## \*\*\* 1NC

### 1NC T

#### The aff isn’t topical—introducing armed forces refers to HUMAN TROOPS only. Prefer this evidence

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As is evident from a textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization. n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary—as opposed to exclusionary—language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as non-members constituting armed forces). n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative. An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops. The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities. This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in [\*992] harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the War Powers Resolution likely does not cover such activities. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. n192 Thus, individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. n193 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. n194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities—which is highly unlikely—such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### Vote neg for Predictable Limits—allowing small parts, weapons, or subsets of weapons creates new topics in a new literature base—destroying preparedness.

### 1NC CP 1

#### Text: The Office of Legal Counsel should determine that the Executive Branch lacks the legal authority use nuclear weapons first in a conflict without congressional approval. The President should require the Office of Legal Counsel to publish any legal opinions regarding policies adopted by the Executive Branch.

#### The CP is competitive and solves the case—OLC rulings do not actually remove authority but nevertheless hold binding precedential value on the executive.

Trevor W. Morrison, October 2010. Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. “STARE DECISIS IN THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL,” Columbia Law Review, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448, Lexis.

On the other hand, an OLC that says "yes" too often is not in the client's long-run interest. n49 Virtually all of OLC's clients have their own legal staffs, including the White House Counsel's Office in the White House and the general counsel's offices in other departments and agencies. Those offices are capable of answering many of the day-to-day issues that arise in those components. They typically turn to OLC when the issue is sufficiently controversial or complex (especially on constitutional questions) that some external validation holds special value. n50 For example, when a department confronts a difficult or delicate constitutional question in the course of preparing to embark upon a new program or course of action that raises difficult or politically sensitive legal questions, it has an interest in being able to point to a credible source affirming the  [\*1462]  legality of its actions. n51 The in-house legal advice of the agency's general counsel is unlikely to carry the same weight. n52 Thus, even though those offices might possess the expertise necessary to answer at least many of the questions they currently send to OLC, in some contexts they will not take that course because a "yes" from the in-house legal staff is not as valuable as a "yes" from OLC. But that value depends on OLC maintaining its reputation for serious, evenhanded analysis, not mere advocacy. n53

The risk, however, is that OLC's clients will not internalize the long-run costs of taxing OLC's integrity. This is in part because the full measure of those costs will be spread across all of OLC's clients, not just the client agency now before it. The program whose legality the client wants OLC to review, in contrast, is likely to be something in which the client has an immediate and palpable stake. Moreover, the very fact that the agency has come to OLC for legal advice will often mean it thinks there is  [\*1463]  at least a plausible argument that the program is lawful. In that circumstance, the agency is unlikely to see any problem in a "yes" from OLC.

Still, it would be an overstatement to say that OLC risks losing its client base every time it contemplates saying "no." One reason is custom. In some areas, there is a longstanding tradition - rising to the level of an expectation - that certain executive actions or decisions will not be taken without seeking OLC's advice. One example is OLC's bill comment practice, in which it reviews legislation pending in Congress for potential constitutional concerns. If it finds any serious problems, it writes them up and forwards them to the Office of Management and Budget, which combines OLC's comments with other offices' policy reactions to the legislation and generates a coordinated administration position on the legislation. n54 That position is then typically communicated to Congress, either formally or informally. While no statute or regulation mandates OLC's part in this process, it is a deeply entrenched, broadly accepted practice. Thus, although some within the Executive Branch might find it frustrating when OLC raises constitutional concerns in bills the administration wants to support as a policy matter, and although the precise terms in which OLC's constitutional concerns are passed along to Congress are not entirely in OLC's control, there is no realistic prospect that OLC would ever be cut out of the bill comment process entirely. Entrenched practice, then, provides OLC with some measure of protection from the pressure to please its clients.

But there are limits to that protection. Most formal OLC opinions do not arise out of its bill comment practice, which means most are the product of a more truly voluntary choice by the client to seek OLC's advice. And as suggested above, although the Executive Branch at large has an interest in OLC's credibility and integrity, the preservation of those virtues generally falls to OLC itself. OLC's nonlitigating function makes this all the more true. Whereas, for example, the Solicitor General's aim of prevailing before the Supreme Court limits the extent to which she can profitably pursue an extreme agenda inconsistent with current doctrine, OLC faces no such immediate constraint. Whether OLC honors its oft-asserted commitment to legal advice based on its best view of the law depends largely on its own self-restraint.

2. Formal Requests, Binding Answers, and Lawful Alternatives. - Over time, OLC has developed practices and policies that help maintain its independence and credibility. First, before it provides a written opinion, n55 OLC typically requires that the request be in writing from the head or general counsel of the requesting agency, that the request be as specific and concrete as possible, and that the agency provide its own written  [\*1464]  views on the issue as part of its request. n56 These requirements help constrain the requesting agency. Asking a high-ranking member of the agency to commit the agency's views to writing, and to present legal arguments in favor of those views, makes it more difficult for the agency to press extreme positions.

Second, as noted in the Introduction, n57 OLC's legal advice is treated as binding within the Executive Branch until withdrawn or overruled. n58 As a formal matter, the bindingness of the Attorney General's (or, in the modern era, OLC's) legal advice has long been uncertain. n59 The issue has never required formal resolution, however, because by longstanding tradition the advice is treated as binding. n60 OLC protects that tradition today by generally refusing to provide advice if there is any doubt about whether the requesting entity will follow it. n61 This guards against "advice-shopping by entities willing to abide only by advice they like." n62 More broadly, it helps ensure that OLC's answers matter. An agency displeased with OLC's advice cannot simply ignore the advice. The agency might  [\*1465]  construe any ambiguity in OLC's advice to its liking, and in some cases might even ask OLC to reconsider its advice. n63 But the settled practice of treating OLC's advice as binding ensures it is not simply ignored.

In theory, the very bindingness of OLC's opinions creates a risk that agencies will avoid going to OLC in the first place, relying either on their general counsels or even other executive branch offices to the extent they are perceived as more likely to provide welcome answers. This is only a modest risk in practice, however. As noted above, legal advice obtained from an office other than OLC - especially an agency's own general counsel - is unlikely to command the same respect as OLC advice. n64 Indeed, because OLC is widely viewed as "the executive branch's chief legal advisor," n65 an agency's decision not to seek OLC's advice is likely to be viewed by outside observers with skepticism, especially if the in-house advice approves a program or initiative of doubtful legality.

OLC has also developed certain practices to soften the blow of legal advice not to a client's liking. Most significantly, after concluding that a client's proposed course of action is unlawful, OLC frequently works with the client to find a lawful way to pursue its desired ends. n66 As the OLC Guidelines put it, "when OLC concludes that an administration proposal is impermissible, it is appropriate for OLC to go on to suggest modifications that would cure the defect, and OLC should stand ready to work with the administration to craft lawful alternatives." n67 This is a critical component of OLC's work, and distinguishes it sharply from the courts. In addition to "providing a means by which the executive branch lawyer can contribute to the ability of the popularly-elected President and his administration to achieve important policy goals," n68 in more instrumental terms the practice can also reduce the risk of gaming by OLC's clients. And that, in turn, helps preserve the bindingness of OLC's opinions. n69

 [\*1466]  To be sure, OLC's opinions are treated as binding only to the extent they are not displaced by a higher authority. A subsequent judicial decision directly on point will generally be taken to supersede OLC's work, and always if it is from the Supreme Court. OLC's opinions are also subject to "reversal" by the President or the Attorney General. n70 Such reversals are rare, however. As a formal matter, Dawn Johnsen has argued that "the President or attorney general could lawfully override OLC only pursuant to a good faith determination that OLC erred in its legal analysis. The President would violate his constitutional obligation if he were to reject OLC's advice solely on policy grounds." n71 Solely is a key word here, especially for the President. Although his oath of office obliges him to uphold the Constitution, n72 it is not obvious he would violate that oath by pursuing policies that he thinks are plausibly constitutional even if he has not concluded they fit his best view of the law. It is not clear, in other words, that the President's oath commits him to seeking and adhering to a single best view of the law, as opposed to any reasonable or plausible view held in good faith. Yet even assuming the President has some space here, it is hard to see how his oath permits him to reject OLC's advice solely on policy grounds if he concludes that doing so is indefensible as a legal matter. n73 So the President needs at least a plausible legal basis for  [\*1467]  disagreeing with OLC's advice, which itself would likely require some other source of legal advice for him to rely upon.

The White House Counsel's Office might seem like an obvious candidate. But despite recent speculation that the size of that office during the Obama Administration might reflect an intention to use it in this fashion, n74 it continues to be virtually unheard of for the White House to reverse OLC's legal analysis. For one thing, even a deeply staffed White House Counsel's Office typically does not have the time to perform the kind of research and analysis necessary to produce a credible basis for reversing an OLC opinion. n75 For another, as with attempts to rely in the first place on in-house advice in lieu of OLC, any reversal of OLC by the White House Counsel is likely to be viewed with great skepticism by outside observers. If, for example, a congressional committee demands to know why the Executive Branch thinks a particular program is lawful, a response that relies on the conclusions of the White House Counsel is unlikely to suffice if the committee knows that OLC had earlier concluded otherwise. Rightly or wrongly, the White House Counsel's analysis is likely to be treated as an exercise of political will, not dispassionate legal analysis. Put another way, the same reasons that lead the White House to seek OLC's legal advice in the first place - its reputation for  [\*1468]  providing candid, independent legal advice based on its best view of the law - make an outright reversal highly unlikely. n76

Of course, the White House Counsel's Office may well be in frequent contact with OLC on an issue OLC has been asked to analyze, and in many cases is likely to make it abundantly clear what outcome the White House prefers. n77 But that is a matter of presenting arguments to OLC in support of a particular position, not discarding OLC's conclusion when it comes out the other way. n78The White House is not just any other client, and so the nature of - and risks posed by - communications between it and OLC on issues OLC is analyzing deserve special attention. I take that up in Part III. n79 My point at this stage is simply that the prospect of literal reversal by the White House is remote and does not meaningfully threaten the effective bindingness of OLC's decisions.

### 1NC CP 2

#### The United States Congress should prohibit the first use of nuclear weapons against China without congressional approval.

#### The counterplan solves their China advantage—it’s entirely based on China’s fears of US first strike against them. It doesn’t solve proliferation

### 1NC DA

#### Obama will win the debt ceiling fight – strength and resolve are key to forcing the GOP to bend

POLITICO 10 – 1 – 13 [“Government shutdown: President Obama holds the line” http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/government-shutdown-president-obama-holds-the-line-97646.html?hp=f3]

President Barack Obama started September in an agonizing, extended display of how little sway he had in Congress. He ended the month with a display of resolve and strength that could redefine his presidency. All it took was a government shutdown. This was less a White House strategy than simply staying in the corner the House GOP had painted them into — to the White House’s surprise, Obama was forced to do what he so rarely has as president: he said no, and he didn’t stop saying no. For two weeks ahead of Monday night’s deadline, Obama and aides rebuffed the efforts to kill Obamacare with the kind of firm, narrow sales pitch they struggled with in three years of trying to convince people the law should exist in the first place. There was no litany of doomsday scenarios that didn’t quite come true, like in the run-up to the fiscal cliff and the sequester. No leaked plans or musings in front of the cameras about Democratic priorities he might sacrifice to score a deal. After five years of what’s often seen as Obama’s desperation to negotiate — to the fury of his liberal base and the frustration of party leaders who argue that he negotiates against himself. Even his signature health care law came with significant compromises in Congress. Instead, over and over and over again, Obama delivered the simple line: Republicans want to repeal a law that was passed and upheld by the Supreme Court — to give people health insurance — or they’ll do something that everyone outside the GOP caucus meetings, including Wall Street bankers, seems to agree would be a ridiculous risk. “If we lock these Americans out of affordable health care for one more year,” Obama said Monday afternoon as he listed examples of people who would enjoy better treatment under Obamacare, “if we sacrifice the health care of millions of Americans — then they’ll fund the government for a couple more months. Does anybody truly believe that we won’t have this fight again in a couple more months? Even at Christmas?” The president and his advisers weren’t expecting this level of Republican melee, a White House official said. Only during Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 21-hour floor speech last week did the realization roll through the West Wing that they wouldn’t be negotiating because they couldn’t figure out anymore whom to negotiate with. And even then, they didn’t believe the shutdown was really going to happen until Saturday night, when the House voted again to strip Obamacare funding. This wasn’t a credible position, Obama said again Monday afternoon, but rather, bowing to “extraneous and controversial demands” which are “all to save face after making some impossible promises to the extreme right wing of their political party.” Obama and aides have said repeatedly that they’re not thinking about the shutdown in terms of political gain, but the situation’s is taking shape for them. Congress’s approval on dealing with the shutdown was at 10 percent even before the shutters started coming down on Monday according to a new CNN/ORC poll, with 69 percent of people saying the House Republicans are acting like “spoiled children.” “The Republicans are making themselves so radioactive that the president and Democrats can win this debate in the court of public opinion” by waiting them out, said Jim Manley, a Democratic strategist and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who has previously been critical of Obama’s tactics. Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said the Obama White House learned from the 2011 debt ceiling standoff, when it demoralized fellow Democrats, deflated Obama’s approval ratings and got nothing substantive from the negotiations. “They didn’t gain anything from that approach,” Greenberg said. “I think that there’s a lot they learned from what happened the last time they ran up against the debt ceiling.” While the Republicans have been at war with each other, the White House has proceeded calmly — a breakthrough phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Friday that showed him getting things done (with the conveniently implied juxtaposition that Tehran is easier to negotiate with than the GOP conference), his regular golf game Saturday and a cordial meeting Monday with his old sparring partner Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. White House press secretary Jay Carney said Monday that the shutdown wasn’t really affecting much of anything. “It’s busy, but it’s always busy here,” Carney said. “It’s busy for most of you covering this White House, any White House. We’re very much focused on making sure that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act continues.” Obama called all four congressional leaders Monday evening — including Boehner, whose staff spent Friday needling reporters to point out that the president hadn’t called for a week. According to both the White House and Boehner’s office, the call was an exchange of well-worn talking points, and changed nothing. Manley advised Obama to make sure people continue to see Boehner and the House Republicans as the problem and not rush into any more negotiations until public outrage forces them to bend. “He may want to do a little outreach, but not until the House drives the country over the cliff,” Manley said Monday, before the shutdown. “Once the House has driven the country over the cliff and failed to fund the government, then it might be time to make a move.” The White House believes Obama will take less than half the blame for a shutdown – with the rest heaped on congressional Republicans. The divide is clear in a Gallup poll also out Monday: over 70 percent of self-identifying Republicans and Democrats each say their guys are the ones acting responsibly, while just 9 percent for both say the other side is. If Obama is able to turn public opinion against Republicans, the GOP won’t be able to turn the blame back on Obama, Greenberg said. “Things only get worse once things begin to move in a particular direction,” he said. “They don’t suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.”

#### Plan kills Obama’s agenda

KRINER 10—Assistant professor of political science at Boston University [Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, pg. 276-77]

One of the mechanisms by which congressional opposition influences presidential cost-benefit calculations is by sending signals of American disunity to the target state. Measuring the effects of such congressional signals on the calculations of the target state is always difficult. In the case of Iraq it is exceedingly so, given the lack of data on the non-state insurgent actors who were the true “target” of the American occupation after the fall of the Hussein regime. Similarly, in the absence of archival documents, such as those from the Reagan Presidential Library presented in chapter 5, it is all but impossible to measure the effects of congressional signals on the administration’s perceptions of the military costs it would have to pay to achieve its objectives militarily.

By contrast. measuring the domestic political costs of congressional opposition, while still difficult, is at least a tractable endeavor. Chapter 2 posited two primary pathways through which congressional opposition could raise the political costs of staying the course militarily for the president. First, high-profile congressional challenges to a use of force can affect real or anticipated public opinion and bring popular pressures to bear on the president to change course. Second, congressional opposition to the president’s conduct of military affairs can compel him to spend considerable political capital in the military arena to the detriment of other major items on his programmatic agenda. On both of these dimensions, congressional opposition to the war in Iraq appears to have had the predicted effect.

#### Losing military authority will embolden the GOP to fight on the debt ceiling

SEEKING ALPHA 9 – 10 – 13 [“Syria Could Upend Debt Ceiling Fight” http://seekingalpha.com/article/1684082-syria-could-upend-debt-ceiling-fight]

Unless President Obama can totally change a reluctant public's perception of another Middle-Eastern conflict, it seems unlikely that he can get 218 votes in the House, though he can probably still squeak out 60 votes in the Senate. This defeat would be totally unprecedented as a President has never lost a military authorization vote in American history. To forbid the Commander-in-Chief of his primary power renders him all but impotent. At this point, a rebuff from the House is a 67%-75% probability.

I reach this probability by looking within the whip count. I assume the 164 declared "no" votes will stay in the "no" column. To get to 218, Obama needs to win over 193 of the 244 undecided, a gargantuan task. Within the "no" column, there are 137 Republicans. Under a best case scenario, Boehner could corral 50 "yes" votes, which would require Obama to pick up 168 of the 200 Democrats, 84%. Many of these Democrats rode to power because of their opposition to Iraq, which makes it difficult for them to support military conflict. The only way to generate near unanimity among the undecided Democrats is if they choose to support the President (recognizing the political ramifications of a defeat) despite personal misgivings. The idea that all undecided Democrats can be convinced of this argument is relatively slim, especially as there are few votes to lose. In the best case scenario, the House could reach 223-225 votes, barely enough to get it through. Under the worst case, there are only 150 votes. Given the lopsided nature of the breakdown, the chance of House passage is about one in four.

