### Off

**Comprehensive reform will pass now – Obama’s going all-in to work with moderates.**

Daily Mail 10/17 [“Immigration battle threatens to dwarf debt-limit fight as many Republicans fear power of 17 MILLION newly legalized loyal Democrats,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2464112/Immigration-battle-threatens-dwarf-debt-limit-fight-Republicans-fear-power-17-MILLION-newly-legalized-loyal-Democrats.html#ixzz2i182BrcS]

The White House has shifted gears and put its policy team in immigration overdrive, zooming past the debt crisis that threatened to sink the republic and on to the task of normalizing the estimated 11 million U.S. residents who have no legal basis for being there. The Democrat-dominated U.S. Senate passed a bill in June that would provide a citizenship path for those who have been in the U.S. since the end of 2011. But as with the early days of the debt crisis and the partial government shutdown, Republican leaders in the House of Representatives aren't eager to consider it. The White House has avoided saying that it take advantage of a weak House and spend its political capital to push an immigration policy, but Republicans have reason to suspect the other shoe is about to drop. The Center for Immigration Studies, a Washington, D.C. think-tank, projects that the Senate bill, S.744, would add 17.3 million new legal, voting-age U.S. residents to 14.9 million whom analysts already expect to appear without the proposed law. 'To place these figures in perspective,' writes Steven Camarota, the group's director of research, 'the last four presidential elections were decided by 4.5 million votes on average.' Obama has been 'trying to destroy the Republican Party' with the debt standoff, says Rep. Raul Labrador, 'and I think that anything we negotiate right now with the president on immigration will be with that same goal in mind' Obama has been 'trying to destroy the Republican Party' with the debt standoff, says Rep. Raul Labrador, 'and I think that anything we negotiate right now with the president on immigration will be with that same goal in mind' Converting illegal immigrants into citizens has long been a Democratic Party brass ring. And not only, as President Barack Obama told business leaders on Sept. 18, because 'we know ... that that can add potentially a trillion dollars to our economy, and that we will continue to attract the best and brightest talent around the world.' Hispanics are the biggest ethnic group involved in U.S. immigration. In the 2012 elections, 77 per cent of those who voted supported Democratic candidates for Congress, according to the polling group Latino Decisions. Seventy-five per cent voted for Obama. Among Hispanic voters who weren't born in the U.S., Democratic congressional candidates picked up 81 per cent of the vote. Obama rated 80 per cent. In fact, Republicans' share of Hispanic votes in presidential elections peaked in 2004, at 43 per cent before tumbling in the next two elections. And the Pew Research Center has consistently found that large majorities Hispanic voters favor policies that produce governments with bigger footprints and more social programs. 'There are things that we know will help strengthen our economy that we could get done before this year is out,' the president said Wednesday night as focus on the debt-limit fix bill moved from the Senate to the House. 'A law to fix our broken immigration system' was first on his wish-list. More... Report: Senate immigration bill includes nearly $300 million in slush funds for immigrants' rights groups, in language drafted by the former policy chief for one such organization 'Immigrants will be the job creators of tomorrow': Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg goes public with backing of immigration reform Obama HECKLED as he tries to woo Hispanic voters by hailing importance of immigrants to U.S. AMNESTY? 'Gang Of Eight' immigration reform will turn illegal aliens into citizens - in 13 YEARS, and after a 2,000 dollar fine 'You have no right to be in the UK and you should leave': Extraordinary moment immigration minister tells five-time failed asylum seeker to go home on live TV 'We had a very strong Democratic and Republican vote in the Senate,' Obama told the Los Angeles affiliate of the Spanish-language network Univision on Tuesday, comparing it to the debt battle. 'The only thing right now that’s holding it back is again, Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives.' 'So we’re going to have to get through this crisis that was unnecessary, that was created because of the obsession of a small faction of the Republican Party on the Affordable Care Act. Once that’s done – you know, the day after – I'm going to be pushing to say, "call a vote on immigration reform."' GOP lawmakers hear from conservative who want the borders closed before any immigrants get a path to citizenship, and from those worried about the impact on reduced wages and employment for citizens Demonstrators marched toward Capitol Hill during a immigration rally in Washington on Oct. 8. They wanted to put pressure on House Republicans to vote on a stalled immigration reform bill Republicans in the House are less split on Obamacare than on immigration, with some arguing that rewarding lawbreakers sets a bad example and others pointing to economic advantages of a larger workforce willing to undertake manual labor, and a boom in fast-tracked visas for those with specialized skills. But if Obama thinks he has the GOP on the ropes, an aide to a conservative House Republican lawmaker told MailOnline, he will be surprised by the party unity that will return as soon as someone breathes 'the "A"-word: "Amnesty".' 'Everyone in the House Republican caucus wants to get rid of Obamacare,' the aide said, 'but not everyone agreed killing it was worth going to the mat.' So-called 'DREAMers' are young illegal immigrants who were brought to the U.S. as children. Some Republicans see virtue in providing them special status So-called 'DREAMers' are young illegal immigrants who were brought to the U.S. as children. Some Republicans see virtue in providing them special status 'But we're talking about changing voting patterns for maybe 100 years and creating natural advantages for candidates who will run against our guys. It's like giving my boss 40 pounds of rocks to carry over his shoulder, and letting his challenger walk around with a fanny pack full of feathers.' The debt-limit and shutdown fights, says Idaho GOP Rep. Raul Labrador, may have made immigration advocates' uphill climb even steeper, especially for Republicans who suspect President Obama of having an ulterior motive. 'I think what he's done over the last two and half weeks [is] he’s trying to destroy the Republican Party,' Labrador said Wednesday at the monthly Conversations with Conservatives meeting organized by the Heritage Foundation. 'And I think that anything we negotiate right now with the president on immigration will be with that same goal in mind, which is to destroy the Republican Party and not to get good policies.' 'There are things that we are on the same page about,' Labrador said, 'and if he is unwilling to negotiate on those things I don’t see how he could in good faith negotiate with us on immigration.' House Republicans' strategy so far has been to approach the Senate bill piecemeal, advancing parts of it – border security and more fences, for instance – that GOP leaders like. Speaker John Boehner has said Senate Democrats' more comprehensive approach won't reach the House floor, even though 14 Senate Republicans gave it 'yes' votes. But the fight over the partial government shutdown that occupied half of October may have given Democrats insights into how to combat that strategy. House Republicans offered a series of nearly a dozen one-off bills to fund government agencies and initiatives whose absence became a black eye, including the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Veterans Affairs and salary payments for active-duty military. Obama found he could stave off the pressure to sign all but a few, insisting on an all-or-nothing approach – which he eventually got. 'There are things that we know will help strengthen our economy that we could get done before this year is out,' Obama said Wednesday night: 'We still need to pass a law to fix our broken immigration system' 'There are things that we know will help strengthen our economy that we could get done before this year is out,' Obama said Wednesday night: 'We still need to pass a law to fix our broken immigration system' Immigration reform activists marched in Washington on Oct. 8, occupying portions of the National Mall that wre officially closed as part of a government shutdown Immigration reform activists marched in Washington on Oct. 8, occupying portions of the National Mall that wre officially closed as part of a government shutdown. The National Park Service later said the Obama administration ordered it to provide security. Several Democratic members of Congress were arrested. 'It's different, of course, because there's no economic catastrophe awaiting if Republicans sit on their hands with immigration,' a Democratic campaign strategist told MailOnline on Wednesday. 'But the White House has learned how stubborn some of the Republicans are willing to be. And more important, they've figured out which ones are worth trying to reason with.' House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi has said she will bring 'any' immigration proposal to her Democratic colleagues in the Senate House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi has said she will bring 'any' immigration proposal to her Democratic colleagues in the Senate While some Republican moderates will be unwilling to cross the tea party caucus while the sting of the debt defeat is still in the air, others have already signaled their openness to meet Democrats halfway, mostly in one-off measures that carve out pet projects from the larger immigration issue. California Rep. Nancy Pelosi, a long-time supporter of immigration reform, said this month that she will do 'whatever it takes' to find a bill that the House can bring to the Senate. She's open to going to a House-Senate legislative conference with 'one bill, two bills, one at a time, singly, jointly, severally, whatever,' betting that whatever emerges from such a meeting would including 'comprehensive immigration reform that will lead to a pathway to citizenship.' Pelosi may find some help from a few Republicans. The Associated Press reported on Sept. 30 that Rep. Bob Goodlatte, who chairs the House Judiciary Committee, has been openly discussing how to change the immigration status of the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. without awarding them special status. His idea is to allow illegal immigrants to have legal work status – a 'green card' – and then to allow them access to a list of existing routes to citizenship. They could be sponsored by a U.S. company, for instance, or by a relative who's already a citizen. Goodlatte favors this more narrow approach to the Senate's catch-all bill, which has a companion bill in the House that no Republicans have been willing to endorse. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, another Virginia Republican, is also helping Goodlatte with a bill that would provide a path to citizenship for immigrants brought illegally to the U.S. as children. Idaho Rep. Raul Labrador and Texas Rep. Ted Poe are trying to create a visa program that would target low-skilled workers for migration into the U.S. Several of these narrow proposals have already passed through House committees, and their Republican chairman are hoping they see action. The U.S.-Mexico border fence stretches through the port of entry at San Ysidro. Millions pass through this checkpoint every year, many of them smuggled in. And countless others cross parts of the border where there are no fences The U.S.-Mexico border fence stretches through the port of entry at San Ysidro. Millions pass through this checkpoint every year, many of them smuggled in. And countless others cross parts of the border where there are no fences Some Latinos are angry at President Obama because he hasn't delivered on his promise of comprehensive immigration reform Some Latinos are angry at President Obama because he hasn't delivered on his promise of comprehensive immigration reform. Others are frustrated that the president has dramatically increased the number of illegal immigrants who are deported back to their home countries House Homeland Security Committee chairman Mike McCaul of Texas told the AP that he thinks a series of immigration bills 'would be the next agenda item in the queue after we're done with this [debt limit] mess.' Cantor spokesman Doug Heye insists, however, that while 'moving immigration forward remains a priority ... right now there's no firm timetable.' Goodlatte has said, though, that he wants to see some movement by the end of October on a bill that could give the Senate some basis to negotiate. A senior aide to a southern Republican House member said that ultimately, some Republicans don't want their party to be 'on the wrong side of the new electoral math,' and 'if we can create our own grateful constituency, that's just good politics in addition to doing the right thing.'

