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### DA—Iran

#### Rouhani and Netanyahu have found the perfect middle ground. Both sides must walk a fine line to prevent war

**Neubauer 3/18**/14 – Defense and foreign affairs specialist @ International Institute for Strategic Studies [[Sigurd Neubauer](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sigurd-neubauer), “Diplomacy With Iran: Not a Zero-Sum Game for Israel,” Huffington Post, Posted: 03/18/2014 9:02 am EDT Updated: 03/18/2014 9:59 am EDT, pg. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sigurd-neubauer/diplomacy-with-iran-not-a\_b\_4967068.html

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu famously lambasted the November interim nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 as a "historic mistake." Netanyahu has since muted his anti-Iran rhetoric as the negotiating parties work hard to hammer out a comprehensive agreement. But as the negotiations move forward, there is little doubt that Israel has become the "white elephant" in the room, prompting speculations over whether the Jewish State will accept an agreement that does not fully dismantle Iran's nuclear program, as repeatedly demanded by Netanyahu. Meanwhile, a potential showdown between the Obama-administration and Israel's supporters in the U.S. Congress seems to have been temporarily averted by Netanyahu's recent AIPAC address.

Amid these shifting variables, certain facts about Iran and Israel are lost. For one, Israel is not against Iran diplomacy per se. What Israel fears, however, is that the negotiating parties won't fully take her interests into account as the Jewish state legitimately fears Tehran's vision for the Middle East. While critics of Netanyahu frequently paint him as a "fearmonnger," with a plan to manipulate international opinion on Iran, it is important not to forget that two countries have had an adversarial relationship over the past 35-years. Given the size of Iran -- with a population of nearly 80-million -- and its region-wide reach and influence, the trajectory chosen by the leadership in Tehran matters to Israel and her security. The Israeli angst about Iran's nuclear intentions should be seen within this basic context.   
Another basic fact, however, is that the Iranian-Israeli animus is not naturally bound to be permanent. In fact, below the surface, officials in both countries have over the past moths lowered the all too well known contentious rhetoric, a possible signal that a far less ominous prospect might await Iranian-Israeli relations. Unlike when Ayatollah Khomeini resumed power in 1979, hoping his hardline stance on Israel would turn the Islamic Republic into the vanguard of the Islamic World, today its "resistance" narrative has brought it international isolation and the toughest sanction regime a nation has ever seen. Iranian pragmatists have over time -- and during the Ahmadinejad period in particular -- come to realize that Tehran's stance on the question of Israel has not only become failed policy but reduced the descendants of the great Persian civilization into an international pariah.

As the Arab Spring has proven, Arab Islamists have been unwilling to look to Iran for leadership, despite Ahmadinjad's uncompromising Israel rhetoric. While Hamas has willingly accepted Iranian funding and arms for the past decade, the Gaza-based Islamist group quickly turned its back on Tehran's strategic interest by supporting the Sunni insurgency against the embattled Syrian government.

Growing Sunni radicalism across the Middle East and in Syria in particular has not only become a strategic threat to the way of life of Shiite communities, but also forced Iran to respond to sectarianism as opposed to driving a regional agenda. These developments coupled with Iran's traditional hardline stance towards a fellow UN member state have denigrated its international standing. Hassan Rouhani, Iran's president, promised his people to bring Iran into the global mainstream as his campaign pledge last year.   
President Rouhani and his faction within the Iranian establishment have [has] since made subtle gestures towards the Jewish state. Take Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, a onetime president and a mentor to Rouhani, who recently boldly declared: "**Iran is not at war with Israel**." Beyond rhetoric, Tehran carried out an apparent goodwill gesture toward Israel in January at a UN energy conference in Abu Dhabi when its energy minister, Hamid Chitchiyan, refrained from the usual boycott and stayed during the speech of his Israeli counterpart, Silvan Shalom. This was a groundbreaking moment: A small, but clearly telling step.  
Meanwhile, Israeli President Shimon Peres' consolatory language towards Iran should not be glanced over, either. The elder statement expressed last December his willingness to meet with Rouhani. Although it cannot be dismissed that Israel and Iran define each other as strategic threats, viewing regional developments through a zero-sum prism, Peres also acknowledged that the ongoing negotiations could benefit his nation, adding: "The purpose is to convert enemies into friends. If it was only him [Rouhani] I'd take it with greater assurance, but there are other structures, other people..[in Tehran].. And I'm not so sure they support the president. We have to see the balance of the situation."   
While it is clear that Rouhani -- limited by the existing taboos within the Islamic Republic's revolutionary ideology -- cannot alone engineer a change of policy toward Israel, he can aim to re-define Tehran's stance. That is exactly what former reformist president Mohammad Khatami sought to do: During his administration (1997-2005), Khatami carefully re-framed Tehran's opposition to Israel. Instead of open-ended hostility, his government stressed -- for the first time -- that Iran would be able to accept whatever compromise Israelis and Palestinians reached. Khatami's stance should be considered a tantamount recognition of Israel.

At the present state, Rouhani could find a middle ground between conservatives at home and the need to reduce tensions with Israel. After all, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has clearly made a strategic decision to support the ongoing negotiations with the world powers. As negotiations move forward, neither Obama nor Khamenei can afford pro-Israel groups demanding additional sanctions as they've vested their personal prestige, to the point of no return.

As we have argued, Israel has become the "white elephant" in the room. Given this fact, coupled with Israel's many friends in the U.S. Congress who remain "distrustful" of Iran, Israel-Iranian "reconciliation" of sorts has to take place in order for U.S.-Iran diplomacy to fully succeed.

At this critical juncture, President Rouhani could tackle the question of Israel indirectly by supporting the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. By doing so, Tehran signals that it could accept Israel sometime in the future without having to deliver an immediate policy change at the present stage. Iranian support for the Arab Peace Initiative would be received favorably by Saudi Arabia, its main rival. Iranian support for Arab-Israeli peace would inevitably reduce tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, Tehran's powerful Lebanese ally. In Israel, Iranian support for the Arab Peace Initiative would send an unmistakable message: Iran does not seek to wipe the Jewish state off the map, as repeatedly stated by Ahmadinejad.  
In return, Israel should let nuclear diplomacy succeed by preventing -- at all costs -- a showdown between the U.S. administration and its friends in Congress. Should Israel fail to do so, it could quickly lose its ability to influence a final agreement -- an accord that could also be favorable to its interests -- and instead bring Tehran and Washington to the brink of war: After all, neither Obama nor Khamenei can afford to back down. Netanyahu, however, can as U.S.-Iran dialogue is not a zero-sum game for Israel.

#### There are two links –

#### First is Iran – losing on a war powers issue shows signs of weakness – that collapses negotiations

ALTERMAN 9/3 – 13 Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and directs the Middle East program at CSIS, teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and George Washington. [Jon B. Alterman, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/us-iran-nuclear-deal-hinges-on-syria-vote.html>]

Many have pointed out that the Iranian government is watching closely what the Barack Obama administration does in Syria. With the president having declared a year ago that the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons “would be a game changer,” the Iranian government wonders what the new game will be. It does so not only out of interest in its clients in Syria, but more important, to judge what Obama’s reaction might be if Iran acquires a nuclear weapons capability, which the president has declared as another red line.

Focusing solely on events in Syria, however, misses a large part of the Iranian calculus, if not the largest. What really matters to Iran is how successful Obama is in winning congressional support for his Syria policy. If he fails, it will deal a double blow to the president. Not only will the Iranian government dismiss the possibility of negotiations with his administration, it will also conclude that Obama can be defied with impunity. The international cost of domestic political failure would be profound.

To start, it is worth noting the extent to which foreign governments are sophisticated consumers of American political information. Decades of international cable news broadcasts and newspaper websites have brought intimate details of US politics into global capitals. Foreign ministers in the Middle East and beyond are US news junkies, and they seem increasingly distrustful of their embassies. For key US allies, the foreign minister often seems to have made him- or herself the US desk officer. Most can have a quite sophisticated discussion on congressional politics and their impact on US foreign relations.

The Iranian government is no exception. While former president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad was emotional and shrill in his opposition to the United States, there remains in Iran a cadre of Western-trained technocrats, fluent in English and nuanced in their understanding of the world. President Hassan Rouhani has surrounded himself with such people, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has charged them with investigating a different relationship between Iran and the United States.

As they do so, they cannot help but be aware that on the eve of Rouhani’s inauguration, the US House of Representatives voted 400–20 to impose stiff additional sanctions on Iran. The House saw Rouhani’s electoral victory as a call for toughness, not potential compromise.

If Iran were to make concessions in a negotiation with the United States, they would surely seek sanctions relief and other actions requiring congressional approval. To make such concessions to Obama, they would need some confidence that he can deliver. A president who cannot bring around a hostile Congress is not a president with whom it is worth negotiating.

In this respect, Syria is a dry run for Obama's lobbying ability on foreign policy. Until now, his record with Congress has been checkered. Congressional representatives complain that the White House has given them the cold shoulder time after time, and there seems to be little warmth between the president and his former colleagues in the legislature. Persuading Congress to back a military action that the majority of the public opposes will require presidential charm, pressure, and a good measure of buttonholing and jawboning. Based on his past performance, Obama appears to be neither a joyful nor an especially skillful practitioner of these political arts.

As difficult as it is for Obama to persuade Congress to fight another battle in the Middle East, it would be even more difficult to persuade it to accept a negotiated deal with Iran. Suspicions about Iran run deep in the United States, as well as among many US allies in the Middle East. Should the White House decide to focus principally on the president’s domestic legacy, it may seem less costly to deter Iran and maintain that no clear nuclear threshold has been crossed than to sell a deal to a skeptical Congress. That would then put the onus on Iran to make any approach to the United States sufficiently attractive to gain the president’s attention. Iranians will surely view a demonstration of the president’s inability to bring Congress along on Syria as a sign that there is no hope of his delivering Congress on Iran. US-Iranian negotiations, surely in the offing for later this year, would be stillborn.

There is, however, an even more stark consequence of Obama losing the Syria vote in Congress. Should the White House, with its immense power and prestige, fail to build sufficient support, leaders around the world will conclude that this president can be defied with impunity. If he cannot win the support of those close to him, what hope does he have of winning over those at a distance?

The consequence here would be a combination of much more difficult diplomacy and even more bad behavior around the world that requires diplomacy to address. Hard-liners in Iran and their allies around the Middle East would certainly be emboldened, and regional states would be far less likely to rely on US cues in managing their own issues. Arab-Israeli negotiations, as well, would be dealt a fundamental blow, as each party would retreat to its own maximal position. China, Russia and a host of other countries are watching closely as well.

#### Second is Israel – handing war initiation authority to Congress will stoke Israeli fears and cause war

**Kramer 13** - President of Shalem College and expert on contemporary Islam and Arab politics [Dr. Martin Kramer, (Received his PhD in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton and History M.A. from Columbia University “Israel Likes Its U.S. Presidents Strong,” Commentary, 09.17.2013 - 11:25 AM, pg. http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/09/17/israel-likes-its-u-s-presidents-strong-2/

Israelis always imagined they would go to Mr. Obama with a crucial piece of highly sensitive intelligence on Iranian progress, and he would make good on his promise to block Iran with a swift presidential decision. So Mr. Obama’s punt to Congress over what John Kerry called an “unbelievably small” strike left Israelis rubbing their eyes. If this is now standard operating procedure in Washington, can Israel afford to wait if action against Iran becomes urgent?

Israel’s standing in Congress and U.S. public opinion is high, but the Syrian episode has shown how dead-set both are against U.S. military action in the Middle East. Israel won’t have videos of dying children to sway opinion, and it won’t be able to share its intelligence outside the Oval Office. Bottom line: The chance that Israel may need to act first against Iran has gone up.

Why was Obama’s recourse to Congress so alarming? Israel has long favored strong presidential prerogatives. That’s because the crises that have faced Israel rarely ever leave it the time to work the many halls of Congress. Israel discovered the dangers of presidential weakness in May 1967, when Israel went to President Lyndon Johnson to keep a commitment—a “red line” set by a previous administration—and Johnson balked. He insisted he would have to secure congressional support first. That show of presidential paralysis left Israel’s top diplomat shaken, and set the stage for Israel’s decision to launch a preemptive war.

2013 isn’t 1967. But Israel long ago concluded that the only thing as worrisome as a diffident America is a diffident American president—and that a president’s decision to resort to Congress, far from being a constitutional imperative, is a sign of trouble at the top.

“Not worth five cents”

What did Israel want from Lyndon Johnson in May 1967? On May 22, in the midst of rising tensions across the region, Egypt’s president Gamal Abdul Nasser announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israel-bound ships headed for the port of Eilat, effectively blockading it. More than a decade before that, in 1956, Israel had broken a similar Egyptian blockade by invading and occupying the Sinai. Israel withdrew in 1957, partly in return for an American [assurance](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v17/d78) that the United States would be “prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage [through the Straits] and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.” In 1967, when Nasser reimposed Egypt’s blockade, Israel asked the United States to make good on that 1957 commitment, by leading an international flotilla through the Straits to Eilat. Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban flew to Washington and met with Johnson in the Yellow Oval Room on May 26 to make Israel’s case.

Johnson astonished Eban by pleading that he didn’t have sufficient authority to act. The U.S. [memorandum](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d77) of conversation summarized it this way:

President Johnson said he is of no value to Israel if he does not have the support of his Congress, the Cabinet and the people. Going ahead without this support would not be helpful to Israel…

We did not know what our Congress would do. We are fully aware of what three past Presidents have said but this is not worth five cents if the people and the Congress did not support the President…

If he were to take a precipitous decision tonight he could not be effective in helping Israel… The President knew his Congress after 30 years of experience. He said that he would try to get Congressional support; that is what he has been doing over the past days, having called a number of Congressmen. It is going reasonably well…

The President said again the Constitutional processes are basic to actions on matters involving war and peace. We are trying to bring Congress along. He said: “What I can do, I do.”

