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#### Resolved requires affirmation of the resolution and negation of the resolution by the negative

Parcher 1—Jeff Parcher, Former Debate Coach at Georgetown University [Feburary 2001, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html]

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### USFG should is governmental action

Ericson, 03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Statutory restrictions are: Overturn authority, alter the jurisdiction, limit authorization, require inter-agency consultation, or require prior notification

KAISER 80—the Official Specialist in American National Government, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress [Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the Legislative Veto; Kaiser, Frederick M., 32 Admin. L. Rev. 667 (1980)]

In addition to direct statutory overrides, there are a variety of statutory and nonstatutory techniques that have the effect of overturning rules, that prevent their enforcement, or that seriously impede or even preempt the promulgation of projected rules. For instance, a statute may alter the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency or extend the exemptions to its authority, thereby affecting existing or anticipated rules. Legislation that affects an agency's funding may be used to prevent enforcement of particular rules or to revoke funding discretion for rulemaking activity or both. Still other actions, less direct but potentially significant, are mandating agency consultation with other federal or state authorities and requiring prior congressional review of proposed rules (separate from the legislative veto sanctions). These last two provisions may change or even halt proposed rules by interjecting novel procedural requirements along with different perspectives and influences into the process.

It is also valuable to examine nonstatutory controls available to the Congress:

1. legislative, oversight, investigative, and confirmation hearings;

2. establishment of select committees and specialized subcommittees to oversee agency rulemaking and enforcement;

3. directives in committee reports, especially those accompanying legislation, authorizations, and appropriations, regarding rules or their implementation;

4. House and Senate floor statements critical of proposed, projected, or ongoing administrative action; and

5. direct contact between a congressional office and the agency or office in question.

Such mechanisms are all indirect influences; unlike statutory provisions, they are neither self-enforcing nor legally binding by themselves. Nonetheless, nonstatutory devices are more readily available and more easily effectuated than controls imposed by statute. And some observers have attributed substantial influence to nonstatutory controls in regulatory as well as other matters.3

It is impossible, in a limited space, to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive listing of congressional actions that override, have the effect of overturning, or prevent the promulgation of administrative rules. Consequently, this report concentrates upon the more direct statutory devices, although it also encompasses committee reports accompanying bills, the one nonstatutory instrument that is frequently most authoritatively connected with the final legislative product. The statutory mechanisms surveyed here cross a wide spectrum of possible congressional action:

1. single-purpose provisions to overturn or preempt a specific rule;

2. alterations in program authority that remove jurisdiction from an agency;

3. agency authorization and appropriation limitations;

4. inter-agency consultation requirements; and

5. congressional prior notification provisions.

#### A topical aff must restrict authority that the President has – they don’t.

Bradley and Goldsmith, 2005 (Curtis and Jack, professor of law at the University of Virginia and professor of law at Harvard, 118 Harvard Law Review 2047, May, lexis)

Second, under Justice Jackson's widely accepted categorization of presidential power, n5 "the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation" attach "when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress." n6 This  [\*2051]  proposition applies fully to presidential acts in wartime that are authorized by Congress. n7 By contrast, presidential wartime acts not authorized by Congress lack the same presumption of validity, and the Supreme Court has invalidated a number of these acts precisely because they lacked congressional authorization. n8 The constitutional importance of congressional approval is one reason why so many commentators call for increased congressional involvement in filling in the legal details of the war on terrorism. Before assessing what additional actions Congress should take, however, it is important to assess what Congress has already done. Third, basic principles of constitutional avoidance counsel in favor of focusing on congressional authorization when considering war powers issues. n9 While the President's constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief is enormously important, determining the scope of that authority beyond what Congress has authorized implicates some of the most difficult, unresolved, and contested issues in constitutional law. n10 Courts have been understandably reluctant to address the scope of that constitutional authority, especially during wartime, when the consequences of a constitutional error are potentially enormous. n11 Instead,  [\*2052]  courts have attempted, whenever possible, to decide difficult questions of wartime authority on the basis of what Congress has in fact authorized. n12 This strategy makes particular sense with respect to the novel issues posed by the war on terrorism.

#### Prefer our interpretation:

#### Limits – A limited point of stasis is necessary for effective limits which provide equitable ground to both sides – this does not exclude their content but does require them to be topical

O’Donnell 2004, Timothy M. O’Donnell, Director of Debate, University of Mary Washington, 2004, “And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate”, DOC, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/DRGArtiarticlesIndex.htm

Given that advocates on all sides have dug in their heels, it does not take much to imagine that if the current situation continues to persist, the debate “community” will eventually splinter along ideological lines with break out groups forming their own organizations designed to safeguard their own sacrosanct approaches to debate. It has happened before. Yet, while debate has witnessed such crises in the past, the present era of discontent seemingly threatens the very existence of the activity as both a coherent, competitive enterprise and a rewarding, educational co-curricular activity. The origins of the present crisis have many contributing causes, including the advent of mutual preference judging, the postmodern, performative, and activist turns in scholarly circles, the dawn of the information revolution and its attendant technologies, as well as a growing resource disparity between large and small debate programs. There appears to be no mutually agreeable solution. Simply put, there is little consensus about what ought to be the focus of debate, or even what constitutes good debate. Moreover, there appears to be no agreement about what question the judge ought to be answering at the end of the debate. In the present milieu, these questions and many more are literally up for grabs.

The product of this disagreement has been a veritable boon for the negative. We need to look no further than the caselist from the 2004 National Debate Tournament (NDT) to witness the wide variety of strategic tools that the negative now has in its arsenal. In one or more debates at this tournament, the negative team attempted to alter the ground for evaluating the debate by criticizing: the use of problem-solution thinking (or the lack thereof), the will to control present in the affirmative’s opening speech act, the reliance on and use of the state, the illusory belief in fiat, the affirmative’s relationship to the “other,” the embracing or eschewing of policymaking, the ethics of the affirmative, the rhetoric of the affirmative, the representations of the affirmative, the debate community as a whole, the debate community’s practices, the affirmative’s style of debate, the type of evidence the affirmative used (including an over or under reliance on experts), the affirmative’s failure to focus on the body, the revolutionary or anti-revolutionary nature of the affirmative, the piecemeal (or lack there of) nature of change advocated by the affirmative, the desires emanating from the affirmative debaters and/or their opening speech act, the identify formation instantiated by the affirmative, the metaphors inspired by the affirmative, and the very act of voting affirmative. And this is only a partial list.

To make the point another way, it is quite likely that an affirmative team on the 2003-2004 college topic who advocated that the United States should cede political control over reconstruction in Iraq to the United Nations – certainly one of the most pressing issues of the day – could have made it through whole tournaments, indeed large portions of the whole season, without ever discussing the merits of U.S. policy in Iraq after the opening affirmative speech. Such a situation seems problematic at best. That the negative’s strategic arsenal has grown so large that negative teams are tempted to eschew consideration of the important issues of the day (in the case of Iraq, an issue with geopolitical repercussions that will echo for the rest of our lives) for competitive reasons seems more than problematic. In fact, it is downright tragic.

What is so tragic about all of this is that a debater could go through an entire debate career with very little effort to go beyond meta-argument or arguments about argument (i.e. debate theory). The sad fact is that, more often than not, the outcome of any given debate today hinges less on the substantive issues introduced by the affirmative’s first speech, than it does on the resolution of these meta-arguments. These so-called “framework” debates about what the question of the debate ought to be, while somewhat interesting, have little practical application to the circumstances of our times and in my judgment, at least, are less intellectually rewarding than their counterparts. In fact, in a situation where the merits of the public policy issues staked out by the year’s resolution along with the critical issues that those policies raise are no longer the focus of the debate – because the negative can shift the question – why have a resolution at all? The disastrous implications of this trend in academic debate are appearing at the very moment that the academy is being urged to take seriously the goal of educating citizens.

In a world where proponents for any one of the varied questions are equally strident in staking out their views about what the debate ought to be about, agreement seems to be impossible. To be sure, there is value in each of these views. Public policy is important. The political consequences of policies are important. The language used in constructing policies is important. The presentational aspects of policy are important. The epistemological, ontological, and ethical underpinnings of policies are important. And so on. What are we to do then in situations where advocates on all sides make more or less equally compelling claims? As an educator, I am interested in having the students that I work with ask and answer all of these questions at one time or another. As a coach, I am interested in having them have a predictable set of arguments to prepare for. Thus, the question for me is, how can we have a game in which they have such an opportunity? The argument of this essay seeks to chart a partial answer to this question. It involves staking out a compromise position that recognizes that there is value in a wide variety of perspectives and that all deserve an equal opportunity to be represented in competitive debates.

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a framework consists of “a set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions” that govern behavior. When we speak of frameworks in competitive academic debate we are talking about the set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions that generate the question that the judge ought to answer at the end of the debate. Given that there is no agreement among participants about which standards, beliefs, or assumptions ought to be universally accepted, it seems that we will never be able to arrive at an agreeable normative assumption about what the question ought to be. So the issue before us is how we preserve community while agreeing to disagree about the question in a way that recognizes that there is richness in answering many different questions that would not otherwise exist if we all adhered to a “rule” which stated that there is one and only one question to be answered. More importantly, how do we stop talking past each other so that we can have a genuine conversation about the substantive merits of any one question?

The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis. Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree.

What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue.

I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.

How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.

