## 1NC

### 1

**The 1AC asks why both Reagan and Obama went after Qaddafi, why we engage in wars for oil overseas:**

**Intervention in Libya against Gaddafi was a necessary response to a war criminal that was murdering thousands of civilians-**

Ramoin, 12

(Bonderman Fellow, Open Society Foundations, Why Intervention in Libya was Justified, 1/25, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/25/why-intervention-in-libya-was-justified/)

On October 30th of 2011—shortly after the death of Muammar al-Qaddafi on August 23rd—NATO’s operations in Libya officially ended. With the final arrests of the Qaddafi circle, the people of Libya liberated themselves from a dictatorship that spanned over four decades. As Libyans now begin a new chapter in building a legitimate government of their own, some are still debating whether intervention in Libya was ever justified. Although Libyans took ownership of their revolution from the beginning, these efforts would have been fruitless were it not for the internationally backed coalition intervention. Indeed, the use of military force to protect civilians is an extremely delicate process with a highly contentious history. While most would agree that the relatively recent international recognition of humanitarian norms has positively contributed to the reduction of mass atrocities, military force justly remains a last resort option in the scope of foreign policy tools. When used, these emergency responses necessitate essential preconditions before becoming a viable foreign policy strategy. The following is an attempt to provide a case for military force applied to humanitarian intervention by observing the unique case of the Libyan Revolution of 2011. I. MORAL OBLIGATION: THE COSTS OF INACTION “**Worse than war is the systematic killing of civilians as the world turns a blind eye**.” -Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times, 3.3.2011 Substantive ethical arguments for the use of military force in order to protect civilians must prove that the costs of inaction would have been greater than were the costs of action. Because of Libya’s extreme repression and lock-down of communication that only intensified after the February 17th movement kicked off, our knowledge of the crimes committed against the Libyan people is limited to the independent reporting of civilians, journalists, and international human rights groups. While evidence of mass atrocities continued to transpire after the coalition involvement (i.e. the discovery of ‘13 more mass graves’[i]), this report will limit itself to evidence that was public before intervention because it aims to explain the international impetus for military interference. A cross examination of these reports **reveals very significant reasons to believe hundreds of thousands of lives were at risk. Even if one were to ignore the historical and economic factors that imply Qaddafi’s potential for brutality, the moral case for intervention can confidently be made by exploring the conduct of the Libyan government forces in the context of Qaddafi’s threats**. By following his rhetoric and actions, this section intends to emphasize the costs of inaction consisting of: 1) Libyans dying on a massive scale; 2) Qaddafi possibly remaining in power for years; and 3) a message being sent out to all dictators that ruthlessness and brutality works. Qaddafi’s Actions & Rhetoric “We are coming tonight. We will find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no pity.” -Muammar al-Qaddafi in a speech directed at Benghazi residents, 3.17.2011 As early as February 22nd the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, declared that the attacks against the Libyan people were both “**widespread and systematic”—potentially amounting to crimes against humanity**[ii]. Three days later and less than a week into the civilian protests, Ms. Pillay confirmed independent reports from human rights organizations that: “thousands may have been killed or injured”[iii]. By February 26th the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had referred the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity, all the while drawing on Libya’s responsibility to protect its citizens[iv]. In early March, the bombing by Libyan Air force of civilian populated towns in the east finally prompted the rebels to reluctantly call-in a formal request for foreign intervention[v]. For two weeks these requests for military assistance by Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC) went completely unanswered as the world watched Qaddafi’s forces use planes, tanks, and gunboats on non-combatants in rebel-held territory[vi]. By March 12th, the then-president of the NTC, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, warned that if Qaddafi’s forces were to successfully bomb-and-advance into the rebel stronghold of Benghazi—as defected-Libyan pilots made clear Qaddafi’s intentions were[vii]—the onslaught would result in “the death of a half a million” people[viii]. On March 16th, the day before UNSCR 1973 was passed, Qaddafi’s son and military commander, Saif al-Islam declared: “The military operations are finished. In 48 hours everything will be over. Our forces are close to Benghazi.” Concerning the UNSC vote for intervention, he said: “Whatever decision is taken, it will be too late.”[ix] The words “too late” galvanized the world’s political leaders at the emergency session of the UN Security Council. The rhetoric the Qaddafis had used up to this point was unequivocally clear. On February 20th, Saif al-Islam described the intended breadth and scope of the brutal government response. Saif warned the protesters that “thousands” would die, “rivers of blood would flow”, and that authorities would “fight [down] to the last man, woman, and bullet”[x]. Two days later, Qaddafi called on his supporters in a state television speech: “Come out of your homes and attack [the opposition] in their dens”. Muammar al-Qaddafi called the protesters “greasy rats” and “cockroaches”[xi]. His threats to “cleanse Libya house by house” harked back chilling memories of Rwanda, when in 1994 Radio Mille Collines’ broadcasts served to catalyze genocide[xii]. The speech praised the Chinese authorities’ crackdown of the famous protests in Tiananmen Square as an example of national unity being “worth more than a small number of protesters”. Surprisingly, Qaddafi’s rhetoric turned even more explicit when he dryly stated that: “anyone who plays games with the country’s unity will be executed”[xiii]. If the rhetoric could be dismissed as a maniacal scare tactic, the civilian body count certainly could not. Between February 15th & March 5th, two weeks before the NATO bombing campaign took place, 6,000 civilian casualties had been killed[xiv]. Only one week into the protests, Human Rights Watch submitted a report stating: Colonel Gaddafi has admitted the systematic intent behind the violence unleashed on the Libyan population and has given cause for substantial concern that further violence will occur. [HRW 2.24.2011] When it became evident that many within the Libyan military units were not going to fire on demonstrators, Qaddafi’s intentions were only made clearer by his conscription of thousands of African mercenaries that fall outside the normal line of command and control[xv]. Their march towards the rebel capital of Benghazi—a town with a population of 700,000—meant either the bloody end to a popular rebellion or a desperate last minute save by an international coalition. Although it is impossible to determine how many lives were saved in averting Qaddafi’s takeover of the large eastern cities, his behavior in cities like Zawiya, Ras Lanuf, and Misrata showed an exemplary lack of concern for civilian life[xvi]. In Zawiya, Qaddafi’s forces bombed a mosque full of civilians[xvii], while at least 50 tanks opened fire on the city—by one protester’s account tearing it “down to the ashes”. In Ras Lanuf, Qaddafi’s warplanes fired missiles into residential areas[xviii]. Moreover, the indiscriminate rocket and mortar fire, as well as the landmines planted in and around Misrata resulted in up to 2,000 killed by the month of April[xix]. Furthermore, the International Criminal Court (ICC) later revealed in war crimes investigations that Qaddafi personally ordered the bombardment and starvation of the civilian population in Misrata[xx]. Qaddafi’s knowledge of the strategic significance in the NTC’s capital of Benghazi was clearly illustrated by the disposition of his military might towards the city[xxi]. His commitment to capturing the city at all costs was divulged when the International Federation for Human Rights revealed that on February 23rd: “130 [of Qaddafi’s] soldiers were executed by their [own] officers in Benghazi for refusing to fire on crowds of protesters”[xxii]. Just before the coalition forces produced air strikes that forced the retreat of Qaddafi’s troops, the fall of Benghazi seemed inevitable[xxiii]. Even if we assume the head of the NTC was exaggerating when he said 500,000 lives would be lost if Qaddafi’s forces were allowed to fully advance, there is no question that countless lives were saved[xxiv] by preventing an abrupt and violent end to the popular rebellion. Manal Omar, Director of the North Africa Programs at the United States Institute of Peace noted at a Brookings lecture[xxv]: There’s a very strong acknowledgment consistently that the reason why Benghazi has the opposition and is able to operate, is due to the fact that the NATO intervened, and also an acknowledgment that they could have been Zawiya. [BI, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect 6.16.2011] From the very beginning Qaddafi vowed to fight until “the last man standing, [and] even the last woman standing”[xxvi]. Not only did he declare that he would “die [in Libya] as a martyr”[xxvii], but a New York Times report revealed that Qaddafi had “tens of billions” of cash reserves (separate from the frozen international funds) to help finance a prolonged war against the rebels[xxviii]—forces which he already enjoyed tremendous military superiority over. There is little doubt that Qaddafi would have continued to carry out his 42-year policy of eliminating opposition voices had he been given the chance[xxix]. Imagine a situation where Qaddafi was to stay in power and the intervention would have never taken place. Libya would enter into an era of isolation, sanction, and deprivation. Like North Korea, the international community would essentially be condemning the Libyan people to continuous poverty and degradation. The international implications for mass atrocity prevention would be crippling. The normative international principle of the Responsibility to Protect would be dealt a coup de grâce. Allowing the Qaddafis to stay in power rather than face the charges of both war crimes and crimes against humanity would have only empowered the tyrannical rulers of the world to use unrestrained violence in the future.

**Their reading of Libya as a ‘war for oil’ is wrong and trivializes the necessity of protecting civilian protestors from a murderous regime**

Cole, 11

(Juan, History Prof-Michigan, “Libya not a War for Oil,” http://www.juancole.com/2011/06/libya-not-a-war-for-oil.html)

The allegation out there in the blogosphere that the United Nations-authorized intervention in Libya was driven by Western oil companies is a non-starter. The argument is that Muammar Qaddafi was considered unreliable by American petroleum concerns, so they pushed to get rid of him. Nothing could be further from the truth. Bloomberg details the big lobbying push by American oil companies on behalf of Qaddafi, to exempt him from civil claims in the US. The United States in any case did not spearhead the UN intervention. President Obama and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, along with the Pentagon brass, considered the outbreak of the Libya war very unfortunate and clearly were only dragged into it kicking and screaming by Saudi Arabia, France and Britain. The Western country with the biggest oil stake in Libya, Italy, was very reluctant to join the war. Silvio Berlusconi says that he almost resigned when the war broke out, given his close relationship to Qaddafi. As for the UK, Tony Blair brought the BP CEO to Tripoli in 2007, and BP had struck deals for Libya oil worth billions, which this war can only delay. Not only is there no reason to think that petroleum companies urged war, the whole argument about UN and NATO motivations is irrelevant and sordid. By now it is clear that Qaddafi planned to crush political dissidents in a massive and brutal way, and some estimates already suggest over 10,000 dead. If UN-authorized intervention could stop that looming massacre, then why does it matter so much what drove David Cameron to authorize it? An argument you sometimes hear is that the new Transitional National Council in Benghazi will be pliant toward Western interests. But Qaddafi himself had come back in from the cold and all sorts of deals were being struck with him by Western powers. Those who more or less support Qaddafi and wanted to let him roll tanks on civilian protesters has weaved itself into a pretzel with all these conspiracy theories, while conveniently managing to leave out of the account ordinary Libyans, so many of whom are willing to risk their lives to bring about the end of Qaddafi’s murderous and mercurial regime.

**The oil wars explanation of war is a myth that is used to mask the actual geopolitical interest for US foreign policy, allowing repeated military adventures to go incorrectly theorized**

Ismael Hossein-Zadeh, author of the recently published The Political Economy of U.S. Militarism, Teaches at Drake University, 2008, Are They Really Oil Wars?, www.counterpunch.org/2008/07/09/are-they-really-oil-wars/

But the major reason for the persistence of this pervasive myth seems to stem from certain deliberate efforts that are designed to perpetuate the legend in order to camouflage some real economic and geopolitical special interests that drive U.S. military adventures in the Middle East. There is evidence that both the military-industrial complex and hard-line Zionist proponents of “greater Israel” disingenuously use oil (as an issue of national interest) in order to disguise their own nefarious special interests and objectives: justification of continued expansion of military spending, extension of sales markets for military hardware, and recasting the geopolitical map of the Middle East in favor of Israel.

