Our affirmation is key to creating a political space for alterity because it engages in a politics of free being.

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A politics of free being (as distinct from a politics of being free) entails both a withdrawal and an afﬁrmation. To be free in free being is not to assert one’s freedom as a right or possession, but to open oneself freely to otherness. To do this, one must proceed, as Nancy writes, by ‘placing the “self” in the position of taking the measure of its existence’ (Nancy 1993, 71). That is, by taking the measure of its existence, one must critically reﬂect on oneself without measure (to measure one’s existence in the strictest sense is to measure it without relating it to anything else; to relate it absolutely). To do this requires a withdrawal from the self (in its self-identity as a democratic self; a self that shares the property of democracy with others) thereby afﬁrming free being (being without relation) as the very chance of democracy. Nancy writes of various modalities of free being, including a certain kind of resistance, but also in terms of the virtues of ‘serenity, grace, forgiveness, or surprises of language, and other still’ (Nancy 1993, 71) that exceed measure (the incommensurable), which are the very measure of what it is ‘to be common’ (Nancy 1993, 72). A politics of free being must therefore be one based on virtue, as I have described it earlier in this paper, understood as the giving, not of what one has, but of what one doesn’t have: free being. To give free being, is to be free by afﬁrming freedom as that which opens being as other; at the same time it is to withdraw from what one is, to resist self-identity. A politics of free being is therefore a praxis that opens the closed spaces of generic democracy through the exercise of common virtues; a praxis which, by its very act, gives birth to democracy in the ‘each time’ of singular events; in the decision to be democratic. As a doing that does what it says, praxis makes political space exist. For political space to exist it cannot be anything but itself (for instance, it cannot be democratic if by being democratic means conforming to some rule or calculation of what it means to be democratic). What political space is, then, is the spacing of being-without-relation (the space of singularities), and hence the giving-sharing of freedom. Political space, as Hannah Arendt has outlined, gives freedom to be in terms of the ‘I-can’, in terms of what is possible; in terms of how one can be in relation to others, thought strictly without relation.

#### Isaac not in the context of Derridian ethics its in the context of conditional morals.

#### They say future generations – Extend Mcquillan – openness to alterity is the only undeconstructable impact – this openness must be oriented towards those who calculation and deferral of responsibility have already killed – their focus on present life makes ethics impossible.

Derrida 1994 Specters of Marx pg xvii-xix

If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts, inheritance, and generations, generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others who are not present, nor presently living, either to us, in us, or outside us, it is in the name of justice. Of justice where it is not yet, not yet there, where it is no longer, let us understand where it is no longer present, and where it will never be, no more than the law, reducible to laws or rights.3 It is necessary to speak of the "ghost, indeed to the ghost and with it, from the moment that no ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does not recognize in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for those others who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born. No justice-let us not say no law and once again we are not speaking here ofIaws4- seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present. within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism. Without this non-contemporaneity with itself of the living presettt, without that which secretly unhinges it, without this responsibility and this respect for justice concerning those who are not there, of those who are no longer or who are not yet present and living, what sense would there be to ask the question "where?" "where tomorrow?" "whither?" This question arrives, if it arrives, it questions with regard to what will come in the future-to-come.5 Turned toward the future, going toward it, it also comes from it, it roceeds rom rovient de the future. It must therefore exceed any presence as presence to itself At least it has to make this presence possible only on the basis of the movement of some disjointing, disjunction, or disproportion: in the inadequation to self. Now, if this question, from the moment it comes to us, can clearly come only from the future (whither? Where will we go tomorrow? where, for example, is Marxism going? where are we going with it?), what stands in front of it must also precede it like its origin: before it. Even if the future is its provenance, it must be, like any provenance, absolutely and irreversibly past, "Experience" of the past as to come, the one and the other absolutely absolute, beyond all modification of any present whatever. If it is possible and if one must take it seriously, the possibility of the question, which is perhaps no longer a question and which we are calling here justice, must carry beyond present life, life as my life or our life. In general. For it will be the same thing for the "my life" or “our life" tomorrow," that is, for the life of others, as it was yesterday for other others: beyond therefore the living present in general. To be just: beyond the living present in general-and beyond its simple negative reversal A spectral moment, a moment that no longer belongs to time, if one understands by this word the linking of modalized presents (past present, actual present: "now," future present). We are questioning in this instant, we are asking ourselves about this instant that is not docile to time, at least to what we call time. Furtive and untimely, the apparition of the specter does not belong to that time, It does not give time, not that one: "Enter the ghost, exit the ghost, re-enter the ghost" (Hamlet).

