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Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

They claim to win the debate for reasons other than the desirability of topical action. That undermines preparation and clash. Changing the question now leaves one side unprepared, resulting in shallow, uneducational debate. Requiring debate on a communal topic forces argument development and develops persuasive skills and critical thinking, which boost any political outcome.

Simualted national security law debates inculcate agency and decision-making skills—that enables activism and avoids cooption

Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11/13, National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course **was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying** doctrinal **material and** creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, **while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage**. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. **This is the most important determination, because the substance of the** doctrinal portion of the course and the **simulation follows from this decision**. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. **This**, then, **becomes a guide for the** doctrinal part of the **course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation** are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. **The one-size fits all approach** currently **dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised** in the current conversation. **Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at** the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion **simulations**, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may **provide an important way forward**. Such **simulations** also **cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education**, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed **the simulation model** above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it **does provide a** starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. **It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which** they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the critical thinking and clash

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

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*Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote weII-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

They undermine debate’s most portable and flexible skills

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

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*Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

In the spring of 2011, facing a legacy of problematic U.S, military involvement in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and criticism for what some saw as slow sup­port of the United States for the people of Egypt and Tunisia as citizens of those nations ousted their formerly American-backed dictators, the administration of President Barack Obama considered its options in providing support for rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. Public debate was robust as the administration sought to determine its most appropriate action. The president ultimately decided to engage in an international coalition, enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 through a number of measures including establishment of a no-fly zone through air and missile strikes to support rebels in Libya, but stopping short of direct U.S. intervention with ground forces or any occupation of Libya. While the action seemed to achieve its immediate objectives, most notably the defeat of Qaddafi and his regime, the American president received both criticism and praise for his mea­sured yet assertive decision. In fact, the past decade has challenged American leaders to make many difficult decisions in response to potentially catastrophic problems. Public debate has raged in chaotic environment of political division and apparent animosity, The process of public decision making may have never been so consequential or difficult. Beginning in the fall of 2008, Presidents Bush and Obama faced a growing eco­nomic crisis and responded in part with '’bailouts'' of certain Wall Street financial entities, additional bailouts of Detroit automakers, and a major economic stimu­lus package. All these actions generated substantial public discourse regarding the necessity, wisdom, and consequences of acting (or not acting). In the summer of 2011, the president and the Congress participated in heated debates (and attempted negotiations) to raise the nation's debt ceiling such that the U.S. Federal Govern­ment could pay its debts and continue government operations. This discussion was linked to a debate about the size of the exponentially growing national debt, gov­ernment spending, and taxation. Further, in the spring of 2012, U.S. leaders sought to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon capability while gas prices in the United States rose, The United States considered its ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan in the face of nationwide protests and violence in that country1 sparked by the alleged burning of Korans by American soldiers, and Americans observed the actions of President Bashir Al-Assad and Syrian forces as they killed Syrian citizens in response to a rebel uprising in that nation and considered the role of the United States in that action. Meanwhile, public discourse, in part generated and intensified by the cam­paigns of the GOP candidates for president and consequent media coverage, addressed issues dividing Americans, including health care, women's rights to reproductive health services, the freedom of churches and church-run organiza­tions to remain true to their beliefs in providing (or electing not to provide) health care services which they oppose, the growing gap between the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans and the rest of the American population, and continued high levels of unemployment. More division among the American public would be hard to imagine. Yet through all the tension, conflict was almost entirely ver­bal in nature, aimed at discovering or advocating solutions to growing problems. Individuals also faced daunting decisions. A young couple, underwater with their mortgage and struggling to make their monthly payments, considered walking away from their loan; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job and a teenager decided between an iPhone and an iPad. Each of these situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consider­ation: others scorn to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and co­workers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make deci­sions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all engage in discourse surrounding our necessary decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an eco­nomical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candi­date to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Should we watch The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue—all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, Time magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of his­tory, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis," and social networking sites, knowledge and truth are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. Through a quick keyword search, we have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? Much of what suffices as information is not reliable, or even ethically motivated. The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical deci­sions' relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength, And, critical thinking offers tools enabling the user to better understand the' nature and relative quality of the message under consider­ation. Critical thinkers are better users of information as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California's requirement states; Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambigu­ous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive arid deductive processes, including an under­standing of die formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly com­petitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing, and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical con­sequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring our solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism,"1 Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets. Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary research confirms the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves die thinking of those involved,2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a com­prehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, "'The debate-critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof ■favoring a positive debate-critical thinking relationship.11'1 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates, formal or informal, These take place in intrapersonal commu­nications, with which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, and in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to argu­ments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of’ others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few Of the thousands of deci­sions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of respon­sibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate. Some people make decision by flipping a coin. Others act on a whim or respond unconsciously to “hidden persuaders.” If the problem is trivial—such as whether to go to a concert or a film—the particular method used is unimportant. For more crucial matters, however, mature adults require a reasoned methods of decision making. Decisions should be justified by good reasons based on accurate evidence and valid reasoning.

Linking the ballot to a *should* question in combination with USFG simulation is key

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

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professor.

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

Engaging the law through in-depth debate is critical to solve their impacts

Harris, professor of law – UC Berkeley, ‘94

(Angela P., 82 Calif. L. Rev. 741)

CRT has taken up this method of internal critique. Like the crits, race-crits have tried to go beyond espousing Doctrine X over Doctrine Y, claiming instead to show that both doctrines are biased against people of color from the outset. n33 For example, as Brooks and Newborn note, the CRT critique of equal protection law challenges not only the "intent" test of Washington v. Davis, n34 but the understanding of racism on which that test is based. n35 And, as Farber notes, the CRT critique of affirmative action challenges the very notion of "merit." n36 This commitment to conceptual as well as doctrinal critique is CRT's radicalism - its attempt to dig down to the very roots of legal doctrine, in contrast with the more reformist bent of traditional civil rights scholarship. Following the first wave's announcement that law is not separate from politics, the second wave of CLS moved to the study of law as "rhetoric" - [\*748] the ways in which legal reasoning accomplishes its ideological effects. n37 Second wave crits have attempted to examine how binary thinking in the law is produced and how it reflects larger historical processes of bureaucratization and commodification. In so doing, the second wave of CLS has found no "there" there beneath the rhetoric of law. Where first wave crits assumed that beneath law's indeterminacy was a "fundamental contradiction" in the human condition itself, n38 or relied on the existence of moments of unalienated, authentic "being" in the world, n39 second wave crits have begun to question whether the very assumption of a human condition separate from the language we use to talk about it makes sense. I call this mood of profound doubt and skepticism "postmodernist." There are as many different definitions of postmodernism as there are postmodernists. n40 As law professors have understood the term, n41 however, [Postmodernism] suggests that what has been presented in our social-political and our intellectual traditions as knowledge, truth, objectivity, and reason are actually merely the effects of a particular form of social power, the victory of a particular way of representing the world that then presents itself as beyond mere interpretation, as truth itself. n42 Postmodernism's strength is in its corrosiveness. First wave crits insisted that law functions as a mask for power; second wave crits question the first wave's faith in "unmasking" itself. The effort to expose law as ideology assumed that it was possible, through the force of critique, to suddenly see the way things "really" are in a flash of enlightenment. But the [\*749] second wave crits doubt this very reliance on a "real reality" underlying ideology. Instead, they suggest that ideology is all there is. n43 Postmodernist critique is congenial to race-crits, who had already drawn from history the lesson that "racism" is no superficial matter of ignorance, conscious error, or bigotry, but rather lies at the very heart of American - and western - culture. In one of the foundational articles of CRT, Kimberle Crenshaw notes that the civil rights movement achieved material and symbolic gains for blacks, yet left racist ideology and race-baiting politics intact. n44 In Crenshaw's view, the crits' critiques did not go far enough to expose the racism in legal reasoning and legal institutions. Derrick Bell argues that racism is a permanent feature of the American landscape, not something that we can throw off in a magic moment of emancipation. n45 And in a moment of deep pessimism, Richard Delgado's fictional friend "Rodrigo Crenshaw" has suggested that racism is an intrinsic feature of "The Enlightenment" itself. n46 **The deeper that race-crits dig, the more embedded racism seems to be**; the deeper the race-crit critique of western culture goes, the more useful postmodernist philosophy becomes in demonstrating that nothing should be immune from criticism. By calling everything taken for granted into question, postmodernist critique potentially clears the way for alternative accounts of social reality, n47 including accounts that place racism at the center of western culture. Thus, Gerald Torres has identified postmodernism as a useful position from which to criticize both theories of interest-group and "communitarian" politics. n48 Anthony Cook sees deconstruction, a postmodernist method of reading texts, as potentially "liberatory" for progressive scholars of color. n49 [\*750] And Robert Chang argues that post-structuralism is useful in order to understand the interaction between Asian American political action and the law. n50 Postmodernist thought refuses to accept any concept, linguistic usage, or value as pure, original, or incorruptible. Postmodernist narratives, as used by race-crits, contend that concepts like neutrality and objectivity, and institutions like law, have not escaped the taint of racism, but rather are often used to perpetuate it. Postmodernist narratives emphasize the ways in which "race" permeates our language, our perceptions, even our fondest "colorblind" utopias. n51 CRT tells postmodernist narratives when it digs down into seemingly neutral areas of law and finds concepts of "race" and racism always already there. B. CRT and Modernist Narratives Even while it exposes racism within seemingly neutral concepts and institutions, however, CRT has not abandoned the fundamental political goal of traditional civil rights scholarship: the liberation of people of color from racial subordination. Although, like crits, race-crits have questioned concepts of neutrality and objectivity, they have done so from a perspective that places racial oppression at the center of analysis and privileges the racial subject. This commitment to antiracism over critique as an end in itself has created rifts between CRT and CLS. For example, in a symposium published by the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, race-crits broke with crits over the efficacy of "rights talk." n52 CLS writers had argued "that rights were malleable and manipulative, that in practice they served to isolate and marginalize rather than empower and connect people, and that progressive people should emphasize needs, informality, and connectedness rather than rights." n53 Patricia Williams, Richard Delgado, and Mari Matsuda, however, all rejected this yearning to go beyond rights to more [\*751] direct forms of human connection, arguing that, for communities of color, "rights talk" was an indispensable tool. n54 This argument between CRT and CLS was more a matter of strategy and tactics than of fundamental disagreement. Both sides agreed that progressive political action should be antiracist and that human connection was a good thing. But a comparison of CRT work with the second wave of CLS work also indicates a more serious tension. In its commitment to the liberation of people of color, CRT work demonstrates a deep commitment to concepts of reason and truth, transcendental subjects, and "really-out-there" objects. Thus, in its optimistic moments, CRT engages in "modernist" narratives. n55 Modernist narratives assume three things: a subject, free to choose, who can be emancipated or not; an objective world of things out there (a world "the way it really is" as opposed to the way things appear to be in a condition of false consciousness); and "reason," the bridge between the subject and the object that enables subjects to move from their own blindness to "enlightenment." Modernist narratives thus call on a particular intellectual machinery, a methodology Brian Fay describes as "critical social science." Critical social science requires the following: First, that there be a crisis in a social system; second, that this crisis be at least in part caused by the false consciousness of those experiencing it; third, that this false consciousness be amenable to the process of enlightenment ...; and fourth, that such enlightenment lead to emancipation in which a group, empowered by its new-found self-understanding, radically alters its social arrangements and thereby alleviates its suffering. n56 [\*752] In its optimistic moments, CRT is described very well by "critical social science." The crisis in our social system is our collective failure to adequately perceive or to address racism. This crisis, according to CRT, is at least in part caused by a false understanding of "racism" as an intentional, isolated, individual phenomenon, equivalent to prejudice. This false understanding, however, can be corrected by CRT, which redescribes racism as a structural flaw in our society. Through these explanations, readers will come to a new and deeper understanding of reality, an enlightenment which in turn will lead to legal and political struggle that ultimately results in racial liberation. Under CRT, as Fay remarks of critical social science in general, "the truth shall set you free." n57 This project fits well with the kind of scholarship most often found in law reviews. As several scholars have recently argued, one characteristic of conventional legal scholarship is its insistent "normativity": the little voice that constantly asks legal scholars, "So, what should we do?" n58 Normativity is both a stylistic and a substantive characteristic. At the stylistic level, normativity refers to how law review articles typically are structured: the writer identifies a problem within the existing legal framework; she then identifies a "norm," within or outside the legal system, to which we ought to adhere; and finally she applies the norm to resolve the problem in a way that can easily translate into a series of moves within the currently existing legal system. n59 At the substantive level, normativity describes the assumption within legal scholarship of a coherent and unitary "we" - a legal subject who speaks for and acts in the people's best interest - with the power to "do" something. Legal normativity also confidently assumes "our" ability to reason a way through problems with neutrality and objectivity: to "choose" a norm and then "apply" it to a legal problem. n60 Whereas second-wave CLS work sits very uneasily with this scholarly method, n61 both traditional civil rights scholarship and CRT adhere for the [\*753] most part to stylistic and substantive normativity. Although the "we" assumed in these articles and essays is often "people of color" and progressive whites rather than a generic "we," the same confidence is exhibited of "our" ability to choose one norm over another, to apply the new principle to a familiar problem, to achieve enlightenment, and to move from understanding to action. n62 Even when the recommended course of action goes beyond adopting Doctrine X over Doctrine Y, as CRT makes a point of doing, the exhortation to action often still assumes that liberation is just around the corner. CRT's commitment to the liberation of people of color - and the project of critical social science (generally) and normative legal scholarship (in particular) as a way to further that liberation - suggest a faith in certain concepts and institutions that postmodernists lack. When race-crits tell modernist stories, they assume that "people of color" describes a coherent category with at least some shared values and interests. They assume that the idea of "liberation" is meaningful - that racism is something that can one day somehow cease to exist, or cease to exert any power over us. Modernist narratives assume a "real" reality out there, and that reason can bring us face to face with it. And modernist narratives have faith that once enough people see the truth, right action will follow: that enlightenment leads to empowerment, and that empowerment leads to emancipation. Modernist narratives, then, are profoundly hopeful. They assume that people of color and whites live in the same perceptual and moral world, that reason speaks to us all in the same way despite our different experiences, and that reason, rather than habit or power, is what will motivate people. Modernist narratives also can be profoundly romantic. They imagine heroic action by a formerly oppressed people rising up as one, "empowered" to be who they "really" are or choose to be, breathing the thin and bracing air of freedom. This optimism and romanticism, though easy to caricature, cannot be easily dismissed. As Patricia Williams and Mari Matsuda have pointed out, faith in reason and truth and belief in the essential freedom of rational subjects have enabled people of color to survive and resist subordination. n63 Political modernism, more generally, has been a **powerful force** in the lives of subjugated peoples; as a practical matter, politically liberal societies are [\*754] vastly preferable to the alternatives. n64 A faith in reason has sustained efforts to educate people into critical thinking and to engage in debate rather than violence. n65 The passionate and constructive energy of modernist narratives of emancipation is also grounded in a moral faith: that human beings are created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights; that oppression is wrong and resistance to oppression right; that opposing subjugation in the name of liberty, equality, and true community is the obligation of every rational person. In its modernist moments, CRT aims not to topple the Enlightenment, but to make its promises real. n66

Engagement with the law solves their impacts, even if bottom-up approaches are ultimately better

Andrews, associate professor of law – University of San Francisco, ‘3

(Rhonda V. Magee, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 483)

The following argument relies on a few important assumptions. The first is the assumption that legal rules have consequences that reach far beyond their intended application from the standpoint of legal analysis. Legal rules play an important part in shaping concrete and metaphysical aspects of the world that we know. Thus, the impact of equal protection doctrine on the meta-narrative of race in America is more than merely symbolic. The Supreme Court's pronouncements on race are presumptively to be followed by lower courts, and together these opinions and their consequences influence the representations of race in federal and state social policies, in the media, in literature, and in the arts. n18 As Justice Brennan noted from the bench, every decision of the court has "ripples" which impact society and social processes. n19 Perhaps in no other area is this basic sociological insight more demonstrably true than in the area of race law. In a very real sense, the history of American civil rights law is the history of America's socio-legal construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction of what it means to be a constitutionally protected human being. In the aftermath of the war required to preserve the Union itself, the architects of the First Reconstruction n20 took on [\*491] the task of reforming the Constitution to provide federal protection for newly "freed" Americans. The law they made not only created a new world in which the centuries-old institution of slavery was virtually **impossible**, n21 but perhaps more importantly, marked the beginning of the reshaping of American **thinking** about the very nature of humanity through the powerful symbolism and mechanisms of the law. n22 Thus, the continuing evolution of what it means to be a human being, and refinement of the state's obligations to human beings subject to its laws, are among the most significant of the unstated objectives of the reconstruction of post-slavery America, and the law itself will play a central role.

