## T – Armed Forces

### A.)Interpretation

### Hostilities as defined by the DOD is

Department of Defense, March 13,2012 (DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-03-13/html/2012-6004.htm>)

The statute then defines ``hostilities'' solely for the purpose of veterans whose eligibility is established under section 1712A(a)(2)(A), as ``an armed conflict in which the members of the Armed Forces [we]re subjected to danger comparable to the danger to which members of the Armed Forces have been subjected in combat with enemy armed forces during a period of war, as determined by the Secretary [of VA] in consultation with the Secretary of Defense.'' 38 U.S.C. 1712A(a)(2)(B). This definition is a general, basic, and commonly understood meaning of the term ``hostilities.'' We do not know, and the legislative history is silent as to, why Congress chose to make this definition explicitly applicable to the use of the term ``hostilities'' in section 1712A(a)(2)(A), but did not address the meaning of the same term as it is used in section 1712A(a)(1)(B)(i)(II). In repeated consultations with DoD over the decades during which we have been providing benefits under this section, VA has been unable to identify a reason that the definition of ``hostilities'' in section 1712A(a)(2)(A) should be different from the definition in the earlier section. Again, the definition provided in 38 U.S.C. 1712A(a)(2)(B) is clear and encompasses the only meaning that we believe could have been intended by the use of the word ``hostilities.'' Hence, we have not in practice distinguished between the ``hostilities'' requirements in 1712A(a)(1) and (a)(2), and do not intend to do so in the proposed rule. Because we do not distinguish between the ``hostilities'' described in sections 1712A(a)(1) and (a)(2), and [[Page 14709]] because we will continue to provide readjustment counseling in accordance with the broader, discretionary authority in section 1712(a)(2)(A), the above-described eligibility criteria for readjustment counseling under section 1712A can be simplified to read as follows:

### **B.) Violations**

### **1.) Hostilities definined as military engagement plan only prevents humanitarian interventions**

### **2.) Plan is effects T only causes a reduction in hostilities as an additional effect of stopping humanitarian interventions**

### 3.) Plan is extra T – Restricting their reduction of war powers to only boots on the ground engagement, goes outside the resolution

### C.) Standards

### 1.) Education – The aff destroys all topic specific education , by redefining any word in the resolution the aff precludes discussion of these specific terms of art and just fiats away the possibility of any topic specific education

### 2.) Ground – Their interpretation jacks all neg ground we literally can’t even read disads or counterplans specific to removing armed forces from hostilities becase they just get o no link and day it’s a link to the squo

### D.) Extra T is a voter because their interpretation of the topic explodes aff ground and allows them to focus on any 1 specific country and just claim some vague relation advantages making an impossible research burden for the negative

### E.) Effects T is a voter because it mixes the burdens of T and solvency making it functionally impossible to be negative

### F.) T is a voter for all of the reasons articulated above and fairness

# Executive Order Counterplan

## 1NC

#### Text: the Executive Branch should execute an Executive Order to restrict all War Powers Authority of the President of the United States toward Syria.

#### Executive action avoids politics

Sovacool 9

Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool 2009 is a Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization., Kelly E. Sovacool is a Senior Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of SingaporeArticle: Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 2009 34 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 333,

¶ Executive Orders also save time in a second sense. The President does not have to expend scarce political capital trying to persuade Congress to adopt his or her proposal. Executive Orders thus save ¶ ¶ presidential attention for other topics. Executive Orders bypass congressional debate and opposition, along with all of the horsetrading and compromise such legislative activity entails.¶ ¶ 292¶ ¶ Speediness of implementation can be especially important when challenges require rapid and decisive action. After the September ¶ ¶ 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, for ¶ ¶ instance, the Bush Administration almost immediately passed ¶ ¶ Executive Orders forcing airlines to reinforce cockpit doors and ¶ ¶ freezing the U.S. based assets of individuals and organizations ¶ ¶ involved with terrorist groups.¶ ¶ 293¶ ¶ These actions took Congress ¶ ¶ nearly four months to debate and subsequently endorse with ¶ ¶ legislation. Executive Orders therefore enable presidents to ¶ ¶ rapidly change law without having to wait for congressional action ¶ ¶ or agency regulatory rulemaking.

