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### Patton

Men, all this stuff you hear about America not wanting to fight, wanting to stay out of the war, is a lot of bullshit. Americans love to fight. All real Americans love the sting and clash of battle. When you were kids, you all admired the champion marble shooter, the fastest runner, the big-league ball players and the toughest boxers. Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser. Americans play to win all the time. That's why Americans have never lost and will never lose a war. The very thought of losing is hateful to Americans. Battle is the most significant competitions in which a man can indulge. It brings out all that is best and it removes all that is base.

George Patton, war hero

### Contention one is *Victory*

#### The United States thinks quite highly of itself. We think we are a city on a hill, that we are invulnerable, that there’s no fight we can lose. The world is a lump of iron and we are a hammer. Justice, goodness, and freedom are not ideals, they are our *possessions*.

#### At least, that’s what we tell ourselves. In reality, this exceptional belief in our righteousness, omnipotence, and invulnerability is a psychological fiction, akin to an outfit we like to wear because it makes us feel like the most popular kid in school. We feel an obligation to eliminate anything that threatens this psychological fiction, lest our nightmares come true and we end up naked to the world.

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It is almost un-American to be vulnerable. As a people, we pride ourselves on being able to stand up to anything, solve all problems. We have long had a national self-image that involves an ability to call forth reservoirs or strength when we need it, and a sense of a protected existence peculiar to America in an otherwise precarious world. In recent times we managed, after all, to weather the most brutal century in human history relatively unscathed. THE BLESSED COUNTRY Our attitude stems partly from geography. We have always claimed a glorious aloneness thanks to what has been called the “Free security” of the two great oceans which separate us from dangerous upheavals in Europe and Asia. While George Washington was not the isolationist he is sometimes represented to be, he insisted on his celebrated Farewell Address of 1796, “’Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world.” That image has been embraced, and often simplified or distorted, by politicians ever since. (He warned against permanent alliances, not alliances in general).

The idea of our separateness and safety from faraway conflicts has had importance from the time of the early settlers, many of whom left Europe to escape political religious, or legal threats or entanglements. Even if one came as an adventurer or an empire-builder, one was leaving a continent of complexity and conflict for a land whose remoteness could support new beginnings. Abraham Lincoln absolutized that remoteness and security from outside attack in order to stress that our only danger came from ourselves: “All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest; with a Buonaparte for a commander, could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years.” However much the world has shrunk technologically in the last half century, and however far-ranging our own superpower forays, that sense of geographic invulnerability has never left us. We have seen ourselves as not only separate from but different from the rest of the world, a special nation among nations. That sense of American exceptionalism was intensely observed by Alexis de Tocqueville, the brilliant French politician and writer, in the early nineteenth century. In de Tocqueville’s view of America, “A course almost without limits, a field without horizon, is revealed: the human spirit rushes forward and traverses [it] in every direction.” American exceptionalism has always been, as the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has pointed out, “a double-edged sword.” In the psychological life of Americans it has been bound up with feelings of unique virtue, strength, and success. But this has sometimes led Americans to be “utopian moralists, who press hard to institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices.” That subjective exceptionalism has been vividly expressed in the historian Richard Hofstadter’s observation, “It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one.” At the time of the Puritans, sentiments of exceptionalism were expressed in biblical terms: America was an “Arcadian image of the New World … an Eden from which the serpent and forbidden trees had been thoroughly excluded,” and “a new Promised Land and a New Jerusalem.” The language was that of a postapocalyptic utopia, and remnants of such sentiments persist whenever we speak of ourselves in more secular terms as the “new world.” Important to this feeling of exceptionalism has been a deep sense that America offered unparalleled access to regenerative power. As Richard Slotkin explains: “The first colonists saw in America an opportunity to regenerate [end page 127] their fortunes, their spirits, and the power of their church and nation,” though “the means to that regeneration ultimately became the means of violence.” Even when Americans played what has been called a “shell game of identity,” they could experience an unlimited capacity for renewal—endless new beginnings as individuals or as a nation. Slotkin speaks of a new relationship to authority in this new world. While “in Europe all men were under authority; in America all men dreamed they had the power to become authority.” These claims of new authority extended to the country as a whole, to America’s authority among nations—a claim to new national authority that was expanded over time thanks to America’s considerable achievements—economic, technological, scientific, and cultural. American exceptionalism has often had the overall psychological quality of a sense of ourselves as a blessed people, immune from the defeats and sufferings of others. But underneath that sense there had to be a potential chink in our psychological armor—which was a deep-seated if hidden sense of vulnerability. OMNIPOTENCE AND VULNERABILITY Ironically, superpower syndrome projects the problem of American vulnerability onto the world stage. A superpower is perceived as possessing more than natural power. [end page 128] (In this sense it comes closer to resembling the comic-strip hero Superman than the Nietzschean Superman.) For a nation, its leaders, or even its ordinary citizens to enter into the superpower syndrome is to lay claim to omnipotence, to power that is unlimited, which is ultimately power over death. At the heart of the superpower syndrome then is the need to eliminate a vulnerability that, as the antithesis of omnipotence, contains the basic contradiction of the syndrome. For vulnerability can never be eliminated, either by a nation or an individual. In seeking its elimination, the superpower finds itself on a psychological treadmill. The idea of vulnerability is intolerable, the fact of it irrefutable. One solution is to maintain an illusion of invulnerability. But the superpower then runs the danger of taking increasingly draconian actions to sustain that illusion. For to do otherwise would be to surrender the cherished status of superpower. Other nations have experiences in the world that render them and their citizens all too aware of the essential vulnerability of life on earth. They also may be influenced by religious and cultural traditions (far weaker in the United States) that emphasize vulnerability as an aspect of human mortality. No such reality can be accepted by those clinging to a sense of omnipotence. At issue is the experience of death anxiety, which is the strongest manifestation of vulnerability. Such a deep-seated [end page 129] sense of vulnerability can sometimes be acknowledged by the ordinary citizens of a superpower, or even at times by its leaders, who may admit, for instance, that there is no guaranteed defense against terrorist acts. But those leaders nonetheless remain committed to eliminating precisely that vulnerability—committed, that is, to the illusory goal of invulnerability. When that goal is repeatedly undermined—whether by large-scale terrorist acts like 9/11, or as at present by militant resistance to American hegemony in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East—both the superpower and the world it acts upon may become dangerously destabilized.

#### Why do we hold such an egotistical self image? We, as citizens, have lost a war over our *consciences*.

#### The power of the presidency is a big part of the reason why. The presidency exists to seduce us into thoughtless compliance. I value security and freedom, so how can I possibly disagree with Bush? I hope for things, and there are things I want changed, so how could I possibly disagree with Obama? The president is like a fortune teller—it tells us vague platitudes we want to hear so we trust it absolutely. As a result, we close off our conscience and consent to an imperial “war on terror”

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From Bush to Obama, the war on terror is principally a war over conscience. The aim of the security regime is to justify itself not only through the ownership of bare life, but in laying claim to the life of conscience as well. Its purpose is to continue the century-old devolution to the messianic presidency through the permeation and colonization of conscience. Its agenda, on the strength of the values it presents as liberal and democratic, is to make conscience the ground of the presidency — to mollify, conscript, subdue and seduce the operation of conscience in sovereign power’s construction of democratic citizenship. The biopolitical project of the war on terror is to produce, and lay claim to, what Agamben calls “forms of life” of which there are two: politically qualified life, the life of the choice-making citizen, and bare life, the naked fact of our biological existence. I argue that the war on terror produces these forms of life through two integrated means. Vivification is the process of animating public deliberation or doing the work of conscience for us in an effigy of democratic communication. It provides a more satisfactory account of the subjective impact of sovereign power as violence than theories of total biopolitical oppression (e.g. Edkins and Pin-Fat) because it acknowledges, with Iris Marion Young, that this power elicits adoration and gratitude. (Young, 2003) Vivisection is the extraction of the truth that makes us secure through rendition, torture and structurally reinforced racism, from the matter of the human body reduced to bare life. The powers of vivification and vivisection mark the rise of the messianic presidency, its biopolitical function as the source of citizenship and arrogator of conscience. They allow a more precise definition of the violence of sovereign power that reduces all of us to homines sacri or bare life. At the same time, it is essential to recognize that these powers have a disparate impact on human personality, through the construction of a taxonomy of citizens and human existents according to their race, gender, religion and social condition. The violence of sovereign power is by no means equal. An ethic of democratic communication would speak to this contest over conscience, mapping it out as the terrain upon which the troubled story of citizenship unfolds and bare human life finds a new political voice.

Barak Obama’s presidency—like good philosophy—raises more questions than it settles about democratic political culture in pluralistic societies. The central problem liberal political philosophy attempts to decide is how to sustain a culture of democratic communication, allowing us equally to share in self-governance as citizens even as we bear disparate, fundamentally irreconcilable views about the big questions of human existence. Will Kymlicka summarizes this project as seeking “equality between groups, and freedom within groups”; the sequestering of deep personal beliefs is essential if we are to allow maximal equality and freedom. (Kymlicka, 2007: 255) The rise to power of this son of a Kenyan scholar, it would seem, affirms the wisdom of a polity designed to relegate existential questions, questions about the good, to the small circles of our private lives whilst structuring the democratic playing field to address the basic, non-metaphysical issue of fairness. More astonishing still, this drama played out against the war on terror’s 198 reassertion of race categories. (Ahmad, 2004) Standing in the light of Obama’s victory, it is tempting to see the theocratic ambition of the Bush White House—its retrograde imposition of faith based standards in domestic policy and on the global stage, branding the war on terror a crusade to rid the world of evil—as an anti-liberal atavism that died with a stake through its heart in the election of 2008. Obama’s triumph was the triumph of political liberalism and its project of creating a neutral framework of democratic communication, a public square emancipated from the stubborn intimacy of race, religion, gender and so on. Political liberalism allows anyone—any domestically born U.S. citizen—to be president. Obama won because he was constitutionally emancipated to fashion for himself answers to the big questions, while excelling in the political capacity to keep his metaphysics to himself and thus prove his worth for the leadership of the world’s leading pluralist democracy: the bi-racially telegenic, cool and neutral decider. The prize is a presidency the framers of the republic would not have recognized as republican—not simply in the scale of the nation’s martial, social and economic resources, but that the president should have these at what amounts to an imperial command.

My sense is that Obama’s success, like the core function of the presidency itself, has nothing to do with anything like a liberal restraint concerning the big questions of human existence but is, instead, a most illiberal and muscular intrusion into these matters. Instead of carving out a zone of exclusion for the private operation of conscience, the function of the presidency in contemporary U.S. political culture is to elicit the conformity of conscience with powerful, charismatic affirmations of the nature and purpose of human life. Clearly, the core of Obama’s ongoing resonance with voters and aliens alike—why we 199 want to adore him—has nothing to do with his bracketing out his beliefs about the big questions, the facts of his race and his religion, his worldview; he built political power in large measure through his acumen in actively presenting these features of his personality. Furthermore, these features were not parsed through the rarefied Cartesian space of a public square, they were embroiled in the maelstrom of detraction, calumny and desperate stargazing that is political discourse in the United States. Judging by his biography, the capacity to foreground his beliefs and make them publicly resonant is not something Obama purchased with his campaign contributions. It is a capacity that is integral to his political personality. None of this was novel or revolutionary in any way because U.S. electoral politics demands that candidates make bold claims about the big questions as defined in the political culture of the United States. Politics, in this sense, remains very much about the power to produce doctrine. The situation persists not as an aberration from the norms of political liberalism, but because of them.

#### The result of this consent to an imperial presidency is that we defer decisions about the life and death of whole populations to sovereign power—the doctrines the sovereign sells us are policed by imperial violence.

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Far from living in a post-metaphysical era, I believe Connolly is correct in his assertion that every “political interpretation projects presumptions about the primordial character of things”. (Connolly, 1993: 1) There is, therefore, a caesaropapist effect in the liberal narrative of public neutrality; it provides plausible cover for the construction of dominant, history-ending definitions about what it means to be human. Instead of building a political culture beyond metaphysics—the purely procedural and inclusive political culture, democratic in the equal freedoms it accords for our private fulfilment in seeking the good individually—this narrative allows sovereign power to enforce its edict about the nature and purpose of human life. The post-metaphysics feint allows a political culture to develop 200 and enforce the limits of the political community, setting the bounds between the citizen and the alien, and the community of life itself, setting the bounds between human and subhuman, the quick, the dead and the expendable. It is the means by which sovereign power bifurcates human existence, producing on the one hand politically qualified life—the citizen made in its own image—and, on the other, bare life, the human organism. Political liberalism’s restraint about the big questions, its concern to create maximal space for our individual, creative self-fashioning, is part of its edict about the “primordial character of things”. Instead of standing against republicanism, political liberalism works symbiotically with the republican project of defining the national character, the way of life, of a democratic people. Together they confer freedom and equality on the terms of sovereign power, not on the terms of conscience. They set the bounds of democratic communication, and remove from the function of citizenship public deliberation about existential questions. There is no return through political liberalism to classical politics, the sharing in self-governance of a democratic people through the scrupulous separation of public and private life, of political life and organic life. Instead, citizenship becomes the constructed acceptance of a synthetic freedom and equality, synthetic because freedom and equality under sovereign power are not the fruit of the operation of conscience; they are, instead, the doctrines of the state policed by violence. Citizenship becomes sovereign power’s imposition of a doctrinal closure on the debate about what it means to be human, because the definition of who is a citizen carries with it the power to define who is and who is not human. This places citizenship at odds against conscience and its principal function of continually discerning the meaning and purpose of human existence; sovereign power 201 might simulate conscience, but it cannot replace the restless human work in conscience of examination and deconstruction.