#### They say U.S. winning war – Terrorism resurging now—even if drone strikes are theoretically effective, they can’t prevent attacks.

The Economist 9/28

The Economist, 9/28/13, “The new face of terror”, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21586832-west-thought-it-was-winning-battle-against-jihadist-terrorism-it-should-think-again

All those gains are now in question. The Shabab is recruiting more foreign fighters than ever (some of whom appear to have been involved in the attack on the Westgate). AQAP was responsible for the panic that led to the closure of 19 American embassies across the region and a global travel alert in early August. Meanwhile al-Qaeda’s core, anticipating the withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan after 2014, is already moving back into the country’s wild east. Above all, the poisoning of the Arab spring has given al-Qaeda and its allies an unprecedented opening. The coup against a supposedly moderate Islamist elected government in Egypt has helped restore al-Qaeda’s ideological power. Weapons have flooded out of Libya and across the region, and the civil war in Syria has revived one of the network’s most violent and unruly offshoots, al-Qaeda in Iraq, now grandly renamed the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. The struggle to depose the Assad regime has acted as a magnet for thousands of would-be jihadists from all over the Muslim world and from Muslim communities in Europe and North America. The once largely moderate and secular Syrian Free Army has been progressively displaced by better-organised and better-funded jihadist groups that have direct links with al-Qaeda. Western intelligence estimates reckon such groups now represent as much as 80% of the effective rebel fighting force. Even if they fail to advance much from the territory they now hold in the north and east of the country, they might end up controlling a vast area that borders an ever more fragile-looking Iraq, where al-Qaeda is currently murdering up to 1,000 civilians a month. That is a terrifying prospect. No more wishful thinking How much should Western complacency be blamed for this stunning revival? Quite a bit. Mr Obama was too eager to cut and run from Iraq. He is at risk of repeating the mistake in Afghanistan. America has been over-reliant on drone strikes to “decapitate” al-Qaeda groups: the previous defence secretary, Leon Panetta, even foolishly talked of defeating the network by killing just 10-20 leaders in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.

#### Their scholarship is BS—it’s influenced by profit motive over fact.

Greenwald 12 [Glenn, was named by The Atlantic as one of the 25 most influential political commentators in the nation. He is the recipient of the first annual I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism, and is the winner of the 2010 Online Journalism Association Award for his investigative work on the arrest and oppressive detention of Bradley Manning former Constitutional and civil rights litigator and is the author of three New York Times Bestselling books, Salon AUG 15, 2012 http://www.salon.com/2012/08/15/the\_sham\_terrorism\_expert\_industry/]

Many of the benefits from keeping Terrorism fear levels high are obvious. Private corporations suck up massive amounts of Homeland Security cash as long as that fear persists, while government officials in the National Security and Surveillance State can claim unlimited powers, and operate with unlimited secrecy and no accountability. In sum, the private and public entities that shape government policy and drive political discourse profit far too much in numerous ways to allow rational considerations of the Terror threat. \* \* \* \* \* But there’s a very similar and at least equally important (though far less discussed) constituency deeply vested in the perpetuation of this fear. It’s the sham industry Walt refers to, with appropriate scare quotes, as “terrorism experts,” who have built their careers on fear-mongering over Islamic Terrorism and can stay relevant only if that threat does. These “terrorism experts” form an incredibly incestuous, mutually admiring little clique in and around Washington. They’re employed at think tanks, academic institutions, and media outlets. They can and do have mildly different political ideologies — some are more Republican, some are more Democratic — but, as usual for D.C. cliques, ostensible differences in political views are totally inconsequential when placed next to their common group identity and career interest: namely, sustaining the myth of the Grave Threat of Islamic Terror in order to justify their fear-based careers, the relevance of their circle, and their alleged “expertise.” Like all adolescent, insular cliques, they defend one another reflexively whenever a fellow member is attacked, closing ranks with astonishing speed and loyalty; they take substantive criticisms very personally as attacks on their “friends,” because a criticism of the genre and any member in good standing of this fiefdom is a threat to their collective interests.

