### 2AC Case

#### Threats aren’t arbitrary – can’t throw out security

Knudsen 1Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing  Securitization,” p. 360]

In the post-Cold War period,  agenda-setting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot be credited to the concept; the change in  security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parlia-  ments before the concept was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view  is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than to the  post-Cold War period.  Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unim-  portant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the  Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own  fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid  political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading  conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for what-  ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misper-  ceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenom-  ena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible  possibilities of danger – referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer to ‘real’  phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a  different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in  terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening.  The point of Wæver’s concept of security is not the potential existence of  danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997  PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view “security” as that which is in  language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to  something more real – it is the utterance itself that is the act.’   The deliberate  disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Wæver’s joint article of the same year.   As a consequence, the phenomenon of  threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.   It seems to me that the  security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its founda-  tion. Yet I see that Wæver himself has no compunction about referring to the  security dilemma in a recent article.  This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to  insignificant concerns. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’  important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action  may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Wæver first began his argu-  ment in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense  of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the  consequent ‘politics of panic’, as Wæver aptly calls it.   Now, here – in the case  of urgency – another baby is thrown out with the Wæverian bathwater. When  real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy;  they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of  making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Wæver’s world,  threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just an-  other argument. I hold that instead of ‘abolishing’ threatening phenomena  ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Wæver does, we should continue  paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency  will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work  in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not  least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

### 2AC K

#### 1. Our interpretation is that the aff gets to weigh our impact against the impacts of the kritik – any other framework moots the 1AC and destroys topic specific education because the debate becomes centered on abstract theories rather than policy action – all other frameworks should be rejected

#### 2. Case outweighs – impacts are real and prevent the deaths of billions of people, their ethical claims are based on the invisible bodies but it is literally impossible for there to be more invisible deaths than the result of not doing the aff

#### 3. Seeking new ways to reshape the world is a form of life-affirmation – we create new ways of being. Suffering is a contingent fact – to say “it’s inevitable” is willful blindness and that blocks off the best path to celebration of life.

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(Todd May, “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 2005 Vol 31 nos 5–6 pp. 517–531nex)

