### 1

#### Our interpretation is that an affirmative should defend an increase on statutory or judicial restrictions on the president’s war authority.

#### “USFG should” proscribes both a stable agent and mechanism

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### The Aff undermines the ability to have a limited and stable number of Affirmatives to prepare against. This is a reason to vote negative.

#### First is Decision-making

#### Increasing the abstraction of debates and undermining stasis hampers the decision-making benefits of debate

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Decision-making is the most important facet of education we could take away from debate – key to success in any future role

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Next is substantive side bias

#### Surely the Aff will say the Neg can still debate them on the substance of their advocacy but not defending the clear actor and mechanism of the resolutional produces a substantive side bias.

#### Affirmatives that don’t defend the resolution make deploying other strategies against them inordinately Aff tilted. They have the ability to radically recontextualize link arguments, empathize different proscriptive claims of the 1AC while using traditional competition standards like perms to make being impossible inordinately difficult.

#### And we have an external impact to this net benefit

#### Sufficient research-based preparation and debates focused on detailed points of disagreement are crucial to transforming political culture

Gutting (professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame) 13

(Gary, Feb 19, A Great Debate, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/?emc=eta1)

This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending and debt. But our political “debates” seldom deserve the name. For the most part representatives of the rival parties exchange one-liners: “The rich can afford to pay more” is met by “Tax increases kill jobs.” Slightly more sophisticated discussions may cite historical precedents: “There were higher tax rates during the post-war boom” versus “Reagan’s tax cuts increased revenues.”

Such volleys still don’t even amount to arguments: they don’t put forward generally accepted premises that support a conclusion. Full-scale speeches by politicians are seldom much more than collections of such slogans and factoids, hung on a string of platitudes. Despite the name, candidates’ pre-election debates are exercises in looking authoritative, imposing their talking points on the questions, avoiding gaffes, and embarrassing their opponents with “zingers” (the historic paradigm: “There you go again.”).

There is a high level of political discussion in the editorials and op-eds of national newspapers and magazines as well as on a number of blogs, with positions often carefully formulated and supported with argument and evidence. But even here we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of assertion, critique, response and counter-critique.  
Such exchanges occur frequently in our law courts (for example, oral arguments before the Supreme Court) and in discussions of scientific papers. But they are not a significant part of our deliberations about public policy. As a result, partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, convincing themselves that they hold to obvious truths, while their opponents must be either knaves or fools — with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions or the weaknesses of their own.

Is there any way to make genuine debates — sustained back-and-forth exchanges, meeting high intellectual standards but still widely accessible — part of our political culture? (I leave to historians the question of whether there are historical precedents— like the Webster-Hayne or Lincoln-Douglas debates.) Can we put our politicians in a situation where they cannot ignore challenges, where they must genuinely engage with one another in responsible discussion and not just repeat talking points?

A first condition is that the debates be **focused on specific points of major disagreement**. Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus spending on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?” This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues at stake.

Another issue is the medium of the debate. Written discussions, in print or online could be easily arranged, but personal encounters are more vivid and will better engage public attention. They should not, however, be merely extemporaneous events, where too much will depend on quick-thinking and an engaging manner. We want **remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses**.

#### And effective deliberative discourse is the lynchpin to solving all existential problems

Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Third is Mechanism Education

#### The Aff’s failure to ID a clear mechanism of change has the most devastating effects on the quality of debates. It makes link comparisons vacuous and means that detailed and well prepared PICs about substance, everyone’s favorite and most education part of debate are all but impossible.

#### We do not need to win that the state is good, rather just that the value of the state is something that should be debated about. This creates another standard for reading the Aff’s evidence – it can’t just indicate that the state or the resolution is bad or ineffective but that they should not even be discussed. Any of the aff’s ev on this account is simply proof that it can be done on the neg – no unique educational benefit to doing it on the aff, only provides an unfair tactical advantage to their arguments.

#### And this turns the Aff – debates over mechanisms for change are crucial to the success of leftist politics

Schostak (Professor of Education at Manchester Metropolitan University) 11

(John, Wikileaks, Tahrir Square – their significance for re-thinking democracy, Manchester social movements conference, April, http://www.enquirylearning.net/ELU/politics/tahrirwikileaks.html)

In his study of the conditions of work imposed by neo-liberal practices in France, Christophe Dejours (1998) has argued that political strategies, particularly those on the left, have not employed appropriate strategies of analysis. Without a good analysis of contemporary circumstances, he argues, **political strategies aiming at social justice will be deficient or wrong**. And **a good analysis for the production of appropriate strategies can only be accomplished through a multiplicity of collective reflections, debates and decision making in public spaces for public action(s).** The protests that have spread since the food riots in Algeria on the 6th January, the revolution in Tunisia and then the revolution in Egypt and then riots spreading to Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Jordan and others have drawn lessons from each other providing experience for the development of local strategies. Any protest will give insights into the conditions underlying the protests and the community and state structures, discourses, practices, and processes that tacitly if not explicitly underlie the social, political and economic order at local, national, transnational and global levels. This is why, it seems to me, that critically exploring from an educational and research perspective what has happened in response to Wikileaks and has been happening in the Middle East is so important today.

### 2

#### The body is a sight for the production of an unfettered being – their understanding of identity rivets being and prevents its creative journey through the infinite. We should not seek to affirm identity; we should seek to reach the point where identity itself is meaningless.

