# **K**

#### **War is complex, but war is hell. John and I have had the privilege to never know war personally, never to experience combat, and that necessarily affects the way we see the world.**

#### However, we dispute the claim that the left has is incapable of explaining war and has no place for Clay’s experience.

#### The experience of war has driven Russel Brown, who served in Vietnam with the Fourth Marines, to a life of political resistance to war. Brown explains with Sherwood Bross in 2012

#### **Ross & Brown in 12** Sherwood Ross, Military Journalist; & Russel Brown—Vietnam veteran turned anti-war activist; “Why An Ex-Marine Turns Pacifist” *Veterans Today*; May 21, 2012; http://www.veteranstoday.com/2012/05/21/why-an-ex-marine-turns-pacifist/

It’s been a long journey for Russell Brown, 65, from the days when he fought with the Fourth Marines in Viet Nam, to becoming one of the “Hancock 33” protesters against drone warfare. Last April 22, he was arrested walking en route to Hancock Air Force Base, just outside of Syracuse, N.Y., where General Atomics-made MQ-9 Reapers, the deadly unmanned aerial vehicles(UAV) that fire Hellfire missiles, dot the runway. The protesters would have liked to serve an indictment for war crimes on the base commander and President Obama, et al, and to reach Hancock’s 2,000 employees with their pacifist message, but the authorities were not going to have any of that.¶ Onondaga County sheriffs stopped them and told them they were all under arrest. “They said we were marching or parading without a permit,” Brown says. “Eventually they offered most of us an opportunity to sign a waiver agreeing to not sue them for false arrest. I believe two people signed, 33 remained arrested. Then they stopped arresting any more people.” The protesters were halted while walking in a long, thin line toward the base, Brown says, and were not obstructing traffic. (“It was a real violation of the First Amendment.”) Brown adds, the U.S. Government likes to try the pacifists before a judge so that “juries don’t learn the U.S. is committing war crimes.”¶ “I lost my religion in Viet Nam,” says Brown, a soft-spoken, hazel-eyed avuncular figure who ties his long white-brown hair in a ponytail with red rubber bands and sports a T-shirt that proclaims, “I Wish To Live Without War.” He thought at the time, “If God is all-good and all-wise, what am I doing holding a dead baby?” Brown, of Buffalo, N.Y., enlisted in the Marines in 1966 “without a lot of forethought” to get a two-year hitch “over with” and return to civilian life. “I was a very naive guy,” he recalls reflecting on that youthful decision. And what he saw in Viet Nam has haunted him ever since.¶ “A sniper shot at us from about 300 yards across a rice paddy and everybody shoots back and when we get over there it’s all dead women and children. We made a mistake. That really opened my eyes. If you can make a mistake at that distance so can a drone operator sitting on this side of the Atlantic make a mistake and kill a person in Afghanistan.”¶ In Nam, Brown saw Marines kicking prisoners in the head. “One guy shot an old woman right in the face and killed her. Atrocities were an ongoing thing. It was constant, and I never spoke about it when I saw something wrong. And there were a lot of people like me who knew something was wrong but did not speak out. Now when I see outrageous injustice I I feel compelled to speak out. Imagine, two million people died! I saw them cutting the ears and fingers off the dead.They took their rings. And all the time I kept quiet.”¶ Brown says men aren’t natural-born killers but “have been impacted by their Marine training to do it so that they think shooting people is like killing squirrels.” One incident that perturbed him was when he was shot in the neck and a medical officer delayed treating him until after the officer finished bawling out a subordinate. Two weeks after he was patched up Brown was back in the line. Not long after his discharge, Brown at last began to speak out about what he saw. His first arrest for protesting the war came in 1971 but he did not serve prison time.¶ Brown took a job in the Buffalo post office, where he worked a variety of jobs for 22 years and then retired. During that period he married, and raised a family yet found time to continue his activism. Recently, Brown traveled to Washington to attend an international drone conference. While he was there he took the time to hold up a “Stop Killer Drones” placard outside each media outlet (ABC, NBC, Fox) where Obama counterterrorism advisor John Brennan happened to be speaking. “He (Brennan) was admitting for the first time Obama was doing drone assassinations,” Brown pointed out.¶ Brown thinks the drone killings are ugly for a number of reasons: First, the CIA pays people to identify suspected terrorists who may not be terrorists at all but may have been turned in for the money. Second, “You see a car but you don’t know if they have the guy that they are targeting inside or who else is in the car with him.” Third, “Who gave us the right to assassinate people anyhow? Those (attacks) are all war crimes. You can’t separate who’s civilians and who’s enemy.” Brown asks, “How would we Americans feel if somebody was targeting us and killing our children? They (the Pentagon and CIA) are only making more enemies.” Finally, Brown objects to the use of drones in countries “where we are not at war—in Yemen and Somalia and Pakistan.”¶ (The British-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates the U.S.¶ has killed some 3,000 people in 319 drone strikes. Of these, 600 were civilian bystanders and approximately one in four of those were children.)¶ Asked why, compared to the Viet Nam war, the peace movement today appears to be so feeble, Brown replied, “My theory is that when Obama got elected all these liberals who opposed Bush were happy to have a guy in the White House who could speak English and who they thought would change things. But that’s changing. As much as they want to look the other way, they realize what Obama is doing is wrong. “He’s a war criminal. He’s responsible for lots of killing. Obama’s not even good on domestic policy. He’s done a lot more damage than Bush ever did.”¶ Brown adds, “I hate to be so cynical but you get more and more cynical whatever Obama says. He’s the perfect candidate for the conservative elite of this country.” For all these reasons, Brown concludes, “I am considering voting for (Dr.) Jill Stein,” the presidential candidate of the Green Party, “if I voted for anybody.” But, he adds cautiously, “I have to vet her first.”¶ Brown has been ordered to appear June 14th in Onondaga County Court, DeWitt, N.Y. At that hearing, he says, a judge likely will decide whether he is able to represent himself in court as he wishes to do. The actual trial will come sometime later. Brown says his case is one of “civil resistance” as it is the government that is breaking the laws. This contrasts with the civil rights movement of the Sixties, he says, when protesters engaged in civil disobedience—-i.e., they knowingly violated laws on the books they deemed to be wrong. “Now, we’re trying to stop the government from breaking laws” (such as the Charter of the United Nations) which is also the supreme law of the land.¶ However Brown’s case turns out, USG is dealing with one implacable citizen, a man who has seen the criminal operation that is militarism up close and from the inside and who is willing to be arrested to defy it, a man who refuses to allow himself to be intimidated.