#### Limited stasis necessary for education and dialogue – absent a prepared in depth focus debate becomes meaningless

Bassham 07 (Gregory, Professor, Chair of the Philosophy Department, and Director of the Center for Ethics and Public Life – King’s College, et al., Critical Thinking: A Student’s Introduction, p. 3-10)

Critical thinking is what a college education is all about. In many high schools, the emphasis tends to be on “lower-order thinking.” Students are simply expected to passively absorb information and then repeat it back on tests. In col-lege, by contrast, the emphasis is on fostering “higher-order thinking”: the active, intelligent evaluation of ideas and information. This doesn’t mean that factual information and rote learning are ignored in college. But it is not the main goal of a college education to teach students¶ what to think.¶ The main goal is to teach students¶ how to think¶ —that is, how to become independent, self-directed think-ers and learners.¶ W¶ HAT¶ I¶ S¶ C¶ RITICAL¶ T¶ HINKING¶ ?¶ Often when we use the word¶ critical ¶ we mean “negative and fault-ﬁnding. This is the sense we have in mind, for example, when we complain about apparent or a friend who we think is unfairly critical of what we do or say. But¶ critical ¶ also means “involving or exercising skilled judgment or observation.”In this sense critical thinking means thinking clearly and intelligently. More precisely,¶ critical thinking¶ is the general term given to a wide range of cogni-tive skills and intellectual dispositions needed to effectively identify, analyze, and evaluate arguments and truth claims; to discover and overcome personal preconceptions and biases; to formulate and present convincing reasons in sup-port of conclusions; and to make reasonable, intelligent decisions about what to believe and what to do. Put somewhat differently, critical thinking is disciplined thinking governed by clear intellectual standards. Among the most important of these intellectual¶ standards are¶ clarity, precision, accuracy, relevance, consistency, logical cor-rectness, completeness,¶ and¶ fairness.¶ ¶ 1 The function of education is to teach one to think intensively and to think critically.¶ —Martin Luther King Jr.¶ The purpose which runs through all other educational purposes—the common thread of education—is the development of the ability to think.¶ —Educational Policies Commission¶ Let’s begin our introduction to critical thinking by looking brieﬂy at each of these important critical thinking standards.¶ Before we can effectively evaluate a person’s argument or claim, we need to understand clearly what he or she is saying. Unfortunately, that can be difﬁcult because people often fail to express themselves clearly. Sometimes this lack of clarity is due to laziness, carelessness, or a lack of skill. At other times it results from a misguided effort to appear clever, learned, or profound. Consider the following passage from philosopher Martin Heidegger’s inﬂuential but notoriously obscure book¶ Being and Time:¶ ¶ Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care. The items of care have not been pieced together cumulatively any more than temporality itself has been put together “in the course of time” [“mit der Zeit”] out of the future, the having been, and the Present. Temporality “is” not an¶ entity¶ at all. It is not, but it¶ temporalizes¶ itself. . . . Temporality temporalizes, and indeed it tempo-ralizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein’s modes of Being, and especially the basic possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence.¶ 2¶ ¶ That may be profound, or it may be nonsense, or it may be both. Whatever exactly it is, it is quite needlessly obscure. As William Strunk Jr. and E. B. White remark in their classic¶ The Elements of Style,¶ “[M]uddiness is not merely a disturber of prose, it is also a destroyer of life, of hope: death on the highway caused by a badly worded road sign, heartbreak among lovers caused by a misplaced phrase in a well-intentioned letter. . . .”¶ 3¶ Only by paying careful attention to language can we avoid such needless miscommunications and disappointments. Critical thinkers not only strive for clarity of language but also seek max-imum clarity of thought. As self-help books constantly remind us, to achieve our personal goals in life we need a clear conception of our goals and priori-ties, a realistic grasp of our abilities, and a clear understanding of the problems and opportunities we face. Such self-understanding can be achieved only if we value and pursue clarity of thought.¶ Precision¶ Detective stories contain some of the most interesting examples of critical thinking in ﬁction. The most famous ﬁctional sleuth is, of course, Sherlock Holmes, the immortal creation of British writer Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. In Doyle’s stories Holmes is often able to solve complex mysteries when the bungling detectives from Scotland Yard haven’t so much as a clue. What is the secret of his success? An extraordinary commitment to¶ precision.¶ First, by care-ful and highly trained observation, Holmes is able to discover clues that other shave overlooked. Then, by a process of precise logical inference, he is able to reason from those clues to discover the solution to the mystery. Everyone recognizes the importance of precision in specialized ﬁelds such as medicine, mathematics, architecture, and engineering. Critical thinkers also understand the importance of precise thinking in daily life. They under-stand that to cut through the confusions and uncertainties that surround many everyday problems and issues, it is often necessary to insist on precise answers to precise questions: What exactly is the problem we’re facing? What exactly are the alternatives? What exactly are the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative? Only when we habitually seek such precision are we truly critical thinkers.¶ Accuracy¶ There is a well-known saying about computers: “Garbage in, garbage out. ”Simply put, this means that if you put bad information into a computer, bad information is exactly what you will get out of it. Much the same is true of human thinking. No matter how brilliant you may be, you’re almost guaran-teed to make bad decisions if your decisions are based on false information. A good example of this is provided by America’s long and costly involve-ment in Vietnam. The policymakers who embroiled us in that conﬂict were not stupid. On the contrary, they were, in journalist David Halberstam’s oft-quoted phrase, “the best and the brightest” of their generation. Of course, the reasons for their repeated failures of judgment are complex and controversial; but much of the blame, historians agree, must be placed on false and inad-equate information: ignorance of Vietnamese history and culture, an exaggerated estimate of the strategic importance of Vietnam and Southeast Asia, false assumptions about the degree of popular support in South Vietnam, unduly optimistic assessments of the “progress” of the war, and so on. Had American policymakers taken greater pains to learn the truth about such matters, it is likely they would not have made the poor decisions they did. Critical thinkers don’t merely value the truth; they have a¶ passion¶ for accurate, timely information. As consumers, citizens, workers, and parents, they strive to make decisions that are as informed as possible. In the spirit of Socrates’ famous statement that the unexamined life is not worth living, they never stop learning, growing, and inquiring. ¶ Relevance Anyone who has ever sat through a boring school assembly or watched a mud-slinging political debate can appreciate the importance of staying focused on relevant ideas and information. A favorite debaters’ trick is to try to distract an audience’s attention by raising an irrelevant issue. Even Abraham Lincoln wasn’t above such tricks, as the following story told by his law partner illustrates: In a case where Judge [Stephen T.] Logan—always earnest and grave—opposed him, Lincoln created no little merriment by his reference to Logan’s style of dress. He carried the surprise in store for the latter, till he reached his turn before the jury. Addressing them, he said: “Gentlemen, you must be careful and not permit yourselves to be overcome by the eloquence of counsel for the defense. Judge Logan, I know, is an effective lawyer. I have met him too often to doubt that; but shrewd and careful though he be, still he is sometimes wrong. Since this trial has begun I have discovered that, with all his caution and fastidiousness, he hasn’t knowledge enough to put his shirt on right.” Logan turned red as crimson, but sure enough, Lincoln was correct, for the former had donned a new shirt, and by mistake had drawn it over his head with the pleated bosom behind. The general laugh which followed destroyed the effect of Logan’s eloquence over the jury—the very point at which Lincoln aimed. 4 Lincoln’s ploy was entertaining and succeeded in distracting the attention of the jury. Had the jurors been thinking critically, however, they would have realized that carelessness about one’s attire has no logical relevance to the strength of one’s arguments. Consistency It is easy to see why consistency is essential to critical thinking. Logic tells us that if a person holds inconsistent beliefs, at least one of those beliefs must be false. Critical thinkers prize truth and so are constantly on the lookout for inconsistencies, both in their own thinking and in the arguments and assertions of others. There are two kinds of inconsistency that we should avoid. One is logical inconsistency, which involves saying or believing inconsistent things (i.e., things that cannot both or all be true) about a particular matter. The other is practical inconsistency, which involves saying one thing and doing another. Sometimes people are fully aware that their words conﬂict with their deeds. The politician who cynically breaks her campaign promises once she takes ofﬁce, the TV evangelist caught in an extramarital affair, the drug counselor arrested for peddling drugs—such people are hypocrites pure and simple. From a critical thinking point of view, such examples are not especially interesting. As a rule, they involve failures of character to a greater degree than they do failures of critical reasoning. More interesting from a critical thinking standpoint are cases in which people are not fully aware that their words conﬂ ict with their deeds. Such cases highlight an important lesson of critical thinking: that human beings often display a remarkable capacity for self-deception. Author Harold Kushner cites an all-too-typical example: Ask the average person which is more important to him, making money or being devoted to his family, and virtually everyone will answer family without hesitation. But watch how the average person actually lives out his life. See where he really invests his time and energy, and he will give away the fact that he really does not live by what he says he believes. He has let himself be persuaded that if he leaves for work earlier in the morning and comes home more tired at night, he is proving how devoted he is to his family by expending himself to provide them with all the things they have seen advertised. 6 Critical thinking helps us become aware of such unconscious practical inconsistencies, allowing us to deal with them on a conscious and rational basis. It is also common, of course, for people to unknowingly hold inconsistent beliefs about a particular subject. In fact, as Socrates pointed out long ago, such unconscious logical inconsistency is far more common than most people suspect. As we shall see, for example, many today claim that “morality is relative,” while holding a variety of views that imply that it is not relative. Critical thinking helps us recognize such logical inconsistencies or, still better, avoid them altogether. Logical Correctness To think logically is to reason correctly—that is, to draw well-founded conclusions from the beliefs we hold. To think critically we need accurate and well supported beliefs. But, just as important, we need to be able to reason from those beliefs to conclusions that logically follow from them. Unfortunately, illogical thinking is all too common in human affairs. Bertrand Russell, in his classic essay “An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish,” provides an amusing example: I am sometimes shocked by the blasphemies of those who think themselves pious—for instance, the nuns who never take a bath without wearing a bathrobe all the time. When asked why, since no man can see them, they reply: “Oh, but you forget the good God.” Apparently they conceive of the deity as a Peeping Tom, whose omnipotence enables Him to see through bathroom walls, but who is foiled by bathrobes. This view strikes me as curious. 8 As Russell observes, from the proposition 1. God sees everything. the pious nuns correctly drew the conclusion 2. God sees through bathroom walls. However, they failed to draw the equally obvious conclusion that 3. God sees through bathrobes. Such illogic is, indeed, curious—but not, alas, uncommon. Completeness In most contexts, we rightly prefer deep and complete thinking to shallow and superﬁcial thinking. Thus, we justly condemn slipshod criminal investigations, hasty jury deliberations, superﬁcial news stories, sketchy driving directions, and snap medical diagnoses. Of course, there are times when it is impossible or inappropriate to discuss an issue in depth; no one would expect, for example, a thorough and wide-ranging discussion of the ethics of human genetic research in a short newspaper editorial. Generally speaking, however, thinking is better when it is deep rather than shallow, thorough rather than superﬁcial. Fairness Finally, critical thinking demands that our thinking be fair—that is, open minded, impartial, and free of distorting biases and preconceptions. That can be very difﬁ cult to achieve. Even the most superﬁ cial acquaintance with history and the social sciences tells us that people are often strongly disposed to resist unfamiliar ideas, to prejudge issues, to stereotype outsiders, and to identify truth with their own self-interest or the interests of their nation or group. It is probably unrealistic to suppose that our thinking could ever be completely free of biases and preconceptions; to some extent we all perceive reality in ways that are powerfully shaped by our individual life experiences and cultural backgrounds. But as difﬁ cult as it may be to achieve, basic fair-mindedness is clearly an essential attribute of a critical thinker. THE BENEFITS OF CRITICAL THINKING Having looked at some of the key intellectual standards governing critical reasoning (clarity, precision, and so forth), let’s now consider more speciﬁcally what you can expect to gain from a course in critical thinking. Critical Thinking in the Classroom When they ﬁrst enter college, students are sometimes surprised to discover that their professors seem less interested in how they got their beliefs than they are in whether those beliefs can withstand critical scrutiny. In college the focus is on higher-order thinking: the active, intelligent evaluation of ideas and information. For this reason critical thinking plays a vital role throughout the college curriculum. In a critical thinking course, students learn a variety of skills that can greatly improve their classroom performance. These skills include • understanding the arguments and beliefs of others • critically evaluating those arguments and beliefs • developing and defending one’s own well-supported arguments and beliefs Let’s look brieﬂy at each of these three skills. To succeed in college, you must, of course, be able to understand the material you are studying. A course in critical thinking cannot make inherently difﬁcult material easy to grasp, but critical thinking does teach a variety of skills that, with practice, can signiﬁcantly improve your ability to understand the arguments and issues discussed in your college textbooks and classes. In addition, critical thinking can help you critically evaluate what you are learning in class. During your college career, your instructors will often ask you to discuss “critically” some argument or idea introduced in class. Critical thinking teaches a wide range of strategies and skills that can greatly improve your ability to engage in such critical evaluations. You will also be asked to develop your own arguments on particular topics or issues. In an American Government class, for example, you might be asked to write a paper addressing the issue of whether Congress has gone too far in restricting presidential war powers. To write such a paper successfully, you must do more than simply ﬁnd and assess relevant arguments and information. You must also be able to marshal arguments and evidence in a way that convincingly supports your view. The systematic training provided in a course in critical thinking can greatly improve that skill as well. Critical Thinking in the Workplace Surveys indicate that fewer than half of today’s college graduates can expect to be working in their major ﬁ eld of study within ﬁ ve years of graduation. This statistic speaks volumes about changing workplace realities. Increasingly, employers are looking not for employees with highly specialized career skills, since such skills can usually best be learned on the job, but for employees with good thinking and communication skills—quick learners who can solve problems, think creatively, gather and analyze information, draw appropriate conclusions from data, and communicate their ideas clearly and effectively. These are exactly the kinds of generalized thinking and problem-solving skills that a course in critical thinking aims to improve. Critical Thinking in Life Critical thinking is valuable in many contexts outside the classroom and the workplace. Let’s look brieﬂ y at three ways in which this is the case. First, critical thinking can help us avoid making foolish personal decisions. All of us have at one time or another made decisions about consumer purchases, relationships, personal behavior, and the like that we later realized were seriously misguided or irrational. Critical thinking can help us avoid such mistakes by teaching us to think about important life decisions more carefully, clearly, and logically. Second, critical thinking plays a vital role in promoting democratic processes. Despite what cynics might say, in a democracy it really is “we the people” who have the ultimate say over who governs and for what purposes. It is vital, therefore, that citizens’ decisions be as informed and as deliberate as possible. Many of today’s most serious societal problems—environmental destruction, nuclear proliferation, religious and ethnic intolerance, decaying inner cities, failing schools, spiraling health-care costs, to mention just a few—have largely been caused by poor critical thinking. And as Albert Einstein once remarked, “The signiﬁcant problems we face cannot be solved at the level of thinking we were at when we created them.” Third, critical thinking is worth studying for its own sake, simply for the personal enrichment it can bring to our lives. One of the most basic truths of the human condition is that most people, most of the time, believe what they are told. Throughout most of recorded history, people accepted without ques-tion that the earth was the center of the universe, that demons cause disease, that slavery was just, and that women are inferior to men. Critical thinking, honestly and courageously pursued, can help free us from the unexamined assumptions and biases of our upbringing and our society. It lets us step back from the prevailing customs and ideologies of our culture and ask, “This is what I’ve been taught, but is it true?”

