# 1AC – see Kentucky

# 2AC

## Heg DA

#### Self defense sovles

Daskal and Vladeck, ’13 [Jennifer Daskal is a fellow at Georgetown’s Center on National Security and the Law and an adjunct professor at Georgetown Law Center. Stephen I. Vladeck is a professor of law and the Associate Dean for Scholarship at American University Washington College of Law. “AFTER THE AUMF”. Open Society Foundations. http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/After-the-AUMF-Final.pdf]

C. The President’s Unquestioned Self-Defense Authorities

Our support of law enforcement tools notwithstanding, we do not claim that the law enforcement approach is the only possible response to terrorism, or that the nation’s hands are tied if law enforcement tools are unavailable (given the location of the individual) or ineffective (given the scale of the threat). To the contrary, we recognize the possibility that groups or individuals will come to light that pose a significant, strategic, and imminent threat that the criminal law cannot adequately address. But if and when this situation presents itself, the Executive has the authority—and the responsibility—to act.

Indeed, it is well settled that the President has inherent authority under Article II of the U.S. Constitution and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to take immediate—and, where necessary, lethal—action in defense of the nation. As the Supreme Court explained 150 years ago, “If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority.”46 President Bush would have required no statute to shoot down the planes headed to the World Trade Center on September 11; President Obama would have required no statute to defend U.S. diplomats from attack in Benghazi. The failure to do so in either tragic episode was not the result of insufficient authorities, but insufficient intelligence in advance of the attacks.

Take, moreover, the type of situation with which the Hoover proposal seems most concerned: a terrorist group that does not neatly fall within the AUMF, but is poised to carry out an imminent and lethal attack on the U.S. homeland from a part of the world in which nonmilitary means of thwarting the attack are unavailable. In such a situation, the President could—and should—take action, consistent with the international law requirements of necessity and proportionality, without waiting for a new congressional authorization to use force. We, too, worry about such a hypothetical, but we fail to why, on those facts, self-defense authorities would be inadequate.

#### Link is US has no threat

#### Disprove K

**Heg doesn’t solve war**

**Fettweis 10** Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College.

(Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” [Survival](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713659919), Volume [52](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713659919%7Etab=issueslist%7Ebranches=52#v52), Issue [2](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=g920313969) April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.[29](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0029) To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.[30](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0030) And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

## 2AC Dada K

#### Fwk – weigh the 1AC

#### Perm do both

Postmodernism Generator, 10/26/13 [“Neostructural Theories: Pretextual discourse and surrealism”. http://www.elsewhere.org/pomo/]

If one examines surrealism, one is faced with a choice: either accept neodialectic materialism or conclude that expression must come from communication, given that consciousness is equal to narrativity. Marx’s analysis of surrealism holds that sexuality is capable of intent.

In the works of Spelling, a predominant concept is the distinction between opening and closing. In a sense, any number of theories concerning capitalist feminism exist. The main theme of the works of Spelling is the role of the artist as poet.

Therefore, surrealism suggests that sexual identity has intrinsic meaning. The subject is interpolated into a capitalist feminism that includes consciousness as a reality.

However, Lyotard suggests the use of predialectic capitalist theory to modify class. An abundance of situationisms concerning not, in fact, narrative, but postnarrative may be revealed.

Therefore, in Robin’s Hoods, Spelling analyses capitalist feminism; in Melrose Place he deconstructs surrealism. The premise of capitalist feminism holds that truth is used to entrench class divisions.

Thus, many sublimations concerning surrealism exist. Derrida promotes the use of neoconceptual Marxism to deconstruct sexism.

#### Perm: Vote aff just... because

#### We should act as if truth exists. We can’t PROVE truth but the critique is irrelevant to our daily lives.

**Backhouse, 1997**

[Roger, Prof. History and Philosophy of Economics at University of Birmingham, “Truth and Progress in Economic Knowledge”, p. 44-45]

We don’t endorse gendered language.

Post-modernism argues that knowledge has to be understood in relation to specific discourse communities, and that there is nothing to be said about knowledge in general. This perspective shades rapidly into relativism: the doctrine that the real world, and evidence about it, do little to constrain our beliefs. All evidence, it is argued, is dependent on a conceptual framework, which undermines any claim to objectivity or to truth in anything other than a purely local sense. Although it may not be as satisfactory a response as we would like, it is quite coherent to argue that although we cannot refute these claims, they can be ignored. Consider the following argument about scepticism in philosophy. How important is it to defeat scepticism? How central is it to the tasks of epistemology? There is an attitude towards epistemological issues that can be expressed thus: Although we cannot answer the sceptical arguments, we are unconvinced by them. No one genuinely doubts his beliefs about his surroundings on the grounds that he cannot show that he is not a brain suspended in a vat of nutrients, sustained and manipulated by a brilliant scientist. Indeed, **the more convinced we are that the arguments cannot be met head on, the more they look like pointless philosophical games**. Consequently, let us leave them behind, and, making the best use we can of our knowledge of the history of science and the psychology of cognition, **construct a plausible, scientifically informed, account of how we know as much as (we all agree) we do know**. This view exploits the fact that our puzzlement by sceptical arguments is apparently 'insulated' from our first order practice of conducting inquiries and forming beliefs. Since they have no impact on this practice, we can ignore these arguments when we search for a philosophical understanding of our success in obtaining knowledge of reality. (Hookway, 1990, p. 130)2 The challenge posed by scepticism to epistemology is not quite the same as the challenge to economic methodology posed by post-modernist arguments, but the parallels are sufficiently close that we could respond in a similar way. Whilst it is certainly the case that knowledge is constructed, and that much of our knowledge of economic events is conditioned by what we take for granted as members of particular discourse communities, it is going too far to argue that there is no such thing as empirical evidence. Post-modernist arguments end up treating all knowledge as similar in kind, whereas in practice this is not the case. Economic knowledge comprises statements which differ markedly as regards the certainty with which they are held. In many cases it may, in practice, be unproblematic to take the existence of objective empirical evidence for granted. We could then use our knowledge of contemporary economics and the history of economic thought, together with such ideas from philosophy or any other relevant discipline, to explore the nature of economic knowledge and to make such generalizations as we can concerning the way in which economic knowledge progresses. Though the results of such inquiries will always remain, to a greater or lesser extent, conjectural, there is no reason in principle why they should not be used as the basis for methodological prescriptions. Such prescriptions will, inevitably, be only as strong as the arguments on which they are based, but that is no reason why they should not be made and debated.

