# Round 4 GSU – UGA FB

## 1NC

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#### Plan causes a compensatory shift to drone strikes – that’s worse

RT, 13 (5/3, “US targeted drone killings used as alternative to Guantanamo Bay - Bush lawyer.” http://rt.com/usa/obama-using-drones-avoid-gitmo-747/)

A lawyer who was influential in the United States’ adoption of unmanned aircraft has spoken out against the Obama administration for what he perceives as using drones as an alternative to capturing suspects and sending them to Guantanamo Bay prison camp. John Bellinger, the Bush administration attorney who drafted the initial legal specifications regarding drone killings after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, said that Bush’s successor has abused the framework, skirting international law for political points. “This government has decided that instead of detaining members of Al-Qaeda [at Guantanamo Bay prison camp in Cuba] they are going to kill them,” Bellinger told a conference at the Bipartisan Policy Center, as quoted by The Guardian. Earlier this week Obama promised to reignite efforts to close Guantanamo Bay, where prisoners have gone on a hunger strike to protest human rights violations and wrongful incarcerations. They were his first in-depth remarks on the subject since 2009, when Obama had just recently been elected to office after campaigning on a promise to close the facility. But international law is equally suspect of drone strikes. Almost 5,000 people are thought to have been killed by roughly 300 US attacks in four countries, according to The Guardian. Bellinger maintained that the government has justified strikes throughout Pakistan and Yemen by using the 'War on Terror' as an excuse. “We are about the only country in the world that thinks we are in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda,” he said. “We really need to get on top of this and explain to our allies why it is legal and why it is permissible under international law." “These drone strikes are causing us great damage in the world, but on the other hand if you are the president and you do nothing to stop another 9/11 then you also have a problem,” he added. Of the 166 detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 86 have been cleared for release by a commission made up of officials from the Department of Homeland Security, Joint Chiefs of Staff and other influential government divisions. White House officials have justified the use of unmanned aircraft by saying the US is at war with Al-Qaeda and that those targeted in drone attacks were planning attacks on America. In the future, experts say, future countries could use the same rationale to explain their own attacks. “Countries under attack are the ones that get to decide whether or not they are at war,” said Philip Zelikow, a member of the White House Intelligence Advisory Board. While the conversation around drones is certainly a sign of things to come, Hina Shamsi of the American Civil Liberties Union encouraged Americans to think about the human rights issues posed by the new technology. It could be another long process, if the Guantanamo Bay handling is any indication. “The use of this technology is spreading and we have to think about what we would say if other countries used drones for targeted killing programs,” Shamsi said. “Few things are more likely to undermine our legitimacy than the perception that we are not abiding by the rule of law or are indifferent to civilian casualties.”

#### Drones cause global war – draws in nuclear powers

Roberts 13 (Kristin, When the Whole World Has Drones, National Journal, 21 March 2013, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321, da 8-1-13) PC

The proliferation of drone technology has moved well beyond the control of the United States government and its closest allies. The aircraft are too easy to obtain, with barriers to entry on the production side crumbling too quickly to place limits on the spread of a technology that promises to transform warfare on a global scale. Already, more than 75 countries have remote piloted aircraft. More than 50 nations are building a total of nearly a thousand types. At its last display at a trade show in Beijing, China showed off 25 different unmanned aerial vehicles. Not toys or models, but real flying machines.¶ It’s a classic and common phase in the life cycle of a military innovation: An advanced country and its weapons developers create a tool, and then others learn how to make their own. But what makes this case rare, and dangerous, is the powerful combination of efficiency and lethality spreading in an environment lacking internationally accepted guidelines on legitimate use. This technology is snowballing through a global arena where the main precedent for its application is the one set by the United States; it’s a precedent Washington does not want anyone following.¶ America, the world’s leading democracy and a country built on a legal and moral framework unlike any other, has adopted a war-making process that too often bypasses its traditional, regimented, and rigorously overseen military in favor of a secret program never publicly discussed, based on legal advice never properly vetted. The Obama administration has used its executive power to refuse or outright ignore requests by congressional overseers, and it has resisted monitoring by federal courts.¶ To implement this covert program, the administration has adopted a tool that lowers the threshold for lethal force by reducing the cost and risk of combat. This still-expanding counterterrorism use of drones to kill people, including its own citizens, outside of traditionally defined battlefields and established protocols for warfare, has given friends and foes a green light to employ these aircraft in extraterritorial operations that could not only affect relations between the nation-states involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order.¶ “I don’t think there is enough transparency and justification so that we remove not the secrecy, but the mystery of these things.”—Dennis Blair, former director of national intelligence¶ Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a lethal strike on anti-Syrian forces inside Syria; Russia picks off militants tampering with oil and gas lines in Ukraine or Georgia; Turkey arms a U.S.-provided Predator to kill Kurdish militants in northern Iraq who it believes are planning attacks along the border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in each case, Tehran, Moscow, and Ankara may point toward Washington and say, we learned it by watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan.¶ This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention paid to the drone program in recent weeks—about Americans on the target list (there are none at this writing) and the executive branch’s legal authority to kill by drone outside war zones (thin, by officials’ own private admission)—what goes undiscussed is Washington’s deliberate failure to establish clear and demonstrable rules for itself that would at minimum create a globally relevant standard for delineating between legitimate and rogue uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation.

**1NC**

**EU soft power high now**

**Ahston 13** – High Representative of the European Union (EU) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Speaking @ a UCLA faculty event

(Catherine, “The European Union in the world: The value of soft power,” May, http://www.international.ucla.edu/news/article.asp?parentid=131775)

The benefits of strong economic policies for the growing number of European Union inhabitants led member states to realize that they could **use their influence** to make their voice heard on common foreign policy positions, she said. “It’s what I call the highest common factor, not the lowest common denominator,” remarked Ashton.¶ ¶ The EU is now trying to embed firmly in European policy thinking that its member states can develop a strong common foreign policy, she said, noting that the 27 foreign ministers meet every month under her chairmanship. In these discussions, she clarified later, it is not so much the economic power of a member state that counts, as its expertise on a particular issue or region, because all members have a vote and can thus block a given policy.¶ ¶ Ashton differentiated between dealing with an acute situation and the ability of a common policy to tackle such a situation. “We saw [this] in Libya and we see it in Syria,” she remarked. “The challenge sometimes leads us away from foreign policy and diplomacy into having to think about military action, as we saw in Libya. And we will continue to worry about the contexts for [such action].” ¶ ¶ “The value of Europe,” commented Ashton, “is that wedon’t have an army. We are a strongeconomic block — **a soft power** — [and we] can leverage that power to try and deal with issues, especially in our neighborhood.” ¶ ¶ Ashton was confident of the future of both the euro and the EU itself, as well as the continued membership of the United Kingdom in the body. Noting that the EU worked closely with a number of non-member states, she said that she spoke more often with Turkey than any other such state. Personally, she said, she would like to see Turkey become an EU member. ¶ ¶ Reflecting on the economic recession, she related, “I think one of the most extraordinary things has been that, despite the real economic challenges, the European Union has stuck together. The 27 heads of state have met regularly to deal with this [economic crisis] and have done so effectively.”¶ ¶ In her view, the EU’s work in addressing these problems **has become a model** **for other countries** seeking to work together to bring strongereconomic cohesion to areas of the world, such as creating a single market.

#### US credibility is collapsing due to detention policy---plan reverses that

David Welsh 11, J.D. from the University of Utah, “Procedural Justice Post-9/11: The Effects of Procedurally Unfair Treatment of Detainees on Perceptions of Global Legitimacy”, http://law.unh.edu/assets/images/uploads/publications/unh-law-review-vol-09-no2-welsh.pdf

The Global War on Terror 1 has been ideologically framed as a struggle between the principles of freedom and democracy on the one hand and tyranny and extremism on the other. 2 Although this war has arguably led to a short-term disruption of terrorist threats such as al-Qaeda, it has also damaged America’s image both at home and abroad. 3 Throughout the world, there is a growing consensus that America has “a lack of credibility as a fair and just world leader.” 4 The perceived legitimacy of the United States in the War on Terror is critical because terrorism is not a conventional threat that can surrender or can be defeated in the traditional sense. Instead, this battle can only be won through legitimizing the rule of law and undermining the use of terror as a means of political influence. 5 ¶ Although a variety of political, economic, and security policies have negatively impacted the perceived legitimacy of the United States, one of the most damaging has been the detention, treatment, and trial (or in many cases the lack thereof) of suspected terrorists. While many scholars have raised constitutional questions about the legality of U.S. detention procedures, 6 this article offers a psychological perspective of legitimacy in the context of detention.