#### Aff kills flexibility

Vermeule 6

Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, 2006,¶ “THE EMERGENCY CONSTITUTION IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD ORDER: SELF-DEFEATING¶ PROPOSALS: ACKERMAN ON EMERGENCY POWERS,” Fordham Law Review, Nov., pp. LN.

The reason for the failure of statutory frameworks is plain. When an emergency or war or

crisis arises, the executive needs flexibility; because statutory limitations determined in¶ advance can only reduce flexibility, and do so in a way that does not anticipate the particular¶ requirements of a new emergency, no one has any ex post interest in insisting that these limitations be respected.¶ Ackerman acknowledges the grim historical record but provides no valid reason for thinking that his framework statute - which is far¶ more ambitious than the other ones - might fare differently.

#### That causes extinction

Yoo 12

(John Yoo, American attorney, law professor, and author. He served as a political appointee, the Deputy Assistant US Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (OLC), during the George W. Bush administration. “War Powers Belong to the President”¶ Posted Feb 1, 2012,¶ <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president>, KB)

A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy.¶ The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

#### The President is the agent of the modern US political era that provides actual institutional and policy-oriented change.

Pildes, 2010 ( Richard H, BOOK REVIEWS LAW AND THE PRESIDENT THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC. By Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, University Press)

It is widely recognized that the expansion of presidential power from the start of the twentieth century onward has been among the central features of American political development. While Andrew Jackson, with his rhetorical creation of the “plebiscitary presidency,” and Abraham Lincoln, with his invocation of presidential war powers during the existential military threat of the Civil War, were among the most powerful and activist of all presidents, the nineteenth-century presidency was essentially a narrowly understood office that presided over a highly decentralized and fragmented political system. What Theodore Roosevelt later began identifying and celebrating as the “Jackson-Lincoln” school of presidential practice remained latent through most of the nineteenth century.1 As the timing of Roosevelt’s comments signals, it was the Progressive movement, first at the state and then at the national level, that turned to executive power as the institutional vehicle through which to bypass corruption-plagued, paralyzed legislative bodies and status quo–affirming courts, and realize the Progressives’ agenda of an activist government, responsive to average voters, that would ensure health, safety, and economic fairness in a world transformed by industrialization and concentration of economic power.2 A string of Progressive Era presidents and intellectuals revived, enhanced, legitimated, and institutionalized the expansive presidency with which, with ebbs and flows, we have since lived. Woodrow Wilson, in his later years as a scholar before assuming office, urged presidents to view their office as “anything [they have] the sagacity and force to make it.”3 Herbert Croly, a key architect of the Progressive movement, has been characterized as seeking to realize “Jeffersonian ends through Hamiltonian means.”4 Indeed, this renaissance of Alexander Hamilton as the original visionary of the energetic President, capable of cutting through factional division and corruption, was characteristic and oft repeated. Calling Hamilton “the most brilliant American statesman who ever lived, possessing the loftiest and keenest intellect of his time,” Roosevelt conjured up Hamilton’s spirit;5 even Roosevelt’s more conservative successor, William Howard Taft, similarly praised Hamilton as “our greatest constructive statesman.”6 Meanwhile, Progressives disparaged the Constitution’s system of checks and balances as a blueprint for government “divided against itself,” a government “deliberately and effectively weakened,”7 that could be forged into an instrument of effective power only through the dominating, energetic leadership of a commanding President. Thus, long before the New Deal, those seeking an activist national government had envisioned a powerful presidency as the vehicle through which their aims could (and had to) be realized.8 In the aftermath of World War II, Congress’s power was further discredited in foreign affairs and military matters by its abject failure in the 1930s to come to terms with the threat that the rise of Nazi Germany posed — a failure that continued to limit Congress’s credibility in these areas for thirty or so years after the war.9 And as is well known, the ensuing rise of the Cold War, the national security state, and the constant specter of instant nuclear annihilation further enhanced the legitimacy (and reality) of ever-expanding presidential power. Only in the 1970s did this general thrust in the direction of enhanced presidential power confront more complex terrain.10 In the aftermath of the presidentially led Vietnam War, increased U.S. participation in wars of choice rather than of necessity, and President Nixon’s domestic abuses of the office, liberals (in particular) developed anxiety and ambivalence about the powers of the presidency. The work of many of the great liberal constitutional scholars for whom the Vietnam War was a formative experience reflected this newfound concern;11 in the mid-1970s, Congress enacted a series of statutes designed to cabin presidential power. Yet this transformation of perspective about the proper bounds of presidential power was countered by the rise of a transformative conservative movement, cresting initially in President Reagan’s 1980 election, which had as its aim a dramatic undoing of the New Deal consensus that had reigned since the 1940s.12 And like all modern insurgent national movements, the new Republican majority viewed presidential power as the means through which its ambitions would be most effectively and immediately realized.13 Conservatives, the one source of efforts to urge limitations on presidential power throughout the twentieth century, now became the leading proponents of the energetic, forceful presidency that had been transforming American government throughout the century. Thus, as Democratic presidents of the 1990s and 2000s became more ambivalent about presidential power than their predecessors, Republican presidents seized the scepter of expansive presidential power. And with their greater control of the presidency since the 1980s, Republicans had greater opportunity to implement their vision — a vision that included renewed emphasis on the “unitary executive branch” theory of government administration14 as well as more aggressive assertions of autonomous Article II powers, which Congress purportedly could not restrict, than in the past.15 In addition, as presidents of both parties found the path to legislative partnership blocked by the rise of hyperpolarized political parties, particularly during divided government, presidents found new tools to set policy unilaterally, without congressional endorsement.16 Thus, presidential power expanded through liberal hands for most of the century, and just as liberals began to have second thoughts, conservatives propelled the expanding presidency further.