I will argue below that the persistence of this unexamined, dominant metaphysics allows the continuing ascendance of the security regime. Further, the political effect of this metaphysics is to consolidate power in the messianic presidency. A great deal of authoritative work has been done to map the contours of, and at times laud, the “imperial presidency”, with reference to the global reach of the executive branch in the United States. (Schlesinger, 1989) In the words of Michael Ignatieff, “Yet what word but ‘empire’ describes the awesome thing that America is becoming?” (Ignatieff, 2005) My concern is the biopolitical dimension this office now assumes; I believe the claim it makes to validate human life as such, to “touch the soul” of the citizen, to be the agent of a divine plan in the unfolding of human history suggest a presidency that is not simply imperial in its self-understanding but messianic. I will suggest that a biopolitical reading of the war on terror gains ground in deconstructing the covert ontology of what passes for democratic political culture, moving the analysis from ideology and discipline to the messianic powers of vivification and vivisection. Ostensible neutrality “about the primordial character of things” is the shell within which the messianic presidency quickens, rising to primacy over constitutional governance in the United States. The Obama White House does not represent a break with this phenomenon; it does not return the Office of the President to the proportions the framers of the republic entrenched constitutionally. Instead, through its reinvigorated prosecution of the war on terror, the Obama White House represents the next phase in the maturation of the messianic presidency.202

#### This leads to an apocalyptic violence, insistent on defending the nation at all costs—that makes annihilation possible

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The apocalyptic imagination has spawned a new kind of violence at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We can, in fact, speak of a worldwide epidemic of violence aimed at massive destruction in the service of various visions of purification and renewal. In particular, we are experiencing what could be called an apocalyptic face-off between Islamist\* forces, overtly visionary in their willingness to kill and die for their religion, and American forces claiming to be restrained and reasonable but no less visionary in their projection of a cleansing war-making and military power. Both sides are [end page 1] energized by versions of intense idealism; both see themselves as embarked on a mission of combating evil in order to redeem and renew the world; and both are ready to release untold levels of violence to achieve that purpose. The war on Iraq—a country with longstanding aspirations toward weapons of mass destruction but with no evident stockpiles of them and no apparent connection to the assaults of September 11—was a manifestation of that American visionary projection. The religious fanaticism of Osama bin Laden and other Islamist zealots has, by now, a certain familiarity to us as to others elsewhere, for their violent demands for spiritual purification are aimed as much at fellow Islamics as at American “infidels.” Their fierce attacks on the defilement that they believe they see everywhere in contemporary life resemble those of past movements and sects from all parts of the world; such sects, with end-of-the-world prophecies and devout violence in the service of bringing those prophecies about, flourished in Europe from the eleventh through the sixteenth century. Similar sects like the fanatical Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which released sarin gas into the Tokyo subways in 1995, have existed—even proliferated—in our own time. The American apocalyptic entity is less familiar to us. Even if its urges to power and domination seem historically recognizable, it nonetheless represents a new constellation of forces bound up with what I’ve come to think of [end page 2] as “superpower syndrome.” By that term I mean a national mindset—put forward strongly by a tight-knit leadership group—that takes on a sense of omnipotence, of unique standing in the world that grants it the right to hold sway over all other nations. The American superpower status derives from our emergence from World War II as uniquely powerful in every respect, still more so as the only superpower left standing at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. More than merely dominate, the American superpower now seeks to control history. Such cosmic ambition is accompanied by an equally vast sense of entitlement, of special dispensation to pursue its aims. That entitlement stems partly from historic claims to special democratic virtue, but has much to do with an embrace of technological power translated into military terms. That is, a superpower—the world’s only superpower—is entitled to dominate and control precisely because it is a superpower. The murderous events of 9/11 hardened that sense of entitlement as nothing else could have. Superpower syndrome did not require 9/11, but the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon rendered us an aggrieved superpower, a giant violated and made vulnerable, which no superpower can permit. Indeed, at the core of superpower syndrome lies a powerful fear of vulnerability. A superpower’s victimization brings on both a sense of humiliation and an angry determination to restore, or even [end page 3] extend, the boundaries of a superpower-dominated world. Integral to superpower syndrome are its menacing nuclear stockpiles and their world-destroying capacity. Throughout the decades of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union both lived with a godlike nuclear capacity to obliterate the cosmos, along with a fear of being annihilated by the enemy power. Now America alone possesses that world-destroying capacity, and post-Soviet Russia no longer looms as a nuclear or superpower adversary. We have yet to grasp the full impact of this exclusive capacity to blow up anyone or everything, but its reverberations are never absent in any part of the world. The confrontation between Islamist and American versions of planetary excess has unfortunately tended to define a world in which the vast majority of people embrace neither. But apocalyptic excess needs no majority to dominate a landscape. All the more so when, in their mutual zealotry, Islamist and American leaders seem to act in concert. That is, each, in its excess, nurtures the apocalypticism of the other, resulting in a malignant synergy. \* In keeping with general usage, Islamist refers to groups that are essentially theocratic and fundamentalist, and at times apocalyptic. Islamic is a more general ethnic as well as religious term for Muslims. The terms can of course overlap, and “Islamic state” can mean one run on Islamist principles.

### Plan(s)

#### The United States Congress should surrender the global war on terror by restricting the President’s authority to introduce armed forces into hostilities.

### Contention two is *Surrender*

#### The act of surrendering is a radical one—it opens us to vulnerability, ambiguity, and acceptance of the world as it is. It gives up on the dream of invulnerability, and helps to shatter falsely held illusions about our place in the world.

Lifton 3 [Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, previously Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School and Director of The Center on Violence and Human Survival at John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York, 2003 (Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation With The World, Published by Thunder’s Mouth Press / Nation Books, ISBN 1560255129, p. 196-199)]

Stepping out of that syndrome would also include surrendering the claim of certainty, of ownership of truth and reality. That ownership gives rise to deadly righteousness, with a claim to illumination so absolute as to transcend ordinary restraints against mass violence. The healthier alternative is an acceptance of some measure of ambiguity, of inevitable elements of confusion and contradiction, [end page 196] whether in relation to large historical events or in matters of personal experience. This would include a more nuanced approach to Islam and Islamist thought and behavior that allows for the possibility of evolution and change. It is often claimed that no such acceptance of ambiguity is possible because superpowers, like nations, like people, are uncomfortable with it, that the tendency is always to seek clarity and something close to certainty. But this assumption may well underestimate our psychological capabilities. Ambiguity, in fact, is central to human function, recognized and provided for by cultural institutions and practices everywhere. American society in particular has cultivated the kinds of ambiguity that go with multiplicity and with shifting populations and frontiers. I have tried in my past work to formulate a version of the self as many-sided, flexible, and capable of change and transformation. This protean self (named after Proteus, the Greek sea god who was capable of taking on many shapes) stands in direct contrast to the fundamentalist or apocalyptic self. Indeed, the closed fundamentalist self and its apocalyptic impulses can be understood as a reaction to protean tendencies, which are widely abroad in our world as a response to the complexities of recent history. Any contemporary claim to absolute certainty, then, is compensatory, an artificial plunge into totalism that seeks an escape from the ambiguity that so pervades our historical legacy. American society is more volatile on these matters than [end page 197] many suspect. Over the previous century and at the beginning of a new one, we have been undergoing waves of contending forms of populism—pendulum swings between totalistic impulses and more open, if less clearly formulated, protean principles. How this psychohistorical struggle will develop we have no way of knowing, but we need hardly give up on ambiguity, or on our capacity to combine it with strongly held ethical principles. There is a real sense in which elements of ambiguity are necessary to our well-being. They certainly are necessary to the well-being of our nation, and of the world. To live with ambiguity is to accept vulnerability. American aspirations toward superpower invulnerability have troubling parallels in Islamist visions of godly power. Surrendering the dream of invulnerability, more enlightened American leaders could begin to come to terms with the idea that there will always be some danger in our world, that reasonable and measured steps can be taken to limit that danger and combat threats of violence, but that invulnerability is itself a perilous illusion. To cast off that illusion would mean removing the psychological pressure of sustaining a falsified vision of the world, as opposed to taking a genuine place in the real one. Much of this has to do with accepting the fact that we die, a fact not altered by either superpower militarism or religious fanaticism. A great part of apocalyptic violence is in the service of a vast claim of immortality, a claim that [end page 198] can, in the end, often be sustained only by victimizing large numbers of people. Zealots come to depend upon their mystical, spiritual, or military vision to protect themselves from death, and to provide immortality through killing.

#### And, Surrender leads to an embrace of change and a willingness to think differently. It changes our psyche. The psychic wound and shock people will feel is an opportunity for growth. A voluntary act of authentic surrender is key.

Moze, Ph.D in Personal Development, 7—Mary Beth, Ph.D. in Personal Development and Transformation [“Surrender: An Alchemical Act in Personal Transformation,” *Journal of Conscious Evolution*, http://www.cejournal.org/GRD/Surrender.pdf]

Surrender and the Ego

Surrender provides a willing path toward greater understandings. Surrender allows for flexibility and movement in relation to a polarized Other and is a voluntary choice to not resist. Such a choice is as much a part of ego development as choosing to resist (LaMothe, 2005). The wise use of our will can get us to the edge of the Ego and beyond; we can will ourselves into the act of surrender that carries us into the flow of possibilities and growth (Hart, 2000).

We think we live by virtues and influences that we can control, but we are governed by more than ourselves (Hawkins, 2002). World religion s teach that the Ego interferes with detection of truth and cannot engage the bigger, systemic view of things (Leary, 2004) central to personal development is the management of the Ego and surrendering to a more universal identity (Hidas, 1981). In lieu of more culturally sanctioned spiritual practices in the West, our need for universal identity and spiritual sustenanc e comes by way of therapy (Some’, 1999), but Western therapy focuses heavily on ego strengthenin g and can inadvertently build up the Ego’s narcissistic muscles.

Recovery from any dysfunction as well as growth fr om places of normality is dependent on the willingness to explore new ways of looking a t things: to endure inner fears when belief systems are shaken (Hawkins, 2002). By quieting the Ego, we can soften its rigid influence and help to strengthen the health of the ego and assist the act of surrender (Hidas, 1981; Leary, 2004). It is an act of ego strength void of Ego fix ation (Hart, 2000). Surrender is the exercise of moral muscles. In surrender, the Ego may feel like it is dying, but the ego is sustained. In the initial efforts to exercise moral muscles, the Ego will feel torn, but it is through that wound – a sacred wound - that new ways of understanding arrive (Branscomb, 1991).

We are complex systems. Systems are made up of systems and exist within ever larger systems within which paradox is characteristic and can be understood (Laszlo, 1996; Morin, 1999; Rowland, 1999). As long as the Ego functions with its narrow view, the paradox of human behavior can not be sufficiently contextualized and it causes frustration. Curiously enough, motives to embrace change arise when the mind is challenged and puzzles are perceived (Baumeister & Vohs, 2002; Hawkins, 2002), and paradoxes are puzzles. The very fears and obstacles that we perceive and resist ironically point us in the very direction of our own growth and serve as portals for surrender (Hart, 2000). Each surrender exposes us to a part of the larger systems within which we function. Through surrender , the Ego can grasp paradox and greater truths.

It is beneath the fears of the narrow Egoic system where one finds the curiosity and courage that is willing to risk and accept what unfolds, driven by a desire to connect (Grant, 1996). Surrender releases the perceived control to which the Ego clings and simultaneously releases of the burden of being in control (Branscomb, 1991). Surrender eases the burden and grip of Egoic boundary control, relaxing narcissistic muscles in order to also flex and build the unintentionally neglected moral muscles.

#### And, Surrender is different than submission, compliance, or resignation. Surrender yields unconditionally, unworried about preferences or expectations. Only this authentic letting go is an act that create immediate, authentic, and lasting personal change.

Moze 7—Mary Beth, Ph.D. in Personal Development and Transformation [“Surrender: An Alchemical Act in Personal Transformation,” *Journal of Conscious Evolution*, http://www.cejournal.org/GRD/Surrender.pdf]

Before pursuing a definition of what surrender is, it is helpful to benchmark what it is not. Some terms are used synonymously with surrender but have subtle shifts in meaning that differ significantly from the healthy version of surrender that grounds this article. Those terms include submission, resignation, and compliance.

Submission entails a role of domination by one over another and is a perversion of surrender (LaMothe, 2005). It is an individual’s conscious acceptance of reality but tainted with an unconscious unacceptance that harbors the desire for eventual revenge (Tiebout, 1949). Submission sustains the tension between self and Other and houses distrust and a sense of betrayal (LaMothe, 2005; Tiebout, 1949). It is ofte n a defense against hopelessness and the fear  of the annihilation of one’s sense of identity (LaM othe, 2005). It resembles surrender in its longing to know and be known, but cheats the process by sustaining a role of bondage and a sense of futility (Ghent, 1990).

Resignation holds an element of judgment (Tolle, 1 999) which is contrary to the unconditional nature of healthy surrender. Resignation moves one into accordance with another, but not based on shared beliefs nor trust and often as a result of exhausted failed efforts to negotiate a mutually satisfying interpersonal relat ionship. It often accompanies the role of submission (Ghent, 1990). Both submission and resignation have a resistant quality about them which maintains an Egoic position, not a state of surrender. To a certain degree, there is a sense of longevity to the roles of submission and resigna tion.

In comparison, compliance has a temporariness abou t it. Like resignation, it entails a going along with attitude while not necessarily approving of that t o which one resigns. However, compliance is more about saying yes in the moment more for the sake of convenience than for the sake of acceptance. Compliance contributes to a sense of guilt, inferiority, and shame for not standing up for oneself and it also deceives all of those involved with the circumstance (Tiebout, 1953).

The more inviting definition of surrender appeals to its resilient nature, not its resistant nature. Resistance operates against growth or chang e and seeks to maintain the familiar, while surrender and resilience operate toward growth (Ghe nt, 1990). Rather than an Egotistical defeat, healthy surrender is a compassionate giving over that rests on trust (LaMothe, 2005). Such surrender involves commitment, openness, soulful mo tivation, and vibrancy.