#### We propose an alternate approach – instead of assuming the specter of war can always reappear, we deny the inevitability of war

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 22-23)

The widespread, unquestioning acceptance of warism and the corresponding reluctance to consider pacifism as a legitimate option make it difficult to propose a genuine consideration of pacifist alternatives. Warism may be held implicitly or explicitly. Held in its implicit form, it does not occur to the warist to challenge the view that war is morally justified; war is taken to be natural and normal. No other way of understanding large-scale human conflict even comes to mind. In this sense warism is like racism, sexism, and homophobia: a prejudicial bias built into conceptions and judgments without the awareness of those assuming it. In its explicit form, warism is openly accepted, articulated, and deliberately chosen as a value judgment on nations in conflict. War may be defended as essential for justice, needed for national security, as “the only thing the enemy understands,” and so on. In both forms warism misguides judgments and institutions by reinforcing the necessity and inevitability of war and precluding alternatives. Whether held implicitly or explicitly, warism obstructs questioning the conceptual framework of the culture. If we assume (without realizing it) that war itself is morally justifiable, our moral considerations of war will be focused on whether a particular war is justified or whether particular acts within a given war are morally acceptable. These are important concerns, but addressing them does not get at the fundamental issue raised by the pacifist: the morality of war as such. In Just and Unjust Wars Michael Walzer explains that “war is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt.”8 The pacifist suggestion is that there is a third judgment of war that must be made prior to the other two: might war, by its very nature, be morally wrong? This issue is considered by Walzer only as an afterthought in an appendix, where it is dismissed as naïve. Perhaps Walzer should not be faulted for this omission, since he defines his task as describing the conventional morality of war and, as has been argued above, conventional morality does take warism for granted. To this extent Walzer is correct. And this is just the point: our warist conceptual frameworks— our warist normative lenses— blind us to the root question. The concern of pacifists is to expose the hidden warist bias and not merely describe cultural values. Pacifists seek to examine cultural values and recommend what they ought to be. This is why the pacifist insists on judging war in itself, a judgment more fundamental than the more limited assessments of the morality of a given war or the morality of specific acts within a particular war.

#### This consciousness of war guarantees endless violence that ensures planetary destruction and structural violence. Our opposition to war isn’t an opposition to soldiers, but to the elites that send them to fight for their own interests.

* Another impact: freeing ourselves from war = more resources for peace

Lawrence 9 (Grant, “Military Industrial "War" Consciousness Responsible for Economic and Social Collapse,” OEN—OpEdNews, March 27)

As a presidential candidate, [Barack Obama](http://obama.senate.gov/) called [Afghanistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29) ''the war we must win.'' He was absolutely right. Now it is time to win it... Senators [John McCain](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0564587/) and Joseph Lieberman [calling](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/inbox/story/960269.html) for an expanded war in Afghanistan "How true it is that war can destroy everything of value." Pope Benedict XVI [decrying](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuue8kE-e0lYZVFpt4RlbX4M_IEw) the suffering of Africa Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years. Lao Tzu on [War](http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/salt/salt09.htm) As Americans we are raised on the utility of war to conquer every problem. We have a drug problem so we wage war on it. We have a cancer problem so we wage war on it. We have a crime problem so we wage war on it. Poverty cannot be dealt with but it has to be warred against. Terror is another problem that must be warred against. In the [United States](http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667&spn=10.0,10.0&q=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667%20%28United%20States%29&t=h), solutions can only be found in terms of wars. In a society that functions to support a massive military industrial war machine and empire, it is important that the terms promoted support the conditioning of its citizens. We are conditioned to see war as the solution to major social ills and major political disagreements. That way when we see so much of our resources devoted to war then we don't question the utility of it. The term "war" excites mind and body and creates a fear mentality that looks at life in terms of attack. In war, there has to be an attack and a must win attitude to carry us to victory. But is this war mentality working for us? In an age when nearly half of our tax money goes to support the war machine and a good deal of the rest is going to support the elite that control the war machine, we can see that our present war mentality is not working. Our values have been so perverted by our war mentality that we see sex as sinful but killing as entertainment. Our society is dripping violence. The violence is fed by poverty, social injustice, the break down of family and community that also arises from economic injustice, and by the managed media. The cycle of violence that exists in our society exists because it is useful to those that control society. It is easier to sell the war machine when your population is conditioned to violence. Our military industrial consciousness may not be working for nearly all of the life of the planet but it does work for the very few that are the master manipulators of our values and our consciousness. Rupert Murdoch, the media monopoly man that runs the "Fair and Balanced" [Fox Network](http://www.fox.com/), Sky Television, and [News Corp](http://www.newscorp.com/) just to name a few, [had](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Murdoch) all of his 175 newspapers editorialize in favor of the [Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War). Murdoch snickers when [he says](http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=341) "we tried" to manipulate public opinion." The Iraq war was a good war to Murdoch [because,](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/07/b122948.html) "The death toll, certainly of Americans there, by the terms of any previous war are quite minute." But, to the media manipulators, the phony politicos, the military industrial elite, a million dead Iraqis are not to be considered. War is big business and it is supported by a war consciousness that allows it to prosper. That is why more war in Afghanistan, the war on Palestinians, and the other wars around the planet in which the [military industrial complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex) builds massive wealth and power will continue. The military industrial war mentality is not only killing, maiming, and destroying but it is also contributing to the present social and economic collapse. As mentioned previously, the massive wealth transfer that occurs when the American people give half of their money to support death and destruction is money that could have gone to support a just society. It is no accident that after years of war and preparing for war, our society is crumbling. Science and technological resources along with economic and natural resources have been squandered in the never-ending pursuit of enemies. All of that energy could have been utilized for the good of humanity, ¶ instead of maintaining the power positions of the very few super wealthy. So the suffering that we give is ultimately the suffering we get. Humans want to believe that they can escape the consciousness that they live in. But that consciousness determines what we experience and how we live. As long as we choose to live in "War" in our minds then we will continue to get "War" in our lives. When humanity chooses to wage peace on the world then there will be a flowering of life. But until then we will be forced to live the life our present war consciousness is creating.

#### The alternative must begin in here and now– we need to free ourselves of the presumption towards war and advocate for peace and social justice to stop the flow of militarism that threatens existence

* Democracy itself is the product of searching for peaceful solutions

Demenchonok 9 – Worked as a senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and is currently a Professor of Foreign Languages and Philosophy at Fort Valley State University in Georgia, listed in 2000 Outstanding Scholars of the 21st Century and is a recipient of the Twenty-First Century Award for Achievement in Philosophy from the International Biographical Centre --Edward, Philosophy After Hiroshima: From Power Politics to the Ethics of Nonviolence and Co-Responsibility, February, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Volume 68, Issue 1, Pages 9-49