While a failure in the House would put action against Syria in limbo, I have felt that the market has overstated the impact of a strike there, which would be limited in nature. Rather, investors should focus on the profound ripple through the power structure in Washington, which would greatly impact impending battles over spending and the debt ceiling. Currently, the government loses spending authority on September 30 while it hits the debt ceiling by the middle of October. Markets have generally felt that Washington will once again strike a last-minute deal and avert total catastrophe. Failure in the Syrian vote could change this. For the Republicans to beat Obama on a President's strength (foreign military action), they will likely be emboldened that they can beat him on domestic spending issues. Until now, consensus has been that the two sides would compromise to fund the government at sequester levels while passing a $1 trillion stand-alone debt ceiling increase. However, the right wing of Boehner's caucus has been pushing for more, including another $1 trillion in spending cuts, defunding of Obamacare, and a one year delay of the individual mandate. Already, Conservative PACs have begun airing advertisements, urging a debt ceiling fight over Obamacare. With the President rendered hapless on Syria, they will become even more vocal about their hardline resolution, setting us up for a showdown that will rival 2011's debt ceiling fight.

I currently believe the two sides will pass a short-term continuing resolution to keep the government open, and then the GOP will wage a massive fight over the debt ceiling. While Obama will be weakened, he will be unwilling to undermine his major achievement, his healthcare law. In all likelihood, both sides will dig in their respective trenches, unwilling to strike a deal, essentially in a game of chicken. If the House blocks Syrian action, it will take America as close to a default as it did in 2011. Based on the market action then, we can expect massive volatility in the final days of the showdown with the Dow falling 500 points in one session in 2011. As markets panicked over the potential for a U.S. default, we saw a massive risk-off trade, moving from equities into Treasuries. I think there is a significant chance we see something similar this late September into October. The Syrian vote has major implications on the power of Obama and the far-right when it comes to their willingness to fight over the debt ceiling. If the Syrian resolution fails, the debt ceiling fight will be even worse, which will send equities lower by upwards of 10%.

Investors must be prepared for this "black swan" event. Looking back to August 2011, stocks that performed the best were dividend paying, less-cyclical companies like Verizon (VZ), Wal-Mart (WMT), Coca-Cola (KO) and McDonald's (MCD) while high beta names like Netflix (NFLX) and Boeing (BA) were crushed. Investors also flocked into treasuries despite default risk while dumping lower quality bonds as spreads widened. The flight to safety helped treasuries despite U.S. government issues. I think we are likely to see a similar move this time. Assuming there is a Syrian "no" vote, I would begin to roll back my long exposure in the stock market and reallocate funds into treasuries as I believe yields could drop back towards 2.50%. Within the stock market, I think the less-cyclical names should outperform, making utilities and consumer staples more attractive. For more tactical traders, I would consider buying puts against the S&P 500 and look toward shorting higher-beta and defense stocks like Boeing and Lockheed Martin (LMT). I also think lower quality bonds would suffer as spreads widen, making funds like JNK vulnerable. Conversely, gold (GLD) should benefit from the fear trade. I would also like to address the potential that Congress does not vote down the Syrian resolution. First, news has broken that Russia has proposed Syria turn over its chemical stockpile. If Syria were to agree (Syria said it was willing to consider), the U.S. would not have to strike, canceling the congressional vote. The proposal can be found here. I strongly believe this is a delaying tactic rather than a serious effort. In 2005, Libya began to turn over chemical weapons; it has yet to complete the hand-off. Removing and destroying chemical weapons is an exceptionally challenging and dangerous task that would take years, not weeks, making this deal seem unrealistic, especially because a cease-fire would be required around all chemical facilities. The idea that a cease-fire could be maintained for months, essentially allowing Assad to stay in office, is hard to take seriously. I believe this is a delaying tactic, and Congress will have to vote within the next two weeks. The final possibility is that Democrats back their President and barely ram the Syria resolution through. I think the extreme risk of a full-blown debt stand-off to dissipate. However, Boehner has promised a strong fight over the debt limit that the market has largely ignored. I do believe the fight would still be worse than the market anticipates but not outright disastrous. As such, I would not initiate short positions, but I would trim some longs and move into less cyclical stocks as the risk would still be the debt ceiling fight leading to some drama not no drama. Remember, in politics everything is connected. Syria is not a stand-alone issue. Its resolution will impact the power structure in Washington. A failed vote in Congress is likely to make the debt ceiling fight even worse, spooking markets, and threatening default on U.S. obligations unless another last minute deal can be struck.

#### Destroys the global economy

DAVIDSON 9 – 15 – 13 co-founder and co-host of Planet Money, a co-production of the NYT and NPR [Adam Davidson, Our Debt to Society, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=1&]

The Daily Treasury Statement, a public accounting of what the U.S. government spends and receives each day, shows how money really works in Washington. On Aug. 27, the government took in $29 million in repaid agricultural loans; $75 million in customs and duties; $38 million in the repayment of TARP loans; some $310 million in taxes; and so forth. That same day, the government also had bills to pay: $247 million in veterans-affairs programs; $2.5 billion to Medicare and Medicaid; $1.5 billion each to the departments of Education and Defense. By the close of that Tuesday, when all the spending and the taxing had been completed, the government paid out nearly $6 billion more than it took in.

This is the definition of a deficit, and it illustrates why the government needs to borrow money almost every day to pay its bills. Of course, all that daily borrowing adds up, and we are rapidly approaching what is called the X-Date — the day, somewhere in the next six weeks, when the government, by law, cannot borrow another penny. Congress has imposed a strict limit on how much debt the federal government can accumulate, but for nearly 90 years, it has raised the ceiling well before it was reached. But since a large number of Tea Party-aligned Republicans entered the House of Representatives, in 2011, raising that debt ceiling has become a matter of fierce debate. This summer, House Republicans have promised, in Speaker John Boehner’s words, “a whale of a fight” before they raise the debt ceiling — if they even raise it at all.

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.

While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.

The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

#### Global nuke wars

Kemp 10—Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Geoffrey Kemp, 2010, *The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East*, p. 233-4]

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

### 1NC—Prolif

#### Prolif decreases the risk of war—robust statistical, empirical evidence proves.

Asal and Beardsley 7 (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” 44:2, Sage)

As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that **nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior**, as stated in H1. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors—Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992)—and five nuclear actors—Gulf War (1990)—only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors—by extension, many general actors as well—experienced war. Therefore, the results can only suggest that, keeping the number of crisis actors fixed, increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. **All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities**. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), **it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons** can serve as a **deter**rent of **aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents**.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving superpowers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of fullscale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. **Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved**. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by Fearon (2002), should be taken seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante assessment of the outcomes. To account for possible selection bias caused by the use of a truncated sample that does not include any non-crisis cases, one would need to use another dataset in which the crisis cases are a subset and then run Heckman type selection models (see Lemke & Reed, 2001). It would, however, be difficult to think of a different unit of analysis that might be employed, such that the set of crises is a subset of a larger category of interaction. While dyadyear datasets have often been employed to similar ends, the key independent variable here, which is specific to crises as the unit of analysis, does not lend itself to a dyadic setup. Moreover, selection bias concerns are likely not valid in disputing the claims of this analysis. If selection bias were present, it would tend to bias the effect of nuclear weapons downward, because the set of observed crises with nuclear actors likely has a disproportionate share of resolved actors that have chosen to take their chances against a nuclear opponent. Despite this potential mitigating bias, the results are statistically significant, which strengthens the case for the explanations provided in this study.

#### Deterrence failure is very unlikely. Proliferation saves more lives than it costs.

Preston 7 (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR—Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate—Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 31-32)

1.) The Cost of Deterrence Failure Is Too Great Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, **it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur** (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Unfortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circumstances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993, 162), for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence because it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989). Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy approaches concerning security matters — whether it be arms control or proliferation regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions —none could be argued with any more certainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. Indeed, one could easily make the argument that **these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars**. Certainly, the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through nonnuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants. Moreover, if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to avoid (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in **favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars**, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the "immense weaknesses" of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of peripheral interests). Moreover, the actual costs of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the combined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 million killed overall during World War II, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001, 28).3 Further, as Gray (1999, 158-59) observes, "it is improbable that policymakers anywhere need to be educated as to the extraordinary qualities and quantities of nuclear armaments." Indeed, the high costs and uncontestable, immense levels of destruction that would be caused by nuclear weapons have been shown historically to be facts that have not only been readily apparent and salient to a wide range of policy makers, but ones that **have clearly been demonstrated to moderate extreme policy or risk-taking behavior** (Blight 1992; Preston 2001) Could it go wrong? Of course. There is always that potential with human beings in the loop. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to be effective at moderating policy maker behavior and introducing an element of constraint into situations that otherwise would likely have resulted in war (Hagerty 1998).

#### New proliferators will build small arsenals which are uniquely stable.

Seng 98 (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci.—U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES,” p. 203-206)

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage chose arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may nor have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

#### Prolif decreases war and encourages rationality

Shen 11—Simon Shen, IR prof @ Hong Kong Inst of Ed. [2011, “Have Nuclear Weapons Made the DPRK a Rogue State?” J. of Comparative Asian Development, v. 10, iss. 2, t&f]

In our traditional mentality, the determination to denuclearize the DPRK quite explicitly assumes that nuclear weapons are evil; as Scott Sagan (2003, p. 49) puts it, “Nuclear weapons have been given a bad name.” This negative perception of nuclear weapons is built upon the basis of the huge devastation that would result in the world if a nuclear war, of whatever scale, broke out. Coupled with the peculiar nature of the DPRK's autocratic regime, a nuclear-armed DPRK is then perceived as too hostile and destructive to its neighbours. However, applying the analogy of “more may be better”, an alternative discourse with respect to nuclear proliferation maintained by Waltz could well pinpoint a far more optimistic scenario. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Waltz asserts that nuclear proliferation not only reduces the possibility of going to war, but also encourages new nuclear states, which used to rule in a radical manner domestically, to behave in an increasingly rational manner diplomatically. At the extreme, Waltz suggests that nuclear proliferation may maintain peace rather than threaten global security. Surprisingly, the application of his theory to the DPRK is rather limited; and is confined only to media reports (Swami, 2010). In his classic study Waltz (1995) proposes five fundamental assumptions to illustrate his argument. First, he argues that the international system is anarchical, i.e., no global authority protects security, provides public goods or controls domestic affairs above the state level. As a result, states have to ensure their own security by preventing attack from other states themselves. In other words, the anarchical system drives states to self-help. The absence of a world government then prompts individual states to gain access to weapons to compensate for a sense of insecurity. Acquisition of nuclear weapons and inducement of an arms race between states show the self-help system at work. Second, as “states coexist in a condition of anarchy”, they try hard to advance the sophistication of weapons and enhance military capability as much as possible to avoid aggression from adversaries (Waltz, 1995, p. 4). This self-strengthening process is what Waltz calls “security maximization”. What do states do with their weapons throughout this process? Waltz thinks that states mainly possess the weapons for a defensive purpose. When a state enhances its military capability (the relevant gain), its neighbouring states immediately face relevant loss to the military equilibrium. In consequence, the latter have to strengthen their military power in response to the relevant loss in order to maintain a balance of power. Waltz (1995, p. 5) explains the defensive intention of security maximization as follows: One way to counter an intended attack is to build fortifications and to muster forces that look forbiddingly strong. To build defenses so patently strong that no one will try to destroy or overcome them would make international life perfectly tranquil, I call this the defensive ideal. However, this statement does not imply that these states will not use weapons to attack others. In the event that a state perceives gains from aggression to outweigh the cost of war, battle might break out. Waltz argues that this scenario is unlikely to happen between nuclear powers. Since Waltz, different schools deriving from neo-realism have offered different assumptions on the likeliness of conflicts owing to different assessments of uncertainty and risk, such as offensive realism or defensive realism. Some might put the defensive rationale by indicating that states tend to keep the nuclear weapons as an “existential deterrent” so as to deter others from military actions (Naval Studies Board & US Research Council, 1997). Third, Waltz (1995, pp. 7, 9) maintains that nuclear weapons, unlike conventional weapons, give “an easy clarity” for states to predict the action of other states and thereby “makes war less likely”. This is because all states realize that nuclear weapons have the potential to cause unlimited and devastating suffering. At the extreme, the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) sends a very clear message to both sides should two nuclear powers go to war. In contrast, as the suffering from conventional weapons can be to some extent contained, states might deem the cost of such war affordable and recklessly wage war and suffer the results of miscalculation. Waltz (1995, p. 9) defines the fundamental essence of nuclear weapons thus: In a nuclear world, prediction is easy to make because it does not require close estimates of opposing forces. … In a conventional world, deterrent threats are ineffective because the damage threatened is distant, limited, and problematic. Fourth, Waltz (1995, p. 7) assumes state actors are rational and are able to predict scenarios as well as calculate their self-interests, so that states will not take the risk of going to war when they predict the battle could only “win much and might lose everything”. Waltz offers the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis to illustrate this point. As nuclear weapons can wreak unlimited damage to states, the strategy of MAD further makes states cautious. This deterrent effect in a nuclear world consequently avoids any miscalculation of gains and losses. Regardless of the regime type, historical context and the political spectrum, nuclear weapons and nuclear wars constantly imply a massive relevant loss to states, thus preventing them from going to war. Even if the historical context might determine a nuclear pair, such as the US and the Soviet Union, China and the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan, many realists argues that rational calculation is more fundamental than bitterness (Rajain, 2005). As Waltz (1995, p. 12) puts it: “Those who believe that bitterness causes wars assume a close association that is seldom found between bitterness among nations and their willingness to run high risks.” In short, states will not go to nuclear war as they are rational actors in international relations. Fifth, when calculation of the prospects makes nuclear states reluctant to go to war, Waltz suggests horizontal nuclear proliferation is encouraged in world politics while vertical proliferation is made redundant. “Vertical proliferation” of nuclear weapons, according to Waltz, was demonstrated during the Cold War, especially between the US and the Soviet Union, when the number of nuclear warheads and their technological quality rapidly increased. Waltz (1995, p. 7) argues that further vertical proliferation is unnecessary since only a few nuclear weapons and a “second strike” capability may be a sufficient deterrent to other would-be attackers. Rather, “horizontal proliferation”, which means the spread of nuclear weapons to different countries, is seen by Waltz as more crucial in preserving peace in the world. When more states possess nuclear weapons, calculations about using them become complicated (Waltz, 1995, p. 15). States will thus be reluctant to take the risk of starting a nuclear war because of the uncertainty of the response from other states and the certainty of unlimited nuclear destruction to both sides should a nuclear response be elicited. This helps exclude the option of using nuclear weapons for the mere purpose of interest maximization.

#### Prolif will be slow.

Tepperman 9 (Jonathon, former Deputy Managing Ed. Foreig Affairs and Assistant Managing Ed. Newsweek, Newsweek, “Why Obama should Learn to Love the Bomb,” 44:154, 9-7, L/N)

The risk of an arms race--with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one--is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; **that's spread at glacial pace**." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors--Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say--might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

#### No chain reactions. Prolif domino effects never materialize.

Alagappa 8 (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow—East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia,” Ed. Muthiah Alagappa, p. 521-522)

It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventive action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On the domino effect, India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapon programs have not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that country's security concerns about the United States and Tehran's regional aspirations. The North Korean test has evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S. Japan security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought reaffirmation of the American extended deterrence commitment, but has firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dramatic change in its political, economic, and security circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not spurred Taiwan or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability. The point is that each country's decision to embark on and sustain nuclear weapon programs is contingent on its particular security and other circumstances. **Though appealing, the domino theory is not predictive;** often it is employed to justify policy on the basis of alarmist predictions. The loss of South Vietnam, for example, did not lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia. In fact the so-called dominos became drivers of a vibrant Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that subregion (Lord 1993, 1996). **In the nuclear arena, the nuclear programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part of a security chain reaction, not mechanically falling dominos**. However, as observed earlier the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests have thus far not had the domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy makers. **Great caution should be exercised in accepting at face value the sensational predictions of individuals who have a vested interest in accentuating the dangers of nuclear proliferation**. Such analysts are now focused on the dangers of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the basis of an objective reading of the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.