#### Vote aff to vote neg

## Suffering k

### Impact

#### Existence outweighs – gateway for valuation

**Gelven ’94** (Michael, Prof. Phil. – Northern Illinois U., “War and Existence: A Philosophical Inquiry”, p. 136-137)

The personal pronouns, like "I" and "We," become governed existentially by the possessive pronouns, like "ours," "mine," "theirs"; and this in turn becomes governed by the adjective "own." What is authentic becomes what is our own as a way of existing. The meaning of this term is less the sense of possession than the sense of belonging to. It is a translation of the German eigen, from which the term eigentlich (authentic) is derived. To lose this sense of one's own is to abandon any meaningfulness, and hence to embrace nihilism. To be a nihilist is to deny that there is any way of being that is our own; for the nihilist, what is one's own has no meaning. The threat here is not that what is our own may yield to what is not, but rather that the distinction itself will simply collapse. Unless I can distinguish between what is our own and what is not, no meaningfulness is possible at all. This is the foundation of the we-they principle. The pronouns in the title do not refer to anything; they merely reveal how we think. Like all principles, this existential principle does not determine specific judgments, any more than the principle of cause and effect determines what the cause of any given thing is. The we-they principle is simply a rule that governs the standards by which certain judgments are made. Since it is possible to isolate the existential meanings of an idea from the thinglike referent, the notions of we-ness and they-ness can be articulated philosophically. On the basis of this primary understanding, it is possible to talk about an "existential value," that is, the weight o. rank given to ways of existing in opposition to other kinds of value, such as moral or psychological values. But the principle itself is not, strictly speaking, a principle of value; it is an ontological principle, for its foundation is in the very basic way in which I think about what it means to be. The ground of the we-they principle is, quite simply, the way in which we think about being. Thus, it is more fundamental than any kind of evaluating or judging. One of the things that the authentic I can do, of course, is to concern itself with moral questions. Whether from a deontological sense of obligation or from a utilitarian projection of possible happiness, an I that considers these matters nevertheless is presupposed by them. Although authenticity and morality are distinct, a sense of who one is must precede a decision about how to act. Thus, the question of authenticity comes before the question of obligation. And since the worth of the I is generated from the prior worth of the we, it follows there can be no moral judgment that cancels out the worth of the I or the We. This is not to say that anything that benefits the we is therefore more important than what ought to be done. It is merely to say that any proper moral judgment will in fact be consistent with the integrity of the we. Thus, I would be morally prohibited from offending someone else merely for my own advantage, but no moral law would ever require me to forgo my existential integrity. This is true not only for moral questions but for any question of value whatsoever: all legitimate value claims must be consistent with the worth of the I and the We. It is only because my existence matters that I can care about such things as morality, aesthetics, or even happiness. Pleasure, of course, would still be preferable to pain, but to argue that one ought to have pleasure or even that it is good to have pleasure would simply reduce itself to a tautology: if I define pleasure as the satisfaction of my wants, then to say I want pleasure is tautological, for I am merely saying that I want what I want, which may be true but is not very illuminating. The existential worth of existing is therefore fundamental and cannot be outranked by any other consideration. Unless I am first meaningful, I cannot be good; unless I first care about who I am, I cannot genuinely care about anything else, even my conduct. To threaten this ground of all values, the worth of my own being, then becomes the supreme assault against me. To defend it and protect it is simply without peer. It is beyond human appeal or persuasion.

#### Survival outweighs – different values and forms of life necessary to sustainability so we shouldn’t privilege ethics over existence.

This is an impact to the argument that we should not try to define the good life. When people make ethics prior argument, they are essentially saying that only living in this way creates meaning. This could be value to life/ethics. This is a way to say that the case impacts outweighs that argument. It’s a good defense to not describe something as a prior argument. We should instead value the neutrality that comes with not putting all our eggs in one basket. Fancy way of survival outweighs. The cost of making living in this way a prior issue means that you can ruin ways of survive. There is not a blanket solution to how we should live.

Marcel **WISSENBURG** Political Theory @ Radboud University (Nijmegen Netherlands) **‘6** “Ecological Neutrality and Liberal Survivalism” *Analyse & Kritik* 28 p. 141-144

One could then argue that even though ecologists may agree on what they want to achieve (let us at least assume that much), they cannot agree in advance on how to achieve it, for the simple reason that more research is needed. Laboratory experiments only get us so far; countless permutations and combinations of technologies, resources and lifestyles will have to be tested in practice, in real life and real environments, simply because the success of any solution for unsustainability is unpredictable. This is where the precautionary principle, one of the few procedural principles most ecologists appear to support, comes into play. It would be imprudent, not to say contrary to any interpretation of the precautionary principle, to prescribe one lifestyle for all humans living under unimaginably different circumstances, i. e., to put all one’s eggs in one basket, or even to create social environments in which some lifestyles are wilfully obstructed. The result could be unforeseen local or global exhaustion of resources, civilization reaching a dead end, new and greener technologies and ways of life remaining undiscovered. Prescribing an appropriate lifestyle instead, one that is ‘in tune’ (in harmony) with a particular group’s natural environment, may appear to be a more sensible solution, but it only gets us halfway there—wherever ‘there’ may be. Misanthropic as the observation may be, many of the darker ecologists have argued that humans have never ever led sustainable lives, and if they did once, all knowledge of it has disappeared. In other words, giving scientific uncertainty its due role, if we do not know what a sustainable life ought to be like for all humans, we do not know what it ought to be like for any particular subset; we could easily face the same results as when prescribing one lifestyle for all. Since laboratory settings and drawing table plans can only be of limited help, the road to sustainability may be one encouraging diversity, bold experiments challenging orthodox views (from space travel to dishwashers), and trial and error. From here, it is only a small step towards accepting an ecological principle of neutrality with regard to lifestyles and social and natural environments (together: life environments), the Life Environment Principle: “There is to be a maximum set of life environments compatible with a similar set for others.” (see