, discusses a notion of democracy outside sovereignty, in a place where subjects are not pre-defined by citizenship, the law, the nation-state, or even world-citizenship. This move requires rethinking what politics is about, broadening our roles as teachers and students: This is no small task...What I call ‘democracy to come ’ would go beyond the limits of cosmopolitanism, that is, of a world citizenship. It would be more in line with what lets singular beings (anyone)‘live together.’...That said, and because all of this will remain for some time out of reach, I believe that everything must be done to extend the privilege of citizen- ship in the world. (130) To continue the necessary resuscitation of democracy in Derrida’s sense, a critical pedagogy in an era of conflict and terrorism demands another look. The aim of articulating a non-mediating rhetoric is to resist deployments of education that would craft an expansive and violent Other under the signs of security and counter-terrorism. Our argument ends and begins from the position that practices of critical pedagogy in an argumentation studies setting (“What is terrorism?”) mark a potential response to violence and a polarized Other. The stakes are large in that the underlying issue is how to address local and global strategies of fear, oppression, control, annihilation, and extermination. An open-ended critical pedagogy informed by Derrida’s concept of a “democracy to come” and Dewey’s advocacy of a politics “against war” can work toward expressive engagements between selves and Others. Our era of fear and war based on terrorism and counter-terrorism requires a vision of a radical, even if impossible, democracy. More specifically, the abandonment of war in certain instances becomes a call symbolizing the need to encounter the Other without judgment or mediating rhetoric, a critical connection to teaching and learning that argues war to transcend.

#### Politics has been ceded to the think tanks, tested in focus groups than formulated into law. The entire system would be laughable if it wasn’t our current political context. This engagement with stupidity begs for deconstruction. Our politics is one that is allergic to policy itself, an issue for the public as well as the policy maker. This difference from policy is exactly what makes democracy thinkable it is a politics that lends way to agency.

Mcquillan 08 (Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

In order for politics to be thinkable there must be some moment at which thought moves over into politics. Now, one could pick at this opening sentence for some time, books could be written and research projects designed to interrogate whether it is true or not. Its truth or otherwise will certainly depend upon what one means here by 'politics' (twice and non-identically), 'thinkable', 'some moment', 'thought', 'moves over', and indeed 'into', none of this is without consequence for either deconstruction or truth. However, allow me momentarily to place my own opening sentence in inverted commas, as if it had been spoken by someone else and with the authority of a someone else. Allow me the In order for politics to be thinkable there must be some moment at which thought moves over into politics. Now, one could pick at this opening sentence for some time, books could be written and research projects designed to interrogate whether it is true or not. Its truth or otherwise will certainly depend upon what one means here by 'politics' (twice and non-identically), 'thinkable', 'some moment', 'thought', 'moves over', and indeed 'into', none of this is without consequence for either deconstruction or truth. However, allow me momentarily to place my own opening sentence in inverted commas, as if it had been spoken by someone else and with the authority of a someone else. Allow me the considerable license of taking this quotation as axiomatic for what is to follow even if both you and I do not believe it as a statement of fact, or at least even if you and I do not quite believe it as a statement of fact because we are more than capable of acting upon it in good faith as if it were fact. Such a statement is a seduction to short-circuit thinking. It asks us not to look at it - do not question me, take me as 'read.' In this sentence, one can find a concentrated example of the logo-rhetorical illusion that is the predicate of politics, in which politics and thought separate themselves into conceptual spheres just as these spheres emerge from the mediated, supplatory conceptualisation in which thought and politics are inextricably bound one to the other. However, today I am in the mood to be seduced and there are ways in which one can, more or less, give oneself up strategically to such overtures. Imagine for a moment that both thought and politics were imaginable outside of mediation and that one followed the other as day follows night and that one could be translated into the other by some alchemical process. Then imagine the consequences of this for politics. If one were able to momentarily suspend all this disbelief (as if 'deconstruction' and centuries of politics had never happened) then we would find ourselves in the position of the policy maker. This is not a new position to be in but one that has a certain visibility today in the technocratic space of liberal democracies. Today, 'policy making' is out- sourced to so-called 'think tanks' where policy is formulated and road- tested on 'focus groups' before being adopted (or paid for) by political parties, diluting to taste. 'Policy' is one of those obscure words of the modern political lexicon; nothing could be more vague or less well understood than this term, which of course means that it is invoked ubiquitously without reflection. The basic assumption of policy, as an idea, is the logo-rhetorical illusion par excellence that theory translates (and is translate-able in principle) into practice. Policy then becomes law, as if the transmission of the law were itself a straightforward and transparent thing. One might laugh at such a naive, 'un-deconstructed' notion, if it were not for the fact that this is how the world is run. The comedian Ken Dodd says of Freud's formulation of laughter as a release of psychic energy: 'the problem with Freud is that he never played the Glasgow Empire.' Equally, the problem with the deconstruction of policy might be that the White House has yet to open itself to a policy of deconstruction. I want to ask in this essay, what would such a policy or set of policies look like, if they were imaginable? This is not to suggest that, after his death, the writing of Derrida might give rise to a set of 'practical' political policies, as the texts of Marx and Lenin were 'read' as the biblical revelation of an onto-theo-politics. Rather, it is to accept Roland Barthes' caution that one cannot simply exclude oneself from the discourse of stupidity. 'I don't mean that one can't be innocent of it', he told Jean-Jacques Brochier in 1975, 'that would be bad faith, but one can't be innocent of it *simply .* .. In any case, stupidity's mode of being is triumph. One can do nothing against stupidity. One can only internalize it, take a small homeopathic dose of it - but not too much' (Barthes 1985, 224). Think of this then as a hypothesis, what analytic philosophy would call a thought experiment. It is certainly not a bid for interpretative rights to the text of Derrida or the political futures of deconstruction, whatever such a word continues to mean. I am also reminded here of another caution, that of Edward Said who had little time for what he called 'travelling theory' (Said 1994, 389 and Said 1991, 226-47), whereby specialization as a mode of professionalisation within the academy comes to serve the interests of policy makers. His complaint is against the professional production of specialists on the 'Orient' who sell their expertise to the government and media while having their appearance in the government or media affirm their expertise. While the very idea of 'policy' no doubt marks an important, and not easily dismissed, transformation in the arena of competency of both party politicians and academics, it calls out for deconstruction. That is a deconstruction of its very premises as the dialectical-complex and unholy alliance between the techno-scientific, global economy and the technocratic university of specialisation in relation to a mediatic space, which presents one through the explanation of the other in terms of pragmatism, expediency, compromise or 'realism'. Here I am talking about a certain culture that we call politics, the properly political (the discourse of parties and politicians in governmental power across the world). As Derrida points out in *Specters of Marx,* in this culture 'virtually everywhere Western models prevail' (Derrida 1994, 52). This culture has always been bound to the culture of tele-technology, to mediation and representation. However, today, this relation is accelerated in an unprecedented fashion according to the rhythm of so-called 'communications' as the 'selective and hierarchized production of "information'" (Derrida 1994, 52) and its auto-immunised interpretation. The academic discourse of the technocratic university is welded to this apparatus in an indissociable way. It is almost impossible to watch a news programme without the appearance of an academic witness who provides the most banal and unscholarly of comments to justify or exemplify the content of a news item. Whole news items are nothing more than the appearance of academics to promote their 'research findings' or latest reports; entire university research strategies are written around the stated desire for such appearances. Which university does not now have a press office? In my institution at least half of the Faculties of the university (those that can afford them) have contracts with media consultants who are employed to write 'accessible' accounts of research activities with a view to placing stories in the media or promoting individuals to the level of media figure, talking head or guru. There is no point at whichh it is thought that academic research (another obscure term which we will need to tackle on another day) is inimical to this form of reductionism or that certain forms of thought might be allergic to passing through a me ia culture in this way. At any rate the idea of policy is related, in no doubt complex and over-determined, ways to this mutation in the channels which run between the academic and public spaces, which have more or less neutralised the notion of the public intellectual (another term we might caution against today given its historical relation to closely policed questions of propriety, gender, race and sexuality). A thinking of the relationship between the text of Derrida and the articulation of policy will necessarily involve a new thinking of the ground of policy and its relation to the media-political culture of today. What if it were possible to imagine something like a 'counter-policy', a thinking of policy as an intervention in the world that neither separated theory from practice nor accepted the easy place of the academic in the political-mediatic apparatus? What if it were possible to set policy- making against itself, to make policies to which policy was itself allergic? This would be an impossible policy, policy which understood the idea of policy to be impossible: policy without telos, policy without policy, policy no longer able to accept the name of policy but the only policy to be worthy of the name as an action in the material world. In imaging such a decentring of policy, one might also pertinently ask, does politics as such always imply an idea of policy in the same way that it always implies an idea of the human? That is to say does policy itself (as the pretext, off-spring and crafting of the moment of political antagonism) imply or assume an inherited idea of the human? Given the location of policy, in its modern sense, within the topography of contemporary political culture, in which policy precedes and enables the agency of political man then the answer is surely yes and a rethinking of policy would be nothing less than an entire disarticulation of this logo-anthro- onto-pological schema. Such a thinking of policy would then require the inauguration of a counter-culture as well as a counter-policy, with its own counter-institutions and spaces of articulation that would of course have their own vexed relation to channels of communication and the new technologies of the digital epoch as an exercise of public critical reason. One should also say that it is undoubtedly the case that such cultural transformations are already under way in spaces not visible to the academic-anthropological or mediatic gaze, across the hinterlands of the world wide web, cyber activism and in corners of the thinking world un-compromised by the funded research culture of the transnational university. However, in this text I am only proposing to take a position not to do the work that the sustainability of such a position would require. I am also talking about a relation between philosophy and policy that would be, unlike other articulations of militancy currently to be found in cyber-space, both properly philosophical and properly a 'political science', if such a thing exists.

