#### Civilian have been killed since Obama's change in policy

Serle 13 Jack Serle, Bureau of Investigative Journalism November 26, 2013 Drone strikes in Yemen New analysis questions constraint on US drone strikes <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/11/26/new-analysis-questions-constraint-on-us-drone-strikes/>

Civilians have been killed in US strikes in the past, the President said. The day before the speech, Attorney General Eric Holder published a letter to Congress saying those killed included a 16-year-old US citizen, Abdulrahman al Awlaqi.

In Yemen, civilians have reportedly been killed in drone strikes after the speech. Between six and seven civilians were reported killed, two of whom were said to be children.

It also emerged this month that the US knew it had killed civilians in strikes after the speech. The LA Times reported that the CIA briefed Congress about civilian casualties, including a child aged 6-13 who had been riding in a car with his older brother, an alleged militant, when the drones attacked. The CIA reportedly did not know he was in the car at the time.

Other reports have identified the child as Abdulaziz, younger brother of Hassan al-Saleh Huraydan, an alleged AQAP commander.

#### Civilians in Yemen were killed by drones

Goodman 12-26-13 Amy Goodman, the Guardian 26 December 2013 President Obama's new normal: the drone strikes continue <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/26/obama-drone-strikes-yemen-pakistan-continue>

There has been yet another violent attack with mass casualties. This was not the act of a lone gunman, or of an armed student rampaging through a school. It was a group of families en route to a wedding that was killed. The town was called Radda – not in Colorado, not in Connecticut, [but in Yemen](http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/12/13/airstrike-in-yemen-worst-attack-in-over-a-year/). The weapon was not an easy-to-obtain semiautomatic weapon, but missiles fired from US drones.

On Thursday, 12 December, 17 people were killed, mostly civilians. The London-based [Bureau of Investigative Journalism has consistently tracked US drone attacks](http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/), recently releasing a report on the six months following President Barack Obama's major address on drone warfare before the National Defense University (NDU) last May. In that speech, Obama promised that "before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured – the highest standard we can set." The

#### Justice outweighs the small risk of the limits disad – Any condition imposed onto accepting the Other lends itself to a politics of tolerance and scrutinized hospitality. Unconditional acceptance of the other is a precondition to any ethics and politics.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 158-159]

The history of the concept reveals that tolerance “is always on the side of the ‘reason of the strongest,”’ firmly tied to the figure of the sov­ereign that Habermas also mentions in our dialogue. From this point of view, being tolerant is not going to make those who feel excluded any more included or understood. This was certainly a blunt statement to make in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, when Western countries were relying on tolerance as their unifying moral commit­ment. While in Derrida’s mind there is no way to overcome the one-sid­edness of tolerance, hospitality is a much more flexible concept. “If I think I am being hospitable because I am tolerant, it is because I wish to limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control over the lim­its of my ‘home,’ my sovereignty, my ‘I can’ (my territory, my house, my language, my culture, my religion, and so on).” Tolerance is “a scruti­nized hospitality, always under surveillance, parsimonious and protec­tive of its sovereignty. In the best of cases, it’s what I would call a con­ditional hospitality, the one that is most commonly practiced by indi­viduals, families, cities, or states.”34 The advantage of hospitality over tolerance is that it lends itself, as forgiveness does, to being posited in the double register of the condi­tional and the unconditional. In fact, tolerance is, for Derrida, condi­tional hospitality. By being tolerant one admits the other under one’s own conditions, and thus under one’s authority, law, and sovereignty. Derrida hopes instead for a new conception of hospitality that is, in a sense, much more tolerant than tolerance. Surprisingly for those who believe that Derrida is a counter-Enlightenment thinker, Kant is his point of reference. Derrida’s articulation of unconditional hospitality hinges on Kant’s distinction between two kinds of rights: right of invi­tation and right of visitation. But pure or unconditional hospitality does not consist in such an invita­tion (“I invite you, I welcome you into my home, on the condition that you adapt to the laws and norms of my territory, according to my lan­guage, tradition, memory, and so on”). Pure and unconditional hospital­ity, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance open to someone who is nei­ther expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other. I would call this a hospitality of visitation rather than invi­tation. The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must not ig­nore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality? As no sense of forgiveness would exist without unconditional forgive­ness, no sense of true hospitality and openness to the other would exist without unconditional hospitality.

#### Epistemology DA – Western representations of the world normalize colonial practices. A critical examination of state politics creates a starting point to challenge homogenous ways of thinking.

Trofanenko 2k5 Research Chair in Education, Culture and Community @ Acadia University 2k5 Brenda-; On Defense of the Nation; THE SOCIAL STUDIES, 96.5 (2005): 193+; [http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA139957613&v=2.1&u=bingul&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w](http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7cA139957613&v=2.1&u=bingul&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w) Toward a More Global Sense of the Nation

Knowing how history is a site of political struggle, how we engage with social studies education means emphasizing how power, processes, and practices bear tangible effects on forging a national (and common) history by reproducing and vindicating inclusions and exclusions. Such a critique requires questioning how a singular, fixed, and static history celebrates the U.S. nation and its place in the world as that "common base of factual information about the American historical and contemporary experience"(27) argues for in the Fordham report. Our world history courses are central to defining, understanding, and knowing not only other nations but also the position of each nation in relation to the United States. The centrality that the west holds (notably the United States as an imperial power) is ingrained and willful in framing specific representations of the west that normalize the imperial practices that established this nation. The role that the United States holds on the world stage frequently remains unquestioned in social studies classrooms. Certainly, we engage with various images and tropes to continue to advance how the colonialist past continues to remain present in our historical sensibilities. Moreover, the increasing number and choices of archival sources function as a complement to further understanding the nation. If students are left to rely on the variety of historical resources rather than question the use of such resources, then the most likely outcome of their learning will be the reflection on the past with nostalgia that continues to celebrate myths and colonial sensibility. To evaluate the history narrative now is to reconsider what it means and to develop a historical consciousness in our students that goes beyond archival and nostalgic impulses associated with the formation of the nation and U.S. nation building. We need to insist that the nation, and the past that has contributed to its present day understanding, is simultaneously material and symbolic. The nation as advanced in our histories cannot be taken as the foundational grounds. The means by which the nation is fashioned calls for examining the history through which nations are made and unmade. To admit the participatory nature of knowledge and to invite an active and critical engagement with the world so that students can come to question the authority of historical texts will, I hope, result in students' realizing that the classroom is not solely a place to learn about the nation and being a national, but rather a place to develop a common understanding of how a nation is often formed through sameness. We need to continue to question how a particular national history is necessary as an educational function, but especially how that element has been, and remains, useful at specific times. My hope is to extend the current critique of history within social studies, to move toward understanding why history and nation still needs a place in social studies education. In understanding how the historicity of nation serves as "the ideological alibi of the territorial state" (Appadurai 1996, 159) offers us a starting point. The challenge facing social studies educators is how we can succeed in questioning nation, not by displacing it from center stage but by considering how it is central. That means understanding how powerfully engrained the history of a nation is within education and how a significant amount of learning is centered around the nation and its history. History is a forum for assessing and understanding the study of change over time, which shapes the possibilities of knowledge itself. We need to reconsider the mechanisms used in our own teaching, which need to be more than considering history as a nostalgic reminiscence of the time when the nation was formed. We need to be questioning the contexts for learning that can no longer be normalized through history's constituted purpose. The changing political and social contexts of public history have brought new opportunities for educators to work through the tensions facing social studies education and its educational value to teachers and students. Increasing concerns with issues of racism, equality, and the plurality of identities and histories mean that there is no unified knowledge as the result of history, only contested subjects whose multilayered and often contradictory voices and experiences intermingle with partial histories that are presented as unified. This does not represent a problem, but rather an opportunity for genuine productive study, discussion, and learning.