**Disagreements over authority trigger constitutional showdowns – even if the executive wants the plan – it’s about who decides, not the decision itself**

Posner 10 and Vermeule - \*professor of law at the University of Chicago AND \*\*professor of law at Harvard (Eric and Adrian, The Executive Unbound, p. 75-77)

Showdowns occur when the location of constitutional authority for making an important policy decision is ambiguous, and multiple political agents (branches, parties, sections, governments) have a strong interest in establishing that the authority lies with them. Although agents often have an interest in negotiating a settlement, asymmetric information about the interests and bargaining power of opposing parties will sometimes prevent such a settlement from being achieved. That is when a showdown occurs. Ultimately, however, someone must yield; this yielding to or acquiescence in the claimed authority of another agent helps clarify constitutional lines of authority, so that next time the issue arises, a constitutional impasse can be avoided. From a normative standpoint, constitutional showdowns thus have an important benefit, but they are certainly not costless. As long as the showdown lasts, the government may be paralyzed, unable to make important policy decisions, at least with respect to the issue under dispute. We begin by examining a simplified version of our problem, one involving just two agents—Congress and the executive. We assume for now that each agent is a unitary actor with a specific set of interests and capacities. We also assume that each agent has a slightly different utility function, reflecting their distinct constituencies. If we take the median voter as a baseline, we might assume that Congress is a bit to the left (or right) of the median voter, while the president is a bit to the right (or left). We will assume that the two agents are at an equal distance from the median, and that the preferences of the population are symmetrically distributed, so that the median voter will be indifferent between whether the president or Congress makes a particular decision, assuming that they have equal information.39 But we also will assume that the president has better information about some types of problems, and Congress has better information about other types of problems, so that, from the median voter’s standpoint, it is best for the president to make decisions about the first type of problem and for Congress to make decisions about the second type ofproblem.40 Suppose, for example, that the nation is at war and the government must decide whether to terminate it soon or allow it to continue. Congress and the president may agree about what to do, of course. But if they disagree, their disagreement may arise from one or both of two sources. First, Congress and the president have different information. For example, the executive may have better information about the foreign policy ramifications of a premature withdrawal, while Congress has better information about home-front morale. These different sources of information lead the executive to believe that the war should continue, while Congress believes the war should be ended soon. Second, Congress and the president have different preferences because of electoral pressures of their different constituents. Suppose, for example, that the president depends heavily on the continued support of arms suppliers, while crucial members of Congress come from districts dominated by war protestors. Thus, although the median voter might want the war to continue for a moderate time, the president prefers an indefinite extension, while Congress prefers an immediate termination. So far, we have explained why the president and Congress might disagree about when to terminate the war, but mere policy disagreement does not result in a showdown. Showdowns arise only when there is a disagreement about authority. If Congress believes that the president has the sole authority to terminate the war, then his view will prevail. Congress may try to pressure him or influence him by offering support for other programs desired by the president, or by trying to rile up the public, but these activities are part of normal politics, and do not provoke a constitutional showdown. Similarly, if the president believes that Congress has the sole authority to terminate the war, then Congress’s view will prevail. This outcome is shown in cell 3 in table 2.1. Similarly, no showdown occurs when the two branches agree both about authority and policy—for example, that the president decides, and Congress agrees with his decision (cell 1). The first column represents the domain of normal politics. Showdowns can arise only when Congress and the president disagree about who decides. Here, there are two further possibilities. First, Congress and the president disagree about who decides but agree about the correct policy outcome (cell 2). In these situations, which arise with some frequency, the two branches are often tempted to paper over their differences because an immediate policy choice is not at stake. But sometimes a showdown will occur. We will discuss this special case later. Second, Congress and the president disagree about the policy outcome and about authority (cell 4). In this case, showdowns are likely, because a policy decision must be made, and if the parties cannot agree about what it should be, then they cannot avoid resolving the question of authority. We focus on this case for now.

**Immigration is critical to the growth – every day its delayed is a linear risk for long-term competitiveness**

Garfield 13 [Dean Garfield, president and CEO of the Information Technology Industry Council, Mercury News, 02/12/2013, “Dean Garfield: Immigration reform means a stronger Silicon Valley and U.S. economy,” http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci\_22570060/dean-garfield-immigration-reform-means-stronger-silicon-valley]

The recent jobs report and the decline in fourth-quarter GDP growth reinforce that the U.S. economy is teetering on the edge of stalling. The policy decisions made in 2013 will be critical in determining our fate. To ensure a future of renewed prosperity and innovation, we should move quickly to advance immigration reform. As an immigrant who spent six years separated from his mother as she dealt with the immigration bureaucracy, I understand the moral imperative of immigration reform. That said, there should be no doubt that reform is in the best interest of Silicon Valley, of California and of our nation. The data are undeniable. When a foreign-born, advanced-degree graduate from a U.S. university decides to stay here and work in a math or science field, an additional 2.6 jobs are created. Multiply that by 50,000 or 100,000 foreign graduate students, and you begin to see just how forcefully immigration reform can propel the economy. From 1995 through 2005, immigrants founded 25 percent of the venture-backed startups in the U.S., and nearly 50 percent in Silicon Valley. In 2011, immigrant entrepreneurs were responsible for more than one in four new U.S. businesses, and immigrant businesses employ one in every 10 people working for private companies. Immigrants and their children founded 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies. These firms, including dynamic brands like Apple, Google, eBay and IBM, collectively generated $4.2 trillion in revenue in 2010 -- more than the GDP of every country in the world except the United States, China and Japan. Immigration is innovation. Every day that goes by without immigration reform is another day when new jobs and new industries start in foreign countries instead of on American shores. If we want next-generation industries to be founded in San Jose instead of Shenzhen, then our policymakers must seize this moment and produce legislation that all sides can support. If done right, immigration reform will result in a stronger innovation economy for the U.S., with new industries, new jobs and new opportunities. To achieve our full economic potential, we must deal with the entire spectrum of immigrants. Reforming our high-skill system will allow companies to fill tens of thousands of good-paying but vacant jobs in knowledge-dependent sectors. ITI recently co-authored a report with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Partnership for a New American Economy on this topic. It found that immigrants working in science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) fields in the U.S. do not compete with American workers but complement them. Reform can help address our STEM skills gap, reward entrepreneurship and fund a pipeline of homegrown STEM students. If Congress can reach agreement on a fair process to legalize the millions of undocumented immigrants in the United States, experts predict that they would add $1.5 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic product during the next 10 years. This would create a cycle that exerts upward pressure on the wages of both American and immigrant workers. Higher wages and better jobs translate into increased consumer purchasing power, which benefits the U.S. economy. Fortunately, the president and Republicans and Democrats in Congress are forging common ground on a set of policy principles that would serve the national interest. This leadership is a once-in-a-generation opportunity, and all of us who have a stake in an effective immigration system should work to build support for it. We cannot afford to miss this opportunity to turn away from old, misguided stereotypes and toward a stronger American future.

**Economic collapse causes global nuclear war.**

Merlini, Senior Fellow – Brookings, 11

[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (~357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

### Off

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order mandating that individuals in military detention who have won their habeas corpus hearing be released.

**Executive can restrain itself --- it is subject to internal separation of powers**

Sales, 12 --- Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law (7/3/2012, Nathan Alexander Sales, Journal of National Security Law & Policy, “Self-Restraint and National Security,” 6 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 227, Lexis))

III. Self-Restraint as Cost-Benefit Asymmetry

As we've seen, certain officials within military and intelligence agencies - general counsels, legal advisors, and other watchdogs - are responsible for ensuring that national security operations comply with the relevant domestic and international legal requirements. These players intervene to rule out missions they believe would cross a legal line. But sometimes they go beyond that basic function - ensure compliance with the law, full stop - and reject operations that, while lawful, are thought to be undesirable on policy grounds. That is, they impose self-restraints that are stricter than the applicable laws. Why?[\*261] One way to answer that question is to consider the individual and institutional incentives that color the behavior of military and intelligence officials. Looking at the government's national security apparatus through the lens of public choice theory (especially the idea that bureaucrats are rationally self interested actors who seek to maximize their utility n152) and basic agency relationships (e.g., the relationships between senior policymakers and the subordinates who act on their behalf n153) reveals a complex system in which power is distributed among a number of different nodes. The executive branch "is a "they,' not an "it.'" n154 The national security community in particular is subdivided into various semi-autonomous entities, each of which promotes its own parochial interests within the system and, in so doing, checks the like ambitions of rival entities; n155 the government thus is subject to what Neal Katyal has called the "internal separation of powers." n156 These basic insights into how military and intelligence agencies operate suggest several possible explanations for why self-restraint occurs. As elaborated in this Part, such constraints might result from systematic asymmetries in the expected value calculations of senior policymakers and their lawyers. In addition, as explained in Part IV, self-restraint might occur due to bureaucratic empire building by officials who review operations for compliance with domestic and international law.