**The plan trades off – Low US credibility is forcing the EU to lead – solves several scenarios for global war**

**Ischinger 7** - the German ambassador to Britain

(Wolfgang, “Can the EU Fill Leadership Void Left by US?” [www.china.org.cn/english/international/203945.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/203945.htm))

In 1990, Charles Krauthammer published his famous essay on the "unipolar moment", about the United States' future power to shape the world at will. He wrote: "The true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold-War world ... is a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the industrial west." In 2007, most will agree that the unipolar moment, if it ever existed, has passed. That is only underlined by the failure of the unipolar experiment also know as the invasion and occupation of Iraq and the damage it inflicted on Washington's international legitimacy and credibility. For traditional European Atlanticists, it does not make for pleasant viewing to see US leadership damaged and questioned. But expectations are low today regarding US ability to lead the international community. **In the face of a US credibility crisis**, **some look to Europe to take the initiative and fill the vacuum**. Can 2007 be a European moment? Critics will contend that the EU is in no shape to lead, as it continues to grapple with its constitutional crisis, its inability to provide clear foreign policy guidance and its lack of military power. But on three critical global issues nuclear **non-proliferation**, **Middle East peace**, and **climate change** it is **better placed than anyone else**. Opening nuclear negotiations with Teheran was a European idea in 2004, initially given a lukewarm reception by Washington. More recently, as the EU3-Britain, France and Germany-approach began to be seen as the only game in town, Washington has offered more active support, but so far continuing to stop short of speaking to Teheran directly on the nuclear issue. Bringing Russia and China on board was, again, a European initiative. If a solution emerges, it is likely to be European-brokered. There is much greater cohesion among Europeans on Iran than there was on Iraq five years ago: On Iran, the EU will not be split. When it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, barely any progress has been made over the past six years. The adoption of the road map and the creation of the quartet EU, Russia, the UN, the United States were born of European ideas. They were formally endorsed by Washington, but never seriously pursued and later quasi-abandoned. This year, a major effort by the current EU presidency has led to the quartet's revival and more diplomatic activity. Many in the region doubt, however, whether Washington will have the determination necessary for a breakthrough in the **peace process** without even more active input from Europe. The European willingness to take more responsibility in the region and to play a role in ending the Lebanon War in 2006, including the deployment of military forces to the country, was an eye-opener for many in the region and beyond. On climate change, the critical question is who can and will lead the international debate about a post-Kyoto regime. If a deal can be hammered out in 2007, and if it has any chance of endorsement in the United States, China and India, it will most likely be the result of the EU's ongoing efforts to move ahead with ambitious goals on carbon dioxide emissions and energy saving. But would a European moment in 2007 not be interpreted as a challenge to the global leadership role of the US? Let's not get carried away. Without active US support, both political and military, none of these major challenges can be resolved. Europeans should beware the hubris of challenging the United States. But the European moment could actually enhance the transatlantic relationship by offering, at a crucial juncture, elements that **the United States currently lacks**: **legitimacy and credibility**. That is why our American friends should encourage European initiatives, embrace a **European willingness to lead**, and welcome the European moment.

**Warming leads to extinction**

**Tickell 08**

[Oliber, Climate Researcher, 8/11/08 On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction, The Guardian, pg. Np]

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction**. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland.** The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. **The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die.** Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. **The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum**, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that **this historical event** **may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.**

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#### The Aff’s foregrounding of human suffering ignores the tools that have been produced to suppress groups and ignores the humanized context of the event.

HEYDT 2K10

[samantha, american abattoirs, December 20th, <http://samheydt.wordpress.com/2010/12/20/224/>, BA Communications New School and Universitat van Amsterdam ]

The American abattoir paved the road to Auschwitz.  The industrialization of death developed at the turn of the century in the US stockyards was adopted by the Nazi Concentration camps, where sectors of humanity relegated into the realm of ‘subhuman’ were slaughtered.  History repeats itself with the algorithms of domination shifting not in construct but in context. The assembly-line technology and eugenic ideology that buttresses the mechanized mass murder of animals share the rationalized cruelty that has historically been used in the Western context against humans in the ‘state of exception’.  Branded inferior, crammed into railcars, forced into labor and killed when no longer of use, the victims of the Holocaust experienced the same fate as the chattel of slaughterhouses do today.  **The justification for this brutality is hinged on the ‘biological inferiority’** of the victims who are dehumanized and denigrated as animals. **The “anthropological machine” distinguishing humans from animals collapses when man is stripped down to ‘bare life’ (Agamben).** Thus, as long as the exploitation and violent slaughter of animals occurs unrefuted, the potential for genocide remains.  As history has shown us time and time again: the realm of nonhuman is not solely occupied by animals. Historical Context: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Patriarchy, slavery and the social matrix of speciesism emerged in tandem to one another from the same region that fathered agriculture in the Middle East during the Chalcolithic Age.  Sumer, now modern Iraq, was the first civilization to engage in core agricultural practices such as organized irrigation and specialized labor with slaves and animals.  They raised cattle, sheep and pigs, used ox for draught their beast of burden and equids for transport (Sayce 99). The knowledge to store food as standing reserve meant migration was no longer necessary to survive. The population density bred social hierarchies supported at its base by slaves (Kramer 47).  **In Sumer, there were only two social strata’s to belong to: lu the free man and arad the slave** (Kramer 47).  **Technologies such as branding irons, chains and cages that were developed to dominate animals paved way for the domination over humans too**. The “human rule over the lower creatures provided the mental analogue in which many political and social arrangements are based” (Patterson 280). Caged and castrated, slaves were treated no different from chattel. Thousands of years later, the tools developed in the Middle East for domestication were used by the Europeans during colonization to shackle slaves. “When the European settlers arrived in Tasmania in 1772, the indigenous people seem not to have noticed them…By 1830 their numbers had been reduced from around five hundred to seventy-two. In their intervening years they had been used for slave labour and sexual pleasure, tortured and mutilated. They had been hunted like vermin and their skins had been sold for a government bounty. When the males were killed, female survivors were turned loose with the heads of their husbands tied around their necks. Males who were not killed were usually castrated. Children were clubbed to death.” (Gray 91). This horrific account illustrates how the indigenous people of Tasmania were enslaved,skinned and slaughtered by the Europeans. Meanwhile across the globe, the trans-Atlantic slave trade was at its peak in the 18th century.  Africans were taken from their native land, branded, bred, and sold as property.  **Linguistically these acts of violence and exploitation are tied to animals- branded, skinned, slaughtered, sold.**  **Be that as it may, “as long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other”** (Pythagoras in Patterson 210).   Racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism and sexism all stem from the same systems of domination that initially subjugated animals. Until we cease to exploit living beings as resources, the threat of man being stripped of his humanity looms.  Although we cringe at the inhumane actions of our ancestors, the scale and efficiency of murder and oppression has only advanced, while the notion of ‘human’ remains increasingly obscured.

#### The construction of dehumanization legitimizes the obsession with humanism. We should reject attempts to “**include**” groups in human paradigms and instead reject human discourse altogether.

Deckha 2k10 [Maneesha, faculty of law, university y of Victoria, “it’s time to abandon the idea of human rights”, the scavenger, dec. 10]

The category of the ‘subhuman’ is inherent in global gendered, racialized and economic violence, throwing up questions around the relevance of concepts of ‘human rights’ and ‘human dignity’ for effective theories of justice, policy and social movements. Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, **a better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary altogether**. A new discourse of cultural and legal protections is required to address violence against vulnerable humans in a manner that does not privilege humanity or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of inferior beings on whom the perpetration of violence is legitimate. **We need to find an alternative discourse to theorize and mobilize around vulnerabilities for “subhuman” humans**, writes Maneesha Deckha. 13 December 2010 One of the organizing narratives of western thought and the institutions it has shaped is humanism and the idea that human beings are at the core of the social and cultural order. The cultural critique humanism has endured, by way of academic theory and social movements, has focused on the failure of its promise of universal equal treatment and dignity for all human beings. To address this failing, a rehabilitative approach to humanism is usually adopted with advocates seeking to undo humanism’s exclusions by expanding its ambit and transporting vulnerable human groups from “subhuman” to “human” status. Law has responded by including more and more humans under the coveted category of “personhood”. Yet, the logic of the human/subhuman binary typically survives this critique with the dependence of the coveted human status on the subhuman (and the vulnerabilities it enables) going unnoticed. This gap in analysis is evident in how most of us think about violence and its related concept of vulnerability. Some would even say that what sets us apart from nonhumans is a capacity for vulnerability. Others who address human-nonhuman relationships more closely might say that what sets human apart from nonhuman animals, if anything, is our capacity for violence. More particular still, feminists would highlight the masculinist orientation of this violence against nonhumans, animals and otherwise, noting that institutionalized violence against nonhumans primarily occurs in male-dominated industries. Yet, the discourse around (hu)man violence against animals is muted in mainstream debates about violence, vulnerability and exploitation in general. More common is a concern with violence against humans and how to eliminate it and make humans less vulnerable. This theorizing largely proceeds through affirmations of the inviolability or sanctity of human life and human dignity, establishing what it means to be human through articulation of what it means to be animal. **The humanist paradigm of anti-violence discourse thus does not typically examine the human/nonhuman boundary, but often fortifies it.** The failure to address this boundary and its creation and maintenance of the figure of the subhuman undermines anti-violence agendas.