#### Doesn’t solve the aff – they posit ethics as conditional. Decision is the utmost ethical responsibility and must be made unconditionally.

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The fact of democracy is the breaching of democracy’s closure in all forms of totalisation and calculation; its openness to the other as absolute. In this case, the democratic relation is not given in advance, but must issue out of a decision that is freely made. We may decide to do something, but the decision itself, in its very act, is that which exceeds all motivation and purpose. Decisions must decide absolutely, where what one decides upon might not be. Decisions are not even reducible to chance or the dice throw, since these presume a state of affairs that can be calculated. Decisions are existential risks, if you like, the risking of the fact that what is, is as it is. Decisions are thus responsibilities that we have in existing, in the face of undecidable otherness. As Derrida puts it, the exposure of undecidability does not mean that we cannot decide; rather that we must decide, but decide on the basis of the undecidability of that about which we decide: ‘if I speak so often of the incalculable and the undecidable it’s not out of a simple predilection for play nor in order to neutralise decision: on the contrary, I believe there is no responsibility, no ethico-political decision, that must not pass through the proofs of the incalculable or the undecidable. Otherwise, everything would be reducible to calculation, program, causality’ (Derrida 1995, 273). The imperative of the decision is not a matter of deciding for something, but of invoking the power to decide as absolutely essential to an existence in such a way that does not immediately surrender it to calculation, prediction and the already decided. To decide in this way (but is there any other way?) is to invoke a power that exceeds self reﬂection, the power of critique as praxis: a way of doing that is itself the very thing that it enacts. 10 As a praxis, freedom enacts itself in the decision to be free. As Nancy puts it, we cannot decide for freedom since we are already free in our capacity to decide (Nancy 1993, 142 ff.). A decision is free insofar as it is a ‘letting being be in its ﬁnite singularity’ (Nancy 1993, 142). As a decision for existence, the decision does not make us good or morally right, but ‘frees us for duty and right, and for the perversion of the one and the other’ (Nancy 1993, 143). 11 It is rendering us capable of morality, rather than an act of being moral. The decision has to be thought in terms other than freedom as a simple self-positing of virtue. How then do we decide if we cannot decide for democracy in the name of freedom?

#### Nuclear war is a text – its reference is what makes it a threat.

Derrida ’84 Jacques Derrida; Catherine Porter; Philip Lewis, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)” Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism. (Summer, 1984), pp. 20-31