#### No topical version – The one size fits all preordained policy option opposes deconstruction.

Mcquillan 08 (Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

One definition of policy might be that policy is not reading. It is the very opposite of deconstruction, if deconstruction can have opposites. Nothing could be more inimical to the patient and scholarly treading of the texts of the other by Jacques Derrida than the pre-ordained, one-size- fits-all, programme-for-tomorrow ambitions of policy or the relationship implied between the academic and the so-called political process in this arrangement. This is not the same as saying that one cannot or should not have an idea what one might do as a political person with respect to schools and hospitals and foreign wars, given the chance. Rather, I think it is revealing of a certain truth about deconstruction, namely that deconstruction is truly a critical nihilism. By this, I do not mean that is anarchistic or destructive, rather in the Nietzschean sense it is a type of reflection and utterance that requires an effort of intelligence and an exercise of reason as a practical, counter-cultural engagement. I for one would like to see the inauguration of an International Forum for Philosophy and Policy as a deconstructive 'counter'-Think Tank. It might be distinguished from existing organisations by the formula: more think, less tank. It would adopt a relation to policy of intervention rather than a preparation. Not in order to outflank public policy through a strategy of negation and transcendental position taking (or posturing) but in order to provide critical readings of singular events as they arrived misshapen and monstrous in the present. Such open and reflective institutions will be absolutely necessary if the future of thought itself is to stand a chance and if it is to continue to confront power with truth.

#### Unconditional hospitability can never have a political or juridical status but must always be pushed to its limits.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 159-160]

Conditional hospitality, or tolerance, is fundamentally the right of invi­tation and as such lays the conditions for international and cosmopoli­tan conventions. Unconditional hospitality, by contrast, corresponds to the right of visitation. As such, it exposes the host to the maximum risk, as it does not allow for any systematic defense or immunity against the other. Derrida admits that unconditional hospitality cannot have a political or juridical status. States cannot include it in their laws, be­cause hospitality without conditions is irreconcilable with the very idea of a sovereign state. And yet, it is only from the standpoint of uncondi­tional hospitality, or the right of visitation, that we gain a critical per­spective on die limits of cosmopolitan right, tolerance, conditional hospitality, and the right of invitation. I11 his treatise Perpetual Peace, Kant backs the idea of cosmopoli­tan right without the support of a world government. Not only, since World War I, did international institutions operate in line with Kant’s legacy, but this is Derrida’s as well as Habermas’s political dream. However, while Habermas sees it as a program, Derrida understands it as an ideal that can best be pursued by continually having it face its lim­its. For, as we have seen, cosmopolitanism expresses only conditional hospitality, or what Kant calls the right of invitation. For Derrida, the ideal of democracy lies beyond cosmopolitanism and world citizenship, over and beyond the economy of sovereignty, politics, and jurisdiction. Cosmopolitanism applies to a world viewed as cosmos, which since the Greeks means an orderly whole regulated by principles and laws. Even though Derrida explicitly stands by cos­mopolitanism and world citizenry, he feels that commitment to justice cannot be fully exercised within the boundaries of law and cosmopoli­tanism. For justice, as well as democracy, is not just about our conduct within the framework of the state or under the obligations of citizen­ship but also in the face of a stranger. I want to underline that Derrida’s belief that room needs to be left for something located somewhere beyond politics and law, cosmopoli­tanism and world citizenry, is firmly anchored in a formal scheme: the distinction between the conditional and unconditional registers. The conceptual formalism of this gesture allows him to avoid reactionary and nostalgic revivals as well as an essentialist reading of tradition and identity. The quality of what is beyond politics and law is never spelled out in terms of any specific content or value but simply indi­cated as the condition of possibility for what politics and law articu­late.35 As forgiveness in the hands of politics and the juridical domain be­comes a therapy of reconciliation, and hospitality in the hands of cos­mopolitanism becomes the simple right of invitation, justice in the hands of law is reduced to law’s simple enforceability. Applicability, “enforceability,” is not an exterior or secondary possibility that may or may not be added as a supplement to law. It is the force es­sentially implied in the very concept of justice as law (droit), of justice as it becomes droit, of the law as “droit” (for I want to insist right away on reserving the possibility of a justice, indeed of a law that not only exceeds or contradicts “law” (droit) but also, perhaps, has no relation to law, or maintains such a strange relation to it that it may just as well command the “droit” that excludes it). The word enforceability reminds us that there is no such thing as law (droit) that doesn’t imply in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility of being “enforced,” applied by force.36

#### Spectatorship DA – Roleplaying as policymakers upholds a spectator mentality that distances debaters from their content. Debaters are taught to be objective and rational which reifies the contemporary practices of power that maintain oppression.

Reid-Brinkley 2k8 [Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, "THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE"page 15]

Genre Violation Four: Policymaker as Impersonal and the Rhetoric of Personal Experience. Debate is a competitive game. 112 It requires that its participants take on the positions of state actors (at least when they are affirming the resolution). Debate resolutions normally call for federal action in some area of domestic or foreign policy. Affirmative teams must support the resolution, while the negative negates it. The debate then becomes a “laboratory” within which debaters may test policies. 113 Argumentation scholar Gordon Mitchell notes that “Although they may research and track public argument as it unfolds outside the confines of the laboratory for research purposes, in this approach students witness argumentation beyond the walls of the academy as spectators, with little or no apparent recourse to directly participate or alter the course of events.” 114 Although debaters spend a great deal of time discussing and researching government action and articulating arguments relevant to such action, what happens in debate rounds has limited or no real impact on contemporary governmental policy making. And participation does not result in the majority of the debate community engaging in activism around the issues they research. Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.” 115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original). 116 The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policyoriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

#### **Cyclical violence isn’t inevitable—rather—the way in which we act perpetuates violence. Adopting an ethical stance targeted killing is the best way to address grievances in order to end the cycle of aggression and reopen the political.**

Blum ’04, William Blum is an author, historian, and renowned critic of U.S. foreign policy. He is the author of *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II* and *Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower*. In early 2006, Blum briefly became the subject of widespread media attention when Osama bin Laden issued a public statement in which he quoted Blum and recommended that all Americans read *Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower*. As a result of the mention sales of his book greatly increased. "I was quite surprised and even shocked and amused when I found out what he'd said," Blum said. "I was glad. I knew it would help the book's sales and I was not bothered by who it was coming from. If he shares with me a deep dislike for certain aspects of US foreign policy, then I'm not going to spurn any endorsement of the book by him. I think it's good that he shares those views and I'm not turned off by that."[4] On the Bin Laden endorsement Blum stated "This is almost as good as being an Oprah book." [http://williamblum.org/chapters/freeing-the-world-to-death/myth-and-denial-in-the-war-against-terrorism]