Engagement with the topic solves their method better—it’s the genesis of the violence they criticize which is key to effective advocacy—their author says it’s a question of the truth claims that inform the advocacy

Medina, your author, ‘11

Jose, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/philosophy/\_people/faculty\_files/\_medinafoucaultstudies.pdf

Foucault distinguishes this critical ‚return to the origin‛ from mere ‚rediscoveries‛ and mere ‚reactivations‛: a rediscovery promotes ‚the perception of forgotten or obscured figures;‛ 18 and a reactivation involves ‚the insertion of discourse into totally new domains of generalization, practices, and transformation.‛ 19 By contrast, an attempt to transform a discursive practice deeply from the inside by resisting its silences and omissions requires a ‚return to the origin.‛ This critical return involves revisiting the texts that have come to be considered foundational, ‚the primary points of reference‛ of the practice, and developing a new way of reading them, so as to train our eyes and ears to new meanings and voices: we pay ‚particular attention to those things registered in the interstices of the text, its gaps and absences. We return to those empty spaces that have been masked by omission or concealed in a false and misleading plenitude.‛ 20 Foucault emphasizes that the modifications introduced by this critical return to the origin are not merely ‚a historical supplement that would come to fix itself upon the primary discursivity and redouble it in the form of an ornament which, after all, is not essential. Rather, it is an effective and necessary means of transforming discursive practice.‛ 21 **If rediscoveries and reactivations of the past are crucial for extending discursive practices**, a ‚return to the origin‛ that unveils omissions and silences is what is required for a deep transformation of our meaning-making capacities within those practices. The ability to identify omissions, to listen to silences, to play with discursive gaps and textual interstices is a crucial part of our critical agency for resisting power/knowledge frameworks. Lacking that ability is a strong indication of one’s inability to resist epistemic and socio-political subjugation, of the limitations on one’s agency and positionality within discursive practices. And the ability to inhabit discursive practices critically that we develop by becoming sensitive to exclusions—by listening to silences— enables us not to be trapped into discursive practices, that is, it gives us also the ability to develop counter-discourses. Indeed, being able to negotiate historical narratives and to resist imposed interpretations of one’s past means being able to develop counter-histories. Becoming sensitive to discursive exclusions and training ourselves to listen to silences is what makes possible the insurrection of subjugated knowledge: it enables us to tap into the critical potential of demeaned and obstructed forms of power/knowledge by paying attention to the lives, experiences and discursive practices of those peoples who have lived their life ‚in darkness and silence.‛ Foucault opened the 1976 lectures in ‚Society Must be Defended” with a discussion of ‚the insurrection of subjugated knowledges.‛ 22 In this discussion he highlights two different aspects of subjugated knowledges that are crucial to understand their critical potential, that is, the kind of insurrection that they can be mobilized to produce. In the first place, Foucault emphasizes that subjugated knowledges are ‚historical contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematizations‛ and that are dug up by new forms of scholarship. 23 By resurrecting these buried and masked blocks of historical knowledge, the critique of institutions, discourses, and hegemonic histories becomes possible. For example, Foucault remarks that what made it possible to develop ‚an effective critique of the asylum or the prison‛ was the retrieval—through ‚the tools of scholarship‛—of ‚blocks of historical knowledges‛ present but masked or buried in ‚functional and systematic ensembles.‛ 24 These blocks of historical knowledge make critique possible because they ‚allow us to see the dividing lines in the confrontation and struggles that functional arrangements or systematic organizations are designed to mask.‛ 25 The historical dimension of subjugated knowledges is crucial because it enables us to see, diachronically, different substrata or deposits of ongoing epistemic subjugations by calling attention to the social struggles and conflicts that have been part of the production of institutions and discourses, but have become buried in their interstices. In the second place, Foucault also highlights another key aspect of subjugated knowledges: they are ‚knowledges from below,‛ ‚unqualified or even disqualified knowledges.‛ 26 The lack of sanction or pedigree, their marginalization and stigmatization, is a crucial part of the epistemological subordination or exclusion that makes them subjugated knowledges: they are ‚knowledges that have been disquali-fied as nonceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity.‛ 27 But Foucault is quick to point out that these disqualified or unqualified knowledges should not be identified with ‚common knowledge or common sense,‛ which is excluded from the realm of science and erudition, but has great currency in mainstream epistemic markets. By contrast, a subjugated knowledge is the one that suffers a more pervasive social exclusion and stigmatization: ‚a knowledge that is local, regional, or differential, incapable of unanimity and which derives its power solely from the fact that it is different from all the knowledges that surround it.‛ 28 These are knowledges that are not articulated or voiced in the proper way, knowledges without accepted credentials; in short, knowledges without social currency because of the history of epistemological exclusions and marginalizations that have kept them out of official markets for epistemic transactions. This second feature of subjugated knowledges is also what makes social critique possible by calling into question official and hegemonic knowledges and interrogating the exclusions that they rest on. Thus, referring to his own genealogical critiques of institutions like the asylum or the hospital and of discourses such as psychiatry or medicine, Foucault remarks that ‚it is the reappearance of what people know at a local level, of these disqualified knowledges, that made the critique possible.‛ 29

### K

The 1ac says you should use your ‘war powers’ – you have power, but your war powers are not the same thing as those of the president or generals and the analogy is super insidious

War metaphors are coercive ploys that map social reality onto a realm of militarism

Nuri ’09 (Dalia, Political Studies Department, Bar-Ilan University and Hadassah College, Jerusalem, “Friendly fire: war-normalizing metaphors in the Israeli political discourse,” Journal of Peace Education Vol. 6, No. 2, September 2009, 153–169)

Combining principles of peace education and political discourse analysis, this study dwells on one powerful metaphorical mechanism engaged in by Israeli political leaders. The discursive phenomenon in question is what I call ‘war-normalizing meta- phors’. War-normalizing metaphors are metaphors that contain the potential to naturalize and legitimate the use of military power by creating a systematic analogy between war and objects that are far from the battlefield; for example, WAR IS A GAME, WAR IS SPORT, or WAR IS BUSINESS. The claim is that systematic use of war-normalizing metaphors frames war3 as a ‘normal’ phenomenon that is part of human nature and ordinary life and a situation that does not require any intervention or change. As such, war-normalizing metaphors are ‘discursive landmines’ that **inflict harm on a culture of peace and should be eliminated from any political discourse**.

This article reports the findings of a case study of the war-normalizing metaphors employed by Israeli political leaders during 1967–1973. The metaphors in this case study were taken from a corpus of 40 speeches, articles and interviews authored by prominent Israeli political leaders. This period was characterized by several types of hostilities (two total wars, a War of Attrition and hundreds of terrorist attacks) as well as various kinds of peace initiatives (that all failed). It is important to note that in this period, the Israeli government had a monopoly over radio transmissions and the single national television channel (which began broadcasting in 1969). It also had crucial influence on the press. Political leaders, therefore, had unlimited access to the arenas available for shaping public opinion with respect to peace and conflict.

While political discourse on peace and war, as defined here, usually evokes political support or political criticism, this article’s position is completely different. It aims to demonstrate the importance of educating political leaders in order to **improve their awareness**, sensitivity and rhetorical skills regarding war and peace discourse. Thus, **the contribution of this research to the field of peace education is dual.** First, it expands the audience targeted for peace education. Traditionally, peace education has favored students still located in the education system (McGlynn et al. 2004), with a focus on special school programs (see for example, Zeiger 2000; Arweck and Nesbitt 2008) or on higher education (see for example, Osborn 2000; Conley Tyler and Bretherton 2006). Teacher education for peace has also aroused scholarly research (see for example Koshmanova and Hapon 2007). In contrast, this study demonstrates the importance of peace education oriented directly toward political leaders. Second, while analysis of peace actions, peace movements and education programs for peace have captured a central place in the field of peace studies in general and in peace education in particular, research on the peace discourse and peace rhetoric has gained momentum only in the last 15 years (e.g., Schaffner and Wenden 1995; Bridgeman 2000; Morke and Pincus 2000; Salomon 2004; Cavin 2006; Friedrich 2007; Wenden 2007).4

Wenden (2003, 171) has succinctly summed up the crucial importance of ‘the linguistic factor’ in promoting a culture of peace:

Since ideologies are expressed in text and talk, albeit indirectly, and since discourses also contribute to the construction and confirmation of already-present ideologies, it is essen- tial that we learn to look critically at discourse as a means of identifying these ideologies that challenge the achievement of a culture of peace...the linguistic factor be taken into account by scholars and researchers, policy makers and government planners, educators and activists in their attempts to deal with the problems of social...violence that challenge contemporary societies.

The current research fits this orientation.

The article opens with an overview of the conceptual framework and continues

with a discussion of the concept war-normalizing metaphors. Following the method- ological section, the article analyzes the war-normalizing metaphors used in the Israeli political discourse between 1967 and 1973. Next is a section containing a short comparison of the war-normalizing metaphors applied in the Israeli political discourse during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. In the concluding section I suggest exploring the introduction of a peace-normalizing mechanism having its own metaphors so as to encourage a peace-oriented rhetorical consciousness among political and military leaders.

The conceptual framework

War and peace discourses function as effective mechanisms for **sustaining relations of control** within a national entity. The identification of political biases in these discourses opens a window to latent processes by which powerful groups attempt to **influence public opinion** and promote their agendas, in this case an aggressive political agenda. Researchers, especially critical linguists, have revealed the manipulative power of a line of new and old terms, concepts and metaphors regarding war and warfare e.g., ‘war on terror’ (Mazid 2007), ‘preventive war’ (Ferrari 2007), ‘surgical strike’ (Gavriely-Nuri 2008), ‘targeted killing’ (Silber forthcoming), ‘smart bomb’ (Muchnik forthcoming) and many others. Manipulation is not only a linguistic device:

Socially, manipulation is defined as **illegitimate domination confirming social inequality.** Cognitively, manipulation as mind control involves the interference with processes of understanding, the formation of biased mental models and social representations. Discursively, manipulation generally involves the usual forms and formats of ideological discourse. (Van Dijk 2006)

The manipulative powers of political metaphors in general and war metaphors in particular will be discussed below.

Metaphors

Metaphors have traditionally been studied by scholars in the fields of literature, rhet- oric and linguistics. For many years, this area of study was considered inappropriate for the analysis of social and political events. Curticapean (2006, 17) succinctly described this attitude: ‘They were deemed incompatible with reason (because meta- phors get in the way of clear ideas and plain truth) or, at best, garments of rational thought (ornaments which decorate texts without affecting their meaning).’

Advances in cognitive linguistics altered the narrow perception of metaphors in the latter part of the twentieth century. In their seminal study Metaphors we live by, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) challenged the traditional approach to metaphors and offered a coherent, systematic framework that became known as the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor. This theory essentially altered the status of metaphor from art to instrument, to a crucial device for the formation of concepts and the conceptualization of reality. Metaphor thus came to be perceived as inherent to human reasoning, and more than a figure of speech, it came to be viewed as a mode of thought. Lakoff and Johnson noted that **metaphors can ‘create social reality and guide future action’**: that **they can behave like ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’** (1980, 156). What is most relevant for the current study is the understanding that ‘ideological struggles are often a matter of fighting for one set of metaphors to become common- sense and “naturalized” as literal’ (Goatly 2002, 265) or, as often claimed: ‘Military strategists stress the importance of controlling the high ground; political strategists stress the importance of controlling the metaphor’ (Thompson 1996, 190).

The internalization of militarism leads to pure war and extinction

Borg, Executive Director at Community Consulting Group, Graduate White Institiute Psychoanalystic Program, 2003, Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society 8.1 (2003) 57-67

Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lotringer's concept of "**pure war"refers to the potential of a culture to destroy itself completely** (12). 2 We as psychoanalysts can—and increasingly must—explore the impact of this concept on our practice, and on the growing number of patients who live with the inability to repress or dissociate their experience and awareness of the pure war condition. The realization of a patient's worst fears in actual catastrophic events has always been a profound enough psychotherapeutic challenge. These days, however, **catastrophic events** not only threaten friends, family, and neighbors; they also **become the stuff of endless repetitions and dramatizations** on radio, television, and Internet. 3 **Such continual reminders of death and destruction affect us all**. What is the role of the analyst treating patients who live with an ever-threatening sense of the pure war lying just below the surface of our cultural veneer? At the end of the First World War, the first "total war," Walter Benjamin observed that "nothing [after the war] remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a field of force of destructive torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile human body"(84). Julia Kristeva makes a similar note about our contemporary situation, "The recourse to atomic weapons seems to prove that horror...can rage absolutely" (232). And, as if he too were acknowledging this same fragility and uncontainability, the French politician Georges Clemenceau commented in the context of World War I that "war is too serious to be confined to the military" (qtd. in Virilio and Lotringer 15). Virilio and Lotringer gave **the name "pure war"to the psychological condition that results when people know that they live in a world where the possibility for absolute destruction** (e.g., nuclear holocaust) **exists**. As Virilio and Lotringer see it, **it is not the technological capacity for destruction** (that is, for example, the existence of nuclear armaments) **that imposes the dread characteristic of** a **pure war** psychology **but the belief systems** that **this capacity sets up**. **Psychological survival requires** that **a way** be found (at least unconsciously) **to escape** inevitable **destruction**—it requires a way out—but **this enforces an irresolvable paradox, because the definition of pure war culture is that there is no escape**. Once people believe in the external possibility—at least those people whose defenses cannot handle the weight of the dread that pure war imposes—**pure war becomes an internal condition**, a **perpetual state of preparation for absolute destruction and for personal, social, and cultural death**. The Pure Warrior The philosophy (or practice) of "pure warriors," that is, of people who are preoccupied with the pure war condition of their society, is based on the perpetual failure within them of the dissociation and repression that allow others to function in a situation that is otherwise completely overwhelming. Joyce was one of those who lived on the border of life and death; she could not escape awareness of that dread dichotomy that most of us are at great pains to dissociate. She manifested the state of perpetual preparation that is the hallmark of pure war culture and of the insufficiently defended pure warrior, and also a constant awareness of the nearness of death in all its various forms. She understood quite well, for instance, that when people are institutionalized (as she had been on numerous occasions), "society is defining them as socially dead, [and that at that point] the essential task to be carried out is to help inmates to make their transition from social death to physical death" (Miller and Gwynne 74). Against this backdrop, Joyce sought psychoanalysis as a "new world," the place where she would break free from the deathly institutionalized aspects of her self, and begin her life anew. Her search for a "new world" included the possibility of a world that was not a pure war world—a prelapsarian Eden. Virilio and Lotringer state that "**war exists in its preparation**" (53). And Sun Tsu, who wrote over 2400 years ago and yet is often considered the originator of modern warfare, said in The Art of War, "Preparation everywhere means lack everywhere" (44). This means that **when** the **members of a culture must be on guard on all fronts**, the **resources** of that culture **are** necessarily **scattered and taxed**. The more defenses are induced and enacted, the more psychologically impoverished a culture (or a person) will be. In war-torn nations, resources like food, clothing, and materials for shelter may be scarce in the general population because they are shunted off to the military. Similarly, the hoarding of psychological resources and the constant alert status of the defense system are outcomes of existence in a pure war culture. We can see this scattering and scarcity of resources occurring already in the United States as billions of dollars are shunted from social services to war efforts and homeland security. **In pure war cultures**—that is, in cultures that enact a perpetual preparation for war—the notion of **peace is itself a defensive fantasy,** although to survive psychically we distract ourselves from such frightening stimuli as widespread terrorist activities and other events that demonstrate our pure war status. **Pure war obliterates the distinction between soldier and citizen**. We have all been drafted. According to Virilio and Lotringer, "**All of us are already civilian soldiers**, without knowing it...**War happens everywhere, but we no longer have the means of recognizing it**" (42).

