# Round 6 UGA – UGA FB

# 1NC

## 1NC Round 6

### Off 1

#### The aff limits war fighting capabilities by limiting the usage of war rhetoric – devastates all operations

Kriner 10 (Douglas – asst prof of poli sci @ Boston Univ , "After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War," Ed. by William Howell and Jon Peverhouse, p. 285-286)

American history offers few examples of Congress using its legislative power to bring to heel a wayward commander in chief. Only in the rarest cases will Congress be able to marshall the supermajorities required to pass legislation compelling the president to abandon his preferred policy preferences. However, to focus only on the lack of concrete legislation terminating an ongoing war or blocking the use of force altogether is to miss the more indirect, yet still powerful means of influence through which members of Congress have routinely shaped the course of American military affairs. Even when Congress fails to write its military preferences into law, its members rarely stand on the sidelines of the policy process. Rather, members of Congress have historically engaged in a variety of actions from formal intiatives, such as introducing legislation or holding hearings that challenge the president's conduct of military action, to informal efforts to shape the nature of the policy debate in the public sphere. These actions can raise significantly the political and strategic costs to the president of waging large-scale, long-duration military actions to pursue their policy goals. In some cases, presidents may judge that the benefits of responding miltiarily to a foreign policy crisis or continuing an ongoing military engagement may outweigh even the heightened costs that congressional opposition generates. In these instances, enacting legislation to compel the president to change course may be the only remedy available to congressional opponents. In many other cases, however, congressional opposition has had tangible effects on policy outcomes. Again and again, the statistical and qualitative analyses have showed presidents modifying their policies, moderating the scale and duration of their military ventures, and sometimes foregoing a military response altogether, when faced with real or anticipated opposition on Capitol Hill. When exerted indirectly, congressional influence is less immediately visible and dramatic than it is in the rare occasions when Congress has enacted legislation to mandate a change in militar policy. Yet through indirect mechanisms, Congress has often encouraged presidents to pursue significantly different military policies than they would have adopted in the absence of congressional opposition.

#### It spills over to destabilize all presidential war powers

Heder 10 (Adam, J.D., magna cum laude , J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, “THE POWER TO END WAR: THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER,” St. Mary’s Law Journal Vol. 41 No. 3, <http://www.stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/Hederreadytogo.pdf>)

This constitutional silence invokes Justice Rehnquist’s oftquoted language from the landmark “political question” case, Goldwater v. Carter . 121 In Goldwater , a group of senators challenged President Carter’s termination, without Senate approval, of the United States ’ Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. 122 A plurality of the Court held, 123 in an opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, that this was a nonjusticiable political question. 124 He wrote: “In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, . . . the instant case in my view also ‘must surely be controlled by political standards.’” 125 Notably, Justice Rehnquist relied on the fact that there was no constitutional provision on point. Likewise, there is no constitutional provision on whether Congress has the legislative power to limit, end, or otherwise redefine the scope of a war. Though Justice Powell argues in Goldwater that the Treaty Clause and Article VI of the Constitution “add support to the view that the text of the Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to terminate treaties to the President alone,” 126 the same cannot be said about Congress’s legislative authority to terminate or limit a war in a way that goes beyond its explicitly enumerated powers. There are no such similar provisions that would suggest Congress may decline to exercise its appropriation power but nonetheless legally order the President to cease all military operations. Thus, the case for deference to the political branches on this issue is even greater than it was in the Goldwater context. Finally, the Constitution does not imply any additional powers for Congress to end, limit, or redefine a war. The textual and historical evidence suggests the Framers purposefully declined to grant Congress such powers. And as this Article argues, granting Congress this power would be inconsistent with the general war powers structure of the Constitution. Such a reading of the Constitution would unnecessarily empower Congress and tilt the scales heavily in its favor. More over, it would strip the President of his Commander in Chief authority to direct the movement of troops at a time when the Executive’s expertise is needed. 127 And fears that the President will grow too powerful are unfounded, given the reasons noted above. 128 In short, the Constitution does not impliedly afford Congress any authority to prematurely terminate a war above what it explicitly grants. 129 Declaring these issues nonjusticiable political questions would be the most practical means of balancing the textual and historical demands, the structural demands, and the practical demands that complex modern warfare brings . Adjudicating these matters would only lead the courts to engage in impermissible line drawing — lines that would both confus e the issue and add layers to the text of the Constitution in an area where the Framers themselves declined to give such guidance.

