# Security K

## Shell

#### Their impact claims of war and conflict are not objective – they are produced by the specific history of the observer and the drive for state security

David Grondin 2004 (Masters in Political Science and Ph.D. Candidate – University of Ottawa, “(Re)Writing the ‘National Security State,’ Center for United States Studies, p. 12-17)

Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden in the use of concepts such as “national security” have something valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, “[…] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated” (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the “real world”, a world that only exists in the analysts’ own narratives. In this light, Barry Posen’s political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. […] Command of the commons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons” (Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that “[d]anger is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. […] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national security discourse does not **evaluate objective threats**; rather, it is itself a product of historical processes and structures in the state and society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discourse that **frames national identity and freezes it**.9 Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions, such as “the state is a rational unitary actor”, “the state is the main actor in international relations”, “states pursue power defined as a national interest”, and so on. I want to show that realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derian’s genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism as constructed in these discourses is called for.10 These scholars cannot refer to the “essentially contested nature of realism” **and then use “realism as the best language** to reflect a self-same phenomenon” (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, “[…] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere ‘relativism’ and/or to endless “deconstruction” in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations” (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality. We are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanating from realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synonymous with national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realist scholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security. In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians “are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting” (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of “national security”. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the “Cold War”. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the “reality” of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as “reality”. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it “make [it] any less real or less significant for being rhetorical” (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, “political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions” (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is “an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population” (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts,12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a “national security state”.14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War, the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992: 76). The term “national security state” designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology – the discourse – that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accomplishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, “the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power” (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amounted to an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which “to say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, […] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak” (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “national unity” on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility – to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18.

#### The process of security leads to unending violence and wars against populations of created threats

Duschinski 2009 – Assistant Prof of Sociology and Anthropology, Ohio University (Haley, “Destiny Effects: Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley.” Anthropological Quarterly, Volume 82, Number 3, Summer 2009, Project MUSE)

Patterns of war emerging in particular local worlds are tied to larger transformations in political-military economies of violence operating on a global scale (Lutz and Nonini 2000:79). The expansion of neoliberal market capitalism since World War II has fed the growth of permanent war economies while also creating large surplus populations that are considered peripheral to the workings of capitalist economies. "State armies, multilateral armed forces (IFOR, the United Nations), private armies, militarized police, and parasitical militias have come to wage a systematic form of 'low intensity warfare,' often against stigmatized populations 'outside the grids' of global capitalist activity and superfluous to labor, **[End Page 693]** capital, and consumption markets" (Lutz and Nonini 2000:78). These interlinked processes of neoliberalism and privatization, ethnic and racial discrimination, and jingoism and militarism have led to the proliferation of infinite and indefinite wars that consolidate collectively imagined national communities at the same time that they violently exclude certain categories of people from participation in the life of the nation. As Victoria Sanford argues, national security states are based, not on the outwardly focused defense of national territory, but rather on a national security ideology that " is grounded in the recourse of coercion and has no room for the participation or consent of civil society" (2003:394-395). Through such ideological work, national security states erase the everyday realities of violence and power their shadow zones and sensitive peripheries in the name of national integrity and cohesion and in the interest of wartime profit.This state practice of carving out differential patterns of citizenship through the waging of perpetual warfare leads to a blurring of boundaries between "crimes of war" and "crimes of peace," producing a continuum of violence that scales from the routine violence of everyday social spaces, such as emergency rooms, court rooms, prisons, detention centers, and schools, to the spectacular violence of hot zones, such as border clashes, ethnic conflicts, and frontiers in the global war on terror (Scheper-Hughes 2002, 2008). These sites of exclusion and concentration provide for the encapsulation and confinement of those forms of political life that have been stripped of rights, cast into a "zone of social abandonment" (Biehl 2005), and subjected to the brutal violence of the state. Such conceptual tools enable us to move past distinctions between " the exception" and "the rule" and examine patterns of militarization that define forms of social suffering for communities living in various domains of threat and "legitimate" destruction: marginalized peasants cast as indigenous rebels in the Oaxaca and Chiapas regions of contemporary Mexico (Stephen 2000); Latino communities cast as drug runners and illegal immigrants along the US-Mexican border (Nagengast 2002); foreign nationals cast as enemy combatants in US military prisons in the War on Terror (Feldman 2005); Catholic nationalist women cast as paramilitary insurgents in the prisons of Belfast (Aretxaga 1997); Black youth cast as criminals in post-Apartheid South Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006); and Puerto Rican men cast as gang members in the barrios of East Harlem (Bourgois 2002). Comparative ethnographies of the political and juridical **[End Page 694]** conditions that similarly delimit possibilities of life in these and other heavily militarized zones leads to a better understanding of "how dominant representations of the dangerous, the subversive, the worthless, the marginal, and the unimportant become linked to making particular groups of people susceptible to violence abuses that allow them to be treated with less than human respect and dignity" (Stephen 2000:823).