Wissenburg 2007 for further interpretations of this principle) Having rid ourselves of the misconception that substantive ecological goals necessarily imply one road to salvation only, or even many roads as long as they do not involve a conception of neutrality, it is now time to look more closely at the liberal conception of neutrality. In the 17th and 18th Century, liberalism contained no such principle as “all theories of the good deserve equal respect”; there was no room for the modern liberal notion of neutrality there. Females, primitives, peasants and atheists were never part of the original liberal plan. Liberals were tolerant and promoted tolerance, but tolerance was almost exclusively limited to different religions (or even only some sects within Christendom) and the moralities to which they gave rise. Overarching ‘all’ different moralities was one final touchstone: natural law. First stretched up to legitimize libertine sexual practices and finally blown to bits by De Sade’s insistence that anything goes that natural law allows, 19th Century liberals like Mill and Green replaced natural law by a perfectionist belief in pluralism as the road to the good life. Although no explicit standards for ‘the best way of life’ were given, the assumption was clearly that some ways of life were better than others, that discovering the better way(s) of life was a matter of experimentation, and that some could even be excluded beforehand—although it has never become clear if pushpin, being an obviously less worthy activity than poetry, belonged to the latter class. It is only in parts of 20th Century liberalism that we can find supporters for the idea that governments should be scrupulously neutral with regard to real-existing and irreducible moral pluralism, i. e., liberals who have given up all hope of moral perfection. In other words, neutrality is not a core value of liberalism, though perhaps tolerance towards reasonably defensible disagreement on foundational principles is. Although liberalism has then, apparently, given up on its belief that the laws of nature include natural laws (i. e., moral laws), it has never rejected the notion of laws of nature (i. e., physics) demarcating the realm of human possibilities. Nor has it given up belief that physical laws do and moral principles should apply equally to all: if I have a right to X by virtue of property Y, and you also have property Y, then, other things being equal, you have an equal right to X. This one natural law left over has always (although not always consistently) served as a restraint on individual acquisition, excluding first violence and murder except when in self-defence, then slavery and the subjection of women, next aspects of pornography and educational indoctrination—all reflected in John Rawls’ First Principle. At this point, we meet a fork in the road. In one direction, we find a typically social liberal a priori argument for nature conservation. The other is more in line with classical liberalism, i. e., John Locke’s defence of the right to private property, requiring real need and sufficient remaining stock as justifications, combined with John Stuart Mill’s harm principle. The social liberal road leads us to the notion of equal opportunity. Where Rawls (1973) criticized Napoleonic equal opportunity as unfair since it made careers open to all but did not guarantee equal education prior to entering the career path, Rawls himself can in turn be criticized for promising equal starting positions (fair equality of opportunity) but not delivering. As conscious as social liberals have always been to educational, social and economic inequality as factors inhibiting an equal start in life, as unmindful have they remained of environmental factors with the same effect—even though one’s birth place is as undeserved as one’s talents or one’s parents’ class. While he himself kept rejecting cosmopolitan liberalism, the later Rawls (1999) did affirm that participation in a just international society is possible only for relatively affluent societies; on them rests a moral obligation (a ‘natural duty’, Rawls (1973) would say) to remove economically and environmentally challenged societies from that state. The same line of reasoning might be used to support the thesis that any society has an obligation to ensure that its members live under conditions of relative scarcity rather than absolute poverty, i. e., that they have sufficient resources to survive in the first place. An alternative route to survival as the primary concern of liberals leads through possessive or classical liberalism. In a way, liberalism has become more and more restrictive over the centuries, excluding more and more ways of life and lifestyles as unjustifiable obstructions to equal liberty, in turn regardless of the goal served by liberty: some lifestyles are straightforward morally repugnant (raping), some are so indirectly by seizing a, by law of nature, scarce good (looting). Just like no human can claim the exclusive right to rule all others any more than any other, no human can (mutatis mutandis) claim the exclusive right to a scarce resource any more than anyone else. In other words: environmental factors limit all systems of human liberty. From here, using Locke’s provisos, it is only a small step towards acknowledging that, first, no human can claim, more than any other, the exclusive right to the use, possession or ownership of nature in any way in which it can be interpreted as a resource; and then to the principle that no part or aspect of nature may be used by any one individual unless an argument can be given that trumps all others against that individual’s using it. Given the fact that nature can always be interpreted in some way as a scarce resource, the only argument that cannot be trumped (although it can be met on equal terms) would be survival. Both roads lead to the same conclusion: survival trumps everything. Without the necessary natural (and social) resources to survive, diversity of lifestyle, autonomy, choice and justice become fantasies; where resources are finite, no individual’s life of luxury can be justified unless ‘enough and as good’ was left for others to survive on, or unless the worst-off had their fair share in natural resources enabling them not just an equal start, but simply the ability to start. Hence, liberalism’s appreciation of moral pluralism combined with the recognition not only in theory but also in practice that the means to realize different views of the good life are limited could become a survivalist theory, a theory in which diversity in lifestyle is permissible only when survival is guaranteed first. The exact meaning of the crucial term “survival” is of course open to debate. From a libertarian point of view, it can be read as a Lockean proviso for those resources needed to breathe, move and procreate (food, water and air in whatever form). Social liberals will indubitably be divided on the exact border between basic needs and further wants, with many arguing that survival equals a life worth living in a given social context, hence some degree of positive liberty: the availability of the best possible (and most expensive) health care in one place, the prohibition of SUVs elsewhere. What matters is not that survival is a controversial or essentially contested concept, what matters is that at the level of principles, survival may come to precede just distribution—in Rawls’ (1973) terms, that a general conception of justice may be more often considered fitting than a special conception, and that more and more often the condition of relative scarcity, required to successfully apply the concept of justice in the first place, may not be judged to have been met at all.