Abba Eban later [gave](http://www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/books.google.co.il/books?id=-fmenQEACAAJ) a more devastating version of the “five-cent” quote: “What a president says and thinks is not worth five cents unless he has the people and Congress behind him. Without the Congress I’m just a six-feet-four Texan. With the Congress I’m president of the United States in the fullest sense.” According to the [Israeli record](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/israel_studies/v004/4.2shalom.html) of the meeting, Johnson also acknowledged that he hadn’t made his own progress on the Hill: “I can tell you at this moment I do not have one vote and one dollar for taking action before thrashing this matter out in the UN in a reasonable time.” And Johnson ultimately [put the onus](http://www2.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/eban1.html) on Israel to get Congress on board: “Unless you people move your anatomies up on the Hill and start getting some votes, I will not be able to carry out” American commitments.

Johnson must have understood the impression he was leaving upon Eban. In the [Israeli record](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/israel_studies/v004/4.2shalom.html), there are two remarkable quotes: “I’m not a feeble mouse or a coward and we’re going to try.” And: “How to take Congress with me, I’ve got my own views. I’m not an enemy or a coward. I’m going to plan and pursue vigorously every lead I can.” That Johnson twice had to insist that he wasn’t a coward suggested that he realized just how feckless he must have seemed.

In his [two](http://www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/books.google.co.il/books?id=-fmenQEACAAJ) [memoirs](http://www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/books.google.co.il/books?isbn=0224037404), Eban recalled his astonishment at this apparent abdication:

I remember being almost stunned by the frequency with which [Johnson] used the rhetoric of impotence. This ostensibly strong leader had become a paralyzed president. The Vietnam trauma had stripped him of his executive powers….

I’ve often ask myself if there was ever a president who spoke in such defeatist terms about his own competence to act…. When it came to a possibility of military action—with a risk as trivial, in relation to U.S. power, as the dispatch of an intimidatory naval force to an international waterway—he had to throw up his hands in defeat…. On a purely logistical level, this would have been one of the least hazardous operations in American history—the inhibitions derived entirely from the domestic political context. The senators consulted by Johnson were hesitant and timorous. They thought that the possibility of Soviet intervention, however unlikely, could not be totally ignored.

The revulsion of Americans from the use of their own armed forces had virtually destroyed his presidential function. I was astonished that he was not too proud to avoid these self-deprecatory statements in the presence of so many of his senior associates. I thought that I could see [Defense] Secretary McNamara and [chairman of the Joint Chiefs] General Wheeler wilt with embarrassment every time that he said how little power of action he had.

The tactical objective, the cancellation of the Eilat blockade, was limited in scope and entirely feasible. It was everything that the Vietnam war was not. Lyndon Johnson’s perceptions were sharp enough to grasp all these implications. What he lacked was “only” the authority to put them to work. Less than three years after the greatest electoral triumph in American presidential history he was like Samson shorn of his previous strength…. With every passing day the obstacles became greater and the will for action diminished. He inhabited the White House, but the presidency was effectively out of his hands.

After the meeting, Johnson wrote a [letter](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d139) to Israeli prime minister Levi Eshkol, reemphasizing the primacy of the Congress: “As you will understand and as I explained to Mr. Eban, it would be unwise as well as most unproductive for me to act without the full consultation and backing of Congress. We are now in the process of urgently consulting the leaders of our Congress and counseling with its membership.” This was actually an improvement on the draft that had been prepared for him, and which [included](http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d139#fn5) this sentence: “As you will understand, I cannot act at all without full backing of Congress.” (Emphasis added.) That accurately reflected the essence of the message conveyed to Eban, but Johnson was not prepared to admit his total emasculation in writing. There is a [debate](http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328430) among historians as to whether Johnson did or didn’t signal a green light to Israel to act on its own. It finally did on June 5.

“Too big for business as usual”

In light of this history, it’s not hard to see why Israel would view any handoff by a president to the Congress in the midst of a direct challenge to a presidential commitment as a sign of weakness and an indication that Israel had better start planning to act on its own. It’s not that Israel lacks friends on the Hill. But in crises where time is short and intelligence is ambivalent—and such are the crises Israel takes to the White House—Israel needs presidents who are decisive.

#### Extinction – turns the case

**Reuveny 10** - Professor of political economy @ Indiana University [Dr. Rafael Reuveny (PhD in Economics and Political Science from the University of Indiana), “Guest Opinion: Unilateral strike on Iran could trigger world depression,” McClatchy Newspaper, Aug 9, 2010, pg. http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking\_out/reuveny\_on\_unilateral\_strike\_Iran.shtml]

BLOOMINGTON, Ind. -- A unilateral Israeli **strike on Iran**’s nuclear facilities **would** likely **have dire consequences, including a** regional war**,** global economic collapse **and a** major power clash.  
For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force.  
Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since **the locations of some of Iran’s** nuclear **facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground**.  
All of these widely spread **facilities are shielded by** elaborate air **defense systems constructed** not only by **the Iranians**, but also the **Chinese and**, likely, the **Russians** as well. By now, **Iran has** also **built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities**, developed early-warning systems, **acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces**.  
Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.  
A regional war  
Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, **Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas,** **and**, perhaps, **Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the** assault, turning a bad situation into a regional **war.**  
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents.  
Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian **coalition** missiles, armed forces, and terrorist **attacks would likely wreak havoc** on its enemy, **leading to a** prolonged tit-for-tat.  
In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.  
An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its **coalition could** still **attack** neighboring **oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.**  
Middle Eastern **oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production** **declines** due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. **Iran and Venezuela would** likely **stop selling oil to the U**nited **S**tates **and Europe**.  
The world economy **would** head into a **tailspin**; international acrimony would rise; and **Iraqi and Afghani citizens** might fully **turn on the U**nited **S**tates, immediately **requiring the deployment of more** American **troops.** Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to **form an alliance and** openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.  
Replaying Nixon’s nightmare  
**Russia and China** might rearmtheir injured **Iran**ian protege **overnight**, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, **and** threaten to intervene**, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened** to join Egypt and Syria **in 1973**. President **Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on** nuclear alert**, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario**.

Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted.

If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons but would probably not risk using force.

While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

### DA—NSA

#### NSA reforms will pass – found a sweet spot – Obama is key

ROLL CALL 3 – 25 – 14 [Hill’s Bipartisan Deadlock on Phone Records May Be Easing, <http://blogs.rollcall.com/hawkings/obama-nsa-reform-plan-could-ease-congressional-deadlock-on-spying/>]

Eight months ago, in one of its most important and fascinatingly nonpartisan votes of recent memory, the House came up just seven members short of eviscerating the government’s vast effort to keep tabs on American phone habits.

The roll call revealed a profound divide in Congress on how assertively the intelligence community should be allowed to probe into the personal lives of private citizens in the cause of thwarting terrorism. It is a split that has stymied legislative efforts to revamp the National Security Agency’s bulk data collection programs.

Until now, maybe. Senior members with jurisdiction over the surveillance efforts, in both parties and on both sides of the Hill, are signaling generalized and tentative but nonetheless clear support for the central elements of a proposed compromise that President Barack Obama previewed Tuesday and will formally unveil by week’s end.

The president, in other words, may be close to finding the congressional sweet spot on one of the most vexing problems he’s faced — an issue that surged onto Washington’s agenda after the secret phone records collection efforts were disclosed by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.

If Obama can seal the deal, which he’s pledged to push for by the end of June, it would almost surely rank among his most important second-term victories at the Capitol. It also would create an exception that proves the rule about the improbability of bipartisan agreement on hot-button issues in an election season.

“I recognize that people were concerned about what might happen in the future with that bulk data,” Obama said at a news conference in The Hague, where he’s been working to gain support for containing Russia from a group of European leaders who have their own complaints about U.S. spying on telephone calls. “This proposal that’s been presented to me would eliminate that concern.”

The top two members of the House Intelligence Committee, GOP Chairman Mike Rogers of Michigan and ranking Democrat C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger of Maryland, introduced their own bill to revamp surveillance policy Tuesday — and declared they expect it would track very closely with the language coming from the administration. They said they had been negotiating with White House officials for several weeks and viewed the two proposals as compatible.

At their core, both the Obama and House bills would end the NSA practice of sucking up and storing for five years the date and time, duration and destination of many millions of phone calls placed or received by Americans. Instead, the phone companies would be required to retain this so-called metadata (and comparable information about email and Internet use) for 18 months, their current practice. And the government would have to obtain something like a search warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, meaning in each discreet case a judge would limit how deeply the telecom companies would have to query their databases in hopes of finding calling patterns that suggest national security threats.

Since both Rogers and Ruppersberger have been prominent defenders of the bulk collection system, any agreement they reach that has Obama’s blessing can be expected to pass the House.

It should garner support from a lopsided majority of the 217 House members (three-fifths of the Republicans and two-fifths of the Democrats) who voted to stick with the status quo last July. And it stands a chance to win over at least some on the other side — an unusual coalition of 94 mostly libertarian-leaning tea party Republicans and 111 liberal Democrats, who say NSA searches of the databases should be limited to information about existing targets of investigations.

But one leader of that camp vowed to work for the defeat of any measure that looks like either the Obama or Intelligence panel plans. Republican Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, who as chairman of House Judiciary a decade ago was instrumental in writing the Patriot Act, believes that law has been grossly misapplied by the NSA to invade personal privacy much too easily.

Sensenbrenner said he would continue to push his measure to almost entirely prevent the NSA from looking at telecommunications metadata. But the sponsor of the companion Senate bill, Judiciary Chairman Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt., said he would remain open to finding the makings of a deal in the Obama plan. Leahy signaled the legislative negotiating would be much smoother if Obama suspended the bulk data collection during the talks.

Much more enthusiastic was Calfornia’s Dianne Feinstein, the Democratic chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who said she generally supports the House proposal and views Obama’s plan “a worthy effort.” Her committee’s top Republican, the retiring Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, was a bit more equivocal but gave a strong indication he was eager to cut a deal based on the ideas from the House and the White House.

There are plenty of important points over which to haggle: about the ways the metadata is to be retained, the format for FBI to view the information, the liability for the telecommunications companies, the specificity of the search requests and the reach and secrecy of the judicial oversight.

And the American Civil Liberties Union said it had already found enough differences between the two measures unveiled Tuesday to give its “crucial first step” blessing to the Obama plan while rejecting the Rogers-Ruppersberger bill. The ACLU said that proposal would end up expanding the FBI’s investigative reach instead of limiting it.

But in a year when all sides say they are still ready to share the credit for at least one more top-tier legislative accomplishment, the knot over surveillance may be starting to unravel.

#### PLAN slays Obama’s agenda

Loomis 07 Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Department of Government at Georgetown University [Dr. Andrew J. Loomis, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy”, March 2, 2007, pg 36-37, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.

#### NSA scandal being unhandled risks a rupture in trans-atlantic ties

HEUSER 13 executive director of the Washington, DC-based Bertelsmann Foundation [Annette Heuser, Euractive, The erosion of the transatlantic trust, 10/25/13 http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/erosion-transatlantic-trust-analysis-531335]

Allegations of the NSA's tapping of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's mobile phone have yet to be proved, but the agency's spying is already causing unprecedented damage to the trans-Atlantic relationship. The controversy has festered for five months, but it reached a new peak with yesterday's call from the chancellor to President Barack Obama. Her message to the president, who is increasingly besieged by his closest allies: Spying on her or her government is unacceptable.

Three things are remarkable about this recent development.

First, the chancellor is known to be a cautious political leader. She takes time to determine her course of action and then still proceeds carefully. But her quick and personal involvement in placing a call to her friend, Barack, would not have occurred if the German intelligence service had not provided her with robust information about US hacking.

Second, President Obama's reportedly cool response to the chancellor reconfirms the skepticism of European leaders and the broader European public about the commander-in-chief's commitment to the trans-Atlantic relationship. Mr Obama is increasingly perceived as a leader who does not see the need to nurture ties with his closest allies or even establish close political ties to his counterparts in Europe and elsewhere. The president is the first in the post-war era who does not appear to be a trans-Atlanticist at heart.

Third, the Obama administration continues to underestimate the short- and long-term effects of the NSA scandal on the trans-Atlantic relationship. Europe is now united in its repugnance of American spying practices, and this abhorrence goes beyond any personal targeting of the German chancellor or her government. Europeans feel that Washington has disregarded and disrespected their privacy, which they, in general, safeguard more than Americans do.

The latest allegations mean the US has likely crossed a line. A European response is now coming, and it will be a collective one. Negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) may be put on hold. There have already been calls among high-ranking European officials to do so.

A recent Bertelsmann Foundation study estimated a TTIP could create 740,000 new American jobs. Putting such a deal in jeopardy means the potential loss of a significant economic boon and the only prestigious project in which the US and Europe are currently engaged.

The NSA scandal and its (mis)management by the White House are causing a political tsunami in Europe. Until now it was the Iraq War that defined the recent nadir in trans-Atlantic relations. But that disagreement concerned military intervention. This time the fundamental issue of trust is at hand, and that means the consequences of a rupture are more severe. Americans and Europeans have been profoundly successful over the past seven decades establishing the close ties that, at least until recently, have bound them together. Nothing short of a profound and tragic break in that fragile tradition could now be unfolding.