For those among us who seek in philosophy a way to grapple with our lives rather than to solve logical puzzles; for those whose reading and whose writing are not merely appropriate steps toward academic advancement but a struggle to see ourselves and our world in a fresher, clearer light; for those who ﬁnd nourishment among impassioned ideas and go hungry among empty truths: there is a struggle that is often waged within us. It is a struggle that will be familiar to anyone who has heard in Foucault’s sentences the stammering of a fellow human being struggling to speak in words worth hearing. Why else would we read Foucault? We seek to conceive what is wrong in the world, to grasp it in a way that offers us the possibility for change. We know that there is much that is, to use Foucault’s word, ‘intolerable’. There is much that binds us to social and political arrangements that are oppressive, domineering, patronizing, and exploitative. We would like to understand why this is and how it happens, in order that we may prevent its continuance. In short, we want our theories to be tools for changing the world, for offering it a new face, or at least a new expression. There is struggle in this, struggle against ideas and ways of thinking that present themselves to us as inescapable. We know this struggle from Foucault’s writings. It is not clear that he ever wrote about anything else. But this is not the struggle I want to address here. For there is, on the other hand, another search and another goal. They lie not so much in the revisioning of this world as in the embrace of it. There is much to be celebrated in the lives we lead, or in those led by others, or in the unfolding of the world as it is, a world resonant with the rhythms of our voices and our movements. We would like to understand this, too, to grasp in thought the elusive beauty of our world. There is, after all, no other world, except, as Nietzsche taught, for those who would have created another one with which to denigrate our own. In short, we would like our thought to celebrate our lives. To change the world and to celebrate life. This, as the theologian Harvey Cox saw, is the struggle within us. 1 It is a struggle in which one cannot choose sides; or better, a struggle in which one must choose both sides. The abandonment of one for the sake of the other can lead only to disaster or callousness. Forsaking the celebration of life for the sake of changing the world is the path of the sad revolutionary. In his preface to Anti-Oedipus, Foucault writes that one does not have to be sad in order to be revolutionary. The matter is more urgent than that, however. One cannot be both sad and revolutionary. Lacking a sense of the wondrous that is already here, among us, one who is bent upon changing the world can only become solemn or bitter. He or she is focused only on the future; the present is what is to be overcome. The vision of what is not but must come to be overwhelms all else, and the point of change itself becomes lost. The history of the left in the 20th century offers numerous examples of this, and the disaster that attends to it should be evident to all of us by now. The alternative is surely not to shift one’s allegiance to the pure celebration of life, although there are many who have chosen this path. It is at best blindness not to see the misery that envelops so many of our fellow humans, to say nothing of what happens to sentient nonhuman creatures. The attempt to jettison world-changing for an uncritical assent to the world as it is requires a self-deception that I assume would be anathema for those of us who have studied Foucault. Indeed, it is anathema for all of us who awaken each day to an America whose expansive boldness is matched only by an equally expansive disregard for those we place in harm’s way. This is the struggle, then.. The one between the desire for life celebration and the desire for world-changing. The struggle between reveling in the contingent and fragile joys that constitute our world and wresting it from its intolerability. I am sure it is a struggle that is not foreign to anyone who is reading this. I am sure as well that the stakes for choosing one side over another that I have recalled here are obvious to everyone. The question then becomes one of how to choose both sides at once. III Maybe it happens this way. You walk into a small meeting room at the back of a local bookstore. There are eight or ten people milling about. They’re dressed in dark clothes, nothing fancy, and one or two of them have earrings or dreadlocks. They vary in age. You don’t know any of them. You’ve never seen them before. Several of them seem to know one another. They are affectionate, hugging, letting a hand linger on a shoulder or an elbow. A younger man, tall and thin, with an open face and a blue baseball cap bearing no logo, glides into the room. Two others, a man and a woman, shout, ‘Tim!’ and he glides over to them and hugs them, one at a time. They tell him how glad they are that he could make it, and he says that he just got back into town and heard about the meeting. You stand a little off to the side. Nobody has taken a seat at the rectangle of folding tables yet. You don’t want to be the ﬁrst to sit down. Tim looks around the room and smiles. Several other people ﬁlter in. You’re not quite sure where to put your hands so you slide them into your jean pockets. You hunch your shoulders. Tim’s arrival has made you feel more of an outsider. But then he sees you. He edges his way around several others and walks up to you and introduces himself. You respond. Tim asks and you tell him that this is your ﬁrst time at a meeting like this. He doesn’t ask about politics but about where you’re from. He tells you he has a friend in that neighborhood and do you know . . . ? Then several things happen that you only vaguely notice because you’re talking with Tim. People start to sit down at the rectangle of tables. One of them pulls out a legal pad with notes on it. She sits at the head of the rectangle; or rather, when she sits down there, it becomes the head. And there’s something you don’t notice at all. You are more relaxed, your shoulders have stopped hunching, and when you sit down the seat feels familiar. The woman at the head of the table looks around. She smiles; her eyes linger over you and a couple of others that you take to be new faces, like yours. She says, ‘Maybe we should begin.’ IV I can offer only a suggestion of an answer here today. It is a suggestion that brings together some thoughts from the late writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with those of Foucault, in order to sketch not even a framework for thought, but the mere outlines of a framework. It is not a framework that would seek to ﬁnd the unconscious of each in the writings of the other. Neither thinker ﬁnishes or accomplishes the other. (Often, for example regarding methodology, they do not even agree.) Rather, it is a framework that requires both of them, from their very different angles, in order to be able to think it. My goal in constructing the outlines of this framework is largely philosophical. That is to say, the suggestion I would like to make here is not one for resolving for each of us the struggle of life-celebration and world-changing, but of offering a way to conceive ourselves that allows us to embrace both sides of this battle at the same time. There are many ways to conceive the bond between world-changing and life-celebrating. Let me isolate two: one that runs from Merleau-Ponty to Foucault, from the body’s chiasmic relation with the world to the politics of its practices; and the other one running back in the opposite direction. The ontology Merleau-Ponty offers in his late work is one of wonder. Abandoning the sterile philosophical debates about the relation of mind and body, subject and object, about the relation of reason to that which is not reason, or the problem of other minds, his ontology forges a unity of body and world that puts us in immediate contact with all of its aspects. No longer are we to be thought the self-enclosed creatures of the philosophical tradition. We are now in touch with the world, because we are of it. Art, for example, does not appeal solely to our minds; its beauty is not merely a matter of the convergence of our faculties. We are moved by art, often literally moved, because our bodies and the work of art share the same world. As Merleau-Ponty says, ‘I would be at great pains to say where is the painting I am looking at. For I do not look at it as I do a thing; I do not ﬁx it in its place. My gaze wanders in it as in the halos of Being. It is more accurate to say that I see according to it, or with it, than that I see it.’ 7 It is only because my body is a fold of this world that art can affect me so. But this affection is also a vulnerability. As my look can happen according to a work of art, so it can happen according to a social practice. And even more so in proportion as that social practice and its effects are suffused through the world in which I carry on my life, the world my body navigates throughout the day, every day. I do not have a chance to look according to a painting by Cezanne very often; but I do encounter the effects of normalization as it has ﬁltered through the practices of my employment, of my students’ upbringing, and of my family’s expectations of themselves and one another. The vulnerability of the body, then, is at once its exposure to beauty and its opening to what is intolerable. We might also see things from the other end, starting from politics and ending at the body. I take it that this is what Foucault suggests when he talks about bodies and pleasures at the end of the ﬁrst volume of the History of Sexuality. If we are a product of our practices and the conception of ourselves and the world that those practices have fostered, so to change our practices is to experiment in new possibilities both for living and, inseparably, for conceiving the world. To experiment in sexuality is not to see where the desire that lies at the core of our being may lead us; that is simply the continuation of our oppression by other means. Rather, it is to construct practices where what is at issue is no longer desire but something else, something that might go by the name of bodies and pleasures. In doing so, we not only act differently, we think differently, both about ourselves and about the world those selves are inseparable from. And because these experiments are practices of our bodies, and because our bodies are encrusted in the world, these experiments become not merely acts of political resistance but new folds in the body/ world nexus. To construct new practices is to appeal to aspects or possibilities of the world that have been previously closed to us. It is to offer novel, and perhaps more tolerable, engagements in the chiasm of body and world. Thus we might say of politics what Merleau-Ponty has said of painting, that we see according to it. Here, I take it, is where the idea of freedom in Foucault lies. For Foucault, freedom is not a metaphysical condition. It does not lie in the nature of being human, nor is it a warping, an atomic swerve, in the web of causal relations in which we ﬁnd ourselves. To seek our freedom in a space apart from our encrustation in the world is not so much to liberate ourselves from its inﬂuence as to build our own private prison. Foucault once said: There’s an optimism that consists in saying that things couldn’t be better. My optimism would consist rather in saying that so many things can be changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than with necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constraints . . . 8 That is where to discover our freedom