#### Obama can push through virtually any executive order

Kumar 13 (Anita, McClatchy Newspapers, “Obama turning to executive power to get what he wants”, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/19/186309/obama-turning-to-executive-power.html#.UdxwMD6gXFw>) TYBG

President Barack Obama came into office four years ago skeptical of pushing the power of the White House to the limit, especially if it appeared to be circumventing Congress. Now, as he launches his second term, Obama has grown more comfortable wielding power to try to move his own agenda forward, particularly when a deeply fractured, often-hostile Congress gets in his way. He’s done it with a package of tools, some of which date to George Washington and some invented in the modern era of an increasingly powerful presidency. And he’s done it with a frequency that belies his original campaign criticisms of predecessor George W. Bush, invites criticisms that he’s bypassing the checks and balances of Congress and the courts, and whets the appetite of liberal activists who want him to do even more to advance their goals. While his decision to send drones to kill U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism has garnered a torrent of criticism, his use of executive orders and other powers at home is deeper and wider. He delayed the deportation of young illegal immigrants when Congress wouldn’t agree. He ordered the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to research gun violence, which Congress halted nearly 15 years ago. He told the Justice Department to stop defending the Defense of Marriage Act, deciding that the 1996 law defining marriage as between a man and a woman was unconstitutional. He’s vowed to act on his own if Congress didn’t pass policies to prepare for climate change. Arguably more than any other president in modern history, he’s using executive actions, primarily orders, to bypass or pressure a Congress where the opposition Republicans can block any proposal.