#### Debate depends on the inclusion of those who maintain critical views of state policy. The foreclosure of critique and dissent marks debate as a fugitive activity by effacing alterity and counter-hegemonic discourses. Deconstruction is necessary to invoke new tropes of political dissent.

Butler ‘4 [2004, Judith Butler is a Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at U.C. Berkeley, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence”, pg. xix-xxi]

Dissent and debate depend upon the inclusion of those who maintain critical views of state policy and civic culture remaining part of a larger public discussion of the value of policies and politics. To charge those who voice critical views with treason, terrorist-sympathizing, anti-Semitism, moral relativism, postmodernism, juvenile behavior, collaboration, anachronistic Leftism, is to seek to destroy the credibility not of the views that are held, but of the very persons who hold them. It produces the climate of fear in which to voice a certain view is to risk being branded and shamed with heinous appellation. To continue to voice one’s views under those conditions is not easy, since one must not only discount the truth of appellation, but brave the stigma that seizes up from the public domain. Dissent is quelled, in part, through threatening the speaking subject with an uninhabitable identification. Because it would be heinous to identify as treasonous, as a collaborator, one fails to speak, or one speaks in throttled ways, in order to sidestep the terrorizing identification that threatens to take hold. This strategy for quelling dissent and limiting the reach of critical debate happens not only through a series of shaming tactics which have a certain psychological terrorizations as their effect, but they work as well by producing what will and will not count as a viable speaking subject and a reasonable opinion within the public domain. It is precisely because one does not want to lose one’s status as a viable speaking being that one does not say what one thinks. Under social conditions that regulate identifications and the sense of viability to this degree, censorship operates implicitly and forcefully. The line that circumscribes what is speakable and what is livable also function as an instrument of censorship. To decide what views will count as reasonable within the public domain, however, is to decide what will and will not count as the public sphere of debate. And if someone holds views that are not in line with the nationalist norm, that person comes to lack credibility as a speaking person, and the media is not open to him or her (though the internet, interestingly, is). The foreclosure of critique empties the public domain of debate and democratic contestation itself, so that debate becomes the exchange of views among the like-minded, and criticism, which ought to be central to any democracy, becomes a fugitive and suspect activity. Public Policy, including foreign policy, often seeks to restrain the public sphere from being open to certain forms of debate and the circulation of media coverage. One way a hegemonic understanding of politics is achieved is through circumscribing what will and will not be admissible as part of the of the public sphere itself. Without disposing populations in such a way that war seems good and right and true, no war can claim popular consent, and no administration can maintain popularity. To produce what will constitute the public sphere, however, it is necessary to control the way in which people see, how they hear, what they see. The constraints are not only on content—certain images of dead bodies in Iraq, for instance, are considered unacceptable for public visual consumption—but on what “can” be heard, read, seen, felt, and known. The public sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as reality, and what will not. It is also a way of establishing whose lives can be marked as lives, and whose deaths will count as deaths. Our capacity to feel and to apprehend hangs in the balance. But so, too, does the fate of the reality of certain lives and deaths as well as the ability to think critically and publicly about the effects of war.