It dies hard. It dies very hard. The notion that terrorist acts against the United States can be explained by envy and irrational hatred, and not by what the United States does to the world – i.e., US foreign policy – is alive and well. The fires were still burning intensely at Ground Zero when Colin Powell declared: “Once again, we see terrorism, we see terrorists, people who don’t believe in democracy …” 1 George W. picked up on that theme and ran with it. He’s been its leading proponent ever since September 11 with his repeated insistence, in one wording or another, that terrorists are people who hate America and all that it stands for, its democracy, its freedom, its wealth, its secular government.” (Ironically, the president and Attorney General John Ashcroft probably hate our secular government as much as anyone.) Here he is more than a year after September 11: “The threats we face are global terrorist attacks. That’s the threat. And the more you love freedom, the more likely it is you’ll be attacked.” 2 The American Council of Trustees and Alumni, a conservative watchdog group founded by Lynne Cheney, wife of the vice-president, announced in November 2001 the formation of the Defense of Civilization Fund, declaring that “It was not only America that was attacked on September 11, but civilization. We were attacked not for our vices, but for our virtues.” 3 In September 2002, the White House released the “National Security Strategy”, purported to be chiefly the handiwork of Condoleezza Rice, which speaks of the “rogue states” which “sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.” In July of the following year, we could hear the spokesman for Homeland Security, Brian Roehrkasse, declare: “Terrorists hate our freedoms. They want to change our ways.” 4 Thomas Friedman the renowned foreign policy analyst of the New York Times would say amen. Terrorists, he wrote in 1998 after two US embassies in Africa had been attacked, “have no specific ideological program or demands. Rather, they are driven by a generalized hatred of the US, Israel and other supposed enemies of Islam.” 5 This idée fixe – that the rise of anti-American terrorism owes nothing to American policies – in effect postulates an America that is always the aggrieved innocent in a treacherous world, a benign United States government peacefully going about its business but being “provoked” into taking extreme measures to defend its people, its freedom and its democracy. There consequently is no good reason to modify US foreign policy, and many people who might otherwise know better are scared into supporting the empire’s wars out of the belief that there’s no choice but to crush without mercy – or even without evidence – this irrational international force out there that hates the United States with an abiding passion. Thus it was that Afghanistan and Iraq were bombed and invaded with seemingly little concern in Washington that this could well create many new anti-American terrorists. And indeed, since the first strike on Afghanistan in October 2001 there have been literally scores of terrorist attacks against American institutions in the Middle East, South Asia and the Pacific, more than a dozen in Pakistan alone: military, civilian, Christian, and other targets associated with the United States, including the October 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia, which destroyed two nightclubs and killed more than 200 people, almost all of them Americans and their Australian and British allies. The following year brought the heavy bombing of the US-managed Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, the site of diplomatic receptions and 4th of July celebrations held by the American Embassy. Even when a terrorist attack is not aimed directly at Americans, the reason the target has been chosen can be because the country it takes place in has been cooperating with the United States in its so-called “War on Terrorism”. Witness the horrendous attacks of recent years in Madrid, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. A US State Department report on worldwide terrorist attacks showed that the year 2003 had more “significant terrorist incidents” than at any time since the department began issuing statistics in 1982; the 2003 figures do not include attacks on US troops by insurgents in Iraq. 6 Terrorists in their own words The word “terrorism” has been so overused in recent years that it’s now commonly used simply to stigmatize any individual or group one doesn’t like, for almost any kind of behavior involving force. But the word’s raison d’être has traditionally been to convey a political meaning, something along the lines of: the deliberate use of violence against civilians and property to intimidate or coerce a government or the population in furtherance of a political objective. Terrorism is fundamentally propaganda, a very bloody form of propaganda. It follows that if the perpetrators of a terrorist act declare what their objective was, their statement should carry credibility, no matter what one thinks of the objective or the method used to achieve it. Let us look at some of their actual declarations. The terrorists responsible for the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 sent a letter to the New York Times which stated, in part: “We declare our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned building. This action was done in response for the American political, economical, and military support to Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in the region.” 7 Richard Reid, who tried to ignite a bomb in his shoe while aboard an American Airline flight to Miami in December 2001, told police that his planned suicide attack was an attempt to strike a blow against the US campaign in Afghanistan and the Western economy. In an e-mail sent to his mother, which he intended her to read after his death, Reid wrote that it was his duty “to help remove the oppressive American forces from the Muslims land.” 8 After the bombings in Bali, one of the leading suspects – later convicted – told police that the bombings were “revenge” for “what Americans have done to Muslims.” He said that he wanted to “kill as many Americans as possible” because “America oppresses the Muslims”. 9 In November 2002, a taped message from Osama bin Laden began: “The road to safety begins by ending the aggression. Reciprocal treatment is part of justice. The [terrorist] incidents that have taken place … are only reactions and reciprocal actions.” 10 That same month, when Mir Aimal Kasi, who killed several people outside of CIA headquarters in 1993, was on death row, he declared: “What I did was a retaliation against the US government” for American policy in the Middle East and its support of Israel. 11 It should be noted that the State Department warned at the time that the execution of Kasi could result in attacks against Americans around the world. 12 It did not warn that the attacks would result from foreigners hating or envying American democracy, freedom, wealth, or secular government. Similarly, in the days following the start of US bombing of Afghanistan there were numerous warnings from US government officials about being prepared for retaliatory acts, and during the war in Iraq, the State Department announced: “Tensions remaining from the recent events in Iraq may increase the potential threat to US citizens and interests abroad, including by terrorist groups.” 13 Another example of the difficulty the Bush administration has in consistently maintaining its simplistic idée fixe: In June 2002, after a car bomb exploded outside the US Consulate in Karachi, killing or injuring more than 60 people, the Washington Post reported that “US officials said the attack was likely the work of extremists angry at both the United States and Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for siding with the United States after September 11 and abandoning support for Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban.” 14 George W. and others of his administration may or may not believe what they tell the world about the motivations behind anti-American terrorism, but, as in the examples just given, some officials have questioned the party line for years. A Department of Defense study in 1997 concluded: “Historical data show a strong correlation between US involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States.” 15 Former US president Jimmy Carter told the New York Times in a 1989 interview: We sent Marines into Lebanon and you only have to go to Lebanon, to Syria or to Jordan to witness first-hand the intense hatred among many people for the United States because we bombed and shelled and unmercifully killed totally innocent villagers – women and children and farmers and housewives – in those villages around Beirut. … As a result of that … we became kind of a Satan in the minds of those who are deeply resentful. That is what precipitated the taking of our hostages and that is what has precipitated some of the terrorist attacks. 16 Colin Powell has also revealed that he knows better. Writing of this same 1983 Lebanon debacle in his memoir, he forgoes clichŽs about terrorists hating democracy: “The U.S.S. New Jersey started hurling 16-inch shells into the mountains above Beirut, in World War II style, as if we were softening up the beaches on some Pacific atoll prior to an invasion. What we tend to overlook in such situations is that other people will react much as we would.” 17 The ensuing retaliatory attack against US Marine barracks in Lebanon took the lives of 241 American military personnel. The bombardment of Beirut in 1983 and 1984 is but one of many examples of American violence against the Middle East and/or Muslims since the 1980s. The record includes: the shooting down of two Libyan planes in 1981 the bombing of Libya in 1986 the bombing and sinking of an Iranian ship in 1987 the shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane in 1988 the shooting down of two more Libyan planes in 1989 the massive bombing of the Iraqi people in 1991 the continuing bombings and sanctions against Iraq for the next 12 years the bombing of Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 the habitual support of Israel despite the routine devastation and torture it inflicts upon the Palestinian people the habitual condemnation of Palestinian resistance to this the abduction of “suspected terrorists” from Muslim countries, such as Malaysia, Pakistan, Lebanon and Albania, who are then taken to places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where they are tortured the large military and hi-tech presence in Islam’s holiest land, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region the support of undemocratic, authoritarian Middle East governments from the Shah of Iran to the Saudis. “How do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic hatred for America?” asked George W. “I’ll tell you how I respond: I’m amazed. I’m amazed that there’s such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us. I am – like most Americans, I just can’t believe it because I know how good we are.” 18 It’s not just people in the Middle East who have good reason for hating what the US government does. The United States has created huge numbers of potential terrorists all over Latin America during a half century of American actions far worse than what it’s done in the Middle East. If Latin Americans shared the belief of radical Muslims that they will go directly to paradise for martyring themselves in the act of killing the great Satan enemy, by now we might have had decades of repeated terrorist horror coming from south of the border. As it is, there have been many non-suicidal terrorist attacks against Americans and their buildings in Latin America over the years. To what extent do Americans really believe the official disconnect between what the US does in the world and anti-American terrorism? One indication that the public is somewhat skeptical came in the days immediately following the commencement of the bombing of Iraq on March 20 of this year. The airlines later announced that there had been a sharp increase in cancellations of flights and a sharp decrease in future flight reservations in those few days. 19 In June, the Pew Research Center released the results of polling in 20 Muslim countries and the Palestinian territories that brought into question another official thesis, that support for anti-American terrorism goes hand in hand with hatred of American society. The polling revealed that people interviewed had much more “confidence” in Osama bin Laden than in George W. Bush. However, “the survey suggested little correlation between support for bin Laden and hostility to American ideas and cultural products. People who expressed a favorable opinion of bin Laden were just as likely to appreciate American technology and cultural products as people opposed to bin Laden. Pro- and anti-bin Laden respondents also differed little in their views on the workability of Western-style democracy in the Arab world.” 20 The Iraqi resistance The official Washington mentality about the motivations of individuals they call terrorists is also manifested in current US occupation policy in Iraq. Secretary of War Donald Rumsfeld has declared that there are five groups opposing US forces – looters, criminals, remnants of Saddam Hussein’s government, foreign terrorists and those influenced by Iran. 21 An American official in Iraq maintains that many of the people shooting at US troops are “poor young Iraqis” who have been paid between $20 and $100 to stage hit-and-run attacks on US soldiers. “They’re not dedicated fighters,” he said. “They’re people who wanted to take a few potshots.” 22 With such language do American officials avoid dealing with the idea that any part of the resistance is composed of Iraqi citizens who are simply demonstrating their resentment about being bombed, invaded, occupied, and subjected to daily humiliations. Some officials convinced themselves that it was largely the most loyal followers of Saddam Hussein and his two sons who were behind the daily attacks on Americans, and that with the capture or killing of the evil family, resistance would die out; tens of millions of dollars were offered as reward for information leading to this joyful prospect. Thus it was that the killing of the sons elated military personnel. US Army trucks with loudspeakers drove through small towns and villages to broadcast a message about the death of Hussein’s sons. “Coalition forces have won a great victory over the Baath Party and the Saddam Hussein regime by killing Uday and Qusay Hussein in Mosul,” said the message broadcast in Arabic. “The Baath Party has no power in Iraq. Renounce the Baath Party or you are in great danger.” It called on all officials of Hussein’s government to turn themselves in. 23 What followed was several days of some of the deadliest attacks against American personnel since the guerrilla war began. Unfazed, American officials in Washington and Iraq continue to suggest that the elimination of Saddam will write finis to anti-American actions. Another way in which the political origins of terrorism are obscured is by the common practice of blaming poverty or repression by Middle Eastern governments (as opposed to US support for such governments) for the creation of terrorists. Defenders of US foreign policy cite this also as a way of showing how enlightened they are. Here’s Condoleezza Rice: [The Middle East] is a region where hopelessness provides a fertile ground for ideologies that convince promising youths to aspire not to a university education, a career or family, but to blowing themselves up, taking as many innocent lives with them as possible. We need to address the source of the problem. 24 Many on the left speak in a similar fashion, apparently unconscious of what they’re obfuscating. This analysis confuses terrorism with revolution. In light of the several instances mentioned above, among others which could be cited, of US officials giving the game away, in effect admitting that terrorists and guerrillas may be, or in fact are, reacting to actual hurts and injustices, it may be that George W. is the only true believer among them, if in fact he is one. The thought may visit leaders of the American Empire, at least occasionally, that all their expressed justifications for invading Iraq and Afghanistan and for their “War on Terrorism” are no more than fairy tales for young children and grown-up innocents. But officialdom doesn’t make statements to represent reality. It constructs stories to legitimize the pursuit of interests. And the interests here are irresistibly compelling: creating the most powerful empire in all history, enriching their class comrades, remaking the world in their own ideological image. Being the target of terrorism is just one of the prices you pay for such prizes, and terrorist attacks provide a great excuse for the next intervention, the next expansion of the empire, the next expansion of the military budget. A while ago, I heard a union person on the radio proposing what he called “a radical solution to poverty – pay people enough to live on.” Well, I’d like to propose a radical solution to anti-American terrorism – stop giving terrorists the motivation to attack America. As long as the imperial mafia insist that anti-American terrorists have no good or rational reason for retaliation against the United States for anything the US has ever done to their countries, as long as US foreign policy continues with its bloody and oppressive interventions, the “War on Terrorism” is as doomed to failure as the war on drugs has been.