There is also evidence that for every dollar’s worth of oil imported from the Persian Gulf region the Pentagon takes five dollars out of the Federal budget to “secure” the flow of that oil! This is a clear indication that the claim that the U.S. military presence in the Middle East is due to oil consideration is a fraud .[26]

While anecdotal, an example of how partisans of war and militarism use oil as a pretext to cover up the real forces behind war and militarism can be instructive. In the early stages of the invasion of Iraq, when the anti-occupation resistance in Iraq had not yet taken shape and the invasion seemed to be proceeding smoothly, two of the leading champions of the invasion, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, often boasting of the apparent or pre-mature success of the invasion at those early stages, gave frequent news conferences and press reports. During one of those press reports (at the end of an address to delegates at an Asian security summit in Singapore in early June 2003), Wolfowitz was asked why North Korea was being treated differently from Iraq, where hardly any weapons of mass destruction had been found. Wolfowitz’s response was: "Let’s look at it simply. The most important difference between North Korea and Iraq is that economically, we just had no choice in Iraq. The country swims on a sea of oil."[27]

Many opponents of the war jumped on this statement, so to speak, as corroboration of what they had been saying or suspecting all along: that the war on Iraq was prompted by oil interests. Yet, there is strong evidence—some of which presented in the preceding pages—that for the last several decades oil interests have not favored war and turbulence in the Middle East, including the current invasion of Iraq. Nor is war any longer the way to gain access to oil. Major oil companies, along with many other non-military transnational corporations, have lobbied both the Clinton and Bush administrations in support of changing the aggressive, militaristic U.S. policy toward countries like Iran, Iraq and Libya in favor of establishing normal, non-confrontational trade and diplomatic relations. Such efforts at normalization of trade and diplomatic relations, however, have failed time and again precisely because Wolfowitz and his cohorts, working through AIPAC and other war-mongering think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Project for the New American Century (PNAC), and Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) oppose them.

These think tanks, in collaboration with a whole host of similar militaristic lobbying entities like Center for Security Affairs (CSA) and National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), working largely as institutional façades to serve the defacto alliance of the military-industrial complex and the pro-Israel lobby, have repeatedly thwarted efforts at peace and reconciliation in the Middle East—often over the objections and frustrations of major U.S. oil companies. It is a well established fact that Wolfowitz has been a devoted champion of these jingoistic think tanks and their aggressive unilateral policies in the Middle East. In light of his professional record and political loyalties, his claim that he championed the war on Iraq because of oil considerations can be characterized only as demagogic: it contradicts his political record and defies the policies he has been advocating for the last several decades; it is designed to divert attention from the main forces behind the war, the armaments lobby and the pro-Israel lobby.

These powerful interests are careful not to draw attention to the fact that they are the prime instigators of war and militarism in the Middle East. Therefore, they tend to deliberately perpetuate the popular perception that oil is the driving force behind the war in the region. They even do not mind having their aggressive foreign policies labeled as imperialistic as long as imperialism implies some vague or general connotations of hegemony and domination, that is, as long as it thus camouflages the real, special interests behind the war and political turbulence in the Middle East.

### case

Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

**Equating targeted killing with all acts of state violence is limitless and undebatable**

Silva, LL.M. from the University of Montreal, 2003

(Jose Sebastian, “Death for Life: A Study of Targeted Killing by States In International Law,” https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/handle/1866/2372)

As defined by Steven R. David, targeted killing is the "intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit governmental approval.,,25 Though concise, the problem with this definition is that it fails to specify the intended targets and ignores the context in which they are carried out. **By failing to define targeted killings as measures of counter-terrorism**, **killings of all types may indiscriminately fall under its mantle with devastating consequences**. As such, the killing of political leaders in peacetime, which amounts to assassination, can fall within its scope. The same can be said about the killing of specific enemy combatants in armed conflict, which amounts to targeted military strikes, and the intentional slaying of common criminals, dissidents, or opposition leaders. Actions carried-out by governments within their jurisdictions can also be interpreted as targeted killings. Although the killing of terrorists abroad may constitute lawful and proportionate self-defense in response to armed attacks, the use of such measures by states for an unspecified number of reasons renders shady their very suggestion. David's definition is **essentially correct** **but over-inclusive**. As discussed in the following chapters, targeted killing will refer to lethal action taken by states against wanted individuals on foreign soil that have, or are preparing, to attack it. They must also not be equated with killings that occur during armed conflicts between states nor in the context of occupation or civil war. For the purpose of this study, **targeted killing will be defined as the *premeditated killing by states of specific individuals on foreign soil outside the context of armed conflict to prevent acts of international terrorism***. This definition covers almost any use of lethal force by states on foreign soil whose purpose is the prevention of international terrorism, provided that it is *not* carried-out in the context of an armed conflict as understood by the Geneva Conventions. Generally, this implies any military confrontation between "two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them,,,26 as well as armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties. The limitation imposed by the proposed definition is that an armed conflict not already exist against the sanctuary-state or an armed group within it, as it would automatically render lawful the use of proportionate military force, including targeted killing. The purpose of the absence of armed conflict qualification is to remove from the analysis any possibility that targeted killings will be *automatically* justified as the killing combatants.

Simualted national security law debates inculcate agency and decision-making skills—that enables activism and avoids cooption

Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11/13, National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course **was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying** doctrinal **material and** creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, **while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage**. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. **This is the most important determination, because the substance of the** doctrinal portion of the course and the **simulation follows from this decision**. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. **This**, then, **becomes a guide for the** doctrinal part of the **course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation** are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. **The one-size fits all approach** currently **dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised** in the current conversation. **Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at** the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion **simulations**, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may **provide an important way forward**. Such **simulations** also **cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education**, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed **the simulation model** above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it **does provide a** starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. **It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which** they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, *Argumentation and Debate*

*Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote weII-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decisionmaking is the most portable and flexible skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, *Argumentation and Debate*

*Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

In the spring of 2011, facing a legacy of problematic U.S, military involvement in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and criticism for what some saw as slow sup­port of the United States for the people of Egypt and Tunisia as citizens of those nations ousted their formerly American-backed dictators, the administration of President Barack Obama considered its options in providing support for rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. Public debate was robust as the administration sought to determine its most appropriate action. The president ultimately decided to engage in an international coalition, enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 through a number of measures including establishment of a no-fly zone through air and missile strikes to support rebels in Libya, but stopping short of direct U.S. intervention with ground forces or any occupation of Libya. While the action seemed to achieve its immediate objectives, most notably the defeat of Qaddafi and his regime, the American president received both criticism and praise for his mea­sured yet assertive decision. In fact, the past decade has challenged American leaders to make many difficult decisions in response to potentially catastrophic problems. Public debate has raged in chaotic environment of political division and apparent animosity, The process of public decision making may have never been so consequential or difficult. Beginning in the fall of 2008, Presidents Bush and Obama faced a growing eco­nomic crisis and responded in part with '’bailouts'' of certain Wall Street financial entities, additional bailouts of Detroit automakers, and a major economic stimu­lus package. All these actions generated substantial public discourse regarding the necessity, wisdom, and consequences of acting (or not acting). In the summer of 2011, the president and the Congress participated in heated debates (and attempted negotiations) to raise the nation's debt ceiling such that the U.S. Federal Govern­ment could pay its debts and continue government operations. This discussion was linked to a debate about the size of the exponentially growing national debt, gov­ernment spending, and taxation. Further, in the spring of 2012, U.S. leaders sought to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon capability while gas prices in the United States rose, The United States considered its ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan in the face of nationwide protests and violence in that country1 sparked by the alleged burning of Korans by American soldiers, and Americans observed the actions of President Bashir Al-Assad and Syrian forces as they killed Syrian citizens in response to a rebel uprising in that nation and considered the role of the United States in that action. Meanwhile, public discourse, in part generated and intensified by the cam­paigns of the GOP candidates for president and consequent media coverage, addressed issues dividing Americans, including health care, women's rights to reproductive health services, the freedom of churches and church-run organiza­tions to remain true to their beliefs in providing (or electing not to provide) health care services which they oppose, the growing gap between the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans and the rest of the American population, and continued high levels of unemployment. More division among the American public would be hard to imagine. Yet through all the tension, conflict was almost entirely ver­bal in nature, aimed at discovering or advocating solutions to growing problems. Individuals also faced daunting decisions. A young couple, underwater with their mortgage and struggling to make their monthly payments, considered walking away from their loan; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job and a teenager decided between an iPhone and an iPad. Each of these situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consider­ation: others scorn to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and co­workers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make deci­sions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all engage in discourse surrounding our necessary decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an eco­nomical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candi­date to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Should we watch The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue—all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, Time magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of his­tory, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis," and social networking sites, knowledge and truth are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. Through a quick keyword search, we have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? Much of what suffices as information is not reliable, or even ethically motivated. The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical deci­sions' relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength, And, critical thinking offers tools enabling the user to better understand the' nature and relative quality of the message under consider­ation. Critical thinkers are better users of information as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California's requirement states; Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambigu­ous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive arid deductive processes, including an under­standing of die formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly com­petitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing, and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical con­sequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring our solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism,"1 Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets. Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary research confirms the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves die thinking of those involved,2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a com­prehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, "'The debate-critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof ■favoring a positive debate-critical thinking relationship.11'1 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates, formal or informal, These take place in intrapersonal commu­nications, with which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, and in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to argu­ments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of’ others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few Of the thousands of deci­sions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of respon­sibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate. Some people make decision by flipping a coin. Others act on a whim or respond unconsciously to “hidden persuaders.” If the problem is trivial—such as whether to go to a concert or a film—the particular method used is unimportant. For more crucial matters, however, mature adults require a reasoned methods of decision making. Decisions should be justified by good reasons based on accurate evidence and valid reasoning.