### Case

There is demonstrable progress in racial inequality—this is *not* to say that everything is perfect by any means, but it does prove that pragmatic change is possible within the current system

Feldscher, Harvard School of Public Health, 9/19/’13

(Karen, “Progress, but challenges in reducing racial disparities,” http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/features/progress-but-challenges-in-reducing-racial-disparities/)

September 19, 2013 — Disparities between blacks and whites in the U.S. remain pronounced—and health is no exception. A panel of experts at Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) discussed these disparities—what they are, why they persist, and what to do about them—at a September 12, 2013 event titled “Dialogue on Race, Justice, and Public Health.” The event was held in Kresge G-1 and featured panelists Lisa Coleman, Harvard University’s chief diversity officer; David Williams, Florence Sprague Norman and Laura Smart Norman Professor of Public Health in the HSPH Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences; Chandra Jackson, Yerby Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the HSPH Department of Nutrition; and Zinzi Bailey, a fifth-year doctoral student in the HSPH Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Robert Blendon, Richard L. Menschel Professor of Public Health and Professor of Health Policy and Political Analysis at HSPH, moderated the discussion. Gains, but pains Health care disparities are troubling, Coleman said. One study found that doctors recommended coronary revascularization—bypass surgery that replaces blocked blood vessels with new ones—among white patients with heart disease 50% of the time, but just 23% of the time for blacks. Black women are less likely to be given a bone marrow density test than white women, even when it’s known they’ve had prior fractures. And the black infant mortality rate is 2.3 times higher than that of non-Hispanic whites. Each speaker acknowledged that racial minorities have made significant gains over the past half-century, but said there is much more work still to do. They cited statistics providing stark evidence of continuing disparities in health, wealth, education, income, arrest and incarceration rates, foreclosure rates, and poverty. Coleman called the data “disconcerting; in some cases, alarming.” Schools are desegregated, she said, but not integrated; median income is $50,000 per year for whites but $31,000 a year for blacks and $37,000 a year for Hispanics; since the 1960s, the unemployment rate among blacks has been two to two-and-a-half times higher than for whites; and one in three black men can expect to spend time in prison during their lifetimes. Blendon shared results from surveys that accentuate sharp differences of opinion about how well blacks are faring in the U.S. For instance, in a survey that asked participants if they thought that the lives of black Americans had changed dramatically over the past 50 years, 54% of whites said yes but only 29% of blacks did. Another survey asked whether or not people approved of the verdict in the George Zimmerman trial; 51% of whites approved but only 9% of blacks did. Reducing disparities through research, education Jackson talked about growing up in a segregated neighborhood in Atlanta and attending a school with 99% black students and inadequate resources. She became the first in her family to attend college. Now, through her research, she hopes to expose and reduce racial health disparities. In a recent study in the American Journal of Epidemiology, Jackson and colleagues reported that blacks—particularly black professionals—get less sleep than whites, which can have potentially negative impacts on health. Bailey discussed what’s known as the “school-to-prison pipeline”—a trajectory in which black teens do poorly in school, get held back a grade, drop out, commit a crime, then end up in jail. On the flip side, she said, there are “diversity pipelines” to recruit minority students into higher education. “Often these programs target students who have already avoided the school-to-prison pipeline,” Bailey said, noting that she would like to see higher education institutions connect with black students at earlier ages to steer them toward positive choices.

falsifiable claims matter for assessing impacts AND that engagement can be effective

Currie 8

<http://www.american.com/archive/2008/november-11-08/the-long-march-of-racial-progress/>

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Measuring racial progress is all about perspective. Since Appomattox, the struggle for racial equality has seen triumphs and setbacks alike. On balance, however, the story of race relations in America is one of extraordinary change and transformation. According to Princeton historian James McPherson, the rate of black illiteracy dropped from roughly 90 percent in 1865 to 70 percent in 1880 and to under 50 percent in 1900. “From the perspective of today, this may seem like minimal progress,” McPherson wrote in his 1991 book, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (a collection of essays). “But viewed from the standpoint of 1865 the rate of literacy for blacks increased by 200 percent in fifteen years and by 400 percent in thirty-five years.” McPherson also noted that the share of school-age black children attending school jumped from 2 percent in 1860 to 34 percent in 1880. “During the same period,” he said, “the proportion of white children of school age attending school had grown only from 60 to 62 percent.” In 1908, 100 years before the election of America’s first black president, there was a bloody race riot in Springfield, Illinois, which began when an angry mob surrounded a prison where a black man falsely accused of rape was being held. As columnist George Will has observed, “The siege of the jail, the rioting, the lynching, and mutilating all occurred within walking distance of where, in 2007, Barack Obama announced his presidential candidacy.” Over the past century, the racial attitudes of white Americans have undergone a sea change. The shift toward greater racial tolerance was driven by many factors, including blacks’ participation in World War II, the integration of professional sports and the military, and the civil rights movement. “Even as Americans were voting more conservatively in the 1980s, their views on race were becoming more liberal,” Wall Street Journal senior editor Jonathan Kaufman wrote recently. “More than three quarters of whites in 1972 told pollsters that ‘blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted.’ Two-thirds of whites that same year said they opposed laws prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale of homes. Forty percent said whites had the right to live in segregated neighborhoods.” However, “By the end of 1980s, all those numbers had fallen markedly and [they] continued to fall through the following decades.” As University of Michigan sociologist Reynolds Farley points out in a new paper, there are now 41 African Americans serving in the House of Representatives, compared to only six when the Kerner Commission issued its famous report on race and poverty in 1968. During the years following the Kerner Report, “The slowly rising incomes of black men and the more rapidly rising incomes of black women produced an important economic change for African Americans,” Farley writes. “In 1996, for the first time, the majority of blacks were in the economic middle class or above, if that means living in a household with an income at least twice the poverty line.” According to Farley, “Only three percent of African Americans could be described as economically comfortable in 1968. That has increased to 17 percent at present. This is an unambiguous sign of racial progress: one black household in six could be labeled financially comfortable.” He notes that the black-white poverty gap “is much smaller now” than it was in the late 1960s. Residential and marriage trends are also encouraging. “The trend toward less residential segregation that emerged in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s continues in this century,” says Farley. Meanwhile, interracial marriage rates have increased dramatically. “At the time of the Kerner Report, about one black husband in 100 was enumerated with a white spouse. By 2006, about 14 percent of young black husbands were married to white women.”

Progressivism is possible, and it depends on effective decision-making, so T turns the case

Clark, professor of law – Catholic University, ‘95

(Leroy D., 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23)

I must now address the thesis that there has been no evolutionary progress for blacks in America. Professor Bell concludes that blacks improperly read history if we believe, as Americans in general believe, that progress--racial, in the case of blacks--is "linear and evolutionary." n49 According to Professor Bell, the "American dogma of automatic progress" has never applied to blacks. n50 Blacks will never gain full equality, and "even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary 'peaks of progress,' short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance." n51

Progress toward reducing racial discrimination and subordination has never been "automatic," if that refers to some natural and inexorable process without struggle. Nor has progress ever been strictly "linear" in terms of unvarying year by year improvement, because the combatants on either side of the equality struggle have varied over time in their **energies, resources, capacities, and** the quality of their plans. Moreover, neither side could predict or control all of the variables which accompany progress or non-progress; some factors, like World War II, occurred in the international arena, and were not exclusively under American control.

With these qualifications, and a long view of history, blacks and their white allies achieved two profound and qualitatively different leaps forward toward the goal of equality: the end of slavery, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Moreover, despite open and, lately, covert resistance, black progress has never been shoved back, in a qualitative sense, to the powerlessness and abuse of periods preceding these leaps forward. n52

Structural antagonism destroys progressivism and re-entrenches racism—we can acknowledge every problem with the status quo, but adopt a pragmatic orientation towards solutions

Clark, professor of law – Catholic University, ‘95

(Leroy D., 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23)

A Final Word

Despite Professor Bell's prophecy of doom, I believe he would like to have his analysis proven wrong. However, he desperately leans on a tactic from the past--laying out the disabilities of the black condition and accusing whites of not having the moral strength to act fairly. That is the ultimate theme in both of his books and in much of his law review writing. That tactic not only lacks full force against today's complex society, it also becomes, for many whites, an exaggerated claim that racism is the sole cause of black misfortunes. n146 Many whites may feel about the black condition what many of us may have felt about the homeless: dismayed, but having no clear answer as to how the problem is to be solved, and feeling individually powerless if the resolution calls for massive resources that we, personally, lack. Professor Bell's two books may confirm this sense of powerlessness in whites with a limited background in this subject, because Professor **Bell does not offer a single programmatic approach** toward changing the circumstance of blacks. He presents only startling, unanalyzed prophecies of doom, which will easily garner attention from a controversy-hungry media. n147

It is much harder to exercise imagination to create viable strategies for change. n148 Professor Bell sensed the despair that the average--especially average black--reader would experience, so he put forth rhetoric urging an "unremitting struggle that leaves no room for giving up." n149 His contention is ultimately hollow, given the total sweep of his work.

At some point it becomes dysfunctional to refuse giving any credit to the very positive abatements of racism that occurred with white support, and on occasion, white leadership. Racism thrives in an atmosphere of insecurity, apprehension about the future, and inter-group resentments. Unrelenting, unqualified accusations only add to that negative atmosphere. Empathetic and more generous responses are possible in an atmosphere of support, security, and a sense that advancement is possible; the greatest progress of blacks occurred during the 1960s and early 1970s when the economy was expanding. Professor Bell's "analysis" is really only accusation and "harassing white folks," and is undermining and destructive. There is no love--except for his own group--and there is a constricted reach for an understanding of whites. There is only rage and perplexity. No bridges are built--only righteousness is being sold.

A people, black or white, are capable only to the extent they believe they are. Neither I, nor Professor Bell, have a crystal ball, but I do know that creativity and a drive for change are very much linked to a belief that they are needed, and to a belief that they can make a difference. The future will be shaped by past conditions and the actions of those over whom we have no control. Yet it is not fixed; it will also be shaped by the attitudes and energy with which we face the future. Writing about race is to engage in a power struggle. It is a non-neutral political act, and one must take responsibility for its consequences. Telling whites that they are irremediably racist is not mere "information"; it is a force that helps create the future it predicts. If whites believe the message, feelings of futility could overwhelm any further efforts to seek change. I am encouraged, however, that the motto of the most articulate black spokesperson alive today, Jesse Jackson, is, "Keep hope alive!" and that much of the strength of Martin Luther King, Jr. was his capacity to "dream" us toward a better place.

Alt fails and causes genocidal backlash

**Emery 7**, Phd, (Kathy, “ The Limits of Violent Resistance,” For the Western Edition, August 27, 2007 http://www.educationanddemocracy.org/Emery/westernedition/Sept07WestEd.pdf)

The August 15th editorial for SF Bayview concluded that the only way to stop gentrification in the Bayview is to “go to war.” Through all our marching and complaining and testifying at City Hall, our “City Fathers” still aren’t listening. At this point, sadly, I don’t think for a minute that anything is going to change if we continue to go the Martin route. I think we need **to channel Malcolm and the Panthers**—and start making some moves instead of making some noise. I need some soldiers on my side, and as much as I am sure that there are people who are willing to protest, I need some people next to me who are willing to go to war. By any means necessary. To me, the really sad thing, is that the editorialist, Ebony Sparks, believes that there are only two “routes” or means of opposition to the dominant/white power structure—that pursued by Martin Luther King Jr’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference or that pursued by Malcolm X and West Coast Black Panther Parties. Sparks apparently lumps the very different strategies employed by SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) and CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) into those employed by the SCLC and NAACP. She also assumes that “marching, and complaining and testifying” is what constitutes the full range of tactics employed by the SCLC. This could not be further from the truth. While I am completely sympathetic and share Sparks’ impatience with the lack of people power in the Bay Area, I think **she does not appreciate the severe limitations** and ramifications **of violent resistance to the powers-that-be**. In fact, any attempts to resist gentrification violently would be used as an excuse to make all the “undesirable” Bayview residents disappear that much more quickly. The state, especially **in the era of Homeland Security and the Patriot Act, can out-gun, out-infiltrate, and out-manipulate any individual or group of people. To “go to war” with City Hall is to attack it at it’s strongest point, a suicidal Pickett’s Charge,** if you will.

Their rev gets crushed

**Flaherty 5**

http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate\_insurgency.html

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In order to understand the national security implications of militant electronic piracy, an examination of conventional insurgency against the American Corporate State is necessary.

THE NATURE OF ARMED INSURGENCY AGAINST THE ACS Any violent insurgency against the ACS is sure to fail **and will only serve to enhance the state's power**. The major flaw of violent insurgencies, both cell based (Weathermen Underground, **Black Panthers,** Aryan Nations etc.) and leaderless (Earth Liberation Front, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, etc.) is that they are attempting to attack the system using the same tactics the ACS has already mastered: terror and psychological operations. The ACS attained primacy through the effective application of terror and psychological operations. Therefore, it has far more skill and experience in the use of these tactics than any upstart could **ever** hope to attain.4 **This makes the ACS impervious to traditional insurgency tactics.**  - Political Activism and the ACS Counterinsurgency Apparatus The ACS employs a full time counterinsurgency infrastructure with resources that are **unimaginable** to most would be insurgents. Quite simply, violent insurgents have **no idea** of just how powerful the foe actually is. Violent insurgents typically start out as peaceful, idealistic, political activists. Whether or not political activists know it, even with very mundane levels of political activity, they are engaging in low intensity conflict with the ACS. The U.S. military classifies political activism as “low intensity conflict.” The scale of warfare (in terms of intensity) begins with individuals distributing anti-government handbills and public gatherings with anti-government/anti-corporate themes. In the middle of the conflict intensity scale are what the military refers to as Operations Other than War; an example would be the situation the U.S. is facing in Iraq. At the upper right hand side of the graph is global thermonuclear war. What is important to remember is that the military is concerned with ALL points along this scale because they represent different types of threats to the ACS. Making distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military forces, and foreign and domestic intelligence services is no longer necessary. After September 11, 2001, **all national security assets would be brought to bear against any U.S. insurgency movement.** Additionally, the U.S. military established NORTHCOM which designated the U.S. as an active military operational area. Crimes involving the loss of corporate profits will increasingly be treated as acts of terrorism and could garner anything from a local law enforcement response to activation of regular military forces. Most of what is commonly referred to as “political activism” is viewed by the corporate state's counterinsurgency apparatus as a useful and necessary component of political control. Letters-to-the-editor... Calls-to-elected-representatives... Waving banners... “Third” party political activities... Taking beatings, rubber bullets and tear gas from riot police in free speech zones... Political activism amounts to an utterly useless waste of time, in terms of tangible power, which is all the ACS understands. Political activism is a cruel guise that is sold to people who are dissatisfied, but who have no concept of the nature of tangible power. Counterinsurgency teams routinely monitor these activities, attend the meetings, join the groups and take on leadership roles in the organizations. It's only a matter of time before some individuals determine that political activism is a honeypot that accomplishes nothing and wastes their time. The corporate state knows that some small percentage of the peaceful, idealistic, political activists will eventually figure out the game. At this point, the clued-in activists will probably do one of two things; drop out or move to escalate the struggle in other ways. If the clued-in activist drops his or her political activities, the ACS wins. But what if the clued-in activist refuses to give up the struggle? Feeling powerless, desperation could set in and these individuals might become increasingly radicalized. Because the corporate state's counterinsurgency operatives have infiltrated most political activism groups, the radicalized members will be easily identified, monitored and eventually compromised/turned, arrested or executed. The ACS wins again.