#### Their scholarship is BS—it’s influenced by profit motive over fact.

Greenwald 12 [Glenn, was named by The Atlantic as one of the 25 most influential political commentators in the nation. He is the recipient of the first annual I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism, and is the winner of the 2010 Online Journalism Association Award for his investigative work on the arrest and oppressive detention of Bradley Manning former Constitutional and civil rights litigator and is the author of three New York Times Bestselling books, Salon AUG 15, 2012 http://www.salon.com/2012/08/15/the\_sham\_terrorism\_expert\_industry/]

Many of the benefits from keeping Terrorism fear levels high are obvious. Private corporations suck up massive amounts of Homeland Security cash as long as that fear persists, while government officials in the National Security and Surveillance State can claim unlimited powers, and operate with unlimited secrecy and no accountability. In sum, the private and public entities that shape government policy and drive political discourse profit far too much in numerous ways to allow rational considerations of the Terror threat. \* \* \* \* \* But there’s a very similar and at least equally important (though far less discussed) constituency deeply vested in the perpetuation of this fear. It’s the sham industry Walt refers to, with appropriate scare quotes, as “terrorism experts,” who have built their careers on fear-mongering over Islamic Terrorism and can stay relevant only if that threat does. These “terrorism experts” form an incredibly incestuous, mutually admiring little clique in and around Washington. They’re employed at think tanks, academic institutions, and media outlets. They can and do have mildly different political ideologies — some are more Republican, some are more Democratic — but, as usual for D.C. cliques, ostensible differences in political views are totally inconsequential when placed next to their common group identity and career interest: namely, sustaining the myth of the Grave Threat of Islamic Terror in order to justify their fear-based careers, the relevance of their circle, and their alleged “expertise.” Like all adolescent, insular cliques, they defend one another reflexively whenever a fellow member is attacked, closing ranks with astonishing speed and loyalty; they take substantive criticisms very personally as attacks on their “friends,” because a criticism of the genre and any member in good standing of this fiefdom is a threat to their collective interests.