Ballantyne 2007 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 78-79)

Landscape reappears with another role in imaging the schizoanalytic ‘subject’, if a subject remains. Just as Lenz found himself in machinic engagement with his surroundings, so that there was no sense of separateness between his ‘self’ and the snowflakes, stars and mountain peaks, so Deleuze and Guattari describe themselves as deserts, inhabited by concepts that wander across them and move on their way, so they are being continually reconstituted and remade. ‘We are deserts,’ said Deleuze but populated by tribes, flora and fauna. We pass our time in ordering these tribes, arranging them in other ways, getting rid of some and encouraging others to prosper. And all these clans, all these crowds, do not undermine the desert, which is our very ascesis; on the contrary they inhabit it, they pass through it, over it**.** In Guattari there has always been a sort of wild rodeo, in part directed against himself. The desert, experimentation on oneself, is our only identity, our single chance for all the combinations which inhabit us. (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 11) The ‘individual’ here is explicitly seen as multiple and political, and the process of subjectification is presented as dynamic and continuing, never as something that has reached or could reach a satisfactory conclusion. For Deleuze and Guattari living is always a process of becoming, never of contemplating an achieved ‘being’**.** Deleuze describes Guattari as ‘a man of the group, of bands or tribes, and yet he is a man alone, a desert populated by all these groups and all his friends, all his becomings’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 16). There is something of the fluidity of identity of ‘the man of the crowd’ in Edgar Allen Poe’s story, where the man participates in the identities of the various tribes and crowds that swarm through the city (Ballantyne, 2005, 204–9). He takes to an extreme, and embodies a principle in a way that only a fictional character can: the principle that we are not formed in isolation, but socially, and we are constituted by way of ideas and practices that do not originate in us but which pass through us and inhabit us and influence the things we do, occasionally perhaps consciously, but for the most part without our having any particular awareness of it happening. So the individual is seen as not so much a political entity as a politics (a micropolitics) populated and engaged, harmonious or conflicted. The image is always of lines and intensities, intersecting planes and multiple colours, atmospheres, flows – never hard dry objects, bounded forms or clear contours. And the face, this white screen/black hole assemblage, is a means of engaging with others, a way of putting into circulation certain sorts of signification that our little parliament, our pandaemonium, feels will help it on its way.

Emphasis on localized identity feeds into state based forms of oppression by masking the enemy and precluding global solutions to global exploitation.

Hardt & Negri, 2000 (\*Michael, Professor of Literature and Italian, Duke University, Ph.D in Comparative Literature, University of Washington, and \*Antonio, Former professor in State Theory, Padua University Empire P44-45)

We maintain, however, that today this localist position, although we admire and respect the spirit of some of its proponents, is both false and damaging. It is false first of all because the problem is poorly posed. In many characterizations the problem rests on a false dichotomy between the global and the local, assuming that the global entails homogenization and undifferentiated identity whereas the local preserves heterogeneity and difference. Often implicit in such arguments is the assumption that the differences of the local are in some sense natural, or at least that their origin remains beyond question. Local differences preexist the present scene and must be defended or protected against the intrusion of globalization. It should come as no surprise, given such assumptions, that many defenses of the local adopt the terminology of traditional ecology or even identify this ‘‘local’’ political project with the defense of nature and biodiversity. This view can easily devolve into a kind of primordialism that fixes and romanticizes social relations and identities. What needs to be addressed, instead, is precisely the production of locality, that is, the social machines that create and recreate the identities and differences that are understood as the local.4 The differences of locality are neither preexisting nor natural but rather effects of a regime of production. Globality similarly should not be understood in terms of cultural, political, or economic *homogenization.* Globalization, like localization, should be understood instead as a *regime* of the production of identity and difference, or really of homogenization and heterogenization. The better framework, then, to designate the distinction between the global and the local might refer to different networks of flows and obstacles in which the local moment or perspective gives priority to the reterritorializing barriers or boundaries and the global moment privileges the mobility of deterritorializing flows. It is false, in any case, to claim that we can (re)establish local identities that are in some sense outside and protected against the global flows of capital and Empire. This Leftist strategy of resistance to globalization and defense of locality is also damaging because in many cases what appear as local identities are not autonomous or self-determining but actually feed into and support the development of the capitalist imperial machine. The globalization or deterritorialization operated by the imperial machine is not in fact opposed to localization or reterritorialization, but rather sets in play mobile and modulating circuits of differentiation and identification. The strategy of local resistance misidentifies and thus masks the enemy. We are by no means opposed to the globalization of relationships as such—in fact, as we said, the strongest forces of Leftist internationalism have effectively led this process. The enemy, rather, is a specific regime of global relations that we call Empire. More important, this strategy of defending the local is damaging because it obscures and even negates the real alternatives and the potentials for liberation that exist within Empire. We should be done once and for all with the search for an outside, a standpoint that imagines a purity for our politics. It is better both theoretically and practically to enter the terrain of Empire and confront its homogenizing and heterogenizing flows in all their complexity, grounding our analysis in the power of the global multitude.

Creativity is only possible with free thinking and openness – because the advocacy functions from the standpoint of the black body the state can bear down on them heavier than ever.

Goddard in 2k6 (July 6th, 2006: The Encounter between Guattari and Berandi and the Post – Modern Era “Felix and Alice in Wonderland”; http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpbifo1.htm)

