Our affirmation is key to creating a political space for alterity because it engages in a politics of free being.

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A politics of free being (as distinct from a politics of being free) entails both a withdrawal and an afﬁrmation. To be free in free being is not to assert one’s freedom as a right or possession, but to open oneself freely to otherness. To do this, one must proceed, as Nancy writes, by ‘placing the “self” in the position of taking the measure of its existence’ (Nancy 1993, 71). That is, by taking the measure of its existence, one must critically reﬂect on oneself without measure (to measure one’s existence in the strictest sense is to measure it without relating it to anything else; to relate it absolutely). To do this requires a withdrawal from the self (in its self-identity as a democratic self; a self that shares the property of democracy with others) thereby afﬁrming free being (being without relation) as the very chance of democracy. Nancy writes of various modalities of free being, including a certain kind of resistance, but also in terms of the virtues of ‘serenity, grace, forgiveness, or surprises of language, and other still’ (Nancy 1993, 71) that exceed measure (the incommensurable), which are the very measure of what it is ‘to be common’ (Nancy 1993, 72). A politics of free being must therefore be one based on virtue, as I have described it earlier in this paper, understood as the giving, not of what one has, but of what one doesn’t have: free being. To give free being, is to be free by afﬁrming freedom as that which opens being as other; at the same time it is to withdraw from what one is, to resist self-identity. A politics of free being is therefore a praxis that opens the closed spaces of generic democracy through the exercise of common virtues; a praxis which, by its very act, gives birth to democracy in the ‘each time’ of singular events; in the decision to be democratic. As a doing that does what it says, praxis makes political space exist. For political space to exist it cannot be anything but itself (for instance, it cannot be democratic if by being democratic means conforming to some rule or calculation of what it means to be democratic). What political space is, then, is the spacing of being-without-relation (the space of singularities), and hence the giving-sharing of freedom. Political space, as Hannah Arendt has outlined, gives freedom to be in terms of the ‘I-can’, in terms of what is possible; in terms of how one can be in relation to others, thought strictly without relation.

#### Their interpretation is an attempt to create pure community but lots of teams fall outside their interpretation. Because of that unbridgeable gap the idea of a community is autoimmune. Turning debate into a community reduces alterity by herding difference making ethics impossible.

Miller ‘9 [J. Hillis Miller, American literary critic, “For Derrida” 2009 Fordham University Press pg. 130-131]

On the next page Derrida claims we would not say we want to belong to the family or community if we really did belong to one or the other: "The desire to belong to any community whatsoever, the desire for be-longing tout court, implies that one does not belong" (TS, z8). This is our happy chance, since my only road to responsible ethical relations to my neighbor, the "wholly other," is by detaching myself from family or com-munity, or by recognizing that I am always already and for good detached, enisled. I must detach myself from the herd, or appropriate my detach-ment, in order to escape the doom of autoimmune self-destruction that always awaits such deconstructible agglomerations. I must come to know that I am detached, and that it's a good thing too. The different concepts of being with represented by Derrida and by all those modern thinkers of being with I began by identifying are incompati-ble. They cannot be synthesized or reconciled. II Put choisir Which do I choose? I wish with all my heart I could believe in Williams's ideal of a happy, classless community or in Hidegger's assumption that Mitsein is a fundamental aspect of being human, but I fear that each man or woman may be an island unto himself or herself, and that real communities are more like the communities of self-destructive autoimmunitv Derrida de-scribes. Certainly the United States these days, if you can dare to think of it as one immense community, is a better example of Derrida's self-destructive autoimmune community than of Williams's community of kindness and mutuality. I claim, moreover, to have confirmed through several examples the tri-ple hypothesis with which I started: (I) that the concept of community, in a given thinker, is consonant with his or her concept of relations between self and other; (2) that you cannot get from Dasein to Mitsein unless you assume from the start that Damn, is Mitsein; (3) that Derrida in his last seminars, almost uniquely among modern philosophers and theorists, af-firms the fundamental and irremediable isolation of each Dasein. For Der-rida, no isthmus, no bridge, no road, no communication or transfer connects or can ever connect my enisled self to other selves. There is no common world. There are only islands. Any community is an artificial, deconstructible, construct fabricated out of words or other signs. Any community, moreover, is self-destructively autoimmunitary to boot. One should not underestimate the consequences of holding that each human being is, throughout his or her lifetime, enisled.