## 2NC

### Bodies

Their implication that experience validates their argument, or disproves our engagement is solipsism that reentrenches oppression—engagement is a better political strategy

David Bridges, Centre for Applied Research in Education, University of East Anglia, 2001, The Ethics of Outsider Research, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 35, No. 3

First, it is argued that only those who have shared in, and have been part of, a particular experience can understand or can properly understand (and perhaps `properly' is particularly heavily loaded here) what it is like. You need to be a woman to understand what it is like to live as a woman; to be disabled to understand what it is like to live as a disabled person etc. Thus Charlton writes of `the innate inability of able-bodied people, regardless of fancy credentials and awards, to understand the disability experience' (Charlton, 1998, p. 128).

Charlton's choice of language here is indicative of the rhetorical character which these arguments tend to assume. This arises perhaps from the strength of feeling from which they issue, but it warns of a need for caution in their treatment and acceptance. Even if able-bodied people have this `inability' it is difficult to see in what sense it is `innate'. Are all credentials `fancy' or might some (e.g. those reflecting a sustained, humble and patient attempt to grapple with the issues) be pertinent to that ability? And does Charlton really wish to maintain that there is a single experience which is the experience of disability, whatever solidarity disabled people might feel for each other?

The understanding that any of us have of our own conditions or experience is unique and special, though recent work on personal narratives also shows that it is itself multi-layered and inconstant, i.e. that we have and can provide many different understandings even of our own lives (see, for example, Tierney, 1993). Nevertheless, our own understanding has a special status: it provides among other things a data source for others' interpretations of our actions; it stands in a unique relationship to our own experiencing; and no one else can have quite the same understanding. It is also plausible that people who share certain kinds of experience in common stand in a special position in terms of understanding those shared aspects of experience. However, once this argument is applied to such broad categories as `women' or `blacks', it has to deal with some very heterogeneous groups; the different social, personal and situational characteristics that constitute their individuality may well outweigh the shared characteristics; and there may indeed be greater barriers to mutual understanding than there are gateways.

These arguments, however, all risk a descent into solipsism: if our individual understanding is so particular, how can we have communication with or any understanding of anyone else? But, granted Wittgenstein's persuasive argument against a private language (Wittgenstein, 1963, perhaps more straightforwardly presented in Rhees, 1970), **we cannot in these circumstances even describe or have any real understanding of our own condition in such an isolated world**. **Rather it is in talking to each other, in participating in a shared language, that we construct the conceptual apparatus that allows us to understand our own situation in relation to others,** and this is a construction which involves understanding differences as well as similarities.

Besides, we have good reason to treat with some scepticism accounts provided by individuals of their own experience and by extension accounts provided by members of a particular category or community of people. We know that such accounts can be riddled with special pleading, selective memory, careless error, self-centredness, myopia, prejudice and a good deal more. A lesbian scholar illustrates some of the pressures that can bear, for example, on an insider researcher in her own community:

As an insider, the lesbian has an important sensitivity to offer, yet she is also more vulnerable than the non-lesbian researcher, both to the pressure from the heterosexual world--that her studies conform to previous works and describe lesbian reality in terms of its relationship with the outside-and to pressure from the inside, from within the lesbian community itself--that her studies mirror not the reality of that community but its self-protective ideology. (Kreiger, 1982, p. 108)

In other words, while individuals from within a community have access to a particular kind of understanding of their experience, this does not automatically attach special authority (though it might attach special interest) to their own representations of that experience. Moreover, while we might acknowledge the limitations of the understanding which someone from outside a community (or someone other than the individual who is the focus of the research) can develop, this does not entail that they cannot develop and present an understanding or that such understanding is worthless. Individuals can indeed find benefit in the understandings that others offer of their experience in, for example, a counselling relationship, or when a researcher adopts a supportive role with teachers engaged in reflection on or research into their own practice. Many have echoed the plea of the Scottish poet, Robert Burns (in `To a louse'):

O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us To see oursels as others see us!3

--**even if they might have been horrified with what such power revealed to them**. Russell argued that it was the function of philosophy (and why not research too?) `to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom . . .It keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect' (Russell, 1912, p. 91). `Making the familiar strange', as Stenhouse called it, often requires the assistance of someone unfamiliar with our own world who can look at our taken-for-granted experience through, precisely, the eye of a stranger. Sparkes (1994) writes very much in these terms in describing his own research, as a white, heterosexual middleaged male, into the life history of a lesbian PE teacher. He describes his own struggle with the question `is it possible for heterosexual people to undertake research into homosexual populations?' but he concludes that being a `phenomenological stranger' who asks `dumb questions' may be a useful and illuminating experience for the research subject in that they may have to return to first principles in reviewing their story. This could, of course be an elaborate piece of self-justification, but it is interesting that someone like Max Biddulph, who writes from a gay/bisexual standpoint, can quote this conclusion with apparent approval (Biddulph, 1996).

People from outside a community clearly can have an understanding of the experience of those who are inside that community. It is almost certainly a different understanding from that of the insiders. Whether it is of any value will depend among other things on the extent to which they have immersed themselves in the world of the other and portrayed it in its richness and complexity; on the empathy and imagination that they have brought to their enquiry and writing; on whether their stories are honest, responsible and critical (Barone, 1992). Nevertheless, this value will also depend on qualities derived from the researchers' externality: their capacity to relate one set of experiences to others (perhaps from their own community); their outsider perspective on the structures which surround and help to define the experience of the community; on the reactions and responses to that community of individuals and groups external to it.4

Finally, it must surely follow that if we hold that a researcher, who (to take the favourable case) seeks honestly, sensitively and with humility to understand and to represent the experience of a community to which he or she does not belong, is incapable of such understanding and representation, then how can he or she understand either that same experience as mediated through the research of someone from that community? The argument which excludes the outsider from understanding a community through the effort of their own research, a fortiori excludes the outsider from that understanding through the secondary source in the form of the effort of an insider researcher or indeed any other means. Again, the point can only be maintained by insisting that a particular (and itself ill-defined) understanding is the only kind of understanding which is worth having.

The epistemological argument (that outsiders cannot understand the experience of a community to which they do not belong) becomes an ethical argument when this is taken to entail the further proposition that they ought not therefore attempt to research that community. I hope to have shown that this argument is based on a false premise. Even if the premise were sound, however, it would not necessarily follow that researchers should be prevented or excluded from attempting to understand this experience, unless it could be shown that in so doing they would cause some harm. This is indeed part of the argument emerging from disempowered communities and it is to this that I shall now turn.

III OUTSIDERS IMPORT DAMAGING FRAMEWORKS OF UNDERSTANDING

Frequent in the literature about research into disability, women's experience, race and homosexuality is the claim that people from outside these particular communities will import into their research, for example, homophobic, sexist or racist frameworks of understanding, which damage the interests of those being researched.

In the case of research into disability it has been argued that outsider researchers carry with them assumptions that the problem of disability lies with the disabled rather than with the society which frames and defines disability. `The essential problem of recent anthropological work on culture and disability is that it perpetuates outmoded beliefs and continues to distance research from lived oppression' (Charlton, 1998, p. 27). By contrast: `a growing number of people with disabilities have developed a consciousness that transforms the notion and concept of disability from a medical condition to a political and social condition' (Charlton, 1998, p.17). Charlton goes on to criticise, for example, a publication by Ingstad and Reynolds Whyte (1995), Disability and Culture. He claims that, although it does add to our understanding of how the conceptualisation and symbolisation of disability takes place, `its language is and perspective are still lodged in the past. In the first forty pages alone we find the words suffering, lameness, interest group, incapacitated, handicapped, deformities. Notions of oppression, dominant culture, justice, human rights, political movement, and selfdetermination are conspicuously absent' (Charlton, 1998 p. 27).

Discussing the neo-colonialism of outsider research into Maori experience, Smith extends this type of claim to embrace the wider methodological and metaphysical framing of outsider research: `From an indigenous perspective Western research is more than just research that is located in a positivist tradition. It is research which brings to bear, on any study of indigenous peoples, a cultural orientation, a set of values, a different conceptualization of such things as time, space and subjectivity, different and competing theories of knowledge, highly specialized forms of language, and structures of power' (Smith, 1999, p. 42).5

This position requires, I think, some qualification. First, researchers are clearly not immune from some of the damaging and prejudicial attitudes on matters of race, sexuality, disability and gender which are found among the rest of the population, though I might hope that their training and experience might give them above-average awareness of these issues and above-average alertness to their expression in their own work. Even where such attitudes remain in researchers' consciousness, this intelligent self-awareness and social sensitivity mean on the whole that they are able to deploy sufficient self-censorship not to expose it in a damaging way. Researchers may thus remain morally culpable for their thoughts, but, at least, communities can be spared the harm of their expression. It is also a matter of some significance that researchers are more exposed than most to public criticism, not least from critics from within these disempowered communities, when such prejudices do enter and are revealed in their work. If they employ the rhetoric of, for example, anti-racist or anti-sexist conviction, they are at least in their public pronouncements exposed to the humiliation of being hoisted by their own petard. It is difficult to see the fairness in excluding all outsider researchers on the a priori supposition of universal prejudice. It is better, surely, to expose it where it is revealed and, if absolutely necessary, to debar individuals who ignore such criticism and persist in using the privilege of their research position to peddle what can then only be regarded as damaging and prejudicial propaganda. Secondly, it is plainly not the case that Western research is located exclusively (as is implied) in a positivist tradition, even if this tradition has been a dominant one. Phenomenology, ethnography, life history, even, more recently, the use of narrative fiction and poetry as forms of research representation, are all established ingredients of the educational research worlds in the UK, USA or Australasia. Contemporary research literature abounds with critiques of positivism as well as examples of its continuing expression.

I have placed much weight in these considerations on the importance of any research being exposed to criticism--most importantly, perhaps, but by no means exclusively by the people whose experience it claims to represent. This principle is not simply an ethical principle associated with the obligations that a researcher might accept towards participants in the research, but it is a fundamental feature of the processes of research and its claims to command our attention. **It is precisely exposure to, modification through and survival of** a process of vigorous public **scrutiny that provides research with whatever authority it can claim**. In contemporary ethnographic research, case-study and life-history research, for example, this expectancy of exposure to correction and criticism is one which runs right through the research process. The methodological requirement is for participants to have several opportunities to challenge any prejudices which researchers may bring with them: at the point where the terms of the research are first negotiated and they agree to participate (or not); during any conversations or interviews that take place in the course of the research; in responding to any record which is produced of the data gathering; in response to any draft or final publication. Indeed, engagement with a researcher provides any group with what is potentially a richly educative opportunity: an opportunity to open their eyes and to see things differently. It is, moreover, an opportunity which any researcher worth his or her salt will welcome.

Not all researchers or research processes will be as open as are described here to that educative opportunity, and not all participants (least of all those who are self-defining as `disempowered') will feel the confidence to take them even if they are there. **This may be seen as a reason to set up barriers to the outsider researcher, but they can and should** more often **be seen as problems** for researchers and participants **to address together in the interests of** their **mutual understanding and benefit.**

Notwithstanding these considerations, one of the chief complaints coming out of disempowered communities is that this kind of mutual interest and benefit is precisely what is lacking in their experience of research. It is to this consideration that I shall now turn. IV OUTSIDERS EXPLOIT INSIDER PARTICIPANTS IN THE COMMUNITIES THEY RESEARCH Ellen describes how fieldwork has become `a rite of passage by which the novice is transformed into the rounded anthropologist and initiated into the ranks of the profession'Ða ritual by which `the student of anthropology dies and a professional anthropologist is born' 􏰈Ellen, 1984, p. 23). This is a reminder that research can carry benefits to the researcher which go beyond those associated with the `pure' pursuit of understanding. As participants in research become more aware of this, their attitudes towards research and researchers can, understandably, change. The following observation was made by a woman from a community that had experienced several waves of enthusiastic researchers: The kind of behaviour researchers have towards locals tells us that they just want to exploit them and take from them their ideas and information. It also tells us that they don't really care at all. They want the information to use in front of a group of people at home, so that they can be seen as clever academics. Then in the end they publish books, reviews, articles etc in order to spread their popularities. So what is this, and what is research really about? Not all researchers are exploiters, but most are, and I think it is time up now for this, and that these researchers should also be exploited by local people. 􏰈Florence Shumba, quoted in Wilson, 1992, p. 199) Researchers who are sensitive to this issue typically look for ways to counter the imbalance of benefit. They will sometimes discuss with participants ways in which the research could be designed to benefit all parties, by, for example, ensuring that it addresses issues on which the participants need information as well as the researchers or by providing data that the research participants can use independently and for their own purposes. In the absence of any other perceived benefit, some schools in the UK have responded to researchers' requests for access and time for interviews by proposing to charge by the hour for teachers' time. Of course sometimes participants will be persuaded to participate on the grounds that some other people whose interests they care aboutÐ pupils in schools, for example, or children currently excluded from educationÐwill secure the benefit of the research, but there has to be the link between something which they perceive to be a benefit 􏰈albeit altruistically) and the commitment which they are asked to make. These illustrations of the terms of engagement between researchers and their participants present a picture of a trade in benefit, the negotiation of a utilitarian equation of mutual happiness and, perhaps, pain, though one in which higher satisfactions 􏰈e.g. new insights and the improvements to the future education of children) have a place alongside lower ones 􏰈a bit of self-publicity or cash in the school fund). Questions of exploitation, in Kantian terms of treating people as means rather than ends 􏰈see Kant, 1964)6 come in if, as is sometimes alleged, researchers use their positions of authority or their sophistication to establish relationships in which the benefits are very one-sided in their favour. This distinction between the utilitarian principle and the Kantian one is crucial here. The utilitarian principle might require us to measure in the scales a much wider community of benefit. If, for example, the researcher could show that, even though the Maori community he or she was researching experienced the inconvenience of the research without the benefit, thousands of other people would benefit from it, then the utilitarian equation might provide justification for the research. But this is precisely one of the weaknesses of the utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest numberÐat least when it is applied with this sort of simplicity. It requires either a broader take on the utilitarian principle 􏰈which might observe that a programme of action which allocates all the benefits to one group and all the `pain' to another will not be conducive to the greatest aggregation of happiness) or the invoking of something closer to the Kantian principle, which would demand that we do not exploit one group of people to the exclusive benefit of another. Researchers seeking collaboration with participants in disempowered communities have essentially two forms of appealÐto their self-interest or to their generosity. Either they need to see some benefit to themselves which is at least roughly commensurate to the effort that is required of them 􏰈or in some cases the value of what they have to offer); or they need knowingly to contribute out of their own benevolence towards the researcher or others whom they believe the research will benefit. In this second case, the researcher is placed in something of the position of the receiver of a gift and he or she needs to recognise consequently the quite elaborate ethical apparatus that surrounds such receipt. There is a particular `spirit' in which we might be expected to receive a gift: a spirit of gratitude, of humility, of mutuality in the relationship. There may also be a network of social expectations, which flow from such givingÐof being in thrall to the giver, of being in his or her debtÐbut on the whole anyone contributing to an educational research project would be naõÈve to assume that such `debts' might be repaid. Most of the time, researchers are in fact inviting the generosity of their participants, and perhaps there is something more ethically elevated in responding to such generosity with a true spirit of gratitude and a recognition of the mutuality of relationship which binds giver and receiver, than in seeking to establish a trade in dubious benefits. Smith 􏰈1999) provides a wonderful picture of the combination of spirit and benefits that might be involved in establishing this relationship 􏰈as well as a whole new angle on the notion of `empowerment'!) when she outlines the range of issues on which a researcher approaching a Maori community might need to satisfy them: `Is her spirit clear? Does he have a good heart? What other baggage are they carrying? Are they useful to us? Can they fix up our generator? Can they actually do anything?' 􏰈Smith, 1999, p.10). Perhaps all educational researchers should be required to satisfy participants on these questions. I conclude that the possibility that outsider educational research may be conducted in an exploitative manner is not an argument for obstructing it comprehensively, but it is an argument for requiring that it be conducted under an appropriate set of principles and obligations and in a proper spirit. `Qualitative researchers', argued Stake, `are guests in the private spaces of the world. Their manners should be good and their code of ethics strict' 􏰈Stake, 1998, p.103). Any community may legitimately reject a researcher 􏰈insider or outsider) who fails to establish and conduct relationships under these requirements. In this field, ethics is never far removed from politics. This essay has focused on the relationship between educational researchers and communities that are self-defined as `disempowered' but has not really addressed the issue of power. At the heart of the objections to outsider research is a view that such research, far from challenging and removing such disempowerment, operates to reinforce it. It is this argument which I shall now address. V OUTSIDERS' RESEARCH DISEMPOWERS INSIDERS At least one of the arguments against outsider research into self-defined `disempowered' sections of the population is made independently of the measure of sensitivity and care, which the outsider researchers demonstrate in its conduct. `If we have learned one thing from the civil rights movement in the US', wrote Ed Roberts, a leading figure in the Disability Rights Movement 􏰈DRM), `it's that when others speak for you, you lose' 􏰈quoted in Driedger, 1989, p. 28). Roberts' case is in part that for so long as such groups depend on outsiders to represent them on the wider stage, they will be reinforcing both the fact and the perception of their subordination and dependency as well as exposing themselves to potential misrepresentation. They have to break the vicious circle of dependencyÐand that means taking control for themselves of the ways in which their experience is represented more widely: The DRM's demand for control is the essential theme that runs through all its work, regardless of political-economic or cultural di􏰀erences. Control has universal appeal for DRM activists because their needs are everywhere conditioned by a dependency born of powerlessness, poverty, degradation, and institutionalisation. This dependency, saturated with paternalism, begins with the onset of disability and continues until death. 􏰈Charlton, 1998, p. 3) Outsider researchers sometimes persuade themselves that they are acting in an emancipatory way by `giving voice to' neglected or disenfranchised sections of the community. Their research may indeed push the evident voice of the researcher far into the background as he or she `simply presents', perhaps as large chunks of direct transcription and without commentary, what participants have to say. But, as Reinharz has warned, this is by no means as simple as it might appear: To listen to people is to empower them. But if you want to hear it, you have to go hear it, in their space, or in a safe space. Before you can expect to hear anything worth hearing, you have to examine the power dynamics of the space and the social actors . . . Second, you have to be the person someone else can talk to, and you have to be able to create a context where the person can speak and you can listen. That means we have to study who we are and who we are in relation to those we study . . . Third, you have to be willing to hear what someone is saying, even when it violates your expectations or threatens your interests. In other words, if you want someone to tell it like it is, you have to hear it like it is. 􏰈Reinharz, 1988, pp. 15±16) Even with this level of self knowledge, sensitivity and discipline, there is a significant temptation in such situations to what is sometimes called ventriloquy: the using of the voice of the participant to give expression to the things which the researcher wants to say or to have said. This is a process which is present in the selection of participants, in the framing of the questions which they are encouraged to answer, in the verbal and visual cues which they are given of the researcher's pleasure or excitement with their responses, and, later, in the researcher's selection of material for publication. Such ventriloquy, argues Fine, disguises `the usually unacknowledged stances of researchers who navigate and camouflage theory through the richness of ``native voices''' 􏰈Fine, 1994, p.22).