#### Our alternative is to Vote Negative to willingly embrace extinction as a thought experiment as a re-evaluation of the politics of humanism.

Kochi and Ordan 08 – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3\_2008/kochiordan\_argument.pdf DH)

For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion – the global suicide of humanity – as a free-willed and ‘final solution’. While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

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#### A. Interpretation – debate is a game that requires the Aff to defend USFG action on restriction of war powers –

#### Restriction is a prohibition

Northglenn 11 (City of Northglenn Zoning Ordinance, “Rules of Construction – Definitions”, http://www.northglenn.org/municode/ch11/content\_11-5.html)

Section 11-5-3. Restrictions. As used in this Chapter 11 of the Municipal Code, the **term "restriction**" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited, and no such use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing shall be **authorized by any permit or license**.

#### --‘resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### --“United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

B. Violation – they claim to win for reasons other than the desirability of that action

C. Reasons to prefer:

**1. Predictability – they allow for infinite frameworks which destroys in-depth preparation and clash – the resolution is the sole source of pre-round prep**

#### 2. Dialogue – debate games open up dialogue which fosters information processing and decision-making – they open up infinite frameworks making the game impossible

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, 51 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### 3. Politics – debate as a competitive political game is the best framework to solve dogmatism and human brutality

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Vico asked his audience at the University of Naples in 1708 to debate two competing ways of knowing: Cartesian rationality versus the poetic world of the ancients. Vico, the “pre-law advisor” of his day, saw law as a rhetorical game. That is, he understood the civic (ethical) value of competi-tion itself.12 He understood that Cartesian rationality, like religious and ideological fundamentalism, generates a kind of certainty that shuts down robust debate. Vico’s comprehensive vision suggests, in effect, that people should practice law and politics not as the search for the most rational or logically correct outcomes but rather as passionate and embodied yet peaceful competitive play. Vico inspires this vision of law and politics as play because he sees that all things in the human mind, including law and politics, are at one with the human body. As Vico put it as he concluded his 1708 address, “[T]he soul should be drawn to love by means of bodily images; for once it loves it is easily taught to believe; and when it believes and loves it should be inflamed so that it wills things by means of its normal intemperance.”13 Vico had no hope that such abstract moral principles as liberty, equality, justice, and tolerance could effectively offset the “crude and rough” nature of men.14 The Holy Bible and the Qur’an contain normative principles of love, tolerance, equal respect, and peace, but these commands have not forestalled ancient and modern religious warfare. This essay proposes that humans learn how to keep the peace not by obeying the norms, rules, and principles of civil conduct but by learning how to play, and thereby reintegrating the mind and the body. People do law, politics, and economic life well when they do them in the same ways and by the same standards that structure and govern good competitive sports and games. The word “sport” derives from “port” and “portal” and relates to the words “disport” and “transport.” The word at least hints that the primitive and universal joy of play carries those who join the game across space to a better, and ideally safer, place—a harbor that Vico him-self imagined. This essay’s bold proposition honors Vico in many ways. Its “grand theory” matches the scope of Vico’s comprehensive and integrated vision of the human condition. It plausibly confirms Vico’s hope for a “concep-tion of a natural law for all of humanity” that is rooted in human historical practice.15 Seeing these core social processes as play helps us to escape from arid academic habits and to “learn to think like children,” just as Vico urged.16 Imagining law and politics as play honors Vico above all because, if we attain Ruskin’s epigraphic ideal,17 we will see that the peace-tending qualities of sports and games already operate under our noses. Seeing law and politics as play enables us “to reach out past our inclination to make experience familiar through the power of the concept and to engage the power of the image. We must reconstruct the human world not through concepts and criteria but as something we can practically see.”18 If at its end readers realize that they could have seen, under their noses, the world as this essay sees it without ever having read it, this essay will successfully honor Vico. As Vico would have predicted, formal academic theory has played at best a marginal role in the construction of competitive games. Ordinary people have created cricket and football, and common law and electoral politics and fair market games, more from the experience of doing them than from formal theories of competitive games. When they play interna-tional football today, ordinary people in virtually every culture in the world recreate the experience of competitive games. Playing competitive games unites people across cultures in a common normative world.19 Within Vico’s social anthropological and proto-scientific framework, the claim that competitive play can generate peaceful civic life is purely empirical: law and politics in progressively peaceful political systems already are nothing more or less than competitive games. All empirical description operates within some, though too often ob-scured, normative frame. This essay’s normative frame is clear. It holds, with Shaw’s epigraph, above: Human brutalities waged against other hu-mans—suicide bombings, genocides, tribal and religious wars that provoke the indiscriminate rape, murder, torture, and enslavement of men, women, and children, often because they are labeled “evil”—are the worst things that we humans do. We should learn not to do them. In Vico’s anti-Cartesian, non-foundational world, no method exists to demonstrate that this essay’s normative core is “correct,” or even “better than,” say, the core norm holding that the worst thing humans do is dishonor God. Readers who reject Shaw’s and this essay’s normative frame may have every reason to reject the essay’s entire argument. However, this essay does describe empirically how those whose core norm requires honoring any absolute, including God, above all else regu-larly brutalize other human beings, and why those who live by the norms of good competitive play do not. People brutalize people, as Shaw’s Caesar observed, in the name of right and honor and peace. Evaluated by the norm that human brutality is the worst thing humans do, the essay shows why and how the human invention of competitive play short circuits the psy-chology of a righteousness-humiliation-brutality cycle. We cannot help but see and experience on fields of contested play testosterone-charged males striving mightily to defeat one another. Yet at the end of play, losers and winners routinely shake hands and often hug; adult competitors may dine and raise a glass together.20 Whether collectively invented as a species-wide survival adaptation or not, institutionalized competitive play under-cuts the brutality cycle by displacing religious and other forms of funda-mentalist righteousness with something contingent, amoral, and thus less lethal. Play thereby helps humans become Shaw’s “race that can under-stand.”

### Case

#### Academics must learn to engage the public’s line of thinking: abstract moralism without addressing how to get our policies passed is useless.

Jeffrey Isaac, Spring 2002. Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=601.

What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left—by which I mean “progressive” faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates—has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing—about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq—continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it—about globalization and sweatshops— is new and in some ways promising (see my “Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement,” *Dissent*, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, **and what the likely costs**, as well as the benefits, **are of any reasonable strategy**. One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic—petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives. But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of **the vast majority of Americans**, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and **who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives**. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an all too-familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. **It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates** (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating *moralism*; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The “peace” demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global *politics*. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in *political* terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism. case in point is a petition circulated on the campus of Indiana University within days of September 11. Drafted by the Bloomington Peace Coalition, it opposed what was then an imminent war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda, and called for peace. It declared: “Retaliation will not lead to healing; rather it will harm innocent people and further the cycle of violence. Rather than engage in military aggression, those in authority should apprehend and charge those individuals believed to be directly responsible for the attacks and try them in a court of law in accordance with due process of international law.” This declaration was hardly unique. Similar statements were issued on college campuses across the country, by local student or faculty coalitions, the national