#### Justice outweighs the small risk of the limits disad – Any condition imposed onto accepting the Other lends itself to a politics of tolerance and scrutinized hospitality. Unconditional acceptance of the other is a precondition to any ethics and politics.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 158-159]

The history of the concept reveals that tolerance “is always on the side of the ‘reason of the strongest,”’ firmly tied to the figure of the sov­ereign that Habermas also mentions in our dialogue. From this point of view, being tolerant is not going to make those who feel excluded any more included or understood. This was certainly a blunt statement to make in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, when Western countries were relying on tolerance as their unifying moral commit­ment. While in Derrida’s mind there is no way to overcome the one-sid­edness of tolerance, hospitality is a much more flexible concept. “If I think I am being hospitable because I am tolerant, it is because I wish to limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control over the lim­its of my ‘home,’ my sovereignty, my ‘I can’ (my territory, my house, my language, my culture, my religion, and so on).” Tolerance is “a scruti­nized hospitality, always under surveillance, parsimonious and protec­tive of its sovereignty. In the best of cases, it’s what I would call a con­ditional hospitality, the one that is most commonly practiced by indi­viduals, families, cities, or states.”34 The advantage of hospitality over tolerance is that it lends itself, as forgiveness does, to being posited in the double register of the condi­tional and the unconditional. In fact, tolerance is, for Derrida, condi­tional hospitality. By being tolerant one admits the other under one’s own conditions, and thus under one’s authority, law, and sovereignty. Derrida hopes instead for a new conception of hospitality that is, in a sense, much more tolerant than tolerance. Surprisingly for those who believe that Derrida is a counter-Enlightenment thinker, Kant is his point of reference. Derrida’s articulation of unconditional hospitality hinges on Kant’s distinction between two kinds of rights: right of invi­tation and right of visitation. But pure or unconditional hospitality does not consist in such an invita­tion (“I invite you, I welcome you into my home, on the condition that you adapt to the laws and norms of my territory, according to my lan­guage, tradition, memory, and so on”). Pure and unconditional hospital­ity, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance open to someone who is nei­ther expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other. I would call this a hospitality of visitation rather than invi­tation. The visit might actually be very dangerous, and we must not ig­nore this fact, but would a hospitality without risk, a hospitality backed by certain assurances, a hospitality protected by an immune system against the wholly other, be true hospitality? As no sense of forgiveness would exist without unconditional forgive­ness, no sense of true hospitality and openness to the other would exist without unconditional hospitality.

#### No topical version – The one size fits all preordained policy option opposes deconstruction.

Mcquillan 08 (Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

One definition of policy might be that policy is not reading. It is the very opposite of deconstruction, if deconstruction can have opposites. Nothing could be more inimical to the patient and scholarly treading of the texts of the other by Jacques Derrida than the pre-ordained, one-size- fits-all, programme-for-tomorrow ambitions of policy or the relationship implied between the academic and the so-called political process in this arrangement. This is not the same as saying that one cannot or should not have an idea what one might do as a political person with respect to schools and hospitals and foreign wars, given the chance. Rather, I think it is revealing of a certain truth about deconstruction, namely that deconstruction is truly a critical nihilism. By this, I do not mean that is anarchistic or destructive, rather in the Nietzschean sense it is a type of reflection and utterance that requires an effort of intelligence and an exercise of reason as a practical, counter-cultural engagement. I for one would like to see the inauguration of an International Forum for Philosophy and Policy as a deconstructive 'counter'-Think Tank. It might be distinguished from existing organisations by the formula: more think, less tank. It would adopt a relation to policy of intervention rather than a preparation. Not in order to outflank public policy through a strategy of negation and transcendental position taking (or posturing) but in order to provide critical readings of singular events as they arrived misshapen and monstrous in the present. Such open and reflective institutions will be absolutely necessary if the future of thought itself is to stand a chance and if it is to continue to confront power with truth.