The argument that insiders within `disempowered' communities (or any other communities for that matter) should be researching and, where appropriate, giving public expression to their own experience is surely uncontroversial. In a context in which insider research has been negligible and hugely subordinated to waves of outsider research, there is a good case for taking practical steps to correct that balance and spare a community what can understandably be experienced as an increasingly oppressive relationship with research.

There are, however, at last three reasons in principle for keeping the possibility of outsider research open: (i) that such enquiry might enhance the understanding of the researcher; (ii) that it might enhance the understanding of the community itself; and (iii) that it might enhance the understanding of a wider public. There is no doubt a place for researching our own experience and that of our own communities, but surely we cannot be condemned lifelong to such social solipsism? Notwithstanding some postmodernist misgivings, `There is still a world out there, much to learn, much to discover; and the exploration of ourselves, however laudable in that at least it risks no new imperialistic gesture, is not, in the end, capable of sustaining lasting interest' (Patai, 1994, p. 67). The issue is not, however, merely one of satisfying curiosity. **There is a real danger that if we become persuaded that we cannot understand the experience of others and that `we have no right to speak for anyone but ourselves', then we will all too easily find ourselves** epistemologically and morally isolated**, furnished with a comfortable legitimation for** ignoring the condition of anyone but ourselves. This is not, any more than the paternalism of the powerful, the route to a more just society.

How, then can we reconcile the importance of (1) wider social understanding of the world of `disempowered' communities and of the structures which contribute to that disempowerment, (2) the openness of those communities and structures to the outsider researcher, and (3) the determination that the researcher should not wittingly or unwittingly reinforce that disempowerment? The literature (from which a few selected examples are quoted below) provides some clues as to the character of relations between researcher and researched which `emancipatory', `participatory' or `educative' research might take.

To begin with, **we need to re-examine the application of the notion of `property' to the ownership of knowledge**. In economic terms, knowledge is not a competitive good. It has the distinctive virtue that (at least in terms of its educative function) it can be infinitely distributed without loss to any of those who are sharing in it. Similarly **the researcher can acquire it from people without denying it to them and can return it enriched**. However, it is easy to neglect the processes of reporting back to people and sharing in knowledge and the importance which can be attached to this process by those concerned. For Smith, a Maori woman working with research students from the indigenous people of New Zealand, `Reporting back to the people is never a one-off exercise or a task that can be signed off on completion of the written report'. She describes how one of her students took her work back to the people she interviewed. `The family was waiting for her; they cooked food and made us welcome. We left knowing that her work will be passed around the family to be read and eventually will have a place in the living room along with other valued family books and family photographs' (Smith, 1999, pp. 15±16).

For some, what is required is a moving away from regarding research as a property and towards seeing it as a dialogic enquiry designed to assist the understanding of all concerned:

Educative research attempts to restructure the traditional relationship between researcher and `subject'. Instead of a one-way process where researchers extract data from `subjects', Educational Research encourages a dialogic process where participants negotiate meanings at the level of question posing, data collection and analysis . . . It . . . encourages participants to work together on an equal basis to reach a mutual understanding. Neither participant should stand apart in an aloof or judgmental manner; neither should be silenced in the process. (Gitlin and Russell, 1994, p. 185)

Instead, we should debate policies that produced the origins for oppression and formation of identity—appeals to experience are solipsistic in that we can’t refute your personal transformation

Craig Ireland, Assistant Professor, Dept. Of American Culture and Literature Bilkent University, 2004, The Subaltern Appeal to Experience: Self-Identity, Late Modernity, and the Politics of Immediacy, p. 162-77

Such subaltern theorizing, however, paints itself into an epistemological corner and partakes of the culture of immediacy when it conflates the disruptiveness of experience with its perceived immediacy. When carried out to its logical conclusion, such a conflation ends up fetishizing the supposed immediacy of the spatial and the material (such as that of the body), as if such material immediacy were the last possible enclave of resistance to the temporally extended ways of dominant metanarratives and as if it were the only legitimate ground from which counterhistories might be erected or counterhegemonic action mustered.

Now what is puzzling in all this is that subaltern theorizing should so insist on immediacy just as a culture of immediacy already seems all too ubiquitous and that immediacy should be expected to buttress the temporal extension of counterhegemonic micronarratives in the first place. More puzzling still is that the very concept of experience, beset as it has been by ambiguous political ramifications, should be so vehemently insisted upon by theories professing to be politically minded and that the role of experience in self-formation, subject as it is to the vicissitudes of historical change, should be paraded as the panacea for all subaltern ailments regardless of sociohistorical context. Because the temporal extension and mediation presupposed by experience can no longer be taken as given and seem instead to have shifted over the last few decades to a culture of immediacy, it is legitimate at this point to ask the following question: is it not possible that the subaltern appeal to immediate experience, instead of representing a laudable attempt to foil dominant discursive mediation and instead of proposing immediate experience as the material out of which is to be inductively constructed temporally extended counterhistory, in fact symptomatically represents an eroded capacity for sustaining mediation and temporal extension tout court?