### Off

Democratic peace theory is a representational practice which make civilizing crusades inevitable, by fixing American identity in opposition to non-liberal states at an ontological level.

Grayson 2003 (Kyle, Dept. of Political Science @ York University, “Democratic Peace Theory as Practice: (Re)Reading the Significance of Liberal Representations of War and Peace”, YCISS Working Paper no. 22, March, <http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/WP22-Grayson.pdf>)

In Violent Cartographies*: Mapping Cultures of War*, Michael Shapiro tries to examine “the ways that¶ enmity-related global geographies and ethnoscapes emerge as collectivities, and how they try to achieve, stabilize, and reproduce their unity and coherence”.43 Historically, the practice of war has emerged as one the most enduring methods to attempt to fix national identities and ontological foundations. Victory in war confirms all the positive subjective views of the ‘self’ while at the same time providing ‘proof’ of the subjectively perceived inferior nature of the ‘other’. Conversely, defeat not only leads to (geo)strategic losses, but also to a reappraisal of the national identity and deep questioning of the¶ foundations that helped define national identity. The American defeat in the Vietnam War provides an¶ excellent example of these identity/foundation casualties. Therefore, Shapiro argues that war is not just¶ (geo)strategic, but is also about the confrontation between competing ontologies.¶ As mentioned earlier, democratic peace theory and its surrounding discourse views war as an¶ activity waged by state actors in pursuit of (geo)strategic spoils (e.g., territory, resources, wealth), as well¶ as an activity arising over disputes of ‘ownership’ of spoils and/or perceived violations of sovereignty.¶ As John Vasquez has argued, “the situation that states in the modern global system are most likely to¶ deal with by the use of force and violence is one in which their territory is threatened....territorial¶ disputes provide the willingness to go to war”.44 Democratic peace theorists believe that liberal¶ democracies can peacefully manage these kinds of disputes amongst themselves; however, in¶ circumstances of dispute between a liberal democracy and a non-liberal/democracy, war is seen as almost inevitable. Conventionally, this has been attributed to the inherently aggressive nature of the ‘authoritarian’ state, which prevents liberal democracies from trusting these states to adhere to peacefully negotiated settlements.¶ Yet, when democratic peace theory is viewed as a representational practice, war becomes¶ inevitable between disputing liberal democratic states and non-liberal/democratic states not because of the aggressive nature of authoritarian regimes but because these situations are viewed as an opportunity for liberal democratic states to engage in a ‘civilizing’ mission and reaffirm their national identity and ontology by demonstrating their superiority in battle. This imperative becomes especially clear if we abandon the traditional view of war contained within democratic peace theory and look at democratic non-state/liberal democratic state disputes and the underlying ontological contestations that fuelled them.45 Barkawi and Laffey have argued that currently “force is used in the service of defending and expanding economic and to a lesser extent political liberalism (in the guise of democracy) beyond the liberal capitalist core”.46 From a historical perspective, the dispute between the Iroquois Six Nations and the Canadian government over the Grand River territory during the first decades of the twentieth century, provides an excellent example of the ontological impetus behind international relations practices and how warfare can also be directed towards the annihilation of culture.

**Our alternative is to demilitarize the public sphere - bottom up rejection of hegemonic politics allows us to move beyond an unsustainable system that leads to inevitable threat escalation**

Lal, 2007

(Prerna P., Master of Arts in International Relations @ San Francisco State University, Senior Graduate Thesis, Critical Security Studies, “Deconstructing the National Security State: Towards a New Framework of Analysis,” http://prernalal.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/css-deconstructing-the-nat-sec-state.pdf)

Throughout this paper, we have seen cases of how **national security is an antonym for human security**. With this essential realization, Booth (2005, 33) gives three reasons for why **the state should not be the referent object of security: “states are unreliable as primary referents because while some are in the business of security some are not; even those which are producers of security represent the means and not the ends; and states are too diverse in their character to serve as the basis for a comprehensive theory of security.”** Additionally, the cases of South Africa and Afghanistan prove how **the national security state is merely an elite tool, which causes human insecurity at home and abroad. The state treats security as a problem that comes from the outside, rather than as a problem that can arise from domestic issues. The end result of state-centric security is that humans are alienated from discussions about their own security and welfare.** The most compelling reason is provided by Hayward Akler (2005, 191) in Critical Security Studies and World Politics, in which he states that **“economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease provide more serious threats to the well-being of individuals and the interest of nations.” Thus, to millions of people, it is not the existence of the Other across the border that poses a security problem, but their own state that is a threat to security.** The question that arises next is how to **put** critical **theory into practice** and deconstruct the national security state. **Critical theory does not offer simple one-shot solutions to the problems created by the neo-realist state and elitist conception of security. To give simple answers would be a performative contradiction, especially after criticizing realism for being intellectually rigid for believing in objective truth.** In other words, **there are no alternatives; just alternative modes of understanding. However, using the poststructuralist** Foucaultian **analysis that discourse is power, we can move towards deconstructing the power of the state and elites to securitize using their own tool: discourse.** The elites who control the meaning of security and define it in terms that are appropriate to their interests hold tremendous power in the national security state. As Foucault astutely observed, “the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge and discourse” (Dalby 1998, 4). For too long, language has been used against us to create our reality, thereby obfuscating our lens of the world, depriving us from an objective search for truth and knowledge. The history of colonized people shows how the construction of language defined and justified their oppressed status. In a way, **we are colonized through discursive practices and subjected to the reality that the state wants us to see. However, definitions belong to the definer, and it is high time that we questioned and defined our own reality.** Thus, **citizen action is critical to questioning and deconstructing the national security state and taking away its power to define our security**. In On Security, Pearl Alice Marsh (1995, 126) advances the idea of **a grassroots statecraft that is defined as “challenging foreign policy of government through contending discursive and speech acts.”** This **calls for pitting the values of civil society against the state establishment and challenging the American statecraft’s freedom to cast issues and events in a security or militarized framework. The U**nited **S**tates **has not always been a national security state and neither does it have to maintain that hegemonic and oppressive status in order to exist. It is critical to remember that fundamental changes in our institutions and structures of power do not occur from the top; they originate from the bottom. History is case in point. Citizen action was critical to ending the Red Scare and the Vietnam War**, as the American people realized the ludicrousness of framing Vietnam as a security issue, which led to the fall of the Second New Deal, the deaths of thousands of American soldiers and a financial cost that we are still shouldering. In the end, what they need to be secured from and how, is a question best left up to individual Americans and subsequently, civil society. Thus, **grassroots citizen action performatively makes individuals the referent subject of security as people would call for the demilitarization and desecuritization of issues that are contrary and irrelevant to human security. There is hope for the future and practical application of critical theory in international relations.** As Robert Lipschutz (2000, 61) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, **“it was the existence of the Other across the border that gave national security its power and authority; it is the disappearance of the border that has vanquished that power.” Britain, France and Germany set aside their historical enmities and became part of a European community, which has formed a new collective identity and security across borders. Cold War rivals that almost annihilated the world are now friends in the “war against terror.” The apartheid regime in South Africa did collapse eventually.** In the past two years, **India and Pakistan have been moving towards a more peaceful future** that also includes fighting the “war against terror” together. **While nation-states that were previously hostile to each other have united to be hostile towards other states, it is not overly idealist to suggest that with each new friendship and alliance, there is one less foe and one less Other. The world is not stable and stagnant, existing in an anarchic, nasty and brutish framework in which states have to endlessly bargain for their self-interest, as realists would like us to believe. On the contrary, international relations and the boundaries constructed by the state are subject to change and ever-transitioning, which presents a compelling case for critical theory as a more realistic framework through which we can view international relations.** Therefore, **our ultimate search for security does not lie in securing the state from the threat of the enemy across the border, but in removing the state as the referent object of security and moving towards human emancipation.** Human emancipation is often cited as the ultimate goal of the CSS project. Kenneth Booth (2005, 181) defines human emancipation as “the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view of freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions...the concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity.” For Booth then, human emancipation is a concern with **questioning and changing structures** and institutions **that oppress us** and prevent us from reaching our true potential, a seemingly Marxist and poststructuralist concern. **Emancipation and security become two sides of the same coin** for Booth (2005, 191), **as humans must be freed from their oppressive structures and overthrow physical and human constraints that prevent them from reaching their true potential. However, emancipation is not the end-all solution but a project that can never be fully realized. This may lead some to question the practicality of the concept**. Here, I will draw an analogy from Karl Marx, whose idea of human emancipation was communism, a goal **that we can see in the horizon, but the closer we get to it, the further away it seems. Yet, when we look back, we see how far we have come.** Therefore, **human emancipation serves practical purpose as an immanent critique, which can be utilized as a philosophical anchorage for tactical goal setting.**