#### Al-Qaeda is the phantom enemy who must be exterminated, regardless of cost. The callous disregard for ‘collateral damage’ or (human life) along the way is part and parcel of the permanent state of war on terror. The precautionary logic that demands strikes to keep us safe fuels the fires of enemy construction and ensures pre-emptive war.

Erickson 08 (Ericsonwas Professor and Director, Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, Canada, “Risk and the War on Terror”, <http://www.didierbigo.com/students/readings/IPS2011/12/Risk_and_the_War_on_Terror.pdf#page=40>)

Terrorism makes precautionary logic obvious. Following 9/11, political speech in the U.S. took a dramatic turn aimed at making precautionary logic part of everyday life. President Bush hit home in various sound-bites the need to preempt the terrorist threat ‘‘before it fully materializes.’’ His then National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, declared that extraordinary police and military mobilization against terrorism is necessary before the ‘‘smoking gun becomes a mushroom cloud’’ (Janus 2004: 577–8).¶ Investigations of the failure to prevent the events of 9/11 focused on the problems of bureaucracy, communication, and tunnel vision in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CIA, and other security agencies, and stressed the need to exercise the catastrophic imagination as a crucial ingredient of future security. The 9/11 Commission Report (Kean and Hamilton 2004: 339) said the 9/11 attacks reﬂected security agencies’ failure of ‘‘imagination – the lack of organisational capacity to imagine such an attack’’ (see also Salter, this volume). Ironically, it recommended efforts to bureaucratize imagination: ‘‘It is therefore crucial to ﬁnd a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination’’ (ibid: 334). While a bureaucratized imagination seems paradoxical, what is being recommended is the embedding of precautionary logic in the security systems of organizations.¶ In all of their planning, strategies, and practices, security agents are to imagine a kind of sea monster intent on leaving tsunami-like destruction in its wake.¶ Precautionary logic has become central to the U.S. politics of risk and security, feeding into and fed by other features of its political culture. There is a concerted effort to conﬂate the need for preemption at home with preemptive strikes against terrorism abroad. This conﬂation was a key feature of Bush’s strategy in the 2004 presidential election, continuing the post-9/ 11 campaign to simultaneously terrorize the American population into the preemptive policies of homeland security, and populations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East through preemptive attacks.¶ This conﬂation of security at home with aggression abroad is effected through the view that the U.S. is at war with terrorists however deﬁned. The U.S. has long used ‘‘war on’’ metaphors to identify suitable enemies and justify extreme security measures against them: ‘‘the war on crime,’’ ‘‘the war on drugs,’’ even ‘‘the war on poverty’’ when welfarism had a glimmer of hope in the American political culture of the 1960s (see also Simon, this volume). ‘‘The war on terrorism’’ in some respects encapsulates all of these ‘‘war on’’ campaigns because it is not only directed at foreign enemies and global security, but also at enemies within, blurring into preemptive approaches to domestic crime, drugs, welfare fraud, and anything else signifying moral degeneracydd (Barak 2005).¶ Agamben (2005) links the pervasiveness of ‘‘war on’’ metaphors in American culture to the fact that the sovereign power of the president is based in declared emergency linked to a state of war.¶ [O]ver the course of the twentieth century the metaphor of war becomes an integral part of the presidential political vocabulary whenever decisions considered to be of vital importance are being imposed. Thus, in 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to assume extraordinary powers to cope with the Great Depression by presenting his actions as those of a commander during a military campaign ... President Bush’s decision to refer to himself constantly as the ‘‘Commander in Chief of the Army’’ after September 11, 2001, must be considered in the context of this presidential claim to sovereign powers in everyday emergency situations. If, as we have seen, the assumption of this title entails a direct reference to the state of exception, then Bush is attempting to produce a situation in which emergency becomes the rule, and the very distinction between peace and war (and between foreign and civil war) becomes impossible. Agamben (2005: 21–2)¶ Richard Clarke, a former member of the U.S. Security Council, even argues that al-Qaeda is a ‘‘phantom enemy’’ manufactured through the precautionary logic of instrumental politicians: ‘‘those with the darkest imaginations become the most powerful’’ (Clarke 2004). Raban (2005: 22) observes there is now ‘‘a world of chronic blur, full of slippery words that mean something different from what they meant before September 2001.’’ It is the blur of a war on everything, envisaged by U.S. military ofﬁcials long before 9/11: In broad terms, fourth generation warfare [involving a nation-state in conﬂict with a non-state actor] seems to be widely dispersed and largely undeﬁned; the distinction will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no deﬁneable battleﬁelds or fronts. The distinction between ‘‘civilian’’ and ‘‘military’’ may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity.

#### No nuclear terror.

Chapman 12 [Stephen, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely May 22, 2012 6:00 AM http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html]

Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be **vanishingly small.”** The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas**,** they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, **it** probably **won’t bother.**

#### The supposed ‘necessity’ of drone strikes doesn’t derive from a neutral set of beliefs. Rather, war coverage is shaped by Islamophobic frames and repeated until it’s treated as true. This enemy fabrication propagates a limited set of narratives about ‘Muslim terrorism’ and causes endless war in the name of security politics.

