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**“Statutory” restrictions are binding law enacted by Congress**

**Hill 13** – Gerald Hill, Juris Doctor from Hastings College of the Law of the University of California, Executive Director of the California Governor's Housing Commission, AB from Stanford University and Kathleen Hill, M.A. in Political Psychology from California State University, Sonoma, Fellow in Public Affairs at the Coro Foundation, The People's Law Dictionary, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2010

statute

n. a Federal or state written law **enacted by** the **Congress** or state legislature, respectively. Local statutes or laws are usually called "ordinances." **Regulations**, **rulings**, **opinions**, **executive orders** and **proclamations** are **not statutes**.

**“Judicial” is courts --- distinct from other actors**

**Webster’s 1** – Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law, “Judicial”, http://research.lawyers.com/glossary/judicial.html

Judicial

Definition - adj

[Latin judicialis, from judicium judgment, from judic- judex judge, from jus right, law + dicere to determine, say]

1 a : of or relating to a judgment, the function of judging, the administration of justice, or the judiciary

b : of, relating to, or being the branch of government that is charged with trying all cases that involve the government and with the administration of justice within its jurisdiction

compare **administrative** **executive** **legislative**

2 : created, ordered, or enforced by a court <a ~ foreclosure>

compare conventional legal

Pronunciation jü-'di-sh&l

**Plan’s not statutory or judicial --- voting issue:**

**Limits --- there are nearly infinite possible restrictions --- they allow any type: individual, state, agency, etc. --- ruins core ground based on the mechanism --- explodes Neg research burdens**

**Precision**

**Cederwall 11** – Paul D. Cederwall, Certified Public Accountant at Pacific Northwest Consultants, “Difference Between Statutory, Regulatory, and Contract Requirements”, Pacific Northwest Consultants, 12-28, http://pacificnwc.blogspot.com/2011/12/difference-between-statutory-regulatory.html

We often **throw around terms** like "statutory requirements", "regulatory requirements", and "contract requirements". Often times, these terms are used interchangeably and sometimes **imprecisely**.

The **fundamental difference** is that statutes are **enacted by Congress** and signed into law by the President whereas regulations are issued by executive agencies in order to implement statutes enacted by Congress. An example of a statute would be Public Law 87-653, The Truth in Negotiations Act. An example of a regulation would be FAR Part 31 Cost Principles. Regulations must be consistent with the enabling statute and the agency must follow the rule making process of the Administrative Procedures Act (i.e. publication of proposed regulation, public comment, final regulation). Regulations have the "force and effect of law" meaning they are just as enforceable as statutes.

From a practical matter then, it makes no difference to a Government contractor whether a requirement flows directly from a statute or whether it flows from a regulation implementing a statute. The contractor must comply either way.

"Contract Requirements" can be statutory, regulatory, or something else. Government contracts are full of regulatory and statutory requirements as well as requirements that are specific or unique to the particular contract. For example, a contract might require contractors to advise the contracting officer when making key personnel moves. Such a requirement has no basis in statute or regulation but is no less enforceable under the contract.

### 1NC K 1

#### The discourse of “whiteness” as a continuous and unidirectional historical project from slavery to the contemporary era prevents effective anti-racist struggle.

#### There are two problems with their characterization of “whiteness”

#### Whiteness is treated as purely negative—their discourse attaches whiteness intrinsically to hierarchy rather than difference. *Slippage in their rhetoric equates “whiteness” with white supremacy*. They do this when they say “White subjectivities are ultimately deputized as little police operatives by the homeland security apparatus conducting a war against racially marked Others.” This posit a purely negative role for white subjectivities

#### Historical oversimplification. Though there is continuity between different white projects failure to recognize, and productively cooperate with alternative white racial formations makes their method counterproductive.

Howard WINANT Sociology @ UCSB 97 [Behind Blue Eyes: Contemporary White Racial Politics, http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/winant/whitness.html]

In a quiet office at a Washington think tank, a balding white man with a Ph.D composes a tract on the biologically-determined intellectual inferiority of blacks. Out on a Brooklyn street, as black demonstrators march through a segregated white enclave, white residents yell racist epithets. In a suburban Virginia church, an evangelical Protestant minister preaches to a largely white, overwhelmingly middle-class audience. At an urban college campus in California, whites and blacks, Latinos and Asians, sit side-by-side in the overcrowded classroom, and in their own separate groups in the cafeteria. As they drive home to their segregated neighborhoods, they pump the same high-volume hip-hop sounds through their car speakers. A few miles up the interstate, neo-Nazis train at a private ranch. A few miles the other way, a multiracial garment workers' union is being organized; a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit are Asians and Latinos, but there are some whites. Among the organizers, one of the most effective is a young white woman who speaks good Spanish. How can we make sense of the highly variable "whiteness" of these rather emblematic characters? How does the contemporary US racial order locate white identities? Indeed, how viable is white identity? Is whiteness merely the absence of "color," the sign of "privilege"? Is it, in other words, a purely negative signifier? Or is it possible to view white identities more positively, to see whiteness in terms of "difference" perhaps, but not in terms of racial domination, supremacy, or hierarchy? In this essay I look at US racial politics and culture as they shape the status of whites. In other words, I begin from the premise that it is no longer possible to assume a "normalized" whiteness, whose invisibility and relatively monolithic character signify immunity from political or cultural challenge. An alternative perspective is demanded, one which begins from a recognition of white racial dualism. My discussion of this theme, in the next section of this essay, is an extension to whites of the Duboisian idea that in a racist society the "color line" fractures the self, that it imposes a sort of schizophrenia on the bearers of racialized identities, which forces them to see themselves simultaneously from within and without. Du Bois of course intended this analysis to explain problems of black politics and culture at the turn of the 20th century; it was a time when few publically questioned the normalization of whiteness. I extrapolate his idea to whites at the end of the 20th century; today, I suggest, whiteness has been deeply fissured by the racial conflicts of the post-civil rights period. Since the 1960s contemporary racial discourse has been unable to function as a logic of racial superiority and justified exclusion. Therefore it has been forced into rearticulations, representations, reinterpretations of the meaning of race and, perforce, of whiteness. In the following section of this paper I analyze the new politicization of whiteness which has taken shape particularly in the post-civil rights era -- the period since the ambiguous victory of the civil rights movement in the mid-1960s. Here we discuss the reasons why, contrary to the racially egalitarian thrust of the civil rights "revolution," the significance of white identity was reinterpreted and repoliticized -- largely in a reactionary direction -- in the wake of the 1960s. I identify several factors contributing to this shift: the erosion of traditional ethnicities, the decline of class-based politics, and the elaboration of right-wing racial ideologies able to rearticulate some of the 1960s movement demands in a discourse of conservatism and "color-blindness." Next, I analyze the range of white racial projects that the contemporary politics of racial dualism generates. My account of racial projects, as developed in earlier work, focuses on the relationship between representation and structure. Therefore in this investigation I look for distinct views on the meaning of whiteness. How do these interpretations link to political positions, policies, and programs? I discuss a series of racial projects that span the political continuum, and develop some critical perspectives on the "left" or "progressive" projects. In the final section, I focus on the future of whiteness in the US, and sketch out some elements of what a potential anti-racist politics for whites might look like. Whiteness as Racial Dualism Once, US society was a nearly monolithic racial hierarchy, in which everyone knew "his" place. Today, nobody knows where he or she fits in the US racial order. Thirty years after the enactment of civil rights legislation, agreement about the continuing existence of racial subordination has vanished. The meaning of race has been deeply problematized. Why? Because the legacy of centuries of white supremacy lives on in the present, despite the partial victories of the 1960s. Because the idea of "equality," it turned out, could be reinterpreted, rearticulated, reinserted in the business-as-usual framework of US politics and culture. Because that framework is extremely resilient and able to absorb political challenges, even fundamental and radical ones. Because the outlawing of formal discrimination, which was a crucial and immediate objective of the 1960s movements, did not mean that informal racist practices would be eradicated, or indeed even that anti-discrimination laws would be seriously enforced. And yet it would be inaccurate to say that the movement failed. In virtually every area of social life, the impact of the postwar racial mobilizations is plain to see (Jaynes and Williams 1989). Although in some sectors, like housing desegregation, massive efforts to transform an entrenched and complex pattern of racial discrimination were largely (though not entirely) defeated (Massey and Denton 1993), in other areas -- for example the desegregation of the armed forces (Moskos 1988, Butler 1980) -- really remarkable change occurred. More relevant to this article, white racial attitudes shifted drmatically in the postwar period. As the definitive work on the subject put it: [S]egregation of and discrimination against black people were supported as principles by a majority of white Americans in the early 1940s, and no doubt in the preceding decades. By the early 1970s, however, support for overt discrimination in employment had nearly vanished..., and in most other public spheres of life -- public accommodations, public transportation, and even public schools -- the proportion of the white population insisting on segregation in principle was both small and shrinking (Schuman et al 1985, 193; emphasis original). "In principle." In practice, however, research demonstrates a continuing [W]hite reluctance to accept the implementation of policies intended to change race relations; reluctance on the part of whites to enter social settings (e.g., schools) in which blacks are the majority; continuing discriminatory behavior by whites, especially in areas involving close personal contact; conflicting beliefs of whites with regard to the values of equality and individualism...(Jaynes and Williams, eds. 1989, 116). So, monolithic white supremacy is over, yet in a more concealed way, white power and privilege live on. The overt politics of racial subordination has been destroyed, yet it is still very possible to "play the racial card" in the political arena. Racially-defined minorities are no longer subject to legal segregation, but they have not been relieved of the burdens of discrimination, even by laws supposedly intended to do so. Whites are no longer the official "ruling race," yet they still enjoy many of the privileges descended from the time when they were. In this situation the old recipes for racial equality, which involved creation of a "color-blind" society, have been transformed into formulas for the maintenance of racial inequality. The old programs for eliminating white racial privilege are now suspected of creating nonwhite racial privilege. The welfare state, once seen as the instrument for overcoming poverty and social injustice, is now accused of fomenting these very ills. Therefore, not only blacks (and other racially-identified minorities), but also whites, now experience a division in their racial identities. On the one hand, whites inherit the legacy of white supremacy, from which they continue to benefit. But on the other hand, they are subject to the moral and political challenges posed to that inheritance by the partial but real successes of the black movement (and affiliated movements). These movements advanced a countertradition to white supremacy, one which envisioned a radicalized, inclusive, participatory democracy, a substantively egalitarian economy, and a nonracial state. They deeply affected whites as well as blacks, exposing and denouncing often unconscious beliefs in white supremacy, and demanding new and more respectful forms of behavior in relation to nonwhites. Just as the movements partially reformed white supremacist institutions, so they partially transformed white racial consciousness. Obviously, they did not destroy the deep structures of white privilege, but they did make counterclaims on behalf of the racially excluded and subordinated. As a result, white identities have been displaced and refigured: they are now contradictory, as well as confused and anxiety ridden, to an unprecedented extent. It is this situation which can be described as white racial dualism.[1]