#### Proliferation in Northeast Asia stabilizes the region

Lukin 12 [Artyom, Far Eastern Federal University, "Russia and the Balance of Power in Northeast Asia," Pacific Focus, Vol 27, Issue 2]

Nuclear weapons, being the most powerful means of destruction mankind has ever created, continue to be a major factor in international relations. Nuclear arms are considered by many to be the most cost-effective way to maximize a state’s security in a dangerous environment. They enable states to satisfy basic security requirements self-reliantly and without incurring the high economic costs of comparably effective conventional defenses. 24 Coupled with deterrence strategies, nuclear weapons increase the likelihood for peaceful coexistence. Kenneth Waltz is one of the most prominent advocates of the stabilizing inﬂuence of nuclear arms. He assumes that states are rational actors seeking to minimize their risks. Dealing with one another, nuclear powers are going to be extremely cautious, because the cost of a conﬂict may be too high. Even states with modest nuclear capabilities can successfully pursue deterrence vis-à-vis much stronger great powers. The history of nuclear states’ interactions unequivocally shows a sobering and moderating effect of nuclear arsenals. Waltz argues that “the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero.” 25 Nuclear weapons are not suitable for offensive purposes: “From ﬁfty years of experience, one may conclude that nuclear weapons effectively preserve a country’s vital interests, but are of little use in extending one country’s control over others.” 26 The pacifying function of nuclear weapons is highlighted by some leading Russian international relations experts. Sergei Karaganov, the chairman of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, asserts that nuclear disarmament is a “harmful myth.” He claims that nuclear weapons are “a good asset designed to save humanity from itself.” 27 Nuclear deterrence is often credited with preventing a major armed clash during the Cold War. An intriguing question is whether the Cold-War-type strategic stability at the global level, which is still in existence between “the ﬁrst nuclear age” powers (the U. S., Russia, Britain, France, and China), can be reproduced at the regional level between new nuclear powers. In this respect, it is useful to analyze the experience of South Asia, where both of the most important players, India and Pakistan, have acquired nuclear status. South Asia remains so far the only case of mutual and pronounced nuclear deterrence at the regional level. Since the late 1980s, India and Pakistan have possessed weaponized nuclear devices. Thus, the two countries have been coexisting under the conditions of mutual nuclear deterrence for more than 2 decades. On the whole, nuclear weapons perform a stabilizing role in the bilateral relationship. It is telling that after going nuclear, the two archrivals have not fought major wars, whereas in their pre-nuclear period they had three large-scale armed conﬂicts (in 1947–1948, 1965 and 1971). Of course, their relations remain tense, with crises ﬂaring up from time to time. Nevertheless, each time the two sides have managed to avoid escalation, which, to a large extent, can be attributed to the effect of nuclear deterrence. This point is highlighted by Muthiah Alagappa: “Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has blunted the potency of India’s large conventional military force. Although it has not canceled out all the consequences of the large power differential between the two countries, it has had signiﬁcant constraining impact on India’s military options and assuaged Pakistan’s concern about the Indian threat.” 28 Unlike the South Asian regional system, which is characterized by full nuclearization, NEA is a partially nuclearized region. 29 Out of seven Northeast Asian players, there are four nuclear powers (the USA, Russia, China, and North Korea), while the other three have non-nuclear status (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). It is signiﬁcant that all of the non-nuclear actors have sufﬁcient ﬁnancial, technological and industrial resources to develop nuclear weapons in a relatively short time. In the foreseeable future, the reduction in the number of nuclear powers in NEA is very unlikely. The DPRK can hardly be expected to renounce its hard-won nuclear capability unless fundamental transformations (such as regime change) happen within the country. In fact, it seems that the world has already tacitly accepted nuclear-armed North Korea. The more interesting question, then, is whether nuclear proliferation in NEA will continue beyond North Korea. Japan is the only country in the world that is able to turn itself into a nuclear power almost overnight. Of course, Japan is committed to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, but they are not legally and constitutionally binding. Japanese politicians have repeatedly made very ambiguous statements on the possibility of going nuclear. Tokyo seems to subtly signal to its neighbors that, with respect to nuclear weapons, it will keep its options open. 30 The nuclear option may become increasingly attractive to Japan, as the country faces worsening demographic decline, which considerably weakens its conventional military capabilities. As for South Korea and Taiwan, their nuclearization looks less likely, but cannot be ruled out altogether. In short, further nuclear proliferation in NEA is not impossible. Are there any reasons to believe that NEA will enjoy the beneﬁts of strategic stability as a result of mutual nuclear deterrence? The concept of deterrence is based on three assumptions. First, actors must be rational, acting on the basis of cost-beneﬁt calculations. Second, nuclear deterrence best operates among nationstates that are by their very nature territorial entities and thus represent easily identiﬁable targets for retaliation strikes. Third, deterrence assumes intense rivalry among the parties, with states in deterrent relationships considering war as the constant possibility. 31 NEA’s regional system perfectly matches these three assumptions. First, all actors in the region are rational players, who are not willing to risk their own survival and are guided by the cost-beneﬁt calculations. Even the DPRK, despite the bizarre appearance of its ruling regime, is no doubt a rational strategic actor, at least in a sense that it is not suicidal and wants to survive. To secure survival, Pyongyang has to act in a shrewd and calculating way. 32 Second, the only meaningful actors in NEA are states. Non-state actors, such as NGOs or terrorist networks, do not have any signiﬁcant role in the region. Most Northeast Asian states have their human and economic potential heavily concentrated in a few urban areas, making them an easy target for nuclear strikes. Third, relations between major states in the region are burdened by rivalry and distrust, while some Northeast Asian powers see one another as potential adversaries. The view that nuclear deterrence can contribute to strategic stability in NEA is shared by some prominent scholars. According to Avery Goldstein, the mutual possession of nuclear weapons provides “the strongest reasons to expect that the dangers associated with China’s arrival as a fully ﬂedged great power will be limited.” 33 Alagappa argues that, on net, nuclear weapons in South Asia and NEA have had a pacifying effect. First, they have not fundamentally disrupted the regional distribution of power or intensiﬁed security dilemmas. In fact, by assuaging the security concerns of weak and vulnerable states they promote stability in conﬂict prone dyads. Second, fear of the devastating consequences of a nuclear exchange prevents the outbreak and escalation of regional hostilities to full-scale war, strengthens the political and military status quo, and impels conﬂicting parties to freeze the conﬂict or explore a negotiated settlement. Third, the combination of minimum deterrence strategies and general deterrence postures enhances stability among major powers and avoids strategic arms races like that during the Cold War. Finally, nuclear weapons reinforce the trend in Asia to circumscribe and transform the role of force in international politics. 34 According to Victor Cha, “Asian nuclear and missile proliferation is certainly dangerous, but not nearly so disastrous as has been popularly predicted.” 35 He argues that there is no reason to expect that the likelihood of a nuclear exchange is “any greater today than in the ﬁrst nuclear age.” 36 Another reason for “sober optimism” is that the new nuclear powers in Asia recognize “the nuclear taboo,” which has become ﬁrmly institutionalized in international agreements and practices, severely circumscribing the realm of legitimate nuclear use. 37 Although, since 1964, the number of Asian nuclear powers has risen from one (China) to four (with India, Pakistan, and North Korea joining the club), this has not led to more major conﬂicts, let alone catastrophe. Concerns that states, having acquired atomic bombs, could become more assertive and warlike have turned out to be largely unjustiﬁed. For instance, there is little evidence to suggest that the acquisition of nuclear arsenal per se has encouraged Pyongyang to take a more belligerent stance. Nuclear weapons, as noted earlier, are much more suitable for self-defense and maintaining the strategic status quo than for aggression and expansion. This partly explains why at least two of the DPRK’s neighbors, China and Russia, seem to keep relatively calm regarding its nuclear capability.

#### Nuclear weapons promote stability in Asia. All evidence shows they reduce the likelihood of conflict and escalation.

Alagappa 8 [Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow—East-West Center, “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa, p. 26]

In exploring the implications of national nuclear strategies and more broadly nuclear weapons for national and regional security, this study advances three propositions. First it posits that nuclear weapons strengthen weaker powers and have a modifying effect on structure and its consequences. However, they do not fundamentally alter the distribution of power to make a difference in system structure or the pattern of security interaction. Nuclear weapons have not substantially altered the security dynamics in Asia. Certain nuclear strategies such as compellence, counterforce, and limited war could and have intensified existing threat perceptions and lines of enmity. However, they have not created new ones. Other strategies such as existential, minimum, and extended deterrence, and a posture of general deterrence have not exacerbated security situations. In fact, they have had an ameliorating effect. By contributing to greater self-reliance in deterrence, nuclear weapons reduce the salience of external balancing as a rationale for alliance among nuclear weapon states. However, alliances and alignments among them still make sense for other reasons. For nonnuclear weapon states that perceive a nuclear threat, alliance with a nuclear weapon state that can extend the deterrence function of its nuclear arsenal provides an incentive for alliance formation and sustenance. On conflict resolution, nuclear weapons do not advance or obstruct settlement of disputes. When they are relevant, nuclear weapons contribute to a situation of no war and no peace. The logic of the enormous destruction power of nuclear weapons argues against conflict resolution through the physical use of violence. However, nuclear weapons are not a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution. The grave risks associated with escalation to nuclear war in certain cases have induced parties to explore a diplomatic settlement. Dispute settlement, however, hinges on the willingness or unwillingness of conflicting parties to negotiate and compromise on political differences that underlie the dispute. Second, the study posits that nuclear weapons have contributed to the security of states and reinforced stability in the Asian security region that is underpinned by several pillars. Although there could be some destabilizing consequences, thus far nuclear weapons have not undermined stability in Asia. In fact, they have contributed to stability by assuaging national security concerns, preventing the outbreak of major wars, strengthening the status quo, increasing deterrence dominance, and reinforcing the trend in the region toward a reduction in the salience of force in international politics. For a number of reasons (acceptance of the political and territorial status quo; increase in the political, diplomatic, and economic cost of using force in a situation of complex interdependence; and the impracticability of resolving conflicts through the use of force) the offensive roles of force have been on the decline in Asia. Nuclear weapons reinforce this trend by enhancing deterrence dominance and making the cost of war among nuclear weapon states catastrophic and prohibitive, especially in a situation of complex interdependence.

#### The opposite of what they say is true of Asia. Nukes preserve stability.

Alagappa 8 [Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow—East-West Center, “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa, p. 512]

International political interaction among Asian states is for the most part rule governed, predictable, and stable. The security order that has developed in Asia is largely of the instrumental type, with certain normative contractual features (Alagappa 2003b). It rests on several pillars. These include the consolidation of Asian countries as modern nation-states with rule-governed interactions, widespread acceptance of the territorial and political status quo (with the exception of certain boundary disputes and a few survival concerns that still linger), a regional normative structure that ensures survival of even weak states and supports international coordination and cooperation, the high priority in Asian countries given to economic growth and development, the pursuit of that goal through participation in regional and global capitalist economies, the declining salience of force in Asian international politics, the largely status quo orientation of Asia's major powers, and the key role of the United States and of regional institutions in preserving and enhancing security and stability in Asia. I extend that argument in this study to include the effects of nuclear weapons and the strategies for their employment. I argue that although there could be destabilizing consequences, on net, nuclear weapons reinforce deterrence dominance and enhance national security and regional stability in the Asian security region. My claim is supported on the following grounds. First, nuclear weapons assuage the security concerns of vulnerable states. Second, nuclear weapons prevent the escalation of regional conflicts to full-scale war. Third, general deterrence postures assure major powers and help stabilize relations among them. Fourth, nuclear weapons strengthen the political and military status quo by making violent change highly dangerous and unlikely. Finally, nuclear weapons further circumscribe and transform the role of force in Asian international politics. Taken together, these political and military effects of nuclear weapons, along with the absence of intense strategic rivalry and competition among the major powers, reinforce the security and stability that have come to characterize the Asian security region over the last three decades. My argument shares certain features of those advanced by Waltz (1995), Hagerty (1998), and Goldstein (2000), but it is also distinct and grounded in two decades of post-Cold War regionwide experience and linked to other political, strategic, and economic factors that also underpin security and stability in the region. It is important to view the roles and effects of nuclear weapons in this larger context.

#### Solving nuclear prolif causes a shift to bio-weapons

Cordesman 2k [Anthony, Senior Fellow for Strategic Assessment—CSIS, Federal News Service, 3-28, L/N]

New, critical technologies are escaping our control One of the problems I have noticed in US government efforts to analyze proliferation is that they focus on past and current threats. As result, our studies tend to give primary weight to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Advances in genetic engineering, biotechnology, medicine, pharmaceuticals, and food processing, however, are making it progressively easier to manufacture biological weapons **with nuclear lethalities**, to do so under breakout conditions, and do so with little or no warning of the precise nature of the threat. The engines and guidance systems needed for cruise missiles are becoming industrial devices like GPS, sensor-triggered fuses, cluster munitions, drones, crop sprayers, cellular phones interaction with the steady growth in global commerce, shipping, and labor migration to make covert and proxy attacks steadily more effective. Ironically, controlling ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons alone tends to simply push proliferation into other weapons systems and modes of delivery.

#### Bioweapons cause extinction—nuclear weapons don’t.

Singer 1— Clifford Singer, Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign [Spring 2001, “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?” The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13.1, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P\_XIII/Singer.htm]

In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a **dominant** civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a socalled nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in **even a full scale nuclear exchange** at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years.

There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more serious threat to human survival. The first and most immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is [[1]](#footnote-1)achieved.

### 1NC China Advantage

#### Their Blumenthal and Mazza card only says the U.S. is one factor among many --- the line right after theirs cites other countries and conventional weakness.

**Blumenthal and Mazza 11** (Dan Blumenthal, M.A., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael Mazza, M.A., international relations (strategic studies and international economics), Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, program manager for AEI's annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy, “China's Strategic Forces in the 21st Century: The PLA's Changing Nuclear Doctrine and Force Posture,” 4/6/11) <http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Chinas_Strategic_Forces.pdf>

When it comes to its development and deployment of nuclear weapons-China first tested a weapon in 1964-China maintains a narrative in which it holds the moral high ground. According to the Chinese Communist Party line, China detests nuclear weapons, which are inhumane. But because the U.S. and the Soviet Union were both building large nuclear arsenals during the Cold War and because (China thought) they used those weapons to coerce non-nuclear states, China had no choice but to pursue those weapons itself. China, the narrative goes, would prefer to see nuclear weapons abolished rather than maintain its own arsenal, but reality requires that China arm itself. Whatever legitimacy this narrative may have once had, it has become less credible. Given China's complicity in the Pakistani and Iranian nuclear programs-for example, China delivered fissile material to A.Q. Kahn-it appears that China sees a use for these weapons other than simple self-defense. Though China appears to have halted its proliferation activities, those activities suggest a more casual attitude towards nuclear weapons than one of abhorrence. Indeed, actions speak louder than words. That Beijing proliferated nuclear technology, materials, and know-how-and to relatively unstable regimes that may be less cautious about using nuclear weapons-is worrying. Considered in this context, China's movement towards an increased reliance on nuclear weapons and shifts in its nuclear doctrine are both unsurprising and of potentially great concern. While China has been growing its nuclear arsenal and fielding new ballistic missiles and ballistic missile submarines, Chinese strategists have been engaged in doctrinal debates over how those weapons should be used. As a younger generation of military thinkers has come to the fore, the long-held tenets of China's nuclear doctrine as originally set forth under Mao-namely, the "no first use" policy and minimum deterrence-are increasingly coming under scrutiny. Indeed, some strategists argue that the People's Republic should cast these policies aside and adopt a new nuclear doctrine that will grant strategic forces a more prominent role in the country's defense. External and internal factors are driving changes in China's nuclear policy and force structure and will continue to do so in the future. Concerns over what the Chinese see as a U.S. threat lead some to call for a greater reliance on nuclear weapons for deterring Washington. Should South Korea or Japan ever "go nuclear"-and there are growing worries that they might-that would similarly impact China's nuclear force posture and doctrine. Internally, economic and demographic challenges will make it more difficult for China to maintain a large standing army in the coming decades and may very well lead Beijing to increasingly rely on nuclear forces for its national defense.

#### Regional concerns drive modernization

Finkelstein, 07 (David, DIRECTOR, “PROJECT ASIA” & THE CHINESE STUDIES CENTER, CNA CORPORATION. Debate at the Carnegie Endowment – “IS CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION PROGRAM A GROWING THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA?” 2-6-07. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/debate_3%20final%20transcript.pdf>)

So the next question is, what is it that’s driving this reform and modernization program? Now, the answer, in my mind, is crystal clear: It is an unsurprising response to two types of assessments that most military professionals use, one a capabilities-based assessment, and the other, a contingency-based assessment. The former speaks to the generic capabilities that a military must possess as a result of the very-changing nature of warfare itself, regardless of who the problem, the threat or the situation happens to be. The latter, a contingency-based assessment, accounts for perceived threats: conflict where, against whom, to secure which national interests? So what do I think is the capabilities-based assessment going on in the PLA? Well, to make a long story very short, the first U.S. Gulf War in 1991 shocked the PLA into confronting the stark reality that it was absolutely incapable of fighting state-of-theart late-twentieth-century warfare. Therefore, since 1993, the PLA has been retooling itself to be able to engage in what they now refer to as local wars under modern informationalized conditions, which comes with 20 pages of descriptors, but I’ll just give you three: It’s fought for limited political objectives and is limited in geographic scope. It’s short in duration but decisive in political and strategic outcome. It’s characterized by joint service operations in all the battle space dimensions to include the electromagnetic spectrum in space, as Larry said. And I’ll throw in a fourth: It is critically dependent upon information and near-total battle space awareness, and employs high level of precision-guided munitions. So what I would argue to you is that even if there were no Taiwan contingency for the PLA to have to worry about, and it does, I would argue that the PLA would still be on the same vector it is on today simply due to the basic requirements that this capabilities based assessment demands. So what about contingencies? First and foremost, Taiwan, and of course, the assumption on the part of the Chinese of U.S. military intervention; second, Japan, for obvious reasons; third, India, whose navy, the Chinese believe, has aspirations astride the sea lanes of communication through which China’s oil comes to its eastern coast; next, the South China Sea, where China is one of several claimants to contested islands, atolls, and maritime resources; and finally, the most obvious requirement of all: to defend the economic center of gravity of China, which is now on the eastern seaboard, no longer sequestered deep in the Chinese interior as it was during the Cold War, protected against a feared Soviet land invasion. So the next question: For the near and mid-term, what appears to be the objective of Chinese military modernization? The short answer is, to create a military that is capable enough to fight and defeat other regional militaries on its periphery, if need be, and a military that is credible enough, operationally, to deter intervention by outside military forces. In other words, in the near and mid-term, the goal is to field a premier military force in the Asia-Pacific region off the Chinese littoral.