What this type of radio achieved most of all was the short-circuiting of representation in both the aesthetic sense of representing the social realities they dealt with and in the political sense of the delegate or the authorised spokesperson, in favour of generating a space of direct communication in which, as Guattari put it, “it is as if, in some immense, permanent meeting place—given the size of the potential audience—anyone, even the most hesitant, even those with the weakest voices, suddenly have the possibility of expressing themselves whenever they wanted. In these conditions, one can expect certain truths to find a new matter of expression.” In this sense, Radio Alice was also an intervention into the language of media; the transformation from what Guattari calls the police languages of the managerial milieu and the University to a direct language of desire: “direct speech, living speech, full of confidence, but also hesitation, contradiction, indeed even absurdity, is charged with desire. And it is always this aspect of desire that spokespeople, commentators and beaureaucrats of every stamp tend to reduce, to filter. [...] Languages of desire invent new means and tend to lead straight to action; they begin by ‘touching,’ by provoking laughter, by moving people, and then they make people want to ‘move out,’ towards those who speak and toward those stakes of concern to them.” It is this activating dimension of popular free radio that most distinguishes it from the usual pacifying operations of the mass media and that also posed the greatest threat to the authorities; if people were just sitting at home listening to strange political broadcasts, or being urged to participate in conventional, organised political actions such as demonstrations that would be tolerable but once you start mobilizing a massive and unpredictable political affectivity and subjectivation that is autonomous, self-referential and self-reinforcing, then this is a cause for panic on the part of the forces of social order, as was amply demonstrated in Bologna in 1977. Finally, in the much more poetic and manifesto-like preface with which Guattari introduces the translation of texts and documents form Radio Alice, he comes to a conclusion which can perhaps stand as an embryonic formula for the emergence of the post-media era as anticipated by Radio Alice and the Autonomia movement more generally: In Bologna and Rome, the thresholds of a revolution without any relation to the ones that have overturned history up until today have been illuminated, a revolution that will throw out not only capitalist regimes but also the bastions of beaureaucratic socialism [...] , a revolution, the fronts of which will perhaps embrace entire continents but which will also be concentrated sometimes on a specific neighbourhood, a factory, a school. Its wagers concern just as much the great economic and technological choices as attitudes, relations to the world and singularities of desire. Bosses, police officers, politicians, beuareaucrats, professors and psycho-analysts will in vain conjugate their efforts to stop it, channel it, recuperate it, they will in vain sophisticate, diversify and miniaturise their weapons to the infinite, they will no longer succede in gathering up the immense movement of flight and the multitude of molecular mutations of desire that it has already unleashed. The police have liquidated Alice—its animators are hunted, condemned, imprisoned, their sites are pillaged—but its work of revolutionary deterritorialisation is pursued ineluctably right up to the nervous fibres of its persecutors.” This is because the revolution unleashed by Alice was not reducible to a political or media form but was rather an explosion of mutant desire capable of infecting the entire social field because of its slippery ungraspability and irreducibility to existing sociopolitical categories. It leaves the forces of order scratching their heads because they don’t know where the crack-up is coming from since it doesn’t rely on pre-existing identities or even express a future programme but rather only expresses immanently its own movement of auto-referential self-constitution, the proliferation of desires capable of resonating even with the forces of order themselveswhich now have to police not only these dangerous outsiders but also their own desires. This shift from fixed political subjectivities and a specified programme is the key to the transformation to a post-political politics and indeed to a post-media era in that politics becomes an unpredictable, immanent process of becoming rather than the fulfilment of a transcendental narrative. In today’s political language one could say that what counts is the pure potential that another world is possible and the movement towards it rather than speculation as to how that world will be organised. As Guattari concludes: “ The point of view of the Alicians on this question is the following: they consider that the movement that arrives at destroying the gigantic capitalist-beaureaucratic machine will be, a fortiori, completely capable of constructing an other world—the collective competence in the matter will come to it in the course of the journey, without it being necessary, at the present stage to outline projections of societal change.”

#### Desire manifests itself at the local level – the unconscious – and resonates into a group order, powering politics. Failure to investigate motivations at the level of desire abandons any possibility of understanding how political formations come to be and ensures serial policy failure.

Ballantyne 2007 (Andrew, Tectonic Cultures Research Group at Newcastle University , "Deleuze and Guattari for Architects" 27-28)

So these habits of thought, once they are planted in us, take over and refract our view of the world and all our dealings with it. It is probably becoming clear by now how the ‘capitalism and schizophrenia’ project, across the two volumes Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, was caught up in every aspect of life. It is set up not as a set of dogmas or even of questions, but as a set of values. It is a work of ethics, and the link with Spinoza’s Ethics is strong. It too is a project based around immanence rather than transcendence. The ‘desiring-machines’ that figure so prominently at the opening of Anti-Oedipus, are the machines that operate without our noticing them to produce the desires that we do notice, and that we would like to act upon. But as mechanisms that operate to produce consciousness, the machines can be pulling in different directions and producing incompatible desires, which might be resolved at a preconscious level, or might surface as conflicted conscious desires. There are thousands upon thousands of these mechanisms, of which we become aware only as they produce effects that approach the level of consciousness, and what goes on amongst them is a micropolitics – thousands upon thousands of rhizomatic connections, without any clear limit on where the connections would stop, and without any necessity to pass through a centralized arborescent hub. The scale of operations builds up from a preconscious sub-’individual’, who is already a swarm of desiring-machines, to a social group, or a crowd, where certain aspects of the people involved connect together to produce a crowd-identity that is unlike that of any of the individuals in the crowd. Crowds will do things that individual people would not (Canetti, 1973). The individuals are to the crowd what desiring-machines are to the individual. Except that one could alternatively say that it is certain of the mass of individuals’ desiring-machines that, upon being brought together in the crowd, they are found to be able to act together to produce the group identity. The crowd is a body. Some of the mechanisms that would come into play in the individual acting alone are somehow switched out of the circuit, and become irrelevant to the crowd, and having been switched off cannot inhibit the crowd’s actions. So the sense of the ‘individual’ is even further problematized, and we see it to be highly divisible. But nevertheless the idea of the individual is deeply ingrained in our language, and if we’re trying to explain ourselves, we might find that it’s the most direct word to be using. If we’re trying to connect with others then we need to be able to allow ourselves, from time to time, to speak like everyone else. As we follow Deleuze and Guattari further into their world, it becomes increasingly difficult to do that, as each ‘straightforward’ utterance seems, from an alternate view, to have an inaccurate aspect.

The focus on difference and individual identity is what allows fascism to escalate to the macro level. **Despotism is totalitarianism meets fascism – all surplus is owed to despot, including money, lives and even the womb. The impact is no value to life and limitless slaughter.**

**Holland 1999** (Eugene, Associate Professor of French and Comparative Literature at the Ohio State University; Deleuze and Guatarri’s Anti-Oedipus and introduction to Schitzoanalysis) Pg 74