#### Their starting point understands all existing white racial projects as coded forms of white-supremacy. Instead, we develop an alternative starting point that recognizes distinct white racial projects.

Howard WINANT Sociology @ UCSB 97 [Behind Blue Eyes: Contemporary White Racial Politics, http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/winant/whitness.html]

Yet it would be inaccurate to describe the racial reaction of the post-civil rights era as merely a new form of "coded" white supremacy. A crucial aspect of its success was its ability to reinterpret some of the 1960s movements' most cherished demands in a conservative and individualistic discourse focused on formal equality. This was in fact a legitimate rendition of certain movement positions, which were selected, to be sure, from a generally more radical movement discourse, but not invented out of whole cloth. The frequent reference made on the right to Dr. King's phrase about "the content of their character, not the color of their skin" (Steele 1990), for example, demonstrates the possibility of rearticulating movement claims in a more pacific direction, and not coincidentally, in a direction far more palatable to whites. The neoconservative rearticulation of 1960s movement demands in the form of the "color-blind" ideal of what a racially egalitarian society would look like thus served several purposes: it did in fact embody a certain current in movement thinking; it described the limited but real accomplishments of integration, accommodation, and tolerance that were achieved in the post-1960s period; it offered a concrete vision of how US society might get "beyond race"; it allowed society's inevitable failure to do this on a large scale to be blamed on "race radicals" and "separatists," who insisted on cultivating a "victim mentality"; and, as I have mentioned, it provided a fig leaf with which to cover over the unpleasant fact that widespread discrimination, and indeed unreconstructed white supremacist attitudes, remained. \*\*\* Thus from the late 1960s on, white identity has been reinterpreted, rearticulated in a dualistic fashion: on the one hand egalitarian, on the other hand privileged; on the one hand individualistic and "color-blind," on the other hand "normalized" and white. Nowhere is this new framework of the white "politics of difference" more clearly on display than in the reaction to affirmative action policies of all sorts (in hiring, university admissions, federal contracting, etc.). Assaults on these policies, which have been developing since their introduction as tentative and quite limited efforts at racial redistribution (Johnson 1967, but see also Steinberg 1994), are currently at hysterical levels. These attacks are clearly designed to effect ideological shifts, rather than to shift resources in any meaningful way. They represent whiteness as disadvantage, something which has few precedents in US racial history (Gallagher 1995). This imaginary white disadvantage -- for which there is almost no evidence at the empirical level -- has achieved widespread popular credence, and provides the cultural and political "glue" that holds together a wide variety of reactionary racial politics. White Racial Projects Both the onset of white racial dualism and the new politicization of whiteness in the post-civil rights era reflect the fragmentation of earlier concepts of white racial identity and of white supremacy more generally. In their place, a variety of concepts of the meaning of whiteness have emerged. How can we analyze and evaluate in systematic fashion this range of white racial projects? As I have argued elsewhere (Winant 1994, Omi and Winant 1994), the concept of racial projects is crucial to understanding the dynamics of racial formation in contemporary society. In this approach, the key element in racial formation is the link between signification and structure, between what race means in a particular discursive practice and how, based upon such interpretations, social structures are racially organized. The link between meaning and structure, discourse and institution, signification and organization, is concretized in the notion of the racial project. To interpret the meaning of race in a particular way at a given time is at least implicitly, but more often explicitly, to propose or defend a certain social policy, a particular racialized social structure, a racial order. The reverse is also true: in a highly racialized society, to put in place a particular social policy, or to mobilize for social or political action, is at least implicitly, but more often explicitly, to articulate a particular set of racial meanings, to signify race in certain ways. Existing racial projects can be classified along a political spectrum, according to explicit criteria drawn from the meaning each project attaches to "whiteness." Such a classification will necessarily be somewhat schematic, since in the real world of politics and culture ideas and meanings, as well as social practices, tend to overlap in unpredictable ways. Nevertheless, I think it would be beneficial to attempt to sort out alternative conceptions of whiteness, along with the politics that both flow from and inform these conceptions. This is what I attempt here, focusing on five key racial projects, which I term far right, new right, neoconservative, neoliberal, and new abolitionist.

#### Their understanding of whiteness leaves whites with one option—repudiation.

#### *Repudiation* is bound to fail—instead we need a representation of “whiteness” that facilitates *rearticulating* a positive, and anti-racist white racial formation.