#### The impact is the loss of fourth-gen warfighting capabilities that escalate to nuclear use

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A. The Emergence of Non-State Actors

Even as the quantity of nation-states in the world has increased dramatically since the end of World War II, the institution of the nation-state has been in decline over the past few decades. Much of this decline is the direct result of the waning of major interstate war, which primarily resulted from the introduction of nuclear weapons.122 The proliferation of nuclear weapons, and their immense capacity for absolute destruction, has ensured that conventional wars remain limited in scope and duration. Hence, "both the size of the armed forces and the quantity of weapons at their disposal has declined quite sharply" since 1945.123 At the same time, concurrent with the decline of the nation-state in the second half of the twentieth century, non-state actors have increasingly been willing and able to use force to advance their causes. In contrast to nation-states, who adhere to the Clausewitzian distinction between the ends of policy and the means of war to achieve those ends, non-state actors do not necessarily fight as a mere means of advancing any coherent policy. Rather, they see their fight as a life-and-death struggle, wherein the ordinary terminology of war as an instrument of policy breaks down because of this blending of means and ends.124 It is the existential nature of this struggle and the disappearance of the Clausewitzian distinction between war and policy that has given rise to a new generation of warfare. The concept of fourth-generational warfare was first articulated in an influential article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, which has proven highly prescient. In describing what they saw as the modem trend toward a new phase of warfighting, the authors argued that: In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). 125 It is precisely this blurring of peace and war and the demise of traditionally definable battlefields that provides the impetus for the formulation of a new. theory of war powers. As evidenced by Part M, supra, the constitutional allocation of war powers, and the Framers' commitment of the war power to two co-equal branches, was not designed to cope with the current international system, one that is characterized by the persistent machinations of international terrorist organizations, the rise of multilateral alliances, the emergence of rogue states, and the potentially wide proliferation of easily deployable weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and otherwise. B. The Framers' World vs. Today's World The Framers crafted the Constitution, and the people ratified it, in a time when everyone understood that the state controlled both the raising of armies and their use. Today, however, the threat of terrorism is bringing an end to the era of the nation-state's legal monopoly on violence, and the kind of war that existed before-based on a clear division between government, armed forces, and the people-is on the decline. 126 As states are caught between their decreasing ability to fight each other due to the existence of nuclear weapons and the increasing threat from non-state actors, it is clear that the Westphalian system of nation-states that informed the Framers' allocation of war powers is no longer the order of the day. 127 As seen in Part III, supra, the rise of the modem nation-state occurred as a result of its military effectiveness and ability to defend its citizens. If nation-states such as the United States are unable to adapt to the changing circumstances of fourth-generational warfare-that is, if they are unable to adequately defend against low-intensity conflict conducted by non-state actors-"then clearly [the modem state] does not have a future in front of it.' 128 The challenge in formulating a new theory of war powers for fourthgenerational warfare that remains legally justifiable lies in the difficulty of adapting to changed circumstances while remaining faithful to the constitutional text and the original meaning. 29 To that end, it is crucial to remember that the Framers crafted the Constitution in the context of the Westphalian system of nation-states. The three centuries following the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 witnessed an international system characterized by wars, which, "through the efforts of governments, assumed a more regular, interconnected character."' 130 That period saw the rise of an independent military class and the stabilization of military institutions. Consequently, "warfare became more regular, better organized, and more attuned to the purpose of war-that is, to its political objective."' 1 3' That era is now over. Today, the stability of the long-existing Westphalian international order has been greatly eroded in recent years with the advent of international terrorist organizations, which care nothing for the traditional norms of the laws of war. This new global environment exposes the limitations inherent in the interpretational methods of originalism and textualism and necessitates the adoption of a new method of constitutional interpretation. While one must always be aware of the text of the Constitution and the original understanding of that text, that very awareness identifies the extent to which fourth-generational warfare epitomizes a phenomenon unforeseen by the Framers, a problem the constitutional resolution of which must rely on the good judgment of the present generation. 13 Now, to adapt the constitutional warmarking scheme to the new international order characterized by fourth-generational warfare, one must understand the threat it is being adapted to confront. C. The Jihadist Threat The erosion of the Westphalian and Clausewitzian model of warfare and the blurring of the distinction between the means of warfare and the ends of policy, which is one characteristic of fourth-generational warfare, apply to al-Qaeda and other adherents of jihadist ideology who view the United States as an enemy. An excellent analysis of jihadist ideology and its implications for the rest of the world are presented by Professor Mary Habeck. 