#### Stasis key to fairness – otherwise debates have no means to engage – fairness is a necessary condition to make debate fun and enjoyable absent ground and effective preparation incentive to research positions diminishes and active engagement is vastly decreased – fair debate is an activity that ought to be encouraged because it creates equal footing to make debate possible

#### Government engagement – a point of controversy around the government allows for transformative educational value – we don’t have to role play but we should focus our demands towards institutions. The fact that one may not like the government is not a reason to disengage – its all the more reason to engage only by debating about the policy implications about the resolution is debate meaningful.

Esberg & Sagan 12 \*Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

### K

#### Trading narrative for the ballot commodifies one’s identity and has limited impact on the culture that one attempt’s to reform—when narrative “wins,” it subverts its own most radical intentions by becoming an exemplar of the very culture under indictment.

Coughlin 95—Anne M. Coughlin, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School [August, 1995, “Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship,” *Virginia Law Review*, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229, Lexis]

Although Williams is quick to detect insensitivity and bigotry in remarks made by strangers, colleagues, and friends, her taste for irony fails her when it comes to reflection on her relationship with her readers and the material benefits that her autobiographical performances have earned for her. n196 Perhaps Williams should be more inclined to thank, rather than reprimand, her editors for behaving as readers of autobiography invariably do. When we examine this literary faux pas - the incongruity between Williams's condemnation of her editors and the professional benefits their publication secured her - we detect yet another contradiction between the outsiders' use of autobiography and their desire to transform culture radically. Lejeune's characterization of autobiography as a “contract” reminds us that autobiography is a lucrative commodity. In our culture, members of the reading public avidly consume personal stories, n197 which surely explains why first-rate law journals and academic presses have been eager to market outsider narratives. No matter how unruly the self that it records, an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of “property in a moneyed economy” n198 and into a valuable intel [\*1283] lectual asset in an academy that requires its members to publish. n199 Accordingly, we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor. n200

Certainly, publication of a best seller may transform its author's life, with the resulting commercial success and academic renown. n201 As one critic of autobiography puts it, “failures do not get published.” n202 While writing a successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual author, this success has a limited impact on culture. Indeed, the transformation of outsider authors into “success stories” subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves to literary and academic consumers. n203 What good does this transformation do for outsiders who are less fortunate and less articulate than middle-class law professors? n204 Although they style themselves cultural critics, the [\*1284] storytellers generally do not reflect on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values they claim to resist. Rather, for the most part, they seem content simply to take advantage of the peculiarly American license, identified by Professor Sacvan Bercovitch, “to have your dissent and make it too.” n205

We will concede, as of the 1NC, that voting affirmative will make you FEEL BETTER than voting negative will. Your desire to do so, and your belief that the ballot really changes things by avoiding complicity in violent systems, is what we criticize—it is a false sense of accomplishment that accomplishes nothing but more talk.

Robyn **WIEGMAN** Women’s Studies & Literature @ Duke **’12** *Object Lessons* p. 81-85