## Politics DA 1NC

#### Obama focused on immigration reform now—everything else is a public ruse

The Daily Caller, 7/23

(Daily Caller, "Obama talks economy, but directs aides to immigration, Obamacare", 7/23, dailycaller.com/2013/07/23/obama-talks-economy-but-directs-aides-to-immigration-obamacare/ NL)

But he also told his 300 campaign aides, community organizers, donors and top political allies that they would remain focused on issues that the public views as low priority.¶ In several pending speeches this week, “I’m going to talk about where we need to go from here; how we need to put behind us the distractions and the phony debate and nonsense that somehow passes for politics these days, and get back to basics,” he told the members of his Organizing for America group, which serves as his year-round campaign force.¶ The public speeches will “get Washington and the press to refocus on the economy and the struggles that middle-class families are going through,” Obama declared at one of two speeches he gave June 22.¶ Those OFA donors and volunteers, however, would be directed at issues that progressives care about, such as rewriting the nation’s immigration laws.¶ “We’re going to need you to continue to stay involved to get immigration reform across the finish line — because now is the time for us to get comprehensive immigration reform done,” he said. This August, a well-funded coalition of progressives and wealthy business-owners is expected to pressure the House GOP to accept the Senate’s draft immigration bill.

#### Plan’s unpopular with Congress—they don’t want to be politically accountable

Noah, 08

(Timothy, writer for Slate, "Congress Doesn't Want War Powers", July 9, [www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/chatterbox/2008/07/congress\_doesnt\_want\_war\_powers.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2008/07/congress_doesnt_want_war_powers.html) NL)

James Baker and Warren Christopher, two former secretaries of state, have [set forth](http://millercenter.org/dev/ci/system/application/views/_newwebsite/mediaguide/pressreleases/NWPC_News_Release_070808.pdf) a new [plan](http://millercenter.org/policy/commissions/warpowers/) to streamline the role of Congress in declaring war. There's only one problem. Congress doesn't want to streamline its role in declaring war, because, for all its bluster (not to mention its [constitutional responsibility](http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.articlei.html)), Congress doesn't want to be held politically accountable for the results. I first became aware of this phenomenon 21 summers ago while covering a House debate on the use of Navy convoys to escort 11 Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf. Iraq and Iran were at war, and although the United States didn't officially take sides, this military action reflected our government's quiet tilt toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq. (For more about this furtive and little-remembered near-alliance, which compelled President Reagan to soft-pedal Saddam's use of chemical weapons, click [here](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/).) Anyway, on that August afternoon in 1987 the House was debating whether to invoke the [War Powers Resolution](http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/50/usc_sup_01_50_10_33.html), a 1973 law meant to require congressional approval of any executive action that introduced the armed forces into hostilities, or into a situation in which hostilities seemed pretty goddamned likely, as appeared to be the case here. (Happily, the Navy escort occurred without incident.) What amazed and shocked me, and moved me to write up the debate for the *New Republic*, was the unembarrassed manner in which members of Congress declared as their paramount interest the absence of any legislative fingerprints on whatever might result from allowing (or not allowing) the Navy convoys to enter an area of violent conflict. In fact, it was pretty much taken as a given that the War Powers Resolution would not be invoked, not because the president was not complying with it (no president ever has) but because doing so would require Congress to either approve or revoke Reagan's decision. [Here](http://www.slate.com/id/2059333/) is how I described the House debate 14 years later in this column (I can't seem to locate the original *New Republic* piece); I should point out that the first two speakers were members of *Reagan's own party*: "This resolution puts congressional fingerprints on our course of action," complained Rep. Toby Roth. "Does this put the fingerprints and the handprints of the Congress on that policy?" asked Rep. Donald Lukens. No, assured Rep. Pat Schroeder: It was "a teeny-weeny first step" that "doesn't commit the Congress in any way." Only then could the resolution pass. The most controversial aspect of the War Powers Resolution is that it "sunsets" military action that fails to win congressional approval. If Congress wants to declare war, it must do so within 30 days after troops are introduced into conflict. If Congress does nothing, the troops must be withdrawn within the following two months. The Baker-Christopher proposal would maintain the 30-day clock but would eliminate the sunset provision. After 30 days, Congress would vote on a resolution supporting the military action. If Congress voted yes, the military action would continue. If Congress voted no ... the military action would continue. But if a senator or representative wanted to introduce a resolution *disapproving* the military action, and if this resolution actually came to a vote, and if it passed the House and Senate, and if the president, after vetoing the resolution, saw his veto overridden (or, less probably, decided that Congress was probably right to end the thing after all) … *then* the armed conflict would end. The obvious question to ask is why, given that Congress currently has no difficulty ignoring the sunset provision in the War Powers Resolution, it should feel compelled, under the new law, to go on record endorsing or opposing military action. Sometimes, sure, Congress may want to express an opinion. More often, it won't want to, or it will want to only in hedged language at odds with the Baker-Christopher proposal's intent. (The 2002 joint [resolution](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-2.html) authorizing the Iraq war is [arguably](http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/09/kerry.iraq/index.html) one such document.) It's almost impossible to imagine circumstances in which Congress would proceed with a resolution of disapproval that would have the effect of ending a war abruptly. And anyway, even if you choose to pretend the War Powers Resolution was never passed, Congress already has the ability to end military actions through the power of the purse. No appropriations, no war.