Total surrender unconditionally yields to what is (Tolle, 1999) rather than to what one prefers or expects. It is a wholehearted acceptance of one’s perception of reality and unreservedly yields to more than the Ego (Cohen, 20 04; Jones, 1994; Tiebout, 1953). Judgments are suspended. One is involved in a code of integrity and unity with Other, and admits to not knowing the full meaning of an encounter, especially in the moment it occurs (Parlee, 1993; Wolff, 1974). This allows for openness of experience and fully embraces the unknown (May, 2004).

Surrender is liberation, expansion of self, and the letting down of defensive barriers (Ghent, 1990). It is something that takes place within one’s self and contingent only upon one’s willingness to let down the barriers that one alone puts up: to give up resistances, defenses, and self-preconceptions in service of healing, acceptance, and seeking to know Other (Branscomb, 1993; Jones, 1994; Tiebout, 1949). Surrender is an existential reality that does not objectify self or Other and rather identifies with limitlessness ( May, 1982). Surrender need not be permanent; it can be a temporary relinquishment of control and suspension of beliefs (Hart, 2000). It leaves intellectual knowledge in tact while releasing one to inquire further about truths (Rutledge, 2004) without an agenda for expected outcomes (Wolff, 197 4). It involves curiosity that is attracted to meaning, not oddity.

Surrender is a particular way of functioning, motivated by the longing for growth and connectedness (Ghent, 1990). It is soulful. Such willingness rests on and is motivated by trust, faith, hope, and heart based desires for meaning; it appeals to that which dignifies and ennobles (Hawkins, 2002). Surrender is an act of faith and a statement of hope based on trust (Hart, 2000). Surrender of this nature reacquaints us with our humanness and innocence, not our individuality, and enables us to see the good in Other and in the world (Branscomb, 1993; Wolff, 1974). It nourishes the needs of the soul and gently releases the wants of the Ego (Zukav, 1990).

An act of surrender is inevitably followed by a state of surrender (Tiebout, 1949), free of time and space (Hart, 2000). Surprisingly, surrender is vibrant, not passive. It is an intimate state of involvement (May, 1982) in which one actively constructs an experience while choosing to give in – to lean in toward – another (LaMothe, 200 5). There is a dynamic flow of emergence and waning that actualizes the potential for enhanc ed meaning and communion with Other (LaMothe, 2005). One does not passively tolerate a situation nor cease personal action; instead, there is an awareness and reciprocity of responsive ness that is improvisational and uncontrolling (Rutledge, 2004; Tolle, 1999). To improvise is to be intuitively creative; it is a universal capacity!

I do not posit a linear relationship between trust, commitment, openness, soulful motivation, and vibrancy. The literature does not suggest anything in this regard. What is noteworthy is the simultaneous simplicity and compl exity of a resilient act of surrender. It is alchemical. It is not an act that simply initiates a natural progression of potential change; it is an innately complex function that transmutes one way of being into another.

I hesitate to offer a definition of surrender, fea ring that it will be concretized. Surrender has a wholesomeness that is elusive and not easily definable. For the sake of grounding the remaining contents of this article, I offer the following definition as support, not absolute. Surrender is a trusting act to which one fully commits and lets go of absolute perceived control and personal defenses in order to step into a limitless unknown and actively engage Other, allowing for the potential discovery of greater truths while being unattached to any expected outcomes. Even more simply stated, surrender is a faithful gesture toward knowing Other and being known.

#### And, by promoting this sort of reflection and thought through the act of surrender, we solve a shift in citizen opinions on the war on terror—the aff is the sort of painful self-examination that creates change

Grieder, bestselling author, 4 [William Greider, a prominent political journalist and author, has been a reporter for more than 35 years for newspapers, magazines and television.. He is the author of the national bestsellers One World, Ready or Not, Secrets of the Temple and Who Will Tell The People. In the award-winning Secrets of the Temple, he offered a critique of the Federal Reserve system. Greider has also served as a correspondent for six Frontline documentaries on PBS, including "Return to Beirut," which won an Emmy in 1985. “Under the Banner of the ‘War’ on Terror” http://samizdat.cc/shelf/documents/2004/06.07-greider/greider.pdf]

An important question remains for Americans to ponder: Why have most people submitted so willingly to a new political order organized around fear? Other nations have confronted terrorism of a more sustained nature without coming thoroughly un- hinged. I remember living in London briefly in the 1970s s, when IRA bombings were a frequent occurrence. Daily life continued with stiff -upper-lip reserve (police searched ladies’ handbags at restaurants, but did not pat down the gentlemen). We can only spec- ulate on answers. Was it the uniquely horrific quality of the 9/11 attacks? Or the fact that, unlike Europe, the continental United States has never been bombed? For mod- ern Americans, war’s destruction is a foreign experience, though the United States has participated in many conflicts on foreign soil. Despite the patriotic breast-beating, are we closet wimps? America’s exaggerated expressions of fear may look to others like a surprising revelation of weakness.

My own suspicion is that many Americans have enjoyed Bush’s “terror war” more than they wish to admit. Feeling scared can be oddly pleasurable, like participating in a real-life action thriller, when one is allied in imagined combat with a united country of brave patriots. The plot line is simple—good guys against satanic forces—and pushes aside doubts and ambiguities, like why exactly these people are out to get us. Does our own behavior in the world have anything to do with it? No, they resent us because we are so virtuous—kind, free, wealthy, democratic. The contest, as framed by Bush, invites Americans to indulge in a luxurious sense of self-pity—poor, powerful America, so innocent and yet so misunderstood. America’s exaggerated fear of unknown “others” is perhaps an unconscious inversion of its exaggerated claims of power.

The only way out of this fog of pretension is painful self-examination by Americans— cutting our fears down to more plausible terms and facing the complicated realities of our role in the world. The spirited opposition that arose to Bush’s war in Iraq is a good starting place, because citizens raised real questions that were brushed aside. I don’t think most Americans are interested in imperial rule, but they were grossly misled by patriotic rhetoric. Now is the time for sober, serious teach-ins that lay out the real history of power in the world, and that also explain the positive and progressive future that is possible. Once citizens have constructed a clear-eyed, dissenting version of our situation, perhaps politicians can also be liberated from exaggerated fear. The self-imposed destruction that has flowed from Bush’s logic cannot be stopped until a new cast of leaders steps forward to guide the country. This transformation begins by changing Presidents.

#### And, the affirmative represents a psychological shift—yes, we think congress should actually surrender the war on terror, but, more importantly, it’s a useful thought experiment for any American.

#### What does it mean that we were wrong about fighting terrorists? What does it mean that we couldn’t win? This change on the psychological and personal level allows us to reclaim our moral compass, resist the fantasy of total control, and change the way future and current leaders deal with feelings of vulnerability

Lifton 3 [Robert Jay Lifton, Visiting Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, previously Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the Graduate School and Director of The Center on Violence and Human Survival at John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York, 2003 (Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation With The World, Published by Thunder’s Mouth Press / Nation Books, ISBN 1560255129, p. 188-192)]

We can do better. America is capable of wiser, more measured approaches, more humane applications of our considerable power and influence in the world. These may not be as far away as they now seem, and can be made closer by bringing our imaginations to bear on them. Change must be political, of course, but certain psychological contours seem necessary to it. As a start, we do not have to collude in partitioning the world into two contending apocalyptic forces. We are capable instead of reclaiming our moral compass, of finding further balance in our national behavior. So intensely have we embraced superpower syndrome that emerging from it is not an easy task. Yet in doing so we would relieve ourselves of a burden of our own creation—the psychic burden of insistent illusion. For there is no [end page 189] greater weight than that one takes on when pursuing total power. We need to draw a new and different lesson from Lord Acton's nineteenth-century assertion: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Acton was not quite right. The corruption begins not with the acquisition of power but with the quest for and claim to absolute power. Ever susceptible to the seductive promise that twenty-first-century technology can achieve world control, the superpower can best resist that temptation by recognizing the corruption connected with that illusion. STEPPING OFF THE TREADMILL To renounce the claim to total power would bring relief not only to everyone else, but, soon enough, to citizens of the superpower itself. For to live out superpower syndrome is to place oneself on a treadmill that eventually has to break down. In its efforts to rule the world and to determine history, the United States is, in actuality, working against itself, subjecting itself to constant failure. It becomes a Sisyphus with bombs, able to set off explosions but unable to cope with its own burden, unable to roll its heavy stone to the top of the hill in Hades. Perhaps the crucial step in ridding ourselves of superpower syndrome is recognizing that history cannot be controlled, fluidly or otherwise. Stepping off the superpower treadmill would also enable us to cease being a nation ruled by fear. [end page 190] Renouncing omnipotence might make our leaders—or at least future leaders—themselves less fearful of weakness, and diminish their inclination to instill fear in their people as a means of enlisting them for military efforts at illusory world hegemony. Without the need for invulnerability, everyone would have much less to be afraid of. What we call the historical process is largely unpredictable, never completely manageable. All the more so at a time of radical questioning of the phenomenon of nationalism and its nineteenth- and twentieth-century excesses. In addition, there has been a general decline in confidence in the nation state, and in its ability to protect its people from larger world problems such as global warming or weapons of mass destruction. The quick but dangerous substitute is the superpower, which seeks to fill the void with a globalized, militarized extension of American nationalism. The traditional nation state, whatever its shortcomings, could at least claim to be grounded in a specific geographic area and a particular people or combination of peoples. The superpower claims to "represent" everyone on earth, but it lacks legitimacy in the eyes of those it seeks to dominate, while its leaders must struggle to mask or suppress their own doubts about any such legitimacy. The American superpower is an artificial construct, widely perceived as illegitimate, whatever the acquiescence it coerces in others. Its reign is therefore inherently unstable. Indeed, its reach for full-scale world domination [end page 191] marks the beginning of its decline. A large task for the world, and for Americans in particular, is the early recognition and humane management of that decline.

#### Rather than singlehanded solving everything in one shot, surrender sets off an avalanche of conversation and questioning that activates our conscience. Only this process can engage both formal legal discourse and social movements—conscience is the one kernel of humanity that exists in every context, it is the lynchpin of solvency

Markwick 10—Michael Markwick, Lecturer at Simon Fraser University, Ph.D candidate in philosophy at Simon Fraser University [Spring 2010, “Terror and Democratic Communication,” Ph.D Dissertation, http://summit.sfu.ca/item/9989]

At the same time, the messianic presidency as sovereign power is the product of continual negotiation, and its powers of vivification and vivisection do not—indeed cannot— extirpate the operation of conscience. Against the facts of the war on terror, I argue for the role of conscience in democratic communication, across the full range of cultural expression, from formal political and jurisprudential discourse to movements of social change and popular culture. Democratic communication persists even in the midst of bare life as the site of the public operation of conscience, of knowing together. It is the assertion of conscience against sovereign power, not through grand narratives or defiant, beautiful acts of hopelessness but through our agonistic and reflexive encounters in a plurality of worldviews. The point, therefore, of Kymlicka’s “equality between groups, and freedom within groups” is not to isolate conscience as an insular entity, but rather to allow us to meet each other and contend with each other over the big questions about human existence, to get to the truth and to order our affairs to suit our best understanding about these questions. The project of democratic communication is not to create zones of exclusion for our creative self-fashioning, it is to allow us to take seriously the content of each other’s lives, to discern therein insights into the way we understand ourselves as human persons. In this sense, democratic communication necessarily involves the ongoing articulation and deconstruction of ontological claims, not to rid us of metaphysics but instead—agonistically, empathetically—to find our own voice in it.

#### Terrorism is politically motivated—only our radical action of stepping back and taking blame can address the real grievences

Blum 4—William Blum is an author, historian, and renowned critic of U.S. foreign policy. He is the author of *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II* and *Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower*. In early 2006, Blum briefly became the subject of widespread media attention when Osama bin Laden issued a public statement in which he quoted Blum and recommended that all Americans read *Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower*. As a result of the mention sales of his book greatly increased. "I was quite surprised and even shocked and amused when I found out what he'd said," Blum said. "I was glad. I knew it would help the book's sales and I was not bothered by who it was coming from. If he shares with me a deep dislike for certain aspects of US foreign policy, then I'm not going to spurn any endorsement of the book by him. I think it's good that he shares those views and I'm not turned off by that."[4] On the Bin Laden endorsement Blum stated "This is almost as good as being an Oprah book." [http://williamblum.org/chapters/freeing-the-world-to-death/myth-and-denial-in-the-war-against-terrorism]