#### Death precedes all other impacts – it ontologically destroys the subject and prevents any alternative way of knowing the world

**Paterson, 03** - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unin- tentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81

In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Life self-affirms its value

**Bernstein ‘2** (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)

This is precisely what Jonas does in The Phenomenon of Life, his rethinking of the meaning of organic life. He tealizes that his philosophical project goes against many of the deeply embedded prejudices and dogmas of contemporary philosophy. He challenges two well-entrenched dogmas: that there is no metaphysical truth, and that there is no path from the "is" to the "ought". To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for value and purpose in being itself. These are strong claims; and, needless to say, they are extremely controversial. In defense of Jonas, it should be said that he approaches this task with both boldness and intellectual modesty. He frequently acknowledges that he cannot "prove" his claims, but he certainly believes that his "premises" do "more justice to the total phenomenon of man and Being in general" than the prevailing dualist or reductionist alternatives. "But in the last analysis my argument can do no more than give a rational grounding to an option it presents as a choice for a thoughtful person — an option that of course has its own inner power of persuasion. Unfortunately I have nothing better to offer. Perhaps a future metaphysics will be able to do more." 8 To appreciate how Jonas's philosophical project unfolds, we need to examine his philosophical interpretation of life. This is the starting point of his grounding of a new imperative of responsibility. It also provides the context for his speculations concerning evil. In the foreword to The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas gives a succinct statement of his aim. Put at its briefest, this volume offers an "existential" interpretation of biological facts. Contemporary existentialism, obsessed with man alone, is in the habit of claiming as his unique privilege and predicament much of what is rooted in organic existence as such: in so doing, it withholds from the organic world the insights to be learned from the awareness of self. On its part, scientific biology, by its rules confined to the physical, outward facts, must ignore the dimension of inwardness that belongs to life: in so doing, it submerges the distinction of "animate" and "inanimate." A new reading of the biological record may recover the inner dimension — that which we know best -- for the understanding of things organic and so reclaim for psycho-physical unity of life that place in the theoretical scheme which it had lost through the divorce of the material and the mental since Descartes. p. ix) Jonas, in his existential interpretation of bios, pursues "this underlying theme of all of life in its development through the ascending order of organic powers and functions: metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind — a progressive scale of freedom and peril, culminating in man, who may understand his uniqueness anew when he no longer sees himself in metaphysical isolation" (PL, p. ix). The way in which Jonas phrases this theme recalls the Aristotelian approach to bios, and it is clear that Aristotle is a major influence on Jonas. There is an even closer affinity with the philosophy of nature that Schelling sought to elaborate in the nineteenth century. Schelling (like many post- Kantian German thinkers) was troubled by the same fundamental dichotomy that underlies the problem for Jonas. The dichotomy that Kant introduced between the realm of "disenchanted" nature and the realm of freedom leads to untenable antinomies. Jonas differs from both Aristotle and Schelling in taking into account Darwin and contemporary scientific biology. A proper philosophical understanding of biology must always be compatible with the scientific facts. But at the same time, it must also root out misguided materialistic and reductionist interpretations of those biological facts. In this respect, Jonas's naturalism bears a strong affinity with the evolutionary naturalism of Peirce and Dewey. At the same time, Jonas is deeply skeptical of any theory of evolutionary biology that introduces mysterious "vital forces" or neglects the contingencies and perils of evolutionary development.' Jonas seeks to show "that it is in the dark stirrings of primeval organic substance that a principle of freedom shines forth for the first time within the vast necessity of the physical universe" (PL 3). Freedom, in this broad sense, is not identified exclusively with human freedom; it reaches down to the first glimmerings of organic life, and up to the type of freedom manifested by human beings. " 'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being, i.e., a manner of executing existence, distinctive of the organic per se and thus shared by all members but by no nonmembers of the class: an ontologically descriptive term which can apply to mere physical evidence at first" (PL 3). This coming into being of freedom is not just a success story. "The privilege of freedom carries the burden of need and means precarious being" (PL 4). It is with biological metabolism that this principle of freedom first arises. Jonas goes "so far as to maintain that metabolism, the basic stratum of all organic existence, already displays freedom — indeed that it is the first form freedom takes." 1 ° With "metabolism — its power and its need — not-being made its appearance in the world as an alternative embodied in being itself; and thereby being itself first assumes an emphatic sense: intrinsically qualified by the threat of its negative it must affirm itself, and existence affirmed is existence as a concern" (PL 4). This broad, ontological understanding of freedom as a characteristic of all organic life serves Jonas as "an Ariadne's thread through the interpretation of Life" (PL 3). The way in which Jonas enlarges our understanding of freedom is indicative of his primary argumentative strategy. He expands and reinterprets categories that are normally applied exclusively to human beings so that we can see that they identify objectively discernible modes of being characteristic of everything animate. Even inwardness, and incipient forms of self; reach down to the simplest forms of organic life. 11 Now it may seem as if Jonas is guilty of anthropomorphism, of projecting what is distinctively human onto the entire domain of living beings. He is acutely aware of this sort of objection, but he argues that even the idea of anthropomorphism must be rethought. 12 We distort Jonas's philosophy of life if we think that he is projecting human characteristics onto the nonhuman animate world. Earlier I quoted the passage in which Jonas speaks of a "third way" — "one by which the dualistic rift can be avoided and yet enough of the dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man" (GEN 234). We avoid the "dualistic rift" by showing that there is genuine continuity of organic life, and that such categories as freedom, inwardness, and selfhood apply to everything that is animate. These categories designate objective modes of being. But we preserve "enough dualistic insight" when we recognize that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood manifest themselves in human beings in a distinctive manner. I do not want to suggest that Jonas is successful in carrying out this ambitious program. He is aware of the tentativeness and fallibility of his claims, but he presents us with an understanding of animate beings such that we can discern both continuity and difference.' 3 It should now be clear that Jonas is not limiting himself to a regional philosophy of the organism or a new "existential" interpretation of biological facts. His goal is nothing less than to provide a new metaphysical understanding of being, a new ontology. And he is quite explicit about this. Our reflections [are] intended to show in what sense the problem of life, and with it that of the body, ought to stand in the center of ontology and, to some extent, also of epistemology. . . The central position of the problem of life means not only that it must be accorded a decisive voice in judging any given ontology but also that any treatment of itself must summon the whole of ontology. (PL 25) The philosophical divide between Levinas and Jonas appears to be enormous. For Levinas, as long as we restrict ourselves to the horizon of Being and to ontology (no matter how broadly these are conceived), there is no place for ethics, and no answer to ethical nihilism. For Jonas, by contrast, unless we can enlarge our understanding of ontology in such a manner as would provide an objective grounding for value and purpose within nature, there is no way to answer the challenge of ethical nihilism. But despite this initial appearance of extreme opposition, there is a way of interpreting Jonas and Levinas that lessens the gap between them. In Levinasian terminology, we can say that Jonas shows that there is a way of understanding ontology and the living body that does justice to the nonreducible alterity of the other (l'autrui). 14 Still, we might ask how Jonas's "existential" interpretation of biological facts and the new ontology he is proposing can provide a metaphysical grounding for a new ethics. Jonas criticizes the philosophical prejudice that there is no place in nature for values, purposes, and ends. Just as he maintains that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood are objective modes of being, so he argues that values and ends are objective modes of being. **There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life**" (IR 81). 15 "**The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being**. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — **this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings**. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human ac-tion so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "**Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth**"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11)

**even devalued lives are worth saving**

**Belliotti 3** – Professor of Philosophy, SUNY (Raymond, Happiness is Overrated, p 84)

Consider the following analysis of human lives. A life is minimally meaningful it embodies enough freely chosen interests, projects, purposes, and commitments to engage the bearer and animate his or her faith in life. Even a minimally meaningful life has a narrative structure as a person organizes her energies and resources around her interests and projects. A minimally meaningful life is minimally worthwhile. A minimally worthwhile life is one worth living, a life such that one would not be better off dead or never having been born. The activities that bring minimal meaning must be appropriate to the experience, they must be real not simulated, not induced through external agency, nor merely hallucinations. The bar of a meaningful life is quite low. Minimal meaning produces enough satisfaction of desires and interests to block suicide or voluntary euthanasia. Lives are worth continuing and minimally meaningful where great achievement is lacking. Some lives are more meaningful than other lives. Robustly meaningful lives, the ones to which we aspire, embody interests, projects, purposes, and commitments that produce significance. A robustly meaningful life is significant, sometimes important, occasionally even exemplary. We, typically, hope not merely to maintain our lives, but to strive for our vision of a good life. To be significant, a life must influence the lives of others in uncommon ways. A significant life leaves historical footprints. To be important, a life must be significant enough to make a relatively enduring difference in the world. These historical footprints express, thereby making more public, the importance of the life. To be exemplary, a life must be meaningful, significant, important, and valuable enough to serve as a model or ideal. The distinction between minimally meaningful and robustly meaningful lives allows us to include, as we should, both a disabled, slightly retarded person and Leonardo da Vinci into the pantheon of lives worth living. Thus, meaningful lives need not be significant, important, or valuable lives. Most of us do not have stunningly significant and important lives, although almost all of us do affect the lives of others. Most of our lives fall somewhere between minimally meaningful and robustly meaningful lives. The degree and manner of influence is crucial. To be valuable, lives must be linked to and support value. Some of the more important types of value are moral, cognitive, aesthetic, and religious. Hitler had a meaningful, significant, and important life. He did not have a valuable life nor an exemplary life. A valuable life is always meaningful, but a meaningful life may not be valuable. Hitler's life was meaningful but it is reasonable to view it as valueless in the sense that his collective deeds were stunningly immoral.