### Off

#### Obama’s ignoring human rights with China now – he doesn’t think he has the moral authority

Roth 10

Kenneth Roth, Foreign Affairs, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, “Empty Promises: Obama's Hesitant Embrace of Human Rights”, 89 Foreign Aff. 10 2010 //jchen

Similarly, in China, Obama followed in the footsteps of successive U.S. presidents by downplaying the importance of human rights in favor of promoting trade, economic ties, and diplomatic cooperation. Before a handpicked audience of "future Chinese leaders" in Shanghai, he spoke of the United States' journey up from slavery and the struggles for women's and workers' rights, making clear that the United States, too, has a far-from-perfect human rights record. He affirmed the United States' bedrock belief "that all men and women are created equal, and possess certain fundamental rights." However, in a question-and-answer session, he seemed to suggest that China's draconian "great firewall" on the Internet was a reflection of different "traditions," rather than demanding that itbe torn down. That remark led to a storm of criticism from Chinese bloggers, and Obama left the country appearing to be in thrall to Chinese economic power and barely interested in risking anything to protect the rights of the 1.3 billion Chinese still living under a dictatorship. In a speech at Georgetown University a few weeks later, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton justified this approach as "principled pragmatism," and administration officials have spoken privately of building up political capital to press China on human rights in the future. But there is no such pressure today. From Clinton's February 2009 statement that human rights "can't interfere" with other U.S. interests in China to Obama's refusal to meet with the Dalai Lama in October, Washington has consistently failed to confront China's authoritarian rulers on questions of religious and political freedom.

#### Closing detention facilities restores credibility – causes resurgence of US international influence

Shattuck, 08, MA International Law Cambridge & CEO of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, served as assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor, and ambassador to the Czech Republic in the Clinton administration,

John, 8/2 “How US can get its groove back,” http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial\_opinion/oped/articles /2008/08/02/how\_us\_can\_get\_its\_groove\_back/) atw

One of the biggest challenges facing the next president is how to restore US credibility in the world. Despite military assets unparalleled in history, US global standing has hit rock bottom. The United States government is widely perceived today to be a violator of human rights. A poll conducted by the British Broadcasting Corp. last year in 18 countries on all continents revealed that 67 percent disapproved of US detention and interrogation practices in Guantanamo. Another poll in Germany, Great Britain, Poland, and India found that majorities or pluralities condemned the United States for torture and other violations of international law. A third poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations showed that majorities in 13 countries, including traditional allies, believe "the US cannot be trusted to act responsibly in the world." The gap between America's values and its actions has severely eroded US global influence. How does it get it back? First, by obeying the law. The United States was founded on the rule of law. Human rights are defined and protected by the Constitution and international treaties ratified and incorporated into domestic law. By flouting basic rules - such as habeas corpus, the Convention Against Torture, and the Geneva Conventions - the US government has created a series of "law-free zones." In these zones detainees have been abused, thousands held indefinitely without charges, and human rights trampled on. Second, by practicing what we preach. The United States loses credibility when it charges others with human rights violations that it is also committing. The State Department routinely criticizes other countries for engaging in torture, detention without trial, and warrantless electronic surveillance, despite its own recent abysmal record in these areas. Fortunately, history shows that US influence in the world can be restored when its values and policies are brought into alignment. A series of bipartisan human rights initiatives during five recent presidencies - three Republican and two Democratic - enhanced the stature of American foreign policy. President Gerald Ford signed the Helsinki Accords, leading to international recognition of the cause of human rights inside the Soviet bloc. President Jimmy Carter mobilized democratic governments to press for release of political prisoners by repressive regimes. President Ronald Reagan signed the Convention Against Torture and persuaded the Senate to ratify it. President George H.W. Bush joined with other governments in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to nurture new democracies of the post-Cold War era. And President Bill Clinton worked with NATO and the UN to implement the Genocide Convention and bring an end to the human rights catastrophe in the Balkans. The next president can restore US influence by reconnecting the nation's values and policies on human rights and the rule of law. He should announce three initiatives.

#### Refocusing on human rights entrenches an ideological divide and reignites a cool war

Feldman 13

Noah Feldman, Bemis Professor of International Law at Harvard Law School, senior adjunct fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Salon, 5/19/13, “How Guantanamo affects China: Our human rights hypocrisies ”, http://www.salon.com/2013/05/19/how\_guantanamo\_affects\_china\_our\_human\_rights\_hypocrisies/ //jchen

How Guantanamo affects China: Our human rights hypocrisies

In May 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Treasury Timothy Geithner were poised to make a rare double visit to China for a high-level strategic and economic dialogue. The presence of both of these key cabinet officials at a delicate moment in the relationship between the two countries marked the importance of the issues. For once, economic interdependence and geopolitics were on the agenda at the same moment.

But on April 22, in the tiny village of Dongshigu in the eastern Shandong province, something happened that would eclipse the visit. Chen Guangcheng, a blind dissident lawyer-activist, managed to scale a high wall to escape the building where he had been under house arrest for two years. Chen broke his foot in the process, yet over the next several days, with the help of other activists, he managed to make his way four hundred miles to Beijing, where he was taken into the U.S. embassy. On April 27, when he was inside the embassy, a YouTube video was posted in which Chen informed Premier Wen Jiabao that he had escaped and demanding punishment for the local officials who had detained him.

In the days that followed, Chen’s future became an international incident of the highest order. Chen first insisted he did not want to leave China. Then, after he was transferred to a Chinese hospital to have his foot treated, he changed his mind. In an emblematic piece of cool war theater, Chen, from his hospital bed, used a borrowed mobile phone to address an open hearing of the U.S. Congress in Washington. He told the congressmen — and the world — that he was worried for his family’s safety and wanted to come to the United States.

Chen’s predicament, featured for days on the front pages of the U.S. press, drew Western eyes away from the secretarial visit. Finally, after days of intense negotiations between ranking U.S. diplomats and their Chinese counterparts, Chen obtained permission to travel to the United States as a special student, a “solution” that spared China the embarrassment of having Chen granted asylum status. The pressing questions of politics and economics that were supposed to be the subject of the visit were ignored, replaced by the subject of human rights.

The Chen Guangcheng episode hints at the hugely complicated and hugely important way that human rights will figure in the cool war. The United States showed a willingness to put human rights issues front and center, even when other issues were supposed to be on the table. The upstaging of a major diplomatic encounter by a focus on China’s human rights violations may conceivably have been planned by someone within the U.S. government, since the whole story of Chen’s escape seems highly improbable without help. Even if the timing of Chen’s escape was accidental, the U.S. embassy still had to decide to take Chen in, creating an inevitable crisis. Either way, the United States knowingly put human rights first in a highly public forum.

From the Chinese standpoint, the whole episode must have been frustrating and embarrassing. Enormous diplomatic resources went into discussing the fate of one previously little-known human rights activist. Instead of being treated respectfully as a rising global power, China was being scolded as a rights violator. The United States seemed to be using human rights to weaken China and give itself an edge in discussions between them.

The emerging historical moment is creating a new context for the rhetoric and practice of human rights. For the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States now has a major incentive to promote the international human rights agenda. So long as China continues to violate human rights, there may be no better ideological tool for the United States to gain advantage under cool war circumstances.

#### Causes US China War – ideology is comparatively more important than other interests

Feldman 13

Noah Feldman is Bemis Professor of International Law at Harvard Law School, senior adjunct fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Cool War”, 2013 //jchen

The Cold War was a battle of ideals. Communism and liberal de-mocracy each claimed the moral high ground, and each claimed to be superior in practice. As systems, they were mutually exclusive. Only one side could win.

Will the cool war be ideological in the same way? Today, is either China or the United States advocating a universal ideology meant to apply to everyone everywhere? If not, then perhaps in the absence of ideological struggle, the two nations could craft a kind of competitive partnership. Each would have its sphere of influence and shared responsibility for maintaining global security and stability. An Asia dominated by China could be counterbalanced by a West dominated by the United States. Everyone would get along. There would be neither cold war nor cool war. Each would be a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system, as Robert Zoellick, George W. Bush’s deputy secretary of state, optimisti¬cally put it in 2007.

This scenario of shared maintenance of the international order sounds appealing. For the United States, after all, being the sole superpower has had its drawbacks. The financial burden of main¬taining global stability has been high. Even more costly have been America’s unforced errors during two decades of unquestioned dominance. A strategic counterpart might help keep it honest. One reason that the United States invaded Iraq and Afghanistan was that it could.

But if cool war ideologies are sufficiently universal and mutually exclusive, they will pose genuine barriers to peaceful, cooperative strategic coexistence. Ideas about how people should be governed and what states are for exert a tremendous influence on international politics. Political ideas are among the tools we use to define what our interests are. These ideas can be even more important than what realists describe as enduring interests. In interna¬tional affairs, as in every area of life, interests are not facts like the laws of nature. They are, rather, objectives that we choose based on our ideas—the product of what we believe our interests to be.