#### Unconditional hospitability can never have a political or juridical status but must always be pushed to its limits.

Borradori ‘3 [Giovanna Borradori, professor of philosophy at Vassar college, Interview with Jacques Derrida “Philosophy in a Time of Terror” pg. 159-160]

Conditional hospitality, or tolerance, is fundamentally the right of invi­tation and as such lays the conditions for international and cosmopoli­tan conventions. Unconditional hospitality, by contrast, corresponds to the right of visitation. As such, it exposes the host to the maximum risk, as it does not allow for any systematic defense or immunity against the other. Derrida admits that unconditional hospitality cannot have a political or juridical status. States cannot include it in their laws, be­cause hospitality without conditions is irreconcilable with the very idea of a sovereign state. And yet, it is only from the standpoint of uncondi­tional hospitality, or the right of visitation, that we gain a critical per­spective on die limits of cosmopolitan right, tolerance, conditional hospitality, and the right of invitation. I11 his treatise Perpetual Peace, Kant backs the idea of cosmopoli­tan right without the support of a world government. Not only, since World War I, did international institutions operate in line with Kant’s legacy, but this is Derrida’s as well as Habermas’s political dream. However, while Habermas sees it as a program, Derrida understands it as an ideal that can best be pursued by continually having it face its lim­its. For, as we have seen, cosmopolitanism expresses only conditional hospitality, or what Kant calls the right of invitation. For Derrida, the ideal of democracy lies beyond cosmopolitanism and world citizenship, over and beyond the economy of sovereignty, politics, and jurisdiction. Cosmopolitanism applies to a world viewed as cosmos, which since the Greeks means an orderly whole regulated by principles and laws. Even though Derrida explicitly stands by cos­mopolitanism and world citizenry, he feels that commitment to justice cannot be fully exercised within the boundaries of law and cosmopoli­tanism. For justice, as well as democracy, is not just about our conduct within the framework of the state or under the obligations of citizen­ship but also in the face of a stranger. I want to underline that Derrida’s belief that room needs to be left for something located somewhere beyond politics and law, cosmopoli­tanism and world citizenry, is firmly anchored in a formal scheme: the distinction between the conditional and unconditional registers. The conceptual formalism of this gesture allows him to avoid reactionary and nostalgic revivals as well as an essentialist reading of tradition and identity. The quality of what is beyond politics and law is never spelled out in terms of any specific content or value but simply indi­cated as the condition of possibility for what politics and law articu­late.35 As forgiveness in the hands of politics and the juridical domain be­comes a therapy of reconciliation, and hospitality in the hands of cos­mopolitanism becomes the simple right of invitation, justice in the hands of law is reduced to law’s simple enforceability. Applicability, “enforceability,” is not an exterior or secondary possibility that may or may not be added as a supplement to law. It is the force es­sentially implied in the very concept of justice as law (droit), of justice as it becomes droit, of the law as “droit” (for I want to insist right away on reserving the possibility of a justice, indeed of a law that not only exceeds or contradicts “law” (droit) but also, perhaps, has no relation to law, or maintains such a strange relation to it that it may just as well command the “droit” that excludes it). The word enforceability reminds us that there is no such thing as law (droit) that doesn’t imply in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility of being “enforced,” applied by force.36

#### Epistemology DA – Western representations of the world normalize colonial practices. A critical examination of state politics creates a starting point to challenge homogenous ways of thinking.

Trofanenko 2k5 Research Chair in Education, Culture and Community @ Acadia University 2k5 Brenda-; On Defense of the Nation; THE SOCIAL STUDIES, 96.5 (2005): 193+; [http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA139957613&v=2.1&u=bingul&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w](http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.binghamton.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7cA139957613&v=2.1&u=bingul&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w) Toward a More Global Sense of the Nation