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Nevertheless, the neoliberal project does undertake a crucial task: the construction of a transracial political agenda, and the articulation of white and minority interests in a viable strategic perspective. This is something which has been missing from the US political scene since the enactment of civil rights legislation thirty years ago. THE ABOLITIONIST PROJECT Drawing their inspiration from W.E.B. Du Bois and James Baldwin, the social historians who have provided the core insights of the abolitionist project stress the "invention of whiteness" as a pivotal development in the rise of US capitalism. They have begun a process of historical reinterpretation which aims to set race -- or more properly, the gestation and evolution of white supremacy -- at the center of US politics and culture. Thus far, they have focused attention on a series of formative events and processes: the precedent of British colonial treatment of the Irish (Allen 1994, Ignatiev 1995); the early, multiracial resistance to indentured servitude and quasi-slavery, which culminated in the defeat of Bacon's Rebellion in late 17th century Virginia; the self-identification of "free" workers as white in the antebellum North (Roediger 1991); and the construction of a "white republic" in the late 19th century (Saxton 1990). These studies, in some cases quite prodigious intellectual efforts, have had a significant impact on how we understand not only racial formation, but also class formation and the developing forms of popular culture in US history. What they reveal above all is how crucial the construction of whiteness was, and remains, for the development and maintenance of capitalist class rule in the US. Furthermore, these studies also show how the meaning of whiteness, like that of race in general, has time and again proved flexible enough to adapt to shifts in the capitalist division of labor, to reform initiatives which extended democratic rights, and to changes in ideology and cultural representation. The core message of the abolitionist project is the imperative of repudiation of white identity and white privilege, the requirement that "the lie of whiteness" be exposed. This rejection of whiteness on the part of those who benefit from it, this "new abolitionism," it is argued, is a precondition for the establishment of substantive racial equality and social justice -- or more properly, socialism -- in the US. Whites must become "race traitors," as the new journal of the abolitionist project calls itself. Its motto: "Treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity." How is this rejection of whiteness to be accomplished? Both analytical and practical measures are envisioned. On the intellectual level, the abolitionist project invites us to contemplate the emptiness, indeed vacuity, of the white category: It is not merely that whiteness is oppressive and false; it is that whiteness is nothing but oppressive and false.... It is the empty and terrifying attempt to build an identity based on what one isn't and on whom one can hold back (Roediger 1994, 13; emphasis original). In short, there is no white culture, no white politics, no whiteness, except in the sense of distancing and rejection of racially-defined "otherness." On the practical level, the argument goes, whites can become "race traitors" by rejecting their privilege, by refusing to collude with white supremacy. When you hear that racist joke, confront its teller. When you see the police harassing a nonwhite youth, try to intervene or at least bear witness. In short, recognize that white supremacy depends on the thousands of minute acts that reproduce it from moment to moment; it must "deliver" to whites a sense of their own security and superiority; it must make them feel that "I am different from those "others." Single gestures of this sort, Race Traitor's editors say, ...would [not] in all likelihood be of much consequence. But if enough of those who looked white broke the rules of the club to make the cops doubt their ability to recognize a white person merely by looking at him or her, how would it affect the cops' behavior (Editorial 1993, 4-5)? Thus the point is not that all whites recognize the lie of their privilege, but that enough whites do so, and act out their rejection of that lie, to disrupt the "white club's" ability to enforce its supremacy. It is easy to sympathize with this analysis, at least up to a point. The postwar black movement, which in the US context at least served as the point of origin for all the "new social movements" and the much-reviled "politics of identity," taught the valuable lesson that politics went "all the way down." That is, meaningful efforts to achieve greater social justice could not tolerate a public/private, or a collective/individual distinction. Trying to change society meant trying to change one's own life. The formula "the personal is political," commonly associated with feminism, had its early origins among the militants of the civil rights movement (Evans 1980). The problems come when deeper theoretical and practical problems are raised. Despite their explicit adherence to a "social construction" model of race (one which bears a significant resemblance to my own work), theorists of the abolitionist project do not take that insight as seriously as they should. They employ it chiefly to argue against biologistic conceptions of race, which is fine; but they fail to consider the complexities and rootedness of social construction, or as we would term it, racial formation. Is the social construction of whiteness so flimsy that it can be repudiated by a mere act of political will, or even by widespread and repeated acts aimed at rejecting white privilege? I think not; whiteness may not be a legitimate cultural identity in the sense of having a discrete, "positive" content, but it is certainly an overdetermined political and cultural category, having to do with socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, ideologies of individualism, opportunity, and citizenship, nationalism, etc. Like any other complex of beliefs and practices, "whiteness" is imbedded in a highly articulated social structure and system of significations; rather than trying to repudiate it, we shall have to rearticulate it. That sounds like a daunting task, and of course it is, but it is not nearly as impossible as erasing whiteness altogether, as the abolitionist project seeks to do. Furthermore, because whiteness is a relational concept, unintelligible without reference to nonwhiteness -- note how this is true even of Roediger's formulation about "build[ing] an identity based on what one isn't" -- that rearticulation (or reinterpretation, or deconstruction) of whiteness can begin relatively easily, in the messy present, with the recognition that whiteness already contains substantial nonwhite elements. Of course, that recognition is only the beginning of a large and arduous process of political labor, which I shall address in the concluding section of this paper. Notwithstanding these criticisms of the abolitionist project, we consider many of its insights to be vital components in the process of reformulating, or synthesizing, a progressive approach to whiteness. Its attention is directed toward prescisely the place where the neo-liberal racial project is weak: the point at which white identity constitutes a crucial support to white supremacy, and a central obstacle to the achievement of substantive social equality and racial justice. CONCLUDING NOTES: WHITENESS AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS In a situation of racial dualism, as Du Bois observed more than 90 years ago, race operates both to assign us and to deny us our identity. It both makes the social world intelligible, and simultaneously renders it opaque and mysterious. Not only does it allocate resources, power, and privilege; it also provides means for challenging that allocation. The contradictory character of race provides the context in which racial dualism -- or the "color-line," as Du Bois designated it, has developed as "the problem of the 20th century." So what's new? Only that, as a result of incalculable human effort, suffering, and sacrifice, we now realize that these truths apply across the board. Whites and whiteness can no longer be exempted from the comprehensive racialization process that is the hallmark of US history and social structure. This is the present-day context for racial conflict and thus for US politics in general, since race continues to play its designated role of crystallizing all the fundamental issues in US society. As always, we articulate our anxieties in racial terms: wealth and poverty, crime and punishment, gender and sexuality, nationality and citizenship, culture and power, are all articulated in the US primarily through race. So what's new? It's the problematic of whiteness that has emerged as the principal source of anxiety and conflict in the postwar US. Although this situation was anticipated or prefigured at earlier moments in the nation's past -- for example, in the "hour of eugenics" (Stepan 1991, Kevles 1985, Gould 1981) -- it is far more complicated now than ever before, largely due to the present unavailability of biologistic forms of racism as a convenient rationale for white supremacy.[7] Whiteness -- visible whiteness, resurgent whiteness, whiteness as a color, whiteness as difference -- this is what's new, and newly problematic, in contemporary US politics. The reasons for this have already emerged in my discussion of the spectrum of racial projects and the particular representations these projects assign to whiteness. Most centrally, the problem of the meaning of whiteness appears as a direct consequence of the movement challenge posed in the 1960s to white supremacy. The battles of that period have not been resolved; they have not been won or lost; however battered and bruised, the demand for substantive racial equality and general social justice still lives. And while it lives, the strength of white supremacy is in doubt. The racial projects of the right are clear efforts to resist the challenge to white supremacy posed by the movements of the 1960s and their contemporary inheritors. Each of these projects has a particular relationship to the white supremacist legacy, ranging from the far right's efforts to justify and solidify white entitlements, through the new right's attempts to utilize the white supremacist tradition for more immediate and expedient political ends, to the neoconservative project's quixotic quest to surgically separate the liberal democratic tradition from the racism that traditionally underwrote it. The biologistic racism of the far right, the expedient and subtextual racism of the new right, and the bad-faith anti-racism of the neoconservatives have many differences from each other, but they have at least one thing in common. They all seek to maintain the long-standing association between whiteness and US political traditions, between whiteness and US nationalism, between whiteness and universalism. They all seek in different ways to preserve white identity from the particularity, the difference, which the 1960s movement challenge assigned to it. The racial projects of the left are the movements' successors (as is neoconservatism, in a somewhat perverse sense). Both the neoliberal racial project and the abolitionist project seek to fulfill the movement's thwarted dreams of a genuinely (i.e., substantively) egalitarian society, one in which significant redistribution of wealth and power has taken place, and race no longer serves as the most significant marker between winners and losers, haves and have nots, powerful and powerless. Although they diverge significantly -- since the neoliberals seek to accomplish their ends through a conscious diminution of the significance of race, and the abolitionists hope to achieve similar ends through a conscious reemphasizing of the importance of race -- they also have one very important thing in common. They both seek to rupture the barrier between whites and racially-defined minorities, the obstacle which prevents joint political action. They both seek to associate whites and nonwhites, to reinterpret the meaning of whiteness in such a way that it no longer has the power to impede class alliances. Although the differences and indeed the hostility -- between the neoliberal and abolitionist projects, between the reform-oriented and radical conceptions of whiteness -- are quite severe, we consider it vital that adherents of each project recognize that they hold part of the key to challenging white supremacy in the contemporary US, and that their counterpart project holds the other part of the key. Neoliberals rightfully argue that a pragmatic approach to transracial politics is vital if the momentum of racial reaction is to be halted or reversed. Abolitionists properly emphasize challenging the ongoing commitment to white supremacy on the part of many whites. Both of these positions need to draw on each other, not only in strategic terms, but in theoretical ones as well. The recognition that racial identities -- all racial identities, including whiteness -- have become implacably dualistic, could be far more liberating on the left than it has thus far been. For neoliberals, it could permit and indeed justify an acceptance of race-consciousness and even nationalism among racially-defined minorities as a necessary but partial response to disenfranchisement, disempowerment, and superexploitation. There is no inherent reason why such a political position could not coexist with a strategic awareness of the need for strong, class-conscious, transracial coalitions. We have seen many such examples in the past: in the anti-slavery movement, the communist movement of the 1930s (Kelley 1994), and in the 1988 presidential bid of Jesse Jackson, to name but a few. This is not to say that all would be peace and harmony if such alliances could come more permanently into being. But there is no excuse for not attempting to find the pragmatic "common ground" necessary to create them. Abolitionists could also benefit from a recognition that on a pragmatic basis, whites can ally with racially-defined minorities without renouncing their whiteness. If they truly agree that race is a socially constructed concept, as they claim, abolitionists should also be able to recognize that racial identities are not either-or matters, not closed concepts that must be upheld in a reactionary fashion or disavowed in a comprehensive act of renunciation. To use a postmodern language I dislike: racial identities are deeply "hybridized"; they are not "sutured," but remain open to rearticulation. "To be white in America is to be very black. If you don't know how black you are, you don't know how American you are" (Thompson 1995, 429).