Of course, countries with very different political ideas and sys¬tems cooperate with one another for mutual benefit. The United States and Saudi Arabia have been close allies for decades despite the fact that one is a democracy with no established religion and the other is an Islamic monarchy. Each side has something the other wants. The United States offers security and a market, and Saudi Arabia offers oil. Even countries at war with each other can reach limited agreements in narrow domains.1

But when political ideologies are opposed and aggressive, then any accommodation cannot be more than temporary—an opportunity for both sides to gather resources for the final battle between them. Cooperation strengthens the enemy and is therefore not to be undertaken except under limited, exceptional circumstances and to avoid disastrous breakdown, like the modest cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War.

#### Extinction.

White 11 [Mr. Hugh White is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra and a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute in Sydney. The Obama Doctrine WSJ, 11/25/11 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204452104577057660524758198.html]

One risk is that escalating strategic competition will disrupt the vital economic relationship between the U.S. and China. Many hope that the two countries' deep interdependence will prevent their rivalry getting out of hand. But that will only happen if both sides are willing to forgo strategic objectives to protect their economic cooperation. With the Obama Doctrine, the President has declared that he has no intention of doing that. Why should we expect the Chinese to act any different? So it is more likely that escalating rivalry will soon start to erode economic interdependence between the two nations, at great cost to both. The other risk is the growing chance of conflict. A war with China over Taiwan or the Spratly Islands is simple to start but hard to end, and could very easily escalate. China is a nuclear-armed power capable of destroying American cities, and the threshold for nuclear exchanges in a U.S.-China clash might be dangerously unclear and disastrously low.

### Case – Legitimacy

**Multipolarity’s inevitable – economic realities make hegemony unsustainable.**

Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. His next book, for Yale University Press, is After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing January 27, 2012 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405?page=1]

The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a **serious fiscal crisis** **by the end of this decade.** As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The **best indicators** of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be **replaced by a multipolar** international **system.** The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency.

**Heg doesn’t solve conflict.**

Fettweis 11 [Christopher, Prof. of Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page 73-6]

The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that US **hegemony is not the** primary **cause of** the current era of s**tability**. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2\* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has **already rid itself of crime.** Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited **empirical evidence** we have suggests that there is **little connection** between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict **declined** while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T 15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of War—**nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms** necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were America to be-co\*e more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it cur-\*7 exis\*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.

**Retrenchment solves war.**

MacDonald and Parent 11 [Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for opti- mism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift bur- dens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in **fewer militarized disputes** than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credi- bility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a **greater geopolitical gamble** than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conºict prone than other moments of acute relative de- cline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons **still have formidable capabil- ity**, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe **the empirical record supports these conclusions.** In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo- American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been inºuenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impend- ing Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or en- gage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incen- tives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the im- portance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy com- mitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expan- sionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential beneªts. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an im- provement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conºict.98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to en- hance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent re- gional order.99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. In- deed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional ter- ritory.100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can **strengthen the credibility of its core commit- ments** while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the beneªts of retrenchment is that it helps **alleviate an unsustainable finan- cial position**. Immense forward deployments will only **exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes.**101

**Hegemony spurs proliferation.**

Monteiro 12 [Nuno P., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University. Unrest Assured Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful, International Security Volume 36, Number 3, Winter 2011/12]

What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater influence over international outcomes.118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification.”119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.”120 At the same time, nothing in my argument determines the decline of U.S. power. The level of conflict entailed by the strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement may be acceptable to the unipole and have only a marginal effect on its ability to maintain its preeminent position. Whether a unipole will be economically or militarily overstretched is an empirical question that depends on the magnitude of the disparity in power between it and major powers and the magnitude of the conflicts in which it gets involved. Neither of these factors can be addressed a priori, and so a theory of unipolarity must acknowledge the possibility of frequent conflict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system. Finally, my argument points to a “paradox of power preponderance.”121 By [End Page 39] putting other states in extreme self-help, a systemic imbalance of power requires the unipole to act in ways that minimize the threat it poses. **Only by exercising great restraint can it avoid** being involved in **wars.** If the unipole fails to exercise restraint, other states will develop their capabilities, **including nuclear weapons—restraining it all the same.**122 Paradoxically, then, more relative power does not necessarily lead to greater influence and a better ability to convert capabilities into favorable outcomes peacefully. In effect, unparalleled relative power requires unequaled self-restraint. [End Page 40]

**Prolif means small conflicts go nuclear.**

Sokolski 9, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, serves on the U.S. congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, (Henry, Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd, Policy Review June & July, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)

At a minimum, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers’ strong alliance systems — the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system ( nato) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk). nato is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or nuclear-weapon-armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners” (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France and the uk), “non-nato allies” (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.

**Detention change uniquely causes court stripping – In other areas Congress seldom does anything; with detention, even procedural protections have been nullified by court stripping. Backlash to the plan would be massive**

Alexander 7 Janet Cooper Alexander, Frederick I. Richman Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. California Law Review Fall, 2007 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1193 ARTICLE: Jurisdiction-Stripping in a Time of Terror

Although the question of congressional power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts is a centerpiece of the federal courts canon, there are few decided cases that grapple squarely with the constitutional issues involved in juris-diction-stripping. n1 For the past fifty years or so, jurisdiction-stripping bills have been introduced on a host of politically controversial issues n2 including racial discrimination, free speech and association, the rights of criminal defendants, state legislative apportionment, abortion, school prayer, gay marriage, n3 and environmental preservation. n4 In the end, however, Congress usually backs off; very few such bills have been enacted. n5 And while the Supreme Court has re-peatedly [\*1194] said that "substantial constitutional questions" would be raised if judicial review of constitutional claims were unavailable, n6 the Court has almost always managed to resolve challenges to jurisdiction-stripping statutes on non-constitutional grounds-most recently in June 2006. n7 Both Congress and the Court have avoided confrontation. n8¶ But now the Executive Branch seems determined to force the constitutional issue. After the Supreme Court rendered decisions requiring procedural safeguards for detainees in the war on terrorism, n9 and with more cases pending that raised additional claims, n10 the Administration elected to press its vision of exclusive and unfettered presidential power and its effort to make Guantanamo Bay a law-free zone where the Constitution does not operate. When the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush that the Guantanamo detainees had a right to file habeas petitions challenging their detention and stated in a footnote that their petitions "unquestionably" described violations of the Constitution, n11 Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) n12 withdrawing federal jurisdiction over habeas petitions by Guantanamo detainees. n13 Senators who opposed [\*1195] eliminating habeas jurisdiction noted that Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a habeas petition challenging the constitutionality of military commission trials of detainees, was then pend-ing before the Supreme Court, n14 and explicitly likened the situation to that of Ex parte McCardle. n15¶ The Administration's handling of the detainees received another blow when the Court held in Hamdan that the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions were inapplicable to pending cases and invalidated the military commissions because they violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions. n16 Rather than complying with the decision, or seeking Congressional authorization of appropriate procedures as the Court strongly hinted, however, the Administration secured the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). n17 Although the MCA was presented as a compromise bill it in fact was a virtually complete victory for the President, a congressional endorsement (albeit over strong opposition in the Senate) of his broad claims of presidential power in the war on terrorism.¶ The statute expands the definition of enemy combatant far beyond the Supreme Court's narrow definition in Hamdi. Whereas Hamdi defined "enemy combatant" as one who was "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in [\*1196] an armed conflict against the United States there," n18 the MCA expands the definition to include those who have "purposefully and materially supported hostilities" against the United States or its allies. n19¶ Hamdi did not authorize detention of anyone who did not actually engage in armed conflict against U.S. or allied troops in Afghanistan. The MCA, however, permits the President to treat persons captured far from any battlefield, who have not participated in any violent activity, as enemy combatants. Indeed, the Government's lawyers have taken the position in court that a "little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but ... really is a front to finance al-Qaeda activities" can be classified as an enemy combatant. n20¶ The MCA also makes all noncitizens who are declared to be enemy combatants subject to trial by military commission rather than the courts, n21 including even lawful permanent residents located within the United States. The provisions denying habeas review apply to all proceedings "relating to" such military commission prosecutions. n22 Additionally, the MCA authorizes the use of military commission procedures that fall short of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions, contrary to the holding of Hamdan; purports to give the President the power to interpret the meaning and application of the Conventions; n23 attempts to legislatively define the commissions and the MCA's amendments to the War Crimes Act into compliance with the Conventions; n24 declares that the Conventions may not [\*1197] be judicially enforced by any individual, including citizens, n25 despite Hamdan's holding to the contrary; and prohibits the courts from using foreign sources of law in cases interpreting the War Crimes Act. n26 In addition to its express provisions, the MCA strengthens the President's assertion of legal authority in his actions toward the detainees by placing them into the highest category of deference under Youngstown, n27 when the President exercises his Article II powers with the express authorization of Congress exercising its Article I powers.¶ The MCA attempts to insulate all of these innovations from constitutional scrutiny by eliminating the possibility of judicial review. While the DTA denied habeas only for noncitizens detained at Guantanamo by the Department of Defense, the MCA purports to deny habeas (and "any other action" seeking judicial review) for any alien, regardless of geographical location, who has been "determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination." n28 The MCA thus strips habeas protection from lawful resident aliens detained within the United States as well as detainees at Guantanamo and other locations outside the United States.