#### Congress will not make statutory restrictions stronger now because of political danger-Libya proves.

Lowry 11 editor, *National Review*

(Rich, *National Review Online*, June 7, 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/268973/obama-kills-war-powers-act-rich-lowry)

The War Powers Act is an excrescence on the American constitutional order that deserves to be the dead letter that President Obama is making it. The president’s inherent powers as commander in chief do not depend on affirmative acts of Congress. **What Congress can do is wield its own powers** — most decisively, **the appropriation of funds** — **to limit or end a military action**. Of course, **Congress usually refuses to do that, since it involves an action for which it could be held politically accountable. Predictably, the grand confrontation between the legislative and executive branches over Libya has been an instance of the cowardly fighting the disingenuous**.

#### Congressional criticism of international policies saps capital for domestic policies—empirically proven for immigration reform

Kriner, 10

(Douglas, Assistant professor of poly sci at Boston University, “After the

Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec

1, 2010)

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact,¶ congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the¶ president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital¶ spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his¶ future policy initiatives . Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have¶ immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59¶ Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid¶ immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest¶ casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital¶ and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic¶ agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon¶ Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite¶ funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson¶ gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and¶ then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term¶ domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because¶ the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action¶ against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61 When making their cost-benefit calculations,¶ presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their¶ military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other¶ elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits¶ of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the¶ international arena.

#### PC is key to passage

Washington Post, 13

(Washington Post, “Why is immigration going so much better for Obama than the budget”, May 2nd, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/05/02/why-is-immigration-going-so-much-better-for-obama-than-the-budget/>)

In his news conference on Tuesday, Obama expressed confidence that Congress would overhaul immigration laws – what he said would be an “historic achievement” – while he was less optimistic about whether he could achieve a grand bargain on the debt. Somehow, the election and public opinion more generally have produced two different outcomes. On immigration, Senate Republicans – led by 2016 presidential contender Sen. Marco Rubio (Fla.) – are eager to strike and sell a deal. But they seem content to stand their ground on the budget. Why? The question has prompted much discussion about the structural forces shaping Congress – and Obama’s limited power to overcome them. The conventional thinking is that on immigration, Republicans are in survival mode: They recognize they need Hispanics to win national elections. On the other hand, Republicans do not see much to lose in a budget fight with Obama, and they see much more to lose if they make themselves vulnerable to primary challenges from the right. This argument is elegant in that it looks at the incentives facing Republicans, and to a large degree it is fair. But it’s also an oversimplification. Obama’s role has been more important than it may seem in shaping the political forces in Washington, but the underlying dynamics favoring an immigration deal and auguring against a budget agreement are even stronger than many recognize. In asking why Republicans seem responsive to public opinion on immigration but impervious on the budget, consider the following chart: It’s extremely unlikely that Republicans would be considering an immigration deal in the absence of Obama’s aggressive pursuit of an overhaul. In words and action, Obama forced Republicans to take a position on the issue. He also created space for more voters to support a pathway to citizenship by being quite tough on illegal immigrants facing deportation – often to the displeasure of the Hispanic community. Republicans, including presidential candidate Mitt Romney, staked out a far different position, opposing any pathway to citizenship. Republicans were savaged on Election Day: exit polling showed Obama winning Hispanics by 44 percentage points.