Knowing how history is a site of political struggle, how we engage with social studies education means emphasizing how power, processes, and practices bear tangible effects on forging a national (and common) history by reproducing and vindicating inclusions and exclusions. Such a critique requires questioning how a singular, fixed, and static history celebrates the U.S. nation and its place in the world as that "common base of factual information about the American historical and contemporary experience"(27) argues for in the Fordham report. Our world history courses are central to defining, understanding, and knowing not only other nations but also the position of each nation in relation to the United States. The centrality that the west holds (notably the United States as an imperial power) is ingrained and willful in framing specific representations of the west that normalize the imperial practices that established this nation. The role that the United States holds on the world stage frequently remains unquestioned in social studies classrooms. Certainly, we engage with various images and tropes to continue to advance how the colonialist past continues to remain present in our historical sensibilities. Moreover, the increasing number and choices of archival sources function as a complement to further understanding the nation. If students are left to rely on the variety of historical resources rather than question the use of such resources, then the most likely outcome of their learning will be the reflection on the past with nostalgia that continues to celebrate myths and colonial sensibility. To evaluate the history narrative now is to reconsider what it means and to develop a historical consciousness in our students that goes beyond archival and nostalgic impulses associated with the formation of the nation and U.S. nation building. We need to insist that the nation, and the past that has contributed to its present day understanding, is simultaneously material and symbolic. The nation as advanced in our histories cannot be taken as the foundational grounds. The means by which the nation is fashioned calls for examining the history through which nations are made and unmade. To admit the participatory nature of knowledge and to invite an active and critical engagement with the world so that students can come to question the authority of historical texts will, I hope, result in students' realizing that the classroom is not solely a place to learn about the nation and being a national, but rather a place to develop a common understanding of how a nation is often formed through sameness. We need to continue to question how a particular national history is necessary as an educational function, but especially how that element has been, and remains, useful at specific times. My hope is to extend the current critique of history within social studies, to move toward understanding why history and nation still needs a place in social studies education. In understanding how the historicity of nation serves as "the ideological alibi of the territorial state" (Appadurai 1996, 159) offers us a starting point. The challenge facing social studies educators is how we can succeed in questioning nation, not by displacing it from center stage but by considering how it is central. That means understanding how powerfully engrained the history of a nation is within education and how a significant amount of learning is centered around the nation and its history. History is a forum for assessing and understanding the study of change over time, which shapes the possibilities of knowledge itself. We need to reconsider the mechanisms used in our own teaching, which need to be more than considering history as a nostalgic reminiscence of the time when the nation was formed. We need to be questioning the contexts for learning that can no longer be normalized through history's constituted purpose. The changing political and social contexts of public history have brought new opportunities for educators to work through the tensions facing social studies education and its educational value to teachers and students. Increasing concerns with issues of racism, equality, and the plurality of identities and histories mean that there is no unified knowledge as the result of history, only contested subjects whose multilayered and often contradictory voices and experiences intermingle with partial histories that are presented as unified. This does not represent a problem, but rather an opportunity for genuine productive study, discussion, and learning.

#### Turn: Adding the ethos of deconstruction takes the alt from a teleological process to an open process of delimitation.

Cheah ‘8 Professor of Rhetoric UC-Berkeley 2008 Pheng diacritics 38.1-2 project muse

In dialectical materialism, the process of actualizing material reality is part of the epigenesis, auto-production, and auto-maintenance of the human corporeal organism as it creates the means of its own subsistence. The proletarian revolution is precisely creative labor’s teleological process of appropriative return writ large on a world-historical stage. Deconstructive materialism is a delimitation of organismic vitalism and its teleological understanding of history. By attending to the machinic and spectral effects of iterability, it accounts for the possibility of the supplementation of organic life by techne and the contamination of living actuality by commodification, ideology etc.5 Indeed, Derrida argues that the key concepts of dialectical materialism are no longer adequate for understanding the rhythms and speeds of contemporary technomediated reality because they deconstruct the opposition between the actual and the ideal or virtual. The deconstruction of dialectical materialism is “demonstrated today better than ever by the fantastic, ghostly, ‘synthetic,’ ‘prosthetic,’ virtual happenings in the scientific domain and therefore the domain of techno-media and therefore the public or political domain. It is also made more manifest by what inscribes the speed of a virtuality irreducible to the opposition of the act and the potential in the space of the event, in the event-ness of the event” [SM 63]. Yet, despite the scarring, dislocation, and tearing that it inflicts on presence, materiality in the deconstructive sense has a rigorously affirmative and generative character. Because it refers us to the radically other, materiality is also the opening of an unforeseeable future, an à-venir (to-come) that cannot be anticipated as a form of presence. Despite his insistence that there was no ethico-political turn in his work, Derrida explored the ethico-political implications of this messianic dimension of materiality as absolute alterity in his writings from the 1990s onward [“As If It Were Possible” 360]. Simply put, since the other is that from which time comes, the experience of absolute alterity, however disruptive, must be affirmed because without it nothing could ever happen. An understanding of materiality in terms of negativity effaces this messianic dimension because by positing the other as the same, it closes off the experience of radical alterity.

#### Turn: The recognition of value is a precondition for a commodity’s exchangeability and use-value. Only a deconstruction of value can prevent the reification of capital.