#### Our pedagogical method is necessary to address issues like the environment, trade, and militarism that *exceed* whiteness. Their representation of “whiteness” as a root cause reduces all these to products of whiteness instead of dealing with them in their full complexity.

George YÚDICE Latin American & Caribbean Studies; Spanish & Portuguese Languages and Literatures; Social and Cultural Analysis @ Princeton, 95[“Neither Impugning nor Disavowing Whiteness Does a Viable Politics Make: The Limits of Identity Politics” *After Political Correctness* eds. Christopher Newfield and Ronald Strickland p. 279-281]

It is arguments such as those of SWOP and Ganados del Valle, not simply the claim that all we need to fight is white, Eurocentric cultural imperialism, that have the power to incorporate the white middle and working classes into struggles led by coalitions that include people of color and that benefit the citizenry rather than capitalist corporations. Whites must feel that they have a stake in the politics of multiculturalism and not simply see themselves as a backdrop against which subordinated groups take on their identity. The question may be raised whether the rearticulation of whiteness and the incorporation of whites into struggles over resource distribution do not lead to the deconstruction of other racial and identity groupings and thus weaken the basis on which people of color in the United State" have waged their politics. Rearticulating whiteness does not necessarily lead to a weakening of the identity of people of color and other oppressed groups, but it does create the possibility that many more issues will be perceived no longer as exclusively "white" concerns but also as matters of importance to ethnoracially and sexually minoritized groups and vice versa. Shifting the focus of struggle from identity to. resource distribution will also make it possible to engage such seemingly nonracial issues as the environment, the military, the military-industrial complex, foreign aid, and free-trade agreements as matters impacting local identities and thus requiring a global politics that works outside of the national frame,

Of course, such a politics is meaningless unless it can be articulated among diverse constituencies and to the location of power and capital in the state. In City of Quartz, Mike Davis has mapped the ways in which urban ethnoracial politics and a myriad of global forces brokered by the US. state are imbricated:

The privatization of the architectural public realm, moreover, is shadowed by parallel restructurings of electronic space, as heavily policed, pay-access "information or- ders:' elite data-bases and subscription cable services appropriate part of the invisible agora. Both processes, of course, mirror the deregulation of the economy and the re- cession of non-market entitlement. 63

The erosion of public space, the bunkerization of the wealthy, the segregation of ethnoracial groups, the political economy of drugs, the expendability of youth, the absolute permeation of everyday life by consumerism from the richest to the poorest, even a religious schism between right-to-lifers (Archbishop Mohanty) and Christian liberationists (Father Olivares)----all of these phenomena are shaped by global forces that greatly exceed although they certainly do not exclude the question of whiteness. It is incumbent upon multiculturalists and identity- politics activists, if we are going to make a difference, to take our politics beyond, without placing all the blame on or fostering disavowal of, the white (straw)man at which we have aimed so many of our efforts. I CAN'T IMAGINE EVER WANTING TO BE WHITE. This statement makes me think, but it does not encourage me to imagine; in fact, it admits to a failure of the imagination. But why not imagine the cir-cumstances under which one might want to be white-or black, or brown, or queer, or none of the above?

### 1NC K 2

#### The battle for the public sphere is over—we lost. Conservatives and Liberals are now two sides of the same coin, and any movement that actually promises radical change will be destroyed as soon as it becomes visible. An invisible movement has the most subversive potential—voting neg to reject politics is the only political act

**The Invisible Committee, ‘7** [an anonymous group of French professors, phd candidates, and intellectuals, in the book “The Coming Insurrection” published by Semiotext(e) (attributed to the Tarnac Nine by the French police), http://tarnac9.noblogs.org/gallery/5188/insurrection\_english.pdf]

Whatever angle you look at it from, **there's no escape from the present. That's** not the least of its virtues. For those who want absolutely to have hope, it knocks down every support. Those who claim to have solutions are proven wrong almost immediately. It's understood that now everything can only go from bad to worse. "There's no future for the future" is the wisdom behind an era that for all its appearances of extreme normalcy has come to have about the consciousness level of the first punks. The sphere of political representation is closed. From left to right, it's the same nothingness acting by turns either as the big shots or the virgins, the same sales shelf heads, changing up their discourse according to the latest dispatches from the information service. Those who still vote give one the impression that their only intention is to knock out the polling booths by voting as a pure act of protest. And we've started to understand that in fact it’s only against the vote itself that people go on voting. Nothing we've seen can come up to the heights of the present situation; not by far. By its very silence, the populace seems infinitely more 'grown up' than all those squabbling amongst themselves to govern it do. Any Belleville chibani 1 is wiser in his chats than in all of those puppets’ grand declarations put together. The lid of the social kettle is triple-tight, and the pressure inside won’t stop building. The ghost of Argentina’s Que Se Vayan Todos 2 is seriously starting to haunt the ruling heads. The fires of November 2005 will never cease to cast their shadow on all consciences. Those first joyous fires were the baptism of a whole decade full of promises. The media’s “suburbs vs. the Republic” myth, if it’s not inefficient, is certainly not true. The fatherland was ablaze all the way to downtown everywhere, with fires that were methodically snuffed out. Whole streets went up in flames of solidarity in Barcelona and no one but the people who lived there even found out about it. And the country hasn’t stopped burning since. Among the accused we find diverse profiles, without much in common besides a hatred for existing society; not united by class, race, or even by neighborhood. What was new wasn’t the “suburban revolt,” since that was already happening in the 80s, but the rupture with its established forms. The assailants weren’t listening to anybody at all anymore, not their big brothers, not the local associations assigned to help return things to normal. No “SOS Racism which only fatigue, falsification, and media omertà 4 could feign putting an end. The whole series of nocturnal strikes, anonymous attacks, wordless destruction, had the merit of busting wide open the split between politics and the political. No one can honestly deny the obvious weight of this assault which **made no demands**, and had no message other than a threat which had nothing to do with politics. But you’d have to be blind not to see what is **purely political** about this **resolute negation of politics,** and you’d certainly have to know absolutely nothing about the autonomous youth movements of the last 30 years. Like abandoned children we burned the first baby toys of a society that deserves no more respect than the monuments of Paris did at the end of Bloody Week 5 -- and knows it. There’s **no social solution** to the present situation. First off because the vague aggregate of social groupings, institutions, and individual bubbles that we designate by the anti-phrase “society” has no substance, because there’s no language left to express common experiences with. It took a half-century of fighting by the Lumières to thaw out the possibility of a French Revolution, and a century of fighting by work to give birth to the fearful “Welfare State.” Struggles creating the language in which the new order expresses itself. Nothing like today. Europe is now a de-monied continent that sneaks off to make a run to the Lidl 6 and has to fly with the low-cost airlines to be able to keep on flying. **None of the “problems” formulated in the social language are resolvable**. The “retirement pensions issue,” the issues of “precariousness,” the “youth” and their “violence” can only be kept in suspense as long as the ever more surprising “acting out” they thinly cover gets managed away police-like. No one’s going to be happy to see old people being wiped out at a knockdown price, abandoned by their own and with nothing to say. And those who’ve found less humiliation and more benefit in a life of crime than in sweeping floors will not give up their weapons, and prison won’t make them love society. The rage to enjoy of the hordes of the retired will not take the somber cuts to their monthly income on an empty stomach, and will get only too excited about the refusal to work among a large sector of the youth. And to conclude, no guaranteed income granted the day after a quasi-uprising will lay the foundations for a new New Deal, a new pact, and a new peace. The social sentiment is rather **too evaporated** for all that. As their solution, they’ll just never stop putting on the pressure, to make sure nothing happens, and with it we’ll have more and more police chases all over the neighborhood. The drone that even according to the police indeed did fly over Seine-Saint-Denis 7 last July 14 th is a picture of the future in much more straightforward colors than all the hazy images we get from the humanists. That they took the time to clarify that it was not armed shows pretty clearly the kind of road we’re headed down. The country is going to be cut up into ever more air-tight zones. Highways built along the border of the “sensitive neighborhoods” already form walls that are invisible and yet able to cut them off from the private subdivisions. Whatever good patriotic souls may think about it, the management of neighborhoods “by community” is most effective just by its notoriety. The purely metropolitan portions of the country, the main downtowns, lead their luxurious lives in an ever more calculating, ever more sophisticated, ever more shimmering deconstruction. They light up the whole planet with their whorehouse red lights, while the BAC 8 and the private security companies’ -- read: militias’ -- patrols multiply infinitely, all the while benefiting from being able to hide behind an ever more disrespectful judicial front. The catch-22 of the present, though perceptible everywhere, is denied everywhere. Never have so many psychologists, sociologists, and literary people devoted themselves to it, each with their own special jargon, and each with their own specially missing solution. It’s enough just to listen to the songs that come out these days, the trifling “new French music,” where the petty-bourgeoisie dissects the states of its soul and the K’1Fry mafia 9 makes its declarations of war, to know that this coexistence will come to an end soon and that a decision is about to be made. This book is signed in the name of an imaginary collective. Its editors are not its authors. They are merely content to do a little clean-up of what’s scattered around the era’s common areas, around the murmurings at bar-tables, behind closed bedroom doors. They’ve only determined a few necessary truths, whose universal repression fills up the psychiatric hospitals and the painful gazes. They’ve made themselves scribes of the situation. It’s the privilege of radical circumstances that justice leads them quite logically to revolution. It’s enough just to say what we can see and not avoid the conclusions to be drawn from it.