But before we can answer this question, we must first consider yet another one: what is it that distinguishes the subaltern appeal to immediacy from similar theoretical enterprises? The hope that immediacy somehow holds the promise of the ideologically irreducible, after all, no less subtends other currents in theory of the Erfahrungshunger decades —currents that, by sharing a common concern for immediacy in spite of their otherwise incompatible tenets, suggest that the subaltern wager on immediate experience is not just the result of some Anglo-American empiricist heritage traceable to Locke. The appeal to immediacy seems instead to involve a more encompassing problem to which even recent currents in German aesthetics, for all their notorious disdain, since Hegel, for anything smacking of premature immediacy, themselves also testify. The Wareniisthetik of the 197os, for example, maintains that since temporal mediation itself harbours the potential for reification and commodification, resistance ought to be sought in the immediate and the punctual2 — a sentiment later echoed in Karl Heinz Bohrer's attempt of the 198os to reinstate the counterhegemonic potential of aesthetic experience with the category of "suddenness" (Plötzlichkeit), which he describes as "a discontinuity in the consciousness of time."3 Minimalism has likewise advocated a dissolute and decentred subject whose disparate punctual experiences, by the fact of their immediacy, can resist the coercive temporal sequentiality of social mediation,4 and of course for many of those who could be loosely referred to as poststructuralist, duration and temporal extension are but coercive operations bent on manhandling the singular and muffling heterogeneities, as can be seen from Lyotard's neo-Nietzschean defense of ephemeral "libidinal intensities" to Deleuze and Guattari's later celebration of "the schizophrenic fragmentation of experience and loss of identity ... as a liberation from the self forged by the Oedipus complex."5 But although subaltern experience-oriented theories and certain currents in aesthetics and French philosophy all wager on immediacy, subaltern cultural theory of the Thompsonian vein stands out on one crucial point: immediacy is not proposed as a new summum bonum that would allow for an anti-oedipal self to punctually escape commodification or as a novum organism that would foster what some, in reference to the more extreme of poststructuralist excesses, have called "the ontologisation of irreducible plurality."6 Immediacy is proposed instead as but p. 164 a moment (whether "strategic" or not) to which must be appended the retrospective devising of counterhistories — histories without which an agent of political change cannot emerge and without which subaltern specificity cannot yield a sense of identity. John Berger, Thompson, and others, to whom much of subaltern theory is in debt, tirelessly stress that a people or a class which is cut off from its own past is far less free to choose and act as a people or class than one that has been able to situate itself in history"7 and that "if we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude of experiences."8 The immediacy advocated by certain strains of cultural, North American feminist, and subaltern theory is not meant to supplant or evade temporal extension as such, and even less does it propose a new postmodern self dispersed within punctual immediacy; it wagers instead on immediate experience in the hope that such a disruption of dominant historiography and ideology might assist in the forging and consolidation of subaltern counterhistories. Since such subaltern experience-oriented theories are after all concerned with problems of agency, it is to be expected that they should have little sympathy for the temporally dispersed self proposed by some as a subversive alternative to temporally extended phallocracy or logophilia. A self so dispersed, however deferential it might be to the heterogeneity of the irreducibly particular, is not exactly amenable to even the semblance of concerted political action — indeed, "such an agent, in some of its versions at least," as Terry Eagleton wryly puts it, "would hardly seem self-collected enough to topple a bottle off a wall, let alone bring down the state."9 However subversive it claims to be and whatever it exactly is that it claims to subvert, the logophobic fetishization of discontinuity and dispersal has little in common with the sort of self-formation that subaltern appeals to experience hope to foster. Such appeals to experience indeed seek to reinforce, and not dissipate, the temporal continuity required for forging counterhistories. But at hand in the subaltern appeal to experience is not just the proclivity of a certain school of thought for the temporal extension needed for praxis and agency. By the fact of their popularization and prevalence in mainstream discourse, let alone their concrete embodiment by new social movements, such experience-oriented theories also testify to a generalized social demand for the sustaining, not the "subverting," of temporal extension. It is indeed significant that while theories of experience of the Erfahrungshunger decades have all been concerned with immediacy and temporality in one form or another, it has not been the celebration of immediacy for its own sake that has caught or driven the popular imagination: the frisson of libidinal intensities, the titillation of anti-oedipal schizophrenic depersonalization and pliitzlich aesthetic experiences have aroused the euphoric enthusiasm of only a very few — an academic and artistic few, at that — and have galvanized yet fewer into taking to the streets in their defense or tossing about confetti in their celebration. What has galvanized entire populations, on the other hand, and what is seductive about various social movements, whether in the neoconservative-traditionalist vein of national history and foundational myths, in the subaltern vein of counterhistories, or even in the regressive neo-eschatological vein of other-worldly cults, from born again Christian fundamentalists to Solar Temple initiates, has been the semblance of temporal extension provided by such social movements — an extension without which not only are national history, counterhistory and history tout court unlikely but also without which the very structure of the modern self becomes precarious at best. Andreas Huyssen rightly observes that current obsessions with the past — museum mania, returns to Tradition, ethnic tales of origins and genealogy, or even the recent fad of historical films catering to literary classics or to legends — turn out to be but "an expression of the basic human need to live in extended structures of temporality, however they be organized."' The magnetism of many of the new social movements resides less in the resistance to hegemony such movements claim to offer than in the semblance of temporal extension they provide. Rather than perpetuate the notion that various forms of identity politics are attempts at cultural resistance, it is perhaps more appropriate to view them instead as a response to an increasingly generalized condition, namely, the erosion of the sociohistorical preconditions for a modern sense of self. It is this latter problem that is both at work and at stake in the subaltern appeal to experience, and not some poststructuralist stance that celebrates, with much fanfare but little substance, the subversive potential of a self that, presumably p. 166 unshackled from the manhandling ways of temporal extension, logophilia, and other insidious ontotheological schemes, can at long last say "Yea" to Dionysian becoming within an ubiquitous immediacy." That a certain obsession with temporal extension should so permeate academic and para-academic identity politics ought not to surprise: although the self of the last few decades may not have reached the state of disorganization comically portrayed above by Eagleton, it has nevertheless become more dispersed than its modern homologue. An extended present indeed so narrows the temporal horizon and thus so fosters a culture of immediacy that the diachronically extended temporality of modernity unavoidably gives way to what Daniel Bell was the first to diagnose some four decades ago as an "end of linearity."2 Such a situadon is hardly conducive to forging a sustained sense of self across the temporal manifold. In the synchronous space of an extended present, which is marked by the evacuation of all but immediate or short-term considerations and where the past is consigned to a mere archival record unrelated to present concerns, individuals, let alone the larger entities of ethnic groups and classes, readily lend themselves to dispersal into a "series of pure and unrelated presents in time."13 It is to such changes in the organization of a sense of self that various theorists of (late) modernity point when they remind us of parallel changes in the dominant patterns of late-modern psychopathology: dysfunctions in the typically modern depth/surface opposition at work in the conflict between a tyrannical superego and a hapless ego in the face of a yet insufficiently tamed id, expressed in such Victorian pathologies as the hysteria that Freud studied at length, have been lately displaced by an increased incidence of pathologies not of a strong ego but of depersonalization, such as anxiety, schizophrenia, and psychosis.14 With good reason it has repeatedly been suggested that the dispersed self of poststructuralism ought to be seen less as a desideratum to be cultivated and still less as a subversive entity to be celebrated than as a factual description of how the self, over the last three decades, has increasingly become organized (or rather, disorganized) into a temporally uncoordinated aggregate of the disparate.15 At this point, Lacan's clinical definition of schizophrenia as a breakdown in the syntagmatic chain of signifiers that constitute meaning and Deleuze and Guatttari's subsequent edification of this definition into the regulative ideal of a new and presumably subversive form of subjectivity seem useful less as a diagnostic tool for psychopathology or as an emancipatory ideal than as a suggestive metaphor for the current state of the self. But that the past, present, and future may be tenuously related to one another, if not altogether engulfed in an extended present, does not entail that narratives can no longer be mustered and deployed. What it does imply, however, is that without the selectivity provided by a future-oriented temporality, without a means to reduce complexity, modern temporal divergence and extension can so contract that narratives may no longer truly help in the organization of the self beyond the immediate and the short term. The paradox of the temporality of late modernity, which Huyssen, Jameson, and others rightly prefer to call late capitalism, is indeed that "the more the present of advanced consumer p. 168 capitalism prevails over past and future, sucking both into an expanding synchronous space ... the weaker is its grip on itself, the less stability or identity it provides for contemporary subjects."' 6 For subaltern experience-oriented theories and their para-academic homologues, then, resistance to dominant mediation is to be mustered by an appeal to, and certainly not the appeal of immediate experience: a group's immediate experiences are sought not for their own sake but as a means to the inductive construction of counterhistories, which, in turn, will "empower" a group by articulating its interests and enabling its agency. But just as the dispersed poststructuralist self is more a description of the current state of the self than it is a subversive ideal to be reached, likewise is the subaltern insistence on immediate experience less a programmatic statement than it is a symptom of the current state of temporality. When invoked as a counterdiscursive and counterhegemonic ground for resistance, the perceived immediacy of experience, as we saw earlier, becomes readily endowed with the palpable concreteness of materiality, the very resilience of which is seen as a source of resistance to the meddlesome ways of temporally extended dominant discursive regimes. But this very insistence on nondiscursive and material immediacy, and this even to the point of retreating to the perceived irreducible immediacy of material bodily experiences (or, in a para-academic parallel, to the physical marks of ethnicity), underscores the increased disconnection of such immediacy from the second term of the subaltern equation, namely, that such immediacy lend itself to the mediating operations of temporally extended counterhistories. The presumed spatial immediacy of the materially concrete can indeed only tenuously lend itself to temporal mediation, however local the operation or subversive the manoeuver, if temporal extension itself has been narrowed, as it has in an extended present, to the point of an ubiquitous immediacy. Since the result, after all, of an ubiquitous immediacy is that we are left to wallow in an aggregate of the disparate (in the manner of a Lacanian schizophrenic reduced to "pure material signifiers" bereft of signification or to a series of "pure and unrelated presents in time") and since an extended present has increasingly become the dominant mode of temporality over the last few decades, then it seems that the appeal to immediate experience is less a categorical imperative enjoining us to boycott the ideologically tainted schemes of temporally extended mediation than it is instead a symptom of the result, already at hand, of an ubiquitous immediacy. The subaltern appeal to immediate experience is not merely a reaction to the swashbuckling ways of dominant discursive regimes, nor is it a matter of purifying or cleansing mediation by inductively or empirically reconstructing it anew, grass-roots style, from the material ground (of a groupuscule's immediate experiences) upwards; still less is it an attempt to flee a proliferation of disembodied media images by seeking refuge in palpable nondiscursive materiality; nor, finally, is it a nostalgic yearning for "presence" within a long and ignominious history of metaphysics. If anything, the subaltern insistence on immediate experience instead symptomatically testifies to the inability to go beyond inchoate immediacy, and the wager on immediate experience ought accordingly to be seen less as an attempt to foster the immediate than as a testimony to the growing incapacity of the late-modern self, today, to be otherwise than immediate. After all, an extended present not only narrows temporal horizons and, in so doing, undermines the role of experience in the modern diachronically extended sense of self; by so undermining future-orientedness, which for the last two centuries has assured a horizon from which selections can be made, complexity contained, and a sense of self maintained, the extended present also erodes the capacity for reckoning with what is temporally distant and extended, whether towards the past or towards the future and whether in the name of metanarratives or of biographical narratives. As Gadamer put it, "he who is without horizon is he who cannot see far enough and who thus overestimates what is close at hand."'? It is just such an overestimation of "what is close at hand" that informs the subaltern appeal to immediate experience. An extended present not only undermines the centrality of experience in self-formation; it also raises doubts about how the very structure of the modern self can last today under the guise that it has had for the preceding two centuries. The continuity suggested by Taylor between the late-eighteenth-century and the present sense of self spans, at best, the period from the late eighteenth century to the 197os. The last three decades have, after all, witnessed a shift from the temporally extended Fordism or Keynesianism of fixed capital to the narrowed temporal horizon of flexible accumulation and the unfettered laissez-faire of speculative (or "casino") capital and from the unproblematic presupposition of experience in self-formation to a vituperative defense of, hunger for, and appeal to experience. The appeal to immediate experience involves more than a concern for guaranteeing subaltern agency or for changing P. 170 the given: the very insistence with which this appeal is bandied about by both academic and para-academic politics of identity instead testifies to a more encompassing problem to which it attempts to respond but which it fails to directly name or thematize — the problem of the late-modern self and whether the role of experience in self-formation may no longer have been as predominant over the last three decades as it had been over the last two centuries. SOCIOHISTORICAL REPRISE Those who appeal to experience in the name of subaltern agency, no less than the neo-Althusserians and poststructuralists who deride such maneuvering, all point a leer insu to a historical issue that cannot be addressed by simply tinkering with current cultural problems or epistemological paradigms. But such a failure to historicize the role expected of experience in self-formation begets yet another unaddressed problem — the problem of socioeconomic class. We have earlier seen that modern future-oriented temporality, along with the accentuated role of experience in self-formation that it enables, is not only a historical phenomenon that surfaces with consistency at the turn of the eighteenth century — it is also a phenomenon that initially manifests itself within a very limited segment of the population, namely, the rising late-eighteenth-century industrial bourgeoisie. Although such an issue has yet to be dealt with by those most ensconced in debates over experience and agency, the class origins of an accentuated role of experience in self-formation has already been pointed out by various theorists of modernity, albeit only in periphery to their larger argument. Habermas's Habilitationschrift, concerned as it is with tracing the origin and prospects of rational argumentation within a public sphere, shows en passant that as a result of an interaction between the emergent Intimsphare of the bourgeois conjugal family and the budding literary public sphere, the eighteenth-century bourgeoisie could articulate its own experiences for itself and, in so doing, eventually consolidate itself and rise to prominence as a specific class with identifiable interests. '8 Others have since shown that it was only when the midto late-eighteenthcentury bourgeoisie, through the mediation at first of the literary and later of the political public sphere, began to understand itself as a specific class that a specifically bourgeois sense of self emerged — a sense of self characterized, inter alia, as an interior enclave of irreducible individuality opposed to an external world, as an inner core in need of future-oriented expressive development, and as a reflexive self-narration sustained by the integration and processing of the unexpected into a biographical narrative of cumulative experiences.'9 Others still have shown that early-nineteenth-century national literary historiography did much, with its tales of emergent nationhood, to manufacture what Jusdanis calls a "network of shared experiences" that in turn played no negligible role in the consolidation of that other bourgeois phenomenon, the modern nation-state." Beyond the specific issue of experience, numerous other theories concerned with the historical emergence of the modern self, from studies of the history of private life and civil society to works on the rise of the novel and aesthetic discourse, have likewise traced specifically to the late-eighteenth-century bourgeoisie that which, in certain quarters, often parades itself today as modern self-identity tout court. Such a focus on the historicity, as well as the class origins, of the modern self are not recent — they can be found no less in Lukács's later work and Goldmann's Pour une sociologic du roman than in the early work of Habermas and the recent work of Charles Taylor. Why, then, has such self-professed interdisciplinary and historically minded inquiry as that of E.P. Thompson and the History Workshops of the 197os, of the Alltagsgeschichte of the 198os, and of the subaltern inquiry of the 199os to this day so far failed to consider, in their attempts to foster counterhistory, the class origins of the very modern self to which their appeals to experience essentially cater? Does such an oversight represent a denial of the current self's prospects for agency, or does it simply point to the inevitable shortcomings of "presentist" tendencies in much of recent cultural and subaltern theory? Whatever the case may be, and although at this point such questions are best left open, it nevertheless remains that what is by convention called modern self-identity and modern temporality, far from representing a P. 172 generalized social phenomenon to be vaguely imputed to the advent of modernity, on the contrary turns out to have initially been a specifically bourgeois phenomenon. If it is within the midto late-eighteenth-century bourgeoisie that the contours of what many call the modern self or modern subjectivity were first delineated and if such an initially bourgeois phenomenon has frequently been equated by the history of ideas with the modern self as such, it has nevertheless been only gradually over the last two centuries that this sense of self and temporality eventually imposed itself upon the rest of the population, slowly percolating downward to an emergent working class no longer tied to (or rather ejected from) the land, migrating upward to a declining nobility that was eventually assimilated by the bourgeoisie through intermarriage and economic necessity, and finally, expanding laterally to Eastern Europe (and, later, to colonies across the globe) as a precondition at first for capital accumulation and, later, for cooperative entrepreneurial ventures." So while it is true, as Taylor puts it, that "by the turn of the eighteenth century, something recognizably like the modern self is in process of constitution," it is also no less true that those initially under its sway, as Taylor hastens to add, were "drawn from the educated classes of Europe and America, and were even a smaller proportion of these as one proceeded eastward, where these were in turn less significant in their societies. Our history since 1800 has been the slow spreading outward and downward of the new modes of thought and sensibility to new nations and classes."22 The future-oriented temporality initially at work within the emergent bourgeoisie, after all, differed not only from the temporality of the courtly and court-aspiring classes, whose vested interests lay in the perpetuation of the present social order through the continuing legitimation of the past; it also stood in sharp contrast with the temporality of the craftsman and artisan, who, well into the eighteenth century, were no less materially insecure and no less entrapped within a narrow temporal horizon than were the peasant or migrant labourer, as the work of Braudel has of course shown. The Verlagssystem, or "putting-out system," may well have shifted from domestic seasonal wage labour, as dictated by lulls in agricultural activity, to a more permanent form of wage labour during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century; yet those working in the new but increasingly predominant cash nexus differed little from their predecessors working in the framework of customary feudal law. So class specific has been bourgeois future-oriented temporality and the sense of self it informs, in fact, that before it became so hegemonic by the early to mid-twentieth century as to be conflated with the modern self as such, it tended to spark violent reactions during periods of revolutionary ferment, as can be seen by the routine shooting of clocks, whether in 1830 or 1848, and as can be seen more tellingly still in the first symbolic gesture, in 1871, of the Commune de Paris, which sought to establish a radically new form of nonbourgeois temporality by toppling the Colonne de VendOme — a move bemoaned by the Parnassian poet and anti-communard Catulle Mendes, who was of irreproachable bourgeois sympathies, as an abolishing of history that "makes for a timeless present, an annihilated past, and an uncertain future."23 Alternative forms both of temporality (such as exemplary, cyclical, or eschatological time) and of self-formation (such as that of the extended family of agricultural society or of the caste system of premodern society) persisted within the nonbourgeois population well beyond the late eighteenth century. Future-orientedness and the modern self it informs were, after all, not some cataclysmic mutation that suddenly ensnared a hapless population in its entirety: "if modernity was to mark a condition of experience," Peter Wagner reminds us, "then the qualifications required to show its existence were largely absent in the allegedly modern societies during the nineteenth century, and for a still fairly large number of people during the first half of the twentieth century."24 To be sure, with the intensification of enclosures in the seventeenth and eighteenth P. 174 centuries, with the resulting influx of landless migrant workers into burgeoning industrial zones, and with the generalization of functional differentiation as a mode of social organization, the circumscription of individual identity in terms of function instead of caste began to extend to increasingly large segments of the population. But such a process did not, overnight, extend the bourgeois sense of temporality and self to these increasing segments of the population: for many during this period, on the contrary, the migration from the country to the city changed very little with regard to their actual experience or expectations; one mode of labouring was merely exchanged for another, and, as David Landes remarks, the "factory worker could be, and usually was, as tradition-bound in his expectations for himself and his children as the peasant."25 And such tradition-bound milieux, as we have seen, hardly encouraged the opening of the future, and still less did they foster an accentuated role of experience in self-formation. Regarding this gradual extension of bourgeois subjectivity to the general population, Ehrenberg's work goes so far as to maintain that what in the early nineteenth century had remained the province of a few literati and a small bourgeois elite — that is, individual futureoriented itineraries based, inter alia, on expectations of upward social mobility and individual future-oriented self-development — was so gradual in its percolation to the population at large that it became a generalized phenomenon only during the trente glorieuses of welfare capitalism, at which point the future-oriented predictability of bourgeois returns from investments was duplicated in the worker's state-sponsored predictable pension plans, unemployment guarantees, and access to postsecondary education and at which point the last vestiges of traditional or premodern sociability and subjectivity gave way to their modern homologues.26 The relation between experience and self-formation ought not to be edified, then, from a sociohistorical phenomenon into an anthropological constant that ignores class boundaries. Yet it is just such an edification that has been at work in those strands of subaltern theory that most vocally appeal to experience. Just as much of subaltern theory anachronistically mimics early-modern nation-building by resorting to a Gramscian notion of subalternity that, in the name "of constructing a historical movement and providing for its self-awareness as a historical protagonist," as Terry Cochran notes, unknowingly "operates according to the same economy of hegemony as the state,"27 likewise do subaltern appeals to experience presume that the modern sense of self is a universal human condition instead of a historical product and that there is a necessary correlation between experience and group specificity. Such subaltern maneuvering essentially, but unintentionally, maintains that what initially applied to the emergent eighteenth-century bourgeoisie holds for today's subaltern groupuscule. Experience has been so inextricably entwined with issues of modern self-formation that, by retrospective projection, it appears to many as an anthropological constant beyond the vagaries of historical change. But even those who acknowledge the historicity of modes of self-formation have often fallen prey to yet another historical oversight: they implicitly endorse an association between, if not a conflation of, the bourgeois self and the modern self tout court. It is here that subaltern appeals of the Thompsonian persuasion most flagrantly err. By transposing into a current context or, worse, by naturalizing what took place at a specific historical juncture within a specific social class, such maneuvering fails to consider the extent to which may or may not be viable today those very sociohistorical vectors that, at first for the late-eighteenth-century bourgeoisie and, subsequently, for Western industrial populations at large, allowed for experience to play a constitutive role in self-formation to begin with.

It is in just such a failure to recognize the class origins of this relation between experience and self-formation that the erring ways of much of subaltern theory are not only at their most flagrant but also at their most self-defeating. For all its claims to being historically minded and for all its initial debt to problems of class (later to shift to ethnic and gender issues), the subaltern appeal to experience itself remains beyond the reach of historical and class analysis. The ironic twist to this is that the structure of bourgeois (let alone of eurocentric or albinocratic) self-formation ends up being unwittingly reproduced and mimicked, albeit on a smaller and more regional scale, within those very counterhistories and micronarratives that were supposed to differentiate the subaltern from bourgeois hegemony to begin with. **At this point, the very raison d'être of the subaltern appeal to experience**, namely, **that subalternity** discover and **reinforce its own specificity**, **ends up effectively sabotaged** — unless, of course, such subaltern theory recognizes, which it rarely does, the extent to which subalternity may be increasingly difficult to demarcate from the bourgeois (or albinocratic or phallocratic) version of the self that over the last two centuries has, after all, no less supplanted alternative modes of self-formation than capitalism has replaced alternative economic systems.