133 Professor Habeck identifies the centrality of the Qur'an, specifically a particular reading of the Qur'an and hadith (traditions about the life of Muhammad), to the jihadist terrorists. 134 The jihadis believe that the scope of the Qur'an is universal, and "that their interpretation of Islam is also intended for the entire world, which must be brought to recognize this fact peacefully if possible and through violence if not."' 135 Along these lines, the jihadis view the United States and her allies as among the greatest enemies of Islam: they believe "that every element of modern Western liberalism is flawed, wrong, and evil" because the basis of liberalism is secularism. 136 The jihadis emphasize the superiority of Islam to all other religions, and they believe that "God does not want differing belief systems to coexist."' 37 For this reason, jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda "recognize that the West will not submit without a fight and believe in fact that the Christians, Jews, and liberals have united against Islam in a war that will end in the complete destruction of the unbelievers.' 138 Thus, the adherents of this jihadist ideology, be it al-Qaeda or other groups, will continue to target the United States until she is destroyed. Their ideology demands it. 139 To effectively combat terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, it is necessary to understand not only how they think, but also how they operate. Al-Qaeda is a transnational organization capable of simultaneously managing multiple operations all over the world."14 It is both centralized and decentralized: al-Qaeda is centralized in the sense that Osama bin Laden is the unquestioned leader, but it is decentralized in that its operations are carried out locally, by distinct cells."4 AI-Qaeda benefits immensely from this arrangement because it can exercise direct control over high-probability operations, while maintaining a distance from low-probability attacks, only taking the credit for those that succeed. The local terrorist cells benefit by gaining access to al-Qaeda's "worldwide network of assets, people, and expertise."' 42 Post-September 11 events have highlighted al-Qaeda's resilience. Even as the United States and her allies fought back, inflicting heavy casualties on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and destroying dozens of cells worldwide, "al-Qaeda's networked nature allowed it to absorb the damage and remain a threat." 14 3 This is a far cry from earlier generations of warfare, where the decimation of the enemy's military forces would generally bring an end to the conflict. D. The Need for Rapid Reaction and Expanded Presidential War Power By now it should be clear just how different this conflict against the extremist terrorists is from the type of warfare that occupied the minds of the Framers at the time of the Founding. Rather than maintaining the geographical and political isolation desired by the Framers for the new country, today's United States is an international power targeted by individuals and groups that will not rest until seeing her demise. The Global War on Terrorism is not truly a war within the Framers' eighteenth-century conception of the term, and the normal constitutional provisions regulating the division of war powers between Congress and the President do not apply. Instead, this "war" is a struggle for survival and dominance against forces that threaten to destroy the United States and her allies, and the fourth-generational nature of the conflict, highlighted by an indiscernible distinction between wartime and peacetime, necessitates an evolution of America's traditional constitutional warmaking scheme. As first illustrated by the military strategist Colonel John Boyd, constitutional decision-making in the realm of war powers in the fourth generation should consider the implications of the OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. 44 In the era of fourth-generational warfare, quick reactions, proceeding through the OODA Loop rapidly, and disrupting the enemy's OODA loop are the keys to victory. "In order to win," Colonel Boyd suggested, "we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries." 145 In the words of Professor Creveld, "[b]oth organizationally and in terms of the equipment at their disposal, the armed forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their heavy equipment and becoming more like police."1 46 Unfortunately, the existing constitutional understanding, which diffuses war power between two branches of government, necessarily (by the Framers' design) slows down decision- making. In circumstances where war is undesirable (which is, admittedly, most of the time, especially against other nation-states), the deliberativeness of the existing decision-making process is a positive attribute. In America's current situation, however, in the midst of the conflict with al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations, the existing process of constitutional decision-making in warfare may prove a fatal hindrance to achieving the initiative necessary for victory. As a slow-acting, deliberative body, Congress does not have the ability to adequately deal with fast-emerging situations in fourth-generational warfare. Thus, in order to combat transnational threats such as al-Qaeda, the executive branch must have the ability to operate by taking offensive military action even without congressional authorization, because only the executive branch is capable of the swift decision-making and action necessary to prevail in fourth-generational conflicts against fourthgenerational opponents.