#### Extinction

**Stivachtis 10** – Director of International Studies Program @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University [Dr. Yannis. A. Stivachtis (Professor of Poli Sci & Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations from Lancaster University), THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION,” The Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2010, pg. http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlantic-studies/78.html]

There is no doubt that US-European relations are in a **period of transition**, and that the stresses and strains of globalization are increasing both the number and the seriousness of the challenges that confront transatlantic relations.

The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War have added significantly to these stresses and strains. At the same time, international terrorism, the nuclearization of **North Korea** and especially **Iran**, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the transformation of **Russia** into a stable and cooperative member of the international community, the growing power of **China**, the political and economic transformation and integration of the **Caucasian** and **Central Asian** states, the integration and stabilization of the **Balkan** countries, the promotion of peace and stability in the **Mid**dle **East**, poverty, climate change, AIDS and other emergent problems and situations require further cooperation among countries at the regional, global and institutional levels.

Therefore, cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is more **imperative** than ever to deal effectively with these problems. It is fair to say that the challenges of crafting a new relationship between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more regional than global, but the implications of success or failure will be global.

The transatlantic relationship is still in crisis, despite efforts to improve it since the Iraq War. This is not to say that differences between the two sides of the Atlantic did not exist before the war. Actually, post-1945 relations between Europe and the U.S. were fraught with disagreements and never free of crisis since the Suez crisis of 1956. Moreover, despite trans-Atlantic proclamations of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. and Europe parted ways on issues from global warming and biotechnology to peacekeeping and national missile defense.

Questions such as, the future role of NATO and its relationship to the common European Security and Defense policy (ESDP), or what constitutes terrorism and what the rights of captured suspected terrorists are, have been added to the list of US-European disagreements.

There are two reasons for concern regarding the transatlantic rift. First, if European leaders conclude that Europe must become **counterweight** to the U.S., rather than a partner, it will be difficult to engage in the kind of open search for a common ground than an elective partnership requires. Second, there is a risk that public opinion in both the U.S. and Europe will make it difficult even for leaders who want to forge a new relationship to make the necessary accommodations.

If both sides would actively work to heal the breach, a new opportunity could be created. A vibrant transatlantic partnership remains a real possibility, but only if both sides make the necessary political commitment.

There are strong reasons to believe that the security challenges facing the U.S. and Europe are more shared than divergent. The most dramatic case is terrorism. Closely related is the common interest in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the nuclearization of Iran and North Korea. This commonality of threats is clearly perceived by publics on both sides of the Atlantic.

Actually, Americans and Europeans see eye to eye on more issues than one would expect from reading newspapers and magazines. But while elites on both sides of the Atlantic bemoan a largely illusory gap over the use of military force, biotechnology, and global warming, surveys of American and European public opinion highlight sharp differences over global leadership, defense spending, and the Middle East that threaten the future of the last century’s most successful alliance.

There are other important, shared interests as well. The transformation of Russia into a stable cooperative member of the international community is a priority both for the U.S. and Europe. They also have an interest in promoting a stable regime in Ukraine. It is necessary for the U.S. and EU to form a united front to meet these challenges because first, there is a risk that dangerous materials related to **WMD** will fall into the wrong hands; and second, the **spread of conflict** along those countries’ periphery could destabilize neighboring countries and provide **safe havens for terrorists** and other international criminal organizations. Likewise, in the Caucasus and Central Asia both sides share a stake in promoting political and economic transformation and integrating these states into larger communities such as the OSCE.

This would also minimize the risk of instability spreading and prevent those countries of becoming havens for international terrorists and criminals. Similarly, there is a common interest in integrating the Balkans politically and economically. Dealing with Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as other **political issues in the Mid**dle **East** are also of a great concern for both sides although the U.S. plays a dominant role in the region. Finally, US-European cooperation will be more effective in dealing with the **rising power of China** through engagement but also containment.

The post Iraq War realities have shown that it is no longer simply a question of adapting transatlantic institutions to new realities. The changing structure of relations between the U.S. and Europe implies that a new basis for the relationship must be found if transatlantic cooperation and partnership is to continue. The future course of relations will be **determined above all by U.S. policy towards Europe** and the Atlantic Alliance.

Wise policy can help forge a new, more enduring strategic partnership, through which the two sides of the Atlantic cooperate in meeting the many major challenges and opportunities of the evolving world together. But a policy that **takes Europe for granted** and routinely **ignores or** even **belittles Europe**an concerns, may force Europe to conclude that the costs of continued alliance outweigh its benefits.

### CP

#### The President of the United States should issue an executive order to which mandates authorization of a permanent bipartisan council of state prior to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into missions beyond self-defense, pursuant to the Rules of Engagement.

### K

#### Reducing war to a question of legal restrictions banalizes global imperial violence. Contemporary warfare is an interconnected process driven by the generation of militarized subjectivities. It’s your foremost ethical task to investigate the affirmative’s imaginary of global war

Heike HARTING, Assistant Professor in the Department of English at the University of Montreal, 6 [“Global Civil War and Post-colonial Studies,” http://globalautonomy.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fn=RA\_Harting\_GlobalCivilWar]

This essay addresses the lack of a post-colonial critique of emerging political and cultural theories of global war (Hardt and Negri 2004; Kaldor 2001; Held 2003; Clark 2003). With the exception of Paul Gilroy's study Postcolonial Melancholia (2005) and Gayatri Spivak's essay "Terror: A Speech After 9-11," which in part examine how discourses of racialized violence legitimize contemporary global wars and their "extreme" "civilizing mission" (Spivak 2004, 82), post-colonial theorists have so far been reluctant to engage in a sustained critique of global warfare. On the one hand, this reluctance might derive from the field's preferred critical engagement, as Tim Brennan observes, with Eurocentrism rather than questions of "military occupation" (2004, 132). On the other, such a reluctance seems surprising given that post-colonial studies is traditionally concerned with the ways in which past and contemporary forms of imperial, colonial, and racialized violence have shaped present subjectivities and political, economic, and social relationships. More importantly, the task of post-colonial studies remains the unsettling of contemporary configurations of what Diana Brydon identifies as "imperial and colonial habits of mind" (1995, 10-11), and along with David Goldberg and Ato Quayson, the "dismantling of the conditions that produce [social] violence and anguish" (2002, xiii). Thus, a critical post-colonial anatomy of the social and cultural logic of global civil warfare would seem intrinsic to the field's traditional research concerns. More specifically, while, amongst many others, such theorists and writers as Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Ngugi Wa Thiongo, Anne McClintock, Wole Soyinka, Ken Saro Wiva, and Bapsi Sidhwa have written extensively about civil and communal warfare, they have done so in the context of particular anti-colonial liberation struggles and post-colonial and neo-colonial nation formation. In part, these writers' works underlie but are not sufficiently acknowledged as a constitutive force in the articulation of dominant contemporary notions of global civil war.

The central argument of this paper builds on the understanding of global civil war which Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri advance in their study Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, the sequel to Empire. They suggest that global civil war designates both an absolute "regime of biopower" (2004, 13) and a form of warfare that is no longer fought between two sovereign states but on one, steadily expanding territory not demarcated by conventional national boundaries. In this sense, global civil war is intrinsic to what the two theorists call empire, namely the formation of a new global sovereignty that supersedes colonialism and imperialism, is dissociated from national and supranational institutions, and emerges from the autonomous and immanent logic of capital expansion and management. By the same logic of immanence, empire is a cultural, economic, and political formation that gives rise to its own movement of resistance or counter-empire.1 In contrast to Hardt and Negri's at times limited notion of global civil war, I suggest to conceptualize global civil war as a social and historical formation rooted in the history of imperial and colonial modernity. As with imperial wars, global civil wars both appropriate the guerilla tactics of insurgency warfare ??? an argument also made by Hardt and Negri ??? and, in contrast to their theory of global civil war, rely on the historical deployment of racialized violence and the perpetual brutalization and surveillance of civil society, often ??? but not exclusively ??? in the name of a humanitarian, peacekeeping, or protective cause.2 The notion of the "civil" in "global civil war" is thus frequently synonymous with the dismantling of civil rights and an internationally condoned assignment to "civilize" so-called rogue or failed nation states. In this sense, we may call the US-led "war against terror" a "global civil war" without, however, reducing the latter concept to a post-9-11 phenomenon. For, polemically speaking, despite its involvement of a wide range of global actors, the "war on terror" remains a national project of the United States. It mobilizes patriotic sentiments of US-American national destiny on a global scale and depends on the simultaneous denial and reinvention of the United States' imperial past.

Contextualizing the notion of global civil war in the history of imperial modernity and violence, then, seeks to adumbrate some of the ways in which contemporary theories of global civil war tend to eclipse the post-colonial moment of these wars. In particular, I wish to ask how contemporary representations of war contribute to the construction of a normalizing global imaginary of war. I use the latter term to refer to those hegemonic narratives through which the West comes to imagine itself as a civilizing bulwark against the violent forces of unruly and terrorist rogue states and to accept global war and racial violence as a historical inevitability of the rule of neo-liberal globalization. Furthermore, how should we conceptualize the post-colonial moment of global civil war, and how does identifying and problematizing such a moment expand and trouble present concepts of global warfare?

To engage with these questions, the first part of this paper provides a brief survey of the ways in which a number of post-colonial theorists have begun to address the particular phenomena of global armed conflict but, by and large, refrained from a systematic discussion of global civil warfare. The paper's second part elaborates my critique of dominant notions of global civil war through a discussion of Hardt and Negri's and, to a lesser extent, Jean-Luc Nancy's writings on globalization and war. Their work, I argue, situates global civil war outside earlier narratives of violence, resistance, and imperialism, when, in fact, all of these narratives either underlie or bleed into the present causes, investments, and media representations of global civil war. In order to develop a post-colonial understanding of global civil war that helps us think beyond presentist models of global war, parts four and five of this paper draw from Jean Arasanayagam's and Michael Ondaatje's fictional accounts of Sri Lanka's prolonged civil war to question received ways of legitimizing violence and to reread the putatively biopolitical character of global civil wars through, what Achille Mbembe calls, the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of global imperialism. Such a rereading, I propose, emphasizes how global civil war operates through the long-term militarization and brutalization of former colonial societies. The sixth and last part of this paper suggests a post-colonial reading of the ways in which the assumed state of a permanent global emergency relies on routinized forms of racial violence and extreme violent global warfare in order to generate disposable human beings and, to use Giorgio Agamben's phrase, "politicize death" (1998, 160).

Post-colonial Readings of Global War

Recent developments in post-colonial studies suggest, according to Brennan, that scholars in the field had to "retool" themselves as "globalization theorists" and consider themselves "as functioning in a larger division of intellectual labor" (2004, 138). What does this "retooling" look like? In particular, how do post-colonial scholars enter and shape debates on global war and violence?3 While there has been prolific research on the construction of diasporic, hybrid, and cosmopolitan subjectivities and transnational imaginaries, or on what Simon Gikandi sees as globalization's discourse of cultural "celebration" (2001, 629), less attention has been paid to globalization as "a discourse of failure and atrophy" (ibid., 638). To understand the latter, for example, Gikandi argues, we have to track back the death of two young Guinean men "whose bodies were found in the cargo hold of a plane in Brussels in August 1998" (ibid., 630) to particular Enlightenment discourses of autonomy and rationality, time, and progress that inform colonial and global modernities. In Gikandi's reading ??? which would warrant a much more detailed analysis than I can offer here ??? the death of these two young African men provides the opportunity to conceptualize globalization as a new version of post-colonialism's critique of Eurocentrism and the failure of the post-colonial nation-state. The global, he maintains, "had to be reinvented as a substitute for nationalism" and the ideologically and politically "vanishing 'Third World'" (ibid., 646) in the wake of the post-Cold War era. In this context, globalization is a violent process that erases the political, historical and cultural presence of the erstwhile colonized from the global present. Their presence seems to be registered only with reference to the ways in which it upsets Eurocentric notions of the nation, belonging, affect, and subjectivity.

Similarly, yet from a different political perspective, Neil Larsen enters the debate on globalization through a "material genealogy of postcolonialism" (2000, 33) and foregrounds the historical and economic continuities between imperialism, colonialism, post-colonialism, and globalization. Larsen traces the role of the nation as the grounding figure that binds all of these terms. Yet, in contrast to those who tend to announce globalization as a new post-national era, Larsen suggests that imperialism and its culmination in World War I and II, along with the wars' concomitant mass migrations, made it impossible, if not obsolete, to reflect on the "world" in terms of homogenous, "particular national histories and experiences" (ibid., 32). Rather, the violent crises of imperialism (WW I and II, Bandung era) gave rise to both a "transeuropean" (ibid., 31) configuration of anti-imperial and revolutionary movements and a cultural conceptualization of the nation as a space of liberation, reflected in national liberation struggles that "re-essentialized, or de-europeanized national space or imaginary" (ibid., 34). Under today's economic pressures of globalization, the Fanonian and Marxian ideal of a transeuropean nation ??? an ideal, which, as Fanon argues, has always been threatened by the co-optation of the colonial elites into a neo-colonial European appropriation of the newly independent nation-state ??? has collapsed. In particular, the transeuropean nation is being transformed into "an institutional/ideological entity that, precisely because it has been rendered inoperative as a site of the accumulation and control of capital, seeks to compensate for this in undergoing a radical reparticularization verging, in the most extreme cases (e.g., Afghanistan, Serbia) on a desecularization" (ibid., 43). In other words, Larsen suggests that contemporary ethnic and civil wars are both a result of the financial restructuring of the globe and its attending disintegration of the nation-state. Yet, what remains troubling and unexplained is why the disintegration of the nation should automatically lead to a violent return to cultural and religious particularism and essentialism. Are we to assume that in all cases of global civil war we are confronted with a return of archaic and primordialist attitudes of ethnic absolutism, to use Paul Gilroy's term, previously kept in check by the authoritative rather than emancipatory operations of the post-colonial nation-state? Indeed, to what extent does a culturalist ??? if not primordialist ??? reading of global war account for the at once global and local politicization and racialization of violence? Larsen, however, reminds us that the destruction of the "nationalized economic regimes in the third (and former 'second' world)" presents a global crisis whose consequences are also "dire" for the "global hegemons [US, Western Europe, Japan]" (ibid., 42). Thus, rather than abandoning the nation-state as politically compromised and ineffective in a global world, he affords it a central and by far not yet resolved role in dealing with the production of a new global order.