#### 4. Acceptance- their argument assumes that we think that death is stopped or good once we do the plan. We know that we will die, the question is how we die and when. A world of regional war, would kill people in a horrifici manner, we solve that which is a better way to die.

#### 5. Living things will inevitably desire to keep living - preserving life is justified *a priori.*

Kacou 08, Amien, WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

On the one hand, one who seeks an explanation for the fact that life exists may well seek no more than an inspiration to, as it were, shape her life. On the other hand, one who seeks a justification for our most basic desire to survive seems to seek an inspiration to want a life. What we have attempted to show can be stated as follows: that wanting to live is an a priori aspect of life—in other words, life has value a priori, irrespective of any explanation regarding its existence. As we have shown that life-as-such (the general condition of experience) has, at the very least, the unproblematic value of pleasure (the liking of experience, or the experience of liking things), then the service of pleasure could be seen as that object or moment in life that is sufficiently “meaningful” in serving what we value. Furthermore, since value-as-such could not be conditioned by any explanation, then the very existence of unproblematic value in life could not rationally be conditioned on one explanation or another for the existence of life. It is not simply that we have some subjective desire for life, but that living things cannot help but desire life a priori. Accordingly, we should be able to see life as an end in itself. Although one explanation, as opposed to another, for the existence of life could depict a better overall situation for life (e.g., one that would involve immortality), we must fight the temptation to believe that any explanation could condition our finding life good.