#### Bioterror causes extinction

Mhyrvold 13 (Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD, Princeton “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action,” Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series

Research paper NO . 2 – 2013)

As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the worst attack one can imagine, for several reasons. First, most of the classic bioweapons are based on 1960s and 1970s technology because the 1972 treaty halted bioweapons development efforts in the United States and most other Western countries. Second, the Russians, although solidly committed to biological weapons long after the treaty deadline, were never on the cutting edge of biological research. Third and most important, the science and technology of molecular biology have made enormous advances, utterly transforming the field in the last few decades. High school biology students routinely perform molecular-biology manipulations that would have been impossible even for the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of biological-weapons research. The biowarfare methods of the 1960s and 1970s are now as antiquated as the lumbering mainframe computers of that era. Tomorrow’s terrorists will have vastly more deadly bugs to choose from. Consider this sobering development: in 2001, Australian researchers working on mousepox, a nonlethal virus that infects mice (as chickenpox does in humans), accidentally discovered that a simple genetic modification transformed the virus.10, 11 Instead of producing mild symptoms, the new virus killed 60% of even those mice already immune to the naturally occurring strains of mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected by any existing vaccine or antiviral drug. A team of researchers at Saint Louis University led by Mark Buller picked up on that work and, by late 2003, found a way to improve on it: Buller’s variation on mousepox was 100% lethal, although his team of investigators also devised combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were partially effective in protecting animals from the engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is that the genetically altered virus is no longer contagious. Of course, it is quite possible that future tinkering with the virus will change that property, too. Strong reasons exist to believe that the genetic modifications Buller made to mousepox would work for other poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses as well. Might the same techniques allow chickenpox or another poxvirus that infects humans to be turned into a 100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is resistant to any known antiviral therapy? I’ve asked this question of experts many times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation couldn’t be done. This case is just one example. Many more are pouring out of scientific journals and conferences every year. Just last year, the journal Nature published a controversial study done at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in which virologists enumerated the changes one would need to make to a highly lethal strain of bird flu to make it easily transmitted from one mammal to another.14 Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential threats. Nor is it clear that anyone is even trying. In addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other parameters can be played with, given that the infectious power of an epidemic depends on many properties, including the length of the latency period during which a person is contagious but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each new case to spread to more people and thus makes the virus harder to stop. This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by HIV , which is very difficult to transmit compared with smallpox and many other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The balancing factor is that HIV can take years to progress to AIDS , which can then take many more years to kill the victim. What makes HIV so dangerous is that infected people have lots of opportunities to infect others. This property has allowed HIV to claim more than 30 million lives so far, and approximately 34 million people are now living with this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15 A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or months—and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV . It could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race— or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.

### Off 2

#### A. Interpretation – debate is a game that requires the Aff to have a defense of the USFG increasing restrictions on the war powers authority of the President in one of the following: targeted killing, indefinite detention, offensive cyber operations, and introduction of US armed forces in hostilities

#### --‘resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### --“United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Restrictions on authority must prohibit actions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### B. They don’t meet –

#### C. Reasons to prefer:

#### Debate games open up dialogue which fosters information processing – they open up infinite frameworks making the game impossible

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, 51 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### The opening of infinite frameworks destroys stasis – agreement on the topic as the starting point for debate creates a platform of argumentative stability that is the crucial foundation for deliberation and makes debate meaningful

O’Donnell 4 (Dr. Tim, Director of Debate – Mary Washington U., “And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate”, Debater’s Research Guide, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/ DRGArticles/Framework%20article%20for%20the%20DRG%20final2.doc)

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary,* a framework consists of “a set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions” that govern behavior. When we speak of frameworks in competitive academic debate we are talking about the set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions that generate the question that the judge ought to answer at the end of the debate. Given that there is no agreement among participants about which standards, beliefs, or assumptions ought to be universally accepted, it seems that we will never be able to arrive at an agreeable normative assumption about what the question ought to be. So the issue before us is how we preserve community while agreeing to disagree about the question in a way that recognizes that there is richness in answering many different questions that would not otherwise exist if we all adhered to a “rule” which stated that there is one and only one question to be answered. More importantly, how do we stop talking past each other so that we can have a genuine conversation about the substantive merits of any one question? The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis.[[1]](#endnote-1) Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.[[2]](#endnote-2) How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.[[3]](#endnote-3)

#### Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote weII-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Simulated national security law debates preserve agency, enables activism, enhances decision-making, and avoids cooption – only legal deliberative action solves

Donohue 13 (Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11, “National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations”, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf)

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying doctrinal material and creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. This is the most important determination, because the substance of the doctrinal portion of the course and the simulation follows from this decision. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. This, then, becomes a guide for the doctrinal part of the course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised in the current conversation. Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion simulations, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may provide an important way forward. Such simulations also cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it does provide a starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

#### Only switch-side debate activates critique and enables for effective deliberation

Stevenson 9 (Ruth – PhD, senior lecturer and independent consultant – Graduate School of the Environment @ Centre for Alternative Technology, “Discourse, power, and energy conflicts: understanding Welsh renewable energy planning policy,” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Volume 27, p. 512-526)

It could be argued that this result arose from the lack of expertise of the convenors of the TAN 8 in consensual decision making. Indeed, there is now more research and advice on popular participation in policy issues at a community level (eg Kaner et al, 1996; Ostrom, 1995; Paddison, 1999). However, for policy making the state remains the vehicle through which policy goals must be achieved (Rydin, 2003) and it is through the state that global issues such as climate change and sustainable development must be legislated for, and to some extent enacted. It is therefore through this structure that any consensual decision making must be tested. This research indicates that the policy process cannot actually overcome contradictions and conflict. Instead, **encompassing them may well be a more fruitful way forward than attempts at consensus.** Foucault reinforces the notion that the `field of power' can prove to be positive both for individuals and for the state by allowing both to act (Darier, 1996; Foucault, 1979). Rydin (2003) suggests that actors can be involved in policy making but through `deliberative' policy making rather than aiming for consensus: ``the key to success here is not consensus but building a position based on divergent positions'' (page 69). Deliberative policy making for Rydin involves: particular dialogic mechanisms such as speakers being explicit about their values, understandings, and activities: the need to move back and forth between memories (historical) and aspirations (future); moving between general and the particular; and the adoption of role taking (sometimes someone else's role). There is much to be trialed and tested in these deliberative models, however, a strong state is still required as part of the equation if we are to work in the interests of global equity, at least until the messages about climate change and sustainable development are strong enough to filter through to the local level. It is at the policy level that the usefulness of these various new techniques of deliberative policy making must be tested, and at the heart of this must be an understanding of the power rationalities at work in the process.

#### Effective decision-making outweighs – it’s the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems – being relevantly informed is key

Lundberg 10 (Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311)

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, **debate builds capacity for** critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change**, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it **builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry** to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology **for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities**. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a **crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life**. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of **meaningful political engagement** and **new articulations of democratic life.** Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to **produce revisions of democratic life** that are **necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive**. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; wholesale **environmental destruction** and the potential for **rapid climate change**; emerging **threats to international stability** in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing **challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an **informed and active citizenry that** deliberates with greater skil**l** and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the **existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### 1NC Case

#### Targeted killing vital to effective counterterrorism---disrupts leadership and makes carrying out attacks impossible

Anderson 13 (Kenneth, Professor of International Law at American University, June 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, Vol. 135, No. 6, http://www.volokh.com/2013/05/22/the-case-for-drones/)

Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities -- but much of the drone's contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties.¶ Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled means to strike directly at terrorist organizations without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens. It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply defensive measures, such as homeland security alone. Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership.¶ If one believes, as many of the critics of drone warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive -- including those that eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law enforcement and criminal law -- then the strategic virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists themselves will seem small. But that has not been American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration -- and not by the Congress of the United States, which has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight the war on terror aggressively. The United States has used many offensive methods in the past dozen years: Regime change of states offering safe havens, counter-insurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common enemies are examples of the methods that are just of military nature.¶ Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target -- one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

#### Casualties are way down and drones are far more precise than alternatives---our ev uses the best data

Michael Cohen 13, Fellow at the Century Foundation, 5/23/13, “Give President Obama a chance: there is a role for drones,” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/23/obama-drone-speech-use-justified