Where, then, does the future lie? Unilateralism, hegemonic political anarchy, mass immiseration, ecocide, and global violence—a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes? Or international cooperation, social justice, and genuine collective—political and human—security? Down which path lies cowering, fragile hope?¶ Humanistic thinkers approach these problems from the perspective of their concern about the situation of individuals and the long-range interests of humanity. They examine in depth the root causes of these problems, warning about the consequences of escalation and, at the same time, indicating the prospect of their possible solutions through nonviolent means and a growing global consciousness. Today's world is in desperate need of realistic alternatives to violent conflict. Nonviolent action—properly planned and executed—is a powerful and effective force for political and social change. The ideas of peace and nonviolence, as expressed by Immanuel Kant, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many contemporary philosophers—supported by peace and civil rights movements—counter the paralyzing fear with hope and offer a realistic alternative: a rational approach to the solutions to the problems, encouraging people to be the masters of their own destiny.¶ Fortunately, the memory of the tragedies of war and the growing realization of this new existential situation of humanity has awakened the global conscience and generated protest movements demanding necessary changes. During the four decades of the Cold War, which polarized the world, power politics was challenged by the common perspective of humanity, of the supreme value of human life, and the ethics of peace. Thus, in Europe, which suffered from both world wars and totalitarianism, spiritual-intellectual efforts to find solutions to these problems generated ideas of "new thinking," aiming for peace, freedom, and democracy. Today, philosophers, intellectuals, progressive political leaders, and peace-movement activists continue to promote a peaceful alternative. In the asymmetry of power, despite being frustrated by war-prone politics, peaceful projects emerge each time, like a phoenix arising from the ashes, as the only viable alternative for the survival of humanity. The new thinking in philosophy affirms the supreme value of human and nonhuman life, freedom, justice, and the future of human civilization. It asserts that the transcendental task of the survival of humankind and the rest of the biotic community must have an unquestionable primacy in comparison to particular interests of nations, social classes, and so forth. In applying these principles to the nuclear age, it considers a just and lasting peace as a categorical imperative for the survival of humankind, and thus proposes a world free from nuclear weapons and from war and organized violence.44 In tune with the Charter of the United Nations, it calls for the democratization of international relations and for dialogue and cooperation in order to secure peace, human rights, and solutions to global problems. It further calls for the transition toward a cosmopolitan order.¶ The escalating global problems are symptoms of what might be termed a contemporary civilizational disease, developed over the course of centuries, in which techno-economic progress is achieved at the cost of depersonalization and dehumanization. Therefore, the possibility of an effective "treatment" today depends on whether or not humankind will be able to regain its humanity, thus establishing new relations of the individual with himself or herself, with others, and with nature. Hence the need for a new philosophy of humanity and an ethics of nonviolence and planetary co-responsibility to help us make sense not only of our past historical events, but also of the extent, quality, and urgency of our present choices.

#### Roll of the ballot – the way we discuss and represent war should come first – the language surrounding violence has direct, concrete effects

**Collins & Glover 2** (John, Assistant Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence University, Ross, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, Collateral Language, p. 6-7)

As any university student knows, theories about the “social con­struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruc­tion) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im­mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (in­cluding genocide), the physical destruction of human commu­nities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violence—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the So­viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of “manufacturing consent” and shaping people’s per­ception of the world around them; people are more likely to sup­port acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef­fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup­posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio­lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu­phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering lan­guage of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

# PIC

In this round, we should welcome and affirm the perspectives of veterans. The role of the ballot is the critic should vote for the team that best welcomes and affirms the perspectives of veterans.

As rhetoricians, we have a unique responsibility to reject the ableism of “listening/voice” metaphors

Lacey 10 (Teacher, MA in English, “The Conversations Metaphor and Ableism”, 9/6, <http://equality101.net/?p=1886> Accessed 2/10/11 GAL)

In my [last post](http://equality101.net/?p=1809), I discussed how I might use the seemingly elementary activity of show-and-tell to introduce students to a foundational concept of college-level composition: the Burkean Parlor metaphor. Frequently expressed as the simpler conversation metaphor, this metaphor illustrates what thinkers, researchers, scholars and, most importantly, writers do: we listen to a conversation; we form our own opinions about this topic of conversation as a result of listening; we eventually add our own voices (**opinions)** to the conversation; and our voices become part of the conversation that others listen to and use to form their opinions.

As I prepared for one of my classes today, I came across the following passage in a chapter called “Reading Rhetorically: The Writer as Strong Reader”:

The goal of this chapter is to help you become a more powerful reader of academic texts, prepared to take part in the conversations of the disciplines you study. To this end, we explain two kinds of thinking and writing essential to your college reading:

Your ability to listen carefully to a text, to recognize its parts and their functions, and to summarize its ideas

Your ability to formulate strong responses to texts by interacting with them, either by agreeing with, interrogating, or actively opposing them

(Ramage, Bean, and Johnson, Allyn & Bacon Guide to Writing, 5th ed., pg. 109)

Clearly, the conversation metaphor is a useful and important framework that has the capacity to help college students understand college-level writing in a new and more applicable way. This metaphor has helped me explain why we do research at all and how composition classes are relevant outside of the required course structure at the university.

Butafter reading this passage, it struck me that this metaphor — built on the notions of listening and speaking — might actually be ableist in effect. It might leave out many students who can still participate in composition meaningfully but who don’t have the ability to listen (or hear) or to speak. I’m not sure why this never occurred to me before. I’ve taught the conversation metaphor to students with hearing difficulties without thinking twice about what I was saying. Despite the ableist language in the metaphor used to present this concept, I think the concept itself is still valuable. So how can we modify this metaphor to accommodate for all students? The easy answer is to change the language and comparison involved. We could use the more situation-neutral language of rhetoric: the rhetor (who can be a speaker, a writer, an artist, a thinker — anyone who puts a message in some form out to an audience) takes in the messages about a particular topic of the rhetors around him/her, uses those messages to learn and to develop an opinion, and then adds his/her own response to the collection of messages surrounding this topic for other would-be rhetors to take in. This conception is rather vague, though, and lacks the benefit of a realistic setting to deliver the metaphor and to demonstrate that what we do as composers in college reflects what we do as workers, family members, citizens, and activists beyond the college classroom. Perhaps a more updated version of this metaphor would use the setting of an online chat room. Instead of entering a parlor — which is an outdated term anyway — to listen and speak to people already engaged in conversation, perhaps you enter a chat room where you read and learn more about conversations that have been ongoing since before other chat users were in the room. While this is a more realistic setting for the concept of participating in a discourse community, there are still touches of ableism (being able to read — though many individuals with visual impairment use devices to allow them to read either print or Braille from their computers) and classism (access to the Web and time to participate in chat rooms).

As the composition field continues to become more relevant as students engage with all kinds of texts and participate in all kinds of discourse communities, we who promote these foundational concepts must remain cognizant that we are considering all of our students. While communication is a human endeavor, we don’t all communicate in the same ways, and it is vital that composition/rhetoric make that basic fact a part of the daily work of teaching students how to critically engage with texts and contribute to their communities.

1. Voting Issue – Ableist Speech strengthens oppression and destroys the purposes of public debate – the impacts trump the other warrants in their arguments