In despotic society, the forces of anti-production operate via undisguised political domination. Despotism results from conquest and the formation of empires, and its mode of anti-production involves superimposing the relations of conquerors to conquered over the existing social dynamics of the latter: “the essential action of the [despotic] State…is the creation of a second inscription by which the new full body [of the despot]…appropriates all the forces and agents of production” (198/235). Remnants of the older, non-power, social relations remain in force locally and co-exist, to a greater or lesser extent, with the new power-relations of the empire, but they do so only within its limits, and so it is on these power-relations that we will focus here.28 In brief, whereas savage anti-production ensured the sharing of fruits of labor, imperial anti-production enforces the extraction of tribute from its subject-peoples for the sake of glorious expenditure (dépense) on the part of the despot. The general law of despotic social organization is not the savage law that anything of value must circulate in horizontal circuits of debt and obligation, but **t**hat everything is owed to the despot. The despot imposes this infinite and unilateral debt by transforming the general syntax of the savage communities beneath him, seizing its patchwork of alliances and lineages and re-aligning all of them on himself. The figure of the despot thus replaces the earth as the socius and original ground of all lineages, in direct filiation with what is characteristically a monotheistic deity, and supplements the networks of savage alliance with a new alliance from above that links him not with this or that specific family or clan, but with his subject-peoples as a whole, and as an un-differentiated mass. Rather than owe one another reciprocal and dischargeable debts, they now all owe the despot everything.29 This includes their lives, for one thing, inasmuch as the power of the despot includes the power of life and death over his people: under despotism, “the debt becomes a debt of existence, a debt of the existence of the subjects themselves’’ (197/234). And it includes tribute, of course, which although paid in money, as we have said, remains a surplus-value of code in that it is extracted by seizing the existing circuits of debt and expenditure obligations and turning them all toward the coffers the despot. But the infinite debt therefore also includes wombs and the women who bear them (e.g. the ten virgins “owed” to the Minotaur annually), inasmuch as they circulate in the very same circuits of debt and expenditure as material goods do.

Our alternative is to foster rhizomatic connections to replace the arborescent models of the state. Our politics seeks to cultivate smooth space for new potentials of political realities.

Conley in 2006 (Verena Andermatt, professor of literature at Harvard, “Borderlines; Deleuze and the Contemporary World, 95-100)