#### Value to life criteria are fascist

**Szacki 96** – Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Warsaw (Jerzy, Liberalism After Communism, p 197)

Thus, the task of politics cannot and should not be to resolve the dispute among different conceptions of life. This is completely unattainable or is attainable only by a totalitarian enslavement of society in the name of some one conception. This being the case, according to Dworkin, 'political decisions must be as far as possible independent of conceptions of the good life, or what gives value to life. Since citizens of a society differ in these conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another.'59

#### increasing global happiness solves value to life

**UMNS 8** – University of Michigan News Service (“Happiness is rising around the world: U-M study” 6/30, <http://www.ns.umich.edu/htdocs/releases/story.php?id=6629>)

People in most countries around the world are happier these days, according to newly released data from the World Values Survey based at the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. Data from representative national surveys conducted from 1981 to 2007 show the happiness index rose in an overwhelming majority of nations studied. "It's a surprising finding," said U-M political scientist Ronald Inglehart, who directs the World Values Surveys and is the lead author of an article on the topic to be published in the July 2008 issue of the journal Perspectives on Psychological Science. "It's widely believed that it's almost impossible to raise an entire country's happiness level." The 2007 wave of the surveys also provides a ranking of 97 nations containing 90 percent of the world's population. The results indicate that Denmark is the happiest nation in the world and Zimbabwe the unhappiest. The United States ranks 16th on the list, immediately after New Zealand. During the past 26 years, the World Values Surveys have asked more than 350,000 people how happy they are, using the same two questions. "Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, rather happy, not very happy, not at all happy?" And, "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?" Combining responses to these two questions, Inglehart and colleagues constructed an index of subjective well-being that reflects both happiness and general life satisfaction. In the 52 countries for which a substantial time series is available (covering 17 years on average), this index rose in 40 countries and fell in only 12. The average percentage of people who said they were "very happy" increased by almost seven points. "Most earlier research has suggested that happiness levels are stable," Inglehart said. "Important events like winning the lottery or learning you have cancer can lead to short-term changes, but in the long run most previous research suggests that people and nations are stuck on a 'hedonic treadmill.' The belief has been that no matter what happens or what we do, basic happiness levels are stable and don't really change." The new findings from the World Values Surveys not only show that during the past 25 years, happiness has in fact risen substantially in most countries. Fully as important as the fact that happiness rose is the reason why. In recent decades, low-income countries such as India and China have experienced unprecedented rates of economic growth, dozens of medium-income countries have democratized and there has been a sharp rise of gender equality and tolerance of ethnic minorities and gays and lesbians in developed societies. Economic growth, democratization and rising social tolerance have all contributed to rising happiness, with democratization and rising tolerance having even more impact than economic growth. All of these changes have contributed to providing people with a wider range of choice in how to live their lives—which is a key factor in happiness. The people of rich countries tend to be happier than those of poor countries, but even controlling for economic factors, certain types of societies are much happier than others. "The results clearly show that the happiest societies are those that allow people the freedom to choose how to live their lives," Inglehart said. As an example, Inglehart points to the tolerant social norms and democratic political systems in Denmark, Iceland, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Canada all of which rank among the 10 happiest countries in the world. "The events of the past 25 years have brought a growing sense of freedom that seems to be even more important than economic development in contributing to rising happiness," Inglehart said. "Moreover, the most effective way to maximize happiness seems to change with rising levels of economic development. In subsistence-level societies, happiness is closely linked with in-group solidarity, religiosity and national pride. At higher levels of economic security, free choice has the largest impact on happiness."

### Perm

Do the plan and embrace the inevitability of suffering

Plan is not an attempt to eliminate suffering as part of the human condition. We think we can contigently address the worse forms of violence.

If the heg and executive power disad don’t prevent voting neg from solving, you can vote aff despite our attempt to secure the world

#### Stability isn’t about perfection. Trying to achieve social peace is about preventing violent anarchy.

**Elshtain ‘3** (Jean Bethke, Prof. Social and Pol. Ethics – U. Chicago, “Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World”, p. 48-49)

Many, myself included, believe that Hobbes overstated his case. But there is a powerful element of truth in his depiction of the state of nature. Without civic peace—a basic framework of settled law and simple, everyday order—human life descends to its most primitive level. By primitive I mean rudimentary, the bare minimum—we struggle just to stay alive. The face of such worlds is known to us. We saw it in Somalia under the warlords. We saw it under the Taliban in Afghanistan, where horrible disorder prevailed in the name of order. When government becomes destructive of the most basic end for which it is instituted, tranquillitas ordinis, it abandons its minimal raison d'être and can no longer be said to be legitimate. This assumption is essential to political theory. All political theories begin with a notion of how to establish and sustain order among human beings. Some go beyond this minimal requirement to ask how human beings can work to attain justice, or serve the common good, or preserve and protect political liberty. But none of these other ends can be served without basic order. George Weigel defines tranquillitas ordinis as "the peace of public order in dynamic political community," insisting that there is nothing static about "the concept of tranquillitas ordinis as it evolved after Augustine." 3 The primary reason for the state's existence is to create those minimal conditions that prevent the worst from happening—meaning, the worst that human beings can do to one another. How do we prevent people from devouring one another like fishes, as Augustine put it? This task is in the first instance one of interdiction: preempting horrible things before they occur. **Not** **all misfortune, catastrophe, or crime can be prevented.** What Augustine calls "corking anxieties" are part of the human condition. **But we can try to eliminate as many of the conditions that give rise to catastrophe as possible. We can refuse to tolerate violent crime and arbitrary, chaotic disorder**. It is horrific to stand in the ruins of a once flourishing city or a section of a city and to know that a government could not prevent what happened there—or was, even worse, the agent of destruction. Imagine such horror as a daily occurrence. If this were our circumstance, we would rightly seek the restoration of basic, minimally decent civic peace and order. And we would rightly ask: Could none of this have been prevented? Is the government somehow responsible for the chaos and destruction? If our answer to the former question is yes, we are likely to call for a new government.

### Alt

Accepting vulnerability is the worst example of slippery slope reasoning possible. It’s probably bad to live in constant paranoid fear of every death threat but it’s not bad to eliminate pointless catastrophic risks. For instance not walking in front of speeding traffic does not imply you become a shut-in who won’t go outside. Regardless of what their authors absurdely claim, people CAN AND DO LIVE THIS MIDDLE GROUND ALL THE TIME.

We can’t stop caring about our survival. The ONLY way humans can deal with the terror of inevitable death is to manage it with order and denial. The alternative LITERALLY makes life unlivable.

**Pyszczynski ‘4** (Tom, Prof. Psych. – U. Colorado, Social Research, “What are we so afraid of? A terror management theory perspective on the politics of fear”, Winter, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2267/is\_4\_71/ai\_n13807478/)