If Larsen sees contemporary wars as a product of the economic disempowerment of nation-states, Arjun Appadurai locates the extreme violence of contemporary global civil wars in larger cultural and ideological formations. Although Appadurai concedes that these wars must be read within the context of the crisis of legitimation of the nation-state (1996, 157) and the biopolitics of the colonial and modern nation-state, he suggests that they are culturalist in that they operate through the "conscious mobilization of cultural differences in the service of a larger national and transnational politics" (ibid., 15). Culturalist movements, he suggests, create communities of sentiment that are "comprehensible only within specific cultural frames of meaning and style and larger historical frames of power and discipline" (ibid., 148), the distribution of images, and the "imagination" (ibid., 149). Culturalist or ethnic violence, he argues, should not be conceptualized as a "primordial sentiment" (ibid., 149). Instead, understanding such violence involves addressing the local, social, and cultural construction of intimacy and the physical and psychic embodiment of rage and pain. Here, Appadurai's insistence on a social critique of the embodiment and localization of culturalist violence in a post-national or global context can serve as a possible trajectory for a post-colonial critique of global civil war. Indeed, as I will argue in section three, it is the historical production of pain and death, or of what Mbembe describes as the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of modernity, that allows us to understand global civil war in localized and historically situated terms.

What all these post-colonial readings of global civil war have in common is their desire to respond to war in an ethical fashion. What does this entail? In her essay "Terror: A Speech After 9-11," Spivak considers the "war on terror" as synonymous with global civil war and emphasizes its archaic and coercive rhetoric of cultural incommensurability. Here the term global war distracts from the fact that the war on terror, despite its involvement of the Northern alliance, refers to an imperial war fought unilaterally by the United States without UN sanction. "The war," Spivak explains, "is part of an alibi every imperialism has given itself, a civilising mission carried to the extreme, as it always must be. It is a war on terrorism reduced at home to due process, to a criminal case???a war zoomed down to a lawsuit and zoomed up to face an abstraction" (2004, 82). In this sense, Spivak's assessment coincides with Hardt and Negri's (2000, 13) observation that the primordialist and Manichaean rhetoric global civil war banalizes war as a form of "police action," creates an absolute enemy, and "sacrilizes" war by grounding military pursuits in putatively ethical claims that protect and reinstate democracy, "order and peace." In other words, global civil war depends on the construction of an enemy by mobilizing and criminalizing cultural Otherness. For this reason, the humanities have an important role to play in responding to and containing global civil war. The foremost pedagogical task, Spivak argues, consists in training "for the eruption of the ethical [understood as] an interruption of the epistemological, which is the attempt to construct the other as object of knowledge" (2004, 83). In other words, a post-colonial critique of global civil war ought to examine how global civil war generates human subjects differentially on a global scale. Thus, what post-colonial studies needs to bring to bear on globalization studies is, first, a detailed analysis of the ways in which post-colonial writing participates in the cultural production of competing narratives of global civil warfare, and, second, a critique of global civil war that accounts for the racialized violence and identity politics that frequently fuel global conflict or are mobilized in its service. Analyzing the ways in which global war generates particular subjectivities is of great importance since global capitalism thrives and depends on both the violent production and commodification of identity and the total militarization of national and global social relationships.

The next section of this paper examines the ways in which a number of cultural narratives of global civil war rearticulate traditional concepts of war. However, by contextualizing war in a presentist and, at times, Eurocentric understanding of globalization, these narratives risk reinforcing rather than destabilizing dominant legitimizing practices of global warfare.

Situating Global Civil War

If globalization refers to the uneven process of restructuring social, political, and economic space within and beyond the nation-state, then a change of the concept of war, its means and purposes, as well as its present ubiquity seem logical effects of globalization. For example, in Empire, Hardt and Negri suggest that although the world has never been at peace, presently war seems to be the single most characteristic feature of "Empire." The latter, they argue, is continuously embroiled in bloodshed, yet "always dedicated to peace ??? a perpetual and universal peace outside of history" (2000, xv). The Kantian allusion provides a first glimpse at how we might begin to address the complex phenomenon of global war. As a preliminary hypothesis, I wish to suggest that global civil war cannot be reduced to exceptional forms of extreme violence enacted in different or unconnected theatres of war. Rather, it relates to indirect yet systemic forms of political and economic coercion. Practically, the concept of global civil war, as, for example, Mary Kaldor suggests, has three characteristics: first, global civil war works through the strategic as well as indiscriminate abuse of human rights, frequently legitimized on grounds of exclusive identity politics; second, the war is not winnable but serves to rally the population around political causes; third, global war generates an economy of plunder and piracy while the state maintains and defends its stakes by deploying mercenaries and engaging in illegal global arms trade. Although this description helps elucidate the global aspects of such historically prolonged armed conflicts as Sri Lanka's and Rwanda's, it brushes over the epistemological dimension of global warfare, namely its frequently dehistoricized conceptualization and its need to mobilize exclusionary identity politics. What remains invisible is that global civil war is intrinsic to predatory global capitalism and aims at maintaining a historically received global order of unequal power relationships. Moreover, the extreme and often genocidal violence of global civil war ??? a phenomenon that connects old and new theatres of war ??? frequently "attempts to eradicate the concept of human altogether, replacing it with the idea of an irrevocable progress towards the eradication of superfluous human beings" (Razack 2004, 160).

Hardt and Negri, then, examine the capitalist, biopolitical, and cultural logic of contemporary warfare by relating global war to both the development of digital technologies for military uses and the increasing importance of immaterial labour, namely, labour engaged in the production of ideas, knowledge, and subjectivities. Their analysis primarily serves to navigate a way out of what they see as a permanent state of exception and to map strategies of resistance for the multitude, their term for a new global class of people loosely and strategically united in their struggle against globalization. Hardt and Negri's reading of global civil war is instructive for its delineation of the ways in which the "war machinery" ??? to use Hardt and Negri's Deleuzean terminology ??? of the United States and its allied partners has appropriated methods of guerrilla and liberation warfare, formerly used in the struggle against colonialism. It seems to me, however, that this kind of appropriation cannot be reduced to the ways in which the non-hierarchical organization of guerrilla troops and warfare have been transformed into an authoritarian chain of command structure, characteristic of conventional armies.

Moreover, emphasizing that war is quickly "becoming a general phenomenon, global and interminable" (2004, 3), they propose to read all contemporary wars as "global civil wars" (ibid., 4) or "netwars" (ibid., 55). Thus, Hardt and Negri tend to conceptualize these wars as postmodern phenomena rather than wars that either pursue particular imperial projects of reordering current global geopolitics or that have long-standing post-colonial roots but have mutated into global civil warfare. Understood as "counterinsurgencies" (ibid., 37), global civil wars change a people's entire social and political makeup, are connected with other war zones, and designate a process in which the distinction between war and civil society has become obsolete. Unlike conventional civil wars, which are considered atavistic remnants of modernity and effects of imperial forms of nation-formation (Horowitz 1985) and emerge out of competing claims to territorial sovereignty, global civil wars are fought by mercenary forces across a global rather than national terrain and aim at population control rather than territorial autonomy.

What, then, is new about global civil war? If war is presumably no longer bound to territorial control and direct conquest but, instead, has become a reflection of media velocity, high-tech combat (Der Derian 2001) and capitalism's need to restructure the planet's markets and geopolitics of resource control, to what extent, we may ask, does global civil war present a qualitatively new phenomenon, rather than, say, a quantitative change of the intensity of warfare, depending on technological development. Furthermore, is global civil war merely another term for the recently revived rhetoric of just wars in a global context? What differentiates Hardt and Negri's notion of "global civil war" from Michael Ignatieff's (1998, 5) notion of "postmodern war," since both terms refer to changes in the organization and modes of contemporary ethnic civil war? Or, how does the term relate to Jean-Luc Nancy's notion of the "confronted community" (2003a, 23)? For, Nancy vehemently opposes such primordialist explanations of contemporary warfare as put forward by Samuel Huntington. Instead, global civil war designates an epistemological and material war of a specific yet globalized civilization, namely of the West, whose values of monotheism, self-presence, and truth have exhausted themselves. Nancy's approach to global war not only makes legible the ways in which global civil war arises as an epistemological problem of Western metaphysics but, by the same token, situates global war within a particularly localized critique of Eurocentrism.

To Nancy, then, contemporary global warfare is symptomatic of the ways in which the idea of community is confronted with itself, with its insistence on and desire for essence, unequivocal identity, propriety, omnipresence, and purity. Indeed, global civil war suggests that Western civilization, understood, in Nancy's words, as a "work of death" (2003a, 24), is finally confronted with its own spiritual emptiness and self-destructive logic of sameness. In this context, global civil war is symptomatic for the disintegration of Western values and truth claims and is interpreted solely as a critique of Eurocentrism, an argument that inadvertently remains indebted to the idea that civil wars result from the disintegration of the nation-state and its attendant epistemologies of belonging. What we find at the horizon of Nancy's critique, then, is the hope of inventing new ways in which the "Euro-Mediterranean world" relates to itself as "Other," to "'value', to the 'absolute', to 'truth'" (2003b, 53). Such a critique of contemporary warfare, however, can think global civil war neither beyond the West's concern with itself nor within different genealogies of both failed and ongoing processes of decolonization. Instead, it begs the question of what or who is the "global" in "global civil war." Indeed, as I argue throughout this essay, the way in which we define the "global" in the context of global war largely determines how we read the particular political investments and interests that underlie global war. For example, if global war is primarily a byproduct of and intrinsic to Empire and its consolidation, it appears to be inevitable and takes place outside discourses of political legitimization and accountability. From a different perspective, conceptualizing global civil war as being engineered by the Global North, that is, predominantly by the United States and its allied nations, reveals the ways in which global war deeply invests in and ensures the continuous accumulation of global capital and centralized practices of uneven capital distribution. Furthermore, if "the global" designates ??? as I think it does ??? a cultural and social space inhabited by those who are impoverished, dispossessed, and violated by the economic and geopolitical restructuring of the world, then the "global" also delineates a process of subject constitution governed by the construction of absolute difference, abjection, and dehumanization.

With its implication of having superseded national politics and interests, the term global civil war appears to require that we accept Hardt and Negri's often criticized assumption that the nation-state no longer mediates claims to sovereignty and power (Tilly 2003; Brennan 2003). For the moment, however, I will refrain from participating in the controversy over the role of the nation in Hardt and Negri's work. Instead, I suggest that while their understanding of global civil war does not explicitly engage in a critique of global violence, but instead focuses on an analysis of the structures of command and strategies of contemporary warfare, it helps raise questions through which to sketch a post-colonial critique of global violence. More specifically, in the next three parts of this paper, I wish to relocate three aspects of their argument in a post-colonial framework: first, the preponderance of biopolitics in their notion of global civil war; second, the construction of normalizing narratives of global civil war, specifically the rhetoric of the archaic; and third, the relationship between global civil war and the notion of the state of exception or emergency. As Hannah Arendt already implied in 1963, the terms global civil war and the state of exception function in tandem as signs and instruments of modern totalitarianism. Today, the state of exception has become globalization's most coercive instrument in regulating the limits of global citizenship and the legal status of particular individuals such as prisoners of war and refugees. More specifically, I suggest that the term "global civil war," specifically when understood as a version of the US-led "war against terror," serves to normalize and legitimize the transformation of constitutional democracy into a permanent but unacknowledged state of exception. The latter is either smothered in a propagandistic rhetoric of fear or shrouded in a misleading public debate over political prevention. From a post-colonial perspective, however, the state of exception, as I propose in the last section of this paper, also designates a cultural and intellectual disposition toward accepting global war and its reliance on the operations of racialized violence as a historical norm and inevitable outcome of Western history. The next part shifts a predominantly biopolitical understanding of global civil war towards an analysis of the necropolitics of these wars.

#### Alternative—Challenge to *conceptual* framework of national security. Only our alternative displaces the source of executive overreach. Legal restraint without conceptual change is futile.