Campus Greens, 9- 11peace.org, and the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition. As Global Exchange declared in its antiwar statement of September 11: “vengeance offers no relief. . . retaliation can never guarantee healing. . . and to meet violence with violence breeds more rage and more senseless deaths. Only love leads to peace with justice, while hate takes us toward war and injustice.” On this view military action of any kind is figured as “aggression” or “vengeance”; harm to innocents, whether substantial or marginal, intended or unintended, is absolutely proscribed; legality is treated as having its own force, independent of any means of enforcement; and, most revealingly, “healing” is treated as the principal goal of any legitimate response. None of these points withstands serious scrutiny. A military response to terrorist aggression is not in any obvious sense an act of aggression, unless any military response—or at least any U.S. military response—is simply *defined* as aggression. While any justifiable military response should certainly be governed by just-war principles, the criterion of absolute harm avoidance would rule out the possibility of *any* military response. It is virtually impossible either to “apprehend” and prosecute terrorists or to put an end to terrorist networks without the use of military force, for the “criminals” in question are not law-abiding citizens but mass murderers, and there are no police to “arrest” them. And, finally, while “healing” is surely a legitimate moral goal, it is not clear that it is a *political* goal. Justice, however, most assuredly is a political goal. The most notable thing about the Bloomington statement is its avoidance of political justice. Like many antiwar texts, it calls for “social justice abroad.” It supports redistributing wealth. But criminal and retributive justice, protection against terrorist violence, or the political enforcement of the minimal conditions of global civility—these are unmentioned. They are unmentioned because to broach them is to enter a terrain that the campus left is unwilling to enter—the terrain of violence, a realm of complex choices and dirty hands. This aversion to violence is understandable and in some ways laudable. America’s use of violence has caused much harm in the world, from Southeast Asia to Central and Latin America to Africa. The so-called “Vietnam Syndrome” was the product of a real learning experience that should not be forgotten. In addition, the destructive capacities of modern warfare— which jeopardize the civilian/combatant distinction, and introduce the possibility of enormous ecological devastation—make war under any circumstances something to be feared. No civilized person should approach the topic of war with anything other than great trepidation. And yet the left’s reflexive hostility toward violence in the international domain is strange. It is inconsistent with avowals of “materialism” and evocations of “struggle,” especially on the part of those many who are *not* pacifists; it is in tension with a commitment to human emancipation (is there no cause for which it is justifiable to fight?); and it is oblivious to the tradition of left thinking about ends and means. To compare the debates within the left about the two world wars or the Spanish Civil War with the predictable “anti-militarism” of today’s campus left is to compare a discourse that was serious about political power with a discourse that is not. This unpragmatic approach has become a hallmark of post–cold war left commentary, from the Gulf War protests of 1991, to the denunciation of the 1999 U.S.-led NATO intervention in Kosovo, to the current post–September 11 antiwar movement. In each case protesters have raised serious questions about U.S. policy and its likely consequences, but in a strikingly ineffective way. They sound a few key themes: the broader context of grievances that supposedly explains why Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden have done what they have done; the hypocrisy of official U.S. rhetoric, which denounces terrorism even though the U.S. government has often supported terrorism; the harm that will come to ordinary Iraqi or Serbian or Afghan citizens as a result of intervention; and the cycle of violence that is likely to ensue. These are important issues. But they typically are raised by left critics not to promote real debate about practical alternatives, but to avoid such a debate or to trump it. As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of “aggression,” but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime—the Taliban—that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most “peace” activists would prefer not to ask: *What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime?* What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: **it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals** and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### There’s no clear articulation of how they aff restricts indefinite detention – their movement will inevitably be co-opted because we’ll just call it something different

#### Turn – Focusing on undermining the heterosexist ideology reintrenches the binary structure of sex itself and the dominative heteronormative system

CindyPatton, Asst. Professor at Temple University, 1995 (*Performativity and Performance*, pg 179-180, ed. Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick)

**We have, I now believe, pressed too hard on the homophobic core, or at least understood the constitution of a “self” through reverse-discourse in too unified a manner, a manner that insists too strongly on the bipolar structure of subject-constitution that is required within the self-other model. Surely these figural “Others” must operate quite differently in different regimes, sometimes simply in relation to a unifiable “Self”** (whether individual or writ larger as class or nation**), but in other cases as the multiply other “Other” in relation to many competing or autonomous sites of knowledge claims. The “homosexual” of AIDS discourse, while palpably still the central figure, is a different “other” from “heterosexual,” “hemophiliac,” or “woman,”** not to mention from “doctor,” “nation,” or “African.” **If it is relatively easy**, through concepts like stigma, **to correlate a range of marginalized in similarly antipodal positions to the idea of a codifying center** (“self” writ large), **this does not mean they are in the same place, subjected to the same discursive and institutional tyrannies. And it is extremely hazardous to assume that the range of “selfs” which multiple notions of “other” inflect are, in fact, constitutive of a single, dominating system. It becomes difficult to see that space and time and the fate of those without the capacity to make specific, protective claims on their institutions are all linked through the idea of movement, if only because the body impinged upon may wish to save itself through flight.**

#### No solvency – no way their movement spills over – that’s cross-x

#### Turn – Identity politics risk erasure of individual identities

Shaun Sewell, PhD Dissertation, Louisiana State University,2005, Public Sexuality: A Contemporary History of Gay Images and Ideologies, [http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/submitted/etd-01212005-212501/unrestricted/Sewell\_dis.pdf], p. 6

However, **the danger in identity groupings so adequately pointed out by Judith Butler is the erasure of individual identities in service of those normalizing regimes. Moreover, tensions are engendered over the “proper” public image to put forward in order to achieve the particular political aim**. In an article which, in part, discusses scholarship of the Black diaspora, Cornel West argues against the essentializing nature of the identity category “Black,” as if the term itself can somehow encompass the identities of all of the people within the category. He writes, Any notions of “the real Black community” and “positive images” are value-laden, socially-loaded and ideologically-charged. To pursue this discussion is to call into question the possibility of such an uncontested consensus regarding them. (73) Similarly, the identity category “American” is also a category in which non-majority political voices are lost. **The major contribution, I think, of postmodern theory is to call into question the nature of identity categories.** To continue with West’s line of reasoning, such categories are politically and culturally constructed.

#### Their methodology fails – it tries to include people not currently included into the system – their links to their critique

#### anti-political focus of queer theory destroys any possibility of activism

**Hall, 06** (Donald, professor of English at West Virginia University, “Imagining Queer Studies Out of the Doldrums”, Chronicle of Higher Education, 9/15, http://chronicle.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/weekly/v53/i04/04b01501.htm)