#### Deconstructing terrorism is the only responsible course of action. This does not mean we do not come to a decision, but rather choose the action which least imposes onto alterity.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. xiii]

Derrida claims that the deconstruction of the notion of terrorism is the only politically responsible course of action because the public use of it, as if it were a self-evident notion, perversely helps the terrorist cause. Such deconstruction consists, as if it were a self-evident notion, in showing that the sets of distinctions within which we understand the meaning of the term terrorism, are problem-ridden. In his mind, not only does war entail the intimidation of civilians, and thus elements of terrorism, but no rigorous separation can be drawn between different kinds of terrorism, such as national and international, local and global. By rejecting the possibility of attaching any predicates to the supposed substance of terrorism, we obviously deny that terrorism has any stable meaning, agenda, and political content. In addition, Derrida exhorts us to be vigilant about the relation­ship between terrorism and the globalized system of communication. It is a fact that, since the attacks of 9/11, the media have been bombarding the world with images and stories about terrorism. Derrida feels that this calls for critical reflection. By dwelling on the traumatic memory, victims typically try to reassure themselves that they can withstand the impact of what may repeat itself. Since 9/11, we have all been forced to reassure ourselves, with the result that terror appears less a past event than a future possibility. Indeed, Derrida is stunned at how naively the media contributed to multiplying the force of this traumatic experi­ence. Yet, at the same time, he is also disconcerted at how real is the threat that terrorism might exploit the technological and information networks. Despite all the horror that we witnessed, he told me, it is not unfeasible that one day we will look back at 9/11 as the last example of a link between terror and territory, as the last eruption of an archaic the­ater of violence destined to strike the imagination. For future attacks— as would be the case with chemical and biological weapons or simply major digital communication disruptions—may be silent, invisible, and ultimately unimaginable.

# 2AC

#### Perm Do Both: The friction between the 1AC and 1NC methodologies are able to induce new tropes of political reality via deconstructive juxtaposition.

Spivak ‘97 [an Indian theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, where she is a founding member of the school's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society, “Jacques Derrida OF GRAMMATOLOGY” Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” <http://www.mohamedrabeea.com/books/book1_3997.pdf>]

Speaking of the hymen, Derrida emphasizes the role of the blank spaces of the page in the play of meaning. Analogically, Derrida himself often devotes his attention to the text in its margins, so to speak. He examines the minute particulars of an undecidable moment, nearly imperceptible displacements, that might otherwise escape the reader’s eye. Reading Foucault, he concentrates on three pages out of 673. Reading Rousseau, he chooses a text that is far from “central.” Reading Heidegger, he proceeds to write a note on a note to Sein and Zeit. His method, as he says to Jean-Louis Houdebine, perhaps a little too formulaically, is reversal and displacement. It is not enough “simply to neutralize the binary oppositions of metaphysics.” We must recognize that, within the familiar philosophical oppositions, there is always “a violent ((lxxvii)) hierarchy. One of the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first .. . to overthrow [renverser] the hierarchy.” (Pos F 57, Pos E. I. 36) To fight violence with violence. In the Grammatology this structural phase would be represented by all those pages where, all apologies to the contrary, the polemical energy seems clearly engaged in putting writing above speech. But in the next phase of deconstruction, this reversal must be displaced, the winning term put under erasure. The critic must make room for “the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept,’ a concept which no longer allows itself to be understood in terms of the previous regime [system of oppositions].” In terms of our book, this would be the aspect that “allows for the dissonant emergence of a writing inside of speech, thus disorganizing all the received order and invading the whole sphere of speech” (Pos E I. 36). To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already inscribed. Deconstruction in a nutshell. But take away the assurance of the text’s authority, the critic’s control, and the primacy of meaning, and the possession of this formula does not guarantee much. Why should we undo and redo a text at all? Why not assume that words and the author “mean what they say?” It is a complex question. Here let us examine Derrida’s most recent meditation upon the desire of deconstruction. Derrida acknowledges that the desire of deconstruction may itself be-come a desire to reappropriate the text actively through mastery, to show the text what it “does not know.” And as she deconstructs, all protestations to the contrary, the critic necessarily assumes that she at least, and for the time being, means what she says. Even the declaration of her vulnerability must come, after all, in the controlling language of demonstration and reference. In other words, the critic provisionally forgets that her own text is necessarily self-deconstructed, always already a palimpsest. The desire of deconstruction has also the opposite allure. Deconstruction seems to offer a way out of the closure of knowledge. By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality —by thus “placing in the abyss” (mettre en abîme), as the French expression would literally have it—it shows us the lure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as much pleasure as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom.Thus a further deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the search for a foundation (the critic behaving as if she means what she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless. The tool for this, as ((lxxviii)) indeed for any deconstruction, is our desire, itself a deconstructive and grammatological structure that forever differs from (we only desire what is not ourselves) and defers (desire is never fulfilled) the text of our selves. Deconstruction can therefore never be a positive science. For we are in a bind, in a “double (read abyssal) bind,” Derrida’s newest nickname for the schizophrenia of the “sous rature.” 81 We must do a thing and its opposite, and indeed we desire to do both, and so on indefinitely. Deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhabited by differance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or deconstructed. Yet the critic provisionally musters the metaphysical resources of criticism and performs what declares itself to be one (unitary) act of deconstruction. As I point out on pages Ixxxi–lxxxii, the kinship with Freud’s interminable and terminable analysis, involving both subject and analyst, is here not to be ignored.