Drone critics have a much different take. They are passionate in their conviction that US drones are indiscriminately killing and terrorizing civilians. The Guardian's own Glenn Greenwald argued recently that no "minimally rational person" can defend "Obama's drone kills on the ground that they are killing The Terrorists or that civilian deaths are rare". Conor Friedersdorf, an editor at the Atlantic and a vocal drone critic, wrote last year that liberals should not vote for President Obama's re-election because of the drone campaign, which he claimed "kills hundreds of innocents, including children," "terrorizes innocent Pakistanis on an almost daily basis" and "makes their lives into a nightmare worthy of dystopian novels". ¶ I disagree. Increasingly it appears that arguments like Friedersdorf makes are no longer sustainable (and there's real question if they ever were). Not only have drone strikes decreased, but so too have the number of civilians killed – and dramatically so. ¶ This conclusion comes not from Obama administration apologists but rather, Chris Woods, whose research has served as the empirical basis for the harshest attacks on the Obama Administration's drone policy. ¶ Woods heads the covert war program for the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), which maintains one of three major databases tabulating civilian casualties from US drone strikes. The others are the Long War Journal and the New America Foundation (full disclosure: I used to be a fellow there). While LWJ and NAJ estimate that drone strikes in Pakistan have killed somewhere between 140 and 300 civilians, TBIJ utilizes a far broader classification for civilians killed, resulting in estimates of somewhere between 411-884 civilians killed by drones in Pakistan. The wide range of numbers here speaks to the extraordinary challenge in tabulating civilian death rates. ¶ There is little local reporting done on the ground in northwest Pakistan, which is the epicenter of the US drone program. As a result data collection is reliant on Pakistani news reporting, which is also dependent on Pakistani intelligence, which has a vested interest in playing up the negative consequences of US drones. ¶ When I spoke with Woods last month, he said that a fairly clear pattern has emerged over the past year – far fewer civilians are dying from drones. "For those who are opposed to drone strikes," says Woods there is historical merit to the charge of significant civilian deaths, "but from a contemporary standpoint the numbers just aren't there." ¶ While Woods makes clear that one has to be "cautious" on any estimates of casualties, it's not just a numeric decline that is being seen, but rather it's a "proportionate decline". In other words, the percentage of civilians dying in drone strikes is also falling, which suggests to Woods that US drone operators are showing far greater care in trying to limit collateral damage. ¶ Woods estimates are supported by the aforementioned databases. In Pakistan, New America Foundation claims there have been no civilian deaths this year and only five last year; Long War Journal reported four deaths in 2012 and 11 so far in 2013; and TBIJ reports a range of 7-42 in 2012 and 0-4 in 2013. In addition, the drop in casualty figures is occurring not just in Pakistan but also in Yemen. ¶ These numbers are broadly consistent with what has been an under-reported decline in drone use overall. According to TBIJ, the number of drone strikes went from 128 in 2010 to 48 in 2012 and only 12 have occurred this year. These statistics are broadly consistent with LWJ and NAF's reporting. In Yemen, while drone attacks picked up in 2012, they have slowed dramatically this year. And in Somalia there has been no strike reported for more than a year. ¶ Ironically, these numbers are in line with the public statements of CIA director Brennan, and even more so with Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee, who claimed in February that the numbers she has received from the Obama administration suggest that the typical number of victims per year from drone attacks is in "the single digits".¶ Part of the reason for these low counts is that the Obama administration has sought to minimize the number of civilian casualties through what can best be described as "creative bookkeeping". The administration counts all military-age males as possible combatants unless they have information (posthumously provided) that proves them innocent. Few have taken the White House's side on this issue (and for good reason) though some outside researchers concur with the administration's estimates.¶ Christine Fair, a professor at Georgetown University has long maintained that civilian deaths from drones in Pakistan are dramatically overstated. She argues that considering the alternatives of sending in the Pakistani military or using manned aircraft to flush out jihadists, drone strikes are a far more humane method of war-fighting.

#### Extinction

Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, <http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf>)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

#### . Enemy creation prevents total war and genocidal =conflict against all

Reinhard 4 – Kenneth Reinhard, Professor of Jewish Studies at UCLA, 2004, “Towards a Political Theology- Of the Neighbor,” online: http://www.cjs.ucla.edu/Mellon/Towards\_Political\_Theology.pdf

If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy/Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the “us” and “them” binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship:

The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the ‘subject’ in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply ‘little wars’ between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries – China, Islam? Enemies without which … it would lose its political being … without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77)

If one accepts Schmitt’s account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stability, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the “imaginary tripod” that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia.

Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for “an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented – therefore monstrous –forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable” (PF 83).