Streuner and Willis, 2009 [Dr. Erin Steuter and Dr. De borah Wills Depart ment o f Soci ology Mount Allis on Univer sity rin Steuter and Deborah Wills are the authors of At Wa r with Meta phor: Media Propaganda and Racism in th e Wa r on Terr or (Lexington Books, 2008). Erin Steuter is an a ssociate professor of Soci ology where she specializes in examining the ideological repr esentations of the ne ws. Recip ient of multiple awards for her teaching and r esearch, her research and published works have appeared in Political Communication and Persuasion , Canadian Jo urnal of Communication , Journal of American and Comparative C ultures , a nd other noted academic journals. Deborah Wills is an associa te professor of English at Mount Allison University . “iscourses of Dehumanization: Enemy Construction and Canadian Media Complicity in the Framing of the War on Terror “http://www.gmj.uottawa.ca/0902/v2i2\_steuter%20and%20wills.pdf]

One of the least visible bu t most ideological ly-charged choices in W ester n medi a’s coverage of the Afg han and Iraqi war s is its “consistent disinterest in nonviolent Muslim perspectives” (Gottsc halk and Greenberg 2007). As Peter Go ttschalk and Gabriel Greenberg (2007) point out, moderate voices from the Mu slim community are routinely omitted from news coverage, an absence that confirms public stereotyping of all Muslims as extremist. While this omission pre-dates September11, it has intensified since; domestic news sources “seldom mention the terms ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islam’ except in the context of conflict, violence, and bloodshed” (G ottschalk and Greenberg 2007).¶ Constructing the Enemy Media coverage of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are critically shaped by pre-existing, Islamophobic frames that reflect neo-colonial assumptions (Henry & Tator, 2002; Kellner, 2004; Norris, Kern & Just, 2003; Nacos, 2002; Paletz, 1992; Picard, 1993). Karim argues that a coherent set of journalistic narratives have emerged regarding “Muslim terrorism” (2003: 81) narratives that reinforce stereotypes of murderous Muslims and advance limited and often inaccurate information about Islam. Edward Said (1997) similarly argues that the image of Is lam in Western media is laden “not only [with] patent inaccuracy but also expressions of unres trained ethnocentrism, cultural and even racial hatred” (Said, 1997: ii). He notes that “malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign cultu re in the West; what is said about the Muslim mind, or character, or religion, or culture as a whole cannot now be said in mainstream discussion about Africans, Jews, other Orientals, or Asians” (Ibid: 12). Journalist David Lamb concurs, noting that Arabs are now “caricatur ed in a manner once reserved for blacks and Hispanics” (cited in Lester & Ross, 2003: 76). ¶ Elizabeth Poole observes that in the media’s discussion of the War on Terror, anti-Western violence is “seen to evolve out of something inherent in the [Muslim] religion” (Poole, 2002: 4). As several studies have documented, after the events of 9/11, North American media intensified their depictions of prevailing st ereotypes about Arabs and Muslims (Pintak, 2006; Inbaraj, 2002; McChesney, 2002). Pintak contends that the bias in American media after 9/11 constitutes “jihad journalism”, adding that such slanted coverage became “the hallmark of the post-9/11 era” (Pintak, 2006: 42-44). The media’s dominant narrative, according to McChesney, portrays “a benevolent, democratic and peace-loving nation brutally attacked by insane evil terrorists who hate the United States for its fr eedoms” (McChesney, 2002: 43). Its chief message is that the U.S. “must immediately increase its military and covert forces, locate the surviving culprits and exterminate them” in order to “root out the global terrorist cancer” (Ibid). This dominant narrative’s reliance on disease metaphors poi nts to one of the key features of North American and European media coverage of th e wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the War on Terror in general: the patterned and systematic dehumanization of Muslims (Kuttab, 2007; Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson & Mihic, 2008)¶ . ¶ Philip Knightly’s (1975) and Sam Keen’s ( 1991) pioneering work on enemy construction analyzes the persistence of animal images of the enemy in media propaganda. The construction of the enemy as a dehumanized Other is much more than a representational strategy performed by the news media; its results can be global in reach. Said’s work lays much of the groundwork for current analyses of the media’s fabrication of the enemy-Other; it argues that colonial and imperial projects depend on the way we characterize those we see as deeply and oppositionally different from ourselves. Over time, these characterizations are systematized and grouped into an organized body of thought, a repertoire of words and images so often repeated that it comes to seem like objective knowledge. Orientalism, the distorting lens created by this process, offers a framework through which the West examines what it perceives as the foreign or alien, Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills 12 consistently figuring the East as the West’s invers e: barbaric to its civilized, superstitious to its rational, medieval to its modern. While We stern citizens are defined by their essential uniqueness and individuality, those of the East are constructed in metaphoric terms that emphasize their indistinguishability; the language of Western media discourse typically emphasizes mass over singularity when it represents the East. ¶ In times of conflict, when constructions of the Other conflate with constructions of the enemy, this pattern intensifies. As Lori A. P eek points out, the processes of defining the enemy and defining the Other have a lot in common, in that they “sometimes lead to devastating outcomes” (Peek, 2004: 28). Presenting the enemy- Other as an indistinguishable mass is an essential strategy in the process of enemy fabrication; wartime images traditionally stress this indistinguishability, as evidenced in Frank Capra’s 1945 propaganda film, Know Your Enemy: Japan , which claimed all Japanese resembled “photographic reprints off the same negative” (Dower, 1986: 18), a message visually reinforced by inter-cutting scenes of a steel bar being hammered in a forge with scenes of regimented Japanese mass activity, the visual correlative of a race lacking individual identity. ¶ Such representations operate most visibly in overt propaganda, but devolve so thoroughly into public discourse that they influence the media’s rhetorical choices. Middle-Eastern identities are confused and eroded; Rayan El Amine notes that the Islamic menace “has replaced the red menace, and the ‘evil empire’ of the cold war ha s become the . . . ‘evil doers’ of the Arab and Muslim world” (2005). The metaphors employed in Canadian newspaper headlines further and solidify such attitudes, compressing difference into unanimity by employing a vocabulary of indistinguishability. Unlike the civilized citizens of the West, who are prim arily identified with culture rather than with nature , the hordes of the East are represented as being as natural as insects and as undifferentiated as a hive or swarm. The headlines gathered here clearly indicate an ongoing equation of the Muslim Other with swarming insects and massing rodents, a metaphoric conflation that is especially resilient and persistent. As Merskin notes, we did not see “the end of enemy construction with the war in Iraq. The stereotype was carried from the Taliban, bin Laden, and terrorists to the axis of evil and Hussein. Since the occupation of Iraq, the evil Arab image shifted to . . . ‘crazed’ Ira qis opposed to U.S. occupation” (2004: 60). Such images are not, as Merskin argues, simply an issue of journalistic imbalance and unfair representations, but speak to fundamental questions of why such images are so necessary and prevalent.

#### TKs cause more terrorism—Hydra effect and local backlash

Gabriella Blum 10, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and Philip Heymann, the James Barr Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, June 27, 2010, “Law and Policy of Targeted Killing,” Harvard National Security Journal, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol-1\_Blum-Heymann\_Final.pdf