#### Constant epistemic friction between genealogies resists cooption.

Medina ’11 Jose Medina, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt, October 2011, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction and Guerilla Pluralism” p. 9-35

As Foucault puts it, genealogies can be described as the ‚attempt to desubjugate historical knowledges, to set them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle against the coercion of a unitary, formal, and scientific theoretical discourse.‛ 40 But, as he emphasizes, genealogies do not simply ‚reject knowledge, or invoke or celebrate some immediate experience that has yet to be captured by knowledge. This is not what they are about. They are about the insurrection of knowledges.‛ 41 Genealogical investigations proceed by ‚way of playing local, discontinuous, disqualified, or nonlegitimized knowledges off against the unitary theoretical instance‛ that filters them out or absorbs them by putting them in their proper place within a hierarchy. Genealogies are insurrections of subjugated knowledges. And the plurals here are crucial, for the plurality of insurrections and of subjugated knowledges has to be kept always alive in order to resist new hegemonic unifications and hierarchizations of knowledges. The danger that the critical work of genealogies can be reabsorbed by hegemonic power/knowledges is brilliantly described by Foucault: Once we have excavated our genealogical fragments, once we begin to exploit them and to put in circulation these elements of knowledge that we have been trying to dig out of the sand, isn’t there a danger that they will be recoded, recolonized by these unitary discourses which, having first disqualified them and having then ignored them when they reappeared, may now be ready to reannex them and include them in their own discourses and their own powerknowledge? And if we try to protect the fragments we have dug up, don’t we run the risk of building, with our own hands, a unitary discourse? 42 38 Ibid. 39 As McWhorter describes it, what her genealogy tries to accomplish is ‚to resurrect old questions and formulate a few new ones, to mess up tidy categories and definitions, to make the questions of what racism is, where it comes from, and what it allies itself with too complex and too persistent and too frightening to put down.‛ (Ibid.) 40 Foucault, ‚Society Must be Defended,” 10. 41 Ibid., 9; my emphasis. 42 Ibid., 11; my emphasis. Insurrections of (de-)subjugated knowledges and their critical resistance can be coopted for the production of new forms of subjugation and exclusion (new hegemonies) or for the reinforcement of old ones. The only way to resist this danger is by guaranteeing the constant epistemic friction of knowledges from below, which—as I have argued elsewhere43—means guaranteeing that eccentric voices and perspectives are heard and can interact with mainstream ones, that the experiences and concerns of those who live in darkness and silence do not remain lost and unattended, but are allowed to exert friction. Genealogies have to be always plural, for genealogical investigations can unearth an indefinite number of paths from forgotten past struggles to the struggles of our present. And the insurrections of subjugated knowledges they produce also need to remain plural if they are to retain their critical power, that is, the capacity to empower people to resist oppressive power/knowledge effects. In the next section I will put this Foucaultian pluralism in conversation with other epistemological pluralistic approaches to memory and knowledge of the past.

#### Epistemic friction does not simply revive alternative memories as corrections of each other but rather reactivates struggles and energizes forms of resistance.

Medina ’11 Jose Medina, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt, October 2011, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction and Guerilla Pluralism” p. 9-35

By contrast, the radical epistemic pluralism that we find in Foucault is not melioristic in this sense. On this more radical pluralism, epistemic frictions are no more tools for learning than they are tools for unlearning (for undoing power/ knowledges—e.g. for undoing ways of remembering and forgetting, when it comes to knowledge of the past). On this view, epistemic frictions are not merely instrumental or transitional—that is, tools for, or steps toward, harmony or conflict resolution. Epistemic frictions are sought for their own sake, for the forms of resistance that they constitute. This is why I will call this more radical epistemic pluralism that can be found in Foucault a guerrilla pluralism. It is not a pluralism that tries to resolve conflicts and overcome struggles, but instead tries to provoke them and to re-energize them. It is a pluralism that aims not at the melioration of the cognitive and ethical lives of all, but rather, at the (epistemic and socio-political) resistance of some against the oppression of others. This is a pluralism that focuses on the gaps, discontinuities, tensions and clashes among perspectives and discursive practices. With respect to knowledges of the past, Foucaultian genealogical investigations do not simply revive alternative memories that can act as correctives of each other and cooperate without losing their specificity, as a Jamesian melioristic pluralism would have it. Rather, Foucaultian genealogical investigations resurrect counter-memories, not just for the sake of joint cooperation, but for the sake of reactivating struggles and energizing forms of resistance. On this view, alternative memories are not simply the raw materials to be coordinated in a heterogeneous (but nonetheless shared) collective memory; rather, they remain counter-memories that make available multiplicitous pasts for differently constituted and positioned publics and their discursive practices.

#### Racial violence cites the structures and movements of language to gain potency. Instead of focusing on the individual words we have to identify the relations between words.