In their dialogues and collaborations, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari enquire of the nature of borders. They summon principles of inclusion and exclusion associated with borderlines. They eschew expressions built on the polarities of ‘either…or’ and in their own diction replace binary constructions with the conjunctive ‘and’. Furthermore, in ‘Rhizome,’ the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, they argue for rhizomatic connections – fostered in language and by ‘and…and…and’ – to replace what they call the arborescent model of the ubiquitous Western tree (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). In constant movement, the tissues and tendrils of rhizomes call attention to the horizontal surfaces of the world in which they proliferate. They bring to their observer a new sense of space that is seen not as a background but a shape that, with the rhizome, moves and forever changes. In the field of play Deleuze and Guattari often produce hybrid, even viral connections and downplay the presence of genealogies conveyed in the figure of the tree bearing a stock-like trunk. Rhizomatic connections form open territories that are not constricted by the enclosing frame of a rigid borderline. In the same breath the two philosophers argue for ‘smooth’ spaces of circulation. They take a critical view of ‘striated’ spaces, replete with barriers and borders that are part of an ‘arborescent’ mentality. Striated spaces cross-hatched by psychic or real borderlines drawn by the state (social class, race, ethnicities) or by institutions (family, school), prevent the emergence of new ways of thinking. Crucial, Deleuze and Guattari declare, is the mental and social construction of new territories and the undoing of inherited barriers. Institutional, familial and even psychoanalytical striations that impede a person’s mobility in mental and physical spheres need to be erased or, at least, drawn with broken lines. When guilt is at the basis of the unconscious, productivity and creativity are diminished. Movement is also arrested wherever the state erects barriers between social classes, races and sexes. To facilitate connections and erase mental or physical borders, Deleuze and Guattari want to do away with the state as well as its institutions. It is as anarchists of sorts and with an insistence on aesthetic paradigms that Deleuze and Guattari argue for making connections and for an ongoing smoothing of striated spaces. In the pages to follow, I will argue that today the problem of borders and barriers is as acute as ever. I will probe how Deleuze and Guattari’s findings on rhizomes and smooth spaces elaborated in a post-1968, European, context might work today in a changed world-space. Is the struggle still between a paternal, bourgeois state and its subjects? Are the state and its institutions still targeted in the same way? Is the undoing of the subject – often through aesthetics – still valid, or is there a need for a more situated subject? We will first rehash the Deleuzian concepts of rhizome and smooth space before investigating whether and how these concepts are operative in the contemporary world. Since 1968, the world has undergone many changes. Over the last few decades, decolonization, transportation, and electronic revolutions have transformed the world. They have led to financial and population flows. Financial flows seem to be part of a borderless world. Today, human migrations occur on all continents. They are producing multiple crossings of external borders that in many places have resulted in local resistance and, in reaction, to the erection of more internal borders that inflect new striated spaces in the form of racism and immigration policy. The ultimate goal for the utopian thinker espousing the cause of rhizomatic thinking is smooth space that would entail the erasure of all borders and the advent of a global citizenry living in ease and without the slightest conflict over religion or ideology. In the transitional moment in which we find ourselves arguing for smooth space can easily lead to a non-distinction between alternative spaces in which goods and currencies circulate to the detriment of the world at large. To account for the transformation specifically of the state and its subjects in a global world, I will argue by way of recent writings by Etienne Balibar for the continued importance of rhizomatic connectivity and also for a qualified notion of smooth space. Striated spaces will have to be continually smoothed so that national borders would not simply encircle a territory. Borders would have to be made more porous and nationality disconnected from citizenship so as to undo striated space inside the state by inventing new ways of being in common. Such a rethinking of borders would lead to further transformations by decoupling the nation from the state. It would open possibilities of – rhizomatic – connections and new spaces. It would produce new hybrids everywhere without simply a ‘withering away of the state’ as advocated by Deleuze and Guattari. Currently, subjects (defined as humans who are asseuttis [subjected] to paternal state power) also want to be citizens (who can individually and collectively define the qualities of their habitus or environment). Yet, the latter are still part of the state. They are not yet entirely global, transnational citizens or cyber-citizens. While information networks seem to operate like rhizomes, it is of continued importance to retain the notion of state but to define it with more porous, connective borderlines so as ultimately to disconnect citizens from nationality. Deleuze and Guattari figure with other philosophers, anthropologists or sociologists who, following 1968, pay renewed attention to space. Their focus on space reappears at the very time Cartesian philosophies undergo radical changes due to the acceleration of new technologies and rapid globalisation. Many thinkers – Henri Lefebvre, Michel de Certeau, Jean Baudrillard, Paul Virilio – condemn what they perceive as the increasing encroachment of technologies that quickly replace more traditional ways of being in the world. People who find themselves out of synch with their environment urge recourse to the body and new ways of using language. Deleuze and Guattari insert themselves into that line of thinking. Their criticism of the static order is twofold. They criticise an inherited spatial model defined by vertical orderings that has dominated the West. In that model, space was considered to be pre-existing. It became a simple décor for human action. Deleuze and Guattari propose not only a criticism of the static model but also invent an entirely new way of thinking space. They propose a more horizontal – and, paradoxically, if seemingly two-dimensional, even more spatial – thinking of the world in terms of rhizomatic lines and networks. In accordance with Deleuze and Guattari’s way of thinking through connections, the two regimes always coexist in an asymmetrical relation. They can never be entirely separated or opposed. In ‘Rhizome’, first published in French in 1976 and translated into English as ‘On the Line’, Deleuze and Guattari claim that for several hundred years it was believed that the world was developing vertically in the shape of a tree (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). The choice of a tree limits possibilities. The mature tree is already contained in the seed. There is some leeway as to form and size, but the seed will become nothing more than the tree that it is destined to be. In lieu of the tree, Deleuze and Guattari propose an adventitious network, a mobile structure that can be likened to underground filaments of grass or the mycelia of fungi. A rhizome moves horizontally and produces offshoots from multiple bifurcations at its meristems. It changes its form by connecting and reconnecting. It does not have a finite or ultimate shape. Space does not pre-exist the rhizome; rather, it is created through and between the proliferating lines. Rhizomes connect and open spaces in-between which, in the rooted world of the tree, an inside (the earth) is separated from an outside (the atmosphere). Unlike the tree, the rhizome can never be fixed or reduced to a single point or radical core. Its movement is contrasted with the stasis of the arborescent model. In ‘Rhizome’ the vertical, arborescent model contributes to the creation of striated spaces. In the ebullient imagination of the two authors it appears that the latter slow down and even prevent movement of the kind they associate with emancipation and creativity. Instead of imitating a tree, Deleuze and Guattari exhort their readers to make connections by following multiple itineraries of investigation, much as a rhizome moves about the surface it creates as it goes. Rhizomes form a territory that is neither fixed nor bears any clearly delimited borders. In addition to this novel way of thinking, rhizomatically, the philosophers make further distinctions between smooth and striated spaces. Smooth spaces allow optimal circulation and favour connections. Over time, however, smooth spaces tend to become striated. They lose their flexibility. Nodes and barriers appear that slow down circulation and reduce the number of possible connections. Writing Anti-Oedipus in a post-1968 climate, Deleuze and Guattari propose rhizomatic connections that continually rearticulate smooth space in order not only to criticise bourgeois capitalism with its institutions – the family, school, church, the medical establishment (especially psychiatry) – but also to avoid what they see as a deadened or zombified state of things. They criticise the state for erecting mental and social barriers and for creating oppositions instead of furthering connections. Institutions and the state are seen as the villains that control and immobilize people from the top down. They argue that when the family, the church or the ‘psy’ instill guilt in a child, mental barriers and borders are erected. The child’s creativity, indeed its mental and physical mobility are diminished in the process. Such a condition cripples many adults who have trees growing in their heads. Deleuze and Guattari cite the example of Little Hans, a child analysed by Freud and whose creativity, they declare, was blocked by adults who wrongly interpreted his attempts to trace lines of flight within and through the structure of the family into which he had been born (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 14). The state, too, functions by ordering, organizing and arresting movement, by creating relations of inclusion and exclusion. The state facilitates the creation of rigid and often ossified institutions.ff It enacts laws of inclusion and exclusion that order the family and the social in general. It tries to immobilize and dominate the social world. Yet the social cannot be entirely dominated. The organising régime of the order-word is never stable. It is constantly being transformed. Lines detach themselves from fuzzy borders and introduce variations in the constant of the dominant order. These variations can lead to a break and produce lines of flight that bring about entirely new configurations. Of importance in the late 1960s and 1970s is the doing away with institutions and the state that represses subjects. In Anti-Oedipus, the philosophers show how institutions like the family and psychiatry repress sexuality and desire in order to maximize their revenue. They argue for the creation of smooth spaces where desire can circulate freely. In A Thousand Plateaus, the bourgeois state ordered by the rules of capitalism is criticised. Deleuze and Guattari rarely contexualise the ‘state’ in any specific historical or political terms. Constructing a universal history of sorts, the philosophers note that the state apparatus appears at different times and in different places. This apparatus is always one of capture. It appropriates what they call a ‘nomadic war machine’ that never entirely disappears. The nomadic war machine eludes capture and traces its own lines of flight. It makes its own smooth spaces. Here Deleuze and Guattari have faith in ‘subjects’ who undermine control by creating new lines of flight. These subjects deviate from the dominant order that uses ‘order-words’ to obtain control. Order-words produce repetitions and reduce differences. They produce molar structures and aggregates that make it more difficult for new lines to take flight. Yet something stirs, something affects a person enough to make her or him deviate from the prescriptive meanings of these words. Deleuze and Guattari would say that the subject molecularises the molar structures imposed by the state. People continually trace new maps and invent lines of flight that open smooth spaces. Deleuze and Guattari call it a ‘becoming-revolutionary’ of the people. In 1980, the philosophers also claim that humans inaugurate an age of becoming-minoritarian. The majority, symbolized by the 35-year-old, white, working male, they declare, no longer prevails. A new world is opening, a world of becoming-minoritarian in which women, Afro-American, post-colonial and queer subjects of all kinds put the dominant order into variation. Changes of this nature occur at the limit of mental and social territories, from unstable borders without any clearly defined division between inside and outside. They occur in and through affects, desire and language. For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-minoritarian must be accompanied by a withering of the state and its institutions without which any generalized transformation would be impossible. Thought they make clear in ‘Rhizome’ that the connections they advocate are different from those of computers that function according to binary oppositions, the philosophers keep open the possibilities of transformations of subjectivities by means of technologies (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 475).Deleuze and Guattari are keenly aware both of the ways that technologies transform subjectivities and of writing in a postcolonial, geopolitical context. Nonetheless, they write about the state in a rather general and even monolithic way without specifically addressing a given ‘nation-state’. It is as if the real villain were a general European concept of state inherited from the romantic age. The institutional apparatus of the state dominates and orders its subjects, preventing them from being creative or pursuing their desires. It keeps them from making revolutionary connections (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 473). To construct rhizomes and create smooth spaces for an optimal circulation of desire, the state, armed with its ‘order-words’, has to be fought until, finally, it withers away and, in accord with any and every utopian scenario, all identity is undone.