Aziz RANA Law at Cornell 11 [“Who Decides on Security?” Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper 87, http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops\_papers/87 p. 45-51]

The prevalence of these continuities between Frankfurter’s vision and contemporary judicial arguments raise serious concerns with today’s conceptual framework. Certainly, Frankfurter’s role during World War II in defending and promoting a number of infamous judicial decisions highlights the potential abuses embedded in a legal discourse premised on the specially-situated knowledge of executive officials and military personnel. As the example of Japanese internment dramatizes, too strong an assumption of expert understanding can easily allow elite prejudices—and with it state violence—to run rampant and unconstrained. For the present, it hints at an obvious question: How skeptical should we be of current assertions of expertise and, indeed, of the dominant security framework itself? One claim, repeated especially in the wake of September 11, has been that regardless of normative legitimacy, the prevailing security concept—with its account of unique knowledge, insulation, and hierarchy—is simply an unavoidable consequence of existing global dangers. Even if Herring and Frankfurter may have been wrong in principle about their answer to the question “who decides in matters of security?” they nevertheless were right to believe that complexity and endemic threat make it impossible to defend the old Lockean sensibility. In the final pages of the article, I explore this basic question of the degree to which objective conditions justify the conceptual shifts and offer some initial reflections on what might be required to limit the government’s expansive security powers. VI. CONCLUSION: THE OPENNESS OF THREATS The ideological transformation in the meaning of security has helped to generate a massive and largely secret infrastructure of overlapping executive agencies, all tasked with gathering information and keeping the country safe from perceived threats. In 2010, The Washington Post produced a series of articles outlining the buildings, personnel, and companies that make up this hidden national security apparatus. According to journalists Dana Priest and William Arkin, there exist “some 1271 government organizations and 1931 private companies” across 10,000 locations in the United States, all working on “counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence.”180 This apparatus is especially concentrated in the Washington, D.C. area, which amounts to “the capital of an alternative geography of the United States.”181 Employed by these hidden agencies and bureaucratic entities are some 854,000 people (approximately 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington itself) who hold topsecret clearances.182 As Priest and Arkin make clear, the most elite of those with such clearance are highly trained experts, ranging from scientists and economists to regional specialists. “To do what it does, the NSA relies on the largest number of mathematicians in the world. It needs linguists and technology experts, as well as cryptologists, known as ‘crippies.’”183 These professionals cluster together in neighborhoods that are among the wealthiest in the country—six of the ten richest counties in the United States according to Census Bureau data.184 As the executive of Howard County, Virginia, one such community, declared, “These are some of the most brilliant people in the world. . . . They demand good schools and a high quality of life.”185 School excellence is particularly important, as education holds the key to sustaining elevated professional and financial status across generations. In fact, some schools are even “adopting a curriculum . . . that will teach students as young as 10 what kind of lifestyle it takes to get a security clearance and what kind of behavior would disqualify them.”186 The implicit aim of this curriculum is to ensure that the children of NSA mathematicians and Defense Department linguists can one day succeed their parents on the job. In effect, what Priest and Arkin detail is a striking illustration of how security has transformed from a matter of ordinary judgment into one of elite skill. They also underscore how this transformation is bound to a related set of developments regarding social privilege and status—developments that would have been welcome to Frankfurter but deeply disillusioning to Brownson, Lincoln, and Taney. Such changes highlight how one’s professional standing increasingly drives who has a right to make key institutional choices. Lost in the process, however, is the longstanding belief that issues of war and peace are fundamentally a domain of common care, marked by democratic intelligence and shared responsibility. Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today’s dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, by way of a conclusion I would like to assess them more directly and, in the process, indicate what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the U.S. faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create of world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states.187 Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of Herring’s national security state, with the U.S. permanently mobilized militarily to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike—at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decisionmaking are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency (one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint)188 greatly outweigh the costs. Yet, although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides—and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be—remains open as well. Clearly technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America’s position in the world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet, in truth they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers.189 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments, assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view—such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have—at times unwittingly—reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America’s post-World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that “our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century,” was no longer “adequate” for the “20th- century nation.”190 For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country’s “preeminen[ce] in political and military power.”191 Fulbright held that greater executive action and war-making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself “burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.”192 According to Fulbright, the United States had both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States’ own ‘national security’ rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion.193 To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principal and overriding danger facing the country. According to the State Department’s Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, in 2009 “[t]here were just 25 U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide” (sixteen abroad and nine at home).194 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers—which have been consistent in recent years—place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger—requiring everincreasing secrecy and centralization—such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit ‘national security’ aims highlights just how entrenched Herring’s old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States’ massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions—like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home—shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. This means that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underscores that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of ‘expertise.’195 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threat to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate.196 These ‘open’ secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making. But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm—the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed,197 its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’—marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact—than policymakers admit. If both objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars—emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness—is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants—danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently—it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that no popular base exists to raise these questions. Unless such a base emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

### AT: UN Advantage

#### Their Stromseth evidence does not establish a broad spill-over to UN credibility --- it says that securing Congressional authorization is key to prevent Congress from overriding the executive and withdrawing us from an ongoing UN operation, which would undermine the effectiveness of that UN mission. There is no recent evidence that the president plans on sending forces to any UN mission. Also, their evidence concedes the internal link to our Iran DA --- says congressional restrictions undermine coercive diplomacy.

Stromseth 95 – Jane E. Stromseth, Associate Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, “Collective Force and Constitutional Responsibility: War Powers in the Post-Cold War Era”, University of Miami, October, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 145, Lexis

If Somalia and Haiti are any guide, we can expect to see several trends at work when the United States participates in U.N.-authorized military operations in the years ahead. First, Congress will scrutinize the objectives of future U.N. operations closely, and will demand a detailed, ongoing account of their goals, costs, and benefits. Even if the President acts unilaterally in deploying U.S. forces, the anticipated congressional scrutiny that is sure to follow will have significant constraining effects. In Haiti, for example, the Clinton Administration deliberately tailored the objectives for U.S. forces narrowly, insisted that a U.S. general be placed in charge of the second phase of the operation, and did a better job than in Somalia of anticipating the challenges involved in making the transition to a U.N.-led operation. In Rwanda, the Administration held back from making any substantial force deployment and opted for a very limited and short-term humanitarian role. More generally, the Administration has taken a cautious stance in the Security Council in voting for and shaping the mandate of future peacekeeping operations.

Second, Congress will use its power of the purse more aggressively not only to limit U.S. contributions to peacekeeping in general, but also to limit U.S. involvement in ongoing conflicts, as in Somalia. In the case of Rwanda, for example, Congress made sure that the President's decision to deploy U.S. forces on a limited humanitarian mission would not lead to another Somalia by imposing a funding cut-off and stipulating  [\*180]  that any change in the U.S. mission from one of strict refugee relief to "peace-enforcing" or "nation-building" not be implemented without the approval of Congress. [n159](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.758131.3552123704&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T19549771459&parent=docview&rand=1396096669189&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n159) By virtue of its power of the purse, the Congress ultimately cannot avoid taking a stand when American forces are deployed in U.N. peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations.

Third, in situations involving delicate diplomacy and ongoing efforts to resolve a conflict peacefully, as in Haiti, Congress will be reluctant to impose binding prospective limits on the President's military options. **This reflects a well-founded concern about undermining the President's ability to engage in coercive diplomacy in a fluid and flexible manner**. If the President fails to pursue a coherent and well-articulated policy, however, Congress will step in to fill the policy vacuum, as it did toward the end of the Somalia operation.

In the end, the United States Congress, despite its newfound assertiveness, will continue to look to the President to play the leading role in shaping U.S. foreign policy goals for the post-Cold War period. Regardless of who is in the White House, one goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to strengthen the United Nations as a valuable instrument for conflict resolution. Yet because Congress is becoming more willing to challenge the President's foreign policy choices (at least in cases that do not involve threats to core U.S. security interests), the importance of sharing responsibility for decisions to send U.S. forces into hostile situations in U.N.-authorized military operations is increasing.

In the years ahead, a continuation of the Cold War "tacit deal" in the U.N. context would deprive the American people of full deliberation by both the executive and legislative branches before American forces are placed in harm's way. A failure to secure and sustain strong domestic support for American involvement in U.N. operations also would leave American policy especially vulnerable to sudden reversal by Congress, which could undermine U.S. credibility among both our allies and our adversaries, and erode the United Nation's ability to respond effectively **to the conflict at hand**. Building a domestic consensus in favor of American military involvement in U.N. operations often will not be easy. But if Presidents choose to remain on executive-power autopilot, they risk unleashing a congressional counterreaction that could ultimately harm America's ability to maintain a posture of constructive international engagement in the challenging times ahead.

#### No disease can cause human extinction—burnout

Posner 5—judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School [Richard A, Winter, “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them,” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_kmske/is\_3\_11/ai\_n29167514/pg\_2?tag=content;col1]

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extiinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

#### Many, many alt causes to rising food prices

IMF in ‘8 (International Monetary Fund, “Impact of High Food and Fuel Prices on Developing Countries—Frequently Asked Questions”, Last Updated 4-11, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/ffpfaqs.htm)

Q. Why is this happening? A. Prices have been propelled by a mix of permanent and temporary factors: • Strong food demand from emerging economies, reflecting stronger per capita income growth, accounts for much of the increase in consumption. Although demand growth has been high for some time now, the recent sustained period of high global growth contributed to depleting global inventories, particularly of grains. • Rising biofuel production adds to the demand for corn and rapeseeds oil, in particular, spilling over to other foods through demand and crop substitution effects. Almost half the increase in consumption of major food crops in 2007 was related to biofuels, mostly because of corn-based ethanol production in the US; and the new biofuel mandates in the US and the EU that favor domestic production will continue to put pressure on prices. • At the same time, supply adjustment to higher prices has remained slow, notably for oil, and inventory levels in many markets have declined to the lowest levels in years. • The policy responses in some countries are exacerbating the problem: (i) Some major exporting countries have introduced export taxes, export bans, or other restrictions on exports of agricultural products. (ii) Some importing countries are not allowing full pass-through of international prices into domestic prices (less than half a sample of 43 developing and emerging market countries allowed for full pass through in 2007). • Drought conditions in major wheat-producing countries (e.g., Australia and Ukraine), higher input costs (animal feed, energy, and fertilizer), and restrictive trade policies in major net exporters of key food staples such as rice have also contributed. • Financial factors: the depreciating US$ increases purchasing power of commodity users outside of the dollar area; falling policy interest rates in some major currencies reduce inventory holding costs and induce shifts from money market instruments to higher-yielding assets such as commodity-indexed funds.

### SOP

#### No Russian War

Weitz ‘11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>, September 27, 2011)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

## \*\*\* 2NC

### 2NC Impact O/V – War

#### Escalation risks extinction—prioritize preventing the only irreversible impact

Giribets 12 [Miguel Giribets, “If US Attacks Iran, Human Survival May Be at Risk (Part III),” Argen Press, 10 January 2012, pg. http://watchingamerica.com/News/141596/if-us-attacks-iran-human-survival-may-be-at-risk-part-iii/]

The dangers of global war are clear. On one side, hundreds of Russian technicians would die working on Iranian nuclear facilities, to which Russia could not stand idly by. According to Chossudovsky: "Were Iran to be the object of a "pre-emptive" aerial attack by allied forces, the entire region, from the Eastern Mediterranean to China's Western frontier with Afghanistan and Pakistan, would flare up, leading us potentially into a World War III scenario. The war would also extend into Lebanon and Syria. It is highly unlikely that the bombings, if they were to be implemented, would be circumscribed to Iran's nuclear facilities as claimed by US-NATO official statements. What is more probable is an all out air attack on both military and civilian infrastructure, transport systems, factories, public buildings.

"The issue of radioactive fallout and contamination, while casually dismissed by US-NATO military analysts, would be devastating, potentially affecting a large area of the broader Middle East (including Israel) and Central Asian region." As an example, a few years ago Burma moved its capital Rangoon to Pyinmana, because it believed that the effects of nuclear radiation caused by an attack on Iran would be less there. Radiation and nuclear winter could have uncontrollable consequences for humans. Put plainly, the survival of the human race would be put at stake if the U.S. attacks Iran.

#### Speed – DA is procedural – aff’s internal links take time and intervening actors can resolve them. 1NC internal link indicates sanctions would be quick once negotiations failed – here is more ev

Klass 12/31/13 (retired USAF Colonel; Lt. General (USA Ret.) Robert Gard, the chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, contributed to this piece (Richard, Huffington Post, “The Road to Wars” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-klass/the-road-to-wars_b_4524280.html>)

Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has introduced legislation that sets the United States on the road to war with Iran and the road to an internal war within the Democratic Party. The bill (S.1881), which has many Democratic co-sponsors, increases the chances for war in two major ways. First, it undercuts ongoing negotiations to build on the first-step nuclear agreement with Iran by adding additional sanctions before the current six month negotiating period plays out. Iran has threatened to withdraw from these negotiations if a bad faith act, such as adding new sanctions, transpires. The U.S. would do the same if, for example, Iran's parliament passed legislation to open a new nuclear production facility. If the first-step deal collapses, there will be no problem in quickly instituting new sanctions. And there will certainly be calls for military action, no matter how short-term the results would be. But if the collapse is triggered by a U.S. unilateral action, the coalition now enforcing those sanctions could well collapse. This undermining of the president's negotiating authority and international cooperation is as unprecedented as it is dangerous. The second danger in this bill is that it encourages an Israeli attack on Iran. The bill states that "... if the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide ..., diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence...." While the language is "should," not "must," and there are bows to the Constitution and congressional authority, this is a clear signal to Israel that it can count on U.S. support for a "unilateral" air strike. And Iran cannot be blamed if it takes it that way. No one should doubt who will determine if the Iranian program provides an existential threat to Israel. The Israeli government's position is that any enrichment in Iran is such a threat. Yet reaching any agreement with Iran will undoubtedly require some residual domestic enrichment capability. Military experts agree that Israel would need substantial U.S. help for any effective attack. This would include not only intelligence and aerial refueling, but also combat search and rescue for downed Israeli pilots, possible suppression of enemy air defenses and other direct combat missions. In short, war. This language, while not requiring that the U.S. support an Israeli attack, certainly will be taken that way in Israel and Iran. Also, it just might be enough to doom a diplomatic settlement and unleash the dogs of war.