#### War causes structural violence – not the other way around

**Goldstein 1** (Joshua, Professor of International Relations – American University, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, p. 412)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. **The evidence** in this book **suggests that causality runs** at least as **strongly the other way**. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the **most important way** to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be **empirically inadequate**.

#### The plan exacerbates problems in the status quo – the state will coopt your academic theory

**McCormack 10** (Tara, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster, *Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches*, page 137-138)

In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of ‘emancipatory’ security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals has served to **enforce international power inequalities** rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have no way of controlling or influencing these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework has not challenged the status quo, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and ‘blindness’ to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to ‘protect’ and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, ‘if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed’ (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a ‘cosmopolitan’ legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today’s conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). Without concrete engagement and analysis, however, the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a **request that people behave in a nicer way** to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them actually **unable to engage** with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

#### Securitized images of war good – they create room for emancipation

Ken Booth, visiting researcher - US Naval War College, 2005, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is thatsome degree of insecurity, as a life-determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individualor groupis insecure, to the extent their life choices and changes are taken away; thisis because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats–whether these are the lack of food for one’s children, or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor.The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in people’s lives. This allows for individual and collective human becoming–the capacity to have some choice about living differently–consistent with the same but different search by others.Two interrelated conclusion follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second,security is not synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival(basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming. As an instrumental value, security is sought because it free people(s)to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievementof a levelof security–and security is always relative –gives to individuals and groups some time, energy, and scope to choose to beor become,other than merely survivingas human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itselfbeyond the merely biological.

#### Legal norms don’t cause wars and the aff can’t effect liberalism

David Luban **10**, law prof at Georgetown, Beyond Traditional Concepts of Lawfare: Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 457

Among these associations is the positive, constructive side of politics, the very foundation of Aristotle's conception of politics, which Schmitt completely ignores. Politics, we often say, is the art of the possible. It is the medium for organizing all human cooperation. Peaceable civilization, civil institutions, and elemental tasks such as collecting the garbage and delivering food to hungry mouths all depend on politics. Of course, peering into the sausage factory of even such mundane municipal institutions as the town mayor's office will reveal plenty of nasty politicking, jockeying for position and patronage, and downright corruption. Schmitt sneers at these as "banal forms of politics, . . . all sorts of tactics and practices, competitions and intrigues" and dismisses them contemptuously as "parasite- and caricature-like formations." n55 The fact is that Schmitt has nothing whatever to say about the constructive side of politics, and his entire theory focuses on enemies, not friends. In my small community, political meetings debate issues as trivial as whether to close a street and divert the traffic to another street. It is hard to see mortal combat as even a remote possibility in such disputes, and so, in Schmitt's view, they would not count as politics, but merely administration. Yet issues like these are the stuff of peaceable human politics.

Schmitt, I have said, uses the word "political" polemically--in his sense, politically. I have suggested that his very choice of the word "political" to describe mortal enmity is tendentious, attaching to mortal enmity Aristotelian and republican associations quite foreign to it. But the more basic point is that Schmitt's critique of humanitarianism as political and polemical is itself political and polemical. In a word, the critique of lawfare is itself lawfare. It is self-undermining because to the extent that it succeeds in showing that lawfare is illegitimate, it de-legitimizes itself.

What about the merits of Schmitt's critique of humanitarianism? His argument is straightforward: either humanitarianism is toothless and [\*471] apolitical, in which case ruthless political actors will destroy the humanitarians; or else humanitarianism is a fighting faith, in which case it has succumbed to the political but made matters worse, because wars on behalf of humanity are the most inhuman wars of all. Liberal humanitarianism is either too weak or too savage.

The argument has obvious merit. When Schmitt wrote in 1932 that wars against "outlaws of humanity" would be the most horrible of all, it is hard not to salute him as a prophet of Hiroshima. The same is true when Schmitt writes about the League of Nations' resolution to use "economic sanctions and severance of the food supply," n56 which he calls "imperialism based on pure economic power." n57 Schmitt is no warmonger--he calls the killing of human beings for any reason other than warding off an existential threat "sinister and crazy" n58 --nor is he indifferent to human suffering.

But international humanitarian law and criminal law are not the same thing as wars to end all war or humanitarian military interventions, so Schmitt's important moral warning against ultimate military self-righteousness does not really apply. n59 Nor does "bracketing" war