Government engagement enables broad-based resistance to executive overreach and racist war powers authority

Mellor, European University Institute Graduate Student, 13

(Ewan E. Mellor, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs,” Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 2013, http://www.academia.edu/4175480/Why\_policy\_relevance\_is\_a\_moral\_necessity\_Just\_war\_theory\_impact\_and\_UAVs, accessed 10-20-13, CMM)

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 ¶ Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 ¶ He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms. ¶ Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis.¶ Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 ¶ Conclusion ¶ This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

A focus on performativity divorced from reason-giving makes dialogic engagement impossible—embodiment of performance is inevitable, but throwing out logos and argumentation destroys the only basis for progressive politics

Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences – The Open University (UK), ‘8

(Clive, “Political affects in public space: normative blind-spots in non-representational ontologies,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers Vol. 33, Issue 2, p. 186–200)

The ontologisation of theory has been associated with a strong preference for models of ethical and political agency that focus attention upon embodied, affective dispositions of subjects. This reflects the influence of various theoretical and philosophical traditions that share a deep suspicion of ‘cognitivist’, ‘intellectualist’ or ‘mentalist’ construals of human action. This follows from a widely shared intuition that propositional ‘knowing-that’ is a function of embodied ‘knowing-how’. Once it is acknowledged that ‘knowing-how’ involves all sorts of learned, embodied dispositions that are inscribed in various types of ‘unconscious’ disposition of anticipation and response, then theoretical traditions that are too partial to a picture of a social world governed by rules, principles and practices of reason seem constricted or even wrong-headed. Consistent with the ontological drift of certain strands of cultural theory and ‘Continental philosophy’ (Hemmings 2005; White 2000), in human geography affect has become the sort of thing one can have ‘a theory of’, where this amounts to the correct delimitation of the ontological status of affective forces (e.g. Anderson B 2006; Anderson and Harrison 2006; McCormack 2007). Thrift (2004a, 464; 2007, 223–35) identifies a family of research fields concerned with affect: cultural-theoretic work on performance; Sylvan Tomkins’ seminal work on affect; Deleuze's reading of Spinoza; and Darwinian accounts. Psychoanalysis is also acknowledged as a source, somewhat reluctantly. So-called ‘non-representational theory’ (Thrift 2007) derives a highly abstract definition of affect from this range of work. Affect is presented as an ontological layer of embodied existence, delimited by reference to the purely formal relationship of the capacity to be affected and to affect. In this presentation, affect is doubly located: in the relational in-between of fields of interaction; and layered below the level of minded, intentional consciousness. This vocabulary of the ‘layering’ of thinking, feeling and judgement is fundamental to the political resonances claimed on behalf of ontologies of affect. In principle, post-foundational philosophies which acknowledge that practical reasoning goes on against a background of affective dispositions and desires could be expected to reconfigure what, following Ryle (1949, 10), we might call ‘the logical geography’ of action. However, when the post-foundationalist avowal of the importance of embodied ‘knowing-how’ is interpreted in terms of ‘layer-cake’ ontologies of practice, there is a tendency to simply assert the conceptual priority of previously denigrated terms – affect over reason, practice over representation. Disputes over the significance for social science of post-foundationalist philosophy turn on the types of priority-claim that are assumed to follow from ontological assertions that ready-at-handedness, background or affective attunement stand as the background to embodied action. The ontologisation of affect in recent cultural theory is associated with the explicit adoption of a layer-cake interpretation of the relationship between practice and expression. Layer-cake interpretations present propositional intentionality as resting upon a more basic level of pre-conceptual, practical intentionality in such a way as to present propositional intentionality as derivative of this layer of practical attunement (Brandom 2002, 328). On this view, the practical presupposition of the available, ready-at-hand qualities of environments in embodied actions that treat these environments as merely occurrent, or present-at-hand, is interpreted as implying an order of conceptual priority of the practical (Brandom 2002, 332). This model of conceptual priority puts in place a view of practical attunement as a stratum that is autonomous of propositional intentionality. It is treated as a layer that ‘could be in place before, or otherwise in the absence of the particular linguistic practices that permit anything to show up or be represented as merely there’ (Brandom 2002, 80). This view of practice as an autonomous layer therefore reproduces a representationalist view of representational practices in order to assert the superiority of an avowedly ‘non-representational’ stance. In contrast to this view, we might instead suppose that the priority of practice only holds in the order of explanation (Brandom 2002, 332). This implies that we cannot understand propositional intentionality without first understanding its dependence on practice, without supposing that this requires an understanding of practice as an intentional layer that kicks-in before others. It means presuming that the capacity to represent things as being a certain way is the result of applying an assertional-inferential filter to things available to us in the first instance as exhibiting various sorts of practical significance. (Brandom 2002, 80) This alternative interpretation does not assert the priority of one ‘layer’ over another. Rather, it reconfigures our understanding of what we are doing when representational discourse breaks out, when we say ‘that things are thus-and-so’ (Brandom 2002, 80). Rejecting the layer-cake interpretation of the type of priority that practice is said to have over propositional intentionality leads to a reconfiguration of the pragmatics of expressive rationality. Rather than supposing that acts of expression are ways of transforming an inner content into an outer expression, in a representational way, we instead think in terms of acts of making explicit what is implicit, in an inferential way (Brandom 2001, 8). An interpretation in terms of the explanatory priority of practice therefore allows us to understand in inferential terms the embodied capacity for making explicit something one can do as something one can say. This is a capacity to translate ‘knowing how’ into a ‘knowing that’ which is expressed in terms of commitments and entitlements, ‘as putting it in a form in which it can both serve as and stand in need of reasons’ (Brandom 2001, 11). The sense of ‘implicit’ in this holistic-inferential account does not presume that the reasons that can be made explicit were present as the maxims behind the actions to which they are retroactively attributed. It just means there is no sharp line between unarticulated know-how and explicit knowledge (Taylor 2000); and that the latter should be thought of as providing a step towards acknowledging the responsibilities entailed in actions. This interpretation of the order of priority that holds between different sorts of intentionality opens up the possibility of reconfiguring the logical geography of action. It supposes that different modalities of action enact their own ‘validity conditions’ that can, in principle, be made explicit in public practices of giving and asking for reasons (e.g. Bridge 2007; Flyvbjerg 2001; Lovibond 2002). This reconsideration of the pragmatics of expressive rationality reconfigures understandings of deliberation that underlie theories of democracy, justice and legitimacy (see Habermas 2000; Brandom 2000). This overlaps with attempts to develop thoroughgoing accounts of affective deliberation in contemporary democratic theory (e.g. Krause 2007; Hoggett and Thompson 2002). This work makes explicit the relevance of affective aspects of life for deliberative models of democracy that work up from the principle of affected interest, according to which those affected by actions and outcomes should have some say in defining the parameters of those actions and outcomes. The upsurge of interest in the theme of affect speaks in compelling ways to a recurrent problem in democratic theory: how to respect citizens as competent moral agents whilst acknowledging the web of dependent, conditioned relationships into which they are thrown. There is an extensive literature in political science on the role that non-rational sentiments, feelings and emotions play in the political decisionmaking processes. This is a literature which is empirically grounded (e.g. Marcus 2002), and explicitly reconfigures understandings of the relationships between rationality, reason and action (e.g. McDermott 2004). The degree to which affective capabilities can be articulated with public procedures of democratic legitimacy is a central problem in post-Habermasian critical theory's project of describing the conditions of radical democratic, pluralistic constitutionalism (e.g. Habermas 2006; Honneth 2007; Markell 2000). Berlant's (2005a) historiography of affective publics in American culture establishes that any and all political public spheres are shaped by affective energies, while Sedgwick (2003) and Riley (2005) have explored the affective dynamics of textual practices. In moral philosophy, affect is embraced as a means of rethinking the role of partiality in deliberative practices, for example in Baier's (1994) feminist ethics of moral prejudice which roots reason in affects, or in Blackburn's (1998) Humean reconstruction of practical reason. The key thought guiding these reconfigurations of affect-with-reason is the idea that rationality emerges out of situated encounters with others. This same theme underwrites the work of political theorists reconfiguring democratic theory around an appreciation of the affective registers of justice and injustice, expressed in an emphasis on the arts of receptivity, of listening and acknowledging and responding (e.g. Young 1997; Coles 2005). Thrift's spatial politics of affect and Connolly's neuropolitics of media affects sits, therefore, in a much broader range of work that is concerned with **affective aspects of political life**. But the examples noted above all focus on the affective aspects of life without adopting a vocabulary of ontological layers, levels and priority. This is in contrast to the characteristic ontologisation of affect in human geography. The ontologisation of affect as a layer of pre-conscious ‘priming to act’ reduces embodied action simply to the dimension of being attuned to and coping with the world. This elides the aspect of embodied knowing that involves the capacity to take part in ‘games of giving and asking for reasons’. While the ontologisation of theory in human geography has been accompanied by claims to transform and reconfigure understandings of what counts as ‘the political’, this project has been articulated in a register which eschews the conventions of justification, that is, the giving and asking for reasons. This is particularly evident when it comes to accounting for why the contemporary deployment of affective energy in the public realm is bad for democracy. The contemporary deployment of anxious, obsessive and compulsive affect in the political realm is presented as having ‘deleterious consequences’ on the grounds that it works against democratic expression (Thrift 2007, 253); contributes to a style of democracy that is consumed but not practised (2007, 248); promotes forms of **sporadic engagement** that can be switched on and off (2007, 240); and generally leads to certain dispositions being **placed beyond question.** There is certainly a vision of democracy as a particular type of engaged ethical practice at work in these occasional judgements (2007, 14), but the precise normative force of this view is not justified in any detail. The eschewing of justification arises in part because the content of these ontologies, which emphasise various layers of knowing that kick-in prior to representation, is projected directly onto the form of exposition. **There is a particular type of authority put into play in this move.** The avowedly anti-intentionalist materialism associated with contemporary cultural-theoretic ontologies of affect closes down the conceptual space in which argument and disagreement can even get off the ground (see Leys 2007). In contrast, and as outlined above, the argument pursued here follows an avowedly ‘non-representationalist’ perspective according to which assertions of knowledge, including the types of knowledge asserted by ontologies of affect, always stand in need of reasons, precisely because they emerge as reasons for certain sorts of commitments and entitlements (Brandom 1996, 167). On this understanding ontological assertions act as justifications, and are subject to the demand for justification. If ‘placing things in the space of reasons’ (McDowell 1994, 5) in this sense is not acknowledged as one aspect of practice, then recourse to the ontological register closes down the inconclusive conversations upon which democratic cultural politics depends (Rorty 2006).

We should center debate on political deliberation rather than weighing competing modes of affect

Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences – The Open University (UK), ‘8

(Clive, “Political affects in public space: normative blind-spots in non-representational ontologies,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers Vol. 33, Issue 2, p. 186–200)