Wheelchair Dancer, 4/28/8

(“On Making Argument: Disability and Language”, <http://cripwheels.blogspot.com/2008/04/on-making-argument-disability-and.html> Accessed: 2/10/11 GAL)  
If you are feeling a little bit of resistance, here, I'd ask you to think about it. If perhaps what I am saying feels like a burden -- too much to take on? a restriction on your carefree speech? -- perhaps that feeling can also serve as an indicator of how pervasive and thus important the issue is. As a community, we've accepted that commonly used words can be slurs, and as a rule, we avoid them, hopefully in the name of principle, but sometimes only in the name of civility. Do you go around using derivatives of the b**\*ch** word?If you do, I bet you check which community you are in**....** Same thing for the N word**.** These days, **depending on your age,** you might say something is retarded **or spastic,** but you probably never say that it's gay. I'd like to suggest that society as a whole has not paid the same kind of attention to disabled people's concerns about language. By not paying attention to the literal value, the very real substantive, physical, psychological, sensory, and emotional experiences that come with these linguistic moves, we have created a negative rhetorical climate. In this world, it is too easy for feminists and people of colour to base their claims on argumentative strategies that depend, as their signature moves, on marginalizing the experience of disabled people and on disparaging their appearance and bodies. Much of the blogosphere discourse of the previous weeks has studied the relationships between race, (white) feminism and feminists, and WOC bloggers. To me, the intellectual takeaway has been an emerging understanding of how, in conversation, notions of appropriation, citation, ironization, and metaphorization can be deployed as strategies of legitimation and exclusion. And, as a result, I question how "oppressed, minoritized" groups differentiate themselves from other groups in order to seek justice and claim authority. Must we always define ourselves in opposition and distance to a minoritized and oppressed group that can be perceived as even more unsavory than the one from which one currently speaks?  
As I watched the discussion about who among the feminist and WOC bloggers has power and authority and how that is achieved, I began to recognise a new power dynamic both on the internet and in the world at large. Feminism takes on misogyny. The WOC have been engaging feminism. But from my point of view, a wide variety of powerful feminist and anti-racist discourse is predicated on negative disability stereotyping. There's a kind of hierarchy here: the lack of awareness about disability, disability culture and identity, and our civil rights movement has resulted in a kind of domino effect where disability images are the metaphor of last resort: the bottom, the worst. Disability language has about it a kind of untouchable quality -- as if the horror and weakness of a disabled body were the one true, reliable thing, a touchstone to which we can turn when we know we can't use misogynistic or racist language. When we engage in these kinds of argumentative strategies, we exclude a whole population of people whose histories are intricately bound up with ours. When we deploy these kinds of strategies to underscore the value of our own existence in the world, we reaffirm and strengthen the systems of oppression that motivated us to speak out in the first place.

# FW

Our interpretation is that an affirmative should defend a topical action by the USfg as the endpoint of their advocacy. This does not mandate roleplaying, immediate fiat or any particular means of impact calculus.

“USFG should” proscribes both a stable agent and mechanism

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

The Aff undermines the ability to have a limited and stable number of Affirmatives to prepare against. This is a reason to vote negative.

First is Decision-making

Increasing the abstraction of debates and undermining stasis hampers the decision-making benefits of debate

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decision-making is the most important facet of education we could take away from debate – key to success in any future role

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

Next is substantive side bias

Surely the Aff will say the Neg can still debate them on the substance of their advocacy but not defending the clear actor and mechanism of the resolutional produces a substantive side bias.

Affirmatives that don’t defend the resolution make deploying other strategies against them inordinately Aff tilted. They have the ability to radically recontextualize link arguments, empathize different proscriptive claims of the 1AC while using traditional competition standards like perms to make being impossible inordinately difficult.

And we have an external impact to this net benefit

Sufficient research-based preparation and debates focused on detailed points of disagreement are crucial to transforming political culture

Gutting (professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame) 13

(Gary, Feb 19, A Great Debate, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/a-great-debate/?emc=eta1)

This is the year of what should be a decisive debate on our country’s spending and debt. But our political “debates” seldom deserve the name. For the most part representatives of the rival parties exchange one-liners: “The rich can afford to pay more” is met by “Tax increases kill jobs.” Slightly more sophisticated discussions may cite historical precedents: “There were higher tax rates during the post-war boom” versus “Reagan’s tax cuts increased revenues.”

Such volleys still don’t even amount to arguments: they don’t put forward generally accepted premises that support a conclusion. Full-scale speeches by politicians are seldom much more than collections of such slogans and factoids, hung on a string of platitudes. Despite the name, candidates’ pre-election debates are exercises in looking authoritative, imposing their talking points on the questions, avoiding gaffes, and embarrassing their opponents with “zingers” (the historic paradigm: “There you go again.”).

There is a high level of political discussion in the editorials and op-eds of national newspapers and magazines as well as on a number of blogs, with positions often carefully formulated and supported with argument and evidence. But even here we seldom see a direct and sustained confrontation of rival positions through the dialectic of assertion, critique, response and counter-critique.  
Such exchanges occur frequently in our law courts (for example, oral arguments before the Supreme Court) and in discussions of scientific papers. But they are not a significant part of our deliberations about public policy. As a result, partisans typically remain safe in their ideological worlds, convincing themselves that they hold to obvious truths, while their opponents must be either knaves or fools — with no need to think through the strengths of their rivals’ positions or the weaknesses of their own.

Is there any way to make genuine debates — sustained back-and-forth exchanges, meeting high intellectual standards but still widely accessible — part of our political culture? (I leave to historians the question of whether there are historical precedents— like the Webster-Hayne or Lincoln-Douglas debates.) Can we put our politicians in a situation where they cannot ignore challenges, where they must genuinely engage with one another in responsible discussion and not just repeat talking points?

A first condition is that the debates be **focused on specific points of major disagreement**. Not, “How can we improve our economy?” but “Will tax cuts for the wealthy or stimulus spending on infrastructure do more to improve our economy?” This will prevent vague statements of principle that don’t address the real issues at stake.

Another issue is the medium of the debate. Written discussions, in print or online could be easily arranged, but personal encounters are more vivid and will better engage public attention. They should not, however, be merely extemporaneous events, where too much will depend on quick-thinking and an engaging manner. We want **remarks to be carefully prepared and open to considered responses**.

Third is Mechanism Education

The Aff’s failure to ID a clear mechanism of change has the most devastating effects on the quality of debates. It makes link comparisons vacuous and means that detailed and well prepared PICs about substance, everyone’s favorite and most education part of debate are all but impossible.

We do not need to win that the state is good, rather just that the value of the state is something that should be debated about. This creates another standard for reading the Aff’s evidence – it can’t just indicate that the state or the resolution is bad or ineffective but that they should not even be discussed. Any of the aff’s ev on this account is simply proof that it can be done on the neg – no unique educational benefit to doing it on the aff, only provides an unfair tactical advantage to their arguments.

# Case

#### Counter-role of the ballot is to affirm or negate the topic. The perspectives of veterans are welcome as a part of, but are not the prerequisite to a valid epistemology.

#### The 1ac engages in dangerous politics of prioritizing methodology and assigning intellectual prerequisites political strategy. Their use of the experience of oppression as the status that defines those who should guide politics harms progressive political strategies. Their particular strategy is part of a larger discourse of recapturing agency through privileging experience as the basis for politics.

Craig IRELAND American Culture @ Bilkent ‘02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002p.87-88

" Once an arcane philosophical term, experience over the last three decades has become a general buzzword. By the 1970s, experience spilled over into the streets, so to speak, and it has since then become the stuff of programmatic manifestos and has been enlisted as the found from which microstrategies of resistance and subaltern counterhistories can be erected. But for all the blows and counterblows that have carried on tor over"\*three decades between those who appeal to the counterhegemonic potential of experience and those who see such appeals as naive voluntarism, such debates show no signs of abating. On the contrary, they have become yet more strident, as can be seen by Michael Pickering's recent attempt to rehabilitate the viability of the term "experience" for subaltern historiography by turning to E. P. Thompson and Dilthey and, more recently still, by Sonia Kruks's polemical defense of experience for subaltern inquiry by way of a reminder that poststructuralist critics of experience owe much to those very thinkers, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, whom they have debunked as if in oedipal rebellion against their begetters. Such debates over experience have so far gravitated around issues of epistemology and agency, pitting those who debunk experience as the stuff of an antiquated philosophy of consciousness against those who argue that subaltern experience provides an enclave against strong structural determination. Lost in such debates, however, have been the potential consequences of appeals to immediate experience as a ground for subaltern agency and specificity.