#### To make micropolitics visible is to coopt it by giving resistance an object – this understanding allows resistance to be framed, to be declared a failure and prevents the immanence of imperceptible politics from coalescing around mundane practices and habitudes of existence

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In this sense imperceptible politics does not necessarily differ from or oppose other prevalent forms of politics, such as state-oriented politics, micropolitics, identity politics, cultural and gender politics, civil rights movements, etc. And indeed imperceptible politics connects with all these various forms of political engagement and intervention in an opportunistic way: it deploys them to the extent that they allow the establishment of spaces outside representation; that is, spaces which do not primarily focus on the transformation of the conditions of the double-R axiom (rights and representation) but on the insertion of new social forces into a given political terrain. In the previous chapter we called this form of politics outside politics: the politics which opposes the representational regime of policing. Imperceptibility is the everyday strategy which allows us to move and to act below the overcoding regime of representation. This everyday strategy is inherently anti-theoretical; that is, it resists any ultimate theorisation, it cannot be reduced to one successful and necessary form of politics (such as state-oriented politics or micropolitics, for example). Rather, imperceptible politics is genuinely empiricist, that is it is always enacted as ad hoc practices which allow the decomposition of the representational strategies in a particular field and the composition of events which cannot be left unanswered by the existing regime of control. If imperceptible politics resists theorisation and is ultimately empiricist, what then are the criteria for doing imperceptible politics? There are three dimensions which characterise imperceptible politics: objectlessness, totality, trust. Firstly, imperceptible politics is objectless, that is it performs political transformation without primarily targeting a specific political aim (such as transformation of a law or institution, or a particular claim for inclusion, etc). Instead imperceptible politics proceeds by materialising its own political actions through contagious and affective transformations. The object of its political practice is its own practices. In this sense, imperceptible politics is non-intentional - and therein lies its difference from state-oriented politics or the politics of civil rights movements, for example - it instigates change through a series of everyday transformations which can only be codified as having a central political aim or function in retrospect. Secondly, imperceptible politics addresses the totality of an existing field of power. This seems to be the difference between imperceptible politics and micropolitics or other alternative social movements: imperceptible politics is not concerned with containing itself to a molecular level of action; it addresses the totality of power through the social changes which it puts to work in a particular field of action. The distinction between molar and molecular (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 275) has only analytical significance from the perspective of imperceptible politics. In fact imperceptible politics is both molar and molecular, because by being local situated action it addresses the whole order of control in a certain field. Imperceptible politics is located at the heart of a field of power and at the same time it opens a way to move outside this field by forcing the transformation of all these elements which are constitutive of this field. In this sense, imperceptible politics is a driving force which is simul­taneously both present and absent. We described this in the previous chapter by exploring the importance of speculative figurations for the practice of escape. On the everyday level of escape (a level we called in this chapter imperceptible politics) speculative figuration can be translated into trust. This is the third characteristic of imperceptible politics; it is driven by a firm belief in the importance and truthfulness of its actions, without seeking any evidence for, or conducting any investigation into its practices. This is trust. Imperceptible politics is driven by trust in something which seems to be absent from a particular situation. Imperceptible politics operates around a void, and it is exactly the conversion of this void into everyday politics that becomes the vital force for imperceptible politics.

#### Their arguments about personal agency are ultimately conservative and de-politicizing – arguments for localizing activism within the purview of social location are the equivalent of privatizing social change, creating us as dependent on the necessity of their advocacy. The more successful their strategy is the more damage it does by making institutions necessary to our understanding of social change

**Hershock 99**, East-West Center, 1999.  [“Changing the way society changes”, *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*, 6, 154; http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/6/hershock991.html]

The trouble is that, like other technologies biased toward control, the more successful legislation becomes, the more it renders itself necessary. Because it aims at rigorous definition -- at establishing hard boundaries or limits -- crossing the threshold of legislative utility means creating conditions under which the definition of freedom becomes so complex as to be self-defeating. Taken to its logical end, legally-biased social activism is thus liable to effect an infinite density of protocols for maintaining autonomy, generating a matrix of limits on discrimination that would finally be conducive to what might be called "axiological entropy" -- a state in which movement in any direction is equally unobstructed *and* empty of dramatic potential. Contrary to expectations, complete "freedom of choice" would not mean the elimination of all impediments to meaningful improvisation, but rather an erasure of the latter's conditions of possibility. The effectiveness and efficiency of "hard," control-biased technologies depend on our using natural laws -- horizons of possibility -- as fulcrums for leveraging or dictating changes in the structure of our circumstances. Unlike improvised contributions to changes taking place in our situation, dictating the terms of change effectively silences our situational partners. Technological authority thus renders our circumstances mute and justifies ignoring the contributions that might be made by the seasons or the spiritual force of the mountains to the meaning -- the direction of movement -- of our ongoing patterns of interdependence. With the "perfection" of technically-mediated control, our wills would know no limit. We would be as gods, existing with no imperatives, no external compulsions, and no priorities. We would have no reason to do one thing first or hold one thing, and not another, as most sacred or dear. Such "perfection" is, perhaps, as fabulous and unattainable as it is finally depressing. Yet the vast energies of global capital are committed to moving in its direction, for the most part quite uncritically. The consequences -- as revealed in the desecration and impoverishing of both 'external' and 'internal' wilderness (for instance, the rainforests and our imaginations) -- are every day more evident. The critical question we must answer is whether the "soft" technologies of legally-biased and controlled social change commit us to an equivalent impoverishment and desecration. The analogy between the dependence of technological progress on natural laws and that of social activism on societal laws is by no means perfect. Except among a scattering of philosophers and historians of science, for example, the laws of nature are not viewed as changeable artifacts of human culture. But for present purposes, the analogy need only focus our attention on the way legal institutions -- like natural laws -- do not prescriptively determine the shape of all things to come, but rather establish generic limits for what relationships or states of affairs are factually admissible. Laws that guarantee certain "freedoms" necessarily also prohibit others. Without the fulcrums of *unallowable* acts, the work of changing a society would remain as purely idealistic as using wishful thinking to move mountains. Changing legal institutions at once forces and enforces societal reform. By affirming and safeguarding those freedoms or modes of autonomy that have come to be seen as generically essential to 'being human', a legally-biased social activism cannot avoid selectively limiting the ways we engage with one another. The absence of coercion may be a basic aim of social activism, but if our autonomy is to be guaranteed both fair and just, its basic strategy must be one of establishing non-negotiable constraints on how we co-exist. Social activism is thus in the business of striking structural compromises between its ends and its means -- between particular freedoms and general equality, and between practical autonomy and legal anonymity. By shifting the locus of freedoms from unique persons to generic citizens -- and in substantial sympathy with both the Platonic renunciation of particularity and the scientific discounting of the exceptional and extraordinary -- social activist methodology promotes dramatic anonymity in order to universally realize the operation of 'blind justice'. Much as hard technologies of control silence the contributions of wilderness and turn us away from the rewards of a truly joint improvisation of order, the process of social activism reduces the relevance of the always unique and unprecedented terrain of our interdependence. This is no small loss. The institutions that guarantee our generic independence effectively pave over those vernacular relationships through which our own contributory virtuosity might be developed and shared -- relationships out of which the exceptional meaning of our immediate situation might be continuously realized. In contrast with Buddhist emptiness -- a practice that entails attending to the mutual relevance of all things -- both the aims and strategies of social activism are conducive to an evacuation of the conditions of dramatic virtuosity, a societal depletion of our resources for meaningfully improvised and liberating intimacy with all things.