An immediate consequence of eliminating leaders of terrorist organizations will sometimes be what may be called the Hydra effect, the rise of more—and more resolute—leaders to replace them. The decapitating of the organization may also invite retaliation by the other members and followers of the organization. Thus, when Israel assassinated Abbas Mussawi, Hezbollah‘s leader in Lebanon, in 1992, a more charismatic and successful leader, Hassan Nassrallah, succeeded Mussawi. The armed group then avenged the assassination of its former leader in two separate attacks, blowing up Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires, killing over a hundred people and injuring hundreds more. Targeted killing may also interfere with important gathering of critical intelligence. The threat of being targeted will drive current leaders into hiding, making the monitoring of their movements and activities by the counterterrorist forces more difficult. Moreover, if these leaders are found and killed, instead of captured, the counterterrorism forces lose the ability to interrogate them to obtain potentially valuable information about plans, capabilities, or organizational structure. The political message flowing from the use of targeted killings may be harmful to the attacking country’s interest, as it emphasizes the disparity in power between the parties and reinforces popular support for the terrorists, who are seen as a David fighting Goliath. Moreover, by resorting to military force rather than to law enforcement, targeted killings might strengthen the sense of legitimacy of terrorist operations, which are sometimes viewed as the only viable option for the weak to fight against a powerful empire. If collateral damage to civilians accompanies targeted killings, this, too, may bolster support for what seems like the just cause of the terrorists, at the same time as it weakens domestic support for fighting the terrorists. When targeted killing operations are conducted on foreign territory, they run the risk of heightening international tensions between the targeting government and the government in whose territory the operation is conducted. Israel’s relations with Jordan became dangerously strained following the failed attempt in September 1997 in Jordan to assassinate Khaled Mashaal, the leader of Hamas. Indeed, international relations may suffer even where the local government acquiesces in the operation, but the operation fails or harms innocent civilians, bringing the local government under political attack from domestic constituencies (recall the failed attack in Pakistan on Al-Zawahiri that left eighteen civilians dead). Even if there is no collateral damage, targeted killings in another country’s territory threatens to draw criticism from local domestic constituencies against the government, which either acquiesced or was too weak to stop the operation in its territory. Such is the case now in both Pakistan and Yemen, where opposition forces criticize the governments for permitting American armed intervention in their countries. The aggression of targeted killings also runs the risk of spiraling hatred and violence, numbing both sides to the effects of killing and thus continuing the cycle of violence. Each attack invites revenge, each revenge invites further retaliation. Innocent civilians suffer whether they are the intended target of attack or its unintentional collateral consequences. Last but not least, exceptional measures tend to exceed their logic. As in the case of extraordinary detention or interrogation methods, there is a danger of over-using targeted killings, both within and outside of the war on terrorism. A particular danger in this context arises as the killing of a terrorist often proves a simpler operation than protracted legal battles over detention, trial, extradition, and release.

#### Their simplification of terrorism perpetuates the harms by oversimplifying a complex event—exploiting fears of future strikes is a self-destructive process that ultimately risks seeking such strikes to justify future violence.

Derrida ‘3  
Jacques, the original postmodernist, Philosophy in a Time of Terror p 107-9

The most terrorist? This question is at once necessary and destined to remain without any answer. Necessary because it takes into account and essential fact: all terrorism presents itself as a response in a situation that continues to escalate. It amounts to saying “I am resorting to terrorism as a last resort, because the other is more terrorist than I am; I am defending myself, counterattacking; the real terrorist, the worst, is the one who will have deprived me of every other means of responding before presenting himself, the first aggressor as a victim.” It is in this way that the United States, Israel, wealthy nations and colonial or imperialist powers are accused of practicing state terrorism and thus of being more terrorist than the terrorist of whom they say they are the victims. The pattern is well known, so I won’t belabor it. But it is difficult to write it off purely and simply, even if it is sometimes applied in a simplistic and abusive fashion. Yet the question you are asking, that of a more or less in terrorism should also not be settled through a purely objectively quantitative logic. For this question can give rise to no such formal evaluation. Terrorist acts try to produce psychic effects (conscious or unconscious) and symbolic or symptomatic relations that might take numerous detours an incalculable number of them, in truth. The quality or intensity of the emotions is provoked (whether conscious or unconscious) is not always proportionate to the number of victims or the amount of damage. In situations and cultures where the media do not spectacularize the event, the killing of thousands of people in a very short period of time might provoke fewer psychic and political effects than the assassination of a single individual in another country, culture, or nation-state with highly developed media resources. And does terrorism have to work only through death? Can’t one terrorize without killing? And does killing necessarily mean putting to death? Isn’t it also a “letting die”? Can’t “letting die”, “not wanting to know that one is letting others die”—hundreds of millions of human beings, from hunger, AIDS, lack of medical treatment, and so on—also be part of a more or less conscious and deliberate terrorist strategy? We are perhaps wrong to assume so quickly that all terrorism is voluntary, sonscious, organized, deliberate, intentionally calculated” there are historical and political situations where terror operates, so to speak as if by itself, as the simple result of some apparatus, because of the relations of force in place, without anyone, any conscious subject, any person any “I”, being really conscious of it or feeling itself responsible for it. All situations of social or national structural oppression produce a terror that is not natural (insofar as it is organized, institutional), and all these situations depend on this terror without those who benefit from them ever organizing terrorist acts or ever being treated as terrorists. The narrow, too narrow meaning commonly given today to the word “terrorism” gets circulated in various ways in the discourse that dominates the public space, and first of all through the technoeconomic power of the media. What would September 11 have been without television? This question has already been asked and explored, so I will not insist on it here. But we must recall that maximum media coverage was in the common interest of the perpetrators of September 11, the terrorist, and those who, in the name of the victims, wanted to declare war on terrorism. Between these two parties, such media coverage was, like the good sense of which Descartes speaks, the most widely shared thing in the world. More than the destruction of the Twin Towers or the attack on the Pentagon, more than the killing of thousands of people the real terrorism consisted of and in fact, began by exposing and exploiting, having exposed and exploited, the image of this terror by the target itself. This target (the United States, let’s say and anyone who supports or is allied with them in the world, and this knows almost no limits today) had it in its own interest (the same interest it shares with its sworn enemies) to expose its vulnerability, to give the greatest possible coverage to the aggression against which it wishes to protect itself. This is again the same autoimmunitary perversion. Or perhaps it would be better to say “pervertibility” so as to name a possibility, a risk, or a threat whose virtuality does not take the form of an evil intention, an evil spirit or a will to do harm. But this virtuality alone is enough to frighten, even terrify. It is the ineradicable root of terror and thus of a terrorism. Implacably. Endlessly. Let me add her e a reminder: there is nothing purely modern in this relation between media and terror, in a terrorism that operates by propagating within the public space images or rumors aimed at terrifying the so called civilian population. It is true, of course, that with radio and television what is called organized propaganda” something that is in fact relatively modern has, in the last century, and already during WWI, played an essential role in “declared” war. It will have gone hand in hand with bombing campaigns (whether conventional or atomic) that could not differentiate between civilian and military any more than the resistance movements and the oppressions of those movements could. It was thus already impossible during the two world wars to distinguish rigorously between war and terrorism.