Johndruff ‘7 [Mike Johndruff, studies relations between the intellect and literature from the Enlightenment to the age of modern literary studies, “Language, Racism, and Beyond” November 23rd 2007]

Jacques Derrida says in "Racism's Last Word" (a short text from 1983 on apartheid) something extremely interesting with respect to how we try to hold racism and especially racist language accountable: he says, "no racism without a language." But Derrida means by this something more precise: The point is not that acts of racial violence are only words but rather that they have to have a word. -"Racism's Last Word" in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume 1, 379. Two things are being said here: first, words are never "only words"--Derrida could have put the two words in quotes. The point here should be obvious, but the text--in particular its lack of quotes, which must be supplemented--indicates that it should be remembered: language, and in particular racist language, says something. It never says nothing, never is "mere" language. But second, this sentence in a different register (and along the trajectory of its most forceful thrust) indicates that racial violence never just manifests itself in words. Words are not the only way racial violence manifests itself. So, in a way, what is being said is that words are "only words." But at this point it is crucial to read these two points together, so that we come up with the following: words are not merely the only manifestation of racial violence, but they are not this only insofar as they are never "without a language." That is, racial violence never just manifests itself in ("mere") words because it is never without language. This paradox is expressed in the last part of the sentence: racial violence is more than mere words because it "has to have" words. The crucial thing for Derrida is this "has to have," the necessity of the linguistic, and not the linguistic itself. Many, many people still make the mistake that Derrida simply applies what one critic called once by the name of "semiological reductionism:" that is, a reduction of everything to movements of the signifier and to language more generally. For Derrida, however, racism does not have to have words because everything is words--that is, because racism and acts of racism can be understood under a broad definition of language. Indeed, this is the main thing I wanted to stress here, for though the paradox we just delimited is interesting, it can be absolutely misunderstood and misapplied if we understand it this way. Racial violence never just manifests itself in mere words because it is never without language--but this is not because racial violence is just another name for language. This cannot explain language being "mere" language for Derrida, "only language:" that is, being a limited set of something larger, more expansive--"racial violence." In Derrida, language still maintains its limited sphere of operation, refusing to open itself out into the model on which everything operates. This does not mean that everything does not need, like racial violence, the structures of language in some way. If this is grasped, the crucial distinction has just been made. The necessity of racial violence having to have words, having to have recourse to language, is not because racial violence is just language, but because racial violence cites the structures and movements of language in order to be different than language, in order to be itself as other than language, to be more than mere language. Thus, there is no racism without language. But racism is not just merely words. It is the citation of the structure of language, and thus needs words in such a way that words cannot be viewed as "only words" if we see this citation at work. Any of these words then will be bigger than just words, signs, but will indicate something larger than themselves that gets performed on their model. Practically, it is obvious what is at stake: the fate of a category of law that could punish hate speech as an act (cf.Only Words by Catherine MacKinnon). Derrida would be gutting this category if he asserted everything is language: all racial violence would be hate speech. And many people act like this is what Derrida is saying. But what is really being addressed by Derrida here is how a juridical notion of hate speech does not and will not adequately do what it wants to do--get rid of racisim. This is because there is indeed something other than this speech--acts of racial violence. But these, according to Derrida, are not without recourse to words, to hate speech. So everything revolves around not just deterring hate speech: racism will not be combated if one merely deals with only words. We have to deal with the necessity in racism that invokes language, that cannot be without words. So punishing hate speech as an act like terrorism, as MacKinnon (brilliantly, and with much justification) suggests, doesn't yet get at the complexity of the acts of violence involved in racism and in hate (and thus makes her disturbingly ignore hate when it occurs in other forms than heterosexual sexual abuse--most notably, in instances of homophobia: for a better analysis of the legal ramifications of speech read Judith Butler's Excitable Speech). I moved fast here because I have a lot to do--but I hope it is clear that the challenge Derrida is leveling here is to not merely see how what he says just reduces everything to language. This injunction to (re)reading Derrida is found in the lack of the quotes, and amounts to the following: if you can't go some lengths to account for the lack of these quotes, you might want to think about whether you are making things too simple regarding the relationship of language to social action and justice, politics, or anything beyond (should I have put this beyond in quotes?) language. I'll leave you with what Derrida continues with: ...but rather that they have to have a word. Even though it alleges blood, color, birth or, rather, because it uses this naturalist and sometimes creationist discourse, racism always betrays the perversion of a human "talking animal." It institutes, declares, writes, inscribes, prescribes. A system of marks, it designs places in order to assign forced residence or to close off borders. It does not discern, it discriminates.

#### Memory is not about preserving the past but turning towards the future. Reorienting the memory of the Enlightenment and modernity through deconstruction problematizes whiteness.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 170-172]