Derrida ‘93 [Jacques Derrida, “Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International” 1993 pg. 201-203]

Without disappearing, use-value becomes, then, a sort of limit, the correlative of a limit-concept, of a pure beginning ~o which no object can or should correspond, and which therefore must be complicated in a general (in any case more general) theory of capital. We will draw from this only one consequence here, among all the many other possible ones: if it itself retains some use-value (namely, of permitting one to orient an analysis of the "phantasmagoric" process beginning at an origin that is itself fictive or ideal, thus already purified by a certain fantastics), this limit-concept of use-value is in advance contaminated, that is, pre-occupied, inhabited, haunted by its other, namely, what will be born from the wooden head of the table, the commodity- form, and its ghost dance. The commodity-form, to be sure, is not use-value, we must grant this to Marx and take account of the analytic power this distinction gives us. But if the commodity-form is not, presently, use-value, and even if it is not actually present, it affects in advance the use-value of the wooden table. It affects and bereaves it in advance, like the ghost it will become, but this is precisely where haunting begins. And its time, and the untimeliness of its present, of its being "out of 202 SPECTERS OF MARX joint." To haunt does not mean to be present, and it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of every concept, beginning with the concepts of being and time. That is what we would be calling here a hauntology. Ontology opposes it only in a movement of exorcism. Ontology is a conjuration. The "mystical character" of the commodity is inscribed before being inscribed, traced before being written out letter for letter on the forehead or the screen of the commodity. Everything begins before it begins. Marx wants to know and make known where, at what precise moment, at what instant the ghost comes on stage, and this is a manner of exorcism, a way of keeping it at bay: before this limit, it was not there, it was powerless. We are suggesting on the contrary that, before the coup de theatre of this instant, before the "as soon as it comes on stage as commodity, it changes into a sensuous supersensible thing," the ghost had made its apparition, without appearing in person, of course and by definition, but having already hollowed out in use-value, in the hardheaded wood of the headstrong table, the repetition (therefore substitution, exchangeability, iterability, the loss of Singularity as the experience of singularity itself, the possibility of capital) without which a use could never even be determined. This haunting is not an empirical hypothesis. Without it, one could not even form the concept either of use-value, or of value in general, or inform any matter whatsoever, or determine any table, whether a wooden table--useful or saleable--or a table of categories. Or any Tablet of commandments. One could not even complicate, divide, or fracture sufficiently the concept of usevalue by pointing out, as Marx does for example, this obvious fact: for its first presumed owner, the man who takes it to market as use-value meant for others, the first use-value is an exchangevalue. "Hence commodities must be realized as values before they can be realized as use-values" (p. 179). And vice versa, which makes the diachrony circular and transforms the distinction into a APPARITION OF THE INAPPARENT 203 co-implication. "On the other hand, [commodities] must stand the test as use-values before they can be realized as values." Even if the transforma.tion of one commodity into use-value and some other into money marks an independent stopping point, a stasis in circulation, the latter remains an infinite process. If the total circulation C-M-C is a "series without beginning or end, as the Critique of Political Economy constantly insists,29 it is because the metamorphosis is possible in all directions between the usevalue, the commodity, and money. Not to mention that the usevalue of the money-commodity (Geldware) is also itself "dual": natural teeth can be replaced by gold prostheses, but this usevalue is different from the one Marx calls "formal use-value" which arises out of the specific social function of money. 30

#### The conceptual economy of use value and exchange value must be deconstructed at logo-centric level.

Jay ‘88 [Gregory Jay, Professor of English, “Values and Deconstructions: Derrida, Saussure, Marx” Cultural Critique,

No. 8 (Winter, 1987-1988), pp. 153-196]