#### CIR key to the economy

Reuters, 13

(Edward Krudy, Reuters, “Analysis: Immigration reform could boost U.S. economic growth,” Tue Jan 29, 2013 1:14am EST, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/29/us-usa-economyimmigration-idUSBRE90S06R20130129>, EGM)¶ (Reuters) - The sluggish U.S. economy could get a lift if President Barack Obama and a bipartisan group of senators succeed in what could be the biggest overhaul of the nation's immigration system since the 1980s. Relaxed immigration rules could encourage entrepreneurship, increase demand for housing, raise tax revenues and help reduce the budget deficit, economists said. By helping more immigrants enter the country legally and allowing many illegal immigrants to remain, the United States could help offset a slowing birth rate and put itself in a stronger demographic position than aging Europe, Japan and China. "Numerous industries in the United States can't find the workers they need, right now even in a bad economy, to fill their orders and expand their production as the market demands," said Alex Nowrasteh, an immigration specialist at the libertarian Cato Institute. The emerging consensus among economists is that immigration provides a net benefit. It increases demand and productivity, helps drive innovation and lowers prices, although there is little agreement on the size of the impact on economic growth. President Barack Obama plans to launch his second-term push for a U.S. immigration overhaul during a visit to Nevada on Tuesday and will make it a high priority to win congressional approval of a reform package this year, the White House said. The chances of major reforms gained momentum on Monday when a bipartisan group of senators agreed on a framework that could eventually give 11 million illegal immigrants a chance to become American citizens. Their proposals would also include means to keep and attract workers with backgrounds in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. This would be aimed both at foreign students attending American universities where they are earning advanced degrees and high-tech workers abroad. An estimated 40 percent of scientists in the United States are immigrants and studies show immigrants are twice as likely to start businesses, said Nowrasteh. Boosting legal migration and legalizing existing workers could add $1.5 trillion to the U.S. economy over the next 10 years, estimates Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda, a specialist in immigration policy at the University of California, Los Angeles. That's an annual increase of 0.8 percentage points to the economic growth rate, currently stuck at about 2 percent. REPUBLICANS' HISPANIC PUSH Other economists say the potential benefit to growth is much lower. Richard Freeman, an economist at Harvard, believes most of the benefits to the economy from illegal immigrants already in the United States has already been recorded and legalizing their status would produce only incremental benefits. While opposition to reform lingers on both sides of the political spectrum and any controversial legislation can easily meet a quick end in a divided Washington, the chances of substantial change seem to be rising. Top Republicans such as Governor Bobby Jindal of Louisiana are not mincing words about the party's need to appeal to the Hispanic community and foreign-born voters who were turned off by Republican candidate Mitt Romney's tough talk in last year's presidential campaign. A previous Obama plan, unveiled in May 2011, included the creation of a guest-worker program to meet agricultural labor needs and something similar is expected to be in his new proposal. The senators also indicated they would support a limited program that would allow companies in certain sectors to import guest workers if Americans were not available to fill some positions. An additional boost to growth could come from rising wages for newly legalized workers and higher productivityfrom the arrival of more highly skilled workers from abroad. Increased tax revenues would help federal and state authorities plug budget deficits although the benefit to government revenues will be at least partially offset by the payment of benefits to those who gain legal status. In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that proposed immigration reform in that year would have generated $48 billion in revenue from 2008 to 2017, while costing $23 billion in health and welfare payments. There is also unlikely to be much of a saving on enforcement from the senators' plan because they envisage tougher border security to prevent further illegal immigration and a crackdown on those overstaying visas. One way to bump up revenue, according to a report co-authored by University of California, Davis economist