**The status quo is paranoiac even in its attempt at counter culture. Status quo methodology confines experimentation to only processes with set goals in mind, destroying these movements from the beginning. We must instead abandon these final goals and embrace free thought.**

**Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Anti-Oedipus, 370-1)**

The codes and their signifiers, the axiomatics and their structures, the imaginary figures that come to occupy them as well as the purely symbolic relationships that gauge them, constitute properly aesthetic molar formations that are characterized by goals, schools, and periods.They relate these aesthetic formations to greater social aggregates, finding in them a field of application, and everywhere enslave art to a great castrating machine of sovereignty. There is a pole of reactionary investment for art as well, a somber paranoiac-Oedipal-narcissistic organization. A foul use of painting, centering around the dirty little secret, even in abstract painting where the axiomatic does without figures: a style of painting whose secret essence is scatological, an oedipalizing painting, even when it has broken with the Holy Trinity as the Oedipal image, a neurotic or neuroticizing painting that makes the process into a goal or an arrest, an interruption, or a continuation in the void**.** This style of painting flourishes today, under the usurped name of modern painting-a poisonous flower-and brought one of Lawrence's heroes to speak much like Henry Miller of the need to have done with pouring out one's merciful and pitiful guts, these "flows of corrugated iron.":" The productive breaks projected onto the enormous unproductive cleavage of castration, the flows that have become flows of "corrugated iron," the openings blocked on all sides. And perhaps this, as we have seen, is Where we find the commodity value of art and literature: a paranoiac form of expression that no longer even needs to "signify" its reactionary libidinal investments, since these investments function on the contrary as its signifier; an Oedipal form of content that no longer even needs to represent Oedipus, since the "structure" suffices. But on the other, theschizorevolutionary, pole, the value of art is no longer measured except in terms of the decoded and deterritorialized flows that it causes to circulate beneath a signifier reduced to silence, beneath the conditions of identity of the parameters, across a structure reduced to impotence; a writing with pneumatic, electronic, or gaseous indifferent supports, and that appears all the more difficult and intellectual to intellectuals as it is accessible to the infirm, the illiterate**,** and the schizos, embracing all that flows and counterflows, the gushings of mercy and pity knowing nothing of meanings and aims(the Artaud experiment, the Burroughs experiment). It is here that art accedes to its authentic modernity, which simply consists in liberating what was present in art from its beginnings**,** but was hidden underneath aims and objects, even if aesthetic, and underneath recodings or axiomatics: the pure process that fulfills itself, and that never ceases to reach fulfillment as it proceeds-art as "experimentation.'

### Case

#### The 1ac engages in dangerous politics of prioritizing methodology and assigning intellectual prerequisites political strategy. Their use of the experience of oppression as the status that defines those who should guide politics harms progressive political strategies. Their particular strategy is part of a larger discourse of recapturing agency through privileging experience as the basis for politics.

Craig IRELAND American Culture @ Bilkent ‘02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002p.87-88

" Once an arcane philosophical term, experience over the last three decades has become a general buzzword. By the 1970s, experience spilled over into the streets, so to speak, and it has since then become the stuff of programmatic manifestos and has been enlisted as the found from which microstrategies of resistance and subaltern counterhistories can be erected. But for all the blows and counterblows that have carried on tor over"\*three decades between those who appeal to the counterhegemonic potential of experience and those who see such appeals as naive voluntarism, such debates show no signs of abating. On the contrary, they have become yet more strident, as can be seen by Michael Pickering's recent attempt to rehabilitate the viability of the term "experience" for subaltern historiography by turning to E. P. Thompson and Dilthey and, more recently still, by Sonia Kruks's polemical defense of experience for subaltern inquiry by way of a reminder that poststructuralist critics of experience owe much to those very thinkers, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, whom they have debunked as if in oedipal rebellion against their begetters. Such debates over experience have so far gravitated around issues of epistemology and agency, pitting those who debunk experience as the stuff of an antiquated philosophy of consciousness against those who argue that subaltern experience provides an enclave against strong structural determination. Lost in such debates, however, have been the potential consequences of appeals to immediate experience as a ground for subaltern agency and specificity. And it is just such potential consequences that will be examined here, These indeed demand our attention, for more is at stake in the appeal to experience than some epistemological faux pas. By so wagering on the perceived immediacy of experience as the evidence for subaltern specificity and counterhegemonic action, appeals to immediate experience, however laudable their goal, end up unwittingly naturalizing what is in fact historical, and, in so doing, they leave the door as wide-open to a progressive politics of identity as to a retreat to neoethnic tribalism. Most alarming about such appeals to experience is not some failure of epistemological nerve – it is instead their ambiguous political and social ramifications. And these have reverberate beyond academia and found an echo in para-academia – so much so that experience has increasingly become the core concept or key word of subaltern groups and the rallying call for what Craig Calhoun calls the “new social movements” in which “experience is made the pure ground of knowledge, the basis of an essentialized standpoint of critical awareness” (468 n.64). The consequences of such appeals to experience can best be addressed not by individually considering disparate currents, but by seeking their common denominator. And in this regard, E.P. Thompson will occupy the foreground. It is safe to say that what started as an altercation between Thompson and Althusser has since spawned academic and para-academic "histories from below" and subaltern cultural inquiries that, for all their differences, share the idea that the identities and counterhistories of the disenfranchised can be buttressed by the specificity of a group's concrete experiences. Much theorizing on experience by certain cultural and historiographical trends, as many have already pointed out, has been but a variation on a persistent Thompsonian theme in which Thompson's "kind of use of experience has the same foundational status if we substitute 'women's' or 'black' or 'lesbian' or 'homosexual' for 'working class'" (Scott, 786)

#### Experience as manifest destiny. The 1ac's description of unalienated experience turns into a new form of authoritarian pedagogy. Presenting the self as evidence prevents a critical inquiry into what authorities experience itself. The discourse of experience becomes a trump card-a fascist prohibition on what can be criticized and what stands as absolute.