**Takes out aff solvency**

Alexander 7 Janet Cooper Alexander, Frederick I. Richman Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. California Law Review Fall, 2007 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1193 ARTICLE: Jurisdiction-Stripping in a Time of Terror

The further effect of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the DTA and the MCA is to eliminate any means of enforcing Rasul and Hamdan - which is to say, to render those decisions nullities if the government does not wish to comply with them. Nothing in the DTA or MCA requires a speedy determination of enemy combatant status, or any determination at all, and no review is possible within the military or court systems until a [\*1198] final decision is made by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) or a military commission. It would now be possible for the ad-ministration simply not to conduct status determinations, and the affected detainees would have no way to obtain any relief. In fact, the statutes attempt to make the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the War Crimes Act, and the substantive restrictions of the Detainee Treatment Act unenforceable as well by expressly eliminating jurisdiction for any judicial review of the conditions of confinement, including interrogation through torture or cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment n29 and forced transfer of detainees to other countries for interrogation and imprisonment. n30 Unlike the DTA, which explicitly applied only to noncitizens in the custody of the Defense Department at Guantanamo Bay, the MCA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions apply to all noncitizens who are determined to be enemy combatants. n31 The provision barring claims based on the Geneva Conventions applies to all persons, including citizens and persons who are not in custody. n32¶ As one supporter of the legislation put it:¶ Congress and the president ... told the courts, in effect, to get out of the war on terror ... It is the first time since the New Deal that Congress had so completely divested the courts of power over a category of cases. It is also the first time since the Civil War that Congress saw fit to narrow the court's habeas powers in wartime because it disagreed with its decisions. The law ... directly reverses Hamdan ... n33¶ The DTA and the MCA not only strip jurisdiction over constitutional questions concerning the treatment of noncitizen detainees in the war on terror, but do so by purporting to eliminate jurisdiction to hear petitions for writs of habeas cor-pus. In the conventional account of broad congressional power to limit federal jurisdiction, habeas is the reassuring backstop that assures that even if Congress goes to the nuclear option and strips the courts of jurisdiction to hear a particular category of cases, there will, in the end, be judicial review through habeas if the constitutional question [\*1199] involves deprivation of life or liberty. n34 Thus the question of the constitutionality of the DTA and MCA seems, to a federal courts teacher, to be a very existential question indeed.

### Case – Democracy

**Fiscal crises tank U.S. democratic model.**

Pillar 10/6 [Paul R., The National Interest, The Shutdown and American Power, Hard and Soft http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/the-shutdown-american-power-hard-soft-9195?page=1]

The liberal democratic model has always had competition based on other criteria. Totalitarian regimes have won admiration for making trains run on time. Now in Washington things are not only not running on time but not running at all. Many people in other countries—and this has repeatedly been demonstrated in the Middle East, as well as elsewhere—opt for undemocratic formulas if they see them as more likely to provide services they expect from government, including among other things physical and economic security. When the leading (ostensible) liberal representative democracy shows it cannot provide governmental services, the undemocratic solutions look more attractive by comparison, and the United States loses some of its soft power. Of course, what has led to the shutdown in the United States is not democracy but instead some very undemocratic behavior. The situation was caused by one political element's decision to pursue its agenda not through democratic methods but instead by threatening to inflict harm on the United States itself. But that distinction may be lost on some foreign observers. The response will be somewhat similar to how many people in the Middle East reacted to the mess in Iraq that followed the U.S. invasion by saying that if that is a birth pang of democracy, they want nothing of it—even though what they were observing was not democracy but instead some of the consequences of an ill-considered military expedition. If there is more of a foreign turn away from democratic models as a result of the situation today in Washington, it will involve a perverse symmetry. Those who brought about this situation have shown that they have so little regard for liberal representative democracy that they place lower priority on maintaining it in the United States than they do on pushing their particular political and policy agenda. This fiasco thus becomes another example of how unseemly behavior in American politics can stimulate echoes of that behavior in other countries.

**Democracy doesn’t solve war – wars versus non-democracies, popular sentiments**

Goldstein (Professor Emeritus, School of International Service, American University) 11

(Joshua, Think Again: War World peace could be closer than you think., Sep/Oct, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/1-5/think\_again\_war?page=full)

Not necessarily. The well-worn observation that real democracies almost never fight each other is historically correct, but it's also true that democracies have always been perfectly willing to fight non-democracies. In fact, democracy can heighten conflict by amplifying ethnic and nationalist forces, pushing leaders to appease belligerent sentiment in order to stay in power. Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant both believed that selfish autocrats caused wars, whereas the common people, who bear the costs, would be loath to fight. But try telling that to the leaders of authoritarian China, who are struggling to hold in check, not inflame, a popular undercurrent of nationalism against Japanese and American historical enemies. Public opinion in tentatively democratic Egypt is far more hostile toward Israel than the authoritarian government of Hosni Mubarak ever was (though being hostile and actually going to war are quite different things).

**Global democracy resilient.**

Stelzenmüller 12 [Constanze Stelzenmüller is a Berlin-based Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. JUN 5 2012 Liberal Democracy is Here to Stay, Thank You—But it Needs to be Tended and Adapted http://gt2030.com/2012/06/05/liberal-democracy-is-here-to-stay-thank-you-but-it-needs-to-be-tended-and-adapted/]

Nor is it remotely accurate to say that the West is in decline, or liberal democracy on its way out. On the contrary. All the historical evidence argues that Western-style democracies are better at weathering crises in the long run, because they are more flexible and resilient; whereas the fragile underpinnings of Russian and Chinese authoritarian power are currently on public display. Meanwhile, the Arab Spring has turned into a long, hot and potentially explosive summer, and the unprecedented protests against Vladimir Putin’s self-re-election may yet wither away in yet another interminable winter of Russian politics. All the same, the message at the heart of both events is one of progress: the protesters want not just safety and prosperity, but participation and accountable government as well—and are no longer too terrified to say so. So liberal democracy is neither dead nor in terminal decline; it remains the model of self-governance aspired to by people living under authoritarian rule all over the globe. Still, that does not mean the existing liberal international order is alive and well. There may be fewer wars and more voters in the world today than twenty or fifty years ago, but the polarization and dysfunctionality of many democracies in the West and elsewhere (including Japan) is hard to deny. There is a pervasive sense that while globalization and integration have made the work of policymakers ever more complex, the world-wide financial crisis has reduced the operating margins for formulating and implementing foreign and security policy to near-zero. It has rendered collective action almost impossible, except on the most urgent issues of crisis management.

**Africa war won’t escalate – perceptions of futility and lack of interest.**

Barrett 5 [Robert, MA in Conflict Analysis and Management, Jun 1, “Understanding the Challenges of African Democratization through Conflict Analysis,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=726162]

This is a problem, as Western nations may be increasingly wary of intervening in Africa hotspots after experiencing firsthand the unpredictable and unforgiving nature of societal warfare in both Somalia and Rwanda. On a costbenefit basis, the West continues to be somewhat reluctant to get to get involved in Africa’s dirty wars, evidenced by its political hesitation when discussing ongoing sanguinary grassroots conflicts in Africa. Even as the world apologizes for bearing witness to the Rwandan genocide without having intervened, the United States, recently using the label ‘genocide’ in the context of the Sudanese conflict (in September of 2004), has only proclaimed sanctions against Sudan, while dismissing any suggestions at actual intervention (Giry, 2005). Part of the problem is that traditional military and diplomatic approaches at separating combatants and enforcing ceasefires have yielded little in Africa. No powerful nations want to get embroiled in conflicts they cannot win – especially those conflicts in which the intervening nation has very little interest.

#### No modeling—Nigeria’s had tribunals since ‘66.

**Human Rights News 11-28-2001. [“Fact Sheet: Past U.S. Criticism of Military Tribunals,” p. http://www.cnss.org/rumsmtp1202.htm]**

The State Department condemned Nigeria following the conviction and execution of author and minority rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists before a specially constituted tribunal in which a military officer was one of three judges. The US ambassador was recalled for consultations and sanctions on the Nigerian regime were extended. Special tribunals in Nigeria, including military tribunals, became commonplace during the periods of military rule from 1966 to 1979 and 1983 to 1999, and had jurisdiction over offenses such as civil disturbances, armed robbery, some categories of corruption, coup-plotting, and illegal sale of petroleum. Many military decrees also included "ouster clauses" providing that government decisions could not be questioned in a court of law. In the Country Reports for 1996, the State Department noted that, in Nigeria, "in practice tribunal proceedings often deny defendants due process." In a statement before the House International Relations Committee in 1998, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice stated that, "military tribunals denied due process to political and other prisoners" in Nigeria.