Derrida’s reflection on the Europe-to-come began in 1990 when he was asked by the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo to respond to the question of European cultural identity. It was just a few months after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Surprisingly, given his usual tendency to refrain from axiomatic statements, on that occasion Derrida did offer one: “What is proper to a culture is not to be identical with itself.”43 This assertion confirms his belief in the ethical value of heterogeneity and difference, which I addressed by discussing the exclusive and in­clusive function of geographical boundaries, including the Berlin Wall, in the second section of this essay. For Derrida, identity entails internal differentiation or, in his formulation, “difference with itself.” Indeed, self-relation produces culture; but there is no culture without a relation to the other. No culture has a single origin: it is in the very nature of culture to explore difference and to develop a systematic openness to­ward others within one’s culture as well as in other cultures. On the one hand, European cultural identity cannot be dispersed ... It cannot and must not be dispersed into a myriad of provinces, into a mul­tiplicity of self-enclosed idioms or petty little nationalisms, each one jeal­ous and untranslatable. It cannot and must not renounce places of great circulation or heavy traffic, the great avenues or thoroughfares of transla­tion and communication, and thus, of mediatization. But, on the other hand, it cannot and must not accept the capital of a centralizing authority that, by means of its trans-European mechanisms ... would control and standardize.44 Beyond Eurocentrism and anti-Eurocentrism, two programs that Der­rida characterizes as “unforgettable” but “exhausted,” what is the cul­tural identity that we are responsible for? What memory and what promise does the name Europe evoke? For whom and before whom are we responsible? Derrida lists two kinds of responsibility. There is responsibility toward memory and responsibility toward oneself. While responsibility toward oneself underlines die need for a personal and unconditional commitment to the process of decision-making, re­sponsibility towards memory calls for a historical self-understanding based on difference and heterogeneity.44 To be responsible for this memory of Europe, we need to transform it to the point of reinventing it. In this way, we won’t simply either repeat or abhor its name. This transformation will occur only if we accept the possibility of an impos­sibility, the experience of aporia. It is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of a difference of Europe, but of a Europe that consists precisely in not clos­ing itself off in its identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way to­wards what it is not, toward the other heading or the heading of the other.46 The notion of capital features in the title that Derrida gave to his short book on Europe: The Other Heading. The book is meant to respond to the political promise of a unified Europe by taking responsibility for Europe’s past—a past that Derrida hopes will both protect and redirect Europe to another heading, another destination. Geographically, Eu­rope has understood itself as a promontory, a cape or a headland: the extreme portion of Eurasia and the point of departure for discoveries and colonization. Even though the need for a physical capital, a single metropolis that has the function of the heart of a nation, has consider­ably aged, the “discourse of the capital” is still intact. This discourse is intertwined with the question of European identity. European culture is responsible for the emergence of the ideal of the nation-state “headed” by a capital city. Paris, Berlin, Rome, Brussels, Amsterdam, Madrid, are all capitals in this very strong sense. The word capital comes from the Latin for head, caput, which also appears in a variety of other expressions, such as the headlines of a newspaper or the head­ing, the title, of a book. Europe, for Derrida, is the name for the head­ing of culture, the exemplary heading of all cultures. Taking responsibility for Europe means responding to the com­plexity constituting its past, present, and future, and reinventing their relations. Sovereignty, which Derrida renames “discourse of the capi­tal” is first on the list. In order to reinvent Europe and, at the same time, taking responsibility for its heritage, we need to believe in paradoxical contaminations, such as “the memory of a past that has never been present,” or “the memory of the future.” After all, Derrida points out, the movement of memory is not necessarily tied to the past. Memory is not only about preserving and conserving the past, it is always already turned toward the future, “toward the promise, toward what is coming, what is arriving, what is happening tomorrow.”47 This other heading is the direction in which Europe, the actual Europe, should be traveling. This is also the direction toward a new form of sovereignty, urgently demanded if cosmopolitanism is to be­come a political reality in the post-9/11 world. This destination is nei­ther new nor old but the memory of a past that has never been present. This is the memory of the promise of the Enlightenment: freedom and equality for all.

#### The striving for unity and coherence is the hallmark of whiteness. Deconstruction is a logic of disintegration that would generate radical and open subjectivities.

Wadham ‘3 [Ben Wadham, TASA Conference University of New England, “The Turn to Whiteness: Race, Nationand Cultural Sociology” December 2003]

There are two points of note here: firstly, that identity is considered relational and hierarchical. There are multiple forms of cultural relations, for example gender is differentiated (Connell 1995), as is race or class (Frankenberg 1993, 1997). Secondly, it is also useful to consider the 'logics of identity', that is, the ways that particular identities position themselves within cultural relations (Hall 1992). Adorn° and Horkheimer (1973) describe the hegemonic logic of identity within Western philosophy, and Western cultures more generally, as a dialectic of Enlightenment. This dialectic refers to the way that the Self valorises identity and the Other is marginalised as an assertion of difference. This reification of Self and Other occludes incommensurability, that is, this subject tan only conceive others on his terms. In some way everything must be commensurable, able to be rationalised on the terms of the hegemonic subject. In the context of Australian racialisation whiteness has become that cocoon where an exclusive national identity has developed. This dialectic of Enlightenment, alternatively described as identitarian thinking, is where the Self articulates the Other as a threat to cultural and individual security, where the destabilisation of the hegemonic order is experienced as disorder, and where multiplicity is dangerous and commensurability paramount (O'Neill 1999: 9). This striving for unity and coherence marks the hegemonic subject and is, I argue, the hallmark of the white, masculinist, bourgeois Self (Adorno 1996, 1973; Becker-Schmidt 1999). It can be described as manifesting a closed subjectivity (Jameson 1990: 9). We can think about the logic of identity as relational, that is, identitarian thinking presents the hegemonic logic of identification while others' logics of identity sit in relations of subordination, complicity or radical alterity to this logic and its associated identities, discursive regimes and cultural practices. In other words, there are different ways of thinking and identifying and different logics of identity. Bhabha's (1990a) work on the third space, Adorno's logic of disintegration (1973), or Derrida's (1982) deconstruction are different ways of talking about the potential for critical and reflexive thought. It is argued that a logic of disintegration would generate open, radical and inclusive subjectivities.

#### Alt can’t solve – there can be no separation from reason – only a deconstruction of rationality and freedom can appropriate those concepts in a counter-hegemonic manner.

Derrida ‘3 [Jacques Derrida, THE “WORLD” OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO COME (EXCEPTION, CALCULATION, SOVEREIGNTY)\* 2003 Pg. 43-44]