#### Strategic reassurance fails – China will pocket the concession.

Parameswaran, 09 (Prashanth, research fellow for Asia Chronicle, a daily online journal, and blogs about international affairs at GlobalEye. “Obama's China Policy: Neither Strategic Nor Reassuring” 11-25-09. Obama's China Policy: Neither Strategic Nor Reassuring)

President Barack Obama failed to wring any concessions from China in his maiden voyage to Beijing last week. But the disappointing visit is only a symptom of the Obama administration's dysfunctional and poorly conceived China policy, which, though well-intentioned, threatens to undermine U.S. objectives and wreck its global image. Dubbed "strategic reassurance," the policy envisions a tacit bargain whereby the United States mollifies Chinese fears of containment, while Beijing assuages U.S. concerns about its global intentions and shoulders more international responsibilities. But so far, the policy has confounded more than clarified. Some China watchers wonder where Obama will strike the balance between soothing Chinese-defined headaches, like arms sales to Taiwan, and addressing American concerns, such as China's lack of transparency about its blistering military modernization and global ambitions. Indeed, administration officials themselves seem divided as to where the focus lies. But more troubling is the very concept of "strategic reassurance" itself. At first glance, it appears quite innocuous, even pragmatic. It makes sense to encourage a rising China to be a status quo -- rather than a revisionist -- power, and Washington needs Beijing's help to tackle a host of big-ticket issues, from curbing greenhouse gas emissions to checking North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions. But in bending over backwards to reassure China, the Obama administration risks undermining America's own objectives, losing leverage with Beijing, and eroding its standing in the world. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton belittled the importance of U.S. pressure on China over human rights earlier this year, she displayed a profound disregard for the power of rhetoric in reinforcing America's principled support for those fighting for freedom in China and beyond. Similarly, Obama's snubbing of the Dalai Lama during his trip to Washington last month was widely perceived as a bow to Chinese pressure. This disturbing pattern of acquiescence continued during Obama's China visit. His polite murmurs on universal rights were drowned out by encomiums about the glory of Chinese civilization, euphemisms regarding "differences" on human rights, and excuses about displaying "respect for different cultures." Kelley Currie, former special assistant to the under secretary for democracy and global affairs, says this conciliatory tone was unfortunate in light of Beijing's assaults on human rights in the days before Mr. Obama's visit, which included the detention of prominent activists. To some observers, the Taiwan portion of the U.S.-China joint statement also seemed to concede too much to Beijing by suggesting that "respect for . . . sovereignty and territorial integrity" represents the "core" of the various documents leading to Sino-American rapprochement. In fact, Washington has always sought to balance its recognition that Taiwan is part of China with guaranteeing Taiwanese security under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Such concessions by Washington will only reduce U.S. leverage, while simultaneously feeding Beijing's sense of its growing power and decreasing its incentive to reform. Furthermore, no amount of reassurance will profoundly change China's core national interests or quell its reluctance to be a "responsible stakeholder" on the world stage. According to Brad Glosserman, director of Pacific Forum CSIS, because China tends to attribute problems like North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan-Pakistan to these countries' desire to reshape their bilateral relationships with the United States, it feels that Washington should bear the burden of resolving them. Glosserman also cites a CSIS survey of Chinese elites that revealed that few felt any sense of global responsibility for China, with a whopping 90 percent rejecting an international leadership role. Recent Chinese conduct confirms this. Beijing has been unwilling to compromise on the renminbi, to utter the word "sanctions" in relation to Iran, to unveil hard targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions, or to fully implement a United Nations Security Council resolution on North Korea. Instead, it has chosen to vastly increase trade with Iran, while also signing a fresh economic package with Pyongyang. And even where its interests do align with the United States, such as stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region or the need for clean energy technologies, Beijing is loath to invest the necessary capital in pursuit of these public goods, preferring that Washington and other developed nations pick up the tab. Nor is Beijing's current behavior or future intentions in any way "reassuring" to Washington or its neighbors. In addition to producing a wide range of missiles, radars, sensors, and torpedoes, Beijing is also moving ahead with a ballistic missile that could deter U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups critical to the defense of Taiwan and the security of Washington's friends. U.S. allies are already sounding alarm bells and counseling a more robust American regional presence. This year's Australian defense white paper paints a grim picture of China contesting American primacy in Asia, while Singapore's patriarch Lee Kuan Yew privately chided Washington for "giving China a free run in Asia" during a recent trip. Finally, given the differences between Washington and Beijing's political systems, Obama's suggestion that Beijing and Washington "together can help to create international norms" is as naïve as it is alarming. Does the United States really want to craft global rules with a country that coddles dictators from Pyongyang to Harare, and tramples on freedom of expression and minority rights domestically? One would hope not. White House spokesman Robert Gibbs argued that the administration had not expected that "the waters would part and everything would change over the course of two and a half days in China." But a flawed strategy will disappoint, no matter how much time is devoted to it. Rhetoric and concessions will never change the fact that Beijing is a rising power bent on pursuing its own interests, and averse to assuming global responsibilities that might impede its ambitions. Instead of "strategic reassurance," Washington should aim for a realistic China policy, working with Beijing where it can, pressuring Beijing when it should, and balancing China's influence where it must. The sooner the Obama administration grasps this, the better, for its current approach is neither strategic, nor reassuring.

#### Blumenthal and Mazza say modernization includes nuclear subs --- those actually increase crisis stability.

Yoshihara, 07 (Toshi, Research Fellow and the resident expert on security issues in the Asia-Pacific region at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. “China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force” p. 340)

Some factors unique to an undersea strategic force (at least in theory) magnify the relative importance of SSBNs vis-à-vis missile defense. A ballistic-missile submarine distinguishes itself even from a road- or rail-mobile ICBM by its stealth and unlimited mobility and endurance, which generate virtually infinite possibilities in terms of launch locations. According to Jing-dong Yang, “Missile defense would make submarines more attractive as a means of increasing missile survivability and for launching from locations and depressed trajectories where missile defenses have limited coverage.” Such advantages would severely strain the ability of a missile defense system to gather cuing data, to track, and to engage a lunch. Indeed, for at least the next two decades, missile defense as currently conceived will have no answer to a capable SSBN patrolling the open ocean. The survivability of SSBNs would also reduce temptations for Beijing to adopt land-based postures and policies that undermine crisis stability and escalation control, including increasing dispersion and decentralized command and control.

#### China will not risk war—economics and diplomacy

Fravel 12—Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT. Taylor is a graduate of Middlebury College and Stanford University, where he received his PhD. He has been a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, a Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, a Fellow with the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program and a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences(M. Taylor, “All Quiet in the South China Sea,” March 22nd, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137346/m-taylor-fravel/all-quiet-in-the-south-china-sea)

Little noticed, however, has been China's recent adoption of a new -- and much more moderate -- approach. The primary goals of the friendlier policy are to restore China's tarnished image in East Asia and to reduce the rationale for a more active U.S. role there.

Beijing is also unlikely to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the United States.

The first sign of China's new approach came last June, when Hanoi dispatched a special envoy to Beijing for talks about the countries' various maritime disputes. The visit paved the way for an agreement in July 2011 between China and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to finally implement a declaration of a code of conduct they had originally drafted in 2002 after a series of incidents in the South China Sea. In that declaration, they agreed to "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes."

Since the summer, senior Chinese officials, especially top political leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, have repeatedly reaffirmed the late Deng Xiaoping's guidelines for dealing with China's maritime conflicts to focus on economic cooperation while delaying the final resolution of the underlying claims. In August 2011, for example, Hu echoed Deng's approach by stating that "the countries concerned may put aside the disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas."

Authoritative Chinese-language media, too, has begun to underscore the importance of cooperation. Since August, the international department of People's Daily (under the pen name Zhong Sheng) has published several columns stressing the need to be less confrontational in the South China Sea. In January 2012, for example, Zhong Sheng discussed the importance of "pragmatic cooperation" to achieve "concrete results." Since the People's Daily is the official paper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, such articles should be interpreted as the party's attempts to explain its new policy to domestic readers, especially those working lower down in party and state bureaucracies.

In terms of actually setting aside disputes, China has made progress. In addition to the July consensus with ASEAN, in October China reached an agreement with Vietnam on "basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues." The accord stressed following international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, China and Vietnam have begun to implement the agreement by establishing a working group to demarcate and develop the southern portion of the Gulf of Tonkin near the disputed Paracel Islands.

China has also initiated or participated in several working-level meetings to address regional concerns about Beijing's assertiveness. Just before the East Asian Summit last November, China announced that it would establish a three billion yuan ($476 million) fund for China-ASEAN maritime cooperation on scientific research, environmental protection, freedom of navigation, search and rescue, and combating transnational crimes at sea. The following month, China convened several workshops on oceanography and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and in January it hosted a meeting with senior ASEAN officials to discuss implementing the 2002 code of conduct declaration. The breadth of proposed cooperative activities indicates that China's new approach is probably more than just a mere stalling tactic.

Beyond China's new efforts to demonstrate that it is ready to pursue a more cooperative approach, the country has also halted many of the more assertive behaviors that had attracted attention between 2009 and 2011. For example, patrol ships from the Bureau of Fisheries Administration have rarely detained and held any Vietnamese fishermen since 2010. (Between 2005 and 2010, China detained 63 fishing boats and their crews, many of which were not released until a hefty fine was paid.) And Vietnamese and Philippine vessels have been able to conduct hydrocarbon exploration without interference from China. (Just last May, Chinese patrol ships cut the towed sonar cable of a Vietnamese ship to prevent it from completing a seismic survey.) More generally, China has not obstructed any recent exploration-related activities, such as Exxon's drilling in October of an exploratory well in waters claimed by both Vietnam and China. Given that China retains the capability to interfere with such activities, its failure to do so suggests a conscious choice to be a friendlier neighbor.

The question, of course, is why did the Chinese shift to a more moderate approach? More than anything, Beijing has come to realize that its assertiveness was harming its broader foreign policy interests. One principle of China's current grand strategy is to maintain good ties with great powers, its immediate neighbors, and the developing world. Through its actions in the South China Sea, China had undermined this principle and tarnished the cordial image in Southeast Asia that it had worked to cultivate in the preceding decade. It had created a shared interest among countries there in countering China -- and an incentive for them to seek support from Washington. In so doing, China's actions provided a strong rationale for greater U.S. involvement in the region and inserted the South China Sea disputes into the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

By last summer, China had simply recognized that it had overreached. Now, Beijing wants to project a more benign image in the region to prevent the formation of a group of Asian states allied against China, reduce Southeast Asian states' desire to further improve ties with the United States, and weaken the rationale for a greater U.S. role in these disputes and in the region.

So far, Beijing's new approach seems to be working, especially with Vietnam. China and Vietnam have deepened their political relationship through frequent high-level exchanges. Visits by the Vietnamese Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, to Beijing in October 2011 and by the Chinese heir apparent, Xi Jinping, to Hanoi in December 2011 were designed to soothe spirits and protect the broader bilateral relationship from the unresolved disputes over territory in the South China Sea. In October, the two also agreed to a five-year plan to increase their bilateral trade to $60 billion by 2015. And just last month, foreign ministers from both countries agreed to set up working groups on functional issues such as maritime search and rescue and establish a hotline between the two foreign ministries, in addition to starting talks over the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.

Even if it is smooth sailing now, there could be choppy waters ahead. Months of poor weather have held back fishermen and oil companies throughout the South China Sea. But when fishing and hydrocarbon exploration activities resume in the spring, incidents could increase. In addition, China's new approach has raised expectations that it must now meet -- for example, by negotiating a binding code of conduct to replace the 2002 declaration and continuing to refrain from unilateral actions.

Nevertheless, because the new approach reflects a strategic logic, it might endure, signaling a more significant Chinese foreign policy shift. As the 18th Party Congress draws near, Chinese leaders want a stable external environment, lest an international crisis upset the arrangements for this year's leadership turnover. And even after new party heads are selected, they will likely try to avoid international crises while consolidating their power and focusing on China's domestic challenges.

China's more moderate approach in the South China Sea provides further evidence that China will seek to avoid the type of confrontational policies that it had adopted toward the United States in 2010. When coupled with Xi's visit to Washington last month, it also suggests that the United States need not fear Beijing's reaction to its strategic pivot to Asia, which entails enhancing U.S. security relationships throughout the region. Instead, China is more likely to rely on conventional diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft than attempt a direct military response. Beijing is also unlikely to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the United States. Whether the new approach sticks in the long run, it at least demonstrates that China, when it wants to, can recalibrate its foreign policy. That is good news for stability in the region.

#### Their Cunningham and Medlaf evidence also concedes Chinese modernization and doctrine shift is inevitable from U.S. conventional capabilities and missile defense.

**Cunninham and Medcalf 11** (Fiona Cunningham, Research Associate at the International Security Program of the Lowy Institute, and Rory Medcalf, Director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute, “The Dangers of Denial: Nuclear Weapons in China-India Relation,” October 2011)

China’s reluctance to thus acknowledge India as a nuclear peer rankles the Indian strategic community, in ways not helpful to a stable strategic relationship. There is a genuine, if not always rational, desire in New Delhi to be noticed and taken seriously by Beijing and other great powers. This helps explain some of the bombastic statements and assertions that emerge from some quarters in India about its nuclear and military prowess and ambitions, for instance around missile tests. There have been assertions that China and India are engaged in a nuclear arms race.13 But at this stage the restrained nature of the nuclear weapons programs and postures in both countries does not support such an assessment, especially if one defines an arms race as involving efforts by two countries to match and surpass the other’s capabilities regardless of cost. Instead India, as the weaker nuclear power, appears to be working to refine the capabilities it deems necessary for stable deterrence. This does not mean the two powers can afford to be complacent about their current state of competitive coexistence and limited nuclear competition. Rather, now is the time to build patterns of dialogue, predictability and mutual understanding against the prospect of a future worsening of tensions. Capabilities and postures To understand the nuclear dynamics and risks between China and India, it is essential to have a picture of their nuclear and wider military capabilities and postures. Reliable information is sketchy, particularly due to the opacity of both nations about their nuclear forces as well as Chinese opacity about conventional forces. China Nuclear doctrine China has historically viewed nuclear weapons as tools of coercion, with their value stemming from possession rather than use. Leaders have seen nuclear weapons as useful for deterring a nuclear attack and countering coercion, but not for fighting or winning wars.14 This has impelled China towards a minimum deterrence posture,15 underpinned by a small arsenal kept off alert, and a no-first-use (NFU) declaratory policy that relies on the threat of a retaliatory strike on an adversary’s cities.16 Although China’s doctrine and capabilities are primarily aimed at deterring the United States, these also affect the security dynamic with India. China’s evolving nuclear strategy is influenced by concerns about US missile defences, conventional strike and superior targeting capabilities, which the Chinese fear could combine to destroy their nuclear forces in a non-nuclear first strike. In turn, the deployment of technologies to defeat US systems, such as multiple warheads, could worry India because of their potential uses during a hypothetical Chinese first strike.17 In addition, debate over force posture prompted by the prospect of a disabling US conventional strike has created some troubling ambiguity over what might constitute ‘first use’ as a trigger for Chinese retaliation, with some Chinese analysts arguing that conventional attacks on Chinese nuclear forces or even credible early warning of an attack should be treated as a nuclear attack.18 Another ambiguity in Chinese nuclear doctrine relates to whether China’s no-first-use pledge excludes India. In 2010 China stated that it has ‘adhered to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, and made the unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will it use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclearweapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.’ 19 Indian commentators have noted it is not clear if this promise applies to India, as a 1995 revision of Chinese declaratory policy made the NFU pledge applicable to members of the NPT or nuclear-weapon-free zones, effectively making it inapplicable to India.20 Further, China’s NFU does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons on ‘Chinese territory’, which presumably includes disputed territory.21 Doubts about China’s NFU pledge will grow as its nuclear forces improve and if dissatisfaction with the doctrine increases in the Chinese strategic community.

#### India-China NFU is resilient and rollback doesn’t cause war

Ahmed, 10 (Ali, Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. “Nuclear Implications of the ‘Two Front’ Formulation” 1-21-10. <http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/NuclearImplicationsoftheTwoFrontFormulation_aahmed_290110>)

In the second scenario of war expansion from two to three powers, in case of an initial India-China conflict, NFU, howsoever qualified, of both can be expected to hold since in the middle term future only limited border wars can be envisaged. Neither state would wish to let the dangerously escalatory nuclear card enter into the equation. In case of Pakistan joining in hyena-like, it would rely on its conventional capability since the nuclear card would be dependent on the senior partner’s intent. India, if pressured, may resort to nuclear signalling at best, since it cannot reasonably prefer the alternative of limited nuclear war that may result.

## \*\*\* 2NC

### 2NC Conventional War

#### The framing question of the debate is not whether there is a risk prolif breaks down—it’s whether or not a world of prolif is more peaceful—default neg on the record of nuclear peace.

Sechser 5 (Todd, Assistant Prof. Politics specializing in International Security—Stanford U., “How Organizational Pathologies Could Make Nuclear Proliferation Safer”, Presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, 4-7, \*I had to ILL this. I don’t think it’s available online)

A second counterargument to the optimist position is the claim that even if proliferation optimism enjoys greater theoretical tenability than previously thought, this does not make its position practically viable. Betts (1999: 65-66) writes that policy makers “do not marvel at all the cases where nuclear weapons will make the world safer, but worry about the exceptions where things will go wrong. . . one exception to the rule may be too many.”13 Likewise, Feaver (1993: 162) argues that even 99.5% prognostic accuracy would be insufficient for proliferation optimism to mount a persuasive case: “At best, rational deterrence theory can predict that nuclear deterrence should assure peace most of the time. Most is not all.” And Sagan (2003b: 184) contends that until military organizations are “perfect,” there is sufficient reason to be pessimistic about the effects of proliferation.14 As long as there is a chance that proliferation might entail some negative effects, the argument holds, then why not play it safe? **This staggering burden of proof is flawed for two reasons**. First, obscures the cost-benefit analysis inherent in any policy deliberation. The appropriate question is not whether the spread of nuclear weapons will result in any nuclear disasters, but whether a world with proliferation would on balance be more peaceful and more stable than a world without it. The issue is whether the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs. If one believes, for example, that nuclear proliferation would eventually result in a preventive war somewhere but that it would also deter numerous conventional wars, then the net overall benefit might justify a more relaxed nonproliferation policy. **Second, the argument obscures the fact that proliferation pessimism to date does not possess a “99.5%” record of accuracy—rather, its record stands at 100%.** Of course, the absence of nuclear catastrophe in the past does not assure its absence in the future. But theories ultimately aim to predict outcomes, and despite unearthing a trove of nuclear near-misses, the theory of proliferation pessimism has not succeeded in accomplishing this task. Existing research has successfully shown that the theory’s predicted causal mechanisms have operated in organizations that handle nu-clear weapons, but this is not the same as showing that these mechanisms generate the theory’s predicted outcomes. Even a major counterforce strike against a new nuclear power would not immediately vindicate pessimism—at least not until case study researchers were able to show that the causal mechanisms they specified (that is, preventive war pressures triggered by military biases) were indeed in operation.