And it is just such potential consequences that will be examined here, These indeed demand our attention, for more is at stake in the appeal to experience than some epistemological faux pas. By so wagering on the perceived immediacy of experience as the evidence for subaltern specificity and counterhegemonic action, appeals to immediate experience, however laudable their goal, end up unwittingly naturalizing what is in fact historical, and, in so doing, they leave the door as wide-open to a progressive politics of identity as to a retreat to neoethnic tribalism. Most alarming about such appeals to experience is not some failure of epistemological nerve – it is instead their ambiguous political and social ramifications. And these have reverberate beyond academia and found an echo in para-academia – so much so that experience has increasingly become the core concept or key word of subaltern groups and the rallying call for what Craig Calhoun calls the “new social movements” in which “experience is made the pure ground of knowledge, the basis of an essentialized standpoint of critical awareness” (468 n.64).

The consequences of such appeals to experience can best be addressed not by individually considering disparate currents, but by seeking their common denominator. And in this regard, E.P. Thompson will occupy the foreground.

It is safe to say that what started as an altercation between Thompson and Althusser has since spawned academic and para-academic "histories from below" and subaltern cultural inquiries that, for all their differences, share the idea that the identities and counterhistories of the disenfranchised can be buttressed by the specificity of a group's concrete experiences. Much theorizing on experience by certain cultural and historiographical trends, as many have already pointed out, has been but a variation on a persistent Thompsonian theme in which Thompson's "kind of use of experience has the same foundational status if we substitute 'women's' or 'black' or 'lesbian' or 'homosexual' for 'working class'" (Scott, 786)

#### The 1ac's description of unalienated experience turns into a new form of authoritarian pedagogy. Presenting the self as evidence prevents a critical inquiry into what authorities experience itself. The discourse of experience becomes a trump card-a fascist prohibition on what can be criticized and what stands as absolute.

Rey CHOW Modern Culture and Media @ Brown ’98 Ethics After Idealism

In the foregoing pages, I have tried to argue that fascism needs to be understood not only in its negative but more importantly in its positive aspects, and that fascism's production of idealism is a projectional production of luminosity-as-self-evidence, "In an essay entitled "The Evidence of Experience," which does not at first seem to have anything to do with the topic of fascism, Joan Scott has made comparable observations about the use of “experience” in the North American academy today. In the general atmosphere of a felt need to deconstruct universalist: claims about human history, Scott writes, scholars of various disciplines have increasingly turned to personal experience as a means of such deconstruction. However, she argues, by privileging experience as the critical weapon against univeralisms, we are leaving open the question as to what authorizes experience itself. Scott charges that the appeal to experience “as uncontestable evidence and as an originary point of explanation” for historical difference has increasingly replaced the necessary task of exploring “how difference is established, how it operates, now, and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world.” For me, what is especially interesting is the manner in which Scott emphasizes the role of vision and visibility throughout her essay. Beginning her discussion with Samuel R. Delany's autobiographical meditation, The Motion of Light in Water, Scott notes that "a metaphor of visibility as literal transparency is crucial to his project." She concludes that, for Delany, "knowledge is gained through vision; vision is a direct apprehension of a world of transparent objects."41 What Scott articulates here is the other side of Virilio's argument about the coterminous nature of visual perception and destruction – that is, the coterminous nature of visual perception and knowledge: "Seeing is the origin of knowing.” While the technology of seeing, or seeing-as-technology, has become an inalienable part of the operation of militarism and fascist propaganda, Scott shows how it has also come to dominate our thinking about identity so much so that visibility and luminosity are the conditions toward which accounts of difference and alternative histories derived from personal experience” now aspire.

This kind of aspiration, Scott implies, is an aspiration toward the self-evidence of the self’s (personal) experience. The self as evidence this means that the self, like the Stalin myth in Soviet cinema, is so transparent, so shone through with light, that it simply is without need for further argument about its history or what Scott calls its “discursive character.”

#### Experience is an insidious tool because it is impossible to question. How can you deny experience? Particularly when any denial of experience must automatically be an illegitimate use of privilege. Rather than use experience to raise critical, open-ended and dialogical questions-the 1 ac deploys experience so that any question is immediately answered-"should we call brenda's mother a hypocrite” -obviously not, any question is insulting and implies sympathy with oppressors.

#### The 1ac begins with the appeal to bodily experience and materiality as the basis for political action. This becomes the basis for an authentic and unldeological experience that questions dominant narrative. Treating this body as the corrective to ideology reduces everyone to a purely biological identity. Instead of exchange and transgression we end up with a static politics and pedagogy.

Craig IRELAND American Culture @ Bilkent ’02 "The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences" Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002, 91-96

It was precisely in response to this turn or events that the culturalist strain in British Marxism, as well as subsequent strands in subaltern studies, came to see experience as that which, by virtue of its prediscursive immediacy, radically demarcates itself from and therefore evades discursive or ideological mediation and determination. Because the imposition of state ideology, as Thompson saw it, "cannot succeed unless there is congruence between the imposed rules and view of life and the necessary business of living in a given mode of production" {Poverty of Theory, 367), something was needed that might sabotage such a congruence and, in so doing, bypass strong structural determination. Of the possible candidates, the perceived nonmediatedness, or immediacy, or experience proved to be particularly seductive. Indeed, because of its seemingly immediate, that is, its nondiscursive or nonideological contact with environing social being, experience represented just that sort of untainted raw materials (to use Thompson’s expression) that, in order to congeal into class or group self-consciousness and agency needed but to be articulated by a regionalized culture sufficiently specific to those sharing particular experiences. Experience, in short, represented the stuff (in the sense of its Germanic cognate, Stoff, that is, resistant material) that, impervious as it appeared to be to ideological tampering, might furnish the material building blocks from which counterhistories could be constructed and subaltern cultures reinforced.

Such perceptions of the counterhegemonic potential of experience were encouraged by the connotations the word had acquired in the Anglo-American world. From a term that from the seventeenth to the early eighteenth century implied knowledge gained through both a reliance on the past as well as through observation untainted, as Francis Bacon would say, by church dogma, superstition, and other obscurantist idols, the concept of experience semantically shifted by the midto late eighteenth century not only to that which opposed reason, but also to that which is "full and active awareness" of both feeling and thought and, as such, assumed an aura of authenticity with which reasoning and ideas could not dispense (Williams, 126). The German equivalents of experience, whether as Erfahrung or as the early nineteenth-century neologism Erlebnis, are likewise informed by a conceptual and etymological history that encouraged the association of experience with notions of counterhegemonic resistance, as can be seen in the recourse to Erfahrung, by certain members of the Frankfurt School and by certain phenomenologists as a means of countering given or dominant horizons of understanding and, as can also be seen in the recourse by Lebensphilosophie to Erlebnis, as a means of opposing the mediacy of abstract reason with the immediacy of the concretely lived.