#### 6. Perm do both – shields link to K

#### 7. It’s totalitarian to determine a specific political meaning to life

Jerzy **SZACKI** Sociology @ Warsaw **'95** Liberalism sifter Communism p. 197

Liberalism does not say which of these different moralities is better than others. It is neutral on this question and regards its neutrality as a virtue, Liberalism as a political doctrine assumes that - as Joseph Raz wrote 'there are many worthwhile and valuable relationships, commitments and plans of life which are mutually incompatible'. 5 I It recognizes that as John Rawls put it - `a modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines but. by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines 57, What is more, for a liberal this is not only a fact to take note of he or she is ready to acknowledge that 'now this variety of conceptions of the good is itself a good thing, that is, it is rational for members of a well-ordered society to want their plans to be different." Thus, the task of politics cannot and should not be to resolve the dispute. ,among different conceptions of **life.** This is completely unattainable or is .attainable only by a totalitarian enslavement **of society in** the name of someone conception. This being the case, according to Dworkin, 'political, :decisions must be as far as possible independent of conceptions of the good life, or what gives value to life. Since citizens of a society differ in these' conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another. '

#### 8. Extinction first – prerequisite to ontology.

Brent Dean Robbins, doctoral student in clinical psychology at Duquesne University, ’99 (Medard Boss, <http://mythosandlogos.com/Boss.html>)

"Death is an unsurpassable limit of human existence," writes Boss (119). Primarily, however, human beings flee from death and the awareness of our mortality. But in our confrontation with death and our morality, we discover the "relationship" which "is the basis for all feelings of reverance, fear, awe, wonder, sorrow, and deference in the face of something greater and more powerful." (120). Boss even suggests that "the most dignified human relationship to death" involves keeping it--as a possibility rather than an actuality--constantly in awareness without fleeing from it. As Boss writes: "Only such a being-unto-death can guarantee the precondition that the Dasein be able to free itself from its absorption in, its submission and surrender of itself to the things and relationships of everyday livingn and to return to itself." (121) Such a recognition brings the human being back to his responsibility for his existence. This is not simply a inward withdrawal from the world--far from it. Rather, this responsible awareness of death as the ultimate possibility for human existence frees the human being to be with others in a genuine way. From this foundation--based on the existentials described above--Boss is able to articulate an understanding of medicine and psychology which gives priority to the freedom of the human being to be itself. By freedom, Boss does not mean a freedom to have all the possibilites, for we are finite and limited by our factical history and death. Yet within these finite possibilities, we are free to be who we are and to take responsibility for who we are in the world with others and alongside things that matter. Psychotherapy comes into play in cases in which people suffer from "pathological deficiencies of freedom," who, while constricted, still retain a degree of freedom, but a freedom which includes a suffering from constrictedness. The therapist, in this regard, provides the client with a space to free up this constricted existence in order to discover previously foreclosed possibilities of being in the world.