What must be thought here, then, is this inconceivable and unknowable thing, a freedom that would no longer be the power of a subject, a freedom without autonomy, a heteronomy without servitude, in short, something like a passive decision. We would thus have to rethink the philosophemes of the decision, of activity and passivity, as well as potentiality and actuality. It is thus rational, legitimately rational, to interrogate or deconstruct—without however discrediting—the fertile distinction between constative and performative. Similarly, beyond law, debt, and duty, it would be necessary to rethink rationally a hyperethics or hyper-politics that does not settle for acting simply “according to duty ( pichtmässig)” or even (to take up the Kantian distinction that founds practical reason) “from duty” or “out of pure duty (eigentlich 44 jacques derrida aus Picht, aus reiner Picht).”12 Such a hyper-ethics or hyper-politics would carry us unconditionally beyond the economic circle of duty or of the task (Picht or Aufgabe), of the debt to be reappropriated or annulled, of what one knows must be done, of what thus still depends on a programmatic and normative knowledge that need only be carried out. The hiatus between these two equally rational postulations of reason, this excess of a reason that of itself exceeds itself and so opens onto its future, its to-come, its becoming, this exposition to the incalculable event, would also be the irreducible spacing of the very faith, credit, or belief without which there would be no social bond, no address to the other, no uprightness or honesty, no promise to be honored, and so no honor, no faith to be sworn or pledge to be given. This hiatus opens the rational space of a hypercritical faith, one without dogma and without religion, irreducible to any and all religious or implicitly theocratic institutions. It is what I’ve called elsewhere the awaiting without horizon of a messianicity without messianism. It goes without saying that I do not detect here even the slightest hint of irrationalism, obscurantism, or extravagance. This faith is another way of keeping within reason [raison garder], however mad it might appear. If the minimal semantic kernel we might retain from the various lexicons of reason, in every language, is the ultimate possibility of, if not a consensus, at least an address universally promised and unconditionally entrusted to the other, then reason remains the element or very air of a faith without church and without credulity, the raison d’être of the pledge, of credit, of testimony beyond proof, the raison d’être of any belief in the other, that is, of their belief and of our belief in them—and thus also of any perjury. For as soon as reason does not close itself off to the event that comes, the event of what or who comes, assuming it is not irrational to think that the worst can always happen, and well beyond what Kant thinks under the name “radical evil,” then only the infinite possibility of the worst and of perjury can grant the possibility of the good, of veracity and sworn faith. This possibility remains infinite, but as the very possibility of an auto-immunitary finitude.

#### Ontological Blackness DA: The neg reinscribes a notion of ontological blackness that effaces black bodies’ individuality. Race becomes replicated within black racial discourses so that ontological blackness becomes the “blackness that whiteness created,” a black aesthetic that signifies the totality of black existence.

Anderson ’95 [Victor – Assistant Professor of Christian Ethics at Vanderbilt Divinity School; PhD in religion, ethics and politics from Princeton University, “BEYOND ONTOLOGICAL BLACKNESS: An Essay on African American Religious and Cultural Criticism]

Race linguistically designates ethnic groups of human beings. Sometimes these groups are identified by nationalities, families, or languages (Omi and Winant 1995, 4). Race has here an accidental quality rather than a formal status. For that persons belong to specific ethnic groups has to do with the historical development of particular human communities, their encounters with other human communities, and the economic conditions under which these communities propagate themselves. This use of race is one that is likely to guide cultural anthropologists, and it is central to the claims that I make for the critical study of race throughout this book. However, in many of the cultural studies that I examine, mostly philosophical and theological ones, race is often regarded as a topic in metaphysical ontology. In metaphysical ontology, race denotes essential properties (essences), such that to lack any one property renders one a member of pseudospecies. According to Erik Erikson, the idea of pseudospecies is connected with group identity formation (1968, 41-41). As human groups construct their identities in relation to other animal groups, they develop categorical ways of solidifying their cultural and social identities. One way that they reassure their social and cultural identities is by defining them in terms of positive qualities that they wish to affirm while projecting negative ones onto others, rendering others false instances of species. Pseudospecies is the name Erikson gives for this othering activity. Erikson warns that while such activities appear to be present through almost every group that we know of, “the pseudospecies…is one of the more sinister aspects of all group identity (1968, 42). For according to Erikson, “there are also ‘pseudo’ aspects in all identity which endanger the individual” (42). Race is one classification under which human group differentiation occurs. In this book, I am interested in the ways that race determines black identity in African American cultural philosophy and theology. The second theme of the book is to make problematic the historic representational functions that race language has had in these cultural studies. In the West, racial representation is closely identified with the Western aesthetic category of genius. (In chapter 4, I give an extensive account of the idea of genius in European aesthetic theory.) In their attempts to give ideological justification for the imperialist ethos that inaugurated the age of Europe, European intellectuals defined their age and themselves as heroic, epochal, and exhibiting racial genius. Comparatively speaking, then, this racial aesthetic renders the other (non-Europeans) a false species, lacking in essential properties which make European genius representative of universal human genius. The third theme is that the cult of European genius, with its essentially heroic, epochal, and culture-advancing qualities, has likewise determined how African Americans represent themselves as the mirror of European genius: ontological blackness signifies the blackness that whiteness created. Beyond Ontological Blackness focusses on the cult of black heroic genius. I use the word cult here to designate dispositions of devotion, loyalty, and admiration for racial categories and the essentialized principles that determine black identity. And racial genius refers to the exceptional, sometimes essentialized cultural qualities that positively represent the racial group in the action of at least one of the group’s members. Insofar as the one member’s actions are said to represent the genius of the group (whether that member is a Sojourner Truth, a Marian Anderson, a Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a Malcolm X, a Michael Jordan, or a Jessye Norman) that member also exhibits the heroic qualities of the race. Of course, as the notion of pseudospecies shows, such racial reasoning can also give way to negative categorical judgments about the race. Therefore, ontological blackness entails a type of categorical racial reasoning and a black aesthetic – a collective racial consciousness expressive and representational of African American genius.

#### Turns all offense: ontological blackness distorts homogenizes the conditions of Black life and experience which is at odds with the new postmodern cultural politics of black identity.