I V. And When Gender Fails ... If the language of the political I have been using throughout this chapter turns repeatedly to the generic figures of justice and social transformation, this should not be read as evidence that I lack opinions about what would constitute their contemporary realization. Nor is it a reflection of the paucity of agendas that reside within the identity field of study that has chiefly organized this chapter's concerns. My task has been to explore the disciplinary force and affective power of the commitment to political commitment by paying attention to the political as a generic discourse and to the hegemony of the belief that underlies it.37 The terms I have used to do this political desire, field imaginary, field formation, progress narrative, and critical realism-have been aimed at deciphering the conundrums that ensue when the political aspiration to enact justice is a field's self-authorizing disciplinary identity and definitive disciplinary rule. Readers who contend that this itinerary abandons real politics will be missing my point even as they inadvertently confirm it, as one of the primary effects of the disciplinarity that I am tracking here is the demand it exacts on practitioners to deliver just such an accusation: that in the absence of the performance of a decisive political claim there can be no political commitments at all-or only bad ones.38 It is the interpellative force of this accusation and the shame that it both covets and induces that is central to the field's ongoing subject construction. Over time, the threat of the accusation can be so fully ingested that the critic responds to it without it ever being spoken, providing her own political rationales and agenda-setting conclusions as the means to cultivate legitimacy and authority as a practitioner in the field. Such authority, let's be clear, is as intoxicating as it is rewarding, and not just on the grounds of critical capital alone. The ingestion of the disciplinary structure has enormous psychic benefits precisely because of the promise it both makes and helps us hold dear, which is that our relationship to objects and analytics of study, along with critical practice as a whole, can be made commensurate with the political commitments we take them to bear. Hence the field-securing necessity of the very pedagogical lesson this chapter has been tracking, where categories, not critical agencies, are said to fail, and new objects and analytics become the valued terrain for sustaining the progress that underwrites the field imaginary's political dispensation to begin with. The problem at the heart of the progress narrative of gender is not, then, about gender per se nor the belief that gender is now used to defend: that the justice-achieving future we want lives in critical practice, if only its generative relations and epistemological priorities can be properly conceived. Instead, my point has been that the progress narrative is a symptom of the disciplinary apparatus that requires it, which is calculated to overcome the anxiety that not only incites but endlessly nags it-the anxiety raised by the suspicion that what needs to be changed may be beyond our control. To acknowledge this anxiety is not to say that critical practice has no political implications, or that nothing can be done in the face of the emergency of the present, or that the desire for agency of any kind is fantastical in the most negative sense. But it is to suggest that the disciplinary structure is as compensatory as it is ideational, in part because the temporality of historical transformation it must inhabit is both unwieldy and unpredictable. Think here of the differences in historical weight, affect, and transformative appeal between community activisms; revolutionary movements; state-based reform; and organized political participation and then place each of these alongside the threats of recuperation; the evisceration of democratic political forms; and the reduction of citizen sovereignty. These and other forms of transformation and interruption stand in stark contrast to the profound belief that disciplinarity engenders: that knowing will lead to knowing what to do. Linda Zerilli, among others, has challenged the idea that the domain of knowledge can be so prioritized, demonstrating how some of the most profound social normativities are inhabited not where knowledge practices explicate the nuances of their operations but in the reflexes, habits, and the ongoing discernments that feminist critics often quite succinctly understand but cannot undo.39 Her example concerns the gap between our own rather pointed critical knowing of the socially constructed nature of sex and gender and the feminist critic's inhabitations of everyday life in which the categories of men and women are experienced in all their fictional realness. But there are a host of other examples to bear out the point that while ignorance can be a form of privilege, its opposite-critical thinking and the knowing it promises to lead us to-may not finally be able to settle the relation between political aspiration and the agency it hopes to cultivate and command. The void at the heart of the language of "the political," "social change," and "justice" is an effect not of indecision or imprecision, then, but of the complex temporality that structures the field imaginary: where on the one hand the disciplinary commitment to the political is borne in the historical configuration of the present while being bound, on the other hand, to the scene of the future in which the projection of the materialization of justice is forced to live. In this temporal glitch between the inadequate but overwhelming present and the necessity of a future that will evince change, the field imaginary performs and projects, as well as deflects, the anxiety of agency that underwrites it. The familiar debate glossed as theory versus practice is one inflection of the anxiety being highlighted here. While often called a divide, the theory/practice formulation is a dependent relation, more circular than divisional as each "side" repeatedly stresses the incapacities of agency invested in the other. So, for instance, practice is the realist check on theory and its passionate forays into modes of thinking and analysis that love to hone what is more abstract than concrete, more ideational than real, more symptomatic than apparent while theory presses against the insistence for instrumentalized knowledge and destinations of critical thought that can materialize, with expediency, the political desire that motivates it- all this even as the language of theory comes steeped in its own idiom of instrumental function whenever it wagers itself as an analogue for politics as a whole. To take up one side or other of the divide is to reiterate the hopeful belief that agency lives somewhere close by and that with just the right instrument-call it a strategy, an object of study, or an analytic- we can intentionally grasp it. In parsing the theory/practice divide in this way, I am trying to foreground the power of the disciplinary rule that displaces the stakes of the debate by eliding the anxiety of agency that underlies it with the agential projections of critical practice-and further to make clear that the conundrums of disciplinarity and the ideational animations of critique cannot be settled by a rhetorical insistence on critical itineraries alone, whether linked to theory or practice or wrapped in the language of community, public knowledge, policy, or action-oriented research**.** This is because the theory/practice divide is a symptom of the anxiety of agency it evokes and cites, not an acknowledgment of, let alone an engagement with, it. While the repetition of the debate can certainly buttress the hope that what matters is which itinerary of critical practice we choose, it also relieves the field from arriving into the dilemma of its and our own limited agency**,** a limit that is not new but recurrent and part of both the complexity and difficulty of demanding to know how to use knowledge to exact justice from the contemporary world. This is not to say that the compensatory resolutions of the disciplinary pedagogies we learn are false or even that they are insufficient, but rather that there is more at stake than we have dared to think about the disciplinarity through which the object investments of critical practice are now performed. In the opening foray that this chapter delivers into Object Lessons as a whole, the problem that I am naming is simply this: that being made by the world we seek to change is always at odds with the disciplinary demand to make critical practice the means and the measure of our capacity to do so.

#### Stop feeling good. Maybe then, we can start actually acting.

Robyn **WIEGMAN** Women’s Studies & Literature @ Duke **’12** *Object Lessons* p. 28-35

Read together, the first two chapters offer a meditation on the work of identification as central to identity's academic knowledge production. In the opening chapter on the progress of gender, identification is the disciplinary force that weds field domain and object of study into representational coherence, with justice being the effect of methods and interpretative practices that conform to the field imaginary's primary disciplinary demand. This is a convergentist project, in which the political commitment that generates the field imaginary is demonstrated by pursuing coherence, synchronicity, inclusion, and equivalence between the objects, analytics, and methods it institutionally arrays. In the second chapter, identification works not through an affective or rhetorical convergence of social movement with academic knowledge production but on the grounds of attachments that live on this side of institutionalization where posthumanist critiques of representation and agency have generative authority in the anti-integrationist field imaginary of queer theory. This project is aimed at privileging asynchronicity, nonequivalence, incommensurability, and irreducible difference in order to wed critical practice to the political aspirations that attend it. In each of these cases, which speak to the disjunctive temporalities at work within identity knowledge domains, the field imaginary is staked to identificatory grounds, as good and bad objects abound to navigate the relationship between critical practice and social justice. While Ian resists identifying with feminism's convergentist agenda, his queer theoretic invests nonetheless in the field imaginary's golden rule: that objects and analytics of study can be made to deliver everything we want from them. But what about the function of disidentification in generating identification's allure? After all, gender's critical promise is secured by mobilizing disidentifications with women just as the demand to take a break from feminism serves as precondition for igniting the queer theoretic's political ambition . The third and fourth chapters of Object Lessons plumb this aspect of identity's object relations by considering the structure and affect of refusing identification with the figure that founds the field, as in Whiteness Studies and American Studies. In both cases, the field domain is oversaturated by the geopolitical power of its primary object of study, requiring various kinds of critical strategies to answer the call for justice. In "The Political Conscious (Whiteness Studies and the Paradox of Particularity)," I explore the optimistic claim that making whiteness an object of study undermines the disembodied universalism on which white supremacy in Western modernity depends. Through various readings of white particularity in critical and popular discourses alike, the chapter argues against the assumption that white supremacy operates through universalism alone in order to make sense of the elasticity of white power as a transforming historical form. One of my main points here is that white disaffiliation from white supremacy in its segregationist formation is the hegemonic configuration of white supremacy in the post-Civil Rights multiculturalist era-a point that Whiteness Studies must subordinate in order to establish disidentification as the strategic mechanism of white antiracism. Such disidentification banks enormously on the status of white self-consciousness and hence on consciousness itself as an anti racist political instrument. But the idealism that Whiteness Studies bestows on knowing and on a fully conscious subject reiterates the constitution of the humanist subject whose white particularity is submerged by the universalizing dictates of white privilege that travel under the guise of rational man. The "paradox" in the chapter's tide has to do, then, with the problem of making consciousness the centerpiece of a project aimed at undoing the very subject whose privileged consciousness is the universalized condition of whiteness under Western epistemological rule. The massive hope invested in a white subject who can produce the right kind of agency to bring down his own political overordination is surely inspiring, but it hardly predicts a future in which white-on-white preoccupations are deferred. As many readers know, Whiteness Studies faltered quite quickly on the contradictory entanglements of its own political aspirations, as seeking to dismantle the power that an object of study holds in the world by refusing identification with it is no easy feat, especially when a field bears the name of the entity it seeks to oppose and the power the object holds clearly exceeds one's critical identification with it. Add to this the sheer fact that dismantling the iconic status of a critical object is a far cry from dismantling the geopolitical power the object stands for, and one can see how genuinely vexed is the deconstructivist move to attend with rigor to the master term. It might even be harder than trying to collate power for an object of study that is routinely subordinated in the regimes of everyday life since the very act of paying attention to it confers value. In chapter 4, "Refusing Identification (Americanist Pursuits of Global Noncomplicity)," I consider these issues in the context of American Studies where the current critical demand to internationalize the field is bent toward securing a perspective uncontaminated not only by the global authority the object wields but by the critical priorities that dominate its practice in the United States. Djelal Kadir calls these practices "American American Studies," which I contextualize less disparagingly as the New American Studies, whose investments in disentangling critical practice from imperial complicities have already been traced through my explication of the concept of a field imaginary above. By exploring how internationalization tropes the discourse of the "outside" that is central to New American Studies, my chapter argues that internationalist proclamations participate in the same field imaginary that their identificatory refusals otherwise condemn. This argument is not made in order to relish the grand ah-ha, as if learning how to expose someone else's implication in what they protest is an inoculation against revealing my own. I'm more interested in the critical force of the charge and the assurance it routinely delivers that critics are not only in control of their object attachments but that what we say about them is the surest truth of what they mean. The point here is that objects of study are bound to multiple relationships, such that the conscious attempt to refuse an identification is in no way a guarantee that one can, let alone that one has done so. In the fifth chapter, "Critical Kinship (Universal Aspirations and Intersectional Judgements)," I move the conversation about the ideal of noncomplicity and the critic's avowedly conscious intentions to the terrain of intersectional investments in order to consider one of the major lessons the project of this book has taught me: that objects can resist what we try to make of them. The chapter focuses initially on a fascinating case involving a fertility clinic mistake and the two couples-one black, one white- who seek legal custody of the same child. The juridical setting of the story is germane to the itinerary of the chapter, as it is the link between this case and the centrality of "the case study" in intersectional theory that allows me to plot the juridical imaginary that intersectionality relies upon and the consequences of this for feminist commitments to the study of race and gender. Crenshaw's inaugural work on intersectionality was chiefly concerned with employment discrimination and violence against black women, whose "intersectional identity as both women and of color" engendered their dual marginalization "within both" feminist and antiracist discourses. 29 In recent years, intersectionality has been given a life of its own, becoming an imperative to attend evenly and adequately to identity's composite whole: race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, class, nation, religion, and increasingly age and ability. Such an insistence builds on Crenshaw's own concern for political and legal amelioration and seeks to forge not only analytic bridges but convergences between the political projects engaged by identity politics and the academic domains they name. The case that I bring to the conversation features a white woman who gives birth to a black child whose embryo was not her own. While feminist scholarship has routinely sided with the birth mother in disputes arising from reproductive technologies, often by claiming it as an antiracist position, my discussion situates the case in the historical context of white racial theft of black reproduction, where it is hardly an easy decision to privilege gestational labor-but just as difficult, I contend, not to do so when one considers the way that prioritizing genetics risks reinscribing essentialist understandings of both race and kinship. By reflecting on the way race and gender are incoherently arrayed in the case, such that adjudicating the dispute renders the analysis of its complexity woefully incomplete, the chapter approaches intersectional analysis more as a political aspiration than a methodological resolution to the multiplicities of identity that incite it. In doing so, I track the incommensurabilities that accompany its travels from, first, the specific province oflaw and, second, the particularity of black women's occlusion in U.S. discourses on race and gender.30 "Critical Kinship" thus mediates on the conundrum that the fertility clinic's mistake raises for intersectional inquiries, adding a third category to the important work done by Eve Sedgwick on paranoid and reparative readings: paradigmaticY For it is in the context of its own attachment to paradigmatic reading that intersectional analysis stages its commitment to justice-as if the imbrications of race and gender actually conform to juridical logic, such that knowing which side to take in one case can serve as the precedent for knowing which side to take in every case. In thinking about the problems generated by paradigmatic reading, this chapter explores not only the cost to feminist theory and to the complexity of"black women's experience" of rendering social life through the instrumental reasoning of juridical form, but the security that this relationship to the object of study affords through the guarantee that it promises to deliver: that the object of study, once named, will always be the same. Interpellated now into the field imaginary on intersectionality's own terms, "black women's experience" is interestingly disciplined by the normative account that has come to describe it Idisciplined, that is, in order to be made legible for political amelioration by the reading that intersectionality performs. Such an inquiry into the disciplinary force of political commitment is foregrounded throughout Object Lessons by a studied attention to the field imaginary and its distribution of knowing subjects and their variously coveted, condemned, or refused objects of study. In the final chapter, "The Vertigo of Critique: Rethinking Heteronormativity," I continue this dis- cussion by considering the way that the shape of a question produces the answer it seeks and what happens to critique when the authority of the question is undone. The chapter began as an abstract for a conference presentation on queer cultural investments in gender transitivity. My original intention was to track how sex as the defining object of study for queer scholarship had been eclipsed by the proliferation of gender in order to contribute a queer theoretical approach to the conference focus on heternormativity. In the context of"DoingJustice with Objects," this was the story of gender's ascendency from the other direction, where it was amassing enormous authority to reconfigure queer cultural and theoretical agendas-a story that the focus on its sojourn through feminist contexts tended to elide. But as I pursued the topic, I grew increasingly distracted by my own founding assumptions. What after all was "queer culture" and why did I assume that a commitment to gender's transitivity belonged to queer culture alone? Or more to the point, why was I so willing to repeat the belief that to be against heteronormativity was to be for gender's transitivity, as if the heteronormative could have no investment in gender's transitivity as well? Where did this equation between gender transitivity and antinormativity come from? Was it a historicist reading of gender, a de-biologizing one, or a political one? Or was the equation the consequence of a political commitment that mistook the questions it posed as a materialist reading of the social formation as a whole? These matters made it impossible to write the talk I had promised, propelling me instead into considering this: that the gesture of citing one's queer disidentification with normativity was itself a disciplinary norm, the very position from which practitioners could assume that their critical practice was unquestionably queer. In a certain sense, "The Vertigo of Critique" is the affective center of Object Lessons, if not one of its key starting points, as each chapter grapples in one way or another with the core assumption that critique has taught me: that critical practice is a political counter to normalizing agencies of every kind. 32 Whether in the mode of dialectical materialism, deconstruction, feminist standpoint, critical race, or queer reading, critique has been alluring because of the promise it makes, which is that through the routes and rhetorics of knowledge production we can travel the distance from speculation to truth, from desire to political comprehension, from wanting a different social world to having the faith that we can make it so. To be sure, critique can also be repetitious and exhausting, self-congratulatory and self-absorbed, but the narcissism it cultivates is nothing if not thrilling. Even when cloaked in skepticism, it allows us to proceed as if we are right.33 How can I not want everything that it aims to make true? The book in your hands is a meditation on this question. It both reflects and refracts the history of my own reliance on the practices and procedures of critique and the various ways in which the authority it offers has come to unsettle me. As readers will see, I now worry over its repetitions and prohibitions, find myself estranged by its pace, and am unnerved by what it chooses not to question, know, or love. Most of all, I long to linger in the spaces of what it insists is done. Object Lessons is not an argument against critique as much as an encounter with its excessive reach. It records my growing interest in questioning left political desire for critical practice to rescue us from ... well ... nearly everything, including the very complexity of identity as it moves incongruently and unevenly across analytic, social, psychic, affective, and historical terrains. It seems strange to say this, but critique has come to haunt me because it promises to deliver too much. Object Lessons is not, then, a critique. It is not even a critique of critique. It is not an intervention. I am not trying to make us conscious of critical habits so that we can change them. It is not an argument against other arguments, nor a dismissal of what others have said or done. It is not a new theory. It offers no new objects or analytics of study. It is an inhabitation of the world-making stakes of identity knowledges and the field imaginary that sutures us to them-a performance, in other words, of the risk and reward, the amnesia and optimism, and the fear and pleasure sustained by living with and within them.