TMT starts with a consideration of how human beings are both similar to, and different from, all other animals. We start with the assumption that, **like all other animals, humans are born with a very basic evolved proclivity to stay alive and that fear, and all the biological structures of the brain that produce it, evolved, at least initially, to keep the animal alive.** This, of course, is highly adaptive, in that it facilitates survival, and an animal that does not stay alive very long has little chances of reproducing and passing on its genes. But as our species evolved, it developed a wide range of other adaptations that helped us survive and reproduce, the most important being a set of highly sophisticated intellectual abilities that enable us to: a) think and communicate with symbols, which of course is the basis for language, b) project ourselves in time and imagine a future including events that have never happened before, and c) reflect back on ourselves, and take ourselves as an object of our own attention--self-awareness. These are all very adaptive abilities that play central roles in the system through which humans regulate their behavior--usually referred to as the self (cf. Carver and Scheier, 1998). These abilities made it possible for us to survive and prosper in a far wider range of environments than any other animal has ever done, and accomplish all that we humans have done that no other species ever has been capable of doing. However, these unique intellectual abilities also created a major problem: they made us aware that, **although we are biologically programmed to stay alive** and avoid things that would cut our life short, the one absolute certainty in life is that we must die. We are also forced to realize that death can come at any time for any number of reasons, none of which are particularly pleasant--a predator, natural disaster, another hostile human, and an incredible range of diseases and natural processes, ranging from heart attacks and cancer to AIDS. If we are "lucky" we realize that our bodies will just wear out and we will slowly fade away as we gradually lose our most basic functions. Not a very pretty picture. TMT posits that this clash of a core desire for life with awareness of the inevitability of death created the potential for paralyzing terror. Although all animals experience fear in the face of clear and present dangers to their survival, only humans know what it is that they are afraid of, and that ultimately there is no escape from this ghastly reality. We suspect that this potential for terror would have greatly interfered with ongoing goal-directed behavior, and **life itself**, if it were left unchecked. It may even have made the intellectual abilities that make our species special unviable in the long run as evolutionary adaptations--and there are those who think that the fear and anxiety that results from our sophisticated intelligence may still eventually lead to the extinction of our species. So humankind used their newly emerging intellectual abilities to manage the potential for terror that these abilities produced by calling the understandings of reality that were emerging as a result of these abilities into service as a way of controlling their anxieties. The potential for terror put a "press" on emerging explanations for reality, what we refer to as cultural worldviews, such that any belief system that was to survive and be accepted by the masses needed to manage this potential for anxiety that was inherent in the recently evolved human condition. **Cultural worldviews manage existential terror by providing a meaningful,** orderly, and **comforting conception of the world** that helps us come to grips with the problem of death. Cultural worldviews provide a meaningful explanation of life and our place in the cosmos; **a set of standards** for what is valuable behavior, **good and evil**, that give us the potential of acquiring self-esteem, the sense that we are valuable, important, and significant contributors to this meaningful reality; and the hope of transcending death and attaining immortality in either a literal or symbolic sense. Literal immortality refer to those aspects of the cultural worldview that promise that death is not the end of existence, that some part of us will live on, perhaps in an ethereal heaven, through reincarnation, a merger of our consciousness with God and all others, or the attainment of enlightenment--beliefs in literal immortality are **nearly universal**, with the specifics varying widely from culture to culture. Cultures also provide us with the hope of attaining symbolic immortality, by being part of something larger, more significant, and more enduring than ourselves, such as our families, nations, ethnic groups, professions, and the like. Because these entities will continue to exist long after our deaths, we attain symbolic immortality by being valued parts of them.

#### The alt fails – and the case is a disad to it

Strauss 59 Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago

[Leo “What is Political Philosophy and Other Studies” (p 54-55)]

The difficulties to which German idealism was exposed gave rise to the third wave of modernity-of the wave that bears us today. This last epoch was inaugurated by Nietzsche. Nietzsche retained what appeared to him to be the insight due to the historical consciousness of the 19th century. But he rejected the view that the historical process is rational as well as the premise that a harmony between the genuine individual and the modern state is possible. He may be said to have returned, on the level of the historical consciousness, from Hegel's reconciliation to Rousseau's antinomy. He taught then that all human life and human thought ultimately rests on horizon-forming creations which are not susceptible of rational legitimization. The creators are great individuals. The solitary creator who gives a new law unto himself and who subjects himself to all its rigors takes the place of Rousseau's solitary dreamer. For Nature has ceased to appear as lawful and merciful. **The fundamental experience of existence is therefore the experience**, not of bliss, but **of** **suffering,** of emptiness, of an abyss. **Nietzsche**'s creative call to creativity was addressed to individuals who should revolutionize their own lives, not to society or to his nation. But he **expected** or hoped that **his call**, at once stern and imploring; questioning and desirous to be questioned, **would tempt the best** ~~men~~ of the generations after him **to become true selves and thus to form a new nobility which would be able to rule the planet**. He opposed the possibility of a planetary aristocracy to the alleged necessity of a universal classless and stateless society. Being certain of the tameness of modern western man, he preached the sacred right of "merciless extinction" of large masses of ~~men~~ with as little restraint as his great antagonist had done. He used much of his unsurpassable and inexhaustible power of passionate and fascinating speech for making his readers loathe, not only socialism and communism, but conservatism, nationalism and democracy as well. After having taken upon himself this great political responsibility, **he could not show his readers a way toward political responsibility**. He left them no choice except that between **irresponsible indifference to politics and irresponsible political options**. He thus prepared a regime which, as long as it lasted, made discredited democracy look again like the golden age. He tried to articulate his understanding both of the modern situation and of human life as such by his doctrine of the will to power. The difficulty inherent in the philosophy of the will to power led after Nietzsche to the explicit renunciation of the very notion of eternity. Modern thought reaches its culmination, its highest self-consciousness, in the most radical historicism, i.e., in explicitly condemning to oblivion the notion of eternity. For oblivion of eternity, or, in other words, estrangement from man's deepest desire and therewith from the primary issues, is the price which modem ~~man~~ had to pay, from the very beginning, for attempting to be absolutely sovereign, to become the master and owner of nature, to conquer chance.

this proves case is a disad to the alternative – we have identified oncoming political problems that absolutely exist – even if we can’t eliminate suffering.

turn and alt fails – fascists will take over

Stackelberg 02 Professor of Modern Hisory at Gonzaga University

[Roderick “Nietszche: Godfather of Fascism?”]

Nietzsche’s rejection of progress and equality made aspects of his philosophy usable for the Nazis without having to distort them. Though a critic of idealist "self-deception" and national vanity, he shared the idealist disdain for merely political freedoms. True to the idealist heritage, Nietzsche's formula for human salvation was not to change material conditions through reform or revolution, as progressives would have it, but to change human ideals. His precepts aimed not at the creation of a just society, but at the development of a higher type of human being. To him, as to the Idealists he criticized, politics (i.e., agitation for social and political reform) was a debased activity. The field of Nietzsche interpretation will continue to provide the terrain, as it has throughout the twentieth century, on which fundamental issues are symbolically fought out. Diverse movements and schools of thought will continue to appeal to his thought. It is precisely because of his radical denial of ultimate truth that today he is hailed as the philosopher of postmodernism. But the criticisms that have been raised against postmodernism – that its political implications even in its left-wing appropriations are profoundly conservative – can be leveled against Nietzsche himself. Nietzsche's failure to provide any concrete social analysis renders futile all efforts to pin down his substantive political position and leaves concepts like “herd animals,” “blond beasts,” “supermen,” “the will to power,” “parry of life,” and “destruction of all that is degenerate and parasitical” to be filled with substantive meaning by his various interpreters. This lack of political consciousness made his philosophy useful to the Nazis and it makes his thinking serviceable to their apologists today.

## Counterplan

#### Counterplans that contain the possibility of advocating the plan are a voting issue

a) Affirmative predictability – the plan is the sacred locus of offense – the negative fiats in a research base – damage to 2AC strategy has already been done

b) Education – focus on process in a vacuum glosses over war powers authoirty – forcing them to contextualize by reading the net benefit alone solves better.

#### Perm do the counterplan. Counterplans must be both functionally and textually competitive – alternative is ambiguity that arbitrary interpretations of fiat.

**Here’s our definition wall:**

**Resolved means to express by formal vote**

**Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1998**  ([dictionary.com](http://dictionary.com/" \t "_blank))

Resolved:5. To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote; to declare or decide by a formal vote; -- followed by a clause; as, the house resolved (or, it was resolved by the house) that no money should be apropriated (or, to appropriate no money).