"Queer Theory" burst onto the scene about 15 years ago. The term received its first high-profile usage in a special issue of the journal differences ("Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities") published in the summer of 1991; was mentioned also in the groundbreaking collection of essays Inside/Out, appearing the same year; and then gained wide notice with the publication in 1993 of Michael Warner's influential collection Fear of a Queer Planet. By the fall of 1993, I was teaching a queer-studies course at California State University at Northridge, a class bursting at the seams with politically agitated students, many of whom were members of the campus activist group Squish — Strong Queers United in Suppressing Heterosexism. Since then my classes have always remained well enrolled (today I still turn away students, even with an enrollment cap of 40), but gradually the political energy has died away almost completely. The students in California (before I left in 2004) and now in West Virginia have become remarkably blasé concerning (what they consider) the few lingering vestiges of homophobia and increasingly eager to claim that life is actually pretty good now, with our many queer television shows, product lines, and other lifestyle components. While vicious gay-marriage debates rage in the media, Brokeback Mountain stirs up heated local controversy, and Fred Phelps's "God Hates Fags" picketers show up at local gay-pride events, even self-identifying queer students seem stunningly dismissive of politics generally, relying often on eye rolling as both critique and response. As we read about the early energy of groups such as Queer Nation and ACT UP, I often ask students about their own lack of passion for social-justice issues and political activism. A few will roll their eyes, but others will admit that their passivity does, in fact, constitute a problem, though with a very unhelpful explanation for its root cause. "It's our own fault," said one very fashionable (and often fashionably late for class) A student. "We're just shallow." While some might see that comment as actual evidence supporting the explanation he offered, I don't buy the ease of that answer. Nor do I agree with another student from a few years ago at Humboldt State University, where I visited to give a talk on the state of queer studies, who tried to explain why all the queer students there seemed a bit depressed during the meeting I had with them: "Things are just too easy on this campus for people to get motivated; we need some real oppression around here to energize us." More oppression is not the answer to anyone's or any field's problems. Certainly there are some social contextual factors that offer help in understanding the waning of political energy in the classroom and in the field of queer studies generally. No student in my class last spring knew a single person who had died of AIDS. Since most of them were born in the mid-1980s and became sexually and socially self-aware in the last 10 years, they have never thought of AIDS as anything other than a pharmacologically manageable disease (even if that is a very dangerous and inaccurate perception, which I address in class). Ellen Degeneres's character on her show Ellen came out on national television in 1997, and the series Will and Grace started in 1998, when most of them were in middle school. The lesbian and gay students in my classes today never knew a time when their identities did not receive at least a modicum of media validation through visibility. Furthermore, the big issue of today — gay marriage — does not motivate them very much as a topic of personal and political urgency. Most of my gay and lesbian students are still sowing wild oats, so to speak; some speak about perhaps wanting to marry someday but express vague confidence that at some indeterminate point in the future, it will probably be allowed without any active work on their part. Others dismiss marriage as an outmoded concept and not worthy of a battle in any event (a perspective with which I have a lot of sympathy). They do become interested when I talk about a few practicalities that marriage might bring with it and use, as an example, my own inability to get health insurance for my partner because of the lack of domestic-partnership benefits in West Virginia. But on the whole, they are not particularly energized by contemplating the impracticalities of being a middle-aged couple with no social safety net except what can be pieced together in spite of an unsympathetic state government. Granted, when I was in my teens and 20s, health insurance wasn't a burning issue for me either, at least until the AIDS crisis hit, and friends of mine without insurance (and many with insurance) faced terrible struggles in trying to get basic care for their illnesses. And given the fact that there is no similar or immediately galvanizing "life and death" issue today to enrage students, it is not surprising perhaps that they are rather blasé about politics. But just as the initial intensity of the feminist movement on college campuses waned long before sexism itself was seriously challenged, so too is queer intensity declining precipitously, even as heterosexism remains legally entrenched and homophobia remains a common political tool and general social undercurrent. What does begin to rouse my students is the immediacy of violenceboth rhetorical and physical. Showing the film Boys Don't Cry got many of them very agitated (even as a few also complained that I should only show them happy films rather than sad ones). Bringing in news stories of the harsh rhetoric used in legislatures across the nation as politicians debated anti-gay-marriage legislation and restrictions on rights for transgendered individuals led to even more-engaged classroom discussion. And I always actively encourage my socially conservative and religious students to speak their minds — not to shoot down their ideas but certainly to generate genuine awareness that not everyone agrees with each other on topics that my queer students seem to take for granted as already resolved. I do not teach political activism — that is not my role as a cultural-studies professor — but I do teach about the dynamics of social movements and hope that my students develop a passionate attachment to the topic, whatever their political beliefs. Once ignited, that intensity has to be nurtured carefully. Readings from the early work of Judith Butler still help in that regard. Her now largely abandoned implication of individual agency in changing sexual and gender norms through disruptive performances (which surfaces in both Gender Trouble from 1990 and the essay "Imitation and Gender Insubordination" from 1991) still makes students leave the classroom thinking that they can change the world if they first work creatively on themselves or their selves. Indeed, much of the early energy in queer studies generally derived from the sense of being asked, and being willing, to commit one's self to an important, realizable, and exhilarating cause. Unfortunately some recent theoretical work is not helpful. Especially deflating is Lee Edelman's much-discussed antipolitical polemic from 2004, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, which is actually a symptom and reinforcement of the very problem of general political passivity that I'm discussing here. Edelman uses Lacanian theory to argue that queers should repudiate the "oppressively political" and abandon any claim to a "viable political future." But the question remains as to how best to rekindle not only intellectual intensity in the classroom, but also an excitement about a dramatically different future that might even motivate students to engage in the hard work of collective action and sustained response long after they leave the university. Fundamental not only to "identity politics," but to all critical-thinking-based pedagogy is the belief that students, whatever their political orientation, should become engaged citizens in the world, not passive consumers who simply accept the status quo. And what I have found works best in that regard is a return to an older model of consciousness-raising, based on dialogue and a sharing of lived experiences (there are always students in class who have endured terrible hardships about which they are willing to speak), followed by exercises that ask students to imagine certain futures — utopias, even — that they would find worthy of fighting for. The diversity of what they come up with (Is sex work legalized? Does marriage become a wholly passé concept? What role does spirituality or religion play?) can lead to very dynamic conversations. Indeed, discussing their utopias allows them to begin to delineate the steps necessary to reach those states, looking backward in time to the successes of past social movements and forward to ones in which they might invest. It encourages students to think critically about how social change occurs, rather than to imagine vaguely that injustice somehow **dissipates magically** without the hard work of individuals and groups' organizing. It urges them to juxtapose the present situation — and whatever fuzzy sense they have of its basic acceptability — with a concrete visualization of what they would prefer as a reigning paradigm (or variety of paradigms). Some, such as Edelman, would argue that such exercises lock us into variations of the "norm" as it currently stands (whatever we project will simply be a version of what already is), but consensus about a single place-holding utopia is never the goal. The wide variety of possible utopias, as they sometimes clash with and sometimes complement each other, leads to intellectual excitement, critical attachment, and even productive anger. I will take that energy any day over the stasis produced by a cynical refusal even to imagine or invest in a future. Queer studies will never be what it was in the early 1990s. Today's context of ongoing oppression but token media and marketplace acceptance is very different. However, the doldrums of the queer-studies classroom and queer studies as a field can be challenged and the energy reignited. This means resisting the all-too-easy acceptance by students of the status quo; it means reminding them of the rhetorical and physical violence that continues to exist (but that is also uncomfortable to acknowledge and much easier simply to ignore or downplay); it means (for those of us working in queer studies) disrupting our own complacency that can result from being tenured, having successful writing and lecturing careers, and being able to afford a few comfortable lifestyle components. Queer studies will have a future only if it does the hard work of imagining possible futures and articulating ways to actually get us there.

Terrorism has to be defined in order to establish an effective response

TTSRL 8 (Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, policy Brif no. 2, 10/1/8, www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf) JPG

Where natural sciences use numbers to communicate an idea, social sciences use words. Unlike numbers, however, words mean different things to different people. Where anyone with a basic education is able to add “4” to “5” and come to the same result, if we ask a group of people to discribe “freedom”, we may end up with many different results depending on the particular persons’ origin, culture, and experience. Words such as “freedom” do not have the same meaning for everybody and such differences obviously hamper communication. Therefore, when studying terrorism, it is necessary to have a look at what different people, states, and international organizations mean when they use the word “terrorism” in their everyday speeches or documents. Without understanding the exact meaning of the term, it is hardly possible to analyze what consequences there are to intranational and international relations. Without a common agreement on the notion, there can hardly be any common steps to counter terrorism, whether at the domestic or the international level. This study should serve as an overview of how people, states and international organizations define terrorism. In chapters two and three, we shall analyze the academic discourse and have a look at what the common attributes that scholars ascribe to terrorism are. Whereas the second chapter uses a positive way of defining the notion – that is, it asks what terrorism is -, chapter three approaches the task from the other direction and asks what terrorism is not. Namely it searches for differences between terrorism and two related terms, organized crime and political violence. In order to articulate general statements, theories and recommendations, scholars try to group similar phenomena together according to common qualities. As we shall see, terrorism has got many facets that may serve as a basis for such classification. Chapter four focuses on several important typologies that have been reflected in academic literature. The academic discourse is important for our understanding of terrorism and for imbedding it in the theory. But although academia reflects reality, academia does not constitute reality. In order to analyze the current situation and obstacles in international cooperation on counter-terrorism, it is thus also necessary to ask how the term “terrorism” is understood in different legal frameworks. Chapter five deals with the international level, paying special attention to the European Union’s efforts to reach a common definition of terrorism. Chapter six, then, focuses on the level of member states and draws conclusions from similarities and differences found in the nation states’ legal orders.