### Case

#### Center proximity critique—the 1AC says “Our proximities to these sites of white supremacist violence, … are the only sites where we can meaningfully resist the technologies of white supremacy”

#### The center-margin model of academic space performed in the 1AC builds a model that excludes non-traditional scholarship and reinforces the pedagogical agenda and institutions of the privileged.

#### Registering criticism of the aff’s spatial practices is a pre-requisite for developing alternative pedagogical networks.

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Our argument is made in the tradition of the critical geography of academic knowledge production and directed toward embedded space-producing practices current within the interdisciplinary work of American studies.3 As geographer Lawrence Berg has argued, "given the radically changing geographies of America . . . there is no better time than the present moment to interrogate the relationships between the production of American space and the spatialized cultural politics of knowledge production in American Studies."4 We offer this essay as a contribution to what Berg calls "the hard work of developing an explicit analysis and re-imagining of the spatialities of American Studies." Following Berg and other critical geographers, we believe that the hard work has to be done in this order: theory and analysis first, reimagining and reconstructing second, because only by rendering visible the everyday practices that currently reproduce and naturalize the dominant geography of American studies will we become able to identify that geography and generate alternatives. The geography of American studies practice is far more than a matter of location: most crucially, it is a matter of the ways in which space is produced through routine scholarly activities. The spatialization of American studies practice is different from, and separable from, the spatialization of American studies subject matter, and it is equally open to reconceptualization. Even when the subject matter of American studies remains organized in terms of a center/margin model, the practice of American studies does not have to be spatialized in the same way, with U.S. -located concerns and institutions normatively positioned at the center. In fact, it is the disciplining power of this center/margin model to shape and limit the agenda for American studies worldwide that we most want to question here. Our goal is to render visible a taken for granted scholarly geography predicated on bordered national identities that enables the Americanist tendency to conflate subject matter with practice, a conflation that renders the U.S. academy the domestic "home" of the discipline. This geography facilitates the division of the world of American studies into two halves, separating U.S. -based (domestic) practice from American studies as practiced everywhere else (foreign). "International American studies," in this configuration, all too often becomes either another way of saying "American studies abroad" or a term used to refer to interactions linking the domestic center to the foreign margins.5 In our understanding, this is a geographical problem: a U.S. -centered domestic/ foreign geography of disciplinary practice in American studies restricts the potential of the international turn by heightening the significance of national location and then privileging the priorities and interests of a perceived core. This center/margin geography is strikingly evident in the discursive convention that renders unexceptional the use of an unspecified collective Americanist "we" voice that is by default U.S. -based. This convention, by which an unlocated Americanist "we" can mean both "we Americanists" and "we U.S.-based Americanists," both results from and feeds back into a nationbased, U.S.-centered geography for global American studies. It firmly locates scholars who self-identify as non-U.S. -based on the wrong side of a conflated national/disciplinary border, rendering them doubly foreign. It also arranges American studies practice worldwide around the hub of U.S. -based academic, institutional, and political issues. We identify this as a geographical problem because it arises out of a particular way of understanding (and producing) space. And because we identify the issue as a conceptual problem, we believe that it requires a conceptual solution. Defining "geography" not as a fixed and neutral physical context but as a form of knowledge, we assume that the practice of sorting academic collectivity by reference to borders, locations, and nation-states is not so much the recognition of an existing geography as it is the performance of a geography, and hence is open to reconsideration and renegotiation. Further, we do not mean to propose a conceptual initiative in opposition to a practical or material program, for while it is obvious that practical rearrangements can revise commonsense geographies, our assumption is that a rethinking of disciplinary geographies will have material effects. Yet, in calling for a rethinking of the geography of American studies practice, we are not using the terms geography and space metaphorically. As geographers Cindi Katz and Neil Smith have made clear, "spatial metaphors are problematic in so far as they presume that space is not."6 When we talk about ways in which the taken-for-granted geography of U.S.-based American studies could be rethought, we mean this quite literally. We want to challenge the dominant understanding of academic space by insisting that alternative geographies of American studies are imaginable. Specifically, we want to propose a conceptual shift away from a territorial geography and toward a relational geography, which is to say, a shift away from the practice of viewing space as a kind of container, within which Americanists act and across the distances of which they relate to each other, and toward the idea that it is the acting and the relating that literally produce the space. For example, Shelley Fisher Fishkin has questioned the significance of national borders in the geography of American studies scholarship, asking how "if national borders no longer delimit the subject of our study" we can "allow them to delimit the scholarship that demands our attention?"7 Shifting the ground slightly, we can usefully rephrase this question to ask not how national borders limit scholarly attention, but how the habitual limits of scholarly attention reinforce national borders in the scholarly world. In this reversal, it is not that Americanists do American studies in particular ways at specific locations, within contained spaces, and across fixed distances, but rather that Americanists make locations, produce space, and define distance in their doing of American studies.8 Borders, locations, distance, proximity, and space are constantly being produced in the mundane practices of American studies. The announcement of the ASAs International Initiative in 2004, for example, argues that "facilitating ongoing conversations between international scholars of American Studies and Americanists in the U.S. can help both groups achieve a better understanding of both the multiple cultures that have shaped U.S. culture from the start, and the impact that American culture has had on other countries around the globe."9 This statement carries with it a range of spatializing effects, the most obvious being its inscription of a border dividing American studies scholars into two groups, the "international" group and the group working "in the U.S." When the term "international" is used as it is here to locates, place or a practice (as beyond the borders of the United States), rather than to describe a process of relations or interactions between different places and practices, it reinforces a strongly territorial geography.

## \*\*\* 2NC

### Bhambra

#### Idea that have to be geographically near zones of oppression or victims of oppression prevents any coalition building across the center to the periphery. “Their cause” can become “our cause” w/o physical proximity

Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)