Third reason. In our techno-scientitico-mifitaro-diplomatic incompetence, we may con-sider ourselves, however, as competent as others to deal with a phenomenon whose essen-tial feature is that of being fabulously textual, through and through. Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, Including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it. You will say, perhaps: but it is not the first time; the other wars, too, so long as they hadn't taken place, were only talked about and written about. And as to the fright of imaginary anticipation, what might prove that a European in the period following the war of 1870 might not have been more terrified by the "technological" image of the bombings and exterminations of the Second World War (even supposing he had been able to form such an image) than we are by the image we can construct for ourselves of a nuclear war? The logic of this argument is not devoid of value, especially if one is thinking about a limited and "clean" nuclear war. But it loses its value in the face of the hypothesis of a total nuclear war, which, as a hypothesis, or, if you prefer, as a fantasy, or phantasm, conditions every discourse and all strategies. Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text. At least today apparently. And that sets us to thinking about today, our day, the presence of this present in and through that fabulous textuality. Better than ever and more than ever. The growing multiplication of the discourse— indeed, of the literature — on this subject may constitute a process of fearful domestication, the anticipatory assimilation of that unanticipatable entirely-other. For the moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not occurred; it has exis-tence only through what is said of it, only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm, are inventions. It may also be called a speculation, even a fabulous specularization. The breaking of the mirror would be, finally, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? dreaming of it, desiring it? You will perhaps find it shock-ing to find the nuclear issue reduced to a fable. But then I haven't said simply that. I have recalled that a nuclear war is for the time being a fable, that is, something one can only talk about But who can fail to recognize the massive "reality “ of nuclear weaponry and of the ter- rifying forces of destruction that are being stockpiled and capitalized everywhere, that are corning to constitute the very movement of capitalization. One has to distinguish between this "reality" of the nuclear age and the fiction of war. But, and this would perhaps be the imperative of a nuclear criticism, one must also be careful to interpret critically this critical or diacritical distinction. For the "reality" of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war are perhaps distinct, but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other words the (able) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through al the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human socius today, everything that is named by the old words culture, civilization, aihriung, schofe, pandeia. "Reality," let's say the encom-passing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an event that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at alp, an event of which one can only speak, an event whose advent remains an invention by men (in all the senses of the word "invention") or which, rather, remains to be invented. An invention because it depends upon new technical mechanisms, to be sure, but an invention also because it does not exist and especially because, at whatever point it should come into existence, it would be a grand premiere appearance. Fourth reason. Since we are speaking of fables, of language, of fiction and fantasy, writing and rhetoric, let us go even further. Nuclear war does not depend on language just because we can do nothing but speak of it — and then as something that has never occurred. It does not depend on language just because the "incompetents" on all sides can speak of it only in the mode of gossip or of doxa (opinion) — and the dividing line between doxa and episteme starts to blur as soon as there is no longer any such thing as an absolutely legitimizable competence for a phenomenon which is no longer strictly techno-scientific but techno-miktaro-politico-diplomatic through and through, and which brings into play the doxa or incompetence even in its calculations. There is nothing but doxa, opinion, "belief." One can no longer oppose belief and science, doxa and episteme, once one has reached the decisive place at the nuclear age, in other words, once one has arrived at the critical place of the nuclear age. In this critical place, there is no more room for a distinction between belief and science, thus no more space for a "nuclear criticism" strictly speaking. Nor even for a truth in that sense. No truth, no apocalypse. (As you know. Apocalypse means Revelation, of Truth, Un-veiling.) No, nuclear war is not only fabulous because one can only talk about it, but because the extraordinary sophistication of its technologies—which are also the technologies of delivery, sending, dispatching, of the missile in general, of mission, missive, emission, and transmission, like all techne — the extraordinary sophistication of these technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and the most cursory, the most archaic, the most crudely opinionated psychagogy, the most vulgar psychology. We can therefore consider ourselves competent because the sophistication of the nuclear strategy can never do without a sophistry of belief and the rhetorical simulation of a text.

#### Their interpretation is an attempt to create community but lots of teams fall outside their interpretation. Because of that unbridgeable gap the idea of a community is autoimmune. Turning debate into a community reduces alterity by herding difference making ethics impossible.

Miller ‘9 [J. Hillis Miller, American literary critic, “For Derrida” 2009 Fordham University Press pg. 130-131]