### 2NC Uniqueness – Israel

#### 3. Obama and his desire for diplomacy is in the driver’s seat. Netanyahu can only be reactive bystander to US politics

**Danin 2/28**/14 – Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies @ Council on Foreign Relations [[Robert M. Danin](http://blogs.cfr.org/danin/author/rdanin), “President Obama’s March Summit with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 28, 2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/kxoltty

The upcoming Israeli-American summit will surely lack such drama. While their conversation will focus on the same two issues that have dominated their nearly five year long dialogue—Iran and peace with the Palestinians—the discussion now will be over major negotiating tactics, not fundamental strategy. President Obama will not spend time trying to keep Israeli aircraft from attacking Iranian nuclear facilities nor will he push Netanyahu to stop settlement activity.

For now, the Obama administration is in the driver’s seat, leading negotiations both with Iran and between Israel and the Palestinians. Netanyahu is largely a bystander to one process and a reactive participant in the other. Differences between the United States and Israel have not been removed so much as deferred. Netanyahu will react to Obama; he is not positioned to advocate a wholly different approach on either front.

Iran: The fundamental gap between Obama and Netanyahu’s objectives regarding Iran remains: the American leader’s goal is to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, the Israeli objective is to see Iran deprived of the capability to develop a nuclear weapon. But the United States has signed an interim nuclear accord with Tehran in the period since Obama and Netanyahu last met, and negotiations on a comprehensive deal between the P5+1 and Iran are ongoing.

Given the now open U.S.-Iranian channel, the Israeli leader will settle, for now, on trying to affect Obama’s negotiating behavior. Israel’s declaratory position is to demand no Iranian enrichment. In recent talks with Israeli officials, lead U.S. negotiator Wendy Sherman suggested that position, while desirable, is unattainable. While Netanyahu will adhere to his public position, in private he is more likely to focus on the types of constraints on Iranian enrichment activity necessary to both detect and prevent an Iranian breakout attempt. Should the negotiations with Iran produce an agreement with ample safeguards, Israel’s planes will likely remain grounded.

#### 4. Relations are good. Netanyahu wants to cooperate with Obama

Cesana 3/5/14 [Shlomo Cesana, Netanyahu: Boycott the boycotters,”Isreal Hayom, Wednesday March 5, 2014, pg. http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter\_article.php?id=15941

During Monday's Netanyahu-Obama meeting, which was described as positive but substantive, Obama asked Netanyahu to show flexibility, yet Netanyahu stood by his positions. On Tuesday, speaking to AIPAC, Netanyahu declared that he is not a rejectionist regarding a peace deal, saying that the ball is in the court of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

Netanyahu called on Abbas to "recognize the Jewish state. No excuses, no delays, it's time. ... Telling your people, the Palestinians, that while we might have a territorial dispute, the right of the Jewish people to a state of their own is beyond dispute."

Netanyahu started off his address taking a moment to thank AIPAC for "working so tirelessly to strengthen the alliance between Israel and America." Then, he continued to the meat of his speech, which was broken down into three topics: Iran, the Palestinians and the anti-Israel boycott threat.

Netanyahu warned that Iran was working around the clock on advanced long-range missiles, which could ultimately reach as far as Los Angeles.

The prime minister said his meeting with Obama was "very good," adding that he told Obama that the Israel and the U.S. must cooperate to "prevent Iran from having the capability to produce nuclear weapons."

### 2NC Link Wall – Israel

#### 3. Credible threat of military action by the Obama is key to keep Israel at the diplomatic table

**Al Jazeera 13** [“Obama reassures Israel over Iran talks,” Last Modified: 01 Oct 2013 09:16, pg. http://tinyurl.com/pvhy5gp

The United States reserves the right to keep all options, including military action, on the table with regards to engaging with Iran, the US president has said after holding talks with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.

Addressing the media after meeting with Netanyahu at the Oval Office in Washington, DC, on Monday, Obama said the United States would be circumspect before entering negotiations with Iran.

"We have to test diplomacy, we have to see if in fact they are serious about their willingness to abide by international norms and international law," Obama said.

"We enter into these negotiations very clear eyed. They will not be easy."

Obama also made clear that he reserved the right to take military action against Iran.  
The meeting comes just days after Obama's historic phone call with new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.

Netanyahu urged President Barack Obama to keep tough economic sanctions on Iran in place, even as the US weighs a potential warming of relations and a restart of nuclear negotiations with Tehran's new government.

"If diplomacy is to work, those pressures must be kept in place,'' Netanyahu said during the meeting with Obama.  
'Heartened'

Al Jazeera's Peter Sharp, reporting from Jerusalem, said Netanyahu would have been heartened by Obama's reassurances that Iran would have to prove itself and that Israel had the right to defend itself.

Netanyahu has been warning the US against equating Rouhani's more moderate rhetoric with substantive changes in Iran's nuclear policy.

The Israeli leader, meeting with Obama at the White House, insisted that Iran's "military nuclear programme" must be dismantled and called for maintaining or strengthening sanctions on Tehran.   
Israel considers a nuclear-armed Iran to be an existential threat while Iran denies that it is seeking nuclear weapons.  
Before leaving the US on Friday, Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani, shared a 15-minute phone call with President Obama, during which he said he wanted to seek a deal with world powers on Iran's nuclear programme within months.

The conversation was the highest-level contact between the two countries for more than 30 years - fuelling hopes for a resolution of a decade-old Iranian nuclear standoff.

The sudden prospect of diplomacy with Iran overshadowed a host of pressing issues on the US-Israeli agenda.

Netanyahu has long been sceptical of Obama's preference for negotiating with Iran, repeatedly pressing his US counterpart to issue credible threats of military action if Tehran gets close to producing a nuclear weapon.

#### 4. Sustained military commitment is key to reassure Israel. They signal that the US will cut and run

**Singh 3/3**/14 – Managing director @ Washington Institute and a former senior director for Middle East affairs @ National Security Council [Michael Singh (Former special assistant to secretaries of state Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell and at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv), “A Regional Approach to Iran,” Foreign Policy, MARCH 3, 2014 - 11:14 AM, pg. http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/03/03/a\_regional\_approach\_to\_iran

The nuclear negotiations with Iran have exacerbated this unease, offering the spectacle of the United States not only sitting across the negotiating table from Iranian officials but offering concessions. Ironically, however, the United States has chosen diplomacy precisely because the alternatives -- military conflict or acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran -- would be destabilizing to its allies' neighborhood.

But handled poorly, the negotiations could also prove destabilizing. The objective, after all, of the talks is not merely to reach an agreement, but to advance the interests of the United States and its allies, especially in regional stability and nonproliferation. If, however, America's allies (or Iran, for that matter) perceive that a deal is the prelude to an American withdrawal, or if Iran is left with too great a nuclear capacity, the result may be greater conflict, particularly along sectarian lines, and a regional race to match Iran's capabilities.

The clearest way to avoid this is to insist on a tough deal with Iran and to be willing to walk away from the table altogether if necessary. However, any negotiation requires giving as well as taking, and even a tough agreement may discomfit America's allies. To mitigate this, Barack Obama's administration should complement the two tracks of its Iran policy -- diplomacy and pressure -- with a third: a "regional" track aimed at assuring allies and warning Iran that the United States remains committed to the Middle East and determined to address any destabilizing Iranian activities in the region and other threats to U.S. interests comprehensively.

As part of this regional policy pillar, the United States should intensify its consultation with allies in the region, including Gulf Cooperation Council states, Jordan, Israel, and others on Iran and regional issues. This should involve not simply back-briefing partners after each round of talks, but huddling with them beforehand to ensure that their concerns are addressed and their interests represented.

The Obama administration's efforts to date have proved heavy on process but light on results outside the military sphere. Indeed, on critical regional issues, the United States and its allies have often worked at cross-purposes. Remedying this will require a steady effort to rebuild trust and communication and to find common policy ground on which the United States and its allies can cooperate.

Obama's trip to Riyadh in March is a welcome step in this regard but cannot be a one-off, nor should it necessarily be the president's only stop in the Persian Gulf. Visits will need to be preceded and followed by ongoing dialogue aimed at ensuring that U.S. and allied approaches to key regional issues are complementary. The reported recent gathering in Washington of regional intelligence chiefs to discuss Syria is precisely the sort of coordination that is needed.

It might be tempting to dismiss allies' concerns regarding Iran's regional activities and other issues as mere hand-wringing or even to hope that with energy independence drawing slowly nearer the United States will no longer need to heed them. This would be misguided -- allies in the region can bring capabilities, insights, and funding to the table in ways that can reinforce America's own efforts. Allowing these alliances to wither may mean less effort in the short run, but would prove costly in the long run.

Consultation, however, will not be sufficient to demonstrate that U.S. commitment to the region and to addressing threats to shared interests will not end when a nuclear deal is signed. It will also require more determined action to advance the interests that the United States and its partners there share. This should take the form not only of an enduring military presence -- something that the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review will provide an opportunity to reinforce -- but also more decisive steps to address the conflicts and problems roiling the region.

The theater in which a more proactive policy is most urgently required -- and would go the furthest to reassure allies and deter Iran -- is Syria. In assessing the new options he has ordered be drawn up for U.S. policy there, Obama should consider the impact that his decision will have on broader U.S. interests in the region.

Too often policymakers resort to straw-man arguments to justify inaction, most egregiously positing "boots on the ground" as the alternative to the United States' current ineffective policy on Syria. The United States need not act alone and certainly should not reflexively resort to military action. But the hard experiences of a decade of war and three years of turmoil in the Arab world should counsel smart, economical, and effective multilateral action, not serve as excuses for inaction.

Any nuclear agreement with Iran will be hard to achieve and will involve difficult choices. But taking steps to reinforce the U.S. commitment to the Middle East and address Iran's destabilizing regional activities will make an agreement both easier to come by -- by serving notice to Iran that the United States is negotiating from a position of strength and confidence and is prepared to act to defend its interests -- and easier to sell to allies, by reassuring them that the United States does not intend to cut and run. If on the other hand the United States neglects the bigger regional picture and focuses solely on deal-making with Tehran, the result may be a tactical victory, but a strategic defeat.

### No Preemption policy

#### Obama doesn’t have a formal preemption doctrine. At best they can point to “imminent threat” in the context of DRONES; not introduction of armed forces.

Paul Reynolds, 5/27/2010. World affairs correspondent, BBC News website. “Obama modifies Bush doctrine of pre-emption,” BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10178193.

One of the main conclusions arising from the new US national security strategy under President Obama is that he has modified the Bush doctrine of pre-emption.

Pre-emption was the defining aspect of President Bush's approach to foreign policy, one prompted by the attacks of 9/11 and one which culminated in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

President Obama has stepped back.

You can see this in the difference in wording between the document just issued and the one from President Bush in 2006. US presidents are required by Congress to produce these documents of doctrine every four years.

In 2006, George Bush's doctrine said: " We do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur... We cannot afford to stand idly by... This is the principle and logic of pre-emption."

In 2010, President Obama, in a specific paragraph called "Use of Force" says: "While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can... when force is necessary we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy..."

Unilateralism

This last, rather tortuous phrase, means that the US will seek international legitimacy (through the UN or Nato, it says) before acting. However, as any American president would, Mr Obama maintains an option to go it alone: "The US must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary."

His refusal to rule out unilateral action has led some to doubt that there is a new doctrine at work here. Foreign Policy magazine says: "The reality is that the new strategy is best characterised as 'Bush Lite', a slightly watered down but basically plausible remake..."

However, the thrust and spirit of the two documents is quite different. George Bush refers to the "War on Terror" and Barack Obama does not. While neither blames Islam for al-Qaeda, one comes close by referring to the "perversion of a proud religion", the other simply has "a far-reaching network of violence and hatred".

Iran differences

Iran is another example. The Bush version made an implicit threat of force if Iran defied the UN, saying: "This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided."

The Obama version is that the US will "work to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon" (even though Iran says it is not doing this and note that the commitment is only to working to prevent, not actually preventing) and that "multiple means" will be employed to this end. "Multiple means" does not rule out force but is some way from threatening it.

### 1AC Cards

#### Russia models U.S. preemption --- risks conflict in Chechnya

Arvizu 4 – Ruben Arvizu, Director for Latin America of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, “The Domino Effect: Preemptive Wars on the Rise”, September, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2004/09/00\_arvizu\_domino-effect.htm

When the Bush administration initiated the invasion of Iraq arguing that preemptive war was a justifiable action, the Pandora's Box was opened. Russia has just announced that its armed forces will conduct preemptive strikes against terrorist bases in "any region of the world." How will the UN or NATO or any government dispute the argument of the right that Russia or any other nations would have to defend its security after the actions of the United States?

#### Conflict’s likely --- new Russian doctrine makes preemptive military action throughout Central Asia

Blank 10 – Stephen Blank, Ph.D. and Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, “The Real Reset: Moscow Refights the Cold War”, World Affairs, September / October, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/real-reset-moscow-refights-cold-war

Pressing the reset button has hardly led to any progress to date on the outstanding issues of European and Eurasian security either. There are clearly elements in Moscow who want a second round with Georgia, for instance, to unseat its government and perhaps accomplish further “territorial revisions” there. In this regard, it is significant that the Duma recently enacted a law that allows Russia’s armed forces to be used in operations beyond Russia’s borders in order to:

• counter an attack against Russian armed forces or other troops deployed beyond Russia’s borders;

• counter or prevent an aggression against another country;

• protect Russian citizens abroad;

• combat piracy and ensure safe passage of shipping.