**Wars don’t have single causes – consensus of experts**

**Cashman 00**

Greg, Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

**Monocausal explanations impoverish scholarship**

**Martin 90** Brian Martin, Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Wollongong, Australia, Uprooting War, 1990 edition http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html

In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters I have examined a number of structures and factors which have some connection with the war system. There is much more that could be said about any one of these structures, and other factors which could be examined. Here I wish to note one important point: attention should not be focussed on one single factor to the exclusion of others. This is often done for example by some Marxists who look only at capitalism as a root of war and other social problems, and by some feminists who attribute most problems to patriarchy. The danger of monocausal explanations is that they may lead to an inadequate political practice. The ‘revolution’ may be followed by the persistence or even expansion of many problems which were not addressed by the single-factor perspective. The one connecting feature which I perceive in the structures underlying war is an unequal distribution of power. This unequal distribution is socially organised in many different ways, such as in the large-scale structures for state administration, in capitalist ownership, in male domination within families and elsewhere, in control over knowledge by experts, and in the use of force by the military. Furthermore, these different systems of power are interconnected. They often support each other, and sometimes conflict. This means that the struggle against war can and must be undertaken at many different levels. It ranges from struggles to undermine state power to struggles to undermine racism, sexism and other forms of domination at the level of the individual and the local community. Furthermore, the different struggles need to be linked together. That is the motivation for analysing the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them

#### Decision-making based on consequences is best mode for action.

Weiss, Prof Poli Sci – CUNY Grad Center, ‘99

(Thomas G, “Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 13.1)

Scholars and practitioners frequently employ the term “dilemma” to describe painful decision making but “quandary” would be more apt.27A dilemma involves two or more alternative courses of action with unintended but unavoidable and equally undesirable consequences. If consequences are equally unpalatable, then remaining inactive on the sidelines is an option rather than entering the serum on the field. A quandary, on the other hand, entails tough choices among unattractive options with better or worse possible outcomes. While humanitarians are perplexed, they are not and should not be immobilized. The solution is not indifference or withdrawal but rather appropriate engagement. The key lies in making a good faith effort to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of different alloys of politics and humanitarianism, and then to choose what often amounts to the lesser of evils.

Thoughtful humanitarianism is more appropriate than rigid ideological responses, for four reasons: goals of humanitarian action often conflict, good intentions can have catastrophic consequences; there are alternative ways to achieve ends; and even if none of the choices is ideal, victims still require decisions about outside help. What Myron Wiener has called “instrumental humanitarianism” would resemble just war doctrine because contextual analyses and not formulas are required. Rather than resorting to knee-jerk reactions to help, it is necessary to weigh options and make decisions about choices that are far from optimal.

Many humanitarian decisions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda—and especially those involving economic or military sanctions— required selecting least-bad options. Thomas Nagle advises that “given the limitations on human action, it is naive to suppose that there is a solution to every moral problem. “29 Action-oriented institutions and staff are required in order to contextualized their work rather than apply preconceived notions of what is right or wrong. Nonetheless, classicists continue to insist on Pictet’s “indivisible whole” because humanitarian principles “are interlocking, overlapping and mutually supportive. . . . It is hard to accept the logic of one without also accepting the others. “30

The process of making decisions in war zones could be compared to that pursued by “clinical ethical review teams” whose members are on call to make painful decisions about life-and-death matters in hospitals.sl The sanctity of life is complicated by new technologies, but urgent decisions cannot be finessed. It is impermissible to long for another era or to pretend that the bases for decisions are unchanged. However emotionally wrenching, finding solutions is an operational imperative that is challenging but intellectually doable. Humanitarians who cannot stand the heat generated by situational ethics should stay out of the post-Cold War humanitarian kitchen.

Principles in an Unprincipled World

Why are humanitarians in such a state of moral and operational disrepair? In many ways Western liberal values over the last few centuries have been moving toward interpreting moral obligations as going beyond a family and intimate networks, beyond a tribe, and beyond a nation. The impalpable moral ideal is concern about the fate of other people, no matter how far away.szThe evaporation of distance with advances in technology and media coverage, along with a willingness to intervene in a variety of post–Cold War crises, however, has produced situations in which humanitarians are damned if they do and if they don’t. Engagement by outsiders does not necessarily make things better, and it may even create a “moral hazard by altering the payoffs to combatants in such a way as to encourage more intensive fighting.“33

This new terrain requires analysts and practitioners to admit ignorance and question orthodoxies. There is no comfortable theoretical framework or world vision to function as a compass to steer between integration and fragmentation, globalization and insularity. Michael Ignatieff observes, “The world is not becoming more chaotic or violent, although our failure to understand and act makes it seem so. “34Gwyn Prins has pointed to the “scary humility of admitting one’s ignorance” because “the new vogue for ‘complex emergencies’ is too often a means of concealing from oneself that one does not know what is going on. “3sTo make matters more frustrating, never before has there been such a bombardment of data and instant analysis; the challenge of distilling such jumbled and seemingly contradictory information adds to the frustration of trying to do something appropriate fast.

International discourse is not condemned to follow North American fashions and adapt sound bites and slogans. It is essential to struggle with and even embrace the ambiguities that permeate international responses to wars, but without the illusion of a one-size-fits-all solution. The trick is to grapple with complexities, to tease out the general without ignoring the particular, and still to be inspired enough to engage actively in trying to make a difference.

Because more and more staff of aid agencies, their governing boards, and their financial backers have come to value reflection, an earlier policy prescription by Larry Minear and me no longer appears bizarre: “Don’t just do something, stand there! “3sThis advice represented our conviction about the payoffs from thoughtful analyses and our growing distaste for the stereotypical, yet often accurate, image of a bevy of humanitarian actors flitting from one emergency to the next.

#### Ethics are inherently situational. We are forced to make hard choices because we have finite resources and political capabilities. Ethics makes us push the blame onto others to maintain the purity of our intentions instead of taking responsibility

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(David, Human Rights Quarterly 23, “The Road to Military Humanitarianism”)

When intervening for ethical ends there is little pressure to account for final policy outcomes. Whatever happens in the targeted states, under international sanctions or military action, it can be alleged to be better than non-intervention. As both Tony Blair and The Guardian argued in response to the ‘collateral’ deaths of ethnic Albanian refugees from the high altitude Nato bombing campaign in Kosovo: ‘Milosevic is determined to wipe a people from the face of this country. Nato is determined to stop him’(The Guardian, 15 May 1999). The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, although dismissing the idea that there was a Serb policy of genocide, still concluded that ‘The issue in Kosovo was ... whether in the absence of Nato intervention, the Serb campaign would have continued over many years, eventually resulting in more deaths and instability in the region than if Nato had not intervened. We believe that it would’ (UKFAC 2000, para.123). The belief that it would have been even worse without international action provides a hypothetical post facto justification that is difficult to disprove. The discourse of ethical foreign policy establishes a framework of western intervention which inevitably encourages a positive view of intervention in the face of exaggerated fears of non-intervention.

#### The impact is genocide

Mohawk, Associate Professor of History @ SUNY Buffalo, ‘2K

(John C, Utopian Legacies, p. 4-5)

People who believe that they are acting on a plan to solve all of the humankind’s problems think they are on a kind of sacred mission, even when the origin of their inspiration is secular in nature and makes no claim to intervention by a higher power. Although adherents may have only a vague idea about how the utopia will come about or what it will be like when it arrives, utopian movements often stimulate high levels of enthusiasm and a widely shared sense of being a “chosen people” with a special destiny. People caught up in such movements tend to be intolerant of others who are not part of this projected destiny, who do not believe in the same things, and are not expected to share in the future benefits. One reason for the popularity of these movements is that they exalt the importance of the group, praise their imagined superior qualities and future prospects, and urge that, relative to other peoples, they are special and more deserving. This pattern of self-aggrandizement has often proven popular and energizing. It contains a message that others who are not special or chosen are without significant value and may be treated accordingly. This kind of intolerance can result in the denial of rights, including the right to live, to hold property, to vote, or to hold professional licenses, if the inspired group has the power to do these things. A scornful indifference to these unbelieving and unentitled others can manifest as racism and/or ethnocentrism. Such intolerance has been known to lead to crimes against humanity, including systematic acts of genocide.

Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, “In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?”, Lee immediately answers, “Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.” This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is “the ethic of responsibility” rather than “the ethic of absolute ends” that is appropriate. While an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, governments must always weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and promoting them will always have to be considered.

#### All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved

**Cummisky, 96** (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontologieal constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that 1 may still saw two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hills example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying

one. Then 1 cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But Similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up. How is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the lass of the one, each is priceless: thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing'letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.\*

#### Apocalyptic scenario-planning is not pointless: It solves their offense, because it’s self-reflexive; and, It boosts valuable participation for the audience.

Bruce Tonn – Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee, and Jenna Tonn, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University – Futures 41 (2009) 760–765 – obtained via Science Direct

This discussion has largely been focused on the historical precedents for a secular tradition of writing about human extinction. Although literary studies may seem outside of the scope of futures studies, authors like Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, H.G. Wells, Aldous Huxley, and Margaret Atwood present compelling visions of the future and generate discussions about the imagination of human extinction and the art of writing its scenarios. Furthermore a literary analysis of the apocalyptic mode of writing offers new insights into the reasons why the narrative of human extinction is so powerful and provides background texts that might help shape and inspire future extinction scenarios. D.H. Lawrence once asked: ‘‘What does the Apocalypse matter, unless in so far as it gives us imaginative release into another vital world? After all, what meaning has the Apocalypse? For the ordinary reader, not much’’ [28]. The goal of this edition is to address D.H. Lawrence’s questions and to prove to the ordinary reader that thinking about human extinction an integral step toward changing the present state of the world.