Giovanni Peri, would be to institute a cap-and-trade visa system. Peri estimated it could generate up to $1.2 billion annually. Under such a system, the government would auction a certain number of visas employers could trade in a secondary market. "A more efficient, more transparent and more flexible immigration system would help firms expand, contribute to more job creation in the United States, and slow the movement of operations abroad," according to a draft report, soon to be published as part of a study by the Hamilton Project, a think tank. There was no immediate sign that either the Obama or the senators' plan would include such a system. The long-term argument for immigration is a demographic one. Many developed nations are seeing their populations age, adding to the burden of pension and healthcare costs on wage-earners. Immigration in the United States would need to double to keep the working-age population stable at its current 67 percent of total population, according to George Magnus, a senior independent economic adviser at UBS in London, While Magnus says a change of that magnitude may prove too politically sensitive, the focus should be on attracting highly skilled and entrepreneurial immigrants in the way Canada and Australia do by operating a points system for immigrants rather than focusing mainly on family connections. "The trick is to shift the balance of migration towards those with education (and) skills," he added. HARD ROAD Academics at major universities such as Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology often lament that many of their top foreign graduates end up returning to their home countries because visas are hard to get. "We have so much talent that is sitting here in the universities," said William Kerr, a professor at Harvard Business School. "I find it very difficult to swallow that we then make it so hard for them to stay." The last big amnesty for illegal immigrants was in 1986 when President Ronald Reagan legalized about 3 million already in the country. Numerous studies have shown that subsequently their wages rose significantly. Research on how immigration affects overall wages is inconclusive. George Borjas at Harvard says immigration has created a small net decrease in overall wages for those born in the United States, concentrated among the low-skilled, while GiovaniPeri at UC Davis found that immigration boosts native wages over the long run. Hinojosa-Ojeda stresses that any reform needs to make it easier for guest workers to enter the country to avoid a new build-up of illegal workers. "If we don't create a mechanism that can basically bring in 300,000 to 400,000 new workers a year into a variety of labor markets and needs, we could be setting ourselves up for that again," said Hinojosa-Ojeda. Nowrasteh at Cato also believes an expanded guest worker program would stem illegal immigration and allow industries to overcome labor shortages.He found that harsher regulations in recent years in Arizona were adversely affecting agricultural production, increasing financial burdens on business and even negatively impacting the state's struggling real estate market. Some large companies have fallen foul of tougher enforcement regulations. Restaurant chain Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc fired roughly 500 staff in 2010 and 2011 after undocumented workers were found on its payrolls. Putting the chill on other employers, it is now subject of an ongoing federal criminal investigation into its hiring. "The current system doesn't seem to work for anyone," Chipotle spokesman Chris Arnold said.

#### Economic decline causes war

Royal, 10

(Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p.213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict ends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg& Hess, 2002, p.89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, &Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

**On the Case debate:**

Plan fails they have solvency deficit.

Let me point out the fact that the affirmative team can’t solve for anything in this debate round because it doesn’t prevent armed forces from engaging in battles. Their plan text states: “define hostilities as to mean a situation in which units of the US armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces” This means that the aff has a large amount of solvency deficit as they can’t acquire any of the net-benefits that they attempt to solve for. This proves that regardless of what they say, you should hold them accountable to this during the debate round which means the aff will never solve for any of their impacts.

-cross apply this to the CP: as only through Obama mandating that we do not strike Syria are we going to be able to solve for the impacts of the aff.