**Should expresses desirability**

**Cambridge Dictionary of American English, 07**  ([http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=should\*1+0&dict=A](http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=should*1+0&dict=A" \t "_blank))

**should**(DUTY) auxiliary verb used to express that it is necessary, desirable, advisable, or important to perform the action of the following verb

**Substantially means in the main, including the essential part**

**Words and Phrases, 2** (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, “Substantially,” Volume 40B, p. 324-330 October 2002, Thomson West)

Okla. 1911. “Substantially” means in substance: in the main; essentially; by including the material or essential part.

#### Perm. Do the counterplan. Do the plan. Solves by fiating the outcome of consultation. We are also making fun of the debate space.

#### NATO process is bogged down by delays and it is guaranteed to water down the plan.

Collins ‘2 (Brian, Lt. Col. – US Air Force and Faculty – National War College, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, “Operation Enduring Freedom and the Future of NATO”, Summer/Fall, CAIO)

Why the United States Didn't Turn to NATO. In the aftermath of September 11, **the United States wanted the form of a coalition, but not the substance,** for several reasons. First, the attacks were on American soil, and consequently the United States had to lead the response. Although citizens from scores of countries were killed in the attacks, it was clear that the United States, its people and its homeland, was the intended victim. Therefore, a response to the terrorist attacks did not automatically involve NATO. Ultimately, there was no direct link to Europe. **Consulting NATO would have been unrealistic, and no American administration would have waited for NATO to form a response**. NATO was also not the United States’s first choice because there is no clear consensus on how to interpret the Washington Treaty in the post-Cold War world. For example, although the treaty does not place explicit restrictions on NATO operations in a geographical sense or require United Nations approval for its operations, many members have conceptual difficulty expanding NATO's role beyond the alliance's immediate periphery, especially in the absence of UN mandates for such operations. Consequently, rather than get embroiled in discussions regarding the legality of NATO participation in Afghanistan, the United States sidestepped the issue and worked with its allies outside of official NATO channels. The mutual defense clause is now particularly open to interpretation. Article 5 states: The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. In the Cold War era, when there was a clear adversary and contingency plans for surprise attacks, the presumption was that NATO would respond as a whole. All national combat units integrated into the NATO military structure in Europe would immediately come under unified NATO command when any member was attacked. NATO, not its individual members, was to lead the operations, and the expectation was that all members would meet their commitments. Today, there is no obvious adversary, and there are no longer standing NATO defense plans. In the aftermath of September 11, there was room for the NATO allies to explore different interpretations of Article 5. For example, the alliance might nominally invoke Article 5, and then deem that no further action was required or provide limited NATO assets like AWACS to the state in need. Alternatively, the alliance could invoke Article 5, then plan and conduct NATO-led, alliance-wide operations. It is possible for a NATO member to agree to invoke Article 5 and consent to NATO military operations, but not provide its own forces for planning or operations. An ally may also support Article 5 but provide the bulk of its support bilaterally, and not through NATO. This concept, often identified as a “coalition of the willing,” is what happened during Operation Enduring Freedom. Eventually NATO must address the issue of how and when to cancel an Article 5 commitment. The assignment of NATO AWACS to the United States was a novel approach. During Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, NATO members, not NATO itself, participated in the U.S.-led coalition. However, NATO did deploy the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) to southeast Turkey to dissuade Iraq from attacking Turkey, and the AMF remained under NATO command. However, during Operation Enduring Freedom, the NATO AWACS were under U.S. command. In a marked change, NATO provided common assets to a member for its individual defense. In addition to concerns about treaty interpretations, **the U**nited **S**tates **did not want to be hindered by NATO’s consensus decision-making process. Numerous debates spawned by the NATO-led war in Kosovo clearly indicate** that the United States has **doubts about the efficacy of NATO**-led military operations. **The slogan “war by committee” is pejoratively used to describe the battles fought between the Supreme Allied Commander** Europe, **the NATO North Atlantic Council**, the NATO Military Committee, **and policymakers in Washington** over the conduct of the combat operations.

#### Perm. Do the counterplan if it results in the aff. Do the plan otherwise.

#### Plan solves the net benefit.

Contradictory conditionality is a voting issue.

## Exec DA

### Impact

This is nonsense. War powers authority does not change Obama’s ability to negotiate a climate change solution.

No uniqueness. Obama will not pass an exo top reduce GHG

Warming won’t cause extinction

Barrett, professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, ‘7

(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

### A2 exec power good

**Syria Thumps**

**Orr 10/1**2013 Syria deal exposes Obama’s weakness by Judith Orr <http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/art/34531/Syria+deal+exposes+Obama%E2%80%99s+weakness>

A few weeks ago the US looked poised to launch a military attack on Syria. Now a deal on Syrian chemical weapons appears to be sealed—and a historic thaw in relations with Iran has been thrown in for good measure.

The Syria deal was struck in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. It says all production and equipment used to manufacture chemical weapons in Syria must be destroyed by 1 November. All existing chemical weapons are to be eliminated by the middle of next year.

All sides claim to be satisfied with this solution because it suits their own ends.

Barack Obama, facing problems at home, wants to spin this as a great achievement for him on the international stage. He is less keen to acknowledge what the deal exposes about US imperialism. First is that, whatever the rhetoric, the US was not confident or strong enough to launch a military attack on Syria.

Obama was loathe to commit to a military attack. He was forced to talk tough rather than risk appearing weak. Yet by pulling back and accepting the UN deal as a solution he has confirmed his weakness. The deal doesn’t even include the US’s preferred wording, which asserts the right to automatic “punitive measures” if Assad breaks any of the conditions.

Syria outweighs the link

David Rothkoph, CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy, 8/3/13, The Gamble, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/31/the\_gamble?page=full

Obama has reversed decades of precedent regarding the nature of presidential war powers -and whether you prefer this change in the balance of power or not, **as a matter of quantifiable fact** he is transferring greater responsibility for U.S. foreign policy to a Congress that is more divided, more incapable of reasoned debate or action, and more dysfunctional than any in modern American history. Just wait for the Rand Paul filibuster or similar congressional gamesmanship.

The president's own action in Libya was undertaken without such approval. So, too, was his expansion of America's drone and cyber programs. Will future offensive actions require Congress to weigh in? How will Congress react if the president tries to pick and choose when this precedent should be applied? At best, the door is open to further acrimony. At worst, the paralysis of the U.S. Congress that has given us the current budget crisis and almost no meaningful recent legislation will soon be coming to a foreign policy decision near you. Consider that John Boehner was instantly more clear about setting the timing for any potential action against Syria with his statement that Congress will not reconvene before its scheduled September 9 return to Washington than anyone in the administration has been thus far.

Perhaps more importantly, what will future Congresses expect of future presidents? If Obama abides by this new approach for the next three years, will his successors **lack the ability to act quickly** and on their own? While past presidents have no doubt abused their War Powers authority to take action and ask for congressional approval within 60 days, we live in a volatile world; sometimes security requires swift action. The president still legally has that right, but Obama's decision may have done more -for better or worse -to **dial back the imperial presidency** than anything his predecessors or Congress have done for decades.