#### 9. The alt forgoes the question of choice – instead of giving the option of embracing or fearing death, the alternative tyrannically presupposes that everyone MUST not fear death ­– this lack of choice is worse than the aff and it’s worse than the status quo – the aff preserves life long enough for people to choose how they approach death

#### 10. Fear is inevitable—ignoring military threats results in extinction.

Walt 91, Stephen Walt, University of Chicago, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” Vol. 35, No. 2, Jun 1991, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, p.229

A recurring theme of this essay has been the twin dangers of separating the study of security affairs from the academic world or of shifting the focus of academic scholar- ship too far from real-world issues. The danger of war will be with us for some time to come, and states will continue to acquire military forces for a variety of purposes. Unless one believes that ignorance is preferable to expertise, the value of indepen- dent national security scholars should be apparent. Indeed, history suggests that countries that suppress debate on national security matters are more likely to blun- der into disaster, because misguided policies cannot be evaluated and stopped in time.40

#### 11. Taliban is corrupt and terrorizes its citizens

Klapper 11 (BRADLEY KLAPPER, 06/25/11, Huff Post, “Afghanistan Corruption: Study Says Taliban Influence Will Outlast U.S. Military Presence,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/25/afghanistan-corruption-study\_n\_884483.html //nimo)

WASHINGTON — The farmer picking apples in the outskirts of Kabul must pay the Taliban $33 to ship out each truckload of fruit. The governor sends in armed men to chase workers off job sites if the official bribes aren't paid. Poor neighborhoods never get their U.N.-provided wheat, long since sold on the black market.¶ These are some of the elements, large and small, that together form the elaborate organized crime environment Afghans contend with daily. And despite the hoped-for success of the U.S. military surge and President Barack Obama's claims of significant progress, Afghanistan's resemblance to a mafia state that cannot serve its citizens may only be getting worse, according to an upcoming report by the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think tank.¶ The 46-page study, to be released next week, looks specifically at Afghanistan's heartland: the rural areas of Ghazni, Wardak, Logar and other provinces just beyond the periphery of Kabul. Unemployment is high, government presence is low and the insurgency operates with impunity. Corruption and cooperation with the Taliban reach the highest levels of local governance.¶ "Nearly a decade after the U.S.-led military intervention little has been done to challenge the perverse incentives of continued conflict in Afghanistan," the research group says. Rather, violence and the billions of dollars in international aid have brought wealthy officials and insurgents together. And "the economy as a result is increasingly dominated by a criminal oligarchy of politically connected businessmen," the report concludes.

12. The K starts from a position of privilege – it ignores the life and death situations that people must face

Jarvis 0 (Darryl S. L. Natl. U of Singapore “international relations and the challenge of postmodernism p 128-129 Google Books) TBC 7/8/10

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge.37 But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsri argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what?" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

#### 12. Our speech is necessary discourse – combating complacency is crucial to halting certain and inevitable extinction

Epstein and Zhao 09 (Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse)

We shall not speculate here as to the “how and when” of human extinction; rather, we ask why there remains so little discussion of this important topic. We hypothesise that a lethal mix of ignorance and denial is blinding humans from the realization that our own species could soon (a relative concept, admittedly) be as endangered as many other large mammals (Cardillo et al. 2004). For notwithstanding the “overgrown Petri dish” model of human decline now confronting us, the most sinister menace that we face may not be extrinsic selection pressures but complacency. Entrenched in our culture is a knee-jerk “boy who cried wolf ” skepticism aimed at any person who voices concerns about the future—a skepticism fed by a traditionally bullish, growth-addicted economy that eschews caution (Table 1). But the facts of extinction are less exciting and newsworthy than the roller-coaster booms and busts of stock markets.

#### 13. Human life has intrinsic and objective value achieved through subjective pleasures – its preservation should be an a priori goal

Kacou 8 (Amien Kacou 8 WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184)

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### 14. Focus on ontology and authentic existence erases plurality—justifies the worst examples of heidegger’s political accomodation to nazism.