It dies hard. It dies very hard. The notion that terrorist acts against the United States can be explained by envy and irrational hatred, and not by what the United States does to the world – i.e., US foreign policy – is alive and well. The fires were still burning intensely at Ground Zero when Colin Powell declared: “Once again, we see terrorism, we see terrorists, people who don’t believe in democracy …” 1 George W. picked up on that theme and ran with it. He’s been its leading proponent ever since September 11 with his repeated insistence, in one wording or another, that terrorists are people who hate America and all that it stands for, its democracy, its freedom, its wealth, its secular government.” (Ironically, the president and Attorney General John Ashcroft probably hate our secular government as much as anyone.) Here he is more than a year after September 11: “The threats we face are global terrorist attacks. That’s the threat. And the more you love freedom, the more likely it is you’ll be attacked.” 2 The American Council of Trustees and Alumni, a conservative watchdog group founded by Lynne Cheney, wife of the vice-president, announced in November 2001 the formation of the Defense of Civilization Fund, declaring that “It was not only America that was attacked on September 11, but civilization. We were attacked not for our vices, but for our virtues.” 3 In September 2002, the White House released the “National Security Strategy”, purported to be chiefly the handiwork of Condoleezza Rice, which speaks of the “rogue states” which “sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.” In July of the following year, we could hear the spokesman for Homeland Security, Brian Roehrkasse, declare: “Terrorists hate our freedoms. They want to change our ways.” 4 Thomas Friedman the renowned foreign policy analyst of the New York Times would say amen. Terrorists, he wrote in 1998 after two US embassies in Africa had been attacked, “have no specific ideological program or demands. Rather, they are driven by a generalized hatred of the US, Israel and other supposed enemies of Islam.” 5 This idée fixe – that the rise of anti-American terrorism owes nothing to American policies – in effect postulates an America that is always the aggrieved innocent in a treacherous world, a benign United States government peacefully going about its business but being “provoked” into taking extreme measures to defend its people, its freedom and its democracy. There consequently is no good reason to modify US foreign policy, and many people who might otherwise know better are scared into supporting the empire’s wars out of the belief that there’s no choice but to crush without mercy – or even without evidence – this irrational international force out there that hates the United States with an abiding passion. Thus it was that Afghanistan and Iraq were bombed and invaded with seemingly little concern in Washington that this could well create many new anti-American terrorists. And indeed, since the first strike on Afghanistan in October 2001 there have been literally scores of terrorist attacks against American institutions in the Middle East, South Asia and the Pacific, more than a dozen in Pakistan alone: military, civilian, Christian, and other targets associated with the United States, including the October 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia, which destroyed two nightclubs and killed more than 200 people, almost all of them Americans and their Australian and British allies. The following year brought the heavy bombing of the US-managed Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, the site of diplomatic receptions and 4th of July celebrations held by the American Embassy. Even when a terrorist attack is not aimed directly at Americans, the reason the target has been chosen can be because the country it takes place in has been cooperating with the United States in its so-called “War on Terrorism”. Witness the horrendous attacks of recent years in Madrid, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. A US State Department report on worldwide terrorist attacks showed that the year 2003 had more “significant terrorist incidents” than at any time since the department began issuing statistics in 1982; the 2003 figures do not include attacks on US troops by insurgents in Iraq. 6 Terrorists in their own words The word “terrorism” has been so overused in recent years that it’s now commonly used simply to stigmatize any individual or group one doesn’t like, for almost any kind of behavior involving force. But the word’s raison d’être has traditionally been to convey a political meaning, something along the lines of: the deliberate use of violence against civilians and property to intimidate or coerce a government or the population in furtherance of a political objective. Terrorism is fundamentally propaganda, a very bloody form of propaganda. It follows that if the perpetrators of a terrorist act declare what their objective was, their statement should carry credibility, no matter what one thinks of the objective or the method used to achieve it. Let us look at some of their actual declarations. The terrorists responsible for the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 sent a letter to the New York Times which stated, in part: “We declare our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned building. This action was done in response for the American political, economical, and military support to Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in the region.” 7 Richard Reid, who tried to ignite a bomb in his shoe while aboard an American Airline flight to Miami in December 2001, told police that his planned suicide attack was an attempt to strike a blow against the US campaign in Afghanistan and the Western economy. In an e-mail sent to his mother, which he intended her to read after his death, Reid wrote that it was his duty “to help remove the oppressive American forces from the Muslims land.” 8 After the bombings in Bali, one of the leading suspects – later convicted – told police that the bombings were “revenge” for “what Americans have done to Muslims.” He said that he wanted to “kill as many Americans as possible” because “America oppresses the Muslims”. 9 In November 2002, a taped message from Osama bin Laden began: “The road to safety begins by ending the aggression. Reciprocal treatment is part of justice. The [terrorist] incidents that have taken place … are only reactions and reciprocal actions.” 10 That same month, when Mir Aimal Kasi, who killed several people outside of CIA headquarters in 1993, was on death row, he declared: “What I did was a retaliation against the US government” for American policy in the Middle East and its support of Israel. 11 It should be noted that the State Department warned at the time that the execution of Kasi could result in attacks against Americans around the world. 12 It did not warn that the attacks would result from foreigners hating or envying American democracy, freedom, wealth, or secular government. Similarly, in the days following the start of US bombing of Afghanistan there were numerous warnings from US government officials about being prepared for retaliatory acts, and during the war in Iraq, the State Department announced: “Tensions remaining from the recent events in Iraq may increase the potential threat to US citizens and interests abroad, including by terrorist groups.” 13 Another example of the difficulty the Bush administration has in consistently maintaining its simplistic idée fixe: In June 2002, after a car bomb exploded outside the US Consulate in Karachi, killing or injuring more than 60 people, the Washington Post reported that “US officials said the attack was likely the work of extremists angry at both the United States and Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for siding with the United States after September 11 and abandoning support for Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban.” 14 George W. and others of his administration may or may not believe what they tell the world about the motivations behind anti-American terrorism, but, as in the examples just given, some officials have questioned the party line for years. A Department of Defense study in 1997 concluded: “Historical data show a strong correlation between US involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States.” 15 Former US president Jimmy Carter told the New York Times in a 1989 interview: We sent Marines into Lebanon and you only have to go to Lebanon, to Syria or to Jordan to witness first-hand the intense hatred among many people for the United States because we bombed and shelled and unmercifully killed totally innocent villagers – women and children and farmers and housewives – in those villages around Beirut. … As a result of that … we became kind of a Satan in the minds of those who are deeply resentful. That is what precipitated the taking of our hostages and that is what has precipitated some of the terrorist attacks. 16 Colin Powell has also revealed that he knows better. Writing of this same 1983 Lebanon debacle in his memoir, he forgoes clichŽs about terrorists hating democracy: “The U.S.S. New Jersey started hurling 16-inch shells into the mountains above Beirut, in World War II style, as if we were softening up the beaches on some Pacific atoll prior to an invasion. What we tend to overlook in such situations is that other people will react much as we would.” 17 The ensuing retaliatory attack against US Marine barracks in Lebanon took the lives of 241 American military personnel. The bombardment of Beirut in 1983 and 1984 is but one of many examples of American violence against the Middle East and/or Muslims since the 1980s. The record includes: the shooting down of two Libyan planes in 1981 the bombing of Libya in 1986 the bombing and sinking of an Iranian ship in 1987 the shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane in 1988 the shooting down of two more Libyan planes in 1989 the massive bombing of the Iraqi people in 1991 the continuing bombings and sanctions against Iraq for the next 12 years the bombing of Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 the habitual support of Israel despite the routine devastation and torture it inflicts upon the Palestinian people the habitual condemnation of Palestinian resistance to this the abduction of “suspected terrorists” from Muslim countries, such as Malaysia, Pakistan, Lebanon and Albania, who are then taken to places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where they are tortured the large military and hi-tech presence in Islam’s holiest land, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region the support of undemocratic, authoritarian Middle East governments from the Shah of Iran to the Saudis. “How do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic hatred for America?” asked George W. “I’ll tell you how I respond: I’m amazed. I’m amazed that there’s such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us. I am – like most Americans, I just can’t believe it because I know how good we are.” 18 It’s not just people in the Middle East who have good reason for hating what the US government does. The United States has created huge numbers of potential terrorists all over Latin America during a half century of American actions far worse than what it’s done in the Middle East. If Latin Americans shared the belief of radical Muslims that they will go directly to paradise for martyring themselves in the act of killing the great Satan enemy, by now we might have had decades of repeated terrorist horror coming from south of the border. As it is, there have been many non-suicidal terrorist attacks against Americans and their buildings in Latin America over the years. To what extent do Americans really believe the official disconnect between what the US does in the world and anti-American terrorism? One indication that the public is somewhat skeptical came in the days immediately following the commencement of the bombing of Iraq on March 20 of this year. The airlines later announced that there had been a sharp increase in cancellations of flights and a sharp decrease in future flight reservations in those few days. 19 In June, the Pew Research Center released the results of polling in 20 Muslim countries and the Palestinian territories that brought into question another official thesis, that support for anti-American terrorism goes hand in hand with hatred of American society. The polling revealed that people interviewed had much more “confidence” in Osama bin Laden than in George W. Bush. However, “the survey suggested little correlation between support for bin Laden and hostility to American ideas and cultural products. People who expressed a favorable opinion of bin Laden were just as likely to appreciate American technology and cultural products as people opposed to bin Laden. Pro- and anti-bin Laden respondents also differed little in their views on the workability of Western-style democracy in the Arab world.” 20 The Iraqi resistance The official Washington mentality about the motivations of individuals they call terrorists is also manifested in current US occupation policy in Iraq. Secretary of War Donald Rumsfeld has declared that there are five groups opposing US forces – looters, criminals, remnants of Saddam Hussein’s government, foreign terrorists and those influenced by Iran. 21 An American official in Iraq maintains that many of the people shooting at US troops are “poor young Iraqis” who have been paid between $20 and $100 to stage hit-and-run attacks on US soldiers. “They’re not dedicated fighters,” he said. “They’re people who wanted to take a few potshots.” 22 With such language do American officials avoid dealing with the idea that any part of the resistance is composed of Iraqi citizens who are simply demonstrating their resentment about being bombed, invaded, occupied, and subjected to daily humiliations. Some officials convinced themselves that it was largely the most loyal followers of Saddam Hussein and his two sons who were behind the daily attacks on Americans, and that with the capture or killing of the evil family, resistance would die out; tens of millions of dollars were offered as reward for information leading to this joyful prospect. Thus it was that the killing of the sons elated military personnel. US Army trucks with loudspeakers drove through small towns and villages to broadcast a message about the death of Hussein’s sons. “Coalition forces have won a great victory over the Baath Party and the Saddam Hussein regime by killing Uday and Qusay Hussein in Mosul,” said the message broadcast in Arabic. “The Baath Party has no power in Iraq. Renounce the Baath Party or you are in great danger.” It called on all officials of Hussein’s government to turn themselves in. 23 What followed was several days of some of the deadliest attacks against American personnel since the guerrilla war began. Unfazed, American officials in Washington and Iraq continue to suggest that the elimination of Saddam will write finis to anti-American actions. Another way in which the political origins of terrorism are obscured is by the common practice of blaming poverty or repression by Middle Eastern governments (as opposed to US support for such governments) for the creation of terrorists. Defenders of US foreign policy cite this also as a way of showing how enlightened they are. Here’s Condoleezza Rice: [The Middle East] is a region where hopelessness provides a fertile ground for ideologies that convince promising youths to aspire not to a university education, a career or family, but to blowing themselves up, taking as many innocent lives with them as possible. We need to address the source of the problem. 24 Many on the left speak in a similar fashion, apparently unconscious of what they’re obfuscating. This analysis confuses terrorism with revolution. In light of the several instances mentioned above, among others which could be cited, of US officials giving the game away, in effect admitting that terrorists and guerrillas may be, or in fact are, reacting to actual hurts and injustices, it may be that George W. is the only true believer among them, if in fact he is one. The thought may visit leaders of the American Empire, at least occasionally, that all their expressed justifications for invading Iraq and Afghanistan and for their “War on Terrorism” are no more than fairy tales for young children and grown-up innocents. But officialdom doesn’t make statements to represent reality. It constructs stories to legitimize the pursuit of interests. And the interests here are irresistibly compelling: creating the most powerful empire in all history, enriching their class comrades, remaking the world in their own ideological image. Being the target of terrorism is just one of the prices you pay for such prizes, and terrorist attacks provide a great excuse for the next intervention, the next expansion of the empire, the next expansion of the military budget. A while ago, I heard a union person on the radio proposing what he called “a radical solution to poverty – pay people enough to live on.” Well, I’d like to propose a radical solution to anti-American terrorism – stop giving terrorists the motivation to attack America. As long as the imperial mafia insist that anti-American terrorists have no good or rational reason for retaliation against the United States for anything the US has ever done to their countries, as long as US foreign policy continues with its bloody and oppressive interventions, the “War on Terrorism” is as doomed to failure/////

as the war on drugs has been. If I were the president, I could stop terrorist attacks against the United States in a few days. Permanently. I would first apologize – very publicly and very sincerely – to all the widows and orphans, the impoverished and the tortured, and all the many millions of other victims of American imperialism. Then I would announce to every corner of the world that America’s global military interventions have come to an end. I would then inform Israel that it is no longer the 51st state of the union but -ññ oddly enough -ññ a foreign country. Then I would reduce the military budget by at least 90% and use the savings to pay reparations to the victims and repair the damage from the many American bombings, invasions and sanctions. There would be more than enough money. One year’s military budget in the United States is equal to more than $20,000 per hour for every hour since Jesus Christ was born. That’s one year. That’s what I’d do on my first three days in the White House. On the fourth day, I’d be assassinated.

## \*\*\* 2AC

### A2: Psych bad for IR--Short

Foreign policy is not rational—emotional concerns about fear, honor, and shame drive every foreign policy decision

PAUL SAURETTE 06 – PHD, associate professor at the School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada (“You dissin me? Humiliation and post 9/11 global politics” Review of International Studies (2006), 32, 495-522)

Throughout the Cold War, a consensus existed within policy and academic circles that US global policy should be oriented by the first and second of Thucydides' strongest motives - but never the third. Interest, rationally calculated and analysed, was to be the sine qua non of America's foreign policy criteria. Through the writings of Morgenthau and deterrence theory, fear too became synonymous with the rational calculation of interest and thus became an indispensable element to be considered. Within the Cold War paradigm, however, Thucydides third motive, honour, was to be virtually excluded. In fact, the distinction between a foreign policy based on rational interest (of which fear became an accepted part) and one based on concerns about honour, shame, humiliation and respect, served as a fundamental basis for distinguishing the new world from the old.4 Recently, however, significant shifts in global politics and the academic context has cracked open this narrow dichotomy. Increasingly, events have seemed to highlight the importance of a much wider range of concerns. How can we, for example, make sense of the contemporary impact of the Danish 'cartoon incident' on global politics without some reference to the force of the emotive commitments related to honour, shame, humiliation and respect? Moreover, scholars using a wide variety of methodological perspectives have begun to examine the ways in which a wide variety of 'non-rational' and emotional factors are central to international relations. Popular commentators have also become increasingly interested in this area and have begun to use them to explain contemporary politics. In fact, were it not for the self-imposed avoidance of most questions of emotion in the post-World War II discipline of International Relations, it might not strike us as very odd that Rich Lowry, a pundit writing for the right-wing National Review, could without difficulty argue that the war on terror should be prosecuted most importantly for reasons of honour, and draw upon two prestigious international relations theorists to support this view.