### Case

#### The aff is stuck in a pincer between the moderate left and hard left – this is the worst of all options - the idea that progress can be made for the black is wrong – any call for reform inevitably results in failure

Wilderson 2008, Frank B. Wilderson, III assistant professor in the Program in African American Studies and the Department of Drama at the University of California, 2008, “Biko Lives!”, “Biko and the Problematic of Presence”, PDF

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, White politicos had been radicalized by Black Consciousness’ criticism of their liberal hypocrisy. But in the 1980s and 1990s they responded to this radicalization with sullen resentment of the “rejection” they had experienced at the hands of Black Consciousness— the movement that had radicalized them. Rather than explore—and surren- der to—the ass umptive logic behind their radicalization, and allow Blacks to continue to lead, even if it meant that they (Whites) would be sidelined politically for another ten or twenty years—or, follow Biko’s demand that they work with and against Whites right where they lived—they instead attached themselves to trade unions such as COSATU, and to the UDF, and rode back into the center of political life on the wings of a “nonracial” class analysis.20 They “had returned to...opposition politics with a sense of revenge and vengeance towards the B.C.M.” and through “their access to financial resources and their influence over the media, academia, and publishing houses . . . they . . . succeeded in stifling the Movement . . . ”21

Even if these White radicals had been persuaded by Biko and Black Consciousness that the essential nature of the antagonism was not capitalism but anti-Blackness (and no doubt some had been persuaded), they could not have been persuaded to organize in a politically masochistic manner; that is, against the concreteness of their own communities, their own families, and themselves, rather than against the abstraction of “the system”—the targetless nomenclature preferred by the UDF. Political masochism would indeed be ethical but would also bring them to the brink of the abyss of their own subjectivity.

They would be embarking upon a political journey the trajectory of which would not simply hold out the promise of obliterating class relations and establishing an egalitar- ian socius (what less articulate and more starry-eyed White activists in the United States refer to as “vision”), but they would be embarking upon a journey whose trajectory Frantz Fanon called “the end of the world.”22 The “new” world that class-based political “vision” is predicated on (i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat) isn’t new in the sense that it ushers in an unimaginable episteme; it is really no more than a reorganization of Modernity’s own instruments of knowledge. But a world without race, more precisely, a world without Blackness, is truly unimaginable. Such a world cannot be accomplished with a blueprint of what is to come on the other side. It must be undone because, as Biko, Fanon, and others have intimated, it is unethical, but it cannot be refashioned in the mind prior to its undoing. A political project such as this, whereby the only certainty is uncertainty and a loss of all of one’s coordinates, is not the kind of political project Whites could be expected to meditate on, agitate for, theorize, or finance. And though it might not be the kind of project that Blacks would consciously support, it is the essence of the psychic and material location of where Blacks are. Caught between a shameful return to liberalism and a terrifying encounter with the abyss of Black “life”— caught, that is, between liberalism and death—some White activists took up the banner of socialism, others espoused a vague but vociferous anti- apartheidism, and most simply worked aimlessly yet tirelessly to fortify and extend the interlocutory life of “the ANC’s long-standing policy of deferring consideration of working class interests...until after national liberation had been achieved.”23

There was no respite from the crowding out scenario elaborated by dis- affected White politicos and Charterist stalwarts on the Left, because the hydraulics of outright repression from the Right was just as debilitating. “[I]n the aftermath of the 1976 uprisings the South African Government proscribed BC organisations and persecuted their leaders—many were banned, imprisoned, and tortured, and some died while in detention,” culminating in the brutal murder of Biko himself. Black Consciousness was caught in a pincer move between White power in what Gramsci designates as “political society,” state coercion, and White power in civil society, benign hegemony of the Left, which culminated in its “removal from the scene, [and] facilitated, at least to some extent, the return to dominance of the A.N.C.”24

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Steve Biko and Black Consciousness were compelled to read Black Skin, White Masks pragmatically rather than theoretically; thus denying their analysis the most disturbing aspects of Black Skin, White Masks which lay in Fanon’s capacity to explain Blackness as an antirelation; that is, as the impossible subjectivity of a sentient being who can have “no recognition in the eyes of ” the Other.25 (Fanon himself seems to stumble, accidentally, into much of his paradigmatic analysis.) Black Consciousness latches on to (fetishizes?) the very antithesis of Fanon’s paradigmatic analysis and does so in the name of Fanon—or, more accurately, in the name of the Fanon it prefers the Fanon of disalienation, the Fanon who heals.