The relation of Marxism to deconstruction, and of both to the do-main of Saussure's semiotics, concerns the production and circulation of values, a system of relations figured in the recurrent metaphorical analogy between language and money.6 Today the task is not to expli-cate that analogy once more, but to subject it (and analogy in general) to a critique of its own conceptual economy, a critique already under-way in the writings of Marx and Derrida on the mystifying strategies of equivalence central to the genealogy of value signs, be they monetary or linguistic. As Jean Baudrillard has summarized the project: It is a question of decoding the birth of the sign form in the same way that Marx was able to uncover the birth of the commodity form in the Critique of Po lit iv; 1 Economy. In consumption generally, economic exchange value (money) is converted into sign exchange value (prestige, etc.); but this operation is still sustained by the ali-bi of use value.... At this point, the field of political economy, ar-ticulated only through exchange value and use value, explodes and must be entirely reanalyzed as genenatud political economy, which implies the production of sign exchange value in the same way and in the same movement as the production of material goods and of economic exchange value. The analysis of the pro-duction of signs and of culture thus does not impose itself as exte-rior, ulterior, and "superstructural" in relation to that of material production; it imposes itself as a revolution (political economy itself, generalized by the theoretical and practical irruption of the politi-cal economy of the sign.' Drawing upon semiotics, deconstruction (and here I include Baud-rillard, though his work traffics in its own unquestioned essences) in-terrogates the conceptual economy of the use value/exchange value opposition, and with lithe ontology of such terms as materialism, histo-ry, circulation, and production. The solidity of the economic base 'sill be dissolved by the dissemination of such fetishized concepts as natural util-ity, universal needs, property, and the object as a thing-in-itself. These terms and concepts belong to a nature/culture hierarchy—shared by the signifier/signified split—still informing much of Marx's discourse. De-construction reads the history and mode of this vocabulary's production, and Derrida will display the ancient common genealogy of these terms and concepts in the interdependent discourses of economics and meta-physics. The critique of logocentrism, then, is inextricable from the cri-ague of ideology, though the latter term may not survive the dissemi- nation of its orthodox conceptual apparatus. Semiotics, in turn, loses its discursive provinciality during the unfolding of the undecidability be-tween commodity and sign transactions. Derrida's deconstructions of classical sign theory and classical notions of ideology are thus tendered together in a single negotiation. His critique of Saussure's logocen-trism in Of Grammatolov (1967) can be seen, then, as a demonstration of Derrida's assertion that his own work has long been, in a certain way, focused on political and institutional concerns. At least since Marx, ideology has been analyzed as a representation-al practice, so that Althusser can summarily write that "ideology is a system (with its own logic and rigour) of representations (images, myths, ideas, or concepts, depending on the case) endowed with a his-torical existence and role within a given society." Ideology legislates the domain of truth and reference, adjudicating the value of objects and subjects. The intervention of Saussurean and poststructural language theory, insofar as it defers the closure of sign and reference that ideologi-cal representation aims towards, participates in the same radical break initiated by The German Ideology when it disputes the claims to divine or natural authorship made by the ideologies of church, state, and philos-ophy. Marx promoted a deconstructive inversion that decoded the so-cial production of supposedly eternal truths: they had been written un-der the sign of material, historical, and class straggles. Caught up with-in the material conditions evolving under early capitalism, Gemian Idealism sublated matter into sense, history into spirit, the production of writing into the mimesis of the transcendental signified. The histori-cal specificity of this idealism, however, is challenged by deconstruction, which subverts the difference between ideology and truthful representa-tion by insisting upon the logooentrisms that underwrite discourse in every period. "What we call ideology," notes Paul de Man, "is precisely the confu-sion of linguistic with natural reality, of reference with phenome-nalism." The study of linguistics and literariness, he concludes, may tell us "more than any other mode of inquiry, including economics," about the workings of ideology.' The critique of referential logo-centrism, then, does not entail the separation of language from history, or of writing from politics. On the contrary, it intends to map how such separations have been managed by various textual strategies. A text's manifest idealism or pronounced materialism contains the meta-physical work and political effects of their latent structuralities. "What is produced in the current trembling," Derrida responds, "is a reeval-uation of the relationship between the general text and what was be-lieved to be, in the form of reality (history, politics, economics, sexuali-ty, etc.), the simple, referable exterior of language or writing, the belief that this exterior could operate from the simple position of cause or accident."0

Perm embrace the spectre of marx: Marx's original Communist Manifesto highlighted why capitalism was bad but did not articulate a coherent position on how communism would pragmatically function. Because deconstruction is the process of breaking apart ideological barriers we performatively engage the critique Karl Marx advocated.

Abbinett 2k6 [Ross Abbinnett “Spectres of Class: Marxism, Deconstruction and the Politics of Affiliation” JOURNAL FOR CULTURAL RESEARCH VOLUME 10 NUMBER 1 (JANUARY 2006)]