#### Our alternative is to give back the gift of security. This reorients our conception of politics away from the realist state terrain that guarantees violence.

Neocleous 08. ( Mark Neocleous is a Professor of the critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, UK and a member of the Editorial Collective of “Radical Philosophy”. *Critique of Security.* 186)

Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text *Critical Security Studies,* inwhich the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put m the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity. It requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing It out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

**Foucault K**

**Link: The aff classification of failure to do the plan results in big war impact, result an asymmetrical soverntigy biopolitics, the tools use by the state to justify emergency powers and control over the right to life .**

**Bussolini 08** (Jeffrey, Associate Professor of at the College of Staten Island, “Nuclear State of Exception: Reading and Extension of Foucault's Concepts of Biopower and Biopolitics in Agamben and the Nuclear Age”)

By any reckoning nuclear weapons are major artifacts of geopolitics and biopolitics. They are inherently geopolitical tools that emerged from a history of intense inter-state conflict, and their scope and effects make any use a geopolitical event (despite repeated attempts to fashion smaller ‘battlefield’ or ‘tactical’ nukes and come up with scenarios for their employment). The nuclear age is characterized by distrust and hostility between states as well as suspicion of a state’s own citizens and populations (as foreign agents, active threats, or as insufficiently disciplined to handle the secrets and necessary actions of security). Lending credence to the notion that the atomic age is closely linked to a state of exception as nationalist norm, all countries that have developed nuclear arms have substantial secret institutions devoted to developing them and devising plans for their possible use. Nuclear secrets are among the most closely guarded of national security matters. In the United States, all information about nuclear arms is ‘born classified’ and automatically subject to strict controls, the only such category in U.S. classification. The 1947 Smyth Report on the Manhattan Project and U.S. nuclear science says that the secrets of the weapons “must remain secret now and for all time.” Clearly these are regarded as central pillars of geopolitics.

The very real threat of Armageddon from these weapons easily gives way to thinking of expediency and triage which instrumentalizes certain populations The fate of those at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the continuing collection of data about them by the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, has been described in Robert Jay Lifton’s Death in Life. Thousands of soldiers and scientists from different nations have been exposed in tests and research. Indigenous people from the American southwest to the Pacific Islands, Kazakhstan, and Algeria have been forcefully relocated to make room for atomic tests, exposed to radiation, or both. Groups such as prisoners and mental patients have been subjected to radiation experiments against their will or knowledge, supposedly for the purpose of building up crucial knowledge about nuclear effects, as documented in Eileen Welsome’s Plutonium Files and Department of Energy reports on Human Radiation Experiments. These weapons**,** then, are intimately tied to power over life and death and the management of subject populations. As such, it seems that the exigency related to nuclear thinking justifies (or is the expression of) significant sovereign power over bare life. In the histories mentioned here, survival and protection of the population at large was seen to validate causing death or illness among smaller subsets of that population. One can note that, given their scale,nuclear weapons force consideration of population-level dynamics, as whole populations are placed at risk. In this respect, these arms follow on and accentuate the massive strategic bombing of World War II in which enemy populations were targeted as vital biopolitical resources.