### AT: BL

The peace movment needs a win—iraq showed it can mobilize and has a groundswell of support, but since then, morale has been low and protest has been unanswered. The aff changes that

Loeb, 2003 [Paul, Paul Rogat Loeb is the author of Soul of a Citizen*: Living With Conviction in a Cynical Time.*http://www.paulloeb.org/articles/reclaiminghope.htm]

The global peace movement may have actually helped pressure the US military to limit what they called “collateral damage,” as they scaled down the initial plans for the massive bombardment they called “shock & awe.”  Now, placed in what psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton called, during Vietnam, “an atrocity-creating situation,” our scared young soldiers have responded to suicide bombers and snipers by shooting up cars full of women and children and firing on unarmed demonstrators. Given the occupation’s continuing chaos and the developing bitterness of ordinary Iraqis, our troops stand to be vulnerable targets for years.

 But watching the complications unfold hasn’t helped peace movement morale. During the war itself, communities that had massive demonstrations just a few weeks before saw the numbers of those visibly protesting quickly melt away. Although public witness remained critically important, we wanted to do more, even to stop the bombs physically. We wanted the power to immediately prevent the destructive actions that were unfolding, but within the war’s abbreviated timeframe, that was something we couldn’t do. As a result, many who’d just recently felt a massive common strength, quickly felt isolated and confused, and have remained so. It’s not that we bought into the administration’s propaganda juggernaut, or do now that the war is over. But it’s hard to know how to challenge it, especially in an atmosphere that attacks even the mildest dissent as allegiance to terrorism.  And without the clear focus of working to prevent a looming war, it’s now harder to define our common tasks.

 As conservative pundits talk glibly of moving on to Syria and Iran, we might start with questioning the ethic of arrogance that would make this war just a first step toward a new imperial America, at home and abroad. On the eve of the war, an army mother from El Paso, Texas, wrote to me, describing why she’d began attending peace vigils. She prayed every night for the safety of her son and the others in his unit.  “I have no doubts,” she wrote, “about our military and the job it can do. But does that make it right and just? I know that Saddam is an evil dictator but he is but one in a long list, and I worry that this administration will not want to stop with just him.  I heard Bill Bennett on TV last night and he was actually grinning and saying that we were a superpower and we have every right to show our might.  What happened to ‘being humble’?”

 We need to challenge a view that we our leaders can do whatever they choose without consequence, simply because they have the power. After the UN didn’t support the Bush administration on Iraq, the Bush administration attacked anyway, then spurned post-war international control, leaving our troops as visible occupiers, exposed to attack, blamed for continued disorder, and inflaming the Islamic world with their presence. Whenever treaties on global warming, tobacco use, child labor, ballistic missiles, or landmines threaten to place limits on corporate or military power, the administration undermines them or withdraws, even though this unilateralism makes it impossible for the world to address our most urgent common problems. If the rich want more tax breaks, it doesn’t matter that the funds come out of domestic education, health and social welfare budgets, even the programs that serve military families. Those making these decisions assume that they will have no costs, or none to anyone who matters.

 We need to challenge this politics of denial and contempt, and offer alternatives that honor our common ties: working with other nations, respecting communities at home, treating democracy as more than just a rhetorical cloak for bullying and greed. To do this effectively, we can begin by working to re-involve those millions of ordinary citizens, who, despite all the polls, do not believe the Bush administration’s actions, whether at home or abroad, have made the world safer, more democratic, or more humane.  For the moment, many have grown quiet—isolated, intimidated, and demoralized. But this past year, so many people got involved—either again or for the first time--they could form the core of the largest American peace and justice movement in decades.

 Powerful journeys can emerge out of bleak times. The first local NAACP meeting attended by Rosa Parks, a dozen years before her stand on the Montgomery bus, addressed one of America’s own buried legacies of terror, the persistence of lynching. We also never know what some of those just coming into involvement may end up accomplishing. In the early 1960s, a friend of mine named Lisa took two of her kids to a Washington, DC, vigil in front of the White House, protesting nuclear testing. The vigil was small, a hundred women at most. Rain poured down. The women felt frustrated and powerless. A few years later, the movement against testing had grown dramatically, and Lisa attended a major march. Benjamin Spock, the famous baby doctor, spoke. He described how he'd come to take a stand, which because of his stature had influenced thousands, and would continue to after his early opposition to the Vietnam War. Spock talked briefly about the issues, then mentioned being in DC a few years before and seeing a small group of women marching, with their kids, in the pouring rain. "I thought that if those women were out there," he said, "their cause must be really important." As he described the scene and setting, and how much he was moved, Lisa realized that Spock was referring to her soggy group.

 The movements of this past year may well have brought into involvement the next Ben Spock, the next Rosa Parks, the next Martin Luther King.  But the tide of new citizen activists will matter only if we can find ways to re-involve them. A prime task, therefore, has to be connecting with those people who participated at the periphery of the movement but melted away when the war began: the neighbor who displayed a peace sign; the co-worker who went to a march or candle-light vigil; the friend who raised hesitations. We need to validate their impulse to participate to begin with, listen to their concerns, refer them to groups that are acting. We need to give them ways to reclaim their voice, and begin reaching out again in their communities. Just the process of working to raise issues together will help us recover some of our sense of power, because nothing is more depressing than watching the bad news in withdrawal and silence.

 We have powerful potential allies institutionally as well as individually. The recent movement brought together key organizations and voices of conscience in ways that didn’t remotely occur even at the height of the opposition to the Vietnam War. The Win Without War coalition joined the National Council of Churches, the Sierra Club, the NAACP, the National Organization for Women, national peace groups, major union leaders, and cyberactivists like [www.moveon.org](http://www.moveon.org/) and Working Assets. We saw strong peace statements from every major Catholic leader and the heads of every major mainline Protestant denomination except the Southern Baptists. ACLU memberships have soared in the wake of the Patriot Act’s gross invasion of the most basic elements of privacy. If these institutions and institutional leaders can keep working together, they can offer powerful ways to create a common voice. Add in a continuing global peace movement, and we have a powerful base for change.

 Making progress on any of these issues will be vastly easier, of course, if we can get George Bush out of office. Many peace, justice, and environmental activists are already shifting gears to begin working toward this end. Many are backing the more progressive Democratic candidates, like Howard Dean and Dennis Kucinich. Some are supporting other contenders, like Richard Gephardt and John Kerry. (Though Gephardt’s support of the war and Kerry’s waffling hardly make this an easy task, either would be far better than Bush in a dozen key ways if they got in.) Others are focusing on registering disengaged voters, and on beginning anew to talk about issues buried beneath Bush’s media whitewashing.

 At some point we’ll be left with no choice but to back the last Democratic standing, or tacitly help Bush get reelected. No matter who the Democratic nominee is in 2004, the Republican agenda is ruthless and regressive enough, and the Bush electoral machine so efficient, that we can’t afford Green Party diversions. We have to be united in voting, helping get out the vote, and doing whatever we can.  But between now and November 2004, it will be our energies that do or don’t build both the grassroots movement that can hold Bush accountable for his actions and the political context that can give us a chance to defeat him.

 We live, alas, in a time of lies. If we stay silent, they build up like mud piling in front of a door. The deeper the mud, the harder it is to dig out from it. So we need to find ways to

help our fellow citizens recognize how little this administration has ever cared about democracy, and how much about its own power. And how that power makes both individuals and communities expendable, whether American troops deployed in the Gulf, Iraqi civilians killed by our bombs, or ordinary citizens living in communities seeing cuts in every institution that serves the poor and vulnerable—and even the middle class, as teachers get laid off from all but the most affluent public schools. We need to start local dialogues about our choices and priorities, who wins and who loses, and the long-term implications of everything from waging preemptive war, to ignoring global warming, to transferring unprecedented amounts of money from the poorest to the wealthiest.  We have to start those dialogues now and with people who don’t necessarily agree with us. We need to give our fellow citizens the courage not to just duck and cover when told they’ve no right to speak out, and stand by those who are attacked.

 Finally, we need to persist. The roots of the Iraq war go back decades, from the “Southern Strategy” that handed the Republicans so much political power to the US role in bringing Saddam Hussein and his Baathist party to power to begin with. These roots won’t be instantly untangled. If we look just at the past few months, we didn’t win what we hoped.  We didn’t stop the war.  But we were never in it only to stop just a single war, but to redirect this country down paths that treat the world with respect. Immediately, we need to do whatever we can between now and November of 2004 to elect a different president. But we also have to be in this for the long haul. If we act with enough courage, and persevere long enough in raising the real and difficult issues, the turnings of history may surprise us in powerful and hopeful ways. Despite the Bush administration’s insistence to the contrary, we are far from alone in this task.

### T authority

#### WAR POWER refers to the power to wage a war and defend the nation – surrender obviously removes this

BALLENTINE’S 10 [BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY, lexis]

TERM: war power.

TEXT: 1. The power of the government of the United States to wage war to the point of success, that is the overcoming of the enemy.

2. The national defense is an absolute necessity of our existence. The people of the United States have prepared themselves for such a situation by confiding to Congress the power to declare war and to support and maintain armies for the national defense. This is necessarily a master power, to be exercised without the hampering interference of anyone. The call of men to the colors is within, and necessarily within, the exercise of this power. To whom the call goes out, and who is to make an answering response are matters germane to, and indeed necessarily involved in, the exercise of the war-making power. Questions which necessarily arise, or may be expected to arise, must be determined in some way and by some tribunal. The warmaking power may therefore provide the required system and constitute the needed tribunals.

#### We = stat restriction

KAISER 80—the Official Specialist in American National Government, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress [Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the Legislative Veto; Kaiser, Frederick M., 32 Admin. L. Rev. 667 (1980)]

In addition to direct statutory overrides, there are a variety of statutory and nonstatutory techniques that have the effect of overturning rules, that prevent their enforcement, or that seriously impede or even preempt the promulgation of projected rules. For instance, a statute may alter the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency or extend the exemptions to its authority, thereby affecting existing or anticipated rules. Legislation that affects an agency's funding may be used to prevent enforcement of particular rules or to revoke funding discretion for rulemaking activity or both. Still other actions, less direct but potentially significant, are mandating agency consultation with other federal or state authorities and requiring prior congressional review of proposed rules (separate from the legislative veto sanctions). These last two provisions may change or even halt proposed rules by interjecting novel procedural requirements along with different perspectives and influences into the process.

It is also valuable to examine nonstatutory controls available to the Congress:

1. legislative, oversight, investigative, and confirmation hearings;

2. establishment of select committees and specialized subcommittees to oversee agency rulemaking and enforcement;

3. directives in committee reports, especially those accompanying legislation, authorizations, and appropriations, regarding rules or their implementation;

4. House and Senate floor statements critical of proposed, projected, or ongoing administrative action; and

5. direct contact between a congressional office and the agency or office in question.

Such mechanisms are all indirect influences; unlike statutory provisions, they are neither self-enforcing nor legally binding by themselves. Nonetheless, nonstatutory devices are more readily available and more easily effectuated than controls imposed by statute. And some observers have attributed substantial influence to nonstatutory controls in regulatory as well as other matters.3

It is impossible, in a limited space, to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive listing of congressional actions that override, have the effect of overturning, or prevent the promulgation of administrative rules. Consequently, this report concentrates upon the more direct statutory devices, although it also encompasses committee reports accompanying bills, the one nonstatutory instrument that is frequently most authoritatively connected with the final legislative product. The statutory mechanisms surveyed here cross a wide spectrum of possible congressional action:

1. single-purpose provisions to overturn or preempt a specific rule;

2. alterations in program authority that remove jurisdiction from an agency;

3. agency authorization and appropriation limitations;

4. inter-agency consultation requirements; and

5. congressional prior notification provisions.

### 2AC Terror DA (Generic)

U ev

“Terrorism experts offer a range of reasons for why al-Qaida or other violent militants have never met their goal of carrying out a biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological attack on the United States or another nation These include:¶ -- substantive efforts by the United States and partner nations to secure the most lethal WMD materials;¶ -- improved border security and visa checks that deny entry to possible foreign-born terrorists;¶ -- a lack of imagination and drive on the part of would-be terrorists to pursue the kind of novel but technically difficult attacks that could lead to widespread dispersal of unconventional materials;¶ -- a general haplessness on the part of the native-born U.S. extremists who have pursued WMD attacks, specifically involving weaponized pathogens;¶ -“

#### Their repetition of terrorist threats reinforces stereotypes and leads to a fearful, securitized, islamophobia. Their disadvantage fuels calls to war and is academically suspect.