This theoretical slippage within Black Consciousness stems from the fact that although its structure of feeling attends to the abject derelic- tion that characterizes Black dispossession, its actual discourse imagines Black dispossession through the rubric of decolonization: this is to say, Black Consciousness feels the distinction between the postemancipation subject and the postcolonial subject, but it is unable (or unwilling) to be elaborated by the grammar of accumulation and fungibility, rather than the grammar of exploitation and alienation.26 This slippage in Black Consciousness can be traced to both its selective and utilitarian reading of Fanon, as well as to the hydraulics of state terror, that were acutely draconian during the time of Steve Biko (making any form of reflection a miracle). It should be remembered that not only was it treasonous to call for an end to apartheid but it was also treasonous to call state terror “terror.” Every enunciation had to function like a feint, a slight of hand, part call to arms, part alle- gory. That anything at all was said under such conditions is a testament to the will and courage of Biko and his comrades. I proceed, therefore, in full recognition that the power of understanding (analysis) is sometimes incompatible with the need to empower (struggle).

**Making aesthetics prior produces fascist politics. Excluding nonaesthetic judgment labels other’s suffering beautiful.**

Martin **JAY** History @ UC Berkeley **’92** “"The Aesthetic Ideology" as Ideology; Or, What Does It Mean to Aestheticize Politics?” *Cultural Critique* 21 Spring p. 43-44

Any discussion of the aestheticization of politics must begin by identifying the normative notion of the aesthetic it presupposes. For unless we specify what is meant by this notoriously ambiguous term, it is impossible to understand why its extension to the realm of the political is seen as problematic. Although a thorough review of the different uses in the literature cited above is beyond the scope of this essay, certain significant alternatives can be singled out for scrutiny. As Benjamin's own remarks demonstrate, one salient use derives from the l'art pour l'art tradition of differentiating a realm called art from those of other human pursuits, cognitive, religious, ethical, economic, or whatever. Here the content of that realm apart-often, but not always, identified with something known as beauty-is less important than its claim to absolute autonomous and autotelic self-referentiality. For the obverse of this claim is the exclusion of ethical, instrumental, religious, etc. considerations from the realm of art. A politics aestheticized in this sense will be equally indifferent to such extra-artistic claims, having as its only criterion of value aesthetic worth. Moreover, the definition of that worth implied by such a rigid differentiation usually suppresses those aspects of the aesthetic, such as sensuous enjoyment and bodily pleasure, which link art and mundane existence; instead, formal considerations outweigh "sentimental" ones. On a visit to Paris in 1891, Oscar Wilde was reported to have said: "When Benvenuto Cellini crucified a living man to study the play of muscles in his death agony, a pope was right to grant him absolution. What is the death of a vague individual if it enables an immortal word to blossom and to create, in Keats' words, an eternal source of ecstasy?" (Raynaud 397). Another classical expression of this attitude appeared in the notorious response of the Symbolist poet Laurent Tailhade to a deadly anarchist bomb thrown into the French Chamber of Deputies in 1893: "**What do the victims matter if the gesture is beautiful**?"8 Not long after, F. T. Marinetti's Futurist Manifesto echoed the same sentiments in glorifying, along with militarism, anarchistic destruction, and contempt for women, "the beautiful ideas which kill" (182). Moving beyond the Futurists' flatulent rhetoric, Mussolini's son-in-law and foreign minister Ciano would confirm the practical results of its implementation when he famously compared the bombs exploding among fleeing Ethiopians in 1936 to flowers bursting into bloom. The aestheticization of politics in these cases repels not merely because of the grotesque impropriety of applying criteria of beauty to the deaths of human beings, but also because of the chilling way in which **nonaesthetic criteria are deliberately** and provocatively **excluded from consideration**. When restricted to a rigorously differentiated realm of art, such antiaffective, formalist coldness may have its justifications; indeed, a great deal of modern art would be hard to appreciate without it. But when then extended to politics through a gesture of imperial dedifferentiation, the results are **highly problematic**. For the disinterestedness that is normally associated with the aesthetic seems precisely what is so **radically** **inappropriate** in the case of that **most basic of human interests, the preservation of life**. Benjamin's bitter observation that mankind's "self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order" ("Work of Art" 244) vividly expresses the disgust aroused by this callous apotheosis of art over life.

#### Disability CANNOT be simplified to a question of the body. PRAGMATISM is a necessary pre-requisite to their Critique.

Vehmas et al. 2009 (Sima, Professor of Special Education at the University of Jyvaskyla; Kristjana, Associate Professor at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Social Work and Health Science; Tom, social scientist with an interest in bioethics, involved in the UK disability movement for twenty years. Introduction in Arguing about Disability, eds. Kristjana Kristiansen, Simo Vehmas and Tom Shakespeare)

In the modern era, disability has been explained by scientific methods, and reduced to an individual's physiological or mental deficiencies. Disability has become, among other phenomena such as alcoholism, homosexuality and criminality, a paradigm case of medicalisation (a term which refers to a process where people and societies are explained increasingly in medical terms). The expression medical model of disability has become a common nickname for a one-sided view that attributes the cause of the individual's deficits either to bad luck (accidents), to inadequate health practices (smoking, bad diet), or to genes. This position views disability as the inevitable product of the individual's biological defects, illnesses or characteristics. Disability becomes a personal tragedy that results from the individual's pathological condition (Barnes et al. 1999; Oliver 1990, 1996; Priestley 2003; Silvers 1998). Since the late 1960s, the one-sided medical understanding of disability has been fiercely criticised. It has been argued that medicine portrays disability in a biased manner that leads to practices and social arrangements that oppress people with impairments; interventions are aimed solely at the 'abnormal' individual while the surrounding environment is left intact. Resources are not directed at changing the environment but rather on ways to 'improve' or 'repair' the impaired individual. This is seen to lead to a social and moral marginalisation of disabled people, preventing their full participation in society. In other words, disability is a social problem that should be dealt with through social interventions, not an individual problem that is to be dealt with through medical interventions. Sociological viewpoints combined with a strong political commitment to the selfempowerment of people with impairments have become the ontological and epistemological foundation for disability studies (e.g., Linton 1998; Oliver 1996; Priestley 2003). Indeed, the way a phenomenon such as disability is understood and explained constitutes the basis for practical interventions aimed at removing the possible hardships associated with disability. A certain view and understanding of disability inevitably directs our responses and actions. In other words, if the cause of impairment and disablement is seen to be spiritual, it is only natural to address the issue with spiritual manoeuvres, such as exorcism and faith-healing. And if disability is understood in terms of medical knowledge and is confused with impairment, then it is only reasonable to concentrate on improving a person's ability with medical interventions. One unfortunate outcome of mechanical applications of either one of these individualistic approaches to disability has been paternalism: making decisions on behalf of others for their own good, even if contrary to their own wishes. Part of paternalism is a kind of expert system where the authorities of relevant knowledge and craft determine how the phenomenon in question should be understood and dealt with. In the religious framework, it is the clergy who are in possession of the truth; in the medical discourse, it is the doctors. In either case, the autonomy of people with impairments has too often been trampled upon, and they become merely passive recipients of the benevolent assistance provided by professionals, and other believers of the dominant disability discourse. The shortcomings of individualistic approaches to disability thus seem clear, and the emergence of a social understanding of disability has been a welcome change to disability discourse and institutional responses to disabled people's lives. The field of disability studies has been dominated by sociology and, in the USA, also by the humanities. The research conducted is mostly empirical with the aim of verifying certain premises. For example, in the UK, disability is often seen to be a matter of oppression, and the function of research is to a large extent to clarify how people with impairments are actually oppressed. However, if disability as a social phenomenon is understood in terms of oppression and discrimination, it would seem vital to make closer analyses of concepts such as health, normality, well-being, discrimination, justice and equality - the kind of concepts that have long been discussed in philosophy. However, very little theoretical work has been done concerning the key concepts and underlying assumptions of disability studies. Hence, this book aims to contribute to the development of disability theory and a more profound understanding of the phenomenon.

## 2NC

### 2NC – A2 – Aesthetics Good

**Aestheticization of politics DEMANDS topicality – the limits of an intersubjective stasis point are ESPECIALLY crucial in this context.  Only SOCIAL instead of INDIVIDUAL aesthetics avoids a collapse into infinitude**

Villa 92¶ assistant Professor Of Political Science, Amherst College,¶ Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action¶ Author(s): Dana R. VillaReviewed work(s):Source: Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 274-308Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: [http://www.jstor.org/stable/192004](http://www.jstor.org/stable/192004" \t "_blank) .¶

This is yet another reason why Kantian taste judgment is the appropriate model for Arendt's account of political judgment*,* the "receptive side" of virtuoso action. It reasserts the intersubjective nature of both appearances and judgment while severing the links between the common or public and the universal. Our capacity for judgment rests on our feeling for the world, and this requires neither a transcendental ground for appearances nor universally valid criteria of argumentative rationality. Practical questions emphatically do not admit of truth.153 Yet political judgment seen as a kind of taste judgment nevertheless helps to tame the agon by reintroducing the connection between plurality and deliberation, by showing how the activity of judgment can, potentially, reveal to an audience what they have in common in the process of articulating their differences. And what they have in common, contra Aristotle and contemporary communitarians, are not purposes per se but the world*.* Debate, not consensus, constitutes the essence of political life, according to Arendt.154 The conception of taste judgment proposed by Kant reopens the space of deliberation threatened by an overly agonisticaestheticization of action but in such a way that consensus and agreement are not the telos of action and judgment but, at best, a kind of *regulative* ideal.The turn to Kant thus enables Arendt to avoid the antipolitical tendencies encountered in the actor-centered version of agonistic action. The meaningcreative capacity of nonsovereign action becomes importantly dependent on the *audience,* conceived as a group of *deliberating agents* exercising their capacity for judgment. The judgment of appearances or the meaning of action is seen by Arendt as predicated on a twofold "death of the author": the actor does not create meaning as the artist does a work, nor can the audience redeem the meaning of action through judgment unless the individuals who constitute it are able to forget themselves. This is not to say that Arendt's conception of political action and judgment extinguishes the self; rather, it is to say that self-coherence is achieved through a process of self-disclosure that is importantly decentered for both actor and judge, for the judging spectator is also engaged in the "sharing of words and deeds" in his capacity as a deliberating agent. As Arendt reminds us, "By his manner of judging, the person discloses to an extent also himself, what kind of person he is, and *this* disclosure, which is involuntary, gains in validity to the degree that it has liberated itself from *merely* individual idiosyncrasies."155