## 2NC

### 2NC Overview

#### We literally can’t know the aff is true without rigorous testing—they prevent that

Zappen 4—James Zappen, Professor of Language and Literature at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute [“The Rebirth of Dialogue: Bakhtin, Socrates, and the Rhetorical Tradition,” p. 35-36]

Finally, Bakhtin describes the Socratic dialogue as a carnivalesque debate between opposing points of view, with a ritualistic crownings and decrownings of opponents. I call this Socratic form of debate a contesting of ideas to capture the double meaning of the Socratic debate as both a mutual testing of oneself and others and a contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives. Brickhouse and Smith explain that Socrates' testing of ideas and people is a mutual testing not only of others but also of himself: Socrates claims that he has been commanded by the god to examine himself as well as others; he claims that the unexamined life is not worth living; and, since he rarely submits to questioning himself, "it must be that in the process of examining others Socrates regards himself as examining his own life, too." Such a mutual testing of ideas provides the only claim to knowledge that Socrates can have: since neither he nor anyone else knows the real definitions of things, he cannot claim to have any knowledge of his own; since, however, he subjects his beliefs to repeated testing, he can claim to have that limited human knowledge supported by the "inductive evidence" of "previous elenctic examinations." This mutual testing of ideas and people is evident in the Laches and also appears in the Gorgias in Socrates' testing of his own belief that courage is inseparable from the other virtues and in his willingness to submit his belief and indeed his life to the ultimate test of divine judgment, in what Bakhtin calls a dialogue on the threshold. The contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives and their ritualistic crowning/decrowning is evident in the Gorgias in Soocrates' successive refutations and humiliations of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.

### AT: C/I

#### Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

### Steinberg/Freeley

#### Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

### AT: Predictability

#### Games occur in clearly framed and transparent spaces with amoral rules – this provides the incentive for perpetual curiosity

Carter 8 – prof @ The Colorado College, research support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the staff of the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Benezet Foundation at The Colorado College (Lief H, 2008, "LAW AND POLITICS AS PLAY," Chicago-Kent Law Review, 83(3), http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol83no3/Carter.pdf)

6. Game Transparency Games take place in clearly framed spaces and in bounded times. This framing process makes information flow to players and spectators manage-able. Although the sheer speed of the game’s action may momentarily con-fuse players and spectators, a good game is, nearly all of the time, transparent to players and observers alike. Bill Bradley wrote of basket-ball’s transparency: As a form of human endeavor it is understandable and pure. The per-formance demands maximum effort, as one sees clearly at courtside. Un-encumbered by masks, pads, or hats, the players reveal their bodies as well as their skills. People come and see and know that what they see is real.122 Sports rules do not condemn athletes who enhance their performances through surgical repair of torn knees and shoulders. These procedures are transparently reported in the press. But they do condemn concealed dop-ing.123 The drive to ensure that players and fans unquestionably experience games as they “really are” led to the lifetime exclusion of Pete Rose from baseball for gambling on games in spite of the fact that he was not accused of deliberately altering the outcomes of games in which he participated.124 The very existence of the wager prevents people from knowing, as Bradley put it, “that what they see is real.” 7. Deception Competitive games are amoral in all respects. “Anything goes” unless a rule prohibits it and a player gets caught violating it. Games capitalize on the human tendency to better oneself by deceiving others. Games permit all things not prohibited by rule. Clock-stopping instances of faked injuries by players on teams playing from behind in the last stages of close college football games and the art of “diving” in international football, for exam-ple, are presumed permissible. Squads of basketball referees routinely de-cide how physically they will permit the teams to play, and they communicate their expectations, how closely or loosely they will call fouls, to the coaches and players prior to the game. Illegal deceptions on the field are, moments after the fact, transparently evident to players and spectators. If referees do not catch them, suddenly-angry coaches and the aggrieved crowd will let the errant referees know soon enough. 8. Minimization of Chance Good sports and games minimize the effects of purely random acci-dents on outcomes.125 The chance elements that remain are either highly transparent, such as starting a game with a coin flip; randomly distributed, like a crazy bounce of the ball; or impact both teams equally, as does a sudden rainstorm. 9. Curiosity and Institutionalized Error Correction The transparency of games, the precision of their framing in time and space, the minimization of chance elements, and the desire to win provide players with every incentive to perceive mistakes in their play and to cor-rect them. Because players and teams define themselves as “skilled,” but never “just” or “entitled to win,” they constantly seek to discard habits and strategies that do not work. To avoid overconfidence, coaches regularly exhort their players to take the worth and merit of their opponents, even apparently weak ones, seriously. In competitive gaming, teams and players imagine that when they lose, they can improve, play again, and hope to win another day. The game context thus overcomes the human impulse to keep their fears of death at bay by believing in their own righteousness. Like the scientific method, competition teaches the benefits of perpetual curiosity. Through games people come to know the satisfactions that flow from em-bracing life’s endlessly surprising novelty.

### ROB

#### Righteousness and fundamentalism are the best historical explanation for race and discrimination – your attempts at justice backfire

Carter 8 – prof @ The Colorado College, research support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the staff of the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Benezet Foundation at The Colorado College (Lief H, 2008, "LAW AND POLITICS AS PLAY," Chicago-Kent Law Review, 83(3), http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol83no3/Carter.pdf)

Fundamentalism includes not only religious righteousness (e.g., Is-lamic and Christian fundamentalists) and secular ideological righteousness (e.g., Leninist/Stalinist or Maoist Communism), it includes beliefs in the physical and biological superiority of one’s “race”: Hitler’s Aryan suprem-acy, which generated the Holocaust, for example, or the racism of many white Americans, which generated so much lynching. A belief in the abso-lute correctness of group belief systems and ways of life, including identi-fication with the cultural and linguistic patterns associated with “race” and ethnicity, necessarily entails a belief in physical purity, which is an objecti-fied form of righteousness. “Others” are, by definition, impure. Tribal, cultural, and ethnic differences do not, in and of themselves, automatically trigger inter-group violence.91 Fundamentalists who believe those differences indicate supremacy, however, behave like Soviet dictators, Hitler, or al Qaeda. American exceptionalists who believe that the United States is “the promised land” may not be far behind.92 Barrington Moore tersely describes instances in which the belief in “our” group’s purity had brutal consequences. His retelling of the August 24, 1572, St. Bartholomew Massacre of the Parisian Huguenots describes how the mutual invective on both sides dehumanized the other by employ-ing metaphors of impurity such as “vermin,” “poison,” and “lepers.”93 The witch trials in Europe between 1450 and 1700, tortured into confessing, burned, and hanged about 100,000 people, the vast majority of them women, in some instances by pulling the accused’s arms from their sockets, or forcing her to sit in a heated metal “witch’s chair.” Among the many elements of this phenomenon, which was deliberately coordinated and en-dorsed by the moral and intellectual leaders of the time, fifteenth century law required that conviction for witchcraft include proof that the accused had been rendered impure by having physical sexual intercourse with a demon.94 Socio-biologists call Moore’s observation “pseudo-speciation” or “despeciation.” Humans “despeciate” the other, i.e., define human victims as not of the species homo sapiens, before slaughtering them. In the Rwan-dan genocide of 1994, Hutus called their Tutsi victims “cockroaches.” Na-zis and Stalinists regularly referred to Jews and Kulaks as “vermin.” Ordinary American members of the U.S. armed forces made Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison act like dogs. Conversely, psychologists have found that when people give a pet animal, even a cockroach or a flea, a human name, they have a difficult time seeing the animal die or putting it down. Hence, Moore also speculates, those groups that give God a name and imagine God as a human-like figure whom they should obey, as pri-mates should obey a silverback leader, in a dominance hierarchy, thereby show a greater historical incidence of group violence t