#### Benefits outweigh the costs 40 to 1.

de Mesquita and Riker 82 [Bruce Bueno and William, Dept. Pol. Sci.—Rochester, Journal of Conflict Resolution, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation”, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 302-303]

One might object further. Conceding that the likelihood of miscalculation does diminish as proliferation occurs, one might still contend that the costs of such a miscalculation are so large that they cannot conceivably justify even the diminished risk of war. If the expected costs from nuclear wars arising out of miscalculation or irrational acts exceed the expected costs from wars that could be prevented by proliferation, then, indeed, proliferation is a very dangerous thing. There is, of course, no precise way to measure these expected costs, but we do have some basis for estimating them. Using expected utility calculations similar to the one suggested here, one of us (Bueno de Mesquita 1981b) found that 65 of approximately 70,000 opportunities to initiate war rationally were seized in the period 1816 to 1974, with hundreds of other opportunities being used to threaten war. In that same study it was also found that only 11 of nearly 500,000 opportunities to initiate war were seized in violation of the expectations arising from the expected utility framework. In other words, the ratio of seemingly rational and correct calculations to either irrational calculations or miscalculations that have led to war is over 40 to 1. This implies that through symmetry-producing nuclear proliferation, we may expect to prevent approximately 40 conventional or one-sided nuclear wars for every one miscalculated or irrational bilateral nuclear exchange. Using the 40 most recent wars as a crude indicator, this analysis implies that a single miscalculated or irrational nuclear exchange in the third world would have to kill several tens of millions of people before some proliferation would be unjustified by yielding a higher expected loss of life. It seems to us unlikely that one such miscalculated or irrational act among third world countries, each with a very few warheads, could produce this level of loss. Still, we do not rule it out, but rather note that it is exactly such estimates that must be made in calculating the trade-offs between gains and losses from nuclear proliferation. One might expect, for instance, that selection of candidates for proliferation might be based partially on the calculation of the marginal effect on expected costs in life and property from not standing in the way of the candidate in question. Thus, proliferation would be resisted where the expected marginal effect would be an increase in loss of life and property over nonproliferation, but would be encouraged where the marginal effect was otherwise.

#### Same effect as nuclear war

Jianguo 95—Major General, frmr assoc. prof and Dean of the Antichemical Warfare Academy [Wu, Nuclear Shadows on High-Tech Warfare, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/jianguo.htm]

What merits our attention is that in a high-tech conventional war, a nuclear environment may still emerge even if nuclear weapons are not used. The more society advances, the greater the demands for energy will be. In order to satisfy the demands for energy, nuclear power stations were built. According to the data released by the International Atomic Energy Agency in March 1994, at the end of 1993 there were 430 nuclear power plants with a total installed capacity of approximately 345 million kw operating in various places throughout the world; these accounted for more than 17 percent of the world's gross power generation. It is predicted that by 2001, there will be 558 nuclear power generating units with a total installed capacity of approximately 460 million kw all worldwide, which will account for 24 percent of the world's gross power generation. The peaceful utilization of nuclear energy is a piece of joyous news to mankind. Meanwhile, the extensive use of nuclear energy also constitutes a latent threat to peace and the existence of human beings. The accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant that occurred in April 1986 inflicted air pollution on 16 Russian oblasts and victimized 250,000 people. In Ukraine, 370,000 people suffered injuries in varying degrees as land covering 40,000 square meters was polluted, and more than 2,000 residential areas were evacuated. In future high-tech warfare, if an enemy intentionally or unintentionally attacks nuclear power plants or other facilities using nuclear energy with high-tech conventional weapons, the secondary nuclear radiation produced and the nuclear environment brought about would likewise do harm. In June 1981, Israel dispatched four aircraft to launch a sudden attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor southeast of the capital Baghdad, dropping 16 tons of bombs in two minutes and hitting all the targets. Fortunately, the reactor was not yet operational; otherwise the attack would have resulted in very serious consequences.

#### Limited retaliation strategy prevents nuclear winter. Use of counterforce targeting prevents city fires and the release of soot.

Powell 89—Professor of Poli Sci @ Harvard University [Robert Powell, “Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Jun., 1989), pp. 503-519]

Conclusions - Although mutually assured destruction may be the technological state of affairs, there are still several conceptual approaches to nuclear deterrence. Recent formal work has focused on brinkmanship crises in which states exert coercive pressure by manipulating the risk of an unlimited nuclear exchange. I have attempted to extend the formal analysis of nuclear deterrence theory to the strategy of limited retaliation in which states exert coercive pressure by inflicting limited amounts of damage on an adversary in order to make the threat of future punishment more credible.

The strategy of limited retaliation has been modeled as a simple game of sequential bargaining. The game's equilibrium suggests that states prefer to have relatively smaller, less-destructive limited options. Moreover, each state also finds counterforce options desirable even though these options are incapable of limiting the total amount of damage an adversary can inflict on the state. When one-sided incomplete information is added to the model, the escalatory dynamic described by the game's unique sequential crisis equilibrium shows that as the crisis continues, the states become less and less likely to escalate further. The challenger also becomes less and less confident that it is facing an irresolute adversary. Moreover, a large reduction in the destructiveness of the defender's limited options may make the probability of a nuclear exchange smaller. A smaller reduction in the destructiveness of these options, however, may reduce crisis stability and make a nuclear exchange more likely. Finally, uncertainty and incomplete information play a crucial role in enhancing deterrence. Doubts about the defender's resolve may deter a state from making a challenge that it would have been certain to make had it been completely confident about the defender's resolve.

\*Robock concludes that 150 nuclear bombs need to be used to trigger nuclear winter

\*Counterforce = Targeting military installation. Avoiding cities

### AT: Conventional War Unlikely

#### Conventional war is probable. Sound deterrent strategies should guide policy analysis.

Horowitz and Shalmon 9 (Michael, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—U. Pennsylvania, Dan, Senior Analyst—Lincoln Group and Graduate Student—Georgetown U., Orbis, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy,” 53:2, ScienceDirect)

Some scholars question the notion that state-on-state warfare has become unlikely. Army Colonel Gian Gentile argues that the COIN community's analysis “more than anything else… stakes a claim on the future,” concluding that Iraq does not provide a “model” for America's future wars.15 U.S. Air Force (USAF) Major General Charles Dunlap has argued that land forces “will be of little strategic import in the next war.”16 Gentile disagrees with Dunlap but also with the COIN community, writing that **“‘legacy’ large-scale battles… might, in fact, still be looming on the horizon**.” Citing Iranian, North Korean and Chinese threats, he argues that planners “could (and should) imagine many types of conflict in the near-to-medium term, not all or even most of them counterinsurgencies.” 17 Michael Mazarr assails the “**naïve… assumption that the world has been rendered immune from the requirement for deterrence of major conventional war**,” referencing possible threats from rogue states, Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).18 Referencing similar threats, Dunlap attacks the COIN community for believing that “human nature will change, that peer competitors will not arise and that the rest of the world will not attempt to challenge U.S. air power.”19 Metz calls for defense thinkers to “jettison the concept of counterinsurgency,” which he describes as having “outlived its usefulness,” and rethink how they understand irregular threats, since “not all armed conflict is war.”20 This is similar to Mazarr's argument that the use of military force is not the most effective way of winning COIN operations. Whereas COIN advocates argue for minimizing the costs of irregular warfare commitments by dedicating units to enhancing the capabilities of friendly regimes—especially those facing Islamic radicalism—Posen and Metz oppose most capacity-building efforts because twenty first century insurgency is “not simply a variant of war” but is rather “part of systemic failure and pathology,” requiring comprehensive social re-engineering.21 Consequently, host nation governments and the United States have inherently conflicting interests. Mazarr makes an even broader argument, claiming that given the character of twenty first century irregular warfare, militaries should de-emphasize COIN and focus on conventional warfighting.22 Reversing McMaster's argument, the essential traditionalist claim is that focusing on irregular war, for which violent tools are ill-suited, will undermine the U.S. military's role in doing what it does best—preventing and winning full-scale interstate wars.

### Africa

#### African conventional conflict likely—Mali crisis

IBT 1/14—Jacey Fortin, writer for International Business Times [January 14 2013, “A Brand New War: Western Forces Square Off Against Islamists In Africa,” http://www.ibtimes.com/brand-new-war-western-forces-square-against-islamists-africa-1014678]

But that hasn’t stopped a new offensive from kicking off late last week in the poverty-stricken West African country of Mali. France is leading the charge, and officials have predicted a quick end to the mission; Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius has said the operation would last only a matter of weeks.

But this is no simple operation. France, Mali's former colonizer, has already garnered promises of support -- however vague -- from several Western powers. As for the insurgents, they comprise various groups with differing aims. The web of alliances among them is ever-shifting.

Some of the rebels in northern Mali -- who last week alarmed the international community by advancing farther south than ever before, toward the capital city of Bamako -- have threatened to retaliate against French troops and civilians in the wake of the intervention, making it clear that this new conflict could have far-ranging implications.

Miserable Months

Despite endemic poverty and underdevelopment, Mali had been a beacon of stable African democracy since 1992. That changed in March of last year, when a band of soldiers stormed into Bamako and took over the civilian government in a widely condemned military coup.

The mutinous soldiers were reacting to a crisis that had begun two months earlier; in January, insurgents had begun taking over various northern communities. The invaders were Tuaregs, a nomadic people that hailed from the Sahel, the band of semi-arid land across Africa just south of the Sahara Desert.

The Tuaregs had long sought an independent state of their own, and were strengthened by their mercenary work for the doomed Moammar Gadhafi during the Libyan revolution. Though they lost that battle, the Tuaregs gained an impressive cache of weapons, which enabled them to overrun Malian forces in early 2012 as they advanced into the sparsely populated northern region.

Above all else, the Tuaregs sought to establish a state of their own, called Azawad. The insurgent group calls itself the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, or MNLA by the French acronym.

Their success didn’t last long. The Tuaregs were usurped by Islamist militants who also came from the Sahel; their overarching goal was impose Shariah, or Islamic law, on Malian communities. Those Islamists, who still occupy the region, are themselves split into several factions.

A Country Divided

“You’ve got three groups operating in Mali at the moment that can be classified as Islamist, and this is in addition to the MNLA, which is basically secular,” says Andrew McGregor, a senior editor at the Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis Program in Washington, D.C.

One group, called Ansar Dine, has some ethnic links with Tuareg rebels although its aims are largely Islamist. The group has indicated a willingness to negotiate with Bamako in the past, but reversed course in recent weeks and is now the most powerful insurgent force in the country.

“Then you have the Movement for Openness and Jihad in West Africa, or MUJWA, which is largely black African in composition although the leadership is mainly Arab and Mauritanian,” says McGregor. “They’re in a somewhat weakened state at the moment; they recently suffered a mass defection of their troops to Ansar Dine.”

The third group is al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM. This decades-old movement, which is rooted in Algeria, was once only a marginal al-Qaeda affiliate but has gained more power in recent months by linking up with other Islamist movements in the region, and by using abductions and drug smuggling to beef up its income.

All of these groups are weakened by their sporadic conflicts with each other, but Western powers are concerned since northern Mali -- which is roughly the size of France -- has become a haven and training ground for Islamist militant groups and terrorists linked to al-Qaeda.

Far from Home

Domestically, the situation is grim; Malian civilians in far-flung northern regions have suffered greatly under the reign of extremists, whose harsh interpretation of Shariah is a far cry from the more moderate version of Islam practiced in the country.

That humanitarian crisis has been the focus of scrutiny in recent months, with Western powers including the United States keen to prevent further destabilization but wary of a risky intervention.

The issue was brought before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in early December. Corinne Dufka, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch, was among the panelists. There, she laid out in dire terms the extent of humanitarian crisis in northern Mali.

Still today, she says, the situation is extreme.

“Civilians from the north have suffered tremendously on account of the armed conflict that erupted a year ago, first at the hands of Tuareg separatists and later on account of the various forms of abuse meted out by the Islamist groups,” says Dufka.

“Those abuses include beatings amputations, executions, destruction of cultural heritage sites and serious restrictions on their way of life. It has provoked the flight of hundreds of thousands of people, both refugees and internally displaced persons.”

Going Down

The international response to this crisis has been a protracted one. The fractured Malian army has so far proven incapable of facing the rebels in battle, so a coalition of forces under the Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, committed itself to formulating a plan to defend Bamako.

It wasn’t until December that the United Nations Security Council approved a rough plan for ECOWAS troops to intervene -- and even then, the force was not expected to coalesce into a deployment until the autumn of 2013.

But the situation became more urgent last week, when Islamists began heading down south with unprecedented speed. On Wednesday, Ansar Dine militants rolled into the town of Konna, in central Mali. Militants then headed further south toward Mopti, which sits on the de facto dividing line between northern and southern Mali.

Suddenly, French forces swooped in with air strikes. It was an unexpected intervention that seemed to sidestep months of careful planning on the part of the U.N. and African forces, but the French say the move was necessary in light of recent insurgent advances.

The conflict has been raging since the intervention began on Friday.

Stephanie Pezard, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a think-tank based in Santa Monica, Calif., notes that it is still too early to tell exactly what French forces have in mind.

“In terms of French capabilities, what they’re going to deploy on the ground will be dependent on how they find the Islamist response to be,” she says. “It remains to be seen what exactly the French mission is to accomplish -- whether it’s containing the Islamist insurgents’ spread or retaking northern territory.”

Early reports are less than encouraging. Although French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian voiced optimism about the intervention on Monday, he also revealed that Islamists had overtaken the central town of Diabaly, which is west of Mopti and about 240 miles north of Bamako. It is the closest yet that Islamist insurgents have gotten to Mali’s capital city.

We're All In

Now, the question is whether other Western countries are willing to back up the French forces. So far, none have promised to send combat troops. But Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have all pledged logistical support.

The United States has kept officially mum about the specifics regarding its plans for supporting the French.

“We stand by our French allies and they can count on U.S. support,” said Air Force Maj. Robert Firman, a spokesman for the Department of Defense. “I won't get into the specific nature of our support. As Secretary [Leon] Panetta has said, we share France's concern in Mali and we will support the French and international community in the effort to counter the terrorist threat there.”

Analysts posit that the U.S. contribution to France’s offensive might involve drone surveillance and crafts for aerial refueling.

As evidenced by their seizure of Diabaly on Monday, the Malian insurgents -- fractured though they are -- may be quite capable of putting up a fight.

“They managed to get a hold of some really good equipment when Libya fell apart,” says McGregor. “On top of that, they seized everything the Malian army left behind [while retreating southward]. They have some decent anti-aircraft pieces."

On the other hand, he adds, “The insurgents are going to suffer from their own lack of air cover. And given the open spaces in the terrain in that region, this will present real difficulties for them in the fight against modern Western military forces.”

The End Game

News of France’s surprise intervention last week sparked immediate debates as to whether France was asserting itself too forcefully into the affairs of Mali, its former colony.

French officials point out that the Malian government has asked for assistance, noting that the insurgency has brought much suffering to the people of northern communities and disrupted the path back to stability in Bamako.

“There’s probably a lot of support for the French right now among northern residents,” says Dufka of HRW. “Their lives have been extremely difficult [under the insurgency].”

But the Islamists themselves have reacted angrily to the presence of French troops, vowing to exact vengeance on the European power -- and the West in general. One spokesman for Ansar Dine told the Associated Press that “this war has become a war against the Crusaders.” France, meanwhile, has raised its domestic terror threat level.

But Pezard of the RAND Corporation notes that terrorist threats against Western powers are nothing new.

“It’s been going on for months, the threat that France was going to be hit on its own territory. There have already been hostages that have constrained France’s action, so I don’t think the situation has changed drastically now that there is an intervention.”

At least six hostages are currently being held by AQIM militants, as was the case before the Mali offensive.

Furthermore, the West is not the only one rushing into Mali. ECOWAS has accelerated its plans, with the current chairman of the organization, Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara, releasing a statement “deciding to authorize the immediate sending of troops on the ground.” Nigerian and Senegalese troops were among the first arrivals in Mali early this week; more are expected to trickle in as the conflict rages on.

Ouattara has also thanked the French government for its quick intervention.

Generally, France’s presence in Mali has been welcomed by most regional players -- but that could change quickly if the conflict drags on.

In a situation as complicated as this one, there are no easy answers. Containing an insurgency is one thing -- achieving stability in Bamako and quashing various terrorist cells in an area as vast as northern Mali is quite another.

For Malians, there is cause for hope that a yearlong domestic crisis will soon reach an end. But there is also a great risk that this sudden Western offensive could be just the beginning of another protracted international conflict.

### Asia

#### Prolif would allow for effective deterrence

Glaser 12—Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies [April 2012, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14, http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883]

Steps could be taken to further enhance the capability of the Philippines military to defend its territorial and maritime claims and improve its indigenous domain awareness, which might deter China from taking aggressive action. Similarly, the United States could boost the maritime surveillance capabilities of Vietnam, enabling its military to more effectively pursue an anti-access and area-denial strategy. Such measures run the risk of emboldening the Philippines and Vietnam to more assertively challenge China and could raise those countries' expectations of U.S. assistance in a crisis.

### Central Asia/Caucasus

#### War in Caucasus likely

Dilanyan 12—Vahan Dilanyan is an analyst of political and security issues. He is serving as the Chairman of the Political Developments Research Center NGO, Yerevan, Armenia [June 7, 2012, “War Is In The Air: A Troubled Caucasus – OpEd,” Eurasia Review, http://www.eurasiareview.com/07062012-war-is-in-the-air-a-troubled-caucasus-oped/]

While Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was on her way to South Caucasus perhaps troubled by growing intensity around Iran, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has proven to be more explosive and hazardous.