#### Nuclear war is a text – its reference is what makes it a threat.

Derrida ’84 Jacques Derrida; Catherine Porter; Philip Lewis, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)” Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism. (Summer, 1984), pp. 20-31

Third reason. In our techno-scientitico-mifitaro-diplomatic incompetence, we may con-sider ourselves, however, as competent as others to deal with a phenomenon whose essen-tial feature is that of being fabulously textual, through and through. Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, Including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it. You will say, perhaps: but it is not the first time; the other wars, too, so long as they hadn't taken place, were only talked about and written about. And as to the fright of imaginary anticipation, what might prove that a European in the period following the war of 1870 might not have been more terrified by the "technological" image of the bombings and exterminations of the Second World War (even supposing he had been able to form such an image) than we are by the image we can construct for ourselves of a nuclear war? The logic of this argument is not devoid of value, especially if one is thinking about a limited and "clean" nuclear war. But it loses its value in the face of the hypothesis of a total nuclear war, which, as a hypothesis, or, if you prefer, as a fantasy, or phantasm, conditions every discourse and all strategies. Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text. At least today apparently. And that sets us to thinking about today, our day, the presence of this present in and through that fabulous textuality. Better than ever and more than ever. The growing multiplication of the discourse— indeed, of the literature — on this subject may constitute a process of fearful domestication, the anticipatory assimilation of that unanticipatable entirely-other. For the moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not occurred; it has exis-tence only through what is said of it, only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm, are inventions. It may also be called a speculation, even a fabulous specularization. The breaking of the mirror would be, finally, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? dreaming of it, desiring it? You will perhaps find it shock-ing to find the nuclear issue reduced to a fable. But then I haven't said simply that. I have recalled that a nuclear war is for the time being a fable, that is, something one can only talk about But who can fail to recognize the massive "reality “ of nuclear weaponry and of the ter- rifying forces of destruction that are being stockpiled and capitalized everywhere, that are corning to constitute the very movement of capitalization. One has to distinguish between this "reality" of the nuclear age and the fiction of war. But, and this would perhaps be the imperative of a nuclear criticism, one must also be careful to interpret critically this critical or diacritical distinction. For the "reality" of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war are perhaps distinct, but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other words the (able) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through al the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human socius today, everything that is named by the old words culture, civilization, aihriung, schofe, pandeia. "Reality," let's say the encom-passing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an event that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at alp, an event of which one can only speak, an event whose advent remains an invention by men (in all the senses of the word "invention") or which, rather, remains to be invented. An invention because it depends upon new technical mechanisms, to be sure, but an invention also because it does not exist and especially because, at whatever point it should come into existence, it would be a grand premiere appearance. Fourth reason. Since we are speaking of fables, of language, of fiction and fantasy, writing and rhetoric, let us go even further. Nuclear war does not depend on language just because we can do nothing but speak of it — and then as something that has never occurred. It does not depend on language just because the "incompetents" on all sides can speak of it only in the mode of gossip or of doxa (opinion) — and the dividing line between doxa and episteme starts to blur as soon as there is no longer any such thing as an absolutely legitimizable competence for a phenomenon which is no longer strictly techno-scientific but techno-miktaro-politico-diplomatic through and through, and which brings into play the doxa or incompetence even in its calculations. There is nothing but doxa, opinion, "belief." One can no longer oppose belief and science, doxa and episteme, once one has reached the decisive place at the nuclear age, in other words, once one has arrived at the critical place of the nuclear age. In this critical place, there is no more room for a distinction between belief and science, thus no more space for a "nuclear criticism" strictly speaking. Nor even for a truth in that sense. No truth, no apocalypse. (As you know. Apocalypse means Revelation, of Truth, Un-veiling.) No, nuclear war is not only fabulous because one can only talk about it, but because the extraordinary sophistication of its technologies—which are also the technologies of delivery, sending, dispatching, of the missile in general, of mission, missive, emission, and transmission, like all techne — the extraordinary sophistication of these technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and the most cursory, the most archaic, the most crudely opinionated psychagogy, the most vulgar psychology. We can therefore consider ourselves competent because the sophistication of the nuclear strategy can never do without a sophistry of belief and the rhetorical simulation of a text.

Hegemonic stability theory is wrong and racist, impact is genocide

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(Catherine, The Bases of Empire p. 29)

The reasons given for stationing U.S. forces overseas, though, cannot simply be called wrong. While the weight of evidence just briefly reviewed suggests that they are, the pursuit of the immense project of circling the globe with soldiers and equipment is fueled as much by myth-structures as by reason and rationality. It then becomes difficult to distinguish one from the other. While such myths may be invalidated by rational argumentation, their explanatory power often remains powerfully intact. Support for foreign military bases hinges first on the idea that war is often necessary and ultimately inevitable. It is widely believed that humans are naturally violent and that war can be a glorious and good venture. **Racism adds the notion that the modern and not coincidentally white nations have the responsibility**, intelligence, religious ethic, and right to control more primitive (and more chaotically violent) others through violence if necessary. These racial ideas made it possible for people in the United States and Europe to support colonial exterminationist wars in the nineteenth century, but to find wars between indus- trialized or civilized states increasingly unthinkable during the late nineteenth century (despite what went on to happen in the twentieth). They also underpin the assumption that Gusterson (1999) has labeled “nuclear orientalism,” which holds that only the United States and European powers can truly be trusted with nuclear weapons. Such beliefs provide important foundation stones for support of the U.S. basing system.16

#### Brooks, Wohlforth, and Ikenberry’s analysis doesn’t even consider the will of non-Americans. Their scholarship is just a tool of imperialism.

Roger 13 Comment on “Pull Back or Lean Forward?” *The Monkey Cage*; January 4, 2013; http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2013/01/03/pull-back-or-lean-forward/

brooks et al. write as if the rest of the world doesn’t actually exist or matter except as a stage for US marauding. their article a terrible case of american centric bubble thought. seriously, it doesn’t even cross their minds to ask what other people around the world actually think of ‘leaning forward’. have they not learned a single thing from postcolonial theory? they write as self-centered imperialists, who assume the god given right to do what they want. this is why American IR is kind of laughed at around the world. it just serves US primacy and thus is hardly a science of anything…

#### Barnett is a hack and paid off by weapons contractors—heg just leads to war

Robb 5 John, expert military analyst who has consulted the DoD, JCS, House Armed Services Committee, and CIA; “Barnett's Neo-Conservative Redux” *John Robb’s Weblog*; December 14, 2005; http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2005/12/barnetts\_neocon.html

Thomas Barnett, an author and an evangelist for a military contractor, is making progress pushing the DoD into a buying binge to build a new nation-building force out of the legacy military. According to him, non-state forces don't have a chance against this new government run super-bureaucracy. The tech, the ideas, and the people will be so great that it can't fail. Of course, I hope he is right that America, armed with this new sys-Admin force will sweep the world of failed states and accelerate the end of history (where everyone lives in a US-aligned capitalist democracy). However, I know he is wrong and this will only result in buckets of grief, blood, and red ink.

#### Their threats are constructed by the military industrial complex

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(Catherine, US Bases and Empire: Global Perspectives on the Asia Pacific, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12-3-09, March 16, 2009. http://old.japanfocus.org/-Catherine\_Lutz/3086)

Alongside their military and economic functions, bases have symbolic and psychological dimensions.  They are highly visible expressions of a nation’s will to status and power.  Strategic elites have built bases as a visible sign of the nation’s standing, much as they have constructed monuments and battleships. So, too, contemporary US politicians and the public have treated the number of their bases as indicators of the nation’s hyperstatus and hyperpower.  More darkly, **overseas military bases can also be seen as symptoms of irrational or untethered fears, even paranoia, as they are built with the long-term goal of taming a world perceived to be out of control**.  Empires frequently misperceive the world as rife with threats and themselves as objects of violent hostility from others.  Militaries’ interest in **organizational survival** has also contributed to the amplification of this fear and imperial basing structures as the solution as they “sell themselves” to their populace by exaggerating threats, underestimating the costs of basing and war itself, as well as understating the obstacles facing preemption and belligerence (Van Evera 2001).