**Their interpretation links to all their offense Cap K and Econ DA proves  
Counter interpretation – we get 2 conditional advocacies  
That’s good  
1.) Innovation –the alternative is teams only run what they are good at, and don’t try new arguments, leads to stale education and dogmatism**

**.2.) Neg Flex –key to check 2ac addons and  2ar persuasion outweighs time benefits of the block. transportation topic is skewed toward the aff.**

**3.) Breadth – Depth is impossible – teams would just read more shitty answers and hope we drop them, only a chance we force critical thinking. Breadth of information allows for multiple access points to education, forces research**

**4) Turns 2ac strategy – force them to read their best offense like turns and addons-Multiple Perms are worse they tempt aff condtionality and skew us worse, voter.  
-Time skew inev – some teams are faster than others, we can run an infinite number of SPEC arguments.   
-Aff didn’t specify their agent – kills agent cps and all implementation based education, voter for fairness education.  
-No Strat Skew – 2ac always has a strategic option - stop crying, 1ar must articulate specific inround abuse  
-Theory is a reason to reject the argument not the team (reasonability)  
A2: Dispo  
Dispo is condo – good teams can kick out of anything.  
a.)    Kills Neg Flex – forces 2nr choice, kills strategic thinking  
b.)    Dogmatism – forces us to defend racism  
c.)     Exhausts education – leads to the worst debates, over-researches a topic.**

2NC Hegemony Unsustainable

Hegemony is unsustainable –

1. Fiscal crisis – debt, inflation, and dollar decline force retrenchment by the end of the decade. That’s Layne.

And primacy makes economic collapse inevitable – fuels bubbles.

Calleo 10 [David P., Dean Acheson Professor and Director of the European Studies Department at the Johns Hopkins University’s Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies ( SAIS), American Decline Revisited, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 4 August 2010 , pages 215 - 227]

The history of the past two decades suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States. As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it clings all the more to its peerless military prowess. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America's geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of the Cold War. The lingering pretension to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against 'terrorism'. Paying for these wars and the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems **poison the currency**, an old pathology that **firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline.** It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In its hegemonic Cold War position, the United States found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today's restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had exploded to just under 300%.25 Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holdings of the Chinese and Japanese. But thanks to today's instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshalled and deployed on very short notice. It is this **excess of volatile money** that arguably **fuels the world's great recurring bubbles**. It can create the semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) **sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings** and **dry up credit** for real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus ends up as a **threat to the world economy** in general.

2. Multipolar transition now – risings powers like China wield increasing clout and demand their place at the table. Great powers will convert resources into military assets if they feel threatened by the U.S. – prevents U.S. power projection. That’s Layne.

3. Prefer neg ev – cites a consensus of economic forecasters and compares the most important indicators.

[Unipolar theorists rely on static measures and fail to grasp the velocity of China’s rise. Insert indicts]

Evaluate their offense within the lens of sustainability – collapse is inevitable which means it’s only a question of safe retrenchment now or miscalculating later in an attempt to prolong primacy.

Layne 7 [Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute,"The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate]

The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. To reduce the fear of U.S. power, the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. 131 Thus, to reduce others' concerns about its power, the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, **it** probably **will**, at some point, **have to fight to uphold its primacy**, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well **hasten its end** by **stimulating more intensive efforts to balance** against the United States, thus causing the United States to become **imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power.** Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.

Try or die – retrenchment now is key to maintain any future influence.

Maher 11 [Richard, IR at Brown, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis Volume 55, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 53–68]

It still remains inevitable that America's outsized role in world politics will decline in the years and decades ahead. Rather than seeking to desperately prolong this position at undue expense, which would serve **only** to **hasten** **America's decline and weaken its long-term position**, the United States should start thinking now about how it will exercise its power and influence once its preeminent position is over. The United States is still in a position to shape this new world order, by **defining the rules, institutions, and patterns of legitimacy** that will prevail in this new era of global politics. Periods of change in the global distribution of power are often chaotic, unstable, and violent. The United States will be responsible for maintaining some kind of global equilibrium so the end of one era of world politics and the emergence of a new, different era avoids the overt power competition and instability of previous transitions. While the United States will face more constraints and pushback from the rest of the world, it may actually be able to **preserve and** in some cases even **expand its influence** in this new era.

Aff evidence doesn’t assume feedback loops.

Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. His current book project, to be published by Yale University Press, is After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. The Global Power Shift from West to East From the MAY-JUNE 2012 issue Share on email Share on twitter Share on facebook Share on digg | More Sharing ServicesMore Christopher Layne | April 25, 2012 http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-global-power-shift-west-east-6796?page=show]

Since the Cold War’s end, America’s military superiority has functioned as an entry barrier designed to prevent emerging powers from challenging the United States where its interests are paramount. But the country’s ability to maintain this barrier faces resistance at both ends. First, the deepening financial crisis will **compel retrenchment**, and the United States will be **increasingly less able** to invest in its military. Second, as ascending powers such as China become wealthier, their military expenditures will expand. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. Thus, over the next decade or so a **feedback loop** will be at work, whereby internal constraints on U.S. global activity will help fuel a shift in the distribution of power, and this in turn will magnify the effects of America’s fiscal and strategic overstretch. With interests throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Caucasus—not to mention the role of guarding the world’s sea-lanes and protecting U.S. citizens from Islamist terrorists—a strategically overextended United States **inevitably will need to retrench.** Further, there is a critical linkage between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige, soft power and agenda-setting capacity, on the other. As the hard-power foundations of Pax Americana erode, so too will the U.S. capacity to shape the international order through influence, example and largesse. This is particularly true of America in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States possessed the material capacity to furnish the international system with abundant financial assistance designed to maintain economic and political stability. Now, this capacity is much diminished.

Heg doesn’t solve conflict –

1. Neocons ignore overwhelming data that proves no correlation between interventions and stability. In the 90s we made cuts and no rivalries developed. That’s Fettweis.

2. Other explanations still hold true in multipolarity – nuclear peace, economic interdependence, and other entrenched norms will exist regardless of power distribution.

3. Their list of vague impacts is academic junk – you should correct for cognitive bias.

Fettweis 11 [Political Science – Tulane, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO]

Assertions that without the combination of U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return to Europe and the Pacific Rim are usually rendered in rather vague language. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “the world will become a more dangerous place and, sooner or later, that will redound to America's detriment.” 53 From where would this danger arise? Who precisely would do the fighting, and over what issues? Without the United States, would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack mainland China again, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace? With one exception, these questions are rarely addressed. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.” 54 Indeed China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese regional, must less global, political expansion. Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination. Overestimating Our Importance One of the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we perceive them to be. A great deal of experimental evidence exists to support the notion that people (and therefore states) tend to overrate the degree to which their behavior is responsible for the actions of others. Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both of which would seem to be especially relevant in the U.S. case. 55 First, believing that we are responsible for their actions gratifies our national ego (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 56 U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders. If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States. Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might, it is not possible to fully understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective. The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.” 57 It is natural, therefore, for U.S. policymakers and strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, we are probably not as important to them as we think. The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, with or without the United States.

Retrenchment’s coming now –

New defense strategy proves.

Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. His next book, for Yale University Press, is After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing January 27, 2012 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405?page=1]

Although cloaked in the reassuring boilerplate about American military preeminence and global leadership, in reality the Obama administration’s new Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) is the **first step** in the United States’ adjustment to the end of the Pax Americana—the sixty-year period of dominance that began in 1945. As the Pentagon document says—without spelling out the long-term grand-strategic implications—the United States is facing “an inflection point.” In plain English, a profound power shift in international politics is taking place, which compels a rethinking of the U.S. world role. The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a serious fiscal crisis by the end of this decade. As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The best indicators of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be replaced by a multipolar international system. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency. Two terms not found in the DSG are “decline” and “imperial overstretch” (the latter coined by the historian Paul Kennedy to describe the consequences when a great power’s economic resources can’t support its external ambitions). But, although President Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta may not admit it, the DSG is the **first move** in what figures to be a **dramatic strategic retrenchment** by the United States over the next two decades. This retrenchment will push to the fore a new U.S. grand strategy—**offshore balancing**. In a 1997 article in International Security, I argued that offshore balancing would displace America’s primacy strategy because it would prove difficult to sustain U.S. primacy in the face of emerging new powers and the erosion of U.S. economic dominance. Even in 1997, it was foreseeable that as U.S. advantages eroded, there would be strong pressures for the United States to bring its commitments into line with its shrinking economic base. This would require scaling back the U.S. military presence abroad; setting clear strategic priorities; devolving the primary responsibility for maintaining security in Europe and East Asia to regional actors; and significantly reducing the size of the U.S. military. Subsequent to that article, offshore balancing has been embraced by other leading American thinkers, including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble and Robert Pape.

Burden-sharing on the rise disproves power vacuum arguments.

Miner 12 [Michael Miner is a Teaching Fellow at Harvard University. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a graduate of Dartmouth College.  Offshore Balancing in an Age of Austerity Michael Miner on Tuesday, 10 January 2012  http://isnblog.ethz.ch/government/offshore-balancing-in-an-age-of-austerity]

Partial integration of British and French force structure is a **sign of things to come** for Europe. Japan and South Korea are making unheralded inroads toward defensive pacts beyond the US regional presence. New military commitments in Australia further strengthen three big allies in the Pacific, and the recent arms package with Saudi Arabia helps check a potentially aggressive Iran in the Persian Gulf – to say nothing of the special relationship with Israel. Stalwart allies are in the process of expanding capability and responsibility; efforts that not only relieve pressure on an overextended US military, but also strengthen allied states aligned against regional competitors. **Offshore balancing has returned** as the time-tested strategy for American security in the near-term. President Obama and his national security team recognize the volatility of anticipating threats to the national interest, and military force remains a vital policy tool within a complex portfolio of options. With regard to the strategic review, President Obama is quietly stressing the importance of regional alliances in a challenging twenty-first century environment. Balancing against great powers and reducing on-the-ground troop commitments is **the first step** toward a strategic clarity that recognizes an America committed to global leadership, but is pragmatically sound in application and concert with allies around the world.