Rey CHOW Modern Culture and Media @ Brown ’98 Ethics After Idealism

In the foregoing pages, I have tried to argue that fascism needs to be understood not only in its negative but more importantly in its positive aspects, and that fascism's production of idealism is a projectional production of luminosity-as-self-evidence, "In an essay entitled "The Evidence of Experience," which does not at first seem to have anything to do with the topic of fascism, Joan Scott has made comparable observations about the use of “experience” in the North American academy today. In the general atmosphere of a felt need to deconstruct universalist: claims about human history, Scott writes, scholars of various disciplines have increasingly turned to personal experience as a means of such deconstruction. However, she argues, by privileging experience as the critical weapon against univeralisms, we are leaving open the question as to what authorizes experience itself. Scott charges that the appeal to experience “as uncontestable evidence and as an originary point of explanation” for historical difference has increasingly replaced the necessary task of exploring “how difference is established, how it operates, now, and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world.” For me, what is especially interesting is the manner in which Scott emphasizes the role of vision and visibility throughout her essay. Beginning her discussion with Samuel R. Delany's autobiographical meditation, The Motion of Light in Water, Scott notes that "a metaphor of visibility as literal transparency is crucial to his project." She concludes that, for Delany, "knowledge is gained through vision; vision is a direct apprehension of a world of transparent objects."41 What Scott articulates here is the other side of Virilio's argument about the coterminous nature of visual perception and destruction – that is, the coterminous nature of visual perception and knowledge: "Seeing is the origin of knowing.” While the technology of seeing, or seeing-as-technology, has become an inalienable part of the operation of militarism and fascist propaganda, Scott shows how it has also come to dominate our thinking about identity so much so that visibility and luminosity are the conditions toward which accounts of difference and alternative histories derived from personal experience” now aspire.

This kind of aspiration, Scott implies, is an aspiration toward the self-evidence of the self’s (personal) experience. The self as evidence this means that the self, like the Stalin myth in Soviet cinema, is so transparent, so shone through with light, that it simply is without need for further argument about its history or what Scott calls its “discursive character.”

#### The 1ac begins with the appeal to bodily experience and materiality as the basis for political action. This becomes the basis for an authentic and unideological experience that questions dominant narrative. Treating this body as the corrective to ideology reduces everyone to a purely biological identity. Instead of exchange and transgression we end up with a static politics and pedagogy.

Craig IRELAND American Culture @ Bilkent ’02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002, 91-96