Dana VILLA Poli Sci @ Notre Dame ‘7 “Arendt, Heidegger and the Tradition” Social Research 74 (4) p. 995-998

Plurality, then, does not do well by the tradition, no matter which segment of it we care to examine. The image of a sovereign will, of a singular moral truth, or of a morally homogenous "people" loom far too large in our tradition for this all-important dimension of political life to be given its due. Margaret Canovan is thus absolutely correct to single out the "emphasis on the plurality of human beings and the political space between them" as "the most distinctive feature of Arendt's political thought" (Canovan, 1992: 205).¶ This emphasis is not only distinctive; it is revolutionary and farreaching in its implications. As Arendt reminds us, the public realm, phenomenologically construed, does not know the distinction between rulers and ruled. Nor does it know any "collective subjects" such as a "sovereign" people, the *Volk,* or the proletariat. As plural (individual) citizens, we are brought together by what lies between us—an institutionally articulated public realm. This realm "relates and separates" us, as a table does those who sit around it (Arendt, 1958: 52). This relation and separation makes the formation of opinions possible, and opinions— the stuff of the talkative politics Arendt celebrates—are held by *individuals,* not groups or collective subjects (Arendt, 1968a: 227). The extraordinary salience of plurality in Arendt's thought raises an iminediate question. If this notion distinguishes her from an overly "Platonic" tradition of political philosophy in general, does it not also distinguish her from her teacher Heidegger in particular?¶ The answer to this question is most assuredly "yes." For while Heidegger was quite aware of the importance of the distinction between *praxis* and *poiesis,* drawing attention to the "productionist" character of ancient Greek ontology as far back as his Marburg lectures of 1927, his notion of authentic *Existenz* was surprisingly devoid of a robust interactive dimension (his identification of *Mitsein* as a structural characteristic of human existence notwithstanding).^ If, as Jacques Taminiaux has suggested, Heidegger's notion of authentic versus inauthentic *Existenz* was based on the reappropriation of Aristotle's distinction, it is a reappropriation that **washes out the importance of human plurality and interaction**—^ what Arendt calls "the sharing of words and deeds" (Taminiaux, 1991:126). The largely individualist character of authentic *Dasein* we find in Div. II *of Being and Time* (at odds, in certain respects, with the relational and anti-Cartesian ontology of Div. I) is reproduced in the "authentic" community that emerges in chapter V ("Temporality and Historicality"). The image of a **unitary people** taking over the role of an authentic self reappears in the notorious *Rektoratsrede* (1933) and again in the *Introduction to Metaphysics {1935)* (See Taminiaux, 1991:133-136).¶ In these texts, Heidegger emerges as an increasingly *VoBdsch* thinker, one who attributes to the state the essentially speculative function of "clearing" a space within which the unique destiny of a particular historical people can come to light. The "world" of a historical people is manifest in its political organization. Its laws, customs, and institutions do not simply articulate a *public* world; rather, they trace an *ontological horizon* for the culture as a whole. Thus, the political association is a "space of disclosure" for Heidegger (as it is for Arendt), but a "space of disclosure" in the most fundamental ("primordial") sense possible. A formulation taken from Heidegger's 1942 seminar on Parmenides brings this speculative-ontological fimction of the political association into sharp focus: What is the polis? . . . *Polis* is the *polos,* the pivot, the place around which gravitates, in its specific manner, everything that for the Greeks is disclosed amidst beings. . . . As this location, the pivot lets beings appear in their Being subject to the totality of their involvement. The pivot neither makes nor creates beings in their Being, but as the pivot, it is the site of the unconcealedness of beings as a whole.... Between polis and Being, a relation of the same origin rules (Heidegger, 1992:132-133).¶ This conception relates back to the idea of the polis as an example of what Heidegger (in "The Origin of the Work of Art" [1936]) calls the "setting-into-work-of-truth." A genuine work of art neither represents nor expresses; rather, it "opens" the "world of a historical people." As Heidegger puts it in that essay, "To be a work means to set up a world" (Heidegger, 1971: 44).¶ The *polis,* then, is a unique, indeed privileged, instance of such a "world-disclosing" artwork. As such, it is made possible not by the interaction—- the *praxis*—of citizens vdthin an institutional-legal context of civic equality. Rather, it is the most fundamental and uncanny instance of poiesis imaginable. The polis is the work of a "creator" who engages in a *polemos* or conflict *vfith* the dark background of nature and myth, struggling to create a human world—a space of disclosure—amid the surrounding darkness, which Heidegger calls "earth." The original *agon* is not between equal but competitve citizens (Arendt's "aristocratic" or Greek conception in The *Human Condition).* Rather, it is between "world" and "earth" as such, between "concealedness" and "unconcealedness." "It is this conflict," Heidegger writes in 1935, that frrst projects and develops what had hitherto been unheard of, unsaid, and unthought. The battle is then sustained by the creators, poets, thinkers, statesmen. Against the overwhelming chaos they set the barrier of their work, and in their work they capture the world thus opened up. It is with these works that the elemental power, *physis,* frrst comes to stand. Only now does the essent become essent as such. This world-building is history in the authentic sense (Heidegger, 1959: 62).¶ Such "world-revealing" or "world-building" *poiesis* can take many forms. It can occur in the words of a thinker, a poet, a priest or a playwright. But it is the city's founder—the "lonely" figure who brings forth a political world in the form of a new polis—who is most important. For the *polis* is "the historical place, the there *in* which, out of which, and *for* which history happens." Such a radical or foundational beginning can occur, Heidegger states, only if there are "violent men" willing to "use power, to become pre-eminent in historical being as creators, as men of action." Such men—founders such as Sophocles's Theseus—are, strictly speaking, *apolis,* "without city and place, lonely, strange, and ahen" (Heidegger, 1959: 62).¶ I cite these passages because they reveal how Heidegger, his thematization of the "productionist" prejudices of Greek ontology notwithstanding, himself succumbed to the lure *of poiesis* (albeit in a "radicalized" form). Plurality and equality are effaced, as the "poetic" founder-legislator performs his lonely, quasi-divine work. Using Sophocles as his departure point (specifically, an interpretation of the first choral ode from Antigone) Heidegger comes to a conclusion surprisingly reminiscent of Machiavelli and Rousseau. Everything, it turns out, depends on the availability of a singular founder-legislator. Without him, no *polis* or republic can come into being and grow into a "world" of its own.¶ Nothing could be further from the Arendtian conception of a constitutional founding than this emphasis of the "lonely, strange, and alien" man of creative, radically poetic, violence. In *On* Revolution Arendt takes enormous pains to separate the *violence* that accompanies *liberation* from oppression (on the one hand) from the debate, deliberation, and argument that precedes the constitutional creation of a new (legally and institutionally articulated) "space of freedom." Hence the paradigmatic stature of the American founders for her; hence her approving citation of their debates at the constitutional convention in Philadelphia as exemplary instances of political speech. Plurality and equality, in other words, attend even the ur-political moment of foundation. This is a remarkable "deviation" not only from Heidegger, but also from the French and Marxian revolutionary traditions (vdth their emphasis on the *violence* of the beginning), and from the Western tradition of political thought as a whole (where the myth of the "founding legislator" looms very large indeed).