Thompson's notion of experience, however, does not seek to rehabilitate the "other" of reason in the manner that Erlebnis had in certain popularizations of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Lebensphilosophie; instead, it wagers on the "other" of the perceived immateriality of signification – the immediacy of experience is opposed to the mediacy of ideology as the material is to the immaterial. If experience plays a central role in certain theories hoping to vindicate subaltern agency, it is because of its assumed unmediated proximity with materiality. Because of its corporeal resistance to external tampering, materiality appears as less malleable and thus less amenable to ideological mediation much as for Locke the qualities or material spatial extension, lending themselves as they do to palpable verification and thus less prone to perceptual distortion, are seen as qualities more primary than the pliable and fickle secondary

qualities of sight or sound. It is true that, in order to avoid both naive empirical positivism and strong structural determinism, Thompson proposed that experience be understood less as binarily opposed to structure than as a mediating third term between "conditioning" and "agency" and at the "intersection between determination and self activity" (Poverty of Theory, 225, 228); it nevertheless remains that his notion of experience is imbued with material properties: 'Thus change takes place in social being which then gives rise to change in experience," Thompson explains,"... and this experience exerts pressure on existent social consciousness, raises questions, and furnishes the material for intellectual elaboration” (200; my emphasis). As raw material and in the manner of a Gegenstand, Thompson's notion of experience stands against and exerts pressure on consciousness, and although dependent on its retrospective mediation within a local culture, this experience nevertheless has all the makings of the spatially extended solidity of matter – matter that, by presumably circumventing ideological determination, can serve as the ground from which resistance can be mustered and alternative sociability constructed. This Thompsonian notion of experience, as many have already pointed out, has found its way in numerous strains of Anglo-American feminist epistemologies and subaltern studies. And rooted as it is in prediscursive materiality, it is hardly surprising that it should have lately migrated to what is considered by many to be the last enclave of resistance against ideological contamination – the perceived nondiscursive material immediacy of the body itself. Certain North American feminist strands propose "experience, qua women's experience of alienation from their own bodies, as the evidence of difference" (Bellamy and Leontis, 167); while others, by contending that the materiality of social practice somehow institutes a disruptive fissure within dominant discursive regimes, have retreated, as Joan W. Scott notes, to "the biological or physical 'experience' of the body" itself (787-88). Others have gone so far as to see the body as the last enclave of resistance where the nonmediated specificity of experience is “registered" or "inscribed” in the manner of Kafka's penal colony, as so many body piercings testifying to the irreducibly singular, telling us, as does Chantal Maille, that "our body is becoming a new locus of struggle, which lays claim to its difference through actions such as body piercing" (quoted in Houde, 6). Such a stance is, of course, beset by numerous problems that have already been repeatedly pointed out by others and that need not be rehearsed here. Suffice it to say, as does Fredric Jameson, that “we must be very suspicious of the reference to the body as an appeal to immediacy (the warning goes back to the very first chapter Hegel's Phenomenology); even Foucault s medical and penal work can be read as an account of the construction of the body which rebukes premature immediacy" ("On 'Cultural Studies,’" 44). The recent obsession with the material body is, of course, hardly in a position to vindicate the historical materialism with which, as if to appease Bourdieu, it often fancies itself allied – Materialism is scarcely achieved by a litany of the body," Jameson rightly notes, and the materialism of the body "should not be confused with a historical materialism that turns on praxis and on the mode of production" (ibid.). But at stake in the recent obsession with the materiality of bodily experience is not just an attempt to redeem historical, let alone dialectical, materialism – something that an exclusive reliance on immediate material experience, bodily or otherwise, is hardly in a position to accomplish anyway; at stake is instead the condition of possibility of an active subject and of a ground from which can be erected strategies of resistance (to use the jargon of the 1980s) and a politics of identity (to use the slogan of the 1990s) that might evade the hegemony, as current parlance phrases it, of dominant discursive formations. It is in the name of agency and cultural specificity that, to this day, appeals are made to immediate and materially grounded experience by those currents in subaltern studies that presuppose a nonmediated homology or correlation between one's structural position, one's socioeconomic interests, one's propensity for certain types of experiences, and certain forms of consciousness or awareness.

It is, of course, unlikely that Thompson would endorse some of the uses to which his notion of experience has been put. But that is beside the point. Regardless of Thompson's motivations, this turn to the material immediacy of bodily experiences is but the logical unfolding of his argument that, for all its cautious disclaimers, attempts to ground group specificity and agency in the nondiscursive and the immediate. Since for the Thompsonian notion of experience all forms of mediation are considered fair game for ideological penetration, the turn to the immediate is to be expected, and the migration toward material immediacy is but an extrapolation of such a turn. But what are the potential consequences of such a turn?

THE SPECTER OF NEOETHNIC TRIBALISM

More is involved here than some epistemological blunder. In their bid to circumvent ideological mediation by turning to the presumed immediacy of experience, Thompsonian experience-oriented theories advance an argument that is not so much theoretically specious as it is potentially dangerous: there is nothing within the logic of such an argument that precludes the hypostatization of other nondiscursive bases for group membership and specificity – bases that can be as readily be those of a group’s immediate experiences as they can be those of a group’s presumed materially immediate biological characteristics or physical markers of ethnicity and sexuality. If the criterion for the disruptive antihegemonic potential of experience is its immediacy, and if, as we have just seen, such a criterion can readily lead to a fetishization of the material body itself, then what starts out as an attempt to account for a nonmediated locus of resistance and agency can end up as a surenchere of immediacy that by but a nudge of a cluster of circumstances can propel toward what Michael Piore's Beyond Individualism calls ''biologism'’ – an increasingly common trend whereby "a person's entire identity resides in a single physical characteristic, whether it be of blackness, of deafness or of homosexuality: (quoted in Gitlin, 6). Blut und Boden seem but a step away.

The step from a wager on immediate experience, whether from theories hoping to account for agency or from groups struggling for cultural recognition, to rabid neoethnic fundamentalisms is only a possible step and not a necessary one', and the link between these two" trends as certainly not one of enmity, and still less one of causality. What the parallelism between the two does suggest, however, is that in spite of their divergent motivations and means, they both attempt to ground group specificity by appealing to immediacy – by appointing, in other words, to something that is less a historical product or a mediated construct than it is an immediately given natural entity, whether it be the essence of a Volk, as in current tribalisms, or the essence of material experiences specific to groups, as in strains of Alltagsgeschichte and certain subaltern endeavors. If a potential for biologism and the specter of neoethnic tribalism are close at hand in certain cultural theories and social movements, it is because the recourse to immediate experience opens the back door to what was booted out the front door – it inadvertently naturalizes what it initially set out to historicize.