In SM Derrida argues that if the question of “living in” the resources of metaphysics cannot be closed (if it is re-opened by every “empirical” concept of community, belonging, identity, friendship, and hospitality), then the question concerning technology (the relationship of “the human” to its supplements) is simultaneous with the questions of ethics, justice and politics that arise from techno-scientific capitalism. What this means is that we can treat “capitalism” neither as a fixed set of socioeconomic conditions, nor as a teleological organization of human desire which will ultimately transcend its negative effects. The term should be understood as registering an open-ended relationship between power, technology and exploitation; a relationship which constantly transforms itself and which precipitates the events of suffering and erasure (of the other/ others) to which Marxism is originally responsible (Derrida 1994, p. 13). Now what is important here is Derrida’s continued insistence that responsibility to “who comes” precedes the particular legal and contractual forms in which it is expressed, and that this originally responsibility is constantly reconfigured in the dynamics of capitalism and technology. The fact that he is unwilling to revert to the dialectical categories of relatedness which Ahmad and Lewis take to be12 ABBINNETT essential to Marxist politics therefore, does not mean that deconstruction is ipso facto complicit with the ideological forms of liberal capitalism, or that it is a type of messianic resignation that awaits deliverance from the evils of the world. Rather the ethical responsibility which is announced in SM both exceeds and includes the dialectical temporality of class relations; for it is immediately given over to questions (about cosmopolitanism, international law, the rights of the foreigner etc) which disrupt the functioning of global-techno-scientific accumulation and configure new and contingent forms of solidarity (Derrida 1994, p. 37) 7 So how can such questions become socially transformative? How, in the absence of the dialectical foci through which Ahmad, Callinicos and Lewis conceive the effectiveness of class relations, can they solicit resistance to established structures of political authority? Callinicos’s answer in Against Postmodernism is that they cannot, and that the position on South Africa which Derrida took in “Racism’s last word” (the essay he contributed to the catalogue for the “Art Contre/Against Apartheid” exhibition which visited Paris in 1983) is proof of his complicity with the political and economic opportunism which was provoked by the existence of such a wealthy racist state. The argument he pursues is that Derrida’s praise of the exhibits for their “silence”—for their withdrawal from any possible collusion with the “last racism still parading itself in a political constitution”—discloses a complete lack of concern with the historical and political realities of the South African regime. Deconstruction, in other words, comports itself best with aesthetic solicitations of an unknown and unknowable future, and, as such, has nothing to say about the multiple struggles which transformed the de facto existence of apartheid (Callinicos 1990, p. 78) A similar claim is made by Ahmad in In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. He argues that division of the globe into “First”, “Second” and “Third” Worlds is a neo-imperialist project which is connived at by immigrant intellectuals who present an aesthetic of home, arrival and displacement that functions without reference to class or gender determinations. This aesthetic configuration of the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer marks the emergence of de-politicized analysis their difference; for the more the colonialist encounter becomes the subject of classless and genderless narratives, the more the “Black intelligentsia” are drawn into the trap of narrating (and re-narrating) the irreducible difference of “Third” and “First” World cultures. Deconstruction therefore emerges as central to a new orientalist apparatus; for in so far as it demands the multiplication of different forms of aesthetic self-representation, it deprives post-colonial politics of its roots in the class struggles which ground international socialism (Ahmad 1992, pp. 91–93). These remarks however are based on a misconstrual of the relationship between writing, différance and general economy which informs Derrida’s concept of the political. The passage from “The time of a thesis: punctuations” which Callinicos quotes in Against Postmodernism, is used to justify his claim that deconstruction always moves from analyses of the (socio-political) conditions which produce certain kinds of discourse, to an obsession with the play of différance which inhabits the structures of truth, identity, and being (Callinicos 1990, pp. 77–78). The claim which Derrida is actually making in this passage however is neither that “the real” is simply a function of the diversity of writing, nor that the project of philosophical inquiry ought to be subsumed under the expository techniques of deconstruction. Rather his argument is that if philosophy can no longer seek to inscribe its metaphysical categories in the institutional space of ethical life, then it must seek to respond to the questions of hospitality that arise from the violence of our living present. If we return to the ontotheological foundations of apartheid (the inscription of God’s hierarchical order of the black and white races in the law of the state) therefore it becomes clear that Derrida’s welcoming of a new aesthetics of self-representation is not simply a refusal to engage with the political reality of South Africa. Rather the silences that are configured in these aesthetics are what make ethico-political transformation conceivable; for they present the undetermined future to which strategic and theoretical praxis is responsible (Derrida 1985, p. 299). Without this obligation to who and what is to come—the very obligation which Mandela assumed in drafting the new South African constitution—there could be no ethical reserve in the dialectics of “historically necessary” transformation (Derrida 2001, pp. 55–58).

#### We solve the impact. Democracy to come is always something to come, this prevents co-option by capitalists, the aff is key to separate capitalism from the ideology of capital.