Streuner and Willis, 2009 [Dr. Erin Steuter a nd Dr. De borah Wills Depart ment o f Soci ology Mount Allis on Univer sity rin Steuter and Deborah Wills are the authors of At Wa r with Meta phor: Media Propaganda and Racism in th e Wa r on Terr or (Lexington Books, 2008). Erin Steuter is an a ssociate professor of Soci ology where she specializes in examining the ideological repr esentations of the ne ws. Recip ient of multiple awards for her teaching and r esearch, her research and published works have appeared in Political Communication and Persuasion , Canadian Jo urnal of Communication , Journal of American and Comparative C ultures , a nd other noted academic journals. Deborah Wills is an associa te professor of English at Mount Allison University . “iscourses of Dehumanization: Enemy Construction and Canadian Media Complicity in the Framing of the War on Terror “http://www.gmj.uottawa.ca/0902/v2i2\_steuter%20and%20wills.pdf]

One of the least visible bu t most ideological ly-charged choices in W ester n medi a’s coverage of the Afg han and Iraqi war s is its “consistent disinterest in nonviolent Muslim perspectives” (Gottsc halk and Greenberg 2007). As Peter Go ttschalk and Gabriel Greenberg (2007) point out, moderate voices from the Mu slim community are routinely omitted from news coverage, an absence that confirms public stereotyping of all Muslims as extremist. While this omission pre-dates September11, it has intensified since; domestic news sources “seldom mention the terms ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islam’ except in the context of conflict, violence, and bloodshed” (G ottschalk and Greenberg 2007).

Constructing the Enemy Media coverage of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are critically shaped by pre-existing, Is lamophobic frames that reflect neo-colonial assumptions (Henry & Tator, 2002; Kellner, 2004; Norris, Kern & Just, 2003; Nacos, 2002; Paletz, 1992; Picard, 1993). Karim argues that a coherent set of journalistic narratives have emerged regarding “Muslim terrorism” (2003: 81) narratives that reinforce stereotypes of murderous Muslims and advance limited and often inaccurate information about Islam. Edward Said (1997) similarly argues that the image of Is lam in Western media is laden “not only [with] patent inaccuracy but also expressions of unres trained ethnocentrism, cultural and even racial hatred” (Said, 1997: ii). He notes that “malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign cultu re in the West; what is said about the Muslim mind, or character, or religion, or culture as a whole cannot now be said in mainstream discussion about Africans, Jews, other Orientals, or Asians” (Ibid: 12). Journalist David Lamb concurs, noting that Arabs are now “caricatur ed in a manner once reserved for blacks and Hispanics” (cited in Lester & Ross, 2003: 76).

Elizabeth Poole observes that in the media’s discussion of the War on Terror, anti-Western violence is “seen to evolve out of something inherent in the [Muslim] religion” (Poole, 2002: 4). As several studies have documented, after the events of 9/11, North American media intensified their depictions of prevailing st ereotypes about Arabs and Muslims (Pintak, 2006; Inbaraj, 2002; McChesney, 2002). Pintak contends that the bias in American media after 9/11 constitutes “jihad journalism”, adding that such slanted coverage became “the hallmark of the post-9/11 era” (Pintak, 2006: 42-44). The media’s dominant narrative, according to McChesney, portrays “a benevolent, democratic and peace-loving nation brutally attacked by insane evil terrorists who hate the United States for its fr eedoms” (McChesney, 2002: 43). Its chief message is that the U.S. “must immediately increase its military and covert forces, locate the surviving culprits and exterminate them” in order to “root out the global terrorist cancer” (Ibid). This dominant narrative’s reliance on disease metaphors poi nts to one of the key features of North American and European media coverage of th e wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the War on Terror in general: the patterned and systematic dehumanization of Muslims (Kuttab, 2007; Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson & Mihic, 2008)

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Philip Knightly’s (1975) and Sam Keen’s ( 1991) pioneering work on enemy construction analyzes the persistence of animal images of the enemy in media propaganda. The construction of the enemy as a dehumanized Other is much more than a representational strategy performed by the news media; its results can be global in reach. Said’s work lays much of the groundwork for current analyses of the media’s fabrication of the enemy-Other; it argues that colonial and imperial projects depend on the way we characterize those we see as deeply and oppositionally different from ourselves. Over time, these characterizations are systematized and grouped into an organized body of thought, a repertoire of words and images so often repeated that it comes to seem like objective knowledge. Orientalism, the distorting lens created by this process, offers a framework through which the West examines what it perceives as the foreign or alien, Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills 12 consistently figuring the East as the West’s invers e: barbaric to its civilized, superstitious to its rational, medieval to its modern. While We stern citizens are defined by their essential uniqueness and individuality, those of the East are constructed in metaphoric terms that emphasize their indistinguishability; the language of Western media discourse typically emphasizes mass over singularity when it represents the East.

In times of conflict, when constructions of the Other conflate with constructions of the enemy, this pattern intensifies. As Lori A. P eek points out, the processes of defining the enemy and defining the Other have a lot in common, in that they “sometimes lead to devastating outcomes” (Peek, 2004: 28). Presenting the enemy- Other as an indistinguishable mass is an essential strategy in the process of enemy fabrication; wartime images traditionally stress this indistinguishability, as evidenced in Frank Capra’s 1945 propaganda film, Know Your Enemy: Japan , which claimed all Japanese resembled “photographic reprints off the same negative” (Dower, 1986: 18), a message visually reinforced by inter-cutting scenes of a steel bar being hammered in a forge with scenes of regimented Japanese mass activity, the visual correlative of a race lacking individual identity.

Such representations operate most visibly in overt propaganda, but devolve so thoroughly into public discourse that they influence the media’s rhetorical choices. Middle-Eastern identities are confused and eroded; Rayan El Amine notes that the Islamic menace “has replaced the red menace, and the ‘evil empire’ of the cold war ha s become the . . . ‘evil doers’ of the Arab and Muslim world” (2005). The metaphors employed in Canadian newspaper headlines further and solidify such attitudes, compressing difference into unanimity by employing a vocabulary of indistinguishability. Unlike the civilized citizens of the West, who are prim arily identified with culture rather than with nature , the hordes of the East are represented as being as natural as insects and as undifferentiated as a hive or swarm. The headlines gathered here clearly indicate an ongoing equation of the Muslim Other with swarming insects and massing rodents, a metaphoric conflation that is especially resilient and persistent. As Merskin notes, we did not see “the end of enemy construction with the war in Iraq. The stereotype was carried from the Taliban, bin Laden, and terrorists to the axis of evil and Hussein. Since the occupation of Iraq, the evil Arab image shifted to . . . ‘crazed’ Ira qis opposed to U.S. occupation” (2004: 60). Such images are not, as Merskin argues, simply an issue of journalistic imbalance and unfair representations, but speak to fundamental questions of why such images are so necessary and prevalent.

#### Presenting the impact of terrorism feeds a political culture that favors preemptive violence—makes war inevitable and causes error replication

Erickson 08 (Ericsonwas Professor and Director, Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto, Canada, “Risk and the War on Terror”, <http://www.didierbigo.com/students/readings/IPS2011/12/Risk_and_the_War_on_Terror.pdf#page=40>)

Terrorism makes precautionary logic obvious. Following 9/11, political speech in the U.S. took a dramatic turn aimed at making precautionary logic part of everyday life. President Bush hit home in various sound-bites the need to preempt the terrorist threat ‘‘before it fully materializes.’’ His then National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, declared that extraordinary police and military mobilization against terrorism is necessary before the ‘‘smoking gun becomes a mushroom cloud’’ (Janus 2004: 577–8).

Investigations of the failure to prevent the events of 9/11 focused on the problems of bureaucracy, communication, and tunnel vision in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CIA, and other security agencies, and stressed the need to exercise the catastrophic imagination as a crucial ingredient of future security. The 9/11 Commission Report (Kean and Hamilton 2004: 339) said the 9/11 attacks reﬂected security agencies’ failure of ‘‘imagination – the lack of organisational capacity to imagine such an attack’’ (see also Salter, this volume). Ironically, it recommended efforts to bureaucratize imagination: ‘‘It is therefore crucial to ﬁnd a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination’’ (ibid: 334). While a bureaucratized imagination seems paradoxical, what is being recommended is the embedding of precautionary logic in the security systems of organizations.

In all of their planning, strategies, and practices, security agents are to imagine a kind of sea monster intent on leaving tsunami-like destruction in its wake.

Precautionary logic has become central to the U.S. politics of risk and security, feeding into and fed by other features of its political culture. There is a concerted effort to conﬂate the need for preemption at home with preemptive strikes against terrorism abroad. This conﬂation was a key feature of Bush’s strategy in the 2004 presidential election, continuing the post-9/ 11 campaign to simultaneously terrorize the American population into the preemptive policies of homeland security, and populations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East through preemptive attacks.

This conﬂation of security at home with aggression abroad is effected through the view that the U.S. is at war with terrorists however deﬁned. The U.S. has long used ‘‘war on’’ metaphors to identify suitable enemies and justify extreme security measures against them: ‘‘the war on crime,’’ ‘‘the war on drugs,’’ even ‘‘the war on poverty’’ when welfarism had a glimmer of hope in the American political culture of the 1960s (see also Simon, this volume). ‘‘The war on terrorism’’ in some respects encapsulates all of these ‘‘war on’’ campaigns because it is not only directed at foreign enemies and global security, but also at enemies within, blurring into preemptive approaches to domestic crime, drugs, welfare fraud, and anything else signifying moral degeneracy (Barak 2005).

Agamben (2005) links the pervasiveness of ‘‘war on’’ metaphors in American culture to the fact that the sovereign power of the president is based in declared emergency linked to a state of war.

[O]ver the course of the twentieth century the metaphor of war becomes an integral part of the presidential political vocabulary whenever decisions considered to be of vital importance are being imposed. Thus, in 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to assume extraordinary powers to cope with the Great Depression by presenting his actions as those of a commander during a military campaign ... President Bush’s decision to refer to himself constantly as the ‘‘Commander in Chief of the Army’’ after September 11, 2001, must be considered in the context of this presidential claim to sovereign powers in everyday emergency situations. If, as we have seen, the assumption of this title entails a direct reference to the state of exception, then Bush is attempting to produce a situation in which emergency becomes the rule, and the very distinction between peace and war (and between foreign and civil war) becomes impossible. Agamben (2005: 21–2)

Richard Clarke, a former member of the U.S. Security Council, even argues that al-Qaeda is a ‘‘phantom enemy’’ manufactured through the precautionary logic of instrumental politicians: ‘‘those with the darkest imaginations become the most powerful’’ (Clarke 2004). Raban (2005: 22) observes there is now ‘‘a world of chronic blur, full of slippery words that mean something different from what they meant before September 2001.’’ It is the blur of a war on everything, envisaged by U.S. military ofﬁcials long before 9/11: In broad terms, fourth generation warfare [involving a nation-state in conﬂict with a non-state actor] seems to be widely dispersed and largely undeﬁned; the distinction will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no deﬁneable battleﬁelds or fronts. The distinction between ‘‘civilian’’ and ‘‘military’’ may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity.

### 2ac saudi relations

#### Outraged now – iran and syria

WSJ 9 – 29 – 13 U.S. Moves on Syria, Iran Anger Saudi Arabia, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303643304579104910000148876.html>

The Obama administration's handling of overtures on Syria and Iran have outraged regional ally Saudi Arabia, which is signaling it wants to do more to boost the power of armed Sunni rebel groups on the ground in Syria as the U.S. pursues diplomacy.

Saudis fear that Syrian President Basher al-Assad will use the time afforded by U.S.- and U.N.-backed diplomacy on Syria "to impose more killing and to torture its people," Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal said Thursday night in New York, in a warning that was overshadowed by the attention paid to the weekend's first public contacts in three decades between the presidents of Iran and the U.S.

Accordingly, Saudi Arabia wants "intensification of political, economic and military support to the Syrian opposition…. to change the balance of powers on the ground" in Syria, Prince Saud said in his remarks to the Friends of Syria group, a coalition of Western and Gulf Arab countries and Turkey that supports the Syria opposition against Mr. Assad. The state-run Saudi Press Agency carried a transcript of his remarks.

The Saudi government has had no public comment so far on the groundbreaking phone call Friday between U.S. President Barack Obama, whose country Saudi Arabia sees as the main military protector of its interests, and new Iranian President Hasan Rouhani, whose country Saudi Arabia sees as its main threat.

Asharq al Awsat, one of Saudi Arabia's leading newspapers, led its front page the morning after the phone call with a photo of Mr. Rouhani, bowed over with laughter.

The Saudi foreign minister's declaration is significant because Saudi Arabia, while one of the main suppliers of Syria's predominately Sunni opposition, up to now has heeded U.S. fears throughout the conflict that aid to Syrian rebels could strengthen armed, anti-Western Sunni factions. Shiite Muslim Iran backs Mr. Assad in the Syrian conflict, while most Sunni Muslim-ruled Gulf Arab states support the rebels fighting to overthrow Mr. Assad.

Saudi Arabia, for example, long held off on supplying Stinger-style missiles to Syrian rebels because of U.S. worries the missiles could be used against Western targets, security analysts briefed by Saudi officials say. Saudi Arabia increased pressure on the U.S. to allow arming the rebels with antiaircraft weapons this summer, as larger numbers of Hezbollah fighters entered the conflict on the side of Mr. Assad's regime.

Saudis now feel that the Obama administration is disregarding Saudi concerns over Iran and Syria, and will respond accordingly in ignoring "U.S. interests, U.S. wishes, U.S. issues" in Syria, said Mustafa Alani, a veteran Saudi security analyst with the Geneva-based Gulf Research Center.

"They are going to be upset—we can live with that," Mr. Alani said Sunday of the Obama administration. "We are learning from our enemies now how to treat the United States."