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/images/cleardot.gif

### 2NC – Wilderson

#### 1NC Wilderson explains paradox of liberalism

Wilderson 2008, Frank B. Wilderson, III assistant professor in the Program in African American Studies and the Department of Drama at the University of California, 2008, “Biko Lives!”, “Biko and the Problematic of Presence”, PDF

They would be embarking upon a political journey the trajectory of which would not simply hold out the promise of obliterating class relations and establishing an egalitar- ian socius (what less articulate and more starry-eyed White activists in the United States refer to as “vision”), but they would be embarking upon a journey whose trajectory Frantz Fanon called “the end of the world.”22 The “new” world that class-based political “vision” is predicated on (i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat) isn’t new in the sense that it ushers in an unimaginable episteme; it is really no more than a reorganization of Modernity’s own instruments of knowledge. But a world without race, more precisely, a world without Blackness, is truly unimaginable. Such a world cannot be accomplished with a blueprint of what is to come on the other side. It must be undone because, as Biko, Fanon, and others have intimated, it is unethical, but it cannot be refashioned in the mind prior to its undoing. A political project such as this, whereby the only certainty is uncertainty and a loss of all of one’s coordinates, is not the kind of political project Whites could be expected to meditate on, agitate for, theorize, or finance. And though it might not be the kind of project that Blacks would consciously support, it is the essence of the psychic and material location of where Blacks are. Caught between a shameful return to liberalism and a terrifying encounter with the abyss of Black “life”— caught, that is, between liberalism and death—some White activists took up the banner of socialism, others espoused a vague but vociferous anti- apartheidism, and most simply worked aimlessly yet tirelessly to fortify and extend the interlocutory life of “the ANC’s long-standing policy of deferring consideration of working class interests...until after national liberation had been achieved.”23

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### 2NC – Ablism

#### There is no such thing as disability it’s all value judgements. That’s a prior question

Pfeiffer 02 (David, Ph.D., Professor of Public Management at Suffolk University, Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22 No. 2, Spring, p. 3-23)

Disability does not refer to a deficit in a person. Disability refers to a value judgment that something is not being done in a certain, acceptable way. Just as race is not a viable biological term and has no "scientific" definition, disability has no "scientific" or even a commonly agreed upon definition. Disability is not based on functioning or normality or a health condition, but on value judgements concerning functioning, normality, and health. In other words, the term disability is based on ideology and social class.

### 2NC – Topical Version Of The Aff

#### Topical version of the aff turns case – absent specific plans with the state ensure failure

Steve 7 (citizen activist against injustice, Anonymous member of Black Block and Active Transformation, civil justice movements, , Date Last Mod. Feb 8, <http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/global/a16dcdiscussion.htm>)

What follows is not an attempt to discredit our efforts. It was a powerful and inspiring couple of days. I feel it is important to always analyze our actions and be self-critical, and try to move forward, advancing our movement. The State has used Seattle as an excuse to beef up police forces all over the country. In many ways Seattle caught us off-guard, and we will pay the price for it if we don't become better organized. The main weakness of the Black Block in DC was that clear goals were not elaborated in a strategic way and tactical leadership was not developed to coordinate our actions. By leadership I don't mean any sort of authority, but some coordination beside the call of the mob. We were being led around DC by any and everybody. All someone would do is make a call loud enough, and the Black Block would be in motion. We were often lead around by Direct Action Network (DAN - organizers of the civil disobedience) tactical people, for lack of our own. We were therefore used to assist in their strategy, which was doomed from the get go, because we had none of our own. The DAN strategy was the same as it was in Seattle, which the DC police learned how to police. Our only chance at disrupting the IMF/WB meetings was with drawing the police out of their security perimeter, therefore weakening it and allowing civil disobedience people to break through the barriers. This needs to be kept in mind as we approach the party conventions this summer. Philadelphia is especially ripe for this new strategy, since the convention is not happening in the business center. Demonstrations should be planned all over the city to draw police all over the place. On Monday the event culminated in the ultimate anti-climax, an arranged civil disobedience. The civil disobedience folks arranged with police to allow a few people to protest for a couple minutes closer to where the meetings were happening, where they would then be arrested. The CD strategy needed arrests. Our movement should try to avoid this kind of stuff as often as possible. While this is pretty critical of the DAN/CD strategy, it is so in hindsight. This is the same strategy that succeeded in shutting down the WTO ministerial in Seattle. And, while we didn't shut down the IMF/WB meetings, we did shut down 90 blocks of the American government on tax day - so we should be empowered by their fear of us! The root of the lack of strategy problem is a general problem within the North American anarchist movement. We get caught up in tactical thinking without establishing clear goals. We need to elaborate how our actions today fit into a plan that leads to the destruction of the state and capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Moving away from strictly tactical thinking toward political goals and long term strategy needs to be a priority for the anarchist movement. No longer can we justify a moralistic approach to the latest outrage - running around like chickens with their heads cut off. We need to prioritize developing the political unity of our affinity groups and collectives, as well as developing regional federations and starting the process of developing the political principles that they will be based around (which will be easier if we have made some headway in our local groups). The NorthEastern Federation of Anarchist Communists (NEFAC) is a good example of doing this. They have prioritized developing the political principles they are federated around. The strategies that we develop in our collectives and networks will never be blueprints set in stone. They will be documents in motion, constantly being challenged and adapted. But without a specific elaboration of what we are working toward and how we plan to get there, we will always end up making bad decisions. If we just assume everyone is on the same page, we will find out otherwise really quick when shit gets critical.

## 1NR

#### The narrative form they choose to present their arguments in subverts its radical content. Their appeal to the ballot to remedy their grievances and the grievances of other outsiders in the debate community only serves to re-inscribe the community’s authority to determine who should and should not receive remedy. The presentation of themselves as the solution mirrors and supports the liberal power relations which produce subordination in the first place

Coughlin 95—Anne M. Coughlin, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School [August, 1995, “Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship,” *Virginia Law Review*, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229, Lexis]

These speculations suggest that we must qualify, perhaps significantly, the outsiders' assertions concerning the revolutionary power of their narratives. Just like the legal discourse that the outsiders condemn, narrative “presupposes some criteria of relevance” that guide the storyteller's selection, arrangement for emphasis, and causal reordering of the events to be included in the story. n91 As one historian explains, “the narrative can be said to [\*1256] determine the evidence as much as the evidence determines the narrative” because the “evidence only counts as evidence and is only recognized as such in relation to a potential narrative.” n92 Even if we reject White's suspicion that the criterion that guides all narrative accounts of real events is “law, legality, legitimacy, or, more generally, authority,” n93 his theory of narrative meaning still exposes the ambivalent political allegiances of the outsider autobiographies. In these texts, no less than in legal opinions or traditional legal scholarship, our system of law is enthroned as the “central organizing principle of meaning.” n94 Law and the legal academy are the subjects that link together, indeed, call forth, each of the personal experiences recounted. The texts are not a desultory collection of personal reminiscences. Rather, they record only those events that support particular claims against or on behalf of law and the academy. For example, Professor Robin West describes her own promiscuity to support her charge that the definition of “consensual sex” applied by law in rape cases conceals the danger of violent male sexuality that women endure. n95 Professor Patricia Williams elaborates the racist content of episodes from her [\*1257] life to create an occasion for her to display her intellectual prowess and professional accomplishments to an academy reluctant to admit African-American women. n96 And Professor Richard Delgado recalls conversations in which senior colleagues warned him to avoid writing about “civil rights or other “ethnic' subjects” to provide evidence of the jealous insularity and undemocratic character of the mainstream civil rights academy. n97

These texts reveal that the law and its specific institutional interests, both in practice and in the academy, already define the relevant points of intersection for the experiences recounted in the outsider narratives. In other words, the law and the academy implicitly supply the appropriate points of contention for outsider narrators. Just as legal doctrine determines the facts that judges will find, so the conventions, practices, and concerns of law and the academy furnish the space for debate and perhaps even produce the truth that outsider stories report by determining which events are significant (or real) enough to be represented. This is one of a variety of ways, then, in which the narrative form distinctly mitigates the subversive intention of outsider storytelling.

To be sure, each of these texts expresses dissatisfaction with law and the professional academy and offers suggestions for reform. Ironically, this criticism celebrates the power of law and reproduces law's indifference to the marginalized position that African Americans and women occupy within our culture no less forcefully than recourse to litigation would do. Contrary to Richard Delgado's assertion, the storytellers really do not propose to subvert law's authority; n98 rather, they supplicate law to exercise its authority so that outsiders, no less than affluent white men, enjoy the same access to, and power to define, the good life. Among the many grievances they detail, law should be authorized to ease the suffering of the impoverished by advancing basic levels of food, housing, medical care, and education; n99 to protect women from domestic violence and the injury of childbirth; n100 to secure women's [\*1258] erotic pleasure just as it secures that of men; n101 to support the African-American nomos by financing African-American schools, while preserving the opportunity of African-Americans to attend white schools; n102 to remedy the harms that hate speech causes; n103 to relieve outsider employees from the grooming preferences imposed by corporate employers; n104 and to assure that workplaces are safe for all employees. n105

Nor do the storytellers propose to tear down the academy. What they want (and have achieved) is to be welcomed within the academy's gates and to speak from behind its sheltering walls. n106 Thus, the academy should “recruit” and “nurture” as scholars those whom culture has victimized, n107 revise its traditional evaluative standards so as to count outsiders' special experiential wisdom as an intellectual credential, n108 and bestow on them the customary professional titles, accoutrements, and perquisites. n109 [\*1259]

By so grossly streamlining the storytellers' allegations, I do not intend to deride their contribution to our understanding of the practices that have relegated people of color and women to poverty, servitude, and obscurity. Rather, I offer it to emphasize that the storytellers' opposition to law concludes by reaffirming the core values of our legal system. Our appreciation of the injustices their narratives provoke is itself derived from the remedial authority of the law, and the cultural sense of justice the law provides is the context for our understanding.