Hours before Clinton’s arrival to Yerevan, on the night of June 4th Azerbaijani armed forces (violating the ceasefire signed in 1994) crossed the borderline nearby the villages Chinari and Berdavan of Tavush region of Republic of Armenia and killed 3 Armenian soldiers. On the next day the second wave of the Azeri sabotage was repelled by the Armenian side, and 5 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed.

“While I had only just learned of these incidents, I am very concerned about the danger of escalation of tensions and the senseless deaths of young soldiers and innocent civilians,” said Clinton, according to a State Department transcript.

Azerbaijan continues firing into direction of Armenian positions. On June 5th, Azerbaijani side continuously fired from DShK heavy machine guns several Tavush Region villages (Movses, Nerqin Karmir Aghbyur and Aygepar). Azerbaijan continues threatening the peaceful lives of the peasants of Tavush region.

Often the kindergartens are targeted by Azerbaijani fire. In the kindergarten of Chinari village defilade was set for the children, and the music plays loud when there is shootings from Azerbaijani side in order the children not to be frightened.

The firing hasn’t stopped for the past three months. Azerbaijani troops have also opened fire at the medical personnel vehicles which were carrying the symbol of International Red Cross.

The abovementioned indicates that Azerbaijan cynically violates the humanitarian principles, affirmed in the Geneva Conventions while blatantly breaking the ceasefire regime.

By doing so Azerbaijan hurts the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs to settle the conflict via peaceful negotiations, and contradicts the principles established in the documents of L’Aquila in 2009, Muskoka in 2010, Deauville in 2011 and Sochi in 2012, which outlined elements of a framework for a comprehensive peace settlement based on the Helsinki Final Act principle of refraining from the threat or use of force.

However, the Co-chairmanship is very selective in condemning such actions of Azerbaijan or refrains from doing so. For example, on April 27th they “urged all sides to respect the 1994 ceasefire and to abstain from retaliatory measures that would lead to further escalation.”

Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan has repeatedly called upon the international community to prevent the further bloodshed including the casualties within the peaceful population. However, the international community was generally silent on these matters, which in its turn, has made the Azerbaijani leadership more “obscene”.

Instead, the leaders of some countries continue to highlight the importance of the Azerbaijani oil resources. During the “Oil and Gas of Caspian” conference which is being held in Baku nowadays, Günther Oettinger, EU Commissioner on energy, emphasized that “EU sees Azerbaijan as a key partner in South Caucasus”.

Meanwhile, in an address, David Cameron, the British prime minister, has indicated that Azerbaijan is in the heart of the region, the energy resources of which will play a crucial role in the world economy in the near future. According to him, “Azerbaijan plays a significant role in using its resources for the common good”.

However, the real picture is different, apart from the fact that Azerbaijani energy resources are non-renewable. Following the launch of BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline, Azerbaijan has dramatically increased its military expenditure.

According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Azerbaijan made the largest increase in military spending worldwide in 2011, 88% in real terms, amidst increasing fears of renewed conflict in the region.

The international community seems to have turned a “blind eye” on the fact that Azerbaijan has exceeded all the possible caps on conventional arms. As a proof, Azerbaijan has declared the possession of 250 military aircrafts, while the convention allows only for 100 units.

The reality is, Azerbaijan spends its energy resources not for the “common good” but for “common evil” and the illusory self-confidence of Azerbaijan, strengthened by increased military expenditure, may in fact turn Azerbaijan into another “Georgia” in the region.

In this case, Azerbaijan falls short of becoming “a key partner for Europe”, not only because of its incompatibility of values to that European democratic values system (the EU has qualified all elections of Azerbaijan as authoritarian while the NKR elections were reported as democratic and the recent parliamentary elections of Armenia as a significant step towards democratic development) but also it may turn into a danger for the security system of Europe by its war rhetoric and militant posture.

It is no secret that in nowadays intertwined world, any war in any part of the globe may overshadow the security systems of many countries. The possible war in South Caucasus will shatter the Euro-Atlantic strategy of energy diversification.

It is worthwhile mentioning that Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa pipelines were blocked during the Russian-Georgian August war.

From this perspective, the Martakert region of Nagorno-Karabakh is aroud 50 km away from the BTC pipeline, and in the case of a possible confrontation, this line could become vulnerable as well.

The international community should act decisively: remaining idle will not prevent the conflict from escalation and adequate measures are to be taken in order to hamper the aggressive stance of Baku.

To this end, Azerbaijan should be forced to sign an agreement on non-use of force.

Now that the elections are over in Armenia, public attention has turned largely from inner problems to external issues. The recent Azerbaijani sabotage attacks have put the society on high alert which could explode any minute.

### Europe

#### Conventional war risk is increasing in Europe.

Kaiser 9 (Karl, Dir. Program on Transatlantic Relations—Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and Adjunct Prof. Public Policy—Harvard Kennedy School, IHT, “An alternative to NATO membership”, 2-5, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/4609)

First, domestic conditions speak against membership. The reckless engagement with a superior Russian military by Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, although he had been thoroughly briefed by the United States about the Russian potential, demonstrated to NATO how bad leadership in combination with a very old conflict can drag the Atlantic alliance into a war it does not want. In Ukraine there is no majority support for membership among the general population; indeed, in the eastern part of the country there is strong opposition. If ever the leadership were to force this issue it would risk a deep split, with potentially disastrous consequences for the integrity of Ukraine. Second, **contrary to the expectations at the end of the Cold War, large-scale conventional warfare in Europe has reappeared as a threatening possibility**. The worst possible scenario for NATO would be that the alliance would be unable to defend an ally under Article V because of lack of political will (even now the majority of people in some NATO countries do not support going to war over Central European members), or for military reasons—as would be the case for Georgia and Ukraine under the present circumstances. This would expose NATO as a paper tiger and cause it to loose the essence of its credibility and meaning.

### Mid East

#### Mid east war likely now—multiple factors and stress points.

Al Sharif 12—Osama Al Sharif is a veteran journalist and political commentator based in Amman. His experience as publisher, editor and syndicated writer in Arabic and English spans over 25 years [June 20, 2012, “Is Middle East headed for another war?” Arab News, http://www.arabnews.com/middle-east-headed-another-war]

Will there be a war in the Middle East this summer? It is a question that is frequently asked by pundits and laymen alike this time of the year, every year. The Middle East is always a good candidate for an outbreak of regional or international conflict. For decades the Arab-Israeli conflict was the friction point at the center of hostilities. Lebanon and Gaza were the optimum battlegrounds. They still are today. But since Iraq’s ill-fated invasion of Kuwait in 1990, after an eight-year-long war with Iran, the focus of tension and aggression has been vacillating between the Gulf region and the Levant.

The first Gulf War, which coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fragmentation of the Soviet bloc, consolidated US military presence in the region. The 9/11 terrorist attacks triggered America’s direct military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since then Israel has waged war against Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008-09). If one adds the conflicts in Somalia, Yemen and Sudan, then it will be safe to say that the Middle East has been in a constant state of war, in various types, throughout the last decade.

But this time the traditional question about the possibility of a new war erupting in the region is warranted. Since the breakout of the Arab Spring and the collapse of the Egyptian regime through a popular uprising, the geopolitical scene has witnessed considerable change. Israel has lost a key Arab ally in the form of the Hosni Mubarak rule, which lasted for more than three decades. Mubarak has supported the peace process, the Palestine National Authority (PNA) controlled by the Fatah faction and maintained an uneasy relationship with Hamas in Gaza. He also made sure that Sinai remained a weapons’ free buffer zone between Egypt and Israel.

Now all of this has changed. The victory by Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Mursi in Egypt’s presidential elections this week will further complicate Egyptian-Israeli relations. Hamas, a faction of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, expects to benefit greatly from its close ties with Egypt’s Islamists. Sinai has been witnessing a steady decline in law and order since the Jan. 25 revolution. Hamas is believed to have infiltrated Gaza’s borders with Egypt to smuggle weapons into the beleaguered strip. There are signs that Al-Qaeda is also active in the desert peninsula. On the eve of the second round of presidential elections a rocket was fired from Sinai into Israeli territory. Israel accused Hamas of ordering the attack at the request of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.

Egypt’s Islamists, including Mursi, have assured Americans that they will honor the Camp David Peace treaty with Israel. But the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict is clear, at least to millions of their followers across the region. It does not recognize Israel and supports holy war to liberate Jerusalem and the occupied territories, which encompasses all of historical Palestine.

This is one of the main reasons why the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt issued a supplementary constitutional proclamation on the eve of the presidential elections. It decreed that the all matters relating to the armed forces will reside with the SCAF and not with the newly elected president. Furthermore, while the president has the right to declare war, he can only do so with the consent of the SCAF.

Sinai will remain a critical point of friction between Israel and Egypt. Since the collapse of the Libyan regime huge caches of weapons have found their way from Libya into the Sinai Peninsula. For Israel the fact that Hamas has now access to new armaments represents a huge security challenge. It is a situation that neither Israel nor Egypt can control. The former may decide to carry out a preemptive strike against Hamas and loyal cells deep within Sinai. Such unilateral action could easily develop into a regional conflict.

Another burning fuse in the region is the Syrian crisis. So far the international community has failed to agree on a path to end the internal conflict between the regime of Bashar Assad and his people. There are strong indications that the crisis has turned into a civil war involving the regime and its loyalists and the opposition which is now armed. Foreign powers are now involved in the Syrian conflict, and the Syrian Free Army has secured weapons which turned a peaceful uprising into a military confrontation. The danger of a spillover has never been stronger. It directly affects Lebanon and Jordan. But Israel has chosen to condemn the Syrian regime and this may prove fundamental in the near future. Last year the Damascus regime allowed hundreds of Palestinians to come close to the cease-fire line in the Golan Heights. It resulted in a bloody response from Israel. Syria has great influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon and it may choose to activate the Lebanon front this summer in order to get some much needed relief.

Israel’s worst nightmare would be a twin rocket attack by Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon against its southern and northern fronts. Such a scenario is not far-fetched. But it will have dire regional consequences.

A third factor this summer will be the result of international negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. The latest round of talks was launched Monday in Moscow, under Russian auspices. Iran wants recognition of its right to enrich uranium and the removal of economic sanctions. The west has made an offer to supply Tehran with needed fuel in return for a halt to enrichment above 5 percent. Iran faces further sanctions at the end of this month if an agreement is not reached. While the possibility of going to war over the Iran case has receded in recent months, the danger remains. Israel is worried that Iranian wavering will only create a situation that will allow Iran to arm its missiles with nuclear heads. The Obama administration is now under pressure, from Republicans, to toughen its stand. The potential of failure is real and the possibility of military action against Tehran remains reasonable.

The common denominator is all three scenarios is Israel, but they also involve other players like Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran. It’s a complex situation that makes the odds for a renewed military conflict in the region all the more higher!

### 2NC War Defense

#### Deterrence breakdowns don’t cause full-scale nuclear war

Waltz 3 Kenneth, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, p. 34-35

States are deterred by the prospect of suffering severe damage and by their inability to do much to limit it. Deterrence works because nuclear weapons enable one state to punish another state severely without first defeating it. "Victory," in Thomas Schelling's words, "is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy." 37 Countries armed only with conventional weapons can hope that their military forces will be able to limit the damage an attacker can do. Among countries armed with strategic nuclear forces, the hope of avoiding heavy damage depends mainly on the attacker's restraint and little on one's own efforts. Those who compared expected deaths through strategic exchanges of nuclear warheads with casualties suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II overlooked the fundamental difference between conventional and nuclear worlds. 38

Deterrence rests on what countries can do to each other with strategic nuclear weapons. From this statement, one can easily leap to the wrong conclusion: that deterrent strategies, if they have to be carried through, will produce a catastrophe. That countries are able to annihilate each other means neither that deterrence depends on their threatening to do so nor that they will necessarily do so if deterrence fails. Because countries heavily armed with strategic nuclear weapons can carry war to its ultimate intensity, the control of force becomes the primary objective. If deterrence fails, leaders will have the strongest incentives to keep force under control and limit damage rather than launching genocidal attacks. If the Soviet Union had attacked Western Europe, NATO's objectives would have been to halt the attack and end the war. The United States had the ability to place thousands of warheads precisely on targets in the Soviet Union. Surely we would have struck military targets before striking industrial targets and industrial targets before striking cities. The intent to hit military targets first was sometimes confused with a war-fighting strategy, but it was not one. It would not have significantly reduced the Soviet Union's ability to hurt us. Whatever American military leaders thought, our strategy rested on the threat to punish. The threat, if it failed to deter, would have been followed not by spasms of violence but by punishment administered in ways that conveyed threats of more to come.

A war between the United States and the Soviet Union that got out of control would have been catastrophic. If they had set out to destroy each other, they would have greatly reduced the world's store of developed resources while killing millions outside of their own borders through fallout. Even while destroying themselves, states with few weapons would do less damage to others. As ever, the biggest international dangers come from the strongest states. Fearing the world's destruction, one may prefer a world of conventional great powers having a higher probability of fighting less- destructive wars to a world of nuclear great powers having a lower probability of fighting more-destructive wars. But that choice effectively disappeared with the production of atomic bombs by the United States during World War II.

### 2NC Accidents

#### Accidental nuclear war is science fiction. Motives are for de-escalation not escalation.

(FYI, referenced later on, are the beginning of the card if they ask about warrants.)

Quinlan 9 (Michael, Former Permanent Under-Sec. State—UK Ministry of Defense, “Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects”, p. 63-69)

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. **It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be**. **Neither side could want escalation**. Both would be appalled at what was going on. **Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt**. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modem delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclearweapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And **none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality**. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's , survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating theznemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postlated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. If vital interests have been defined in a way that is dear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably .so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is `If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which 1 a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it, to a tolerable outcome--the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger, and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor volib wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, Dr the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme **it is absurd to claim,** as has been heard from distinguished figures, **that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years**). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements----it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. **A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low**. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by, indicators mistaken or misconstrued. **In none of these instances**, it is accepted, **did matters get at all near to nuclear launch**--extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. **But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote**. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. **To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets**. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of it initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way **belongs to science fiction**.

### 2NC Irrational Leaders

#### 2. Rationality on some level is inevitable—using a nuke is suicidal and no leader wants that. Even if some leaders are irrational now—the attainment of nukes forces them to moderate their behavior—that’s Shen—more evidence.

Tepperman 9 (Jonathon, former Deputy Managing Ed. Foreig Affairs and Assistant Managing Ed. Newsweek, Newsweek, “Why Obama should Learn to Love the Bomb”, 44:154, 9-7, L/N)

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb **may actually make us safer**. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable.

The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons **have not been used** since 1945. Second, there's **never** been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states."

To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are **rational on some basic level**. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. **Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win**. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price.

Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—**the basic math shifts**. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is **forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable** and thus **not worth the effort**. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?"

Why indeed? The **iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction** is **so compelling**, it's led to what's known as **the nuclear peace**: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which **all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows**. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is **fundamentally reassuring**—because in each instance, **very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion**.

Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time."

The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies **slide toward war**, then **pull back**, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.

Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues.

But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens.

Yet when push came to shove, their regimes **balked at nuclear suicide**, and **so would today's international bogeymen**. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but **nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish**.

### 2NC Multiparty Proliferation

#### 2. Even one nuclear power in a region induces caution on all sides. This an EMPIRICAL STUDY RESULT. Means asymmetry is irrelevant. Best evidence proves

Asal 7—pol sci, SUNY—AND—Kyle Beardsley—pol sci, Emory (Victor, Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior, http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/44/2/139)

As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior, as stated in H1. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors – Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992) – and five nuclear actors – Gulf War (1990) – only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors – by extension, many general actors as well – experienced war. Therefore, the results can only suggest that, keeping the number of crisis actors fixed, increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent of aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving super- powers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of full-scale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by Fearon (2002), should be taken seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante assessment of the out-comes. To account for possible selection bias caused by the use of a truncated sample that does not include any non-crisis cases, one would need to use another dataset in which the crisis cases are a subset and then run Heckman-type selection models (see Lemke & Reed, 2001). It would, however, be difficult to think of a different unit of analysis that might be employed, such that the set of crises is a subset of a larger category of interaction.

#### 3. Multipolar arms races will actually be stable.

O’Neil 5 (Andrew, Associate Prof. IR and Associate Head of Research in Faculty of Social Sci.—Flinders U., Comparative Strategy, “Nuclear Proliferation and Global Security: Laying the Groundwork for a New Policy Agenda”, 23:343-359, InformaWorld)

Against this historical background, there are some positive signs that multipolar nuclear deterrence may actually work in contributing to global nuclear stability by fostering greater restraint and caution among those possessing nuclear weapons.61 States might be less inclined to engage in destabilizing actions or conventional conflict for fear of escalating tensions to a level where nuclear use could become a reality. It is entirely plausible that a system of multipolar deterrence could appear organically, over time, as distinct from one imposed “from above” by the P-5 group of states as part of a great power condominium. A U.S. deterrent-based nuclear relationship with North Korea may be followed by a similar type of informal arrangement with Iran. That is, after a period of strategic readjustment in the wake of Iran acquiring a nuclear capability, both countries may arrive gradually at a shared understanding that, short of war, deterrence is the only real alternative in managing the nuclear dimension of their relationship. Some have claimed that poorly developed command-and-control systems in new and emerging nuclear states would render the risks of moving to multipolar deterrence unacceptably high. According to this perspective, underdeveloped command and control systems will encourage states to place excessive emphasis on positive control (i.e. ensuring that weapons will be launched when they need to be), and devote insufficient attention to negative control (i.e. ensuring that weapons will not be launched when they should not be).62 Yet, this is a problem that could be minimized, and it is worth remembering that all nuclear states, including the superpowers, have faced this positive-negative dilemma since 1945. There would be nothing to stop the more established nuclear powers, and even technologically advanced nonnuclear states, acting in their own self-interest by discreetly offering new and emerging nuclear states technical assistance to lessen the risk of accidental nuclear launch due to immaturity in force structure and underdeveloped command-and-control systems.