#### 15. Fear of death is necessary to prevent genocide and extinction

Beres 96, Louis Rene, PhD at Princeton, “No Fear, No Trembling Israel, Death and the Meaning of Anxiety,” www.freeman.org/m\_online/feb96/beresn.htm

Fear of death, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival. This is true not only for individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance. So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration - a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war - this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe unawareness of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for individuals, confronting death can give the most positive reality to life itself. In this respect, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety." There is, of course, a distinctly ironic resonance to this argument. Anxiety, after all, is generally taken as a negative, as a liability that cripples rather than enhances life. But anxiety is not something we "have." It is something we (states and individuals) "are." It is true, to be sure, that anxiety, at the onset of psychosis, can lead individuals to experience literally the threat of self-dissolution, but this is, by definition, not a problem for states. Anxiety stems from the awareness that existence can actually be destroyed, that one can actually become nothing. An ontological characteristic, it has been commonly called Angst, a word related to anguish (which comes from the Latin angustus, "narrow," which in turn comes from angere, "to choke.") Herein lies the relevant idea of birth trauma as the prototype of all anxiety, as "pain in narrows" through the "choking" straits of birth. Kierkegaard identified anxiety as "the dizziness of freedom," adding: "Anxiety is the reality of freedom as a potentiality before this freedom has materialized."