At this point, I want to anticipate an objection that the storytellers and some of their readers may interject. The objection is this: the outsider storytellers are not merely identifying or trying to repair law's failure to make good on (among others) its promise of equal respect and equal opportunity for all persons regardless of race or gender. Rather, by conferring on law authority to intervene in and remedy a broader range of outsider grievances than liberal individualist ideology would seem to allow, they are producing a revolutionary vision of a human self that is dependent on external assistance for its well-being.

This objection might be a forceful one, particularly if the outsider project began to identify not only the legal mechanisms that consign women and people of color to dependence on social relief, but also those that dictate and support, even as they privilege, the identity of white men. n110 Ultimately, however, the autobiographical self constructed by these texts overwhelms any alternative vision of human nature they might offer. When Richard Delgado identifies the storytellers' desire to elude the role of “supplicant” as one of the primary motivations underlying their project, he never remarks that such desire is produced by and understandable only within a system, such as liberal individualism, that condemns as failures those whose success, if not survival, is attributed to legal [\*1260] or social relief. Thus, even as they demand law's intervention on behalf of other outsiders - African Americans and women condemned to haunt the margins of a community committed to individual solutions n111 - the storytellers are busy proving that they are not supplicants. They achieved their success the liberal way; they earned it. No less than insider texts, the outsider narratives instruct other outsiders that if they would succeed they too must do it by themselves. In the end, therefore, these stories mirror and support the liberal power relations the outsiders would dismantle.

#### And, The affirmative is stuck in an *authority paradox*. They define themselves in opposition to the state, to topicality, to norms—this creates rejection of the norm as just another academic norm. Defining yourself against topicality is just another act of disciplinary gate-keeping that keeps the game the same.

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A progress narrative is, quite obviously, a temporal formation, but in the framework of Object Lessons it is also a wish-to get past the beginning, to make good use of time, to know where one is going. If we read its operations only to condemn the false promises it makes, we risk overlooking the power the wish holds by ceding the whole terrain of politics and agency to materiality (and our ability to discern it) alone. My point in following the progress of gender in the last chapter was not to lament or chastise its capture of the field imaginary of Women's and now Gender Studies, even as I sought to interrupt its propulsion in order to pay attention to what the turn to gender was a turn away from. I wanted instead to inhabit the utopic force of the wish and to witness the ways that it shapes the political rhetorics, institutional aspirations, critical affects, and object relations in which identity knowledges produce and reflect their commitment to doing justice. In doing so, I sought to highlight the paradox that underlies identity knowledges as a whole: that the priority of the political that so defiantly characterizes them serves as their most insistent, most demanding disciplinary rule. There is, I contend, no escape from this predicament in which the institutionalization of identity as an object and analytic of study is bound to reproducing the very hope that inspires it as the disciplinary idiom for legible, no less than legitimate, belonging to the field. While the signifier of the political changes both within and across identity domains, the resonant investment in political commitment as the disciplinary syntax is not simply consistent, but constitutive. The lessons to be learned here arise not from trying to outrun disciplinarity or institutionalization, but from engaging the spell that the disciplinary apparatus casts, which entails ongoing attention to the ways in which critical practice serves as the animating scene of political desire in identity-oriented fields. To that end, this chapter seeks to attend to institutionalization more fully and formally by considering how the itineraries of social movements collated around identity rubrics and the academic fields they provoke diverge, in political idiom, historical form, and affective force. While the predominant discussion of institutionalization typically laments this divergence-often condemning institutionalization for evacuating identity and its minoritized knowledges of their radical political effects I begin these inquiries by presupposing that every political struggle in whatever idiom or venue is always profoundly, indeed inextricably, double valenced, being simultaneously an agent and a target of change. There is no agency that comes into being on its own or that acts autonomously, no agency that has the power to remain intact, to not be shaped and remade, resignified, even undone by its worldly sojourn. This is why it seems so strange to me when scholars expend enormous energy to critique such phenomena as homonormativity and queer liberalism without exploring how struggles to undo any form of phobic exclusion can never be made immune either to the desire for accessing traditional forms and formulas of normative U.S. life or to reinterpretation, if not reinvention, by the conservative forces that cede political ground to minoritized existence in the process.1 While I might share the sense that becoming a legible state subject on the terrain of one's identity-based subjection is always dicey, I hold no belief that the critical project of saying so tells us as much as we need to know about the complicated historical itineraries in which political struggles over identity have been and continue to be remade. "Transformation" as the goal of left/progressive politics-whether insurgent, radical, avantgarde, or left-of-center mainstream-cannot be determined or acknowledged solely on the grounds of one's own attachments, unless we find it convincing that an accusatory discourse of incipient complicity has traction in compelling people to want the political future that we do. 2 The central issue for thinking about political struggle is not, then, located in the determinacies of what changes and what seemingly remains the same but in grasping the challenge of the fact that nothing is static or, from a different direction, that transformation is all there is. From this perspective, continuity is the effect of change, not its subordination or eradication, and being other than what it once was is the persistent, not exceptional, condition of everything engaged by identity know ledges. These are all simple enough observations, cliche even, but that doesn't mean they are easy to remember when critical practice is bound to a disciplinary apparatus that reproduces the priority of its own authority as the means and the measure for doing politically transgressive work. Here, the failure of transformation to match the political idealizations nurtured by the field imaginary serves as the disciplinary point of departure, being both the engine of critical authority and the rhetorical form through which it draws its analytic force .3 **FOOTNOTE 3 INSERTED** 3· Evidence for these metacritical ruminations lives most animatedly in the province of humanities-oriented work shaped by the critical genealogies of cultural studies, where political intimacy with the present takes priority, even in historically bent work, such that the rhetorical form of the argument proceeds through a calculated assessment of the relationship between the critic's objects of study and the hope of leftist political transformations. As I have emphasized, the criteria for the political is not uniform, bur I have been struck in recent years by the resurgence of a familiar taxonomy in which "reformist" political projects are figured against more "radical" or "alternative" ones-with reformism serving as a code phrase for projects that seek transformation within the U.S. state apparatus, thereby participating in the violences of liberal democracy by buttressing its universalist debt to individualism and the autonomous agency it inscribes. What interests me throughout Object Lessons is not the extent to which the critique of reformism or any other figure of political constraint or failure is exacting, useful, or true, but what it means for critical practice to be so decisively relied upon as the means/or knowing this, as if the procedures of analysis, methodological priorities, objects of study to which it turns to produce its own critical authority are not themselves bound to a fantasy of agency one that is credited with the ability to intervene in both disciplinary orders of knowledge and social orders of govern mentality through the sheer power of the critical claim to do so. I take my point to hold even in those cases where critics explicitly theorize political agency as the effect of contradiction (between say capitalism and democracy, or white supremacist and patriarchal formations), or that define alternativity as the excess or ghostly remains of political struggle, as the matter at stake is not the sophistication of the theoretical formulation but the investment it demonstrates in the agency of critical practice. **[FOOTNOTE 3 ENDS]** My attention to the institutionalization of identity in this chapter seeks to counter the routines of shock that often accompany such discussions, where the sheer fact that identity's itinerary has not lived up to everything that has been projected onto it becomes the sole framework for understanding what academic institutionalization is. I will argue against the often heard postulation that institutionalization is always a political domestication by insisting on the necessary divergence of identity in its transit from social movement projects to academic ones, thus asking for more, not less, differentiation between the two-which means questioning all impulses and incitements to produce equivalencies between the critical registers, social scales, and psychic formations of identity across the diverse array of institutional sites and historical modalities in which it has lived.4 **[FOOTNOTE 4 INSERTED]** Many scholars have warned against the institutional domestication of identity knowledges. One of the most noteworthy is Judith Buder, who uses precisely this language when she reflects on the shared objects of study that link feminist and queer scholarly critique: 94 } I would insist that both feminist and queer studies need to move beyond ... the institutional separatisms which work effectively to keep thought narrow, sectarian, and self-serving. The critique of the conservative force of institutionalization ought to be kept alive as a crucial mode of self-interrogation in the rush to acquire new legitimacy .. .. There is more to learn from upsetting such grounds, reversing the exclusions by which they are instated, and resisting the institutional domestication of queer thinking. For normalizing the queer would be, afi:er all, its sad finish. ("Against Proper Objects," 21) Here, Buder arrays a number of now-familiar assumptions about critical practice that are at the heart of Object Lessons's inquiries into the disciplinary formation of identity knowledges, including the notion that critique is the privileged means to counter "the conservative force of institutionalization," and that a reverence for the "antinormative" is essential to cultivating a less-complicit political imaginary for the work of academic fields . The paradox of course is that it is precisely this consolidation of the alternative perspective, put into play by self-interrogation and manifesting a position resistant not just to institutional norms but to becoming normative, that has become the characteristic description and reproductive mechanism not only of queer theory but of much scholarship in identity domains today. [**FOOTNOTE 4 ENDS]** In mak ing an argument for divergence, I am seeking to disorganize identity as it functions as a critical referent and political sign by bringing difference to identity as the key feature of its metacritical discernment. I thus hope to foreground the various ways that institutionalization transforms identity's political calculus and to provide a more nuanced critical anatomy of the translations and migrations through which an institutionalized academic object of study emerges into disciplinary form, both in its relation to and difference from the referent it names and from the social movement it is said to bear. My chapter's tide, "Telling Time," is meant to situate this discussion in the conceptual register that best evokes the ongoing and irresolvable difficulty of grasping historical praxis from our inadequate position within it. To learn to tell time is about deciphering the transformations produced by, with, and to identity as its moves into academic institutional form, becoming other to itself. From this perspective, identity and its political value are just as contextually situated, socially imbricated, and historically dependent as we are. No doubt the ease of saying this provides little comfort in addressing the challenge of saying how.