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My argument, drawn from Jacques Derrida’s essays on democracy as well as Jean-Luc Nancy’s writing on the experience of freedom, is in response to an emerging problem in cultural critique where it is becoming increasingly difﬁcult to think of a mode of democracy other than the one advanced through global capital. In this mode, freedom is produced in terms of its immanence to all social relations, so that democratic freedom becomes a self-evident virtue associated with the freedom of the citizen as an autonomous self. At the same time, human being (as deﬁned in the occidental tradition) is becoming ever increasingly conﬁgured into calculations of economic efﬁciency (techne¯ ) and the necessities of behaviour accompanying subjectiﬁcation. We are free so long as we subject ourselves to the commands and calculations that make us free. Thus human being is caught in an aporia between freedom and necessity conﬁgured at the very heart of democracy and especially in the current process of global democratisation. This paradoxical process colonises the practice of democracy grounded in a common way of life, restricting it to a set of predictable behaviours (e.g. opinion polls, statistics). The possibility of a common ground of democracy is now vanishing, as globalisation transforms all ground 1 into the groundlessness of the spectacle and the aura of the phantasm. As the ground of democracy, freedom becomes an issue once again. We need a way of thinking the ‘free ground’ of democracy as something possible within the groundlessness of contemporary culture. We need to think of freedom as part of the ground of democracy in common being, something shared between free individuals. However, instead of taking freedom to be that of a citizen-consumer nexus based on the autonomous self and aligned with neo-liberal ideology, we need to consider freedom in terms of the very possibility of the political. Hannah Arendt has argued that political freedom in pre-Christian thought was located in the ‘I-can [as] an objective state of the body’ (Arendt 1978, 19), enabling individuals to enter into relations with other individuals freely, without coercion. She differentiates this kind of freedom from the freedom associated with the ‘I-will’ which invokes the autonomy of the self and its drive to will itself into existence. Political freedom is the freedom of the ‘I-can’, not the ‘I-will’, the capacity to be free in open relations with others. 2 This kind of freedom is withdrawing and along with it, the possibility of democracy as a project of self-critique and political renewal. This means that the problem of freedom has once again returned to centre stage. As Antonio Negri has recently argued: ‘the problem of reclaiming freedom within the very circle of power must be addressed’ (Negri 2008, 26). I am seeking to restore a sense of free thought to the question of democracy, requiring a capacity to decide, that is, a capacity to decide for democracy in the experience of freedom opened up through the ﬁnitude that democracy is when exposed to the limits of what it could possibly be. In this case we need to consider the issue of freedom, not as freedom of the subject but as the ground of subjective experience: freedom as a ‘radically contingent fact’ (Žižek 1996, 16). This capacity, which, I argue, is no less than that of critique, has been all but overtaken by generic processes preﬁgured in the incorporation of the subject by global capital, leading to the transformation of the democratic relation into a generic form. Generic democracy presumes that democracy does not need to be achieved since it has already arrived. Thus, in its operations or when challenged, democracy simply needs to re-afﬁrm itself according to self evident virtues (think of ex-US president George W. Bush’s call for the installation of democracy in Iraq and other ‘rogue’ states as if, by this very call, its virtue was simply self-evident) all of which are presupposed as generic to democracy. 3 No decision is necessary with regard to what democracy might be since everything has been decided in advance. However, to be capable of deciding for democracy (rather than presupposing democracy as an already established form) is to be free in a certain way: to exist in the ‘ﬁrst time’ of a decisive break with what democracy already is, thereby risking what it could possibly be. This is to risk a new beginning for democracy by breaking with its ideational origins. Here we can turn to Derrida’s deconstructive writings on democracy in which he asks us ‘to think and live politics, a friendship, a justice which begin by breaking with their naturalness or their homogeneity, with their alleged place of origin . . . every time in the singular urgency of the here and now’ (Derrida 1997, 105). In the singular urgency of the here and now, we are faced with a responsibility to think democratically, that is, to think the kind of relationality required for democracy to come. This is always a question of deciding, of the decision to be democratic, which cannot take place without a certain freedom to start again, to begin to think. For democracy to come, it cannot be thought generically; it must be made to happen, requiring a certain kind of exposure of thought to otherness. This is an exposure that does not presuppose the other as already given in advance, but as absolutely other.4 The absolutely other of democracy is not that it will come (it is not a matter of the will; its certainty, inevitability or necessity) but that it might come, that it might be possible (its contingent possibility). This is the fact of democracy, its openness to otherness. The fact of democracy is the ﬁnite occurrence of what democracy already is, but thought, strictly, from that place (the‘here and now’) in terms of what it might be.