5. America's international standing will likely suffer.

As a consequence of all of the above, even if the president "wins" and persuades Congress to support his extremely limited action in Syria, the perception of America as a nimble, forceful actor on the world stage and that its president is a man whose word carries great weight is **likely to be diminished**. Again, like the shift or hate it, **foreign leaders can do the math.** Not only is post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan America less inclined to get involved anywhere, but when it comes to the use of U.S. military force (our one indisputable source of superpower strength) **we just became a whole lot less likely to act** or, in any event, act quickly. Again, good or bad, that is a stance that is likely to **figure into the calculus of those who once feared provoking the United States**.

A final consequence of this is that it seems ever more certain that Obama's foreign policy will be framed as so anti-interventionist and **focused on disengagement from world affairs** that **it will have major political consequences in 2016**. The dialectic has swung from the interventionism of Bush to the leaning away of Obama. Now, the question will be whether a centrist synthesis will emerge that restores the idea that the United States can have a muscular foreign policy that remains prudent, capable of action, and respects international laws and norms. Almost certainly, that is what President Obama would argue he seeks. But I suspect that others, including possibly his former secretary of state may well seek to define a different approach. Indeed, we may well see the divisions within the Democratic Party on national security emerge as key fault lines in the Clinton vs. Biden primary battles of 2016. And just imagine Clinton vs. Rand Paul in the general election.

Otherwise there’s no spillover

Jack Balkin, The Atlantic, 9/3/13, What Congressional Approval Won't Do: Trim Obama's Power or Make War Legal, www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/what-congressional-approval-wont-do-trim-obamas-power-or-make-war-legal/279298/

Wouldn’t congressional refusal make the United States look weak, as critics including Senator John McCain warn loudly? Hardly. The next dictator who acts rashly will face a different situation and a different calculus. The UN Security Council or NATO may feel differently about the need to act. There may be a new threat to American interests that lets Obama or the next president offer a different justification for acting. It just won’t matter very much what Obama said about red lines in the past. World leaders say provocative things all the time and then ignore them. Their motto is: That was then, and this is now.

If Congress turns him down, won’t Obama be undermined at home, as other critics claim? In what sense? It is hard to see how the Republicans could be less cooperative than they already are. And it’s not in the interest of Democrats to fault a president of their own party for acceding to what Congress wants instead of acting unilaterally.

Some commentators argue (or hope) that whatever happens, Obama’s request for military authorization will be an important precedent that will begin to restore the constitutional balance between the president and Congress in the area of war powers. Don’t bet on it. By asking for congressional authorization in this case, Obama has not ceded any authority that he ­or any other president ­has previously asserted in war powers.

It is naive to think that the next time a president wants to send forces abroad without congressional approval, he or she will be deterred by the fact that Barack Obama once sought congressional permission to bomb Syria. If a president can plausibly assert that any of the previous justifications apply -­including those offered in the Libya intervention -the case of Syria is easily distinguishable.

Perhaps more to the point, Congress still cannot go to the courts to stop the president, given existing legal precedents. Congress may respond by refusing to appropriate funds, but that is a remedy that they have always had -and have rarely had the political will to exercise.

The most important limit on presidential adventurism is political, not legal. It will turn less on the precedent of Syria than on whether the last adventure turned out well or badly.

### 2AC link

#### Only codification prevents Court evisceration of War Powers

Benjamin Wittes 8, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, co-founder and editor-in-chief of the Lawfare blog, member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security Law, Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror, google books

What the Supreme Court has done is carve itself a seat at the table. It has intimated, without ever deciding, that a constitutional basis for its actions exists—in addition to the statutory bases on which it decided the cases—meaning that its authority over overseas detentions may be an inherent feature of judicial power, not a policy question on which the legislature and executive can work their will. Whether the votes exist on the court to go this extra step we will find out soon enough. But the specter of a vastly different judicial posture in this area now haunts the executive branch—one in which the justices assert an inherent authority to review executive detention and interrogation practices, divine rights to apply with that jurisdiction based on due process and vaguely worded international humanitarian law principles not clearly implemented in U.S. law, and allow their own power to follow the military’s anywhere in the world. Such a posture would constitute an earthquake in the relationships among all three branches of government, and the doctrinal seeds for it have all been planted. Whether they ultimately take root depends on factors extrinsic to the war on terror—particularly the future composition of a Supreme Court now closely divided on these questions. It will also pivot on the manner in which the political branches posture the legal foundations of the war in the future. Building a strong legislative architecture now may be the only way to avert a major expansion of judicial power over foreign policy and warfare.

# 1AR

#### Epistemic grounding is irrelevant. We don’t need absolute truth.

**Nussbaum ’92** (Martha, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics – U. Chicago, Political Theory, “HUMAN FUNCTIONING AND SOCIAL JUSTICE In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism'”, 20:2, May, JSTOR)

Let me say very directly where I stand on the objections to essentialism. I believe that Kantian and related contemporary arguments (by Quine, Davidson, Putnam, and Goodman in particular) have indeed successfully established the untenability of extreme metaphysical realism. I cannot argue this here, but I hope it can at least be agreed that it would be extremely unwise for a political proposal to rely on the truth of metaphysical realism, given our current argumentative situation. On the other hand, it does not seem to me that such a result shows anything like what the relativist objectors think it shows. When we get rid of the hope of a transcendent metaphysical grounding for our evaluative judgments -about the human being as about anything else -we are not left with the abyss. We have everything that we always had all along: the exchange of reasons and arguments by human beings within history, in which, for reasons that are historical and human but not the worse for that, we hold some things to be good and others bad, some arguments to be sound and others not sound. Why, indeed, should the relativist conclude that the absence of a transcendent basis for judgment - a basis that, according to them, was never there anyway -should make us despair of doing as we have done all along, distinguishing persuasion from manipulation? In fact, the collapse into extreme relativism or subjectivism seems to me to betray a deep attachment to metaphysical realism itself. For it is only to one who has pinned everything to that hope that its collapse will seem to entail the collapse of all evaluation -just as it is only to a deeply believing religious person, as Nietzsche saw, that the news of the death of God brings the threat of nihilism. What we see here, I think, is a reaction of shame -a turning away of the eyes from our poor humanity, which looks so mean and bare -by contrast to a dream of another sort. What do we have here, these critics seem to say? Only our poor old human conversations, our human bodies that interpret things so imperfectly? Well, if that is all there is, we do not really want to study it too closely, to look into the distinctions it exhibits. We will just say that they are all alike, for, really, they do look pretty similar when compared to the heavenly standard we were seeking. It is like the moment reported by Aristotle when some students arrived at the home of Heraclitus, eager to see the great sage and cosmologist. They found him -not on a hilltop gazing at the heavens but sitting in his kitchen or, perhaps, on the toilet (for there is a philological dispute at this point!). He looked at their disappointed faces, saw that they were about to turn away their eyes, and said, "Come in, don't be afraid. There are gods here too." Aristotle uses this story to nudge his reluctant students out of the shame that is preventing them from looking closely at the parts of animals. When you get rid of your shame, he says, you will notice that there is order and structure in the animal world.3" So too, I think, with realism: the failure to take an interest in studying our practices of analyzing and reasoning, human and historical as they are, the insistence that we would have good arguments only if they came from heaven - all this betrays a shame before the human. On the other hand, if we really think of the hope of a transcendent ground for value as uninteresting and irrelevant, as we should, then the news of its collapse will not change the way we do things: it will just let us get on with the business of reasoning in which we were already engaged.