On the next page Derrida claims we would not say we want to belong to the family or community if we really did belong to one or the other: "The desire to belong to any community whatsoever, the desire for be-longing tout court, implies that one does not belong" (TS, z8). This is our happy chance, since my only road to responsible ethical relations to my neighbor, the "wholly other," is by detaching myself from family or com-munity, or by recognizing that I am always already and for good detached, enisled. I must detach myself from the herd, or appropriate my detach-ment, in order to escape the doom of autoimmune self-destruction that always awaits such deconstructible agglomerations. I must come to know that I am detached, and that it's a good thing too. The different concepts of being with represented by Derrida and by all those modern thinkers of being with I began by identifying are incompati-ble. They cannot be synthesized or reconciled. II Put choisir Which do I choose? I wish with all my heart I could believe in Williams's ideal of a happy, classless community or in Hidegger's assumption that Mitsein is a fundamental aspect of being human, but I fear that each man or woman may be an island unto himself or herself, and that real communities are more like the communities of self-destructive autoimmunitv Derrida de-scribes. Certainly the United States these days, if you can dare to think of it as one immense community, is a better example of Derrida's self-destructive autoimmune community than of Williams's community of kindness and mutuality. I claim, moreover, to have confirmed through several examples the tri-ple hypothesis with which I started: (I) that the concept of community, in a given thinker, is consonant with his or her concept of relations between self and other; (2) that you cannot get from Dasein to Mitsein unless you assume from the start that Damn, is Mitsein; (3) that Derrida in his last seminars, almost uniquely among modern philosophers and theorists, af-firms the fundamental and irremediable isolation of each Dasein. For Der-rida, no isthmus, no bridge, no road, no communication or transfer connects or can ever connect my enisled self to other selves. There is no common world. There are only islands. Any community is an artificial, deconstructible, construct fabricated out of words or other signs. Any community, moreover, is self-destructively autoimmunitary to boot. One should not underestimate the consequences of holding that each human being is, throughout his or her lifetime, enisled.

#### Justice outweighs the small risk of the limits disad – Any condition imposed onto accepting the Other lends itself to a politics of tolerance and scrutinized hospitality. Unconditional acceptance of the other is a precondition to any ethics and politics.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 158-159]

The history of the concept reveals that tolerance “is always on the side of the ‘reason of the strongest,”’ firmly tied to the figure of the sov­ereign that Habermas also mentions in our dialogue. From this point of view, being tolerant is not going to make those who feel excluded any more included or understood. This was certainly a blunt statement to make in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, when Western countries were relying on tolerance as their unifying moral commit­ment. While in Derrida’s mind there is no way to overcome the one-sid­edness of tolerance, hospitality is a much more flexible concept. “If I think I am being hospitable because I am tolerant, it is because I wish to limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control over the lim­its of my ‘home,’ my sovereignty, my ‘I can’ (my territory, my house, my language, my culture, my religion, and so on).” Tolerance is “a scruti­nized hospitality, always under surveillance, parsimonious and protec­tive of its sovereignty. In the best of cases, it’s what I would call a con­ditional hospitality, the one that is most commonly practiced by indi­viduals, families, cities, or states.”34 The advantage of hospitality over tolerance is that it lends itself, as forgiveness does, to being posited in the double register of the condi­tional and the unconditional. In fact, tolerance is, for Derrida, condi­tional hospitality. By being tolerant one admits the other under one’s own conditions, and thus under one’s authority, law, and sovereignty. Derrida hopes instead for a new conception of hospitality that is, in a sense, much more tolerant than tolerance. Surprisingly for those who believe that Derrida is a counter-Enlightenment thinker, Kant is his point of reference. Derrida’s articulation of unconditional hospitality hinges on Kant’s distinction between two kinds of rights: right of invi­tation and right of visitation. But pure or unconditional hospitality does not consist in such an invita­tion (“I invite you, I welcome you into my home, on the condition that you adapt to the laws and norms of my territory, according to my lan­guage, tradition, memory, and so on”). Pure and unconditional hospital­ity, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance open to someone who is nei­ther expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other. I would call this a hospitality of visitation rather than invi­tation. The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must not ig­nore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality? As no sense of forgiveness would exist without unconditional forgive­ness, no sense of true hospitality and openness to the other would exist without unconditional hospitality.