**2NC**

Lal, 2007

(Prerna P., Master of Arts in International Relations @ San Francisco State University, Senior Graduate Thesis, *Critical Security Studies*, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf)

Throughout this paper, we have seen cases of how **national security is an antonym for human security**. With this essential realization, Booth (2005, 33) gives three reasons for why **the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the means and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.”** Additionally, the cases of South Africa and Afghanistan prove how **the national security state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare.** The most compelling reason is provided by Hayward Akler (2005, 191) in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, in which he states that **“economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security.** The question that arises next is how to **put** critical **theory into practice** and deconstruct the national security state. **Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth.** In other words, **there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist** Foucaultian **analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse.** The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, **we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality.** Thus, **citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security**. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of **a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.”** This **calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The U**nited **S**tates **has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War**, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, **grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations.** As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, **“it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France and Germany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually.** In the past two years, **India and Pakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future** that also includes fighting the “war against terror” together. **While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that with each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations.** Therefore, **our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation.** Human emancipation is often cited as the ultimate goal of the CSS project. Kenneth Booth (2005, 181) defines human emancipation as “the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view of freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions...the concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity.” For Booth then, human emancipation is a concern with **questioning and changing structures** and institutions **that oppress us** and prevent us from reaching our true potential, a seemingly Marxist and poststructuralist concern. **Emancipation and security become two sides of the same coin** for Booth (2005, 191), **as humans must be freed from their oppressive structures and overthrow physical and human constraints that prevent them from reaching their true potential. However, emancipation is not the end-all solution but a project that can never be fully realized. This may lead some to question the practicality of the concept**. Here, I will draw an analogy from Karl Marx, whose idea of human emancipation was communism, a goal **that we can see in the horizon, but the closer we get to it, the further away it seems. Yet, when we look back, we see how far we have come.** Therefore, **human emancipation serves practical purpose as an immanent critique, which can be utilized as a philosophical anchorage for tactical goal setting.**

**Bjork 93** (Rebecca. Former college debater and former associate professor at the University of Utah, where she taught graduate and undergraduate courses in Communication and Women in Debate, Reflections on the Ongoing Struggle, Debater's Research Guide 1992-1993: Wake Forest University.Symposium, web.archive.org/web/20011012220529/members.aol.com/womynindebate/article3.htm)

While reflecting on my experiences as a woman in academic debate in preparation for this essay, I realized that I have been involved in debate for more than half of my life. I debated for four years in high school, for four years in college, and I have been coaching intercollegiate debate for nine years. Not surprisingly, much of my identity as an individual has been shaped by these experiences in debate. I am a person who strongly believes that debate empowers people to be committed and involved individuals in the communities in which they live. I am a person who thrives on the intellectual stimulation involved in teaching and traveling with the brightest students on my campus. I am a person who looks forward to the opportunities for active engagement of ideas with debaters and coaches from around the country. I am also, however, a college professor, a "feminist," and a peace activist who is increasingly frustrated and disturbed by some of the practices I see being perpetuated and rewarded in academic debate. I find that **I can no longer separate my involvement in debate from the rest of who I am as an individual**. Northwestern I remember listening to a lecture a few years ago given by Tom Goodnight at the University summer debate camp. Goodnight lamented what he saw as the debate community's participation in, and unthinking perpetuation of what he termed the "death culture." He argued that the embracing of "big impact" arguments--nuclear war, environmental destruction, genocide, famine, and the like-by debaters and coaches signals a **morbid and detached fascination** with such events, one that views these real human tragedies as part of a "game" in which so-called "objective and neutral" advocates actively seek to find in their research the "impact to outweigh all other impacts"--the round-winning argument that will carry them to their goal of winning tournament X, Y, or Z. He concluded that **our "use" of such events in this way is tantamount to a celebration of them**; our detached, rational discussions reinforce a detached, rational viewpoint, when emotional and moral outrage may be a more appropriate response. In the last few years, my academic research has led me to be persuaded by Goodnight's unspoken assumption; language is not merely some transparent tool used to transmit information, but rather is an incredibly powerful medium, the use of which inevitably has real political and material consequences. Given this assumption, I believe that it is important for us to examine the "discourse of debate practice:" that is, the language, discourses, and meanings that we, as a community of debaters and coaches, unthinkingly employ in academic debate. If it is the case that the language we use has real implications for **how we view the world**, **how we view others**, and **how we act in the world**, then it is imperative that we critically examine our own discourse practices with an eye to how our language does violence to others. I am shocked and surprised when I hear myself saying things like, "we killed them," or "take no prisoners," or "let's blow them out of the water." I am tired of the "ideal" debater being defined as one who has mastered the art of verbal assault to the point where accusing opponents of lying, cheating, or being deliberately misleading is a sign of strength. But what I am most tired of is how women debaters are marginalized and rendered voiceless in such a discourse community. Women who verbally assault their opponents are labeled "bitches" because it is not socially acceptable for women to be verbally aggressive. Women who get angry and storm out of a room when a disappointing decision is brendered are labeled "hysterical" because, as we all know, women are more emotional then men. I am tired of hearing comments like, "those 'girls' from school X aren't really interested in debate; they just want to meet men." We can all point to examples (although only a few) of women who have succeeded at the top levels of debate. But I find myself wondering how many more women gave up because they were tired of negotiating the mine field of discrimination, sexual harassment, and isolation they found in the debate community. As members of this community, however, we have great freedom to define it in whatever ways we see fit. After all, **what is debate except a collection of shared understandings and explicit or implicit rules for interaction**? What I am calling for is a critical examination of how we, as individual members of this community, characterize our activity, ourselves, and our interactions with others through language. We must become aware of the ways in which our mostly hidden and unspoken assumptions about what "good" debate is function to exclude not only women, but ethnic minorities from the amazing intellectual opportunities that training in debate provides. Our nation and indeed, our planet, faces incredibly difficult challenges in the years ahead. I believe that it is not acceptable anymore for us to go along as we always have, assuming that things will straighten themselves out. If the rioting in Los Angeles taught us anything, it is that complacency breeds resentment and frustration. We may not be able to change the world, but we can change our own community, and if we fail to do so, **we give up the only real power that we have**.

#### Turns case because it reduces the experiences to the readily identifiable, physical struggles people face

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It was precisely in response to this turn or events that the culturalist strain in British Marxism, as well as subsequent strands in subaltern studies, came to see experience as that which, by virtue of its prediscursive immediacy, radically demarcates itself from and therefore evades discursive or ideological mediation and determination. Because the imposition of state ideology, as Thompson saw it, "cannot succeed unless there is congruence between the imposed rules and view of life and the necessary business of living in a given mode of production" {Poverty of Theory, 367), something was needed that might sabotage such a congruence and, in so doing, bypass strong structural determination. Of the possible candidates, the perceived nonmediatedness, or immediacy, or experience proved to be particularly seductive. Indeed, because of its seemingly immediate, that is, its nondiscursive or nonideological contact with environing social being, experience represented just that sort of untainted raw materials (to use Thompson’s expression) that, in order to congeal into class or group self-consciousness and agency needed but to be articulated by a regionalized culture sufficiently specific to those sharing particular experiences. Experience, in short, represented the stuff (in the sense of its Germanic cognate, Stoff, that is, resistant material) that, impervious as it appeared to be to ideological tampering, might furnish the material building blocks from which counterhistories could be constructed and subaltern cultures reinforced.