#### Saudi couldn’t get nukes – and wouldn’t – against their interest – interpret internal statements with skepticism

DEMING 13 research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues, CSIS, D&D Expert, lvl 12 cleric [Kyle Demin, Over a Barrel or Under an Umbrella: Factors Influencing Saudi Arabia’s Decisions against a Nuclear Iran, <https://csis.org/blog/over-barrel-or-under-umbrella-factors-influencing-saudi-arabias-decisions-against-nuclear-iran>]

In a series of statements dating back to 2009 [1], Saudi Arabia has repeatedly asserted its capability and inclination to acquire a deterrent of its own if Iran successfully forces its way into the nuclear club. The significance of a poly-nuclear Middle East has driven policymakers and analysts to consider the likelihood that Riyadh will fulfill its promises. Assuming Saudi Arabia could develop a suitable domestic program or obtain a weapons system from a nuclear power – two avenues which, given the available evidence, would represent no small challenge to pursue [2]– does a survey of observable Saudi behavior and the incentives guiding it provide assurance that Riyadh would avoid reciprocating Tehran’s nuclear efforts? Several factors are worth considering:

First, the international pressure against leaving the nonproliferation regime is enormous, a consideration likely to enter regime calculations even under crisis. Saudi Arabia would not only have to abandon its leading position on the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone and its accompanying enforcement in the Middle East (trumpeted most recently in an August op-ed by Prince Turki al-Faisal [3]), but risk international condemnation, multilateral sanctions, and the loss of American security guarantees and economic support. Special provisions to support Saudi Arabia’s nascent nuclear industry [4] would be dropped at the first sign of suspicious activity.

Absent a near-certain existential threat – which would probably be too short-term to resolve with nuclear acquisition anyway – it seems highly unlikely that Riyadh would sacrifice hard-won international legitimacy for a marginal gain in security relative to its current position. The United States obviously takes Saudi regime security seriously (intervention in the first Gulf War serving as the most prominent example); any decision in favor of nuclearization would have to be made in the context of complete loss of faith in American protection.

Second, the economic damage risked by a move toward nuclear status would be substantial and long-term, likely imperiling Saudi Arabia’s attempts to diversify and develop its fossil fuel-driven economy. After nearly two years of coalition-imposed sanctions, Iran’s economy has suffered significantly [5], an observation unlikely to elude their Sunni rival. While Saudi Arabia’s crucial production position in the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries may give it enough leverage over global supplies to keep its oil exports from declining under a sanctions regime (a fate that has befallen Iran [6]), possibilities for foreign direct investment in other sectors would likely diminish, and reliance on sustained high oil prices would increase [7]. Given the monarchy’s reliance on economic prosperity to quell dissent and keep the kingdom running smoothly, a severe interruption to growth would be easily understood as a threat to stability.

So, how should observers interpret high-level Saudi statements in favor of the nuclear option? In short, with a degree of skepticism and an eye on Riyadh’s well-understood goals: the preservation of domestic stability, the maintenance of its international legitimacy, and protection against its chief regional adversary. Even if a Saudi nuclear deterrent accomplished the third goal, it would almost certainly deal unacceptable harm to the other two. A strong argument can be made that Saudi acquisition would be too scientifically demanding or time-intensive to be technically possible in the near term; even if these practical challenges could be met or circumvented, however, the end result would probably still be unacceptable to Riyadh.

#### Orientalist, proliferation discourse results in domination of the south and oppression.

Gusterson 99—Hugh Gusterson is a professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. [“Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 111-143, accessed through JSTOR]

Nuclear Colonialism and the Return of the Repressed

Noam Chomsky (1982) has suggested that the arms race between the superpowers was not really "about" the U.S.-Soviet rivalry at all but was a convenient way to assure the subjugation of smaller countries in the Third World under the guise of superpower competition. One does not have to swallow whole the simple reductionism of this argument to accept that there is obviously some connection between the nuclear stockpiles of some developed nations on the one hand and the political clientship and economic underdevelopment of Third World nations on the other. Just as some nations have abundant access to capital while others do not, so some nations are allowed plentiful supplies of the ultimate weapon while others are prevented by elaborate treaties and international police activities from obtaining it. Without devising rigidly deterministic models connecting economic power and nuclear weapons-models that such states as Japan and Germany obviously would not fit-one can at least sketch the broad contours of this generalization: the nuclear underdevelopment of the developing world is one fragment in a wider and systematic pattern of global disempowerment that ensures the subordination of the south. 19

The discourse on nuclear proliferation legitimates this system of domination while presenting the interests the established nuclear powers have in maintaining their nuclear monopoly as if they were equally beneficial to all the nations of the globe. And, ironically, the discourse on nonproliferation presents these subordinate nations as the principal source of danger in the world. This is another case of blaming the victim.

The discourse on nuclear proliferation is structured around a rigid segregation of "their" problems from "ours."///

In fact, however, we are linked to developing nations by a world system, and many of the problems that, we claim, render these nations ineligible to own nuclear weapons have a lot to do with the West and the system it dominates. For example, the regional conflict between India and Pakistan is, in part at least, a direct consequence of the divide-and-rule policies adopted by the British raj; and the dispute over Kashmir, identified by Western commentators as a possible flash point for nuclear war, has its origins not so much in ancient hatreds as in Britain's decision in 1846 to install a Hindu maharajah as leader of a Muslim territory (Burns 1998). The hostility between Arabs and Israelis has been exacerbated by British, French, and American intervention in the Middle East dating back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. More recently, as Steven Green points out, "Congress has voted over $36.5 billion in economic and military aid to Israel, including rockets, planes, and other technology which has directly advanced Israel's nuclear weapons capabilities. It is precisely this nuclear arsenal, which the U.S. Congress has been so instrumental in building up, that is driving the Arab state to attain countervailing strategic weapons of various kinds" (1990).

Finally, the precariousness of many Third World regimes is not at all unconnected with the activities of the WorId Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the CIA, and various multinational corporations based in the West. And if U.S. sanctions against India and Pakistan after their 1998 tests destabilize these countries, Western commentators will doubtless point to this instability as a further reason why they cannot be trusted with the bomb. "Our" coresponsibility for "their" problems and the origin of some of those problems in a continuing system of global domination which benefits the West is an integral part of ordinary political discourse in the Third World itself; it is, however, denied by an orientalist discourse that disavows that we and the Other are ultimately one.

#### The nuclear apartheid is a manifestation of racism—ensures genocide and war is inevitable.

Batur 7 [Pinar, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Sociology @ Vassar, *The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide*, Handbook of The Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 441-3]

War and genocide are horrid, and taking them for granted is inhuman. In the 21st century, our problem is not only seeing them as natural and inevitable, but even worse: not seeing, not noticing, but ignoring them. Such act and thought, fueled by global racism, reveal that racial inequality has advanced from the establishment of racial hierarchy and institutionalization of segregation, to the confinement and exclusion, and elimination, of those considered inferior through genocide. In this trajectory, global racism manifests genocide. But this is not inevitable. This article, by examining global racism, explores the new terms of exclusion and the path to permanent war and genocide, to examine the integrality of genocide to the frame-work of global antiracist confrontation. GLOBAL RACISM IN THE AGE OF “CULTURE WARS” Racist legitimization of inequality has changed from presupposed biological inferiority to assumed cultural inadequacy. This defines the new terms of impossibility of coexistence, much less equality. The Jim Crow racism of biological inferiority is now being replaced with a new and modern racism (Baker 1981; Ansell 1997) with “culture war” as the key to justify difference, hierarchy, and oppression. The ideology of “culture war” is becoming embedded in institutions, defining the workings of organizations, and is now defended by individuals who argue that they are not racist, but are not blind to the inherent differences between African-Americans/Arabs/Chinese, or whomever, and “us.” “Us” as a concept defines the power of a group to distinguish itself and to assign a superior value to its institutions, revealing certainty that affinity with “them” will be harmful to its existence (Hunter 1991; Buchanan 2002). How can we conceptualize this shift to examine what has changed over the past century and what has remained the same in a racist society? Joe Feagin examines this question with a theory of systemic racism to explore societal complexity of interconnected elements for longevity and adaptability of racism. He sees that systemic racism persists due to a “white racial frame,” defining and maintaining an “organized set of racialized ideas, stereotypes, emotions, and inclinations to discriminate” (Feagin 2006: 25). The white racial frame arranges the routine operation of racist institutions, which enables social and economic repro-duction and amendment of racial privilege. It is this frame that defines the political and economic bases of cultural and historical legitimization. While the white racial frame is one of the components of systemic racism, it is attached to other terms of racial oppression to forge systemic coherency. It has altered over time from slavery to segregation to racial oppression and now frames “culture war,” or “clash of civilizations,” to legitimate the racist oppression of domination, exclusion, war, and genocide. The concept of “culture war” emerged to define opposing ideas in America regarding privacy, censorship, citizenship rights, and secularism, but it has been globalized through conflicts over immigration, nuclear power, and the “war on terrorism.” Its discourse and action articulate to flood the racial space of systemic racism. Racism is a process of defining and building communities and societies based on racial-ized hierarchy of power. The expansion of capitalism cast new formulas of divisions and oppositions, fostering inequality even while integrating all previous forms of oppressive hierarchical arrangements as long as they bolstered the need to maintain the structure and form of capitalist arrangements (Batur-VanderLippe 1996). In this context, the white racial frame, defining the terms of racist systems of oppression, enabled the globalization of racial space through the articulation of capitalism (Du Bois 1942; Winant 1994). The key to understanding this expansion is comprehension of the synergistic relationship between racist systems of oppression and the capitalist system of exploitation. Taken separately, these two systems would be unable to create such oppression independently. However, the synergy between them is devastating. In the age of industrial capitalism, this synergy manifested itself imperialism and colonialism. In the age of advanced capitalism, it is war and genocide. The capitalist system, by enabling and maintaining the connection between everyday life and the global, buttresses the processes of racial oppression, and synergy between racial oppression and capitalist exploitation begets violence. Etienne Balibar points out that the connection between everyday life and the global is established through thought, making global racism a way of thinking, enabling connections of “words with objects and words with images in order to create concepts” (Balibar 1994: 200). Yet, global racism is not only an articulation of thought, but also a way of knowing and acting, framed by both everyday and global experiences. Synergy between capitalism and racism as systems of oppression enables this perpetuation and destruction on the global level. As capitalism expanded and adapted to the particularities of spatial and temporal variables, global racism became part of its legitimization and accommodation, first in terms of colonialist arrangements. In colonized and colonizing lands, global racism has been perpetuated through racial ideologies and discriminatory practices under capitalism by the creation and recreation of connections among memory, knowledge, institutions, and construction of the future in thought and action. What makes racism global are the bridges connecting the particularities of everyday racist experiences to the universality of racist concepts and actions, maintained globally by myriad forms of prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Batur 1999, 2006). Under colonialism, colonizing and colonized societies were antagonistic opposites. Since colonizing society portrayed the colonized “other,” as the adversary and challenger of the “the ideal self,” not only identification but also segregation and containment were essential to racist policies. The terms of exclusion were set by the institutions that fostered and maintained segregation, but the intensity of exclusion, and redundancy, became more apparent in the age of advanced capitalism, as an extension of post-colonial discipline. The exclusionary measures when tested led to war, and genocide. Although, more often than not, genocide was perpetuated and fostered by the post-colonial institutions, rather than colonizing forces, the colonial identification of the “inferior other” led to segregation, then exclusion, then war and genocide. Violence glued them together into seamless continuity. Violence is integral to understanding global racism. Fanon (1963), in exploring colonial oppression, discusses how divisions created or reinforced by colonialism guarantee the perpetuation, and escalation, of violence for both the colonizer and colonized. Racial differentiations, cemented through the colonial relationship, are integral to the aggregation of violence during and after colonialism: “Manichaeism [division of the universe into opposites of good and evil] goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes” (Fanon 1963:42). Within this dehumanizing framework, Fanon argues that the violence resulting from the destruction of everyday life, sense of self and imagination under colonialism continues to infest the post-colonial existence by integrating colonized land into the violent destruction of a new “geography of hunger” and exploitation (Fanon 1963: 96). The “geography of hunger” marks the context and space in which oppression and exploitation continue. The historical maps drawn by colonialism now demarcate the boundaries of post-colonial arrangements. The white racial frame restructures this space to fit the imagery of symbolic racism, modifying it to fit the television screen, or making the evidence of the necessity of the politics of exclusion, and the violence of war and genocide, palatable enough for the front page of newspapers, spread out next to the morning breakfast cereal. Two examples of this “geography of hunger and exploitation” are Iraq and New Orleans.

### 2AC Prez Powers/Warfighting/flexx

#### No impact to prez powers

**Healy 11**

Gene Healy is a vice president at the Cato Institute and the author of The Cult of the Presidency, The CATO Institute, June 2011, "Book Review: Hail to the Tyrant", http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/book-review-hail-tyrant

Legal checks “have been relaxed largely because of the need for centralized, relatively efficient government under the complex conditions of a modern dynamic economy and a highly interrelated international order.” What’s more, the authors insist, America needs the legally unconstrained presidency both at home (given an increasingly complex economy) and abroad (given the shrinking of global distances).

These are disputed points, to say the least. If Friedrich Hayek was at all correct about the knowledge problem, then if anything increasing economic complexity argues for less central direction. Nor does the fact that we face “a highly interrelated international order” suggest that we’re more vulnerable than we were in 1789, as a tiny frontier republic surrounded by hostile tribes and great powers. Economic interdependence — and the rise of other modern industrial democracies — means that other players have a stake in protecting the global trading system.

Posner and Vermuele coin the term “tyrannophobia,” which stands for unjustified fear of executive abuse. That fear is written into the American genetic code: the authors call the Declaration of Independence “the ur-text of tyrannophobia in the United States.” As they see it, that’s a problem because “the risk that the public will fail to trust a well-motivated president is just as serious as the risk that it will trust an ill-motivated one.” They contend that our inherited skepticism toward power exacerbates biases that lead us to overestimate the dangers of unchecked presidential power. Our primate brains exaggerate highly visible risks that fill us with a sense of dread and loss of control, so we may decline to cede more power to the president even when more power is needed.