It was precisely in response to this turn or events that the culturalist strain in British Marxism, as well as subsequent strands in subaltern studies, came to see experience as that which, by virtue of its prediscursive immediacy, radically demarcates itself from and therefore evades discursive or ideological mediation and determination. Because the imposition of state ideology, as Thompson saw it, "cannot succeed unless there is congruence between the imposed rules and view of life and the necessary business of living in a given mode of production" {Poverty of Theory, 367), something was needed that might sabotage such a congruence and, in so doing, bypass strong structural determination. Of the possible candidates, the perceived nonmediatedness, or immediacy, or experience proved to be particularly seductive. Indeed, because of its seemingly immediate, that is, its nondiscursive or nonideological contact with environing social being, experience represented just that sort of untainted raw materials (to use Thompson’s expression) that, in order to congeal into class or group self-consciousness and agency needed but to be articulated by a regionalized culture sufficiently specific to those sharing particular experiences. Experience, in short, represented the stuff (in the sense of its Germanic cognate, Stoff, that is, resistant material) that, impervious as it appeared to be to ideological tampering, might furnish the material building blocks from which counterhistories could be constructed and subaltern cultures reinforced. Such perceptions of the counterhegemonic potential of experience were encouraged by the connotations the word had acquired in the Anglo-American world. From a term that from the seventeenth to the early eighteenth century implied knowledge gained through both a reliance on the past as well as through observation untainted, as Francis Bacon would say, by church dogma, superstition, and other obscurantist idols, the concept of experience semantically shifted by the midto late eighteenth century not only to that which opposed reason, but also to that which is "full and active awareness" of both feeling and thought and, as such, assumed an aura of authenticity with which reasoning and ideas could not dispense (Williams, 126). The German equivalents of experience, whether as Erfahrung or as the early nineteenth-century neologism Erlebnis, are likewise informed by a conceptual and etymological history that encouraged the association of experience with notions of counterhegemonic resistance, as can be seen in the recourse to Erfahrung, by certain members of the Frankfurt School and by certain phenomenologists as a means of countering given or dominant horizons of understanding and, as can also be seen in the recourse by Lebensphilosophie to Erlebnis, as a means of opposing the mediacy of abstract reason with the immediacy of the concretely lived. Thompson's notion of experience, however, does not seek to rehabilitate the "other" of reason in the manner that Erlebnis had in certain popularizations of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Lebensphilosophie; instead, it wagers on the "other" of the perceived immateriality of signification – the immediacy of experience is opposed to the mediacy of ideology as the material is to the immaterial. If experience plays a central role in certain theories hoping to vindicate subaltern agency, it is because of its assumed unmediated proximity with materiality. Because of its corporeal resistance to external tampering, materiality appears as less malleable and thus less amenable to ideological mediation much as for Locke the qualities or material spatial extension, lending themselves as they do to palpable verification and thus less prone to perceptual distortion, are seen as qualities more primary than the pliable and fickle secondary qualities of sight or sound. It is true that, in order to avoid both naive empirical positivism and strong structural determinism, Thompson proposed that experience be understood less as binarily opposed to structure than as a mediating third term between "conditioning" and "agency" and at the "intersection between determination and self activity" (Poverty of Theory, 225, 228); it nevertheless remains that his notion of experience is imbued with material properties: 'Thus change takes place in social being which then gives rise to change in experience," Thompson explains,"... and this experience exerts pressure on existent social consciousness, raises questions, and furnishes the material for intellectual elaboration” (200; my emphasis). As raw material and in the manner of a Gegenstand, Thompson's notion of experience stands against and exerts pressure on consciousness, and although dependent on its retrospective mediation within a local culture, this experience nevertheless has all the makings of the spatially extended solidity of matter – matter that, by presumably circumventing ideological determination, can serve as the ground from which resistance can be mustered and alternative sociability constructed. This Thompsonian notion of experience, as many have already pointed out, has found its way in numerous strains of Anglo-American feminist epistemologies and subaltern studies. And rooted as it is in prediscursive materiality, it is hardly surprising that it should have lately migrated to what is considered by many to be the last enclave of resistance against ideological contamination – the perceived nondiscursive material immediacy of the body itself. Certain North American feminist strands propose "experience, qua women's experience of alienation from their own bodies, as the evidence of difference" (Bellamy and Leontis, 167); while others, by contending that the materiality of social practice somehow institutes a disruptive fissure within dominant discursive regimes, have retreated, as Joan W. Scott notes, to "the biological or physical 'experience' of the body" itself (787-88). Others have gone so far as to see the body as the last enclave of resistance where the nonmediated specificity of experience is “registered" or "inscribed” in the manner of Kafka's penal colony, as so many body piercings testifying to the irreducibly singular, telling us, as does Chantal Maille, that "our body is becoming a new locus of struggle, which lays claim to its difference through actions such as body piercing" (quoted in Houde, 6). Such a stance is, of course, beset by numerous problems that have already been repeatedly pointed out by others and that need not be rehearsed here. Suffice it to say, as does Fredric Jameson, that “we must be very suspicious of the reference to the body as an appeal to immediacy (the warning goes back to the very first chapter Hegel's Phenomenology); even Foucault s medical and penal work can be read as an account of the construction of the body which rebukes premature immediacy" ("On 'Cultural Studies,’" 44). The recent obsession with the material body is, of course, hardly in a position to vindicate the historical materialism with which, as if to appease Bourdieu, it often fancies itself allied – Materialism is scarcely achieved by a litany of the body," Jameson rightly notes, and the materialism of the body "should not be confused with a historical materialism that turns on praxis and on the mode of production" (ibid.). But at stake in the recent obsession with the materiality of bodily experience is not just an attempt to redeem historical, let alone dialectical, materialism – something that an exclusive reliance on immediate material experience, bodily or otherwise, is hardly in a position to accomplish anyway; at stake is instead the condition of possibility of an active subject and of a ground from which can be erected strategies of resistance (to use the jargon of the 1980s) and a politics of identity (to use the slogan of the 1990s) that might evade the hegemony, as current parlance phrases it, of dominant discursive formations. It is in the name of agency and cultural specificity that, to this day, appeals are made to immediate and materially grounded experience by those currents in subaltern studies that presuppose a nonmediated homology or correlation between one's structural position, one's socioeconomic interests, one's propensity for certain types of experiences, and certain forms of consciousness or awareness. It is, of course, unlikely that Thompson would endorse some of the uses to which his notion of experience has been put. But that is beside the point. Regardless of Thompson's motivations, this turn to the material immediacy of bodily experiences is but the logical unfolding of his argument that, for all its cautious disclaimers, attempts to ground group specificity and agency in the nondiscursive and the immediate. Since for the Thompsonian notion of experience all forms of mediation are considered fair game for ideological penetration, the turn to the immediate is to be expected, and the migration toward material immediacy is but an extrapolation of such a turn. But what are the potential consequences of such a turn? THE SPECTER OF NEOETHNIC TRIBALISM More is involved here than some epistemological blunder. In their bid to circumvent ideological mediation by turning to the presumed immediacy of experience, Thompsonian experience-oriented theories advance an argument that is not so much theoretically specious as it is potentially dangerous: there is nothing within the logic of such an argument that precludes the hypostatization of other nondiscursive bases for group membership and specificity – bases that can be as readily be those of a group’s immediate experiences as they can be those of a group’s presumed materially immediate biological characteristics or physical markers of ethnicity and sexuality. If the criterion for the disruptive antihegemonic potential of experience is its immediacy, and if, as we have just seen, such a criterion can readily lead to a fetishization of the material body itself, then what starts out as an attempt to account for a nonmediated locus of resistance and agency can end up as a surenchere of immediacy that by but a nudge of a cluster of circumstances can propel toward what Michael Piore's Beyond Individualism calls ''biologism'’ – an increasingly common trend whereby "a person's entire identity resides in a single physical characteristic, whether it be of blackness, of deafness or of homosexuality: (quoted in Gitlin, 6). Blut und Boden seem but a step away. The step from a wager on immediate experience, whether from theories hoping to account for agency or from groups struggling for cultural recognition, to rabid neoethnic fundamentalisms is only a possible step and not a necessary one', and the link between these two" trends as certainly not one of enmity, and still less one of causality. What the parallelism between the two does suggest, however, is that in spite of their divergent motivations and means, they both attempt to ground group specificity by appealing to immediacy – by appointing, in other words, to something that is less a historical product or a mediated construct than it is an immediately given natural entity, whether it be the essence of a Volk, as in current tribalisms, or the essence of material experiences specific to groups, as in strains of Alltagsgeschichte and certain subaltern endeavors. If a potential for biologism and the specter of neoethnic tribalism are close at hand in certain cultural theories and social movements, it is because the recourse to immediate experience opens the back door to what was booted out the front door – it inadvertently naturalizes what it initially set out to historicize.