This acknowledgement seems to present an occasion to enter into an argument about how and why certain sorts of submission, to certain sorts of affective regimes, may or may not be justifiable, legitimate, or malign and unjust. It is here, in other words, that one might expect the intuition behind the ‘quite clear’ to be worked up into an effort to ‘show’ what is at stake. But no such argument or demonstration is forthcoming. Perhaps this is due to a residual sense that to articulate a justificatory argument would somehow do an injustice to the integrity of visceral feeling out of which ‘proto-political longings for change’ (Thrift 2004b, 69) initially emerge. The notion that rationality – asking for and giving reasons – might be put to good effect in the service of such intuitions **does not seem to be countenanced.** Instead, we are offered a list of preferred ethical stances which, in the absence of any argument as to why these are to be the preferred virtues of personal conduct, are recommended to us primarily on the grounds that they are the best way of cultivating a certain sort of open, creative, experimental, hopeful character (2004b, 68). Connolly's intellectual project for a decade or more has explicitly concerned itself with the elaboration of a fully-fledged ethos of democratic pluralisation (Connolly 1995 1999 2005a). This ethos is elaborated as a process of self-expressive agonistic confrontation and enlarged generosity. This is an ethos of flourishing critical responsiveness (1995, xv–xix), one that aims to proliferate the forms in which pluralism is democratically negotiated, and to multiply the sources of incorrigible values that generate pluralistic contestation. The elaboration of an ethos of engagement (1999, 137–61) indicates that the layered understanding of mind and body, habit and reflection in the affect onto-story is not wholly at odds with approaches that focus on deliberative reason. The development of accounts of the ethos of democracy follows from the acknowledgement that citizen's affective attachments to diverse conceptions of the good is an irreducible feature of public life that cannot be contained by neutral procedures (Krause 2004). Accounts of democratic ethos are presented as figures for alternative regulative practices that might help reproduce fidelity to democratic principles. The ethos of engagement, like other accounts of democratic ethos, therefore fills a procedural-shaped hole in normative democratic theory. It augments and displaces Habermasian consensualism and Rawlsian overlapping consensus with a more fecund image of democratic culture (Connolly 1999, 35–6, 70). And yet, while there is a promise that the political ontology of affective neuropolitics can provide a ‘modification’ to those sorts of democratic theories (Connolly 2002b, 36), Connolly has had nothing to say ‘about affect within specific processes of evaluative judgement’, and even less to say about ‘what normative models of political judgment and democratic deliberation would look like after an appropriate affective inflection’ (Krause 2007, 2; see also Krause 2006). The ontologising of affect, and the recourse to the rhetoric of ethos, might in fact militate against any such modification. The ontologisation of affect expels affect from the space of reasons by drawing too sharp a distinction between different layers of perception and action that are assumed to be related in an order of conceptual priority. The recourse to ethos-talk marks a choice to deploy a genre that allows one to register a commitment to certain values without having to directly avow norms and principles or present arguments in favour of them (Anderson A 2006, 137). The question that remains, however, is whether the content of ontologies that disclose the aspects of action that are pre-conscious and dispositional rather than highly reflective justifies the eschewing of reasons at the level of theoretical exposition. The eschewing of reasons might also betray an unacknowledged parochialism in these ontologies of affect. Affectively enhanced onto-stories actively embrace as a virtue rather than a vice the recurring difficulty that characterises deliberative accounts of democratic pluralism: have in not being able to outline neutral procedures for negotiating across difference without positing a particular substantive conception of the good life. Eschewing reason-giving in favour of the enactment of affectively infused figures of democratic ethos therefore openly courts the possibility of universalising culturally specific norms. Only now, the universalisation is not of rationalist norms of deliberative argumentation, but of affectively sedimented models of good character and public virtue, such as generosity and responsibility. And this runs the risk of prejudging the sorts of harm and injustice to which the emergence of democratic politics is a situational response (see Dryzek 2005). In short, we can see that the ontology of affect stands as a reason to favour an affective ethos of democratic pluralisation that promises a less strenuous and more open account of the cultural conditions of democratic politics. But in enacting this commitment, it opens the space for a demand that some justification at least be offered for the preference accorded to the particular virtues espoused by this ethos. Placing affect in the space of reasons Both Thrift's ontology of spatial affects and Connolly's ontology of media affects ask us to worry about the political implications of the designed, engineered, automated qualities of contemporary spaces of public interaction. But they do so without specifying any reasons why, or when, we should worry. This work challenges the rationalist pieties of democratic theory, and even points out the inadvertent sources of harm and injustice that might inhabit these theories. However, these ontologised accounts of affective politics are characterised by an ambivalence that also gives us pause for thought and reflection. This is ambivalence between claiming that any and all subjective apprehension of the self relies on a background of affective dispositions, and a politically inflected claim that the manipulation of these background conditions in particular situations carries with it a normatively charged threat of harm or injustice, in the form of involuntary submission to the will of others. What remains unexplored is how and when one might tell the difference between these two aspects of life, or even what reconfigured understanding of criteria might help in this task. Two related questions are provoked by the ontologised, instrumental interpretation of the political work that ‘affect’ does, not so much behind people's backs as under their skins. First, in the critical vision of the politics of affect, affect matters politically because it opens up new surfaces for the exercise of manipulation. This leaves aside the question of the circumstances in which being ‘manipulated’ is a bad thing, politically or ethically. Excitement, joy, hope, love, surprise, distress, anguish, fear, terror, anxiety, obsession, compulsion, shame, hatred, humiliation, contempt, disgust, anger and rage have no a priori political valence at all. This depends on what it is they are mobilised around or attached to. Manipulating affective dispositions around some topics or objects might not always be meaningfully described as political. Knowing whether it should be depends on a willingness to take seriously how those affected interpret the issue at hand. Second, in the affirmative vision of the politics of affect, ontologies of affect are presented as the basis of new models of progressive politics, in which politics is understood as a means of intervening in affective regimes to bring about new configurations of feeling. This leaves aside the question of why the type of academic-artistic experiments that writers such as Thrift and Connolly recommend count as ‘progressive’, or even minimally ‘legitimate’. Their value as progressive seems to follow **solely from the ends** to which these interventions are oriented – furthering emotional liberty, or cultivating a generous ethos of engagement. Their value as legitimate remains unclear, not least because no effort is made to clarify what practical implications the ontology of affect has for the simple democratic principle according to which those affected by actions should have some role in defining the parameters of those actions. There are a range of registers available for acknowledging the affective aspects of political life. Acknowledgement of the affective aspects of life can serve as an important warning against an excessively rationalist faith in the power of argument to resolve disputes. And it should lead us to embrace with a passion the faith that what we have left after rationalistic rationality is more argument**, the game of giving of and asking for reasons** without end.

Logos-centered debate is possible even though we are defined by our subject positions—clash and dialogue are possible because we can be both situated and impartial—T is not objectivity, but it acknowledges that compassion and dialogue are not mutually exclusive

Disch, professor and associate chair of women’s studies – U Michigan, ‘93

(Lisa J., “MORE TRUTH THAN FACT: Storytelling as Critical Understanding in the Writings of Hannah Arendt,” *Political Theory* Vol. 21 No. 4, p. 665-694)