Such perceptions of the counterhegemonic potential of experience were encouraged by the connotations the word had acquired in the Anglo-American world. From a term that from the seventeenth to the early eighteenth century implied knowledge gained through both a reliance on the past as well as through observation untainted, as Francis Bacon would say, by church dogma, superstition, and other obscurantist idols, the concept of experience semantically shifted by the midto late eighteenth century not only to that which opposed reason, but also to that which is "full and active awareness" of both feeling and thought and, as such, assumed an aura of authenticity with which reasoning and ideas could not dispense (Williams, 126). The German equivalents of experience, whether as Erfahrung or as the early nineteenth-century neologism Erlebnis, are likewise informed by a conceptual and etymological history that encouraged the association of experience with notions of counterhegemonic resistance, as can be seen in the recourse to Erfahrung, by certain members of the Frankfurt School and by certain phenomenologists as a means of countering given or dominant horizons of understanding and, as can also be seen in the recourse by Lebensphilosophie to Erlebnis, as a means of opposing the mediacy of abstract reason with the immediacy of the concretely lived.

Thompson's notion of experience, however, does not seek to rehabilitate the "other" of reason in the manner that Erlebnis had in certain popularizations of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Lebensphilosophie; instead, it wagers on the "other" of the perceived immateriality of signification – the immediacy of experience is opposed to the mediacy of ideology as the material is to the immaterial. If experience plays a central role in certain theories hoping to vindicate subaltern agency, it is because of its assumed unmediated proximity with materiality. Because of its corporeal resistance to external tampering, materiality appears as less malleable and thus less amenable to ideological mediation much as for Locke the qualities or material spatial extension, lending themselves as they do to palpable verification and thus less prone to perceptual distortion, are seen as qualities more primary than the pliable and fickle secondary

qualities of sight or sound. It is true that, in order to avoid both naive empirical positivism and strong structural determinism, Thompson proposed that experience be understood less as binarily opposed to structure than as a mediating third term between "conditioning" and "agency" and at the "intersection between determination and self activity" (Poverty of Theory, 225, 228); it nevertheless remains that his notion of experience is imbued with material properties: 'Thus change takes place in social being which then gives rise to change in experience," Thompson explains,"... and this experience exerts pressure on existent social consciousness, raises questions, and furnishes the material for intellectual elaboration” (200; my emphasis). As raw material and in the manner of a Gegenstand, Thompson's notion of experience stands against and exerts pressure on consciousness, and although dependent on its retrospective mediation within a local culture, this experience nevertheless has all the makings of the spatially extended solidity of matter – matter that, by presumably circumventing ideological determination, can serve as the ground from which resistance can be mustered and alternative sociability constructed. This Thompsonian notion of experience, as many have already pointed out, has found its way in numerous strains of Anglo-American feminist epistemologies and subaltern studies. And rooted as it is in prediscursive materiality, it is hardly surprising that it should have lately migrated to what is considered by many to be the last enclave of resistance against ideological contamination – the perceived nondiscursive material immediacy of the body itself. Certain North American feminist strands propose "experience, qua women's experience of alienation from their own bodies, as the evidence of difference" (Bellamy and Leontis, 167); while others, by contending that the materiality of social practice somehow institutes a disruptive fissure within dominant discursive regimes, have retreated, as Joan W. Scott notes, to "the biological or physical 'experience' of the body" itself (787-88). Others have gone so far as to see the body as the last enclave of resistance where the nonmediated specificity of experience is “registered" or "inscribed” in the manner of Kafka's penal colony, as so many body piercings testifying to the irreducibly singular, telling us, as does Chantal Maille, that "our body is becoming a new locus of struggle, which lays claim to its difference through actions such as body piercing" (quoted in Houde, 6). Such a stance is, of course, beset by numerous problems that have already been repeatedly pointed out by others and that need not be rehearsed here. Suffice it to say, as does Fredric Jameson, that “we must be very suspicious of the reference to the body as an appeal to immediacy (the warning goes back to the very first chapter Hegel's Phenomenology); even Foucault s medical and penal work can be read as an account of the construction of the body which rebukes premature immediacy" ("On 'Cultural Studies,’" 44). The recent obsession with the material body is, of course, hardly in a position to vindicate the historical materialism with which, as if to appease Bourdieu, it often fancies itself allied – Materialism is scarcely achieved by a litany of the body," Jameson rightly notes, and the materialism of the body "should not be confused with a historical materialism that turns on praxis and on the mode of production" (ibid.). But at stake in the recent obsession with the materiality of bodily experience is not just an attempt to redeem historical, let alone dialectical, materialism – something that an exclusive reliance on immediate material experience, bodily or otherwise, is hardly in a position to accomplish anyway; at stake is instead the condition of possibility of an active subject and of a ground from which can be erected strategies of resistance (to use the jargon of the 1980s) and a politics of identity (to use the slogan of the 1990s) that might evade the hegemony, as current parlance phrases it, of dominant discursive formations. It is in the name of agency and cultural specificity that, to this day, appeals are made to immediate and materially grounded experience by those currents in subaltern studies that presuppose a nonmediated homology or correlation between one's structural position, one's socioeconomic interests, one's propensity for certain types of experiences, and certain forms of consciousness or awareness.

It is, of course, unlikely that Thompson would endorse some of the uses to which his notion of experience has been put. But that is beside the point. Regardless of Thompson's motivations, this turn to the material immediacy of bodily experiences is but the logical unfolding of his argument that, for all its cautious disclaimers, attempts to ground group specificity and agency in the nondiscursive and the immediate. Since for the Thompsonian notion of experience all forms of mediation are considered fair game for ideological penetration, the turn to the immediate is to be expected, and the migration toward material immediacy is but an extrapolation of such a turn. But what are the potential consequences of such a turn?

THE SPECTER OF NEOETHNIC TRIBALISM

More is involved here than some epistemological blunder. In their bid to circumvent ideological mediation by turning to the presumed immediacy of experience, Thompsonian experience-oriented theories advance an argument that is not so much theoretically specious as it is potentially dangerous: there is nothing within the logic of such an argument that precludes the hypostatization of other nondiscursive bases for group membership and specificity – bases that can be as readily be those of a group’s immediate experiences as they can be those of a group’s presumed materially immediate biological characteristics or physical markers of ethnicity and sexuality. If the criterion for the disruptive antihegemonic potential of experience is its immediacy, and if, as we have just seen, such a criterion can readily lead to a fetishization of the material body itself, then what starts out as an attempt to account for a nonmediated locus of resistance and agency can end up as a surenchere of immediacy that by but a nudge of a cluster of circumstances can propel toward what Michael Piore's Beyond Individualism calls ''biologism'’ – an increasingly common trend whereby "a person's entire identity resides in a single physical characteristic, whether it be of blackness, of deafness or of homosexuality: (quoted in Gitlin, 6). Blut und Boden seem but a step away.

The step from a wager on immediate experience, whether from theories hoping to account for agency or from groups struggling for cultural recognition, to rabid neoethnic fundamentalisms is only a possible step and not a necessary one', and the link between these two" trends as certainly not one of enmity, and still less one of causality. What the parallelism between the two does suggest, however, is that in spite of their divergent motivations and means, they both attempt to ground group specificity by appealing to immediacy – by appointing, in other words, to something that is less a historical product or a mediated construct than it is an immediately given natural entity, whether it be the essence of a Volk, as in current tribalisms, or the essence of material experiences specific to groups, as in strains of Alltagsgeschichte and certain subaltern endeavors. If a potential for biologism and the specter of neoethnic tribalism are close at hand in certain cultural theories and social movements, it is because the recourse to immediate experience opens the back door to what was booted out the front door – it inadvertently naturalizes what it initially set out to historicize.