**By failing to sufficiently** **historicize the association between experience and self-formation and, worse, by failing to consider the** class **origins of** such an **association**, much of **subaltern theorizing unsurprisingly finds itself increasingly disconnected from those in whose name it professes to speak**.28 In the case, say, of feminism — which has recently come under increased scrutiny by class-oriented and historically minded feminists themselves, from Rita Felski and Roxanne Rimstead to Barbara Ehrenreich — attempts at countering the effects of gender inequality by proposing, say, that seminars be renamed ovulars may have done much to appease the conscience of those concerned with being subversive, yet they have done little for improving the economic and social lot of those women who continue to earn roughly seventy cents for every dollar earned by their male counterparts for the same work and with the same qualifications and who, as members of a workforce only slightly cheaper and less docile than the child labour that the West now subcontracts for many of its industrial tasks, from Nike to Wall-Mart, continue to be nick-led and dimed to death, to use Ehrenreich expression.29

Cultural issues can, admittedly, help redress certain wrongs, but they can also shield those promoting such cultural redress, with their professional academic status and relatively stable salaries, from the socioeconomic realities of precisely those whom they claim to represent along ethnic or gender lines yet whom they neglect along class lines — from the socioeconomic realities of the secretaries, janitors, house cleaners, child day-care workers, and imported nannies who directly or indirectly serve them yet whose need for a less precarious living wage has been supported and publicized, tellingly enough, not by academic colloquia dealing with differance or postcolonial otherness, but by labour and student activism. Statistically and demographically speaking, few have been liberated by a tinkering with language and culture alone, and **cultural determinism is no less one-sided, hegemonic, and narrow-minded than the economic determinism** that it has diabolized over the last three decades. It is indeed important not to forget that many of the notions devised with the initially laudable intent, in the 196os and 197os, to "give a voice" to the oppressed have since the 1980s (and particularly glaringly since the iggos) become, as Masao Miyoshi somewhat caustically put it, little more than academic and middle class chic: self-proclaimed subversive theoretical disciplines such as subaltern studies and postcolonialism are indeed but "a luxury largely irrelevant to those who live under the most wretched conditions," for "neither nativism, nor pluralism are in their thoughts, only survival."3

### 2nc t version

Their method is compatible and enhanced by engagement with the topic—the question is which forms of knowledge we use, which means T version of the aff solves.

Medina, your author, ‘11

Jose, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/philosophy/\_people/faculty\_files/\_medinafoucaultstudies.pdf

How do we fight against power on this view? Not by trying to escape it (as if liberation consisted in standing outside power altogether), but rather, by turning power(s) against itself(themselves), or by mobilizing some forms of power against others. Similarly, how do we fight against established and official forms of knowledge when they are oppressive? Not by trying to escape knowledge altogether, but rather, by turning knowledge(s) against itself(themselves), or by mobilizing some forms of knowledge against others. The critical battle against the monopolization of knowledge-producing practices involves what Foucault calls ‚an insurrection of subjugated knowledges.‛ When it comes to knowledge of the past and the power associated with it, this battle involves resisting the ‚omissions‛ and distortions of official histories, returning to lost voices and forgotten experiences, relating to the past from the perspective of the present in an alternative (out-of-the-mainstream) way. And this is precisely what the Foucaultian notions of ‚counter-history‛ and ‚counter-memory‛ offer.

**It’s empirically effective and doesn’t cause cooption**

Medina, your author, ‘11

Jose, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/philosophy/\_people/faculty\_files/\_medinafoucaultstudies.pdf

Different experiential and agential standpoints can make different contributions to genealogical investigations and even offer alternative genealogical histories. Given the right socio-political conditions, the critical reconstruction and reevaluation of our beliefs can (and should) be reopened and resumed whenever new standpoints appear on the scene, but also whenever we discover that certain voices or perspectives were never considered or were not given equal weight. Thus it is not surprising that populations feel particularly compelled to reopen the conversation about their past when the socio-political conditions change in such a way that voices and perspectives that had previously been ignored or not fully taken into consideration can now participate differently in the reconstruction of their past because they enjoy a different kind of agency. For example, this has been happening periodically in different ways and on different fronts in the public debates about past dictatorial regimes that have taken place in countries such as Argentina, Chile, or Spain.45 In these countries different publics have demanded a sustained effort to critically revisit the reconstruction of a shared past in the light of evidence, testimony, and articulations or interpretations of facts that challenge established beliefs or are simply not integrated in the collective memory and ‚official history‛ in circulation. There is a plurality of lived pasts and of knowledges about the past that resist unification and create friction. But what are we to make of this resistance and friction? Pluralistic views of truth and knowledge make productive use of those forms of epistemic friction and resistance, whereas monistic views regard epistemic diversity always as a problem. I will restrict myself here to pluralistic views, but I want to emphasize that different kinds of epistemic pluralism involve different normative attitudes with respect to epistemic diversity and the kinds of epistemic friction and resistance that heterogeneous perspectives can exert.

### at: w/m—wpa

The “war powers authority” of the President is his Commander-in-Chief authority

Gallagher, Pakistan/Afghanistan coordination cell of the U.S. Joint Staff, Summer 2011

(Joseph, “Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication,” *Parameters*, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2011summer/Gallagher.pdf)

First, consider the constitutional issue of power imbalance. Central to the Constitution is the foundational principle of power distribution and provisions to check and balance exercises of that power. This clearly intended separation of powers across the three branches of government ensures that no single federal officeholder can wield an inordinate amount of power or influence. The founders carefully crafted constitutional war-making authority with the branch most representative of the people—Congress.4

The Federalist Papers No. 51, “The Structure of Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments,” serves as the wellspring for this principle. Madison insisted on the necessity to prevent any particular interest or group to trump another interest or group.5 This principle applies in practice to all decisions of considerable national importance. **Specific to war powers authority**, **the Constitution empowers the legislative branch with the authority to declare war but endows the Executive with the authority to act as Commander-in-Chief.**6 This construct designates Congress, not the president, as the primary decisionmaking body to commit the nation to war—a decision that ultimately requires the consent and will of the people in order to succeed. By vesting the decision to declare war with Congress, the founders underscored their intention to engage the people—those who would ultimately sacrifice their blood and treasure in the effort.

“War powers authority” covers military operations—

Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History 2012

(Oxford University Press via Oxford Reference, Georgetown University library)

**The War Power in the Twenty-First Century**.

The presumption of a dual war-making role appears to have been eclipsed since 2001, during which time it has been argued by some that the president stands supreme in his war-making capacity as **commander in chief** and that he has no obligation to share such power with Congress. This view assumes that the president has all the requisite and necessary **authority to order whatever he deems necessary in terms of military operations** and that Congress can claim only the power to declare war; the resulting operational conduct is strictly a presidential prerogative. Opponents of this interpretation point to all the additional powers dealing with the military that are vested in Congress.

### 2nc at: case DA

process comes before product—inscribing a set ethical outcome at the outset destroys agency

Race and Pedagogy Project, University of California at Santa Barbara, 2005, Jay, Gregory and Gerald Graff. “A Critique of Critical Pedagogy”, http://bit.ly/11e8uXY

Jay and Graff argue that **critical pedagogy is problematic** because it claims to liberate students but in fact only reinforces the “banking” dynamic by forcing progressive ideologies upon students, enforcing a predetermined outcome based upon an assumed true position on the part of the teacher. Oppositional pedagogy makes the same mistake. Instead, the authors recommend a method of “teaching the conflicts,” where the unilateral teacher’s authority in the classroom is balanced by a “counterauthority,” thus opening the possibility for multiple points of view, all of which are laid open to critique. Suggestions for practical application follow. Freire’s close adherence to the Marxian-Hegelian master-slave dialectic, in which all desire on the part of the oppressed is inevitably formed by the oppressor, suffers from a double bind, giving power only to the “liberatory” teacher, who must impose liberation upon the oppressed, freeing them from false consciousness by persuading them of his (tacitly correct) point of view. In other words, **only students persuaded to the radical point of view of the teacher can be expressing an authentic desire**. “This assumption spares Freire from ever having to consider an unpleasant possibility: that what ‘the people’ authentically prefer might conflict with the pedagogy of the oppressed. The assumption is that, deep down, in our most authentic selves, we are all Christian or existentialist Marxists. According to Freire’s model, the resistance of students to the pedagogy of the oppressed would be taken seriously only as a symptom of their woefully mystified consciousness. The teacher would treat their ideas as the suspect products of their political unconscious, not as arguments that might have their own rationality, persuasiveness, and basis in experience. Needless to say, the possibility never arises that the radical teacher might have his or her mind seriously challenged by the conservative student.” (203) The authors are careful to state that they are both progressives themselves; their **opposition to critical pedagogy rises not from a desire to maintain conservative systems, but rather to avoid the** reinscription of oppression **that** they believe **critical** and oppositional **pedagogies promote by silencing and denying authentic agency to the student who has an alternative point of view**. “The failure to take seriously the objections of the unpersuaded seems to us a serious limitation of critical pedagogy both on ethical and strategic grounds.” (204) The authors further attack critical pedagogy by noting a contextual problem: “Freire’s assumption of a student body that will readily accept a description of themselves as the oppressed is understandable in the original context of Freire’s work with Latin American peasants. But Freire’s model encounters serious problems when it is transplanted to a North American campus, where not all students are obviously members of an oppressed class, and where even many of those who might plausibly fit that designation refuse to accept it.” (204) And later, “In our view, the definition of categories such as the disenfranchised and the dominant, oppressed and oppressor, should be a product of the pedagogical process, not its unquestioned premise.” (207) In contrast, “teaching the conflicts” allows for the autonomy and freedom of the subject through the building of discourse communities which go outside the tacit authority of the teacher, and even outside of the traditional boundaries of the classroom. “To be sure, there is a useful place for the ‘collaborative learning’ strategy of decentering authority by breaking the class into small groups. To decenter authority in a fully useful way, however, and transcend the double bind of radical pedagogy, our classrooms need not just to diffuse authority, but to introduce counterauthorities. And this for us means moving beyond the limitations of the isolated course, a model that unwittingly echoes the myth of the unified subject.” (210) **Students should be** presented with multiple viewpoints in any given classroom **and invited to support or contest all of them**. This does not remove politics from the classroom**, but** in fact **makes it truly possible.** “**Real political** opposition and **change** cannot be accomplished by isolated individuals or random acts of critique. Unlike critique, politics is a social enterprise. It requires that persons form communities based on some degree of trust and faith and. mutual respect – even for those with whom one is ideologically at odds.” (208)

### 2nc at: roleplaying bad

Arguing that a current government policy is bad is not roleplaying

Scott Harris, Director of Debate, Kansas University, 2013, This Ballot, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.0

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor. This idea that debate is about role playing being a part of the government puzzles me greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now never once have I role played being part of the government. When I debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott Harris has formed many opinions about what the government and other institutions should or should not do without ever role playing being part of those institutions. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated. I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about the things their government does. I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. I have no idea at all why it would be oppressive for someone to form an opinion about whether or not they think the government should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made during the NCAA tournament. If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

Analysis of policy is particularly empowering, even if we’re not the USFG

**Shulock 99**

Nancy, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC POLICY --- professor of Public Policy and Administration and director of the Institute for Higher Education Leadership & Policy (IHELP) at Sacramento State University, The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 18, No. 2, 226–244 (1999)

In my view, none of these radical changes is necessary. **As interesting as our politics might be with the kinds of changes outlined by proponents of** participatory and **critical policy analysis,** **we do not need these changes to justify our investment in policy analysis.** **Policy analysis already involves discourse, introduces ideas** into politics, **and affects policy outcomes**. The problem is not that policymakers refuse to understand the value of traditional policy analysis or that policy analysts have not learned to be properly interactive with stakeholders and reflective of multiple and nontechnocratic perspectives. The problem, in my view, is only that policy analysts, policymakers, and observers alike do not recognize policy analysis for what it is. **Policy analysis has changed**, right along with the policy process, to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the discourse that shapes citizen preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality in an increasingly complex political environment. Regardless of what the textbooks say, there does not need to be a client in order for ideas from policy analysis to resonate through the policy environment.10¶ Certainly there is room to make our politics more inclusive. But **those critics who see policy analysis as a tool of the power elite might be less concerned if they understood that analysts are only adding to the debate**—they are unlikely to be handing ready-made policy solutions to elite decisionmakers for implementation. Analysts themselves might be more contented if they started appreciating the appropriation of their ideas by the whole gamut of policy participants and stopped counting the number of times their clients acted upon their proposed solutions. And **the cynics disdainful of the purported objectivism of analysis might relax if analysts themselves would acknowledge that they are seeking not truth**, **but to elevate the level of debate with a compelling, evidence-based presentation of their perspectives. Whereas critics call**, **unrealistically** in my view, **for analysts to** present competing perspectives on an issue or to “**design a discourse among multiple perspectives,” I see no reason why an individual analyst must do this** when multiple perspectives are already in abundance, brought by multiple analysts. If we would acknowledge that policy analysis does not occur under a private, contractual process whereby hired hands advise only their clients, we would not worry that clients get only one perspective.¶ **Policy analysis is used, far more extensively than is commonly believed**. Its **use could be appreciated and expanded if policymakers, citizens, and analysts themselves began to present it more accuratel**y, not as a comprehensive, problem-solving, scientific enterprise, but **as a contributor to informed discourse**. For years Lindblom [1965, 1968, 1979, 1986, 1990] has argued that we should understand policy analysis for the limited tool that it is—just one of several routes to social problem solving, and an inferior route at that. Although I have learned much from Lindblom on this odyssey from traditional to interpretive policy analysis, my point is different. Lindblom sees analysis as having a very limited impact on policy change due to its ill-conceived reliance on science and its deluded attempts to impose comprehensive rationality on an incremental policy process. I, with the benefit of recent insights of Baumgartner, Jones, and others into the dynamics of policy change, see that **even with** these **limitations, policy analysis can have a major impact on policy. Ideas, aided by institutions and embraced by citizens, can reshape the policy landscape. Policy analysis can supply the ideas.**

### at: roleplay = passivity

DEBATE roleplay specifically activates agency

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish

Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of

Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have

taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the

Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant

professor.

Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

## 1NR

### k

Gut check – he’s writing in ceasefire magazine

Here’s a direct quote

According to Deleuze and Guattari, war is not the aim of the war-machine (except when it is captured by the state); rather, war-machines tend to end up in a situation of war with states because of the incommensurability of the war-machine with the state and with striated space. War-machines end up in conflict with states because their goal is the ‘deterritorialisation’ of the rigid fixities of state space, often to create space for difference or for particular ways of life. Think for instance of squatters’ movements: in themselves they do not aim for conflict, but rather, seek different kinds of arrangements of space by forming new combinations of unused geographical spaces with otherwise ‘spaceless’ social groups. Yet such movements are often forced into conflict with the machinery of state repression because the state ignores, or refuses to recognise these new articulations. As I write this, the JB Spray squat in Nottingham is continuing a campaign of resistance to reoccupation by state forces acting on behalf of capitalist owners who have no intent of putting the space to use. This is a struggle I would very much encourage readers to support (see this article and related links for details; contact 07817493824 or email jbspray[at]hotmail.co.uk). It is also a clear, local example of how autonomous social movements are forced into conflict by the state’s drive to repress difference.