Fair enough in the abstract — but Posner and Vermuele fail to provide a single compelling example that might lead you to lament our allegedly atavistic “tyrannophobia.” And they seem oblivious to the fact that those same irrational biases drive the perceived need for emergency government at least as much as they do hostility towards it. Highly visible public events like the 9/11 attacks also instill dread and a perceived loss of control, even if all the available evidence shows that such incidents are vanishingly rare. The most recent year for which the U.S. State Department has data, 2009, saw just 25 U.S. noncombatants worldwide die from terrorist strikes. I know of no evidence suggesting that unchecked executive power is what stood between us and a much larger death toll.

Posner and Vermuele argue that only the executive unbound can address modernity’s myriad crises. But they spend little time exploring whether unconstrained power generates the very emergencies that the executive branch uses to justify its lack of constraint. Discussing George H.W. Bush’s difficulties convincing Congress and the public that the 1991 Gulf War’s risks were worth it, they comment, “in retrospect it might seem that he was clearly right.” Had that war been avoided, though, there would have been no mass presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil — “Osama bin Laden’s principal recruiting device,” according to Paul Wolfowitz — and perhaps no 9/11.

Posner and Vermuele are slightly more perceptive when it comes to the home front, letting drop as an aside the observation that because of the easy-money policy that helped inflate the housing bubble, “the Fed is at least partly responsible for both the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and for its resolution.” Oh, well — I guess we’re even, then.

Sometimes, the authors are so enamored with the elegant economic models they construct that they can’t be bothered to check their work against observable reality. At one point, attempting to show that separation of powers is inefficient, they analogize the Madisonian scheme to “a market in which two firms must act in order to supply a good,” concluding that “the extra transaction costs of cooperation” make “the consumer (taxpayer) no better off and probably worse off than she would be under the unitary system.”

But the government-as-firm metaphor is daffy. In the Madisonian vision, inefficiency isn’t a bug, it’s a feature — a check on “the facility and excess of law-making … the diseases to which our governments are most liable,” per Federalist No. 62. If the “firm” in question also generates public “bads” like unnecessary federal programs and destructive foreign wars — and if the “consumer (taxpayer)” has no choice about whether to “consume” them — he might well favor constraints on production.

From Franklin Roosevelt onward, we’ve had something close to vertical integration under presidential command. Whatever benefits that system has brought, it’s imposed considerable costs — not least over 100,000 U.S. combat deaths in the resulting presidential wars. That system has also encouraged hubristic occupants of the Oval Office to burnish their legacies by engaging in “humanitarian war” — an “oxymoron,” according to Posner. In a sharply argued 2006 Washington Post op-ed, he noted that the Iraq War had killed tens of thousands of innocents and observed archly, “polls do not reveal the opinions of dead Iraqis.”

Syria destroys the da

David Rothkoph, CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy, 8/3/13, The Gamble, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/31/the\_gamble?page=full

Obama has reversed decades of precedent regarding the nature of presidential war powers -and whether you prefer this change in the balance of power or not, **as a matter of quantifiable fact** he is transferring greater responsibility for U.S. foreign policy to a Congress that is more divided, more incapable of reasoned debate or action, and more dysfunctional than any in modern American history. Just wait for the Rand Paul filibuster or similar congressional gamesmanship.

The president's own action in Libya was undertaken without such approval. So, too, was his expansion of America's drone and cyber programs. Will future offensive actions require Congress to weigh in? How will Congress react if the president tries to pick and choose when this precedent should be applied? At best, the door is open to further acrimony. At worst, the paralysis of the U.S. Congress that has given us the current budget crisis and almost no meaningful recent legislation will soon be coming to a foreign policy decision near you. Consider that John Boehner was instantly more clear about setting the timing for any potential action against Syria with his statement that Congress will not reconvene before its scheduled September 9 return to Washington than anyone in the administration has been thus far.

Perhaps more importantly, what will future Congresses expect of future presidents? If Obama abides by this new approach for the next three years, will his successors **lack the ability to act quickly** and on their own? While past presidents have no doubt abused their War Powers authority to take action and ask for congressional approval within 60 days, we live in a volatile world; sometimes security requires swift action. The president still legally has that right, but Obama's decision may have done more -for better or worse -to **dial back the imperial presidency** than anything his predecessors or Congress have done for decades.

5. America's international standing will likely suffer.

As a consequence of all of the above, even if the president "wins" and persuades Congress to support his extremely limited action in Syria, the perception of America as a nimble, forceful actor on the world stage and that its president is a man whose word carries great weight is **likely to be diminished**. Again, like the shift or hate it, **foreign leaders can do the math.** Not only is post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan America less inclined to get involved anywhere, but when it comes to the use of U.S. military force (our one indisputable source of superpower strength) **we just became a whole lot less likely to act** or, in any event, act quickly. Again, good or bad, that is a stance that is likely to **figure into the calculus of those who once feared provoking the United States**.

A final consequence of this is that it seems ever more certain that Obama's foreign policy will be framed as so anti-interventionist and **focused on disengagement from world affairs** that **it will have major political consequences in 2016**. The dialectic has swung from the interventionism of Bush to the leaning away of Obama. Now, the question will be whether a centrist synthesis will emerge that restores the idea that the United States can have a muscular foreign policy that remains prudent, capable of action, and respects international laws and norms. Almost certainly, that is what President Obama would argue he seeks. But I suspect that others, including possibly his former secretary of state may well seek to define a different approach. Indeed, we may well see the divisions within the Democratic Party on national security emerge as key fault lines in the Clinton vs. Biden primary battles of 2016. And just imagine Clinton vs. Rand Paul in the general election.

#### Focus on credibility causes terrible policy---the aff's a better approach

Jonathan Mercer 8/28, 2013, associate professor of political science at the University of Washington in Seattle and a Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the London School of Economics. Bad Reputation, 28 August 2013, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139376/jonathan-mercer/bad-reputation

Even if Assad were so simpleminded, the administration’s critics are wrong to suggest that the president should have acted sooner to protect U.S. credibility. After the red line was first crossed, Obama could have taken the United States to war to prevent Assad from concluding that an irresolute Obama would not respond to any further attacks -- a perception on Syria’s part that seems to have now made a U.S. military response all but certain. But going to war to prevent a possible misperception that might later cause a war is, to paraphrase Bismarck, like committing suicide out of fear that others might later wrongly think one is dead.

It is also possible that the United States did not factor into Assad’s calculations. A few months before the United States invaded Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s primary concerns were avoiding a Shia rebellion and deterring Iran. Shortsighted, yes, but also a good reminder that although the United States is at the center of the universe for Americans, it is not for everyone else. Assad has a regime to protect and he will commit any crime to win the war. Finally, it is possible that Assad never doubted Obama’s resolve -- he just expects that he can survive any American response. After all, if overthrowing Assad were easy, it would already have been done.

Instead of worrying about U.S. credibility or the president’s reputation, the administration should focus on what can be done to reinforce the longstanding norm against the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The belief in credibility empirically causes war.

Shiping Tang, Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, Co-director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue, 2005 (“Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” *Security Studies*, Volume 14, Number 1, January-March, p. 46)

Decisionmakers’ persistent concern for losing reputation has brought unnecessary bloodiness to international politics: too many wars have been waged for the sake of defending honor, prestige, reputation, and credibility. During the cold war alone, the two superpowers fought at least three large scale wars (Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan) and were involved in countless proxy conflicts for the sake of reputation (or prestige, honor, and credibility).42 On many occasions, politicians’ only justification for plunging into conflicts was defending reputation and credibility. Consider Ronald Reagan’s justification for U.S. involvement in Central America: “If we cannot defend ourselves (in Central America) . . . our credibility will collapse and our alliance will crumble. . . . If Central America were to fall, . . . which ally, which friend would trust us then?” (Type I-a).43

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### Ground Spec Good

#### Congressional ground specification key

FISHER 85—Specialist, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress [Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by members of congress, North Carolina Law Review, APRIL, 1985, 63 N.C.L. Rev. 707]

Another example of congressional independence concerns the Civil Rights Act of 1964. n275 Basing this statute solely on the fourteenth amendment would have risked a head-on collision with The Civil Rights Cases n276 of 1883, which never had been overruled. Congress chose the commerce power as an alternative constitutional foundation for the Civil Rights Act, n277 and the Supreme Court upheld the Act by finding in the commerce power sufficient congressional authority. n278

Congressional-Court dialogues need not consume decades before Congress alters the shape of a Supreme Court decision. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 n279 modified three controversial Court rulings on criminal procedure. The first, Mallory v. United States, n280 held that suspects must be taken before a magistrate for arraignment as quickly as possible. n281 Additionally, admission obtained from the suspect during illegal detainment could not be used against him. The Court made room for congressional involvement by basing its decision not solely on constitutional grounds, [\*745] but also on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure enacted by Congress. n282 The decision thus invited Congress to enter the arena and modify those rules. Congress did so: Title II established six hours as a reasonable period before arraignment. n283 Congressional action was justified as a modification of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure even though constitutional issues clearly were present.

### No Nuclear Terrorism

#### No WMD terror—prefer it, from their author—shows their paranoia b/c only focus on the worst case scenarios

Oswald 5/30, Rachel Oswald, staff editor for the National Journal and the Global Security Newswire, “Despite WMD fears, terrorists are focused on conventional attacks,” May 30, 2013, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/despite-wmd-fears-terrorists-are-focused-on-conventional-attacks-20130417?page=1&utm_source=feedly>

“Terrorism experts offer a range of reasons for why al-Qaida or other violent militants have never met their goal of carrying out a biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological attack on the United States or another nation These include:¶ -- substantive efforts by the United States and partner nations to secure the most lethal WMD materials;¶ -- improved border security and visa checks that deny entry to possible foreign-born terrorists;¶ -- a lack of imagination and drive on the part of would-be terrorists to pursue the kind of novel but technically difficult attacks that could lead to widespread dispersal of unconventional materials;¶ -- a general haplessness on the part of the native-born U.S. extremists who have pursued WMD attacks, specifically involving weaponized pathogens;¶ -“

#### ANY retaliation would be bilateral—it would not draw in other countries.

Schuyler 7 [Dave, “Restating the U.S. Policy of Nuclear Deterrence,” Last Mod Nov 13, http://theglitteringeye.com/?p=459]

There’s no generally accepted definition of terrorism so before tackling this point I’ll propose one. Ignoring the issue of state actors vs. non-state actors I think that a terrorist attack is an attack on civilians or civilian assets whose purpose is to provoke terror. It has no other tactical or strategic significance. Any nuclear response by the United States would be against military or governmental facilities, sites involved in military production, or command and control. The objective would be to eliminate the possibility of future attacks or the support for those who would engage in future attacks. That such a response would inevitably result in massive civilian casualties is sad. But such a response would not, by definition, be terrorism \* A nuclear retaliation Iran in response to a terrorist nuclear attack would inevitably draw France, Russia, and China to enter the conflict. To believe this you must believe that France, Russia, and China will act irrationally. There is absolutely no reason to believe that this is the case. All three nations know that their intervention against the U. S. would result in total annihilation. There are other issues as well and let’s examine the two distinct cases: Russia on the one hand and France and China on the other. As a major non-Gulf producer of oil Russia would be in a position to benefit enormously in case of a disruption of Gulf oil production or shipment. That being the case they would publicly deplore a retaliation against Iran but privately rejoice. Both France and China are in an extremely delicate position. A nuclear response by either would result in total annihilation and, equally importantly, wouldn’t keep the oil flowing. Lack of a blue water navy means that both nations are completely at the mercy of the United States’s (or more specifically the U. S. Navy’s) willingness to keep shipments of oil moving out of the Gulf. China is particularly vulnerable since it has only about two weeks’ worth of strategic oil reserves. Neither France nor China has any real ability to project military force other than nuclear force beyond their borders. They’d be upset. But they’re in no position to do anything about it.

### AT: GWoT

#### Empirical ev shows targeted killings are counterproductive counterterrorism policy

Jordan 9—Jenna Jordan is a PhD Candidate at the University of Chicago [“When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” *Security Studies*, Volume 18, Issue 4, 2009, pg. 719-755]

This article explores the effectiveness of decapitation as a counterterrorism policy. First, I identified the conditions under which decapitation results in organizational decline. A group's age, size, and type are all important predictors of when decapitation is likely to be effective. The data indicate that as an organization becomes larger and older, decapitation is less likely to result in organizational collapse. Furthermore, religious groups are highly resistant to attacks on their leadership, while ideological organizations are much easier to destabilize through decapitation.

Second, the data also show that decapitation is not an effective counterterrorism strategy. Decapitation does not increase the likelihood of organizational collapse beyond to a baseline rate of collapse for groups over time. The marginal utility for decapitation is actually negative. Groups that have not had their leaders targeted have a higher rate of decline than groups whose leaders have been removed. Decapitation is actually counterproductive, particularly for larger, older, religious, or separatist organizations.

Finally, in order to determine whether decapitation hindered the ability of an organization to carry out terrorist attacks, I looked at three cases in which decapitation did not result in a group's collapse. The results were mixed over the extent to which decapitation has resulted in organizational degradation. While in some cases decapitation resulted in fewer attacks, in others the attacks became more lethal in the years immediately following incidents of decapitation. I argue that these results are largely driven by a group's size and age.

Ultimately, these findings indicate that our current counterterrorism strategies need rethinking. The data show that independent of other measures, going after the leaders of older, larger, and religious groups is not only ineffective, it is counterproductive. Moreover, the decentralized nature of many current terrorist organizations has proven to be highly resistant to decapitation and to other counterterrorism measures. The remainder of this article will proceed in five parts. First, I will look at existing explanations for leadership decapitation, focusing on theories of charismatic leadership and social network analysis. Second, I will outline the data and methodology used in this study. Third, I will identify the conditions under which decapitation is likely to result in organizational collapse. Fourth, I will evaluate the effectiveness of decapitation. Fifth, I will look at three cases to explore the extent to which decapitation can weaken an organization. I will conclude with a discussion of policy implications.