Anderson ’95 [Victor – Assistant Professor of Christian Ethics at Vanderbilt Divinity School; PhD in religion, ethics and politics from Princeton University, “BEYOND ONTOLOGICAL BLACKNESS: An Essay on African American Religious and Cultural Criticism]

As a critic of the categorical and representational functions of ontological blackness, I suggest that there are good critical reasons for pressing beyond its centrality in black cultural studies. First, in its categorical and representational functions, ontological blackness distorts far too much of the conditions of African American life and experience in the United States. African American life and experience are structured by dispersed and not always commensurable interests of class, gender, sexual differentials, and race. Therefore, racial identity is not total, although it is always present. From a religious point of view, when race is made total, then ontological blackness is idolatrous, approaching racial henotheism. As a religious critic whose religious and moral sensibilities are derived from a radical monotheistic faith, I find myself at odds with such a cultural idolatry. A second warrant for pressing beyond ontological blackness is that the idea is incommensurable with the demand for a new cultural politics of black identity that meaningfully relates to the conditions of postmodern North American life. A list of African American literary and cultural critics calling for a new politics of black identity includes Cornel West, bell hooks, Toni Morrison, Alice Walker, Henry Lewis Gates, Jr., Houston Baker, Jr., Darlene Clark Hine, Wilson J. Moses, Michael Dyson, and Joe Wood. The new cultural politics of difference takes seriously the ways that ontological blackness alienates African Americans who pursue genuine interests in personal fulfillment along class, gender, ethnic, and sexual differentials. The fourth theme governing this book is that those racial discourses that derive their legitimacy from ontological blackness are at odds with contemporary postmodern black life.

#### Deconstruction is the best method to break down gender binaries.

Khezerloo ‘10 [Rasool Khezerloo, Professor of Literature at Urmia University, “WINKING AT DERRIDA:

THE HAPPY UNION OF DECONSTRUCTION AND FEMINISM” March 2010 <http://bibliotecavirtualut.suagm.edu/Glossa2/Journal/march2010/Winking%20at%20derrida.pdf>]

The theory of deconstruction has been used most notably by the feminists, but there is not a fixed formula for how they affect each other because they continually 126 redefine one another. Both feminism and deconstruction point out that “there is no thematic to the category of „woman‟” (Diane, 20001, p. 208). Derrida‟s seminal works Of Grammatology (1976) and Writing and Difference (1978) have influenced feminist deconstructive philosophy. One typical form of deconstructive reading is the critique of binary oppositions or the criticism of dichotomous thought. A central deconstructive argument holds that in all the classic dualities of Western thought one term is privileged or central over the other. The privileged term is the one that most associated with phallus and logos. In his work Of Grammatology (1976), Derrida argues that the first term is privileged because it is conceived as original, authentic, central, and superior while the other is considered as peripheral, secondary or derivative. Since Aristotle, Western thought has a tendency to organize things in terms of binary oppositions. Derrida states that these oppositions are not natural but a “… violent hierarchy. One of the two terms govern the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand” (Derrida, 1981a, p. 41). Significantly, the first term in these binaries is privileged because it presents the unified and self-identical. The second term is subordinate and is defined as unformed, transforming and chaotic; it represents the „Other‟ and absence. Derrida believes that the male side of the opposition is privileged; therefore, the opposition is not equal since woman is considered to be inferior to man. To focus on man‟s right would be a lopsided view of deconstruction, one that does not match his theory of deconstruction. He refutes the patient-doctor relationship in which the doctor has power and the patient is subordinate. In terms of feminist struggles, deconstruction offers feminism a tool for analyzing theory, a new way of thinking about the world, i.e., challenging binary thinking, and 127 through these processes a way of imaging a future that contains the feminine as well as the masculine. Deconstruction demonstrates that these oppositions are unstable, reversible, and mutually dependent on one another. Hence, deconstructive approach plays an important role in demonstrating that there can be no universal and privileged meanings and values in literary traditions. Derrida seeks to move beyond the constraints of binaries. He does not seek to reverse the hierarchies implied in binary pairs to favor feminine over masculine. Rather deconstruction wants to erase the boundaries between oppositions, hence shows that the values and order implied by the oppositions are not rigid. The entire structure of binary oppositions becomes particularly unstable, and unravels in an infinite play in the so-called undecidables. To quote Derrida, “To deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment” (Derrida, 1981a, p. 41).

#### No solvency – the alt does not dismantle the notion of the “Other” which is the root cause of gender difference.

Khezerloo ‘10 [Rasool Khezerloo, Professor of Literature at Urmia University, “WINKING AT DERRIDA:

THE HAPPY UNION OF DECONSTRUCTION AND FEMINISM” March 2010 <http://bibliotecavirtualut.suagm.edu/Glossa2/Journal/march2010/Winking%20at%20derrida.pdf>]

To recapitulate: deconstruction means interpreting a text by means of exposing what is usually suppressed. It focuses upon searching what is absent rather than what is present, just as feminism does. Derridean deconstruction challenges binary system, not by replacing unitary meaning for another, but by transforming terms to make visible their multiple meanings. Derrida argues that binary oppositions are subjective and constantly changing; therefore they will eventually overlap and begin to contradict one another. He is of the idea that meaning of words are not in the words themselves, but in the differences between them. Derrida‟s notion of undecidabilty rests on his notion of difference and différance. Essentially, he argues that it is in the nature of language to produce meaning only with reference to other meanings against which it takes on its own significance. Thus, we can never establish stable meanings by attempting correspondence between language and the world addressed by language. Instead, meaning is the result of 136 differential significances that we attach to words. In Derridean view, the only language available is the logocentric, phallogocentric, and binary language. He believed that the symbolic order can be weakened by providing suppressed alternative interpretation of texts. He coined the term différance to describe the ineliminable gap (irreducible otherness) between reality and language that confounds us. Derrida‟s différance model also maintains that women are equal to men but different. Though women have the same status to men as human beings, they have their own identity and they are different from men. To dismantle the notion of the “Other”, Derrida deconstructs the word “woman” from a subordinate association and reconstructs it through proving that women do not need to be rationalized by male dominance. He acknowledges that it is human tendency to think in opposites, but instead of the opposite of man, to him it is non-man, not woman. Derrida believed that we should liberate our thoughts from binary oppositions such as male / female, nature / nurture, speech / writing, and so forth. His rejection of a single truth is important to an understanding of postmodern feminism. There is a refusal of an essential nature of women, of one way to be a woman. His writings can uncover how race and gender can be thought differently. Derrida argues that the two oppositions, male and female, are dependent upon one another and woman is not a supplement to man since what is complete in itself cannot be added to. In sum, he is more interested in the margins since like marginalized women, for Derrida margins are not peripheral but central.