We suggest that alternative models of identity and community are required from those put forward by essentialist theories, andthat these are offered by the work of two theorists, SatyaMohanty and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Mohanty’s ([1993] 2000)post-positivist, realist theorisation of identity suggests a way through the impasses of essentialism, while avoiding the excessesof the postmodernism that Bramen, among others, derides as aproposed alternative to identity politics. For Mohanty ([1993]2000), identities must be understood as theoretical constructions that enable subjects to read the world in particular ways; as such, substantial claims about identity are, in fact, implicit explana-tions of the social world and its constitutive relations of power. Experience – that from which identity is usually thought to derive– is not something that simply occurs, or announces its meaningand signiﬁcance in a self-evident fashion: rather, experience is always a work of interpretation that is collectively produced (Scott 1991). Mohanty’s work resonates with that of Nelson (1993), whosimilarly insists upon the communal nature of meaning ork nowledge-making. Rejecting both foundationalist views of knowledge and the postmodern alternative which announces the“death of the subject” and the impossibility of epistemology,Nelson argues instead that, it is not individuals who are theagents of epistemology, but communities. Since it is not possiblefor an individual to know something that another individualcould not also (possibly) know, it must be that the ability to makesense of the world proceeds from shared conceptual frameworksand practices. Thus, it is the community that is the generator andrepository of knowledge. Bringing Mohanty’s work on identity astheoretical construction together with Nelson’s work on episte-mological communities therefore suggests that, “identity” is one of the knowledges that is produced and enabled for and by individu-als in the context of the communities within which they exist. The post-positivist reformulation of “experience” is necessary here as it privileges understandings that emerge through the processing of experience in the context of negotiated premises about the world, over experience itself producing self-evident knowledge (self-evident, however, only to the one who has “had” the experience). This distinction is crucial for, if it is not the expe-rience of, for example, sexual discrimination that “makes” one afeminist, but rather, the paradigm through which one attempts tounderstand acts of sexual discrimination, then it is not necessary to have actually had the experience oneself in order to make theidentiﬁcation “feminist”. If being a “feminist” is not a given factof a particular social (and/or biological) location – that is, beingdesignated “female” – but is, in Mohanty’s terms, an “achieve-ment” – that is, something worked towards through a process of analysis and interpretation – then two implications follow. First,that not all women are feminists. Second, that feminism is some-thing that is “achievable” by men. 3 While it is accepted that experiences are not merely theoretical or conceptual constructs which can be transferred from one person to another with transparency, we think that there is some-thing politically self-defeating about insisting that one can only understand an experience (or then comment upon it) if one has actually had the experience oneself. As Rege (1998) argues, to privilege knowledge claims on the basis of direct experience, orthen on claims of authenticity, can lead to a narrow identity poli-tics that limits the emancipatory potential of the movements or organisations making such claims. Further, if it is not possible to understand an experience one has not had, then what point is there in listening to each other? Following Said, such a view seems to authorise privileged groups to ignore the discourses of disadvantaged ones, or, we would add, to place exclusive responsibility for addressing injustice with the oppressed themselves. Indeed, as Rege suggests, reluctance to speak about the experi-ence of others has led to an assumption on the part of some whitefeminists that “confronting racism is the sole responsibility of black feminists”, just as today “issues of caste become the soleresponsibility of the dalit women’s organisations” (Rege 1998).Her argument for a dalit feminist standpoint, then, is not made in terms solely of the experiences of dalit women, but rather a call for others to “educate themselves about the histories, the preferred social relations and utopias and the struggles of the marginalised” (Rege 1998). This, she argues, allows “their cause” to become “our cause”, not as a form of appropriation of “their” struggle, but through the transformation of subjectivities that enables a recognition that “their” struggle is also “our” struggle. Following Rege, we suggest that social processes can facilitate the understanding of experiences, thus making those experi-ences the possible object of analysis and action for all, while recognising that they are not equally available or powerful forall subjects. 4 Understandings of identity as given and essential, then, we suggest, need to give way to understandings which accept them as socially constructed and contingent on the work of particular,overlapping, epistemological communities that agree that this orthat is a viable and recognised identity. Such an understanding avoids what Bramen identiﬁes as the postmodern excesses of “post-racial” theory, where in this “world without borders (“rac-ism is real, but race is not”) one can be anything one wants to be: a black kid in Harlem can be Croatian-American, if that is whathe chooses, and a white kid from Iowa can be Korean-American”(2002: 6). Unconstrained choice is not possible to the extent that,as Nelson (1993) argues, the concept of the epistemological com-munity requires any individual knowledge claim to sustain itself in relation to standards of evaluation that already exist and thatare social. Any claim to identity, then, would have to be recog-nised by particular communities as valid in order to be success-ful. This further shifts the discussion beyond the limitations of essentialist accounts of identity by recognising that the commu-nities that confer identity are constituted through their shared epistemological frameworks and not necessarily by shared characteristics of their members conceived of as irreducible. 5 Hence, the epistemological community that enables us to identify our-selves as feminists is one that is built up out of a broadly agreed upon paradigm for interpreting the world and the relations between the sexes: it is not one that is premised upon possessing the physical attribute of being a woman or upon sharing the same experiences. Since at least the 1970s, a key aspect of black and/orpostcolonial feminism has been to identify the problems associated with such assumptions (see, for discussion, Rege 1998, 2000). We believe that it is the identiﬁcation of injustice which calls forth action and thus allows for the construction of healthy solidarities. 6 While it is accepted that there may be important differences between those who recognise the injustice of disadvantage while being, in some respects, its beneﬁciary (for example, men, white people, brahmins), and those who recognise the injustice from the position of being at its effect (women, ethnic minorities,dalits), we would privilege the importance of a shared political commitment to equality as the basis for negotiating such differences. Our argument here is that thinking through identity claims from the basis of understanding them as epistemological communities militates against exclusionary politics (and its asso-ciated problems) since the emphasis comes to be on participation in a shared epistemological and political project as opposed to notions of ﬁxed characteristics – the focus is on the activities indi- viduals participate in rather than the characteristics they aredeemed to possess. Identity is thus deﬁned further as a function of activity located in particular social locations (understood asthe complex of objective forces that inﬂuence the conditions in which one lives) rather than of nature or origin (Mohanty 1995:109-10). As such, the communities that enable identity should not be conceived of as “imagined” since they are produced by very real actions, practices and projects.

### 2NC Whiteness-es

#### Only a project that *rearticulates* rather than condemns whiteness can succeed—we need a critical race theory that can connect the pedagogical method and language to dominant institutions and groups in our society.

George YÚDICE Latin American & Caribbean Studies; Spanish & Portuguese Languages and Literatures; Social and Cultural Analysis @ Princeton, 95[“Neither Impugning nor Disavowing Whiteness Does a Viable Politics Make: The Limits of Identity Politics” *After Political Correctness* eds. Christopher Newfield and Ronald Strickland p. 273-275]

It is incumbent upon multiculturatists, then, to project a new democratic vision that makes sense to the white middle and working classes. But identity politics have been at their weakest, in my opinion, in articulating such a vision. Each iden- tity FOUp has articulated its own agenda. with nods to the agendas of other groups also perceived to have been oppressed on the basis of their racial, ethnic and sexual identity. Multiculturalism is at its strongest in disseminating the representations of these identities and on this basis legitimating needs claims and their satisfaction. After all, it is people of color, women, gays and lesbians, and other subordinated groups who are on the front lines of the downward slide of life chances. But this should not he seen as a point of contention around which groups divide, claiming greater victimization and thus construing themselves as more deserving of compensation than this or that other subordinated group. It is an opportunity, rather, for subordinated groups to occupy positions of leadership in multiracial and nmltigroup coalitions struggling to increase and democratize the distribLition of resources. This may sound a hit Pollyannaish, especially in light of the painful racial and sexual conflicts throughout the United States epito- mized in New York by Puerto Ricans pitted against Hasidim in Williamsburg, blacks against Koreans in Flatbush, and other examples cited above. But these conflicts, it seems to me, point not to a weakness in the struggle over resource distribution that I advocate but rather to the limitations of an identity politics that does not look at the larger picture: the relationship between identity groups and institutions, the relationship among institutions (e.g., the academy and business), the relationship between these institutions, the state (the military and the welfare bureaucracy), and the economy, and the articulation of all of these relationships in a global context. I am only trying to make the obvious point that identity politics and its academic ideology multiculturalism must go beyond a politics of representations, understood as the critique of omitted and distorted representations, to a critique and an intervention in the institutional supports of these representations and their immersion in state and economic rationalities. The problem is that mulitculturalism has no place in it to legitimate the claims of over 70 percent of the population-the white working and middle classes- who also have to face the shrinkage of educational, employment, and other social and economic resources. As Manning Marabie argues, "We need to keep in mind constantly that 6o percent of all welfare recipients are white; that 62 percent of all people on food stamps are white; that more than two-thirds of Americans with- out medical insurance are white."" Whiteness, then, is not only a matter of social and cultural privilege; we all know that it is also an economic advantage, that con- structions of race correlate with and reproduce class positions. But it is more than this; it is also about the very mechanisms-instruments such as census question- naires, polls, etc.-on which institutions, be they educational, legal, civic, or even recreational, rely in order to achieve self-understanding. Whiteness is even an issue in foreign affairs, underlying decisions that favor economic aid, say, for East- ern European countries over aid for Latin American, African, or Asian countries. It is an important factor in immigration policy, the negotiation of free-trade agreements with Mexico and other Latin American countries and the relation of these agreements to the shrinking U.S. labor market, and so on. I don't want to suggest that multiculturalists have completely disregarded these issues; it does seem to me, however, that they have gotten short shrift in the much more vociferous call for "whites" to recognize the history and demands of people of color, a call in which whiteness is taken for granted. After arguing that we must all understand each other, one writer, for example. asserts: Those from the dominant culture and class [meaning middle-class whites] must cease naming our [meaning people of color's} experience for us, outside of our participa- tion. Instead, if they sincerely wish to express solidarity for the self-determination of people of color, they must work to use their influence to support in concrete ways our struggles for a place to work, speak, and affirm our existence. There must be an active comniitint'iit by those front the dominant culture to work in their own communities to challenge the forms of injustice which result from rac-ism, classism, sexism, homopliohia and other forms of institutional oppression. There must exist a clear understanding by all that the struggle of people of color i" not one that is limited to the domain of the intellectual, the academic or the realm of ideology, but rather that it is a struggle that is ultimately linked to the material, to the heart, and to the spirit." These are desiderata that I share. But for radical multiculturalists to share them is not the problem. The problem is, rather, how to get liberals and the so-called dominant class and culture, especially white youth, to share them as well. I am afraid that accepting the hegemonic white construct is not the best means. This is a dilemma that Kathy Dohie explores in an essay on disaffected white youth who opt to embrace white supremacism: If ethnic identity and ethnic suffering are valued now, what's a mongrel white kid to do? (Most of the skin [headis are some hodgepodge of Weswrn European ancestry that ceased to mean anything a long tiuie ago.) "What about our history?" they yell. They don't seem to see themselves as part of the big white backdrop that people of color have charged against for ages, making a mark here and there. They're just blanks. Because of their white skin, they've escaped hyphenation. They're just American kids, not African-American or Asian-American or Mexican-American, Yet it makes them feel rootless, all alone, without a flag to defend. They want an ethnic community, too-but what is it? What can it be for a white American kid?" One thing it cannot be is an ethnic identity analogous to that of people of color and other subordinated groups who have had to bear the brunt of diminishing ex- pectations. The conditions for mobilizing white youth to light for a progressive culture cannot be provided convincingly by continually telling them that they must forget their own interests on behalf of those of others. On the contrary, rather than forget their whiteness in order to focus on the plight of others, they must rearticulate it; the basis for their relative privilege must be uncovered and it- placed with an understanding of how life chances have diminished under free- market policies not only for people of color but for themselves too. It must be demonstrated that their opportunities to get ahead in the world are diminished not because of affirmative action but rather because of the abandonment of the social contract under the Reagan and Bush administrations and, more generally, under the logic of late capitalism, which now brings us the North American Free Trade Agreement.