#### 4. The Cold War was multiparty—the U.S., USSR, and China were each at risk of conflict. India, Pakistan and China are also a triad without an impact.

#### 5. This applies to conventional conflict more. The relevance of small changes in the balance of power is greater under conventional buildups. Nuclear weapons clarify since even one weapon on each side of the alliance structure instantly makes conflict unacceptable.

#### 6. All our small arsenals and prolif slow arguments apply here too.

### 2NC First Strike Pressure

#### 3. Small arsenals are survival. Mobility. Iraq war proves.

Preston 7 (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR—Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate—Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 79-80)

Another lesson of the Gulf War is that small states have begun to develop survivable means of retaliation against militarily superior opponents. The U.S. inability to successfully eliminate the Iraqi Scud threat, even after six weeks of extensive bombing and complete air superiority, clearly illustrates how even a small state with an antiquated mobile launch system can frustrate preemption efforts and maintain a credible retaliatory capability. Utilizing a strategy of "hide-and-seek," Iraq scattered its mobile Scuds throughout the countryside, deployed wooden decoys to confuse Allied reconnaissance efforts, and continued to launch missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia for six weeks after the beginning of the air war. The Iraqis were able to launch forty-nine Scuds during the first ten days of the war, and continued to launch thirty-nine more during the final thirty days of the conflict. As the Gulf War Air Power Survey (1993, 334) observed: In sum, Iraq's operational approach and employment tactics meant that the probability of finding Iraq's mobile launchers and destroying them from the air before they fired was very close to nil at the outset of the conflict. Nor did the chances of finding mobile Scuds before they fired improve appreciably as the campaign unfolded. Even with the use of platforms like JSTARS and special forces on the ground, Coalition forces had little success either detecting mobile launchers moving from their hide sites or catching them while they were setting up to fire from pre-surveyed launch points. (emphasis added) Had Iraqi Scuds been carrying nuclear warheads, dozens would have gotten through despite the unparalleled air campaign. Would the U.S. have been willing to trust that Saddam Hussein would not have dared strike its conventional military forces in the Saudi/Kuwaiti desert if a ground war began which actually threatened his regime's survival? Would any U.S. president trust that American nuclear superiority would deter such a leader to the extent that a risky policy, like the liberation of Kuwait or the overthrow of Saddam, would be attempted given the clear political risks of high U.S. casualties? Further, would the Saudis (like the Western Europeans during the Cold War) have been willing to serve as a nuclear battlefield in order to support U.S. policy in Kuwait or Iraq? Clearly, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a nuclear- armed Iraq would not have significantly altered the course of recent events in the Gulf (whether in 1991 or 2003). Finally, although the Iraqi air force failed to play a significant role during the Gulf War, it still provides an important lesson which should not be overlooked by analysts. Specifically, the successful escape of over one hundred Iraqi aircraft into Iran, despite Allied air superiority and efforts to prevent it, demonstrated that although the Iraqi air force lacked the ability to directly engage Coalition air power, it still possessed some ability to escape interdiction and penetrate defenses (Freedman and Karsh 1991, 28). Had Iraq possessed nuclear weapons and the will to use them, a concerted effort to use its advanced strike aircraft, flying low to avoid radar, would have provided it with an effective and difficult-to-interdict delivery system. It should also be noted that in future great power—small state confrontations, the kind of overwhelming air superiority enjoyed by the Allies over Iraq is unlikely to be replicated in such a way as to render small state strike aircraft completely ineffective. Combined with the potential of mobile ballistic missiles, the possibility that only a few nuclear-armed aircraft could evade interception provides small nuclear states with the ability to develop redundant and survivable force structures capable of providing some degree of credible deterrence.

#### 4. No pressure for first strikes—it’s empirically denied.

Alagappa 8 (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow—East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa, p. 523-524)

It has been argued that states with small or nascent nuclear arsenals might have strategic incentive to use them early in a conflict to secure a military advantage in an impending full-scale war or to prevent the crippling of their nuclear arsenals in the event of a preventive strike. Without survivable nuclear forces, these considerations would encourage launch-on-warning postures that could produce crisis situations and undermine stability. Park and Lee (Chapter 9 of this volume) discuss this theme in relation to North Korea. Although uncertain how this theoretical possibility might materialize, they posit that North Korea's nuclear armaments will generate continuous crises and threats to peace on the Korean peninsula. That North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons and the American responses have generated crisis situations and may do so in the future is not the issue. The question is whether nascent and small nuclear weapon states will adopt early-launch postures that produce crisis and undermine stability. **There is little empirical evidence to support such a claim**. In the abstract, it would be illogical for a nascent or small nuclear power to adopt such a posture against a much superior adversary, as for example in the standoff between North Korea and the United States. Even if North Korea were to inflict substantial damage on the United States or its allies, it is unclear what coercive value would accrue to it. It is almost certain, though, that it would not survive a massive retaliatory strike by the United States. An early use posture can only be rationalized on the basis of an irrational regime, as has been the case with North Korea. However, if North Korea develops a partially survivable nuclear force, early use could have some value; but still such use is likely to be deterred by the possibility of massive retaliation and destruction by the more powerful adversary. Early use postures may make more sense between powers of roughly equal capability with partially survivable nuclear forces. However, evidence from the India-Pakistan dyad, which has a relatively longer nuclear history, does not support this abstract possibility. Despite Pakistan's refusal to embrace an NFU policy and its attempt to exploit the risk of escalation to nuclear war, Islamabad has not opted for an early use posture (see Khan and Lavoy, Chapter 7 of this volume). India, which is committed to an NFU policy, has also not adopted an early use posture. As Devin Hagerty (1998) points out, despite the tensions between them, both countries have taken unilateral and bilateral measures to avoid early use. Deterrence, not early use, characterizes their nuclear postures. **Evidence from Asia offers little support for the instability arguments**. On the contrary, **the claim that nuclear weapons have thus far contributed to security and stability rests on a relatively stronger empirical foundation**. **Stability has also been enhanced by the further circumscription due to nuclear weapons** **of the role of force** in Asian international politics.

## \*\*\* 1NR

### 2NC Preventive Strikes

#### 2. Evidence for preventive war is spotty.

Sechser 5 (Todd, Assistant Prof. Politics specializing in International Security—Stanford U., “How Organizational Pathologies Could Make Nuclear Proliferation Safer”, Presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, 4-7, \*I had to ILL this. I don’t think it’s available online)

Empirically, the case against the preventive war bias is at least as strong as that behind it, not least because of the historical absence of such wars against emergent nuclear powers. Proponents of the preventive war hypothesis have found evidence to corroborate their viewpoint in the U.S. military’s attitude toward the Soviet Union’s budding nuclear capability, but a critic might highlight its approach to China’s emerging arsenal: even Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay, notorious for having pressed for preemptive airstrikes against Soviet missile sites in Cuba a year earlier (May and Zelikow 1997), opposed preventive attacks on Chinese nuclear sites on the grounds that they would invite retaliation and create diplomatic problems for the United States. Rather, it was the Kennedy administration’s civilian strategists that maintained an interest in keeping China non-nuclear through preventive strikes, although they too rejected the option (Burr and Richelson 2000/2001). The arguments in this section caution against interpreting archival evidence too broadly. Rarely have high-ranking military officials actually recommended preventive war to state leaders; rather, most examples of “preventive war bias” have been drawn from officers’ memoirs, diaries, or informal conversations. The distinction between these illustrations and actual policy advice should not be underestimated. Military officers consider absurd ideas all the time—U.S. officers, for example, once toyed with the idea of detonating a nuclear weapon on the moon to intimidate the Soviets (Davidson 1999: 94-95). It is one thing for on officer to make aggressive remarks to a newspaper or college commencement audience about preventive war, or to lecture Air War College students about the dangers of allowing an adversary to become strong. But it is quite another to recommend to high-level political leaders that the country initiate an all-out war without immediate provocation. One act entails little professional risk (other than being removed for publicly disparaging government policy), while the other places one’s accountability, career, and possibly life on the line. The logic and examples above suggest that the gap between risk-free chatter and actual policy recommendations is larger than proliferation pessimists have been willing to acknowledge.

#### 3. Lots of historical disproof

Alagappa 8 (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow—East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa, p. 522)

The prospect of military action to destroy nuclear weapons and facilities in East and South Asia has declined markedly. The Soviet Union contemplated preventive military action against China's nuclear facilities in 1969, but the United States refused to support such action. Several years ago there was concern that India might attack Pakistan's nuclear installations. Even if this was a serious possibility, its probability has declined sharply. The two countries entered into an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. This agreement held even during the crisis situations in the 1999-2002 period. Since then, India and Pakistan have taken additional measures to prevent an accidental outbreak or escalation of conflict. More germane to the contemporary context is the emphasis in the U.S. 2002 Nuclear Posture Review on offensive military action against rogue states. The United States seriously contemplated a preventive strike against North Korea's nuclear weapon facilities during the first nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1993-94 (Perry 2006). And the George W. Bush administration threatened preventive action against North Korea during its first term. 3 However, that policy has lost traction and has no support among states in Northeast Asia, including U.S. allies. Neighboring countries oppose any preventive strike, fearing that it could result in a general war that would have negative consequences for their own national security and regional stability. Although the United States has the military capability to undertake such an action it is unlikely to act without the support of its regional allies. The force option is still on the table, but the approach to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem has decidedly shifted to the diplomatic arena.

#### Empirics prove preventive wars either don’t happen or don’t escalate

Rousseau 2k (David, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—Penn, "Proliferation Module," http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~rousseau/archived\_web/psci150/modules/pro/lecture1.htm)

Second, opponents of proliferation claim that states acquiring nuclear weapons have enduring rivals. These critics argue that injecting nuclear weapons into these already volatile relationships will result in violence. New nuclear power could launch preemptive or preventative strikes. These people argue that the existence of a rivalry greatly increases the probability the nuclear weapons will be used. History has demonstrated that only states facing a hostile external environment will be willing to spend the billions and billions of dollars necessary to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the existence of a enduring and hostile rival does not pose a real danger for two reasons. First, history shows that injecting nuclear weapons into long term hostile situations does not result in war. The United States allowed the Soviets to get nuclear weapons in 1949 without initiating violence. The Soviets allowed the British to get nuclear weapons in 1952 without initiating violence. The Soviets allowed France to get nuclear weapons in 1960 without initiating violence. The United States and Soviet Union allowed the Chinese to get nuclear weapons in 1964 without initiating violence. The Chinese allowed India to get nuclear weapons in 1974 without initiating violence. The Indians allow Pakistan to get nuclear weapons in the 1990's without initiating violence. Nuclear proliferation has not lead to either conventional or nuclear war. Second, if an existing nuclear power engages in a preventative strike, it will not be the end of the world. Israel's preventative strike against the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981 did not result in the use of nuclear weapons. While the attack was personal tragedy for those killed in the raid, it would not lead me to conclude that proliferation is very dangerous.

#### 4. No military bias in favor of preventive war.

Sechser 5 (Todd, Assistant Prof. Politics specializing in International Security—Stanford U., “How Organizational Pathologies Could Make Nuclear Proliferation Safer”, Presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, 4-7, \*I had to ILL this. I don’t think it’s available online)

Proliferation pessimism contends that the spread of nuclear weapons is dangerous because it could lead new nuclear states—particularly those lacking strong civilian control of the military—to launch preventive wars against rivals with burgeoning nuclear programs: Whenever a new state is seen to be developing nuclear weapons, it is likely that its rivals will consider preventive war under this “better now than later” logic. My theory and the evidence both suggest, however, that preventive war is more likely to be chosen when military leaders, who minimize diplomatic considerations and believe war is inevitable in the long term, have a significant degree of influence over the final decision. While there have not been, obviously, any nuclear preventive wars among the new proliferants, the probability of such attacks will increase since strict centralized civilian control over military organizations is problematic in some new and potential proliferant states (Sagan 2003a: 61).4 These fears rest on a fundamentally sociological view of organizations. Drawing largely from political science classics such as Allison’s Essence of Decision (1971) and Halperin’s Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (1974), pessimism draws its conclusions about militaries and preventive war from a notion of organizational behavior that makes four basic claims:5 1. Parochial interests. According to this view, organizations tend to protect their own interests first—and military organizations’ singular, centralized dependence on the state for resources forces them to be ferociously protective of their organizational interests (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Thus militaries seek support for generous budget appropriations and tend to support government policies that would bring greater resource allocations. 2. Goal displacement. Individuals within organizations are not asked to reconcile all of their actions with the organization’s driving goals. Instead, the logic goes, “boundedly rational” individuals are each assigned small pieces of responsibility—large tasks are carved up and labor is divided to make assignments manageable. The consequence, however, is that decisions within an organization are not made with the organization’s broader objectives in mind. For militaries, this may mean that officers assigned to think only about military issues are prone to support plans for preventive war that may not serve the national interest. This does not mean that military officers are consciously disloyal, but it does suggest that officers tend to conflate the interests of their organization with the broader interests of the nation. 3. Autonomy. Organizations seek to minimize environmental and operational uncertainty by resisting outside control. In this view, interference from politicians in matters of operations and doctrine threatens officers’ ability to control their own fate, so militaries tend to support doctrines that exclude civilians from the planning process and promote military autonomy. 4. Routines. Finally, organizations develop fixed procedures in order to ensure the reliable and efficient performance of predictable tasks. Individuals approach everyday problems by considering available routines and choosing the one that appears to be most appropriate. While such procedures prevent excessive energy from being expended on common tasks, they can be rigidly inflexible even when poorly suited to the problem at hand. Thus, officers accustomed to employing military solutions to problems may draw from their repertoire of military solutions even when such solutions are inappropriate. From these assumptions come four beliefs about military biases; in turn, these beliefs provide the foundation for the argument that proliferation will lead to preventive wars.6 First, according to the theory, military officers are socialized to envision national security as a strictly military problem (Walt 1987; Posen 1984). They undervalue economic and diplomatic aspects of international relations while overemphasizing the importance of the military balance. Consequently, military leaders and civilians think about threats and opportunities very differently. On one hand, military officials see threats where civilians see none. Professionally fixated with the balance of forces, they conflate capabilities with threats and overlook political intentions. On the other hand, officers’ inattention to non-military considerations renders them more likely than civilians to see opportunities to prevent these threats from emerging. The advantages of striking first are exaggerated, while long-term economic and political factors play weakly, if at all, into military cost-benefit calculations (Huntington 1957; Van Evera 1984; Lebow 1987; Schofield 2000). Second, organizational pessimists contend that military leaders tend to overstate the probability of war (Huntington 1957; Snyder 1984; Lovell 1964; Abrahamsson 1969; Janowitz 1960). They view war as an inherent condition of mankind and are cynical about the long-term prospects for avoiding it. For proliferation pessimists,these perceptions prejudice military officers in favor of preventive war: if war cannot be avoided, then a state can improve its chances of winning by utilizing surprise and triggering war before the adversary can fully prepare for it. Third, this interpretation of organization theory states that militaries tend to favor offensive doctrines, of which preventive wars are archetypal. Offensive doctrines are desirable for military organizations in a variety of ways: they minimize uncertainty and maximize decisiveness, allowing a military to fight on its own pre-planned terms; they require vast arms expenditures, directing additional resources to military organizations; they bolster the prestige of military commanders, who stand to win few honors from fighting inglorious wars of attrition; and their technical complexity helps exclude civilians from the planning process (Vagts 1956; Posen 1984; Snyder 1984). While offensive biases predispose officers to favor preventive military action, they also risk inadvertently provoking war, even if parochial biases do not lead military officers to recommend it outright.7 Finally, military officers in this view tend to focus on the immediate costs and benefits of initiating preventive wars while ignoring potential long-term drawbacks. When problems of managing the postwar world are excluded from the decision-making calculus, deterrence is more easily undermined. Pessimists draw much of their empirical support from analyses of American military thinking during the Cold War (Trachtenberg 1988; Rosenberg 1983; Gentile 2000). They contend that in the early stages of the Cold War, the suggestion that the United States “precipitate a major war at a time when we have the greatest potential for winning it” (Nichols 1987: 9-12) enjoyed widespread support—indeed, even becoming the “prevailing philosophy” (Brodie 1953: 1) among high-ranking military officers.8 I argue, however, that while this view of military organizations may apply to analyses of conventional military stability, it does not necessarily support gloomy conclusions about the probability of preventive war among emerging nuclear states. In this respect, the discussion of organization theory within the preventive war debate has been at best incomplete. First, there are good reasons to believe that defensive nuclear doctrines support the organizational goals of militaries in ways that defensive conventional doctrines do not. On one hand, while conventional defense carries the disadvantage of fighting a war according to somebody else’s “standard scenario,” this is hardly relevant in a nuclear environment, where the offensive seizure of territory has less (and perhaps no) meaning. On the other hand, nuclear survivability—a strictly defensive mission—demands a set of weaponry at least as advanced and diverse as that of the offense. Air defenses, warhead shelters, hardened communication nodes, missile silos, and mobile transporters are just a few of the multifarious countermeasures that may be prepared by emerging nuclear nations. The resources required for a strictly defensive posture consequently may not be significantly less than those required for offense. It is thus problematic to predict offensive nuclear biases strictly from the parochial interests of militaries—it is not clear that such interests are better served by the blind construction of more nuclear weapons. Second, the argument that militaries prefer preventive war as a means to reduce uncertainty and ensure that wars are fought on their terms is not persuasive in a nuclear environment. If organizations seek to avoid uncertainty, as organization theory asserts, one would expect that they would be loathe to take on radical and new endeavors (like launching surprise attacks) for fear of disrupting the predictable status quo. For most organizations, change is to be feared, not embraced—indeed, sociologists have often noted the inability of large organizations to undertake radical innovation when external circumstances demand it (Cyert and March 1963). War—particularly against a near-nuclear rival—is a highly uncertain and risky activity, and militaries bear the brunt of this risk. Consequently, organization theory would expect militaries to be unlikely to favor disrupting a stable operational environment by sending troops into battle unless war with a rival appears absolutely imminent. Third, even if military officers tend to favor preventive war when civilian control is strong, they are unlikely to retain this bias when civilian control is weak. Pessimists argue that militaries focus on pure military logic because their bureaucratic assignments demand that they do so—under civilian-controlled governments, militaries have no responsibilities other than winning wars, and can thus focus strictly on military affairs. Such is not the case, however, when civilian control is minimal. Organization theory suggests that militaries who run the entire government apparatus must think a great deal about diplomatic, economic, and political problems. The narrow military viewpoint that once colored officers’ perceptions of problems, solutions, and consequences thus dissolves, and with it the propensity to favor preventive war.