**Internal Link : In a state of domination the body is fixed into a powerless side, that allow the sovereignty to do anything that they deem fit.**

**Lemke 2k** ( Thomas, Member of the editorial board of the journal Foucault Studies, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique) http://www.andosciasociology.net/resources/Foucault$2C+Governmentality$2C+and+Critique+IV-2.pdf

Domination is a particular type of power relationship that is both stable and hierarchical, fixed and difficult to reverse. Foucault reserves the term “domination” to “what we ordinarily call power” (1988b, p. 19). Domination refers to those **asymmetrical relationships of power in which the subordinated persons have little room for maneuver because their “margin of liberty is extremely limited**” (1988b, p. 12). But states of domination are not the primary source for holding power or exploiting asymmetries, on the contrary they are the effects of technologies of government. Technologies of government account for the systematization, stabilization and regulation of power relationships that may lead to a state of domination (see Hindess 1996; Patton 1998, Lazzarato 2000).

**Impact: Biopower is the foundation that guarantees the worst atrocities in human history. It allow, risk and justify the extinction of population via genocide and racism.**

**Stohler 95** (Anne, Professor of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Race and the education of desire: Foucault's History of sexuality and the colonial order of things, , p. 81-82)

Biopower was defined as a power organized around the management of life, where wars were waged on behalf of the existence of everyone, entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of the life necessity, massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so may to be killed, at stake is the biological existence of a population. **If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life**, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of the population. The sovereign right to kill appears as an “excess” of biopower that does away with life in the name of securing it. How does this power over life permit the right to kill, if this is a power invested in augmenting life and the quality of it? How is it possible for this political power to expose to death not only its enemies, but even its own citizens. This is the point where racism intervenes. “What inscribes racism in the mechanisms of the state is the emergence of biopower…. racism inscribes itself as a fundamental mechanism of power that exercises itself in modern states” racist discourse it is a “means of introduction a fundamental division between those who must live and those who must die. It fragments the biological field it establishes a break inside the biological field, it establishes a break inside the biological continuum of human beings by defining a hierarchy of races, a set of subdivisions in which certain races are classified as “good,” fit, and superior. It establishes a positive relation between the right to kill and the assurance of life. It posits that the more you kill and let die, the more you will live.”

**Alt: The care of oneself. An engagement of stepping back and affirming ourselves as a creative force of change toward abandoning notion of normatively establish sovereign truths. By doing this can we able to break away from the asymmetrical power dominance**

**Clifford 01** (Michael Clifford, Political Genealogy After Foucault, , pg 144)

Foucault’s genealogical analyses reveal that “ the self is not given to us”- there is no essential identity around which discourse, power relations, and modes of subjectivation revolve, but rather the subject is an effect of their interplay. This recognition of the subject as historically contingent effect, rather than essential, metaphysical entity, lead Foucault to a Nietzschean conclusion, that” we have to create ourselves as work of art.” We gave to become involved in an ongoing process of creative self-transformation, of self-overcoming, in a genuinely Nietzchean sense. Yet When Foucault say that we have to create ourselves, he is not expressing this as a moral demand; it is rather, a description of our situation. **Constituting ourselves as subject is a creative endeavor that involves giving meaning- ourselves as subject is a creative endeavor that involves giving meaning- style – to our existence,** whether we recognize that it as such or not. And Foucault is also extending an invitation: he is inviting us to open a space of freedom for ourselves a freedom that insists in affirming our selves” as a creative force.” In abandoning any notion of metaphysical essentiality or anthropological necessity regarding who and what we are, we are able to recognize the creative contribution of the subject in the proves of his or her own self-formation. This recognition itself is a kind of liberation, a distancing form the processes of subjection and subjectivization, though which the power of a particular identity is suspended. In the affirmation, not of a discourse of truth about ourselves as “ creative being,” but of creative activity in and for itself, a recognition is no longer a determination. Through this affirmation, identity become a game, in which the relationship we have to ourselves are not of unity and coherence, but of difference and creation. In this way subjectivity becomes, not a limitation, but an art.