This law would not only provide a “legal” basis for the offensive projection of Russian military force beyond Russia’s borders—and thus justify any subsequent attack against Georgia in response to alleged attacks on “the Russian citizens” of the supposedly independent states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia—but it would also provide a basis for the offensive use of Russian force against every state from the Baltic to Central Asia. Certainly the policy puts Ukraine at risk, given Moscow’s frequent complaints about the derogation of the Russian language and culture there, and the situation in Crimea. Moscow continues to use all the means at its disposal to manipulate Ukrainian politics and economics in order to subordinate Ukraine to this vision of Russian hegemony. None of this should surprise us. After all, in the wake of the Russo-Georgian war, Medvedev made it clear that Russia not only reserves the right to revise borders or intervene in other countries, but also demands a sphere of influence in Eurasia as a whole. A recent study of Russian policy in Latvia conducted by Gundar J. King and David E. McNabb got the larger picture right: “We see several, interrelated short-term [Russian] strategies focusing on exercising ever-increasing influence in the politics of the target states. What we do not see is a policy of military conquest but, rather, a gradual but unswerving drive to eventually regain dominance over the social, economic, and political affairs of what are to become entirely dependent client states.”

## \*\*\* 1NR

### 2NC—Impact

#### National security frame justifies extinction in the name of saving human life.

Dillon 96—Michael, University of Lancaster [October 4, 1996, “Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought”]

The way of sharpening and focusing this thought into a precise question is first provided, however, by referring back to Foucault; for whom Heidegger was the philosopher. Of all recent thinkers, Foucault was amongst the most committed to the task of writing the history of the present in the light of the history of philosophy as metaphysics. 4 That is why, when first thinking about the prominence of security in modern politics, I first found Foucault’s mode of questioning so stimulating. There was, it seemed to me, a parallel to be drawn between what he saw the technology of disciplinary power/knowledge doing to the body and what the principle of security does to politics.

What truths about the human condition, he therefore prompted me to ask, are thought to be secreted in security? What work does securing security do for and upon us? What power-effects issue out of the regimes of truth of security? If the truth of security compels us to secure security, why, how and where is that grounding compulsion grounded? How was it that seeking security became such an insistent and relentless (inter)national preoccupation for humankind? What sort of project is the pursuit of security, and how does it relate to other modern human concerns and enterprises, such as seeking freedom and knowledge through representative-calculative thought, technology and subjectification? Above all, how are we to account—amongst all the manifest contradictions of our current (inter)national systems of security: which incarcerate rather than liberate; radically endanger rather than make safe; and engender fear rather than create assurance—for that terminal paradox of our modern (inter)national politics of security which Foucault captured so well in the quotation that heads this chapter. 5 A terminal paradox which not only subverts its own predicate of security, most spectacularly by rendering the future of terrestrial existence conditional on the strategies and calculations of its hybrid regime of sovereignty and governmentality, but which also seems to furnish a new predicate of global life, a new experience in the context of which the political has to be recovered and to which it must then address itself: the globalisation of politics of security in the global extension of nihilism and technology, and the advent of the real prospect of human species extinction.

#### From our privileged position all genuine change is presumed dangerous and undesirable. Your decision should be willing to risk the possibility of danger to redress colonial exploitation.

Saunders 5 [Rebecca Comparative Lit @ Illinois St., “Risky Business: Edward Said as Literary Critic” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle Eas p. 529-532]

Risk-free ethics, like all protection from risk, are a class privilege. As Deborah Lupton puts it, “The disadvantaged have fewer opportunities to avoid risks because of their lack of resources compared with the advantaged”; “people’s social location and their access to material resources are integral to the ways in which they conceptualize and deal with risk.”22 Or, as Ulrich Beck argues, “Poverty attracts an unfortunate abundance of risks. By contrast, wealth (in income, power or education) can purchase safety and freedom from risk.”23 Thus when we endorse a risk-free ethics, we should bear in mind that members of social groups with less to lose and more to gain are more likely to engage in risky behaviors than are members of more secure and privileged social groups. Moreover, as Mary Douglas has argued at length, risk is a forensic resource and, much like the “danger” she elaborated in her early work, functions as a means of social control. “Anthropologists would generally agree,” she writes, “that dangers to the body, dangers to children, dangers to nature are available as so many weapons to use in the struggle for ideological domination.”24 These weapons are sharpened, she argues, by Western societies’ association of risk assessment with scientific neutrality. Along similar lines, Nick Fox contends that “risk analysis is a deeply political activity. The identification of hazards (and the consequent definition of what is a risk) can easily lead to “the valorization of certain kinds of living over others.”25 The identification of “risk groups” deemed to be threatening to the social order—the unemployed, criminal, insane, poor, foreign—are a common technology for establishing boundaries between self and other, the normal and the pathological, that is, for securing that “formidable battery of distinctions” Said analyzes between “ours and theirs, proper and improper,” higher and lower, colonial and native, Western and Eastern.26 In a fascinating article on debates over native title in Australia, Eva Mackey demonstrates both the way in which political actors deploy a rhetoric of risk, danger, and threat and the uses of risk management to imperial hegemony. Not only have newspaper headlines “presented native title as an issue that has brought the nation to the brink of a dangerous abyss, to the point of destruction,” but the Howard government “constructs native title as a danger and risk to the ‘national interest,’ particularly a risk to competitiveness, opportunities, and progress. The entire anti-native title lobby have all stated . . . that the uncertainty over native title is dangerous for investment and economic competitiveness.”27 As Mackey points out, these notions of danger imply “a normative, non-endangered state,” and it is through ideas of the normal and deviant that institutional power is maintained.28 A related argument articulated by governmentality theorists is that modern societies normalize risk avoidance and pathologize risk taking, represent the former as rational and mature, the latter as irrational and childish— oppositions that, again, are familiar to any student of colonial discourse.29 These oppositions are buttressed by an elaborate apparatus of expert knowledge produced by disciplines such as engineering, statistics, actuarialism, psychology, epidemiology, and economics, which attempt to regulate risk through calculations of probability and which view the social body as “requiring intervention, management and protection so as to maximize wealth, welfare and productivity.”30 Knowledge produced about probability is then deployed as counsel to individuals about how to conduct their lives. As Lupton contends: “In late modern societies, not to engage in risk avoiding behavior is considered ‘a failure of the self to take care of itself—a form of irrationality, or simply a lack of skillfulness’ (Greco 1993). Risk-avoiding behavior, therefore, becomes viewed as a moral enterprise relating to issues of self-control, self-knowledge and self-improvement.”31 This is a characteristic of neoliberal societies that Pat O’Malley, Franc¸ois Ewald, and others refer to as the “new prudentialism.”32 To recognize that risk is a form of social control, and that risk taking is more necessary to certain classes than to others, is also to recognize that risk is not an objective entity or preexisting fact but is produced by specific cultural, political, and institutional contexts, as well as through competing knowledges. “To call something a risk,” argues Douglas, “is to recognize its importance to our subjectivity and wellbeing.” 33 Anthony Giddens, similarly, contends that “there is no risk which can be described without reference to a value.”34 In a frequently cited passage, Ewald writes, “Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event.”35 Indeed, this is precisely the unconscious of risk-management technologies, which assume both that risks are preexistent in nature and that individuals comport themselves in strict accordance with a “hedonic calculus.” 5 3 1 Also embedded within this insurantial unconscious is the fact that, as Fox puts it, “The welladvertised risk will turn out to be connected with legitimating moral principles.”36 If postcolonial studies, as I am arguing, should more rigorously interrogate risk-avoidance strategies (including those that repress or discipline the foreignness in language) on their political, class, and ideological investments, it should also recognize the degree to which risk management (no doubt among modernity’s most wildly optimistic formulations) indulges in a fantasy of mastery over uncertainty. In risk-management discourses, risk has taken on the technical meaning of a known or knowable probability estimate, contrasted with uncertainty, which designates conditions where probabilities are inestimable or unknown. This transformation of the unknown into a numerical figure, a quantification of nonknowledge that takes itself for knowledge, attempts to master whatever might be undesirable in the unknown (i.e., the future) by indemnifying it in advance—and thereby advertising its own failure. I believe it could be demonstrated, moreover, were we to trace the genealogy of this fantasy, that it coincides at crucial moments with the history of colonization. The notion of risk, first used in relation to maritime adventures, arises contemporaneously with modern imperialism, to describe the hazards of leaving home. With industrial modernity, and particularly the rise of the science of statistics in the nineteenth century, it took on themien of instrumental reason and the domination of nature, nuances that bear an unmistakable resemblance to the logics of concurrent colonial enterprises.37 This fantasy of mastery is also a suppression of possibility; in most instances, risk avoidance is an (implicit or explicit) maintenance of dominant values. Risk taking, by contrast, is the condition of possibility of possibility— that is, of change. It is perhaps no surprise that one’s political position is the strongest predictor of his/her attitude toward risk. Risk, as we have seen, is regularly formulated as that which threatens the dominant order (conceived on the level of a society, a colonial regime, or a global economic order). That threat, of course, is the “danger” of transformation, of reorganized social and ideological hierarchies, redistributed economic and cultural capital, renovated geopolitical relations—in short, precisely the kinds of transformation called for by much of postcolonial studies. Risk, including the risk of errors in meaning, may be necessary to any social change, that is, to engaging in the kind of oppositional criticism Said advocates: “Criticism must think of itself,” he writes, “as constitutively opposed to every form of tyranny, domination, and abuse.”38 The necessity of risk to change (and the craven conformism of risk avoidance) is a principle Friedrich Nietzsche elaborates in Beyond Good and Evil, where, critiquing the “timidity of morality,” he calls for a new species of philosophers, willing to risk untruth, uncertainty, even ignorance, thinkers willing to inhabit “the dangerous maybe.”39 Nietzsche was also prescient in recognizing that “howmuch or how little is dangerous to the community . . . now constitutes the moral perspective; here, too, fear is again themother ofmorals.”40 More recently, philosophers such as Derrida and John D. Caputo (explicitly taking up Nietzsche’s vocation) have argued that change, indeed social responsibility itself, inevitably demands a wager on uncertain possibilities (or, in Derridean terms, the “aporia”). “Let us not be blind,” writes Derrida, “to the aporia that all change must endure. It is the aporia of the perhaps, its historical and political aporia. Without the opening of an absolutely undetermined possible, without the radical abeyance and suspense marking a perhaps, there would never be either event or decision. . . . no decision (ethical, juridical, political) is possible without interrupting determination by engaging oneself in the perhaps.”41 On similar grounds, Caputo argues for “the suspension of the fine name of ethics in the name of obligation” and contends that “to speak of being against ethics and deconstructing ethics is to own up to the lack of safety by which judging is everywhere beset. . . . to admit that ‘obligation’ is not safe, that ethics cannot make it safe, that it is not nearly as safe as ethics would have us believe.”42

### 1NR—K Prior

#### Framing war powers restrictions as a *means* to achieve greater national security quashes political alternatives to unilateral war-fighting.

Francisco J. CONTRERAS Prf. Philosophy of Law @ Seville AND Ignacio de la RASILLA Ph.D. candidate in international law, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 8 [“On War as Law and Law as War” Leiden Journal of International Law Vol. 21 Issue 3 p. 770-773]