### 2NC Preemptive Strikes

#### 2. No incentive for preemptive strikes—they can’t solve—lack of delivery capabilities, decoys and target mobility

Seng 98 (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci.—U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES,” p. 156)

In sum, though Third World proliferators are likely to lack some of the technologies that dissipated preemptive incentives between the superpowers, they will also enjoy circumstances that allow them to protect their nuclear weapons from first strikes without those technologies. In some situations of Third World proliferation, preemptors will have to rely on bombers to deliver the preemptive strike. Bombers are relatively slow, which decreases the chances that preemptive strikes will eliminate nuclear weapons on the ground before counterlaunch. Bombers are also vulnerable to air defenses, which decreases the chances that a preemptive effort will be successful in eliminating all of its targets. Nuclear-capable missiles are becoming more and more plentiful in the Third World, and their addition to nuclear relationships is likely co increase the ease of weapons protection rather than increasing the viability of counterforce strategies. Third World missiles will not be as accurate as the superpower weapons, which makes them less appropriate for counterforce missions. In addition, the small size of Third World nuclear arsenals, the small size of Third World missiles, and the poor reconnaissance capabilities of Third World adversaries will facilitate missile mobility and effective hiding strategies. Third World proliferators may lack the hardening technologies and early warning systems of the superpowers but, on balance, there is no reason to expect preemptive incentives to be any stronger for Third World proliferators than they were for the U.S. and Soviets.

### AT: Accidents

#### Fear of accidents prevents them from ever occurring

Waltz 95 [Kenneth, Prof. Emeritus of Pol. Sci—UC Berkeley, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate,” p. 111]

Deterrence is also a considerable guarantee against accidents, since it causes countries to take good care of their weapons, and against anonymous use, since those firing the weapons can neither know that they will be undetected nor what form of punishment detection might bring. In life, uncertainties abound. In a conventional world, they more easily lead to war because less is at stake. Even so, it is difficult to think of wars that have started by accident even before nuclear weapons were invented. It is hard to believe that nuclear war may begin accidentally, when less frightening conventional wars have rarely done so.21 Fear of accidents works against their occurring. Again this is illustrated by the Cuban Missile Crisis. Accidents happened during the crisis, and unplanned events took place. An American U-2 strayed over Siberia, and one flew over Cuba. The American navy continued! to play games at sea, such games as trying to force Soviet submarines to surface. In a crisis, presidents and party chairmen wanted to control all relevant actions, while knowing they could not do so. Fear of losing control propelled Kennedy and Khrushchev to end the crisis quickly. In a conventional world, uncertainty may tempt a country to join battle. In a nuclear world, uncertainty has the opposite effect. What is not surely controllable is too dangerous to bear.

#### No historical support for this.

Hagerty 98 (Devin, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci.—UMBC, “The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons From South Asia”, p. 192)

INADVERTENT WAR. Another possibility is inadvertent war. This is the notion that during a future crisis India and Pakistan might stumble into a conflict neither side actually wants. This fear of inadvertence stems from the supposedly inherent logic of preemption, each side's stated conventional military doctrine of "offensive-defense," and the shaky intelligence estimates of India's Research and Analysis Wing and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. From this perspective, miscalculation of the adversary's intentions by one or both sides might lead inexorably to a shooting war. As the fighting progresses, either or both sides (but most likely Pakistan) might ready nuclear weapons for last-resort use. At this point, goes this reasoning, all bets are off and a nuclear exchange is a real possibility. While compelling on the surface, this logic does not hold up to sustained scrutiny. None of the three Indo-Pakistani wars began inadvertently; indeed, all of the major international wars since the end of World War II have been premeditated. It is even less likely that two nuclear powers would slide down the slippery slope into war, given the additional margin of caution induced by nuclear weapons.

#### New powers will have MUCH better command and control.

Seng 98 (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci.—U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES,” p. 200-201)

Third World proliferators will have two important advantages in terms of command and control that help alleviate the concerns of analysts. One, because their arsenals will be so small, their launch bureaucracies and control organizations can be very small. Third World proliferators may well cultivate positive control by delegating launch capability to peripheral commanders, and/or the lack of electronic use-control devices may make it difficult for central commanders to physically prevent peripheral commanders from launching weapons inappropriately. However, the limited numbers of weapons in Third World arsenals will mean that there need not be more than a handful of peripheral launch commanders. There may be more than one 'finger on the button' in Third World nuclear states, but not many more. Peripheral commanders can be carefully screened and tightly supervised by central command. Moreover, because the numbers of personnel involved in nuclear launches will be very small, Third World proliferators will not suffer the dangers of large and complicated organizational routines and standard operating procedures that plagued the superpowers. The organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite and unambiguous decision to press that button. Finally, small arsenals are also easy to secure from thieves and terrorists. The requirements of securing small arsenals are not likely to overburden the resources of Third World states. Two, as argued above, Third World proliferators will be able to protect their weapons from first strikes by simply concealing them. Concealment strategies will give proliferators the luxury of time////

in their launch procedures, which means that proliferators need not eschew negative control features to ensure that nuclear counter-launches happen quickly and automatically. A quick reaction rime is not crucial to concealment strategies; if adversaries cannot find weapons in the weeks and months before launching an attack, they will not be able to find them in the few days following. Counter-launches can proceed slowly. Launch commanders and operators can take their time in doublechecking the appropriateness of launches by confirming that attack alarms are not false and/or waiting to get 'go-aheads' from higher authorities. Also, because peripheral commanders and launch operators in the Third World will probably have launch capability (i.e., because they will not be restricted by electronic use-control devices or because they may be given launch capability by design), central authorities do not have to worry about decapitation strikes thwarting their counter-launches. If central command is destroyed, peripheral launch delegates can launch on their own—after caking the time to confirm that central command is indeed gone.

### China

#### US NFU will not impact India’s nuke doctrine

Tertrais, 09 (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) [Bruno Tertrais (Associate Researcher at the Centre d’Etude des Relations Internationales (CERI)), “The Trouble with No First Use,” Forum: The Case for No First Use: An Exchange, Survival, Volume 51, Issue 5 October 2009 , pages 17 – 46//Informaworld])

Sagan argues that first-use options encourage other countries to follow suit, citing the example of India. But nuclear doctrines are hardly a matter of fashion. They are driven by security interests and technical capabilities, political imperative and moral choices. More often than not, the same causes produce the same effects. Other countries' doctrines are used essentially as legitimising factors. New Delhi abandoned its no-first-use policy in 2003 for fear that Pakistan or China could use chemical or biological weapons in the course of a conflict against India despite their ratification of the relevant conventions. //EDLEE

#### Pakistan won’t model --- military-strategic considerations overwhelm.

**Bajpai 02** - Professor of International Studies @ Jawaharlal Nehru University [Kanti Bajpai, “No First Use in the India-Pakistan Context,” Pugwash Meeting no. 279, London, UK, 15-17 November 2002, pg. http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/bajpai.htm.]

Pakistani skepticism or opposition to NFU seems to arise from the following concerns. In contrast to India, Pakistan’s thinking on a no first use/first use policy is almost completely military-strategic. First of all, as in India and elsewhere in the world, there are those in Pakistan who doubt the efficacy and practicality of an NFU. In extremis, can Pakistan rely on India’s leadership to abide by a no first use commitment? Is there any way of verifying that an adversary is committed to no first use?

Secondly, even if NFU were credible, acceptance of it would mean permanent Pakistani strategic inferiority and vulnerability. Given Pakistan’s inferiority in conventional forces, the threat of first use is vital to its deterrent against India, while the actual use of nuclear weapons first may be vital to defence if and when deterrence fails.

#### No Indo-China war

Wagner & Agarwal, ‘10

[Daniel, Managing Dir. – Country Risk Solutions (a pol and econ risk consultancy), and Subhash, New-Delhi based political analyst and founer – India Focus, Huffington Post, “The State of Indian-Sino Relations”, 2010, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/the-state-of-indian-sino_b_458847.html>]

Indian/Sino friction will continue in the coming decade and is likely will be based on three primary issues: 1) The disputed border: Having never formally resolved their lingering border dispute, both countries will continue to find the absence of a resolution an irritant that will underlay and influence the health of bilateral relations; 2) Naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean: As China seeks to project its power regionally, India's navy will continue to be the only regional impediment to China's blue water ambitions. Other countries in the region may object to China's projection of sea power, but only India has the ability to challenge it; and 3) Pakistan: China's continuing support of Pakistan's military, and by extension its ability to remain an irritant on the subject of Kashmir, will remain a point of contention for India. India is of course aware that China has deftly spread its diplomatic influence globally in a very short span of time, largely through the disbursement of overseas aid (to African and Latin American nations) and through careful nurturing of its political connections in the West. Indian business, more than Indian diplomats, look longingly at the list of former U.S. government officials who have at some point in the past two decades acted as intermediaries and lobbyists for Chinese business interests -- from Henry Kissinger to Alexander Haig to Cyrus Vance. India also knows that Chinese ascendancy is much more than economic. Part of the future competition between India and China will be based on whether India can develop its military hardware and rebuild its naval muscle faster than Chinese attempts to build cultural and diplomatic sophistication. **But neither China nor India have an interest in overt or uncontrolled hostility. Both will work for their respective long-term interests within the rules of the present global order,** with China having greater deliberation and speed than India. It is most unlikely that China will attack India, even in the Northeast. Any military action by China towards any of its neighbors, especially a democracy like India, will erode the carefully crafted image of its "peaceful rise" and will only serve to reignite the Tibet issue. It would also provide a diplomatic opportunity for the U.S. to justify its continued militarily presence in Asia, as well as prompt Japan to want to expand its own military presence in the region.

#### Indo-Pak war doesn’t escalate.

Gwynne Dyer 02, Ph.D. in war studies from the University of London, serves on the Board of Governors of Canada’s Royal Military College, independent journalist, May 24, 2002, Hamilton Spectator, “Nuclear war a possibility over Kashmir,” p. Lexis

For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is that the damage would be largely confined to the region. The Cold War is over, the strategic understandings that once tied India and Pakistan to the rival alliance systems have all been cancelled, and no outside powers would be drawn into the fighting. The detonation of a hundred or so relatively small nuclear weapons over India and Pakistan would not cause grave harm to the wider world from fallout.

#### Regional factors are the most significant influence on Indian nuclear doctrine.

Creasman, 08 (Major David, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, “The Evolution of India’s Nuclear Program: Implications for the United States”, 5-22, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485460&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Ashley Tellis, in his study for RAND, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture states that “in general there are four variables that will influence the direction, extent, and patterns of change in India’s nuclear posture over time: the character of the global nuclear regime; the demands imposed by regional security and, in particular, regional nuclear threats; the character of India’s bilateral relations with key powers in the international system; and the opportunities offered by indigenous performance and capabilities in the context of domestic political debates about nuclearization.”62 In examining Tellis’ work, these variables are vital to achieve an understanding of Indian nuclear doctrine and policy in that these factors have shaped the way that Indians have thought of themselves and their role in the world since beginning to explore the use of nuclear weapons. Global Nuclear Issues Global nuclear issues are critical because they assist in determining “the direction, extent, and patterns of change in India’s nuclear posture. Most but not all, of the world’s major powers are nuclear weapons states. Most, but not all, of the world’s nuclear weapons states are major powers.”63 Because of this, the global nuclear regime influences the direction of India’s nuclear posture in that “it makes denuclearization impossible and, to the extent that it allows the existing nuclear weapon states to continually maintain and perhaps improve their arsenals even if only in qualitative term.”64 While this does not mean that Indian policymakers are unaware of the changes that have occurred in the global nuclear regime, it does imply that the changes that have occurred are insufficient and possess little to no impact on their own situation. The present global nuclear regime is viewed within India with mixed opinions. In his book India: Emerging Power, Stephen Cohen identifies two arguments that favor India’s attempt to be a part of the global nuclear regime: “On the one hand, nuclear weapons were considered a shameful badge worn by the great powers of the cold war. On the other extreme, some saw a positive link between India’s nuclear weapons and great power status.”65 This is because in an era where nuclear countries continue to downsize their nuclear arsenals to historic lows because of the reduced threat from other nuclear weapon equipped countries, India (and Pakistan) continues to explore ways to increase the size and capability of their own arsenals. Indian policymakers see this global reduction as being in their strategic interests as it allows them to maintain a type of status quo with other nuclear countries. In analyzing the various documents on India’s nuclear posture it is evident that despite the changing world nuclear posture, there are a number of options available to nuclear equipped countries to affect India’s nuclear posture- by influencing the nature of the nuclear deterrence regime. The significant issue is that the current deterrence strategies are centered on offensive capabilities; that implies the capacity of a nuclear power to readily inflict horrible damage on the population centers of an adversary.66 This offensive dominant posture has significant advantages because it requires only modest nuclear arsenals for the purpose of deterrence. This is especially important for emerging nuclear powers, since relatively small nuclear forces can hold at risk a large number of adversarial population centers. “Small nuclear forces can therefore function as highly credible deterrents in an offense-dominant regime. As long as the present regime, which ultimately derives its efficacy from MAD, remains intact, it is therefore likely that the future Indian nuclear arsenal would remain relatively modest, at least by the standards of the Cold War.”67 In conclusion, the global nuclear order affects India’s future nuclear posture in significant ways. It defines the potential for further nuclearization or denuclearization and ultimately determines the character of the threat. In light of the data collected on this topic, it is evident that the size and scope of India’s nuclear program will come into question as nuclear equipped countries continue to downsize their arsenals and India makes strides to become a more effective nuclear equipped regional power. This allows India to become the offensive postured nuclear force that is capable of maintaining the deterrent force in South Asia. Regional Nuclear Threats **In contrast to India’s global outlook, there are far more pressing concerns in their regional relations as they relate to their current nuclear posture**. This subsection of the monograph analyzes India’s relations with two regional rivals-Pakistan and China. It is with these two rivals that India has historically feuded over border areas, regional dominance and nuclear weapons capabilities. “Since the early 1990s India and Pakistan have been steadily moving their nuclear deterrence from aircraft based to ballistic missile based with potentially devastating results for the Indo-subcontinent’s stability.”68 This move from aircraft based to missile based delivery increases the ambiguity between the nations as to the extent of their nuclear programs, which could ultimately result in fears over preemption and false early warnings resulting in nuclear launches by both countries. In addition to India’s nuclear issues with Pakistan, the regional foreign policy is based upon the assumptions that, “the entire subcontinent is a single strategic unit on the basis of perceived geophysical and cultural unity and Indian in terms of culture and geographic history; the strategic unity of the subcontinent therefore naturally leads to the inappropriateness of the Two Nations Theory for the subcontinent which undermines India’s image of itself as a secular, pluralistic, multiethnic democracy; and that Indian hegemony in South Asia is both natural and desirable.”69 These Indian assumptions lead to the root problem of Indo-Pakistan relations; as each side sees themselves as being the dominant power, tensions increase. This is never more evident than the continuing Kashmir conflict that has been in some state of warfare since 1947. A second major regional actor that affects Indian nuclear posture is China. “Since 1962, nuclear weapons have played a significant role in Sino-Indian relations.”70 Indian leaders have perceived a clear nuclear threat from China since 1964 and it is China’s land-based ballistic missile force, together with the types of warheads that can be delivered, that remain India’s principle concern in the near term.

#### Zero risk of Russian war

Graham 7 (Thomas Graham, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs” The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

## \*\*\* 2NR

### AT: Robock

#### AND, nuclear winter doesn’t exist—Robock is cooking the numbers

Seitz 11—Research fellow in physics @ Harvard University [Russell Seitz (Ph. D in applied physics @ Harvard University), “Nuclear winter was and is debatable,” Nature, 475, 37 (07 July 2011) pg. http://tinyurl.com/7jr3sxz]

Alan Robock's contention that there has been no real scientific debate about the 'nuclear winter' concept is itself debatable (Nature 473, 275–276; 2011). This potential climate disaster, popularized in Science in 1983, rested on the output of a one-dimensional model that was later shown to overestimate the smoke a nuclear holocaust might engender. More refined estimates, combined with advanced three-dimensional models (see http://go.nature.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/kss8te), have dramatically reduced the extent and severity of the projected cooling.

Despite this, Carl Sagan, who co-authored the 1983 Science paper, went so far as to posit “the extinction of Homo sapiens” (C. Sagan Foreign Affairs 63, 75–77; 1984). Some regarded this apocalyptic prediction as an exercise in mythology. George Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology protested: “Nuclear winter is the worst example of the **misrepresentation of science** to the public in my memory,” (see http://go.nature.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/yujz84) and climatologist Kerry Emanuel observed that the subject had “become notorious for its lack of scientific integrity” (Nature 319, 259; 1986).

Robock's single-digit fall in temperature is at odds with the subzero (about −25 °C) continental cooling originally projected for a wide spectrum of nuclear wars. Whereas Sagan predicted darkness at noon from a US–Soviet nuclear conflict, Robock projects global sunlight that is several orders of magnitude brighter for a Pakistan–India conflict — literally the difference between night and day. Since 1983, the projected worst-case cooling has fallen from a Siberian deep freeze spanning 11,000 degree-days Celsius (a measure of the severity of winters) to numbers so unseasonably small as to call the very term 'nuclear winter' into question.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)