Zero influence.

Quiggin 11 [John, professor at the University of Queensland, The end of US decline, by John Quiggin on January 30, 2011, http://crookedtimber.org/2011/01/30/the-end-of-us-decline/]

In geopolitical terms, the US spends a lot more on its military than anyone else (in fact, more than everyone else put together) and (contrary to the beliefs of most Americans) hardly anything on development aid or other efforts at promoting global public goods. The amount of sustainable influence generated as a result appears **pretty trivial.** The number of places in the world where the US can directly determine, or even substantially influence, political outcomes is **approximately zero** – nothing like what might be associated with an old style Great Power, let alone a superpower or “hyperpower”.As I’ve observed before, Americans of all classes (except those directly connected to the military-industrial complex) get very little payoff for their military expenditure – trillions of dollars of expenditure has been unable to produce positive outcomes in a couple of relatively insignificant countries, or even to put paid to a bunch of pirates in the Indian Ocean.

Primacy fails – no influence.

Mastanduno 9 [Michael, Professor of Government at Dartmouth World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco]

During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

Heg spurs war with Russia and China – extinction.

Roberts 10 [Paul Craig Roberts, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy and associate editor of the Wall Street Journal. He was columnist for Business Week, Scripps Howard News Service, and Creators Syndicate. He has had many university appointments. The Road to Armageddon, Foreign Policy Journal, February 26, 2010 http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/02/26/the-road-to-armageddon]

The U.S. has already encircled Iran with military bases. The U.S. government intends to neutralize China by seizing control over the Middle East and cutting China off from oil. This plan assumes that Russia and China, nuclear armed states, will be intimidated by U.S. anti-missile defenses and acquiesce to U.S. hegemony and that China will lack oil for its industries and military. The U.S. government is delusional. Russian military and political leaders have responded to the obvious threat by declaring NATO a direct threat to the security of Russia and by announcing a change in Russian war doctrine to the pre-emptive launch of nuclear weapons. The Chinese are too confident to be bullied by a washed-up American “superpower.” The morons in Washington are **pushing the envelope of nuclear war.** The insane drive for American hegemony **threatens life on earth.** The American people, by accepting the lies and deceptions of “their” government, are facilitating this outcome.

Multipolarity key to solve China-India war.

Malone and Mukherjee 10 [David M. Malone is President of Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC). A former Canadian ambassador to the UN and High Commissioner to India, he is currently completing a book, "Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy" for Oxford University Press. An occasional scholar of the UN Security Council and related issues of war and peace, he teaches at the NYU Law School and is an associate faculty member of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton, Rohan Mukherjee is a senior research specialist at the Institutions for Fragile States research program at Princeton University. He holds a Master's in public affairs with a specialization in international development from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He has worked with the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and the National Knowledge Commission, Government of India. His principal interests are in the international relations of emerging powers, the political economy of development, and service delivery in developing countries. India and China: Conflict and Cooperation Survival, Volume 52, Issue 1 February 2010 , pages 137 - 158]

And yet, beyond the recognition of its status as a meaningful global power, India does not yet seem to have much of a project for its global reach, while China, which might well have one, is exercising great prudence in articulating it publicly. In a genuinely multipolar world where the principal powers engage one another constantly across a wide range of issues in many different forums, India and China should be able to manage their parallel rise **without generating shocks** on their own continent. A more systematic dialogue, going well beyond high-level visits and acknowledging differences instead of emphasising imagined similarities, could lay the foundations for a better understanding of the domestic compulsions that drive the two countries' foreign policies and help both sides manage their nationalist impulses, transform public perceptions and learn to pre-empt situations before they can develop into **full-blown confrontation.**

Causes extinction.

Kahn 9 [Jeremy, independent journalist who writes about international affairs, politics, business, the environment and the arts. His work has recently appeared in Newsweek International, The New York Times, The Atlantic, Smithsonian, The Boston Globe, The New Republic, Slate, Foreign Policy, Fortune, and Inc., as well as other publications. He has also contributed to the public radio program "Marketplace." Kahn was the managing editor at The New Republic from 2004 to 2006. October 19, 2009, “Why India Fears China,” online: http://www.newsweek.com/id/217088]

The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and China could result in a **nuclear exchange.** And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.

#### Don’t solve war – studies

Henderson ‘2(Errol Henderson, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida, 2002, Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?)

The replication and extension of Oneal and Russet (1997), which is one of the most important studies on the DPP, showed that democracies are not significantly less likely to fight each other. The results demonstrate that Oneal and Russet (1997) findings in support of the DPP are not robust and that join democracy does not reduce the probability of international conflict of pairs of states during the postwar era. Simple and straightforward modifications of Oneal and Russett’s (1997) research design generate these dramatically contradictory results. Specifically, by teasing out the separate impact of democracy and political distance (or political dissimilarity) and by not coding cases of ongoing disputes as new cases of conflict,it became clear that there is no siginifant relationship between join democracy and the likelihood of international war or militarized interstate dispute (MID) for states during the postwar era. These findings suggest that the post-Cold War strategy of “democratic enlargement,” which is aimed at ensuring peace by englaring the community of democratic states, is quite a thin reed on which to rest a state’s foreign policy- much less the hope for international peace. The results indicate that democracies are more war-prone than non-democracies (whether democracy is coded dichotomously or continu­ously) and that democracies are more likely to initiate interstate wars. The findings are obtained from analyses that control for a host of political, economic, and cultural factors that have been implicated in the onset of interstate war, and focus explicitly on state level factors instead of simply inferring state level processes from dyadic level observations as was done in earlier studies (e.g., Oneal and Russett, 1997; Oneal and Ray, 1997). The results imply that democratic enlargement is more likely to increase the probability of war for states since democracies are more likely to become involved in—and to ini­tiate—interstate wars.

#### Their studies are flawed- they have research design problems and ignore both extrastate conflict and third world states

Henderson ‘2(Errol Henderson, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida, 2002, Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 14-15

To my mind, the empirical evidence in support of both the dyadic and the nomadic DPP is problematic for several reasons. The most recent studies alluded to earlier, which indicate that democracies are less likely to fight each other and are more peaceful, in general, than non-democracies, are beset by research design problems that severely hinder their reliability (e.g., Oneal and Russett, 1997; Oneal and Ray, 1997; Russett and Oneal, 2001). For example, many of them rely on a questionable operationalization of joint democracy that conflates the level of democracy of two states with their political dissimilarity. Only by teasing out the effects of each factor are we in a position to confi­dently argue that shared democracy, rather than other factors, is actually the motivating force driving democratic states toward their alleged­ly more peaceful international relations. In addition, the findings used to support monadic DPP claims also rely on questionable research designs that exclude whole categories of international war—namely, extrastate wars, which are usually imperialist and colonial wars. The exclusion of these wars from recent tests of the DPP leaves us unable to determine the actual applicability of the DPP to the full range of international war. In addition, given that some scholars suggest that the DPP is applicable to civil wars (Krain and Myers, 1997; Rummel, 1997), it is important to determine to what extent we observe a “domes­tic democratic peace” for the most civil war prone states—the post­colonial, or third world, states. Previous work has not tested the DPP for this specific group of states, and it is important that our research design address this omission.

#### They were legalized in ’86.

**Amnesty International 2k. [Annual Report on the Federal Republic of Nigeria, p.**

**http://web.amnesty.org/report2000/countries/b1b5babbdb8d5b3b802568f200552956?OpenDocument]**

Also rescinded were decrees which provided for special courts used to imprison and execute government critics after grossly unfair political trials. The Treason and Other Offences (Special Military Tribunals) Decree, No. 1 of 1986, provided for Special Military Tribunals headed by members of the military government. Between 1986 and 1998, these tribunals held treason trials which failed to meet nearly all standards of fair trial, resulting in a total of 79 executions of armed forces officers and the imprisonment of dozens of prisoners of conscience and possible prisoners of conscience. The Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunals) Decree, No. 2 of 1987, provided for Civil Disturbances Special Tribunals directly appointed by the military. Between 1987 and 1995, such tribunals conducted politically motivated and unfair trials, in 1995 resulting in the execution of nine Ogoni activists. Other decrees revoked were the Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree, No. 29 of 1993, which broadened the definition of treason, and the retroactive Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree, No. 12 of 1994, which prohibited legal action challenging any government action or decree.

#### The government always used tribunals.

**Amnesty International 1995. [Nigeria: A Travesty of Justice, Secret treason trials and other concerns, p.** [**http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR440231995?open&of=ENG-376**](http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR440231995?open&of=ENG-376)**]**

They are among 43 prisoners convicted of treason and related offences after secret and grossly unfair trials by a Special Military Tribunal headed by a member of the military government. They are alleged to have been involved in plotting to overthrow the government in March 1995, a plot whose existence is widely doubted. Although the government commuted the death sentences on 14 of them on 1 October 1995, they and most of the other prisoners must now serve long prison terms of between 15 years' and life imprisonment. They have been sent to prisons hundreds of kilometres from their homes where conditions are harsh and pose serious risks to their health.