#### No topical version – The one size fits all preordained policy option opposes deconstruction.

Mcquillan 08 (Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

One definition of policy might be that policy is not reading. It is the very opposite of deconstruction, if deconstruction can have opposites. Nothing could be more inimical to the patient and scholarly treading of the texts of the other by Jacques Derrida than the pre-ordained, one-size- fits-all, programme-for-tomorrow ambitions of policy or the relationship implied between the academic and the so-called political process in this arrangement. This is not the same as saying that one cannot or should not have an idea what one might do as a political person with respect to schools and hospitals and foreign wars, given the chance. Rather, I think it is revealing of a certain truth about deconstruction, namely that deconstruction is truly a critical nihilism. By this, I do not mean that is anarchistic or destructive, rather in the Nietzschean sense it is a type of reflection and utterance that requires an effort of intelligence and an exercise of reason as a practical, counter-cultural engagement. I for one would like to see the inauguration of an International Forum for Philosophy and Policy as a deconstructive 'counter'-Think Tank. It might be distinguished from existing organisations by the formula: more think, less tank. It would adopt a relation to policy of intervention rather than a preparation. Not in order to outflank public policy through a strategy of negation and transcendental position taking (or posturing) but in order to provide critical readings of singular events as they arrived misshapen and monstrous in the present. Such open and reflective institutions will be absolutely necessary if the future of thought itself is to stand a chance and if it is to continue to confront power with truth.

#### Unconditional hospitability can never have a political or juridical status but must always be pushed to its limits.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 159-160]

Conditional hospitality, or tolerance, is fundamentally the right of invi­tation and as such lays the conditions for international and cosmopoli­tan conventions. Unconditional hospitality, by contrast, corresponds to the right of visitation. As such, it exposes the host to the maximum risk, as it does not allow for any systematic defense or immunity against the other. Derrida admits that unconditional hospitality cannot have a political or juridical status. States cannot include it in their laws, be­cause hospitality without conditions is irreconcilable with the very idea of a sovereign state. And yet, it is only from the standpoint of uncondi­tional hospitality, or the right of visitation, that we gain a critical per­spective on die limits of cosmopolitan right, tolerance, conditional hospitality, and the right of invitation. I11 his treatise Perpetual Peace, Kant backs the idea of cosmopoli­tan right without the support of a world government. Not only, since World War I, did international institutions operate in line with Kant’s legacy, but this is Derrida’s as well as Habermas’s political dream. However, while Habermas sees it as a program, Derrida understands it as an ideal that can best be pursued by continually having it face its lim­its. For, as we have seen, cosmopolitanism expresses only conditional hospitality, or what Kant calls the right of invitation. For Derrida, the ideal of democracy lies beyond cosmopolitanism and world citizenship, over and beyond the economy of sovereignty, politics, and jurisdiction. Cosmopolitanism applies to a world viewed as cosmos, which since the Greeks means an orderly whole regulated by principles and laws. Even though Derrida explicitly stands by cos­mopolitanism and world citizenry, he feels that commitment to justice cannot be fully exercised within the boundaries of law and cosmopoli­tanism. For justice, as well as democracy, is not just about our conduct within the framework of the state or under the obligations of citizen­ship but also in the face of a stranger. I want to underline that Derrida’s belief that room needs to be left for something located somewhere beyond politics and law, cosmopoli­tanism and world citizenry, is firmly anchored in a formal scheme: the distinction between the conditional and unconditional registers. The conceptual formalism of this gesture allows him to avoid reactionary and nostalgic revivals as well as an essentialist reading of tradition and identity. The quality of what is beyond politics and law is never spelled out in terms of any specific content or value but simply indi­cated as the condition of possibility for what politics and law articu­late.35 As forgiveness in the hands of politics and the juridical domain be­comes a therapy of reconciliation, and hospitality in the hands of cos­mopolitanism becomes the simple right of invitation, justice in the hands of law is reduced to law’s simple enforceability. Applicability, “enforceability,” is not an exterior or secondary possibility that may or may not be added as a supplement to law. It is the force es­sentially implied in the very concept of justice as law (droit), of justice as it becomes droit, of the law as “droit” (for I want to insist right away on reserving the possibility of a justice, indeed of a law that not only exceeds or contradicts “law” (droit) but also, perhaps, has no relation to law, or maintains such a strange relation to it that it may just as well command the “droit” that excludes it). The word enforceability reminds us that there is no such thing as law (droit) that doesn’t imply in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility of being “enforced,” applied by force.36