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han do polytheistic or non-theist cultures. These traditions often tell stories of encounters—that of Saul of Tarsus—with God that are “blinding.” We might say that people are blinded by righteousness.95 Thus the Crusades may have been inevitable. If “my God” has a name and a story that gives a life its meaning, all the psychological factors—disputed sacred turf, belief in one’s own purity, the affection for things we name, and ultimately the fear of death—point toward despeciating and killing those who threaten to tear that world apart.96 Moore does not claim that religious or ideological fundamentalist beliefs cause brutality in any simple linear way. Most fundamentalists behave peacefully most of the time. But fundamentalist beliefs do seem to act as “purity boosters,” en-ablers of moralistic group violence that make brutality against the other seem “right.”97 D. The Trouble with Justice“Justice” cannot have any objectively correct substantive content in a socially constructed world. As Kahneman, noted above, and other psy-chologists have found, people on all sides of a conflict believe they are “right.” When justice takes on substantive meaning, that meaning tends inevitably toward the absolutist and righteous; justice itself becomes a trig-ger of brutality. In the context of competitive play, “justice” and “rights” merely describe the prizes political and legal contestants strive to win.98 In psychodynamic terms, justice often describes a rationalization of the ex- perience of injustice, i.e., of outrage triggered by insults to power, turf, and purity. Perceived violations of the expectation of fairness and of equal treatment of equals often trigger anger and potential violence.99 Frans de Waal has demonstrated that non-human primates similarly react to perceived unfairness and inequality. After discovering experimentally that capuchin monkeys would angrily reject food, in this case a piece of cucumber, that they had once accepted after seeing their partners getting more valued food (a grape), de Waal concluded: The fairness issue is closely related to the interests of economists, who have classically assumed that human beings are rational optimizers of the costs and benefits of their choices. Some economists, however, believe that we are guided by emotions and passions that sometimes lead to irrational behaviors, at least in the short run, such as in the case of a monkey refusing food. . . . Some economists have become interested in such irrational human actions and have developed very interesting evolutionary explanations for it. The results of this study are aligned with that thinking, in the sense that monkeys behave in a similar manner, rejecting acceptable food when the rational strategy would be always to exchange. They exhibit emotions similar to humans, becoming very unhappy when someone else receives a better deal than they. 100 De Waal has termed this primate pattern “moralistic aggression,” and the term aptly describes the common human brutality syndrome. Timothy McVeigh bombed the Oklahoma City Federal Building on the anniversary of the deaths of the Branch Davidians at Waco because the injustice of the government’s murder of innocent believers in Waco outraged him.

## 1NR

### Case

#### No biopower impact-

Edward Ross Dickinson 4, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, Central European History, Vol. 37 No. 1, p. 34-36

And it is, of course, embedded in a broader discursive complex (institutions, professions, fields of social, medical, and psychological expertise) that pursues these same aims in often even more effective and inescapable ways.89 In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable.¶ Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies.¶ In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90¶ Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. ¶ This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91

#### You’re responsible for catastrophic consequences if you could prevent them

Russ Shafer-Landau, University of Kansas Ethics, July 97 v107 n4 p584(28)

Even Nozick, a staunch absolutist, allows that cases of "catastrophic moral horror" may require suspension of absolute side constraints.(18) Attention to the dire consequences that may be brought about by allegiance to absolute rules needn't move us to the consequentialist camp--it didn't incline Ross or Nozick in that direction, for instance. But it does create a presumptive case against absolutism. Absolutist responses to the argument standardly take one of two forms. The first is to reject premise (1) and deny that absolutism generates tragic consequences, by arguing that a set of suitably narrowed absolutist rules will not require behavior that results in "catastrophic moral horror." The second response is to reject premise (2) and defend the moral necessity of obedience even if tragic consequences ensue. Rejecting Premise (1) Consider the first strategy. This is tantamount to a specificationist program that begins by admitting that the standard candidates--don't kill, lie, cheat, commit adultery--cannot plausibly be construed as absolute rules. Just as we had to narrow their scope if we were to show them universally relevant, so too we need to narrow the scope of such properties to show them universally determinative. The question, though, is how far, and in what way, this added concreteness is to be pursued. The double dangers that the absolutist must avoid at this juncture are those of drawing the grounding properties too broadly, or too narrowly. Rules drawn too narrowly will incorporate concrete details of cases in the description of the grounding properties, yielding a theory that is particularist in all but name. The opposite problem is realized when we allow the grounding properties to be drawn broadly enough as to be repeatably instantiated, but at the cost of allowing the emerging rules to conflict. Some middle ground must be secured. How could we frame an absolute rule that enjoined just the actions we want, while offering an escape clause for tragic cases? There seems to be no way to do this other than by appending a proviso to the rule, to the effect that it binds except where such obedience will lead to catastrophic consequences, very serious harm, horrific results. Because of the great variety of ways in which such results can occur, there doesn't seem to be any more precise way to specify the exceptive clause without reducing it to an indefinitely long string of too-finely described scenarios. Is this problematic? Consider an analogous case. Someone wants to lose weight and wants to know how long to maintain a new diet. A dietician offers the following advice: "Cut twenty percent of your caloric intake; this will make you thinner, but also weaker. If you reach a point where you've gotten too thin and weak, increase your calories." The dietician's advice is flawed because it doesn't give, by itself, enough information to the person trying to follow it. It's too general. The qualified moral rule is similarly uninformative. If abiding by the rule will occasion harmful results, one wants to know how harmful they have to be to qualify as too harmful. The rule doesn't really say--`catastrophic' is just a synonym for `too harmful'. Such a rule is crucially underspecific, and this undermines efforts to apply it as a major premise in deductive moral argument. This lack of specificity results from an absence of necessary and sufficient conditions that could determine the extension of the concept "catastrophic consequences."(19) Efforts to remove this underspecificity by providing a set of definitional criteria typically serve only to falsify the resulting ethical assessments; imagine the futility of trying to precisely set out in advance what is to count as catastrophic consequences. Rendering the notion of "catastrophic" more precise seems bound to yield a rule that omits warranted exceptions. Or it may cover all such exceptions, but at the cost of making the exceptive clause so fine-grained that it will be nothing less than an indefinitely long disjunction of descriptions of actual cases that represent exceptions to the general rule. Neither option should leave us very sanguine about the prospects of specifying absolute rules so as to ensure that such rules can be obeyed without occasioning catastrophic consequences. Rejecting Premise (2) The alternative for the absolutist is to stand fast and allow that morality requires adherence to rules that will sometimes yield catastrophic horrors. There is no inconsistency in taking such a stand. But the ethic that requires conduct that is tantamount to failure to prevent catastrophe is surely suspect. Preventing catastrophe is presumptively obligatory. The obligation might be defeasible, but absolutists have yet to tell the convincing story that would override the presumption. Imagine that you are a sharpshooter in a position to kill a terrorist who is credibly threatening to detonate a bomb that will kill thousands. If you merely wound him, he will be able to trigger the firing mechanism. You must kill him to save the innocents. Suppose that in obedience to an absolutist ethic you refrain from shooting. The terrorist detonates the bomb. Thousands die. Something must be said about the agent whose obedience to absolute rules occasions catastrophe. It is possible that an absolutist ethic will blame you for doing your duty. Possible, but unlikely. Absolutists who allow that obedience to their favored rules may occasion catastrophe typically seek ways to exculpate those whose obedience yields tragic results. The standard strategy is to endorse some version of the doctrine of double effect, or the doctrine of doing and allowing. The former says that harms brought about by indirect intention may be permissible even though similar harms brought about by direct intention are forbidden. The latter says that bringing about harm through omission or inaction may be permissible even though similar harms brought about by positive action are forbidden. The motivating spirit behind both doctrines is to legitimate certain kinds of harmful conduct, to exculpate certain harm doers, and to forestall the possibility that absolute rules might conflict. The truth of either doctrine would ensure that agents always have a permissible option to pursue--namely, obedience to an absolute moral rule.(20) Quite apart from the fact that these doctrines have yet to be adequately defended,(21) their adequate defense would still leave us short of a justification of the absolute rules that are to complement them. Neither of these doctrines is itself a defense of absolutism; rather, they are really "helping doctrines," whose truth would undermine the inevitability of conflict among absolute rules. We may always have a permissible option in cases where we must choose between killing and letting die, intending death or merely foreseeing it, but this by itself is no argument for thinking that the prohibition on intentionally killing innocents is absolute.

#### Util is best – politics is organized according to interests.

Harries, 94 – Editor @ The National Interest

(Owen, Power and Civilization, The National Interest, Spring, lexis)

Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, “In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?”, Lee immediately answers, “Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice.” This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is “the ethic of responsibility” rather than “the ethic of absolute ends” that is appropriate. While an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, governments must always weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and promoting them will always have to be considered.

#### Existence is a prerequisite to value

Wapner ‘3 (Paul, Associate Prof. and Dir. Global Env’t. Policy Prog. – American U., Dissent, “Leftist criticism of “nature””, Winter, 50:1, Proquest)

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions--except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean Francois Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.