Arendt seems to have viewed Thucydides as she did herself, as a political theorist from whom the question of historical objectivity is an irrelevant methodological debate. The task of the political theorist is not to report objectively but to tell a story that engages the critical faculties of the audience. Euben makes a similar claim, crediting Thucydides with "offering a new standard of accuracy" to his readers. He writes that "however personal or Athenian his work, however much he may have had ties to the aristocratic class at Athens, there is a sense in which he is absent from his discourse. Or to put it more accurately, he is trying to sustain conditions within the text that makes discourse outside it possible."87 This is no conventional model of objective reporting, as it consists neither in a bloodlessly neutral writing style nor in an attempt to avoid selectivity but, rather, in the fact that Thucydides leaves the reader with the task of interpreting the various conflicts he represents. To Euben and Arendt then, who are political theorists, Thucydides' work achieves something more important than objectivity: political impartiality. Political impartiality is not secured by means of detachment from politics but by fostering public deliberation that depends on the ability "to **look upon the same world from one another's standpoint."**88 Arendt credits the practice of political impartiality to the polis, which she idealizes as a realm of "incessant talk" and plurality, in which "the Greeks discovered that the world we have in common is usually regarded from an infinite number of different standpoints, to which correspond the most diverse points of view."89 Thucydides' work fosters political impartiality by an artistic (though not fictional) creation of plurality by his representation of speeches from the multiple, divergent perspectives that constitute the public realm. Euben writes that Thucydides gives us "a form of political knowledge that respects, even recapitulates, the paradoxes and 'perspectivism' of political life."9? This account of political impartiality, characterized not by abstraction but by the interplay among a plurality of perspectives, anticipates the conception of impartiality that Arendt will discern in Kant's description of the "enlarged mentality" in Third Critique. She admires Thucydides because his imagina- tive history makes it possible for the reader to think as if engaged in the debates of his time. This section bears out the claim that there is an "untold story" about storytelling in the discrepancies among the various statements of method, published and unpublished, that Arendt formulated over the course of writing Origins. This story documents her "unusual approach" to political theory and historical writing, in the shift she makes from abstract, neutral reporting to explicitly moral storytelling from the personal experience of the author. She adopts this approach to demonstrate and teach a kind of critical understanding that, in Nussbaum's words, "consists in the keen responsiveness of intellect, imagination, and feeling to the particulars of a situation."9' This early work begins to describe how to make a judgment from experience, arguing that one proceeds not by applying principles from a transcendent framework but by considered attention to one's immediate response to an event. It does not yet explain what makes this contingent judgment critical. The answer to this question lies in her attempt to discern a political philosophy in Kant's Critique of Judgment. SITUATED IMPARTIALITY In her lectures on Third Critique, Arendt explains that she is drawn to Kant's conception of taste as a model for political thinking because she finds in it a formulation of impartiality that accords with plurality. Its subject, she claims, is "men in the plural, as they really are and live in societies."92 Where practical reason is individual and abstract, imagining the principle of one's act as a universal rule, Kant defines the impartiality necessary for aesthetic judgment in terms of intersubjectivity, which he calls "enlarged thought."93 Arendt creatively appropriates Kant's description of taste as "enlarged thought" to explain how one gets from experience to criticism: the critical move entails a shift from thinking from a private perspective to thinking from a public vantage point. Her version of enlarged thought makes a bridge between storytelling and situated impartial critical understanding Arendt foreshadows her turn to Kant's Third Critique as early as the preface to Origins where she uses the term "crystallization." As Seyla Benhabib argues, this term is an attempt to explain the unconventional structure and organization of the book-the structure that Arendt explained to Mary Underwood as writing "against" history-by alluding to Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of History." Benjamin argues that the critical historian who refuses to write from the perspective of the victor must "brush history against the grain."94 According to Benhabib, Arendt uses the peculiar language of "elements" and "crystallization" because she, like Benjamin, wants "to break the chain of narrative continuity, to shatter chronology as the natural structure of narrative, to stress fragmentariness, historical dead ends, failures and ruptures."9 The crystallization metaphor is unquestionably an attempt by Arendt to bring Benjamin to mind, but it is also an allusion to Kant's account of taste. The reference to Kant affirms the claim of Arendt's early writings that political events are contingent and so cannot be named or known in terms of existing conceptual categories. In Third Critique, Kant introduces "crystal- lization" as a metaphor for contingency, which he calls "the form of the purposiveness of an object, so far as this is perceived in it without any representation of a purpose. "' Crystallization describes the formation of objects that come into being not by a gradual, evolutionary process but suddenly and unpredictably "by a shooting together, i.e. by a sudden solidi- fication, not by a gradual transition. . . but all at once by a saltus, which transition is also called crystallization."97 In describing a kind of being that is contingent but susceptible to critical evaluation nonetheless, crystallization justifies the possibility of a kind of judgment that is both spontaneous and principled.98 In calling totalitarianism "the final crystallizing catastrophe" that consti- tutes its various "elements" into a historical crisis, Arendt makes an analogy between contingent beauty and unprecedented evil. This analogy turns on the claim that totalitarianism, a phenomenon to which no abstract categorical framework is adequate, poses a problem of understanding that is similar to that posed by beauty. Political events, like aesthetic objects, can neither be explained in evolutionary terms nor judged with reference to an external purpose or principle. Even so, we are bound to discern their meaning or else to relinquish our freedom by reacting without thinking against forces we do not understand. Arendt is drawn to Third Critique because she wants to argue that political judgment is not a kind of practical reason or moral judgment but a kind of taste. Moral judgment, according to Kant, is "determinant," which means that it functions by subsuming a particular instance under a general rule that is rationally derived prior to that instance.99 Taste, on the other hand, is reflec- tive. It operates in a contingent situation, meaning one for which there can be no predetermined principle, so that a thinker takes her bearings not from the universal but from the particular (p. 15). Leaving technical language behind, the implication of reflective judgment is that it is primarily concerned with questions of meaning. Arendt's turn to Third Critique for a model for political judgment is utterly consistent with her early essays, then, because aesthetic judgment confronts the world from the start as a problem of understanding. Kant's problem in Third Critique is to account for the possibility of aesthetic judgment by distinguishing judgments about beauty from idiosyn- cratic preferences, on one hand, and from categorical values, on the other. He claims that an expression of taste in the beautiful differs from our interest in the pleasant, to which we are drawn by the desire for gratification, and from our regard for the good, which we are compelled to esteem by its objective worth according to the categorical imperative. Taste is unique in that it is spontaneous but principled. He calls it "a disinterested and free satisfaction; for no interest, either of sense or of reason, here forces our assent" (p. 44). To account for the possibility of aesthetic judgment, Kant must explain how an expression of taste can be more than "groundless and vain fancy," without arguing that it is objectively necessary (p. 191). Kant answers this problem by proposing that aesthetic judgment is intersubjective. A statement of preference is subjective, in that when I affirm that something is pleasing I mean that it is pleasing to me; in stating that something is beautiful, however, I am expressing a preference that I attribute to everyone else. Aesthetic judgment differs from pure and practical reason in that this claim to intersubjective validity is not justified with reference to an abstract universal concept of beauty but rests on a purportedly common sense of pleasure in the beautiful. This common sense is, according to Kant, what makes taste "strange and irregular" because "it is not an empirical concept, but a feeling of pleasure (consequently not a concept at all) which, by the judgment of taste, is attributed to everyone" (p. 27). He explains further that taste speaks "with a universal voice . . [but] does not postulate the agree- ment of everyone.... It only imputes this agreement to everyone, as a case of the rule in respect of which it expects, not confirmation by concepts, but assent from others" (pp. 50-51). That is, although a judgment of taste cannot be proved, its validity turns on the presumption that others would assent to it. The paradox that Kant sustains in defining taste as a judgment that takes its bearings not from transcendental concepts but from feeling is analogous to Arendt's attempt to define political judgment as critical understanding that does not withdraw to an abstract vantage point but takes its bearings from experience. Paul Guyer has noted that Kant's account is deeply ambiguous because Kant proposes to defend the possibility of taste both on the grounds of intersubjectivity, that a judgment about beauty is imputed to everyone else, and on the grounds of communicability, that it actually secures the assent of others in public exchange. Although Kant appears to suggest that intersub- jectivity is both necessary and sufficient to communicability, one could impute a judgment to others without communicating it to them or defending it to their satisfaction. Guyer claims that intersubjectivity takes precedence over communicability in Kant's argument, writing that although Kant "is at pains to show that pleasure in the beautiful may be imputed to others, he is not at equal pains to show how such pleasure may be conveyed from one who feels it to one who, in particular circumstances, does not.""" What is interesting about this ambiguity for the purposes of this essay is that Arendt makes a creative appropriation of taste by suggesting a significantly different ground of validity. Arendt politicizes Kant's concept of taste by arguing that its validity turns on "publicity."'0' Publicity means openness to contestation, which she de- scribes as "the testing that arises from contact with other people's think- ing."'02 This claim that critical thinking involves contestation suggests that neither intersubjectivity nor communicability adequately accounts for the possibility of reflective judgment. In contrast to intersubjectivity, publicity requires that a judgment come into "contact" with others' perspectives; it cannot simply be imputed to them. But "contact" and "testing" in no way imply that validity depends on actually securing general assent to one's own beliefs. On the contrary, given Arendt's claim that the public realm is constituted by a plurality of divergent perspectives, general assent would be not just an unlikely outcome of public debate but an undesirable one. Thus Arendt politicizes Kant's "taste" by eschewing its tendency toward consen- sus in favor of contestation. Even though "publicity" makes a significant departure from Kant's de- fense of taste, Arendt attributes it to him nonetheless, claiming that she learned it from his concept "common sense." Kant argues that aesthetic judgment presupposes common sense, which he defines as a capacity to practice "enlarged thought." This practice involves "comparing your judg- ment with the possible rather than the actual judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the place of any other man, by abstracting from the limitations which contingently attach to our own judgment."'03 Thus Kant argues that one raises one's idiosyncratic preference for an object to a critical judgment by abstracting from one's own contingent situation to arrive at the standpoint of any observer. Hannah Arendt appropriates "enlarged thought" from Kant's Third Cri- tique but with a creative departure from the original that she does not acknowledge. Arendt writes that the general validity of taste is "closely connected with particulars, with the particular conditions of the standpoints one has to go through in order to arrive at one's own 'general standpoint.' "104 Where enlarged thinking, as Kant describes it, involves abstracting from the limitations of a contingent situation to think in the place of any other man,"'05 Arendt speaks explicitly of a general standpoint that is achieved not by abstraction but by considered attention to particularity."> Thus enlarged thought, in her terms, is situated rather than abstract. She calls it training "one's imagination to go visiting,"" which involves evoking or telling yourself the multiple stories of a situation from the plurality of conflicting perspectives that constitute it.'08 Enlarged thought is Arendt's answer to the question of how one **moves from experience to critical understanding**, but it is not the Kantian "enlarged thought" that she has in mind. In her creative appropriation of Third Critique, Arendt redefines enlarged thought from abstract reasoning to what I call "situated impartiality." She credits Kant with breaking from the customary assumption that abstraction is requisite to impartiality, writing that Kantian impartiality "is not the result of some higher standpoint that would then actually settle [a] dispute by being altogether above the melee"; instead, it "is obtained by taking the viewpoints of others into account."'09 Curiously, Arendt conceals her innovation by failing to mark the distinction between situated impartial thinking and Kant's "enlarged mentality." Where enlarged thinking is a consequence of either securing assent to one's judgment or simply imputing it to others, situated impartial thinking involves taking divergent opinions into account in the process of making up one's mind and, ultimately, locating one's judgment in relation to those views. Although she conceals it, Arendt makes a **significant break** with the universalizing assumptions of Kant's thought. The departure from Kant's "taste" is even more pronounced, as Arendt argues that it is not the philosopher but the storyteller who possesses an extraordinary talent for enlarged thinking.110 Arendt describes storytelling as an art that needs "a certain detachment from the heady, intoxicating business of sheer living that, perhaps, only the born artist can manage in the midst of living.""' Although this description comes from her essay on Isak Dinesen, the conceptualization of storytelling on which it relies brings to mind Walter Benjamin's essay, 'The Storyteller." Not only does Benjamin credit story- tellers with the ability to think critically "in the midst of living," but he also implies that storytellers inspire enlarged thinking in others: "the storyteller takes what he tells from experience-his own or that reported by others. And he in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale.""2 As Benjamin describes it, the capacity for situated impartial thinking is not the storyteller's exclusive privilege, and the storyteller is not the kind of teacher who imparts a lesson to her listeners. Rather, the storyteller's gift is, in his words, the ability to craft an account that is "free from explanation," thereby teaching the practice of situated impartial vision."3 A skillful story- teller teaches her readers to see as she does, not what she does, affording them the "intoxicating" experience of seeing from multiple perspectives but leaving them with the responsibility to undertake the critical task of interpre- tation for themselves. This capacity of storytelling to invite situated impartial thinking can be understood only if the distinctions among storytelling, testimonial, and illustration are clearly demarcated. A testimonial is **self-expressive**: it asserts "this is the way I see the world." It is fully determined by the experience of the speaker and, as such, can inspire refutation or empathy but not critical engagement as Arendt defines it. In contrast, illustration is not at all expres- sive. Its purpose is to give anecdotal "proof" of a theory; consequently, it is determined not by experience but by the abstract framework it is meant to exemplify. The kind of story that Arendt and Benjamin have in mind invites the reader to "go visiting," asking "how would the world look to you if you saw it from this position?" The critical perspective that one achieves by visiting is neither disinterested, like Kant's taste, nor empathic. Arendt writes that "this process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is not a question of . .. empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like something else ... but of being and thinking in my own identity where I am not."" 4 Visiting means imagining what the world would look like to me from another position, imagining how I would look to myself from within a different world, and coming to understand that I might define my principles differently if I did not stand where I am accustomed to."5 Where visiting promotes understanding, empathy obstructs it. By empathizing with another, I erase all difference. But when I visit another place, I experience the disorientation that lets me understand just how different the world looks from different perspectives. The relationship between storytelling and situated impartiality is multiple and complex. Storytelling is a means by which one "visits" different perspec- tives. It is also a narrative form that lends itself to giving a multiperspectival account of a situation, that, in turn, invites others to "visit" those perspectives. Relative to abstract argument, testimonial, and illustration, the advantage of a story is that it can be both ambiguous and meaningful at once. An ambiguous argument, testimony, or example is less effective for its indeter- minacy, because the purpose of such modes of discourse is to distill the plural meanings of an incident into definitive conclusions. Ambiguity in a story encourages the permanent contestation and multiple reinterpretation of meanings that make situated impartiality possible. In Arendt's unfinished lectures on judgment, then, there is an implicit answer to the question of how thinking from experience can be critical. This answer turns on a creative appropriation of Kant's enlarged thinking by means of storytelling and situated impartiality. For Arendt, critical under- standing involves telling or hearing multiple stories of an event from the plurality of perspectives that it engages. One purpose of testing one's per- spective against the perspectives of others is to take a stand in full recognition of the complexity and ambiguity of the real situations in which judgments are made. One further purpose is to hold oneself responsible to argue with and speak not only to those with whom one agrees but to those with whom one disagrees. This means not simply acknowledging the inevitable partiality of any individual perspective but insisting that perspectival differences be raised, contested, and situated in reference to each other. The point is not consensus or accuracy but plurality and accountability.

Unbridled affirmation outside the game space makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish

Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of

Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have

taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the

Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant

professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

## 2NC

### priv

These privilege arguments should not precede political movement building

Andrea Smith, Ph.D., co-founder of Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, UC Riverside Associate Professor, 2013, Geographies of Privilege, Unsettling the Privilege of Self-Reflexivity, Kindle

In my experience working with a multitude of anti-racist organizing projects over the years, I frequently found myself participating in various workshops in which participants were asked to reflect on their gender/race/sexuality/class/etc. privilege. These workshops had a bit of a self-help orientation to them: “I am so and so, and I have x privilege.” It was never quite clear what the point of these confessions were. It was not as if other participants did not know the confessor in question had her/his proclaimed privilege. It did not appear that these individual confessions actually led to any political projects to dismantle the structures of domination that enabled their privilege. Rather, the confessions **became the** political **project** themselves. The benefits of these confessions seemed to be ephemeral. For the instant the confession took place, those who do not have that privilege in daily life would have a temporary position of power as the hearer of the confession who could grant absolution and forgiveness. The sayer of the confession could then be granted temporary forgiveness for her/his abuses of power and relief from white/male/heterosexual/etc guilt. Because of the perceived benefits of this ritual, there was generally little critique of the fact that in the end, it primarily served to reinstantiate the structures of domination it was supposed to resist. One of the reasons there was little critique of this practice is that it bestowed cultural capital to those who seemed to be the “most oppressed.” Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered. “I may be white, but my best friend was a person of color, which caused me to be oppressed when we played together.” Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. And despite the cultural capital that was, at least temporarily, bestowed to those who seemed to be the most oppressed, these rituals ultimately reinstantiated the white majority subject as the subject capable of self-reflexivity and the colonized/racialized subject as the occasion for self-reflexivity. These rituals around self-reflexivity in the academy and in activist circles are not without merit. They are informed by key insights into how the logics of domination that structure the world also constitute who we are as subjects. Political projects of transformation necessarily involve a fundamental reconstitution of ourselves as well. However, for this process to work, individual transformation must occur concurrently with social and political transformation. That is, the undoing of privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle the systems that enable these privileges. The activist genealogies that produced this response to racism and settler colonialism were not initially focused on racism as a problem of individual prejudice. Rather, the purpose was for individuals to recognize how they were shaped by structural forms of oppression. However, the response to structural racism became an individual one – individual confession at the expense of collective action. Thus the question becomes, how would one collectivize individual transformation? Many organizing projects attempt and have attempted to do precisely this, such Sisters in Action for Power, Sista II Sista, Incite! Women of Color Against Violence, and Communities Against Rape and Abuse, among many others. Rather than focus simply on one’s individual privilege, they address privilege on an organizational level. For instance, they might assess – is everyone who is invited to speak a college graduate? Are certain peoples always in the limelight? Based on this assessment, they develop structures to address how privilege is exercised collectively. For instance, anytime a person with a college degree is invited to speak, they bring with them a co-speaker who does not have that education level. They might develop mentoring and skills-sharing programs within the group. To quote one of my activist mentors, Judy Vaughn, “You don’t think your way into a different way of acting; you act your way into a different way of thinking.” Essentially, the current social structure conditions us to exercise what privileges we may have. If we want to undermine those privileges, we must change the structures within which we live so that we become different peoples in the process.

### affect stuff

‘Affect first’ arguments rely on flawed neuroscientific models that assume we are irrelevant to our own decisions and thoughts

Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences – The Open University (UK), ‘8

(Clive, “Political affects in public space: normative blind-spots in non-representational ontologies,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers Vol. 33, Issue 2, p. 186–200)

Connolly's account of micropolitics presents a tightly mediated view of the relationship between formal politics and a diffuse set of cultural practices. This tendency has been heightened in Connolly's most recent work on neuropolitics. Connolly's (2002b) neuropolitics of affect relies on a selective reading of the literature on neuroscience by writers such as Varela (1999) and Damasio (2000).1 Connolly derives an ontological principle from this scientific field, which is understood to reveal ‘how much of perception and judgment is **prior to consciousness’** (Connolly 2005b, 73). Connolly interprets this scientific field as providing a causal model of the emergent relationship between micropolitical interventions and macropolitical outcomes. In so doing, he supposes that certain philosophical problems can be cleared up if and when ‘science’ develops the proper understanding of the human brain (cf. Rée 2004; Descombes 2001). One gets little sense from Connolly's account that neuroscience is a contested field, nor much acknowledgement that the implications of this field for political theory and moral philosophy are **far from cut-and-dried** (e.g. Bennett et al. 2007; Churchland 2006; Habermas 2007; Rorty 2004; Searle 2006). Developing a political diagnosis of the present conjuncture on the basis of an ontologised interpretation of neuroscience is associated with the reduction of ‘the media’ to a mere medium, understood as a means to an end that can supposedly be grasped independently of the specificities of the medium as such. In Connolly's (2002b) recent account of neuropolitics, micropolitics is quite literally big-P Politics writ small. It is the means through which the agendas of ‘Political politics’ become inscribed in the recesses of the sub-cortical zones of the brain: Micropolitics in and around the dinner table, the church, the movie theater, the union hall, the TV sitcom and talk show, the film, the classroom, and the local meeting set the table for macro-policy initiatives in these domains by rendering large segments of the public receptive or unreceptive to them. (Connolly 2002a, 3) On Connolly's account, the paradigmatic mediums for this micropolitical priming of receptive subjects are the techniques of cinematic representation and the dark arts of political campaign advertising on television. Classical media-effects research is often criticised for assuming a hypodermic model of media power, ascribing to ‘the media’ the ability to inject their preferred messages into the minds of their audiences. Connolly goes one better than this: his account of media-affects is meant almost literally as a hypodermic model of influence, with media technologies ascribed remarkable determinative power in infusing affective dispositions under the skin of their audiences. Connolly's account of the politics of affect relies on a very specific ontology of Film. Film serves as his paradigm of cultural practice in general, for understanding how artistry and technique are configured in a world of omnipotent and ubiquitous screens to organise perception and consolidate habits. By translating neuroscience into an ontology of political affects via a specific style of Film analysis, Connolly constructs a conceptual-methodological mechanism of affective interpellation. Echoing another classical problem of media research, this allows the critic to substitute their own analysis of the imputed effects/affects of Film or campaign advertisements for any substantive analysis of the practices in which these sound-images are embedded. Connolly's reading of Film adopts a Deleuzian methodology, focusing primarily on ‘technique’ rather than ‘symbolic interpretation’ to explain the relationship between politics and film (Connolly 2002a). Interpretative approaches to visual media always generate the conceptual and methodological problem of how and whether image–sound assemblages actually affect audiences in the ways intended. Connolly's combination of Deleuzian Film theory and neuroscience generates no such problem, precisely because the extra-disciplinary appeal to science seems to provide a cast-iron account of how ‘the media’ engineer outcomes by circumventing interpretative layers of action completely. The same move is evident in Thrift's media ontology, which presents affect as working through a generalised power of automatism: ‘the body is the medium for the transmission of force but without any conscious volition’ (2007, 241). This understanding of affect working to make various dispositions automatic allows Thrift to imply that empirical evidence showing that the subjects of mediascapes are not completely credulous actually confirms that, in fact, at a deeper level they are. After all, the effectiveness of affective technologies lies in instilling the feeling that subjects are agents of free will and volition by implanting this feeling in ‘a substrate of the will which is not conscious’ (2007, 246). In Connolly's theory of affective media spaces, a claim about the ontological layering of affect beneath consciousness is combined with a claim about priority to present media practices as highly influential mediums for the micropolitical priming of political agency. Connolly uses the example of the persistent charge levelled against John Kerry in the 2004 US Presidential election, that he was prone to ‘flip-flops’ on key issues, to claim that media affects are the key technologies mediating between the micro and macro levels of contemporary politics. The flip-flop charge was, Connolly suggests, ‘planted’ in the minds of the electorate early on in the 2004 campaign, during the Primary season, before Kerry was installed as the Democratic candidate and before people were explicitly ‘tuned in’ to the Presidential campaign: They were distracted, thus primed to receive subliminal messages. It was renewed later, after being installed in the lower psyches of many voters as a fact as if they had discerned it themselves. (Connolly 2005b, 9) Connolly initially invokes a straightforwardly chronological sense of temporal order: a theme ‘planted’ at some earlier date is ‘renewed’ at a subsequent one. This chronological ordering is then collapsed into a stronger claim about the priority of layered embodied-affective dispositions over explicit representational reasoning in generating calculable electoral outcomes. His claim is that the pinning of the ‘flip-flop’ charge to Kerry helps us ‘to discern how media presentations do much of their work below the level of explicit attention’ (Connolly 2005c, 880). Here, in contrast to the chronological ordering identified above, the order of priority being claimed refers to a distinction between explicit and implicit attention. Connolly is careful to say that media do not simply manipulate people's feelings. But the force of this disavowal is somewhat undermined by his clarification that the media do predispose people to accept certain messages (2005c, 880). It remains unclear whether the point of the analysis of neurologically mediated micropolitics is to claim that affective technologies are good at mobilising people to act in ways they are already predisposed toward, or at actually shaping those predispositions in the first place and then mobilising them at election time. Connolly's discussion of the low-down-and-dirty campaigning against Kerry is meant to illustrate the affective effectiveness of election campaign advertising. The implication is that the flip-flop charge put people off voting for Kerry, but this claim is not empirically substantiated in his analysis. There are good reasons to doubt whether the analysis of Film can bear the diagnostic weight ascribed to it in Connolly's political ontology of media affects. The idea that the analysis of Film discloses invariant features of technique shared by other visual media overlooks the quite distinctive ontological features that differentiate film from, for example, television (see Cavell 1982). Connolly shows little concern for the practices in which the image–sound assemblages of film or television spots are enacted. The determinative power ascribed to Film technique in shaping visceral dispositions depends on making a great deal out of the observation that Film plays to ‘captive audiences in darkened rooms’ (Connolly 2002a, 25). Connolly's account of affected individuals being predisposed to favour particular political slates over others presents these individuals as essentially isolated monads, watching TV or films in silence, glued to the screen. Conflating different mediums, Connolly claims that the TV and film viewer is immobilized before a moving image and sound track, while the everyday perceiver is either mobile or one step removed from mobility. The position of immobility amplifies the affective intensities received. (2005c, 880) This emphasis on the immobility of the viewer underplays the degree to which, in contrast to the clear emplacement of film viewers in front of projected film images, the phenomenology of electronic media like television redistributes the subject of television into the distanciated spaces of mediation itself (Weber 1996). The distinctive ontology of television means that, in this medium, it is ‘the powerful’ who are obliged to attune themselves to the affective modalities of presentation inherent in the phenomenology of these spaces, or risk suffering the consequences (Berlant 2005b; Scannell 1995). Like Thrift's spatial politics of affect, Connolly's critical account of the neuropolitics of affect presents ‘the media’ as an instrumental medium for doing groundwork on the political dispositions of massified subjects. These dispositions are subsequently re-energised for macropolitical mobilisation. This argument is attached to a neuro-ontology centred on a rhetorical construction of the pre-cognitive visceral priming of subjects’ feelings and emotions. The combination of appeals to scientific authority and ontological claims of layering and priority reduces the question of ‘the political’ to a consideration of the ways in which various technologies enable monadic preceptors to be assembled into blocks of more or less **willing**, more or less **recalcitrant** voters or **consumers.**

### at: code switching

There are no fixed codes, to speak is to code switch, and insistence on a single preferable code is essentialist

Mellom 6 - Assistant Research Scientist for CLASE; Center for Latino Achievement and Success in Education CODE-SWITCHING AT A BILINGUAL SCHOOL IN COSTA RICA: IDENTITY, INTERTEXTUALITY AND NEW ORTRAITS OF COMPETENCE, PAULA JEAN MELLOM

<http://athenaeum.libs.uga.edu/bitstream/handle/10724/9023/mellom_paula_j_200605_phd.pdf?sequence=1>

On the other hand, some sociolinguists have tended to view code-switching as an emergent phenomenon which is a product of social interaction (Gumperz, 1982) and a means to construct identity or (re)affirm group membership (Heller, 1988). However, there is little agreement about when code-switching can happen and who can do it. Some argue that code-switching, can only occur in “stable bilingual communities”, like those in countries like Belgium and Switzerland. However, some researchers (Zentella, 1997) have troubled the essentialist model of traditional diglossia which posits that the two languages used in a community are relegated to certain social situations which are clearly defined and mutually exclusive. In fact, recent studies have begun to focus on other language contact situations, where code-switching can also occur (Gallindo 1996, Rampton 1995). These “linguistic borderlands” like cities with large immigrant populations, borders between countries or territories and schools with large and diverse ethnic populations are rife with individuals, with varying degrees of bilingualism who alternate from one language to another as a matter of course. But these borderlands, with their shifting linguistic landscape, muddy the monolingual-based analysis waters and pose serious theoretical problems to structuralist frameworks designed to analyze code-switching because these depend on the integrity of discreet language systems. Gardner-Chloros (1995), in her work on Alsatian code-switching advocates a (re)viewing of the theoretical assumptions behind the terminology used in code-switching research. She forcefully argues that the commonly accepted concept of “code-switching” implies two inherently separate “standard” languages and asserts that we must remember that all “standard languages” are hybrids.

Debate is code switching

Marjorie Hass, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Muhlenberg College, 2000, The Style of the Speaking Subject: Irigaray's Empirical Studies of Language Production, Hypatia 15.1 64-89

Within her paradigm, the meaning of a question includes a desire to maintain relationship with an Other. Questions are a specific linguistic gesture; they present a dialogic style of engagement that is integral to their meaning and cannot be reproduced via other linguistic structures. Questions also reflect an element of limitation. In a question, the other is reached towards not only for engagement but also as a supplement to the limited perspective of the speaker. [End Page 75] Questions remove the appearance of universality from the speaker by reflecting her limits. In dialogue the interrogative acts, as does negation, to accent the renitent borders of sexual difference. Questions are irreducibly distinct from both monological statements and hierarchical imperatives in that they disrupt the self-reflexivity of these other speech acts by introducing another, necessary, pole.

I argued above that new syntactic patterns can result from the transformation of an unconscious pattern into a strategic style. Irigaray's use of interrogatives in her own writing is illustrative. Questions play a key role in Irigaray's readings, appearing at almost every key moment in her theoretical writings. With them, her tone is dialogic; she poses questions, inviting response from the texts with which she engages. And as a reader, one is also invited to participate. In "Place, Interval," for example, she responds to a passage from Aristotle's Physics IV:

If I may return to the parallel I have been drawing between the issue of place and the issue of sexual difference, I shall affirm that the masculine is attracted to the maternal-feminine as place. But what place does the masculine offer to attract the feminine? His soul? His relation to the divine? Can the feminine be inscribed or situated there? . . . Is he able to receive woman in the reverse of herself? In her mourning for herself? Can he beckon to her and welcome her into himself once he has separated himself from her? (Irigaray 1993a, 39-40)

The effect of this series of questions is to re-frame our experience of Aristotle's text without foreclosing our own active engagement with it. Her questions are directed towards Aristotle, towards the reader, and towards herself. Here the interrogative expressions betoken openness to the other, a desire for relation and at the same time a limit to the speaker's powers. And always there is the echo of women's subconscious interrogative expressions and the transformative rhythm of the question.

### 2nc at: roleplaying bad

Arguing that a current government policy is bad is not roleplaying

Scott Harris, Director of Debate, Kansas University, 2013, This Ballot, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.0

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor. This idea that debate is about role playing being a part of the government puzzles me greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now never once have I role played being part of the government. When I debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott Harris has formed many opinions about what the government and other institutions should or should not do without ever role playing being part of those institutions. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated. I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about the things their government does. I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. I have no idea at all why it would be oppressive for someone to form an opinion about whether or not they think the government should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made during the NCAA tournament. If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

## 1NR

### n-word

Debate is a spoken activity so to have evidence that says something is for us to say something, but white people categorically can’t and shouldn’t say it, so their standard is bunk –

Mary Elizabeth Williams, Salon, 2013, “No, white people, you can’t say the N-word,” October 30, <http://www.salon.com/2013/10/30/no_white_people_you_cant_say_the_n_word/>

So let’s settle this – considering the ubiquity of the word, the way it is so frequently used in popular music and on schoolyards, **are there ever any occasions when it’s acceptable for a white person to use it?** During a CNN discussion on the subject last summer, spurred by revelations of Paula Deen’s cheerfully nostalgic use of it, the consensus was a resounding no. But I would argue there are some exceptions. Just ask yourself a few questions first. Are you a journalist directly quoting another source, perhaps within a story about racism itself? Are you an actor, playing a vicious slave owner in a historical drama? Are you Louis C.K.? If the answer to any of these questions is “Ummm, no, I don’t think so,” stop yourself right there.

**It doesn’t matter if Kanye gets to say it. It doesn’t matter if you claim you grew up in an era and an environment in which the word was commonly used.** **It doesn’t matter if you say you have a problem with conservative white males,** or you just really love hip-hop, or – and this one’s the richest of all – that you’re talking about a particular kind of person who behaves in a certain way but surely not all persons of a certain color. Yeah, still no. Just a big, big, big no. **What about if you put a letter A on it, instead of an “er”? Still no.** There will always come a point in the Biggie lyrics where you are not permitted to rap along. And you can’t do blackface either, by the way.

It doesn’t matter that you grew up in the projects or you voted for Obama or you’re just doing a routine from “Blazing Saddles.” It’s a **derogatory term** that has been traditionally and is still frequently used by members of one race to **insult and demean** members of another race. The fact that it is now sometimes appropriated in different contexts **does not change that**, and it most especially doesn’t change it with regard to you as a white person applying it to black people. Are you bothered that this means African-Americans have cultural permission to do something that you can’t? You feel that’s unfair? Yes, let’s whine about unfairness; this will be fun. You talk about how you can’t say the N-word, and then I’ll point you to all of American history up to and including this very moment. You can’t use a single word? SO TOTALLY UNFAIR. Get over it. **But if you need any further evidence that it’s not OK to say it, just look at the people who do: morons on Reddit and suspended schoolteachers**.

### 1nr ov

The situation in Libya is unique and insulated from other instances of state violence

Cole 11

(Juan Cole An Open Letter to the Left on Libya Informed Comment Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History at the University of Michigan Mar 27 11 http://www.juancole.com/2011/03/an-open-letter-to-the-left-on-libya.html)

Many are crying hypocrisy, citing other places an intervention could be staged or worrying that Libya sets a precedent. I don’t find those arguments persuasive. Military intervention is always selective, depending on a constellation of political will, military ability, international legitimacy and practical constraints. The humanitarian situation in Libya was fairly unique. You had a set of tank brigades willing to attack dissidents, and responsible for thousands of casualties and with the prospect of more thousands to come, where aerial intervention by the world community could make a quick and effective difference. This situation did not obtain in the Sudan’s Darfur, where the terrain and the conflict were such that aerial intervention alone would have have been useless and only boots on the ground could have had a hope of being effective. But a whole US occupation of Iraq could not prevent Sunni-Shiite urban faction-fighting that killed tens of thousands, so even boots on the ground in Darfur’s vast expanse might have failed. The other Arab Spring demonstrations are not comparable to Libya, because in none of them has the scale loss of life been replicated, nor has the role of armored brigades been as central, nor have the dissidents asked for intervention, nor has the Arab League. For the UN, out of the blue, to order the bombing of Deraa in Syria at the moment would accomplish nothing and would probably outrage all concerned. Bombing the tank brigades heading for Benghazi made all the difference. That is, in Libya intervention was demanded by the people being massacred as well as by the regional powers, was authorized by the UNSC, and could practically attain its humanitarian aim of forestalling a massacre through aerial bombardment of murderous armored brigades. And, the intervention could be a limited one and still accomplish its goal. I also don’t understand the worry about the setting of precedents. The UN Security Council is not a court, and does not function by precedent. It is a political body, and works by political will. Its members are not constrained to do elsewhere what they are doing in Libya unless they so please, and the veto of the five permanent members ensures that a resolution like 1973 will be rare. But if a precedent is indeed being set that if you rule a country and send tank brigades to murder large numbers of civilian dissidents, you will see your armor bombed to smithereens, I can’t see what is wrong with that.

Gaddafi racially exploited Africans and deployed them as mercenaries

Russeau, 11

(Simba, 4/11, “LIBYA: UPRISING REVIVES ENTRENCHED RACISM TOWARDS BLACK AFRICANS,” http://www.racialicious.com/2011/04/28/libya-uprising-revives-entrenched-racism-towards-black-africans/)

Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi’s use of African mercenaries to quell the uprising against his autocratic regime has **revived a deep-rooted racism between Arabs and black Africans**. Though most will deny its existence, in Libya discrimination is common not only against migrant black Africans, but also against darker-skinned Libyans, especially from the south of the country. “Against this background, one needs to be a little wary of the accusations of ‘African mercenaries’ or even ‘black African mercenaries’ that have been bandied around. Certainly, Gaddafi **has used, in the past, mercenaries from other parts of Africa,** and our information is that some of these are likely involved in the current situation on Gaddafi’s side,” Na’eem Jeenah, executive director of the Afro-Middle East Centre in Johannesburg, South Africa told IPS. “Mercenaries, of course, are extremely useful because the regular army forces include conscripts — who can easily leave their posts and join the uprising. Mercenaries work for money and have no compunction about whom they kill.” About one and a half million sub-Saharan African migrants and refugees, out of a population of nearly two to two and a half million migrants, work as cheap labour in Libya’s oil industry, agriculture, construction and other service sectors. However, this is not the first time Libya’s most vulnerable immigrant population has fallen victim to racist attacks. In 2000, dozens of migrant workers from Ghana, Cameroon, Sudan, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Nigeria were targeted during street killings in the wake of government officials blaming them for rising crime, disease and drug trafficking. In response, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed concern over Libya’s practices of racial discrimination against dark-skinned migrants and refugees. In 2004 it accused the country of violating Article 6 of the 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), and for failing to implement proper mechanisms safeguarding individuals from any racial acts that circumvent human rights.

Second, their invocation of ‘wars for oil’ – the discursive construct of oil wars is used to justify militaristic interventions overseas, but the oil companies don’t want those wars – they prefer predictable price dynamics, BUT the 1AC’s trope has a masking effect

In the context of Libya, that means we look for oil to explain what was a war of imperialism and violence against the poor, related to the same violence that occurs here in the US – flips their ability to solve the aff

Ismael Hossein-Zadeh, author of the recently published The Political Economy of U.S. Militarism, Teaches at Drake University, 2011, Why Regime Change in Libya?, www.counterpunch.org/2011/06/17/why-regime-change-in-libya/

It is very tempting to seek the answer to the question “why regime change in Libya?” in oil/energy. While oil is undoubtedly a concern, it falls short of a satisfactory explanation because major Western oil companies were already extensively involved in the Libyan oil industry. Indeed, since Gaddafi relented to the US-UK pressure in 1993 and established “normal” economic and diplomatic relations with these and other Western countries, major US and European oil companies struck quite lucrative deals with the National Oil Corporation of Libya.

So, the answer to the question “why the imperialist powers want to do away with Gaddafi” has to go beyond oil, or the laughable “humanitarian concerns.” Perhaps the question can be answered best in the light of the following questions: why do these imperialist powers also want to overthrow Hugo Cavez of Venezuela, Fidel Castro (and/or his successors) of Cuba, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, Rafael Correa Delgado of Ecuador, Kim Jong-il of North Korea, Bashar Al-assad of Syria and Evo Morales of Bolivia? Or, why did they overthrow Mohammad Mossadeq of Iran, Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala, Kusno Sukarno of Indonesia, Salvador Allende of Chile, Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti and Manuel Zelaya in Honduras?

**That guarantees that their method for opposing imperialism is wrong from the get-go – deconstructing the hypothesis that the US is just out for more energy resources is necessary to craft good strategies against harmful economic exploitation and violent intervention**

**Hossein-zadeh**, professor of economics and finance – Drake University, **‘9**

(Ismael, “The Political Economy of US Wars of Choice,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 8.2-3)

A most widely-cited factor behind the recent US wars of choice is said to be oil. “No Blood for Oil” has been a rallying cry for most of the opponents of the war. While some of these opponents argue that the war is driven by the US desire for cheap oil, others claim that it is prompted by Big Oil’s wish for high oil prices and profits. Interestingly, most antiwar forces use both claims interchangeably without paying attention to the fact that they are diametrically- opposed assertions.

Not only do the two arguments contradict each other, but each argument is also wanting and unconvincing on its own grounds; not because the US does not wish for cheap oil, or because Big Oil does not desire higher oil prices, but because war is no longer the way to control or gain access to energy resources. Colonial-type occupation or direct control of energy resources is no longer efficient or economical and has, therefore, **been abandoned for more than four decades**.

The view that recent US military adventures in the Middle East and the broader Central Asia are driven by energy considerations is further reinforced by the dubious theory of Peak Oil , which maintains that world production of conventional oil will soon reach—if it has not already reached—a maximum, or peak, and decline thereafter. It follows that, therefore, war power and military strength are key to access or control of the stagnant, shrinking, or soonto- be-shrinking oil.

In this study I will first argue that while, prima facie, Peak Oil sounds like a reasonable thesis, it is dubious on both theoretical and empirical grounds. I will then show that war and military force are no longer the necessary or appropriate means to gain access to sources of energy, and that resorting to military measures can, indeed, lead to costly, not cheap, oil. Next, I will demonstrate that, **despite** the lucrative spoils of war resulting from high oil prices and profits, **Big Oil prefers** **peace** and stability, not war and geopolitical turbulence, in global energy markets. Finally, I will argue a case that behind the drive to war and military adventures in the Middle East lie some powerful special interests (vested in war, militarism, and geopolitical concerns of Israel ) that use oil as an issue of “national interest”—as a façade or pretext—in order to justify military adventures to derive high dividends, both economic and geopolitical, from war.

**This is offense – the myth of energy wars has been perpetrated to further a materialist lens of conflict-drivers that makes imperialism harder to oppose – it also implicates their affect arguments because the reason the ‘oil wars’ hypothesis is so pervasive is because of its intuitive ‘feels right’ appeal to our common-sense**

**Hossein-zadeh**, professor of economics and finance – Drake University, **‘9**

(Ismael, “The Political Economy of US Wars of Choice,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 8.2-3)

Now let us consider the widely-shared view that attributes the US drive to war and military adventures in the oil-rich regions of the Middle East and central Asia to the influence of big oil companies in pursuit of higher oil prices and profits. As noted, this is obviously the opposite of the “war for cheap oil” argument, as it claims that Big Oil tends to instigate war and political tension in the Middle East in order to cause an oil price hike and increase its profits. Like the “war for cheap oil” theory, this claim is not supported by facts. Although the claim has an element of a prima facie reasonableness, that apparently facile credibility rests more on precedent and perception than reality. Part of the perception is due to the exaggerated notion that both President Bush and Vice President Cheney were “oil men” before coming to the White House. But the fact is that George W. Bush was never more than an unsuccessful petty oil prospector and Dick Cheney headed a company—the notorious Halliburton —that sold, and still sells, services to oil companies and the Pentagon.

The larger part of the perception, however, stems from the fact that oil companies do benefit from oil-price hikes that result from war and political turbulence in the Middle East . Such benefits are, however, largely incidental. Surely, American oil companies would welcome the spoils of the war (that result from oil price hikes) in Iraq or anywhere else in the world. From the largely incidental oil price hikes that follow war and political convulsion, some observers automatically conclude that, therefore, Big Oil must have been behind the war.20 But there is no evidence that, at least in the case of the current invasion of Iraq, oil companies pushed for or supported the war.

On the contrary, there is strong evidence that, in fact, oil companies did not welcome the war because they prefer stability and predictability to periodic oil spikes that follow war and political convulsion: “Looking back over the last 20 years, there is **plenty of evidence** showing the industry’s push for stability and cooperation with Middle Eastern countries and leaders, and the US government’s drive for hegemony works against the oil industry”.21 As Thierry Desmarest, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of France’s giant oil company, Total FinaElf, put it, “A few months of cash generation is not a big deal. Stable, not volatile, prices and a $25 price (per barrel) would be convenient for everyone”.22

It is true that for a long time, from the beginning of Middle Eastern oil exploration and discovery in the early twentieth century until the mid-1970s, colonial and/or imperial powers controlled oil either directly or through control of oil producing countries—at times, even by military force. But that pattern of colonial or imperialist exploitation of global markets and resources has **changed** now. Most of the current theories of imperialism and hegemony that continue invoking that old pattern of Big Oil behavior tend to suffer from an ahistorical perspective. Today, as discussed earlier, even physically occupying and controlling another country’s oil fields will not necessarily be beneficial to oil interests. Not only will military adventures place the operations of current energy projects at jeopardy, but they will also make the future plans precarious and unpredictable. Big Oil interests, of course, know this; and that’s why they did not countenance the war on Iraq: “The big oil companies were not enthusiastic about the Iraqi war,” says Fareed Mohamedi of PFC Energy, an energy consultancy firm based in Washington D.C. that advises petroleum fi rms. “Corporations like Exxon-Mobil and Chevron -Texaco want stability, and this is not what Bush is providing in Iraq and the Gulf region,” adds Mohamedi.23

Big Oil interests also know that not only is war no longer the way to gain access to oil, it is in fact an obstacle to gaining that access. Exclusion of US oil companies from vast oil resources in countries such as Russia , Iran , Venezuela , and a number of central-Asian countries due to militaristic US foreign policy is a clear testament to this fact. Many of these countries (including, yes, Iran) would be glad to have major US oil companies invest, explore and extract oil from their rich reserves. Needless to say that US oil companies would be delighted to have access to those oil resources. But US champions of war and militarism have successfully torpedoed such opportunities through their unilateral wars of aggression and their penchant for a Cold War -like international atmosphere.

### at: overdetermination

We aren't the overdetermined interpretation of hip hop that your evidence speaks to - the political implications are external to the cultural interpretations

Andrews 13 (Kehinde, lecturer in Childhood and Early Childhood Studies at Newman University College, Birmingham) “From the 'Bad Nigger' to the 'Good Nigga': an unintended legacy of the Black Power movement” <http://rac.sagepub.com/content/55/3/22>

Now, this is not to blame rappers for the ills in the community. They did not create the problem but are fortunate enough to profit from it. However, images and messages that are reproduced within Gangsta Rap provide legitimacy to a vision of Niggativity that can only bring heartache to the community. It appears as though some rappers have chosen to ‘pimp’ Uncle Tom’s Cabin and take up residence.

Gangsta rappers do not fit classical conceptions of the Uncle Tom figure as the middle-class sell-out who talks, thinks and acts White. With their university degrees and attendant middle-class airs it is easy to paint the Black bourgeoisie as Uncle Toms; however, we must be clear that this is not a cultural position but a political one. This is important to note because the cultural view of ‘tomming’ shields Gangsta Rappers from such a charge because of their presumed authenticity by virtue of their Lumpen image. It is not rapper 50 Cent’s Blackness that is questioned by commentators, but his good sense and morals. However, taking a political definition of ‘tomming’ from the Black Power movement necessitates including 50 Cent with the Clarence Thomas’s of the world.65 It is only by breaking the automatic link of authenticity with the Black poor (or formerly poor in the case of many rap artists), that a radical accounting of society can take place.

There’s no room for error in revolutionary movements – the Freedom Riders prove

Johnson 11

CRYSTAL L. JOHNSON 2011 "THE CORE WAY: THE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1942-1968" graduate degree program in History and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Unbeknownst to the Riders, the Alabama Knights of the Ku Klux Klan were constructing a plan to deal with the Freedom Riders when they hit the Alabama border. Provided with information from the Birmingham Police Department, Sergeant Tom Cook, Commissioner of Public Safety Eugene “Bull” Connor, and a group of ultra- segregationist Klansmen devised a plan to disrupt the Freedom Ride initiative and maintain white supremacy in Alabama. The plan called for, as Arsenault explained, “a rude welcome for the invading „niggers‟ and „nigger lovers‟ who were about to violate the timeworn customs and laws of the sovereign state of Alabama.”263 Cook and Gary Thomas Rowe, an Eastview Klavern #13 member and FBI informant, developed the violent attack against the Freedom Riders in several meetings. Rowe collected and turned over information to the Birmingham FBI office that indicated Cook, along with, members of the Birmingham Police Department and officials of the Alabama Highway Patrol would cooperate in the attack. “You will work with me and I will work with you on the Freedom Riders,” Cook guaranteed “We‟re going to allow you fifteen minutes.... You can beat ‟em, bomb ‟em, maim ‟em, kill ‟em. I don‟t give a shit. There will be absolutely no arrests. You can assure every Klansman in the country that no one will be arrested in Alabama for that fifteen minutes.”264 Rowe reported to his Birmingham FBI contacts all the information collected at these planning meetings. J. Edgar Hoover, FBI director, had many opportunities to forewarn Farmer and the Riders, but instead “instructed the Birmingham field office to use care in furnishing information to the Birmingham police department, and discretion in its contacts with Bull Connor and Tom Cook in light of Cook‟s contacts with Rowe.”265 The FBI took an idle stance, even with the damaging evidence, against the perpetrators of this violent plot. Hoover had a clear idea that these Klansmen, with the help of the local authority, planned “to beat the Freedom Riders into submission.”266 He knew that the Warrior Klavern planned to place three Klansmen on one of the busses in Atlanta. He was privy to the press release drafted by Bobby Shelton, the Imperial Wizard of the Alabama Knights, who stated that, “it was up to the constituted authorities of Alabama to stop any demonstrations by CORE, but if state authorities did not do their duty, the Alabama Knights, KKK Inc. would do all they could to force the CORE representatives to leave Alabama.”267 Nine days before the vigilante attack against the Freedom Riders took place; Hoover knew the details of the plan and conveyed some of Rowe‟s assessment to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Deputy Attorney General Byron White, and other Justice Department officials. Even with this partial information, Kennedy, White, and the other officials in the Justice Department did not inform the Freedom Riders. The lack of “special instructions” by the Justice Department was the official reason given for the negligence of the Federal government in Alabama.268

Unaware of the plan, when the Riders returned to the dorms that evening they went over the next phase of the Freedom Ride. This final briefing set in place, as Farmer recalled, “The division of responsibilities for the most ominous leg of the journey, the ride through Alabama.”269 Being the National Director of CORE, Farmer stressed he would be lead tester on the Trailways bus, and James Peck would be the tester on the Greyhound bus. It was imperative that, as Farmer explained, “Discipline and compliance be strict and tight.”270 There was no room for error as the Riders entered Alabama. Alabama was the prime opportunity, even with the frightening challenges awaiting them, for the Riders to highlight to the world nonviolent direct action.

### at: we consume their knowledge

Argument engagement is not commodification—saying that they have come to an incorrect conclusion is not consuming their knowledge

Rosi Braidotti 6, contemporary philosopher and feminist theoretician, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, 76

I beg to differ from Spivak's assessment. The charge of vampiristic or consumerist consumption of others is an ill-informed way of approaching the issue, in that it ignores the rigorous anti-humanistic, cartographic and materialistic roots of poststructuralism. It specifically rests on a misreading of what is involved in the poststructuralist critique of representation and on what is at stake in the task of redefining alternative subject positions. Spivak attempts to rescue Derrida, whom she credits with far more self-reflexivity and political integrity than she is prepared to grant to Foucault and Deleuze. The grounds for this preferential treatment are highly debatable. Nomadic thinking challenges the semiotic approach that is crucial to the 'linguistic turn' and also to deconstruction. Both Deleuze and Foucault engage in a critical dialogue with it and work towards an alternative model of political and ethical practice. It seems paradoxical that thinkers who are committed to an analytics of contemporary subject-positions get accused of actually having caused the events which they account for; as if they were single-handedly responsible for, or even profiting from, the accounts they offer as cartographies. Naming the networks of power-relations in late postmodernity, however, is not as simple as metaphorizing and therefore consuming them. In my view there is no vampiristic approach towards 'otherness' on the part of the poststructuralists. Moreover, I find that approach compatible with the emerging subjectivities of the former 'others' of Western reason. Late postmodernity has seen the proliferation of many and potentially contradictory discourses and practices of difference, which have dislocated the classical axis of distinction between Self or Same/Other or Different. The point of coalition between different critical voices and the poststructuralists is the process of elaborating the spaces in-between self and other, which means the practice of the Relation. They stress the need to elaborate forms of social and political implementation of non-pejorative and nondualistic notions of 'others'.