### militarism

Their Stanford evidence – they cut it off before the conclusion – frames the need to cause violence in hyper-masculinist terms that lead to suicide vanguard politics – also collapses the economy

BLACK GUERRILLA WARFARE: STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Author(s): MAX STANFORD 70

Source: The Black Scholar, Vol. 2, No. 3, THE BLACK SOLDIER (November 1970), pp. 30-38

These powers are, one, the power to stop the machinery of government - that is, the power to cause chaos, and make the situation such that nothing runs. Two, is the power to hurt the economy. With black people creating mass chaos - especially in the major urban areas in the North - and disrupting the agricultural setup in the South, the economy of the oppressor would come to almost a standstill. Three, is the power of unleashing violence. This is the power that black people have to tear up "Charlie's" house. This is something that probably every Asian, African and Latin American revolutionary wished he could do. But this goody is left to the Afro-Ameri- can. All Afro-Americans must begin to think like guerilla fighters, since we are all "blood brothers" in the struggle. Let us learn from our mistakes in the past. Ap- pealing to a power structure does no good. The only thing that power reacts to is more power. If we don't think we can win, then there is no use in trying. Cowards give up when the odds look bad. A guerilla fighter knows he or she is right and attempts to win no matter what the odds are. Many of us think we can create chaos, but can't take state power. This is not true. Others say we cannot be successful withouthe physi- cal help of our Asian, African, and Latin American revolutionary brothers. This is also a degree of defeatism. It is true that our struggle is part of a world black revolution, and we must unite with the "Bandung" forces, but it is incor- rect and defeatist to say that we cannot win under any circumstances. We must, under all conditions, be united with our Asian, African, and Latin American broth- ers and sisters, but as Fidel Castro says, "revolutionaries must make the revolution/' This means that we ( Afro- Americans ) must make our own revolution. Also, **we must be willing to accept the responsibility of revolution and be willing to go all the way**, no matter what happens.

That causes RIGHT WING takeover

**Hart**, politicalscience @ the University of Michigan, March/April **‘9**

(Ronald, Foreign Affairs, How Development Leads to Democracy, p. 26-38)

Thus, other things being equal, high levels of economic development tend to make people more tolerant and trusting, bringing more emphasis on self-expression and more participation in decisionmaking**.** This process is not deterministic, and any forecasts can only be probabilistic, since economic factors are not the only influence; a given country's leaders and nation-specific events also shape what happens. Moreover, modernization is not irreversible. Severe economic collapse can reverse it, as happened during the Great Depression in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain and during the 1990s in most of the Soviet successor states. Similarly, **if the current economic crisis becomes a twenty-first-century Great Depression, the world could face a new struggle against renewed xenophobia and authoritarianism**. outsourcing of jobs, and the perceived threat to U.S. power and sovereignty by other foreign powers."

Patriarchal war-frames make violence inevitable

**Nhanenge 7** (Jytte, Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT”)

The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological 'isms' of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if the scientific "truth" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community simply cannot survive. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth.

### robinson

Their Robinson evidence is a glorification of Amazonian tribes that waged war on each other in a balance of power framework – he goes on to compare that situation to modern gangs

Robinson 10. Andrew, PhD in political theory at the University of Nottingham, “In Theory Why Deleuze (still) matters: States, war-machines and radical transformation,” <http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-deleuze-war-machine>, September 10/

The autonomous war-machine, as opposed to the state-captured war-machine, is a form of social assemblage directed against the state, and against the coalescence of sovereignty. The way such machines undermine the state is by exercising diffuse power to break down concentrated power, and through the replacement of ‘striated’ (regulated, marked) space with ‘smooth’ space (although the war-machine is the ‘constituent element of smooth space’, I shall save discussion of smooth space for some other time). In Clastres’ account of Amazonian societies, on which Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is based, this is done by means of each band defending its own autonomy, and reacting to any potential accumulation of power by other bands. One could similarly think of how neighbourhood gangs resist subordination by rival gangs, or how autonomous social movements resist concentrations of political power. Autonomous social movements, such as the European squatters’ movement, the Zapatistas, and networks of protest against summits, are the principal example Deleuze and Guattari have in mind of war-machines in the global North, though they also use the concept in relation to Southern guerrilla and popular movements such as the Palestinian intifada and the Vietnamese resistance to American occupation, and also in relation to everyday practices of indigenous groups resisting state control. One could also argue that the ‘war-machine’ is implicit in practices of everyday resistance of the kind studies by James Scott. Marginal groups, termed ‘minorities’ in Deleuzian theory, often coalesce as war-machines because the state-form is inappropriate for them.

Their appeal to the rightness of their war is a fundamentally conservative tactic – violence is A-OK as long as it’s for our just cause is exactly what’s used by all sides of a conflict to brutally escalate

Kennedy ’09 (Victor Kennedy, Faculty of Education University of Maribor, “Intended Tropes and Unintended Metatropes in Reporting on the War in Kosovo,” METAPHOR AND SYMBOL, 15(4), 253–265)

Lakoff (1991) analyzed metaphors used by the Bush administration and reported by the media to encourage public support for the Gulf War. Lakoff (1991) argued that there are (a) **a fixed set of metaphors that structure the way people think;** (b) a set of definitions that allow us to apply such metaphors to a particular situation; and that, as a result, (c) use of a metaphor with a set of definitions can “hide realities in a harmful way.” From the various metaphors used by the Bush administration to support their policies, Lakoff induced the “Clausewitz metaphor,” which proposes that “WAR IS POLITICS” and “WAR IS BUSINESS,” leading to a cost–benefit analysis of war; the “STATE IS A PERSON” metaphor, which posits that “strength for a state is military strength” and suggests “war is a fight between two people”; and the “RULER-FOR-STATE METONYMY,” which allows characterization of an “aggressor as a bully” and an “intervener as a policeman” and **leads to “the fairy tale of the just war**,” in which there is a villain, a victim, and a hero: The villain commits a crime against the victim, who is then rescued by the hero. This gives rise to two related but contradictory scenarios, the “rescue scenario” and the “self-defense scenario.” Lakoff concluded that although these metaphors were successful in creating public support for the war, they were harmful because they hide the reality of the human costs of the war.

There are similarities between the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 NATO bom- bardment of Kosovo and Serbia: In both, the United States led an alliance to inter- vene in a regional conflict, and in both, careful media preparation of public support to avoid Vietnam-style opposition was criticized by academics (e.g., Lakoff’s, 1991, and Rohrer’s, 1995, analysis of the Gulf War, and Chomsky’s, 1999, and Cooke’s, 1999, commentary on the bombing of Kosovo). This criticism leads to an awareness of some subtle issues regarding both media reporting and government briefings. During the Kosovo conflict, **each side represented itself as a defender**: The NATO alliance, led by the United States, claimed to be defending human rights, whereas Serbia claimed to be defending its historical homeland. Public sup- port for each position was solicited through news broadcasts; newspaper and magazine articles; and in a new development, commercial and private sites on the Internet, which began to pick up and publish e-mail from within Serbia. (Newspa- pers were quick to follow.) On the Serbian side, the media was directly govern- ment-controlled; dissenting broadcasters were quickly silenced (Duffy, 1999). On the NATO side, government control was more indirect, with information being disseminated mainly through U.S. State Department and NATO briefings. The myths and metaphors used by each side were less controlled than the facts, but each side’s media did report government-generated myths and metaphors**. Each side also presented the other’s media as biased**, **characterizing the other as the aggressor.** For example, Serbian television broadcast images of demonstrators waving placards denouncing “NATO Nazis,” whereas CNN broadcast Bill Clinton’s speeches comparing Slobodan Milosevic to Adolf Hitler.

### rev

Black power and Zapatista tactics are a disaster – empirics are conclusive, wherever modes of resistance go, if elites feel threatened, they’ll be infiltrated and undermined – we cannot ignore differences in resources, media spin, existry weaponry, or expertise when we’re designing a resolution – all of this is a reason using the resolution as a training ground for guerilla pluralism is more effective

Best empirics

John W. Sherman **‘6**

– Professor of History and Director of the MA Program in History at Wright State University “Comparing Failed Revolutions” Wright State University. *Latin American Research Review* 41.2 (2006) 260-268

The overwhelming majority of revolutionary movements in the postwar era have been crushed by the State. Employing an ever-increasing arsenal of sophisticated surveillance and intelligence technology, military and security apparatuses have easily outgunned and dismantled insurgencies in nearly all urban settings. Rural insurgencies have proven more resilient, but since the mid-1980s even these have greatly waned. The resource curve for the powers-that-be has been particularly striking since the early 1980s, when hefty increases in funding under Ronald Reagan helped bring on-line a host of new technologies—digital-based, satellite-interfaced surveillance systems, path-breaking communications interception, and highly proficient night-vision and detection equipment, among them. If successful revolution was made difficult with the advent of better transportation infrastructure and communications in the late nineteenth century, today it is all but impossible. Even rural insurgencies can now be fairly easily snuffed out, especially when the State has no qualms about exterminating part of the civilian populace in the process. Torture, too, is integral to information-gathering—for the simple fact that it works. Finally, the power of mass media, especially the statistical analysis of polling data coupled with television, has equipped the State with a level of refined propaganda that could have made Josef Goebbels blush.

There is, in the contemporary age, a revolutionary dialectic. When insurgent forces rouse a populace with promises of liberation and carry out their first acts of redemptive violence, they invariably trigger a massive retaliatory strike on the part of the State (which often employs at this juncture unsavory characters and allows for acts of sadism). This, in turn, produces a revolutionary surge, as the populace is alienated by the initial bloodletting and aligns with the revolutionaries in a quest for self-defense and empowerment. The problem, of course, is that modern revolutionaries have neither the military resources nor the organizational sophistication to arm an entire populace. Finding themselves at the mercy of a brutal military, with no options, civilians will inevitably swing back **[End Page 261]** into line with those in power as their only means of survival. As they do so, the authorities will reign in the most unsavory and sadistic, even while employing selective violence to eradicate the revolutionaries themselves. In the midst of this counterrevolutionary project the organized political Left is invariably annihilated, leaving a country even more vulnerable to political manipulation and economic exploitation than it was before the revolution began. In this way, failing insurgencies are actually beneficial to North Americans and others who have money in a world of tremendous economic disparity.

This dialectic has been played out in various degrees in Colombia, El Salvador, and Chiapas—three places where insurrections have failed in recent decades. Analysis of an emerging body of historical and political scholarship, however, suggests that both the dialectic and the inherent shortcomings of revolution in the modern age are still not fully appreciated.

Revolutionary Puritanism leads to Stalinism, Che proves

**Brull 10/12/10**

http://web.overland.org.au/2010/12/the-communist-puritan-it-is-good-to-die-for-the-revolution/

Michael Brull blogs on Israel, Palestine, and media discussion of related issues on the Independent Australian Jewish Voices website. He now has a blog where he will comment on other matters at http://michaelbrull.wordpress.com/

Che did not appreciate what he saw as the bureaucratic privileges he encountered in his visits to the Soviet Union. He was more impressed by Maoist China, especially their understanding of **the need for ‘sacrifice’**, which was ‘fundamental to a communist education’ (p 574). What sort of sacrifice does he mean? Essentially, it meant serving the new state with the same fervour as Che. Che thought that ‘even if the Cubans should disappear from the face of the earth because an **atomic war is unleashed** in their names ... **they would feel completely happy and fulfilled’ knowing the triumph of the revolution.** (p 455) Anderson does not note any polls on which this view is based. It seems to me perhaps a little unlikely that millions of people would be pleased to be killed for the sake of his glorious revolution. Even though Cuba brought the world closer to **nuclear annihilation** than at any other point in history, Che welcomed the prospect: ‘Thousands of people will die everywhere, but the responsibility will be theirs [the imperialists], and their people will also suffer ... But that should not bother us.’ Cubans would ‘fight to the last man, to the last woman, to the last human being capable of holding a gun’. (p 571) Which brings us to Che’s underlying values. One of Che’s most famous quotes is that ‘the true revolutionary is guided by a great feeling of love’. Yet it may be more fair to say that Che’s ‘true revolutionary’ is guided by something a little different. Anderson identifies a ‘prime element’ of the qualities Che thought necessary for the future great battle against imperialism: ‘a relentless hatred of the enemy, impelling us above and beyond the natural limitations that man is heir to, and transforming him into an effective, violent, seductive and cold killing machine. Our soldiers must be thus: a people without hatred cannot vanquish a brutal enemy.’ (p 687) Che’s central motivation in life appears not to have been love or compassion. It was, above all, hatred – hatred of ‘the great enemy of mankind: the United States of America.’ (p 688) Years of fighting guerrilla warfare against ‘the great enemy’ helped make Che the cold, ruthless killing machine that he considered ideal. **The result** was that **after Che overthrew a cruel dictatorship, he helped install a new one.** Shortly after the revolution, Castro began closing down dissenting newspapers (pp 433–4, 451). Che had openly opposed a free press for years. When witnessing the overthrow of democracy in Guatemala by the US, he explained why he didn’t support democracy either: ‘This is a country where one can expand one’s lungs and fill them with democracy. There are dailies here run by United Fruit, and if I were Arbenz I’d close them down in five minutes, because they’re shameful and yet they say whatever they want’ (p 127). Imagine the horror of living in a country where one breathes in democracy! Che, however, took charge of the trials of alleged counter-revolutionaries. The spectacle of these public trials and executions overwhelmingly appalled all independent witnesses and foreign journalists (p 372). But Che was a killing machine, deaf to the pleas for compassion, or procedural fairness. He explained that ‘revolutions are ugly but necessary, and part of the revolutionary process is justice at the service of future justice.’ (p 436) If **judicial murder** is ugly, at least we can presume it was **for a greater cause**: the **Maoist tyranny** that Che thought ideal. This should be stressed: Che was not guided by love, and he does not seem to have thought that a goal like trying to make the world happier would have been worthwhile, despite his youthful reading of the social philosophy of Bertrand Russell. It is also a shame he did not read Russell’s critique of the Bolsheviks. One of Russell’s many pertinent insights was his observation that ‘the hopes which inspire Communism are, in the main, as admirable as those instilled by the Sermon on the Mount, but they are held as fanatically, and are likely to do as much harm. ... [F]rom men who are more anxious to injure opponents than to benefit the world at large no great good is to be expected.’ Eduardo Galeano described Che as ‘the most puritanical of the Western revolutionary leaders’ (p 575). This is eminently fair. Anderson writes that Che’s ‘workweek lasted from Monday through Saturday, including nights, and on Sunday mornings he went off to do voluntary labour. Sunday afternoons were all he spared for his family.’ (p 536) While some may admire Che for how hard he worked, he apparently thought the ideal society would be motivated by the same religious fervour: constant, joyless sacrifice for the revolution. He explained that after the revolution, the New Man ‘becomes happy to feel himself a cog in the wheel ... creating a sufficient quantity of consumer goods for the entire population’. Russell, on the other hand, condemned the ‘sacrifice of the individual to the machine that is the fundamental evil’ of capitalism. Emma Goldman likewise complained of the ‘fatal’ crime of capitalism, ‘turning the producer into a mere particle of a machine, with less will and decision than his master of steel and iron’. One recalls the saying that under capitalism man exploits man, but under communism, it’s the complete opposite. Che’s contempt for mere people manifested itself in his cruelty towards the people he knew, and also to those he didn’t. Visiting a literacy program for peasants, he saw one man who hadn’t made much progress. Che publicly insulted him with such spite that he reduced the humiliated peasant to tears (pp 537–8). Illustrative of his fanatical zeal, Che helped design a 32-storey bank. However, he thought it should go without an elevator (Che could get by without an elevator: why not everyone else?). And they could ‘eliminate at least half ’ of the bathrooms. ‘But in revolutions,’ he was told, ‘people go to the bathroom just as much as before it.’ ‘Not the new man,’ said Che. ‘He can sacrifice.’ (pp 431–2) And sacrifice he must. For Che’s puritanical vision must be imposed; **all must sacrifice for the revolution.** Before Che was executed, he declared: ‘Shoot, coward, you are only going to kill a man.’ (p 710) Che could finally make the ultimate sacrifice for the vision he lived for. It’s just a shame that his vision was so inhumane. While Che’s hatred and fanaticism may have made him a gifted guerrilla, they did not help create a more just society.