Kennedy begins by coldly contradicting those opponents of the Bush administration ‘that have routinely claimed that the United States has disregarded these rules’ (p. 40) by pointing out that both opponents and supporters of the Iraq war as well as both opponents and supporters of the great panoply of US legal measures related to the war on terror ‘were playing with the same deck’ (p. 40) in presenting ‘professional arguments about how recognised rules and standards, as well as recognised exceptions and jurisdictional limitations, should be interpreted’ (p. 40). The author’s only concession with reference to the Bush administration’s legal advisers is to point out that ‘as professionals, these lawyers failed to advise their client adequately about the consequences of the interpretations they proposed, and about the way others would read the same texts – and their memoranda’ (p. 39).Thus Kennedy does not adopt any legal position to the detriment of any other, as his assessment does not seemingly pretend to persuade his reader at the level of the world of legal validity presented in the vocabulary of the UN Charter. The extent to which that excludes the author from the category of being a ‘true jus-internationalist’, according to A. Canc¸ado Trindade’s understanding of those who actually ‘comply with the ineluctable duty to stand against the apology of the use of force which is manifested in our days through distinct “doctrinal” elaborations’,42 is not for us to judge. Suffice it to note that the starting point of Kennedy’s convoluted perspective on the matter is that ‘the law of force’ is a form of ‘vocabulary for assessing the legitimacy’ (p. 41) of a form of conduct (e.g. amilitary campaign) or ‘for defending as well as attacking the “legality”’ (p. 41) of an act (e.g. distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate targets) in which the same law of force becomes a two-edged sword, everybody’s and no one’s strategic partner in a contemporary world where ‘legitimacy has become the currency of power’ (p. 45). For the author, in today’s age of ‘lawfare’ (p. 12), ‘to resist war in the name of law . . . is to misunderstand the delicate partnership of war and law’ (p. 167). In Kennedy’s view, therefore, ‘there is little comfort in knowing that law has become the vernacular for evaluating the legitimacy of war and politics where it has done so by itself becoming a strategic instrument of war and the continuation of politics by similar means’ (p. 132). 3. LAW AS A MODERN LEGAL INSTITUTION Of War and Law seems, indeed, to be animated by a certain philosophical perplexity regarding the ambiguous relation between the apparently antithetical nature of the terms appearing in its title. Since antiquity both jurists and philosophers have taught that the law’s raison d’eˆ tre is that of making social peace possible, of overcoming what would later be commonly known as the Hobbesian state of nature: bellum omnium contra omnes. Kant noted that law should be perceived first and foremost as a pacifying tool – in other words, ‘the establishment of peace constitutes, not a part of, but the whole purpose of the doctrine of law’43 – and Lauterpacht projected that same principle onto the international sphere: ‘the primordial duty’ of international law is to ensure that ‘there shall be no violence among states’.44 The paradox lies, of course, in that law performs its pacifying function not by means of edifying advice, but by the threat of the use of force. In this sense, as Kennedy points out, ‘to use law is also to invoke violence, at least the violence that stands behind legal authority’ (p. 22). Hobbes himself never concealed the fact that the state, ‘that mortal god, to which we owe under the immortal God our peace and defence’,would succeed in eradicating inter-individual violence precisely due to its ability to ‘inspire terror’;45 but Weber – ‘the State is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’46 – Godwin,47 and Kelsen48 have also provided support for the same proposition. This ambivalent and paradoxical relationship between law and violence,which is obvious in the domestic or intra-state realm, becomes even more obvious in the interstate domain with its classical twin antinomy of ubi jus, ibi pax and inter arma leges silent until the law in war emerges as a bold normative sector which dares to defy this conceptual incompatibility; even war can be regulated, be submitted to conditions and limitations. The hesitations of Kant in addressing jus in bello49 or the very fact that the Latin terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello were coined, as R. Kolb has pointed out,50 at relatively recent dates, seem to confirm that this has never been per se an evident aspiration.51 Kennedy explains his own calling as international lawyer as being partly inspired by his will to participate in the law’s civilizing mission (p. 29)52 as something utterly distinct from war: We think of these rules [law in war] as coming from ‘outside’ war, limiting and restricting the military. We think of international law as a broadly humanist and civilizing force, standing back from war, judging it as just or unjust, while offering itself as a code of conduct to limit violence on the battlefield. (p. 167) The author notes how this virginal confidence in the pacifying efficiency of international law – its presumed ability to forbid, limit, humanize war ‘from outside’ – becomes progressively nuanced, eroded, almost discredited by a series of considerations. The disquieting image of the ‘delicate partnership of war and law’ becomes more and more evidenced; the lawyer who attempts to regulate warfare inevitably also becomes its accomplice. As Kennedy puts it, The laws of force provide the vocabulary not only for restraining the violence and incidence of war – but also for waging war and deciding to go to war. . . . [L]aw no longer stands outside violence, silent or prohibitive. Law also permits injury, as it privileges, channels, structures, legitimates, and facilitates acts of war. (p. 167) Unable to suppress all violence, law typifies certain forms of violence as legally admissible, thus ‘privileging’ them with regard to others and investing some agents with a ‘privilege to kill’ (p. 115). Law thereby becomes, in Kennedy’s view, a tool not so much for the restriction of war as for the legal construction of war.53 Elsewhere we have labeled Kennedy ‘a relative outsider’54 who, peering from the edge of the vocabulary of international law, tries to ‘highlight its inherent structural limits, gaps, dogmas, blind spots and biases’, as someone ‘specialised in speaking the unspeakable, disclosing ambivalences and asking awkward questions’.55 The ‘unspeakable’, in the case of the ‘law of force’, is precisely, in Kennedy’s view, this process of involuntary complicity with the very phenomenon one supposedly wants to prohibit. Prepared to ‘stain his hands’ a` la Sartre, in his attempt to humanize the military machine from within, to walk one step behind the soldier reminding him constantly, as an imaginary CNN camera, of the legal limits of the legitimate use of force, the lawyer starts to realize, in the author’s view, that he is becoming but an accessory to the war machine. Kennedy maintains that law, in its attempt to subject war to its rule, has been absorbed by it and has now become but another war instrument (p. 32);56 law has been weaponized (p. 37).57 Contemporary war is by definition a legally organized war: ‘no ship moves, no weapon is fired, no target selected without some review for compliance with regulation – not because the military has gone soft, but because there is simply no other way to make modern warfare work. Warfare has become rule and regulation’ (p. 33).War ‘has become a modern legal institution’ (p. 5), with the result that the international lawyer finds himself before an evident instance of Marxian reification, in other words ‘the consolidation of our own products as a material power erected above us beyond our control that raises a wall in front of our expectations and destroys our calculations’.58 Ideas and institutions develop ‘a life of their own’, an autonomous, perverted dynamism.

#### Debating the rhetorical *frame* for war-fighting decisions is the only way to address the source of war-fighting abuses.

Jeremy ENGELS Communications @ Penn St. AND William SAAS PhD Candidate Comm. @ Penn ST. 13 [“On Acquiescence and Ends-Less War: An Inquiry into the New War Rhetoric” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 99 (2) p. 230-231]

The **framing** of public discussion facilitates acquiescence in contemporary wartime: thus, both the grounds on which war has been **justified** and the ends toward which war is **adjusted** are **bracketed** and hence made infandous. The rhetorics of acquiescence bury the grounds for war under nearly impermeable layers of political presentism and keep the ends of war in a state of **perpetual flux** so that they cannot be **challenged**. Specific details of the war effort are excised from the public realm through the rhetorical maneuver of ‘‘occultatio,’’ and the authors of such violence\*the president, his administration, and the broader national security establishment\*use a wide range of techniques to displace their own responsibility in the orchestration of war.28 Freed from the need to cultivate assent, acquiescent rhetorics take the form of a status update: hence, President Obama’s March 28, 2011 speech on Libya, framed as an ‘‘update’’ to Americans ten days after the bombs of ‘‘Operation Odyssey Dawn’’ had begun to fall. Such post facto discourse is a new norm: Americans are called to acquiesce to decisions already made and actions already taken. The Obama Administration has obscured the very definition of ‘‘war’’ with euphemisms like ‘‘limited kinetic action.’’ The original obfuscation, the ‘‘war on terror,’’ is a perpetually shifting, ends-less conflict that denies the very status of war. How do you dissent from something that seems so overwhelming, so inexorable? It’s hard to hit a perpetually shifting target. Moreover, as the government has become increasingly secretive about the details of war, crucial information is kept from citizens\*or its revelation is branded ‘‘treason,’’ as in the WikiLeaks case\*making it much more challenging to dissent. Furthermore, government surveillance of citizens cows citizens into quietism. So what’s the point of dissent? After all, this, too, will pass. Thus even the most critical citizens come to rest in peace with war. The confidence game of the new war rhetoric is one of perpetually shifting ends. In this ‘‘post-9/11’’ paradigm of war rhetoric, citizens are rarely asked to harness their civic energy to support the war effort, but instead are called to passively cede their wills to a greater Logos, the machinery of ends-less war. President Obama has embodied the dramatic role of wartime caretaker more adeptly than his predecessor, repeatedly exhorting citizens to ‘‘look forward’’ rather than to examine the historical grounds upon which the present state of ends-less war was founded and institutionalized.29 All the while, that forward horizon is constantly being reshaped\*from retribution, to prevention, to disarmament, to democratization, to intervention, and so on, as needed. What Max Weber called ‘‘charisma of office’’\*the phenomenon whereby extraordinary political power is passed on between charismatically inflected leaders\*is here cast in bold relief: until and unless the grounds of the new war rhetoric are meaningfully represented and unapologetically challenged, ends-less war can only continue unabated.30 War rhetoric is a mode of display that aims to dispose audiences to certain ways and states of being in the world. This, in turn, is the essence of the new war rhetoric: authorities tell us, don’t worry, we’ve got this, just go about your everyday business, go to the mall, and take a vacation. What we are calling acquiescent rhetorics aim to disempower citizens by cultivating passivity and numbness. Acquiescent rhetorics facilitate war by shutting down inquiry and deliberation and, as such, are anathema to rhetoric’s nobler, democratic ends. Rhetorical scholars thus have an important job to do.We must bring the objective violence of war out into the open so that all affected by war can meaningfully question the grounds, means, and ends of battle.We can do this by describing, and demobilizing, the rhetorics used to promote acquiescence. In sum, we believe that by making the seemingly uncontestable contestable, rhetorical critics can and should begin to invent a pedagogy that would reactivate an acquiescent public by creating space for talk where we have previously been content to remain silent.

### Humanitarian Aid Link

#### Their security reps are inaccurate and cause action-reaction cycles. Such cycles are the root of violence and make extinction inevitable. Even if they win that their impacts are true, or that primacy is good for “humanitarian aid” they must first prove their apocalypticism is a good method to approach crises stability.

**Calkivik 10** (Emine, A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, “DISMANTLING SECURITY”, October 2010, <http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/99479/1/Calkivik_umn_0130E_11576.pdf>)

Poultry and peasants may seem unlikely subjects to begin narrating international relations. Yet, as I argue throughout my dissertation, this episode is not marginal but symptomatic of a broader transformation: the consolidation of the empire of security across the global bio-political horizon. **The empire at issue is one that is dedicated to protecting life from wars, from hunger, from addiction, from ideological excess, from environmental catastrophes, from corrupt governments, and from its own practices**. **In this empire, security as bio-politics is charged with the task of producing and transforming social life at its most general and global level**. In this empire—**as citizens, scholars, experts and politicians—we are called upon to be at constant war to secure life against poverty, against rogues, against ignorance and destruction. In this empire, lack of security informs massive efforts devoted to humanitarian interventions and scholarly investigations; it breathes life into innumerous civilizing organizations**. Although the so-called Global War on Terror has become a privileged point in the ongoing debates about the changing nature of insecurities and the concomitant reevaluation of the adequacy of existing frameworks to analyze contemporary security landscapes, it is important to notice that **long before this war made its way to the top of the agenda of the international community, security had already firmly established itself as a primary value and an omnipresent end in itself.** **Through discourses and practices** ***entailed in humanitarian interventions***, through the ever-expanding domains and objects to be secured—from environment to information, from health to food, from the nation to the human—**security emerges as the primary objective toward which politics aspires and the ground upon which politics is built.** As the idea that we are living in an increasingly dangerous world proliferates, **security reaches far beyond official discourses and formal politics. It infuses the mundane, the everyday life, *and colonizes the global social and political imaginary///***

. **It enacts a value order produced and reproduced through discourses, practices, and networks that weave together state apparatuses, international organizations, civil society actors, academics, experts**, and private companies. Perhaps just as alarming is the proliferation of the phenomenon of vigilante citizens, as subjects around the globe take the law into their hands to secure themselves against gangs, drugs, and “illegal aliens.” One of the paradigmatic examples of this “statecraft from below” is civilian border patrol groups such as the Minutemen Project, founded in California in 2004 by a retired businessman to police the U.S.-Mexico border against the so-called invasion by immigrants. 9 As Doty explains, with undocumented migration becoming an increasingly prominent issue and the filling up of media outlets with news of humans referred to as “aliens” being trafficked across borders, **ordinary citizens** respond to calls from private groups to **take action and form their own unofficial**, unauthorized, but not necessarily illegal **patrolling of borders**. **The global army that security enlists in its service is not situated merely at the borders of national territories and identities**, however. Across the globe, there are many private patrol groups that are formed to clamp down on local crime, monitor other illicit and unwanted behavior. Depicting this trend as “both a logical response and an integral aspect” of the global political order wrought by neoliberalism, Pratten and Sen provide ample proof of the rising tide of vigilante-style justice and violence as a global phenomenon. 10 It could be said that **the obsession with security is democratized to the extent that it has become a common language, a “vernacular**” 11 shared across topographies of global hierarchies. **The post-Cold War jubilation in countries that have witnessed political liberation and economic liberalization has been accompanied by the emergence of an overwhelming fear of crime and a desire for security**. 12 **As the global security agenda was transmogrifying toward an obsession with securing the life of the species**, 13 **eagerness to criminalize dystopic social phenomenon such as poverty became a global phenomenon**: **zero tolerance policies turned into wars on urban squatters**, practically ***evolving into an active “dictatorship*** over the poor.” 14 **Security has become a medium through which we relate to —orient ourselves towards— life, politics, and the world**. As I discuss below, with **the logic of preemption and precautionary principles becoming definitive of contemporary politics of security, not merely the fear of what exists, but also the danger of what might be** — not only one’s chances today, but also one’s fortunes tomorrow— **has become the stock and trade of security discourse and practices.** What is paradoxical is that **this “will to secure” saturates life at a time when a constant state of terror emerges as the defining condition of life**. **It is a terror underwritten by monstrous inequalities and oppression affecting unprecedented numbers of human beings on earth as systemic and non-systemic violence casts its shadow on everyday life around the globe. It is a terror that afflicts not only the “wretched of the earth,”** but liberal societies as well—societies that have taken upon themselves the task of securing of common humanity through a temporally, spatially limitless War on Terror. 15 **This paradoxical co-existence of the hegemony of security amidst ever proliferating dangers and intensifying insecurities** provides the intellectual focus and central question of my dissertation. Against the reigning passion to secure, my argument is that **what is needed is not more security, but to dismantle the whole architecture of security**. Rather than writing security, I suggest, **critical inquiry needs to be “untimely**” 16 **and reflect upon the meaning, content, and political implications of producing and reproducing for security so as to open a space for dismantling it**. **Taking** **as** my **starting point the way in which** the global **passion to secure disavows the violence and insecurity it renders**, I ask: **what would it mean to dismantle security rather than reproduce its imperial gaze**? What political imaginaries are available, which we can draw upon? How might those political imaginaries alternatively be deployed, and with what effects? What would the political and ethical implications of such an undertaking be? **How could they help us envision a new ethics, a new politics?**