## \*\*\* 1NR

### 2NC Visibility

#### The only local space left to us is that of the imperceptible – their ressentiment against exclusion prevents us from loving the present enough to change it

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**New tools of subversion are emerging, but they have not crystallised, they are ungraspable**. This describes our encounter with imperceptible politics; it is not simply situated in our present conditions of postliberal sovereignty. Of course, **imperceptible politics is demanded by our situatedness.** But at the same time, it is imaginary and outside of the present historical chronotope. It is only possible to work on the real conditions of the present by invoking imaginaries which take us beyond the present. **And this trajectory away from the present is achieved by working in time, by intensifying the present. Imperceptible politics works with the present. Time is fractured and non-synchronous - the historical present can be understood both as containing residues of the past and as anticipating the future** (Marvakis, 2005; Bloch, 1986). Yet it is impossible to identify either the past or the future by moving backwards or forwards in time. Neither move is possible. **Time forces us to work in the present, by training our senses to examine what appears evident as well as what is absent. This sensibility enables us to perceive and imagine things and ourselves in unfamiliar ways, to follow open trajectories.** **Time contains both experiences of the world which have been rendered invisible and the seeds of experience which maybe possible to realise** (Santos, 2003). **Imperceptible politics can be neither perceived nor conducted from a transcendent perspective; that is, elaborating a 'metaphysics of the present'** (as criticised in Adam, 1995) **can reveal nothing of the mode of engagement with the present we are describing. This engagement entails experiencing time in a subjective and embodied way, being forced to transform ourselves in order to deal with this current predicament of resistance.** **Situated in the present historical regime of control, imperceptible politics involves remaking the present by remaking our bodies: the ways we perceive, feel, act. Imperceptible politics transforms our bodies. Loving the present, existing in the present, imperceptible politics is practised in the present.** **It works with social reality in the most intimate and immanent ways, recalling the whole history and practice of escape, as we described earlier, and rethinking it anew.** **Doing imperceptible politics entails the refusal to use our perceptual and action systems as instruments for representing the current political conditions of resistance.** It functions through diffraction rather than reflection (Haraway, 1997, 1991c): diffraction creates 'effects of connection, of embodiment, and of responsibility for an imagined elsewhere that we may yet learn to see and build here' (Haraway, 1992, p. 295). In this sense **imperceptible politics is more concerned with changing the very conditions of perception and action than with changing what we see.** **Only such bodily, lived transformations are sufficient for interrupting the pervasive sensibilities being shaped by sovereign powers.**

#### Joyful affirmation of the present is prerequisite to any imperceptible politics. Our critique begs the question of whether or not the 1AC should have even happened

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Joy is crucial to this book. The joy of escape defies seriousness and this, as we try to show, is the most crucial condition for revealing truth. Paraphrasing Bakhtin's (1984, p. 285) reading of Rabelais' concept of truth, we could say that **behind the sanctimonious seriousness of many exalted and official concepts of social transfor­mation of the traditional left (and beyond) we find barking instead of acting and laughing. Rather than succumbing to barking out the fidelity to the coming event or to the new truth we prefer to enjoy the ways in which truth erupts out of the present.** The emergence of 'a truth inwardly free, gay and materialistic' is made possible by the kind of laughter and hilarity that pervades the atmosphere of the carnival banquet (Bakhtin 1984, p. 285; see also pp. 94ff.). And it is the collective joy of eating and drinking in a 'banquet for all the world' (Bakhtin 1984, p. 278) which opens the possibility to partake in the world instead of being devoured by it. The laughter and joy of those who partake in the world defies seriousness, disperses fear, liberates the word and the body and reveals a truth escaping the injustices of the present. This laughter is the prime mover of escape. **Escape is joyful. This is not an intellectual argument we are advancing in order to resist the ubiquitous melancholy and mourning of the left. Rather we are pointing to an embodied political practice which contests a dominant understanding of social change as the result of a response to suffering. Casting action as the force of pain is a terribly Eurocentric view. It demands that we become, or worse wheel in, a victim whose capacity to act is reduced to a mere response to pain**. With Oswald de Andrade we prefer to talk about the pleasure of anthropophagy (Andrade, 1990, p. 51). Joyfully devouring the sacred enemy in order to create a new body and new conditions for seeing and acting in the world, anthropophagy triggers processes of transformation which simultaneously act at the heart of and escape the practices underpinning modernity and postmodernity in Global North Atlantic societies. **Joy marks the routes of social transforma­tion. Joy is the ultimate proof.**

### Globalist subjectivity Link

#### Their attempt to shirk this obligation through a localist model of education that focuses on this debate renders us as passive spectators to global oppression – this prevents us from honoring our ethical obligation to others. This is a trade-off DA. Vote negative

**Ruiz and Minguez ‘1** Prof. Dr Pedro Ortega Ruiz, Facultad de Educacio´ n, Campus de Espinardo, Universidad de Murcia, “Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral and political education” *Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2001*

In addition to the reality of the dominant presence of instrumental reason in modern society, another closely linked phenomenon is shaping life at the level of the individual and society, individuals and peoples. **We refer to the phenomenon of the increasing globalisation of ways of life in our complex societies which derive as much from the new forms of production as from the influence of science and technology upon life and social organisation (Waters, 1995). This explains the problems we find in guaranteeing a base of social solidarity in a general sense and the provision of forms of identity sufficiently strong for the social agents.** It is difficult to represent the society in which we live in a unified manner. As individuals we belong to diverse communities, at times mutually contradictory. It is difficult to escape the need of having to choose between diverse forms of identity and belonging (Bafircena, 1997). **The phenomenon of globalisation has invalidated the autistic, localist-focused procedures for highlighting and resolving problems because the great part of our social life is determined by global processes; that is to say, in those processes in which the influence of cultures, political economies, media and national frontiers are all weakened. The emergence of globalisation has made it possible to overcome the concept of nation states, giving way to another, wider reality: humanity, world citizenship or human family to foster the birth of new areas of identity beyond that of the nation state** (Luhmann, 1997). During the last few decades it could be thought that the relationships and obligations of the citizen started and finished in their local community, in their *polis*, or at most in their national community. Now, on the other hand, we are concerned by problems occurring far from our frontiers or the conventional established limits. **We have become aware that we are immersed in problems of such magnitude (environmental pollution, poverty and marginalisation of a large part of the world’s population, ethnic–cultural con- flicts, etc.) that we seriously question localist attempts and have thrown to the winds the recipes so long applied to solve our problems. A new concept of citizenship and the citizen has been imposed on us. Our *polis* has become too small. The diversity of cultures and national frontiers are no longer barriers to the recognition of our inter-dependency and implication in problems which we now must share///**

**These features (primacy of instrumental reason and globalisation) cannot go unnoticed in our pedagogy. Youth cannot be educated according to out-dated localist schemes already undermined by the real situation; nor offer educational models which place the learners in the position of open-mouthed spectators at what happens around them, distanced from the social reality which is supposedly impossible to change, governed by the implacable laws of market forces.** **To educate,** as we understand it, **is above all a praxis orientated towards enabling the learners to “read” and interpret reality and furthermore to take responsibility in the face of this reality. It is to help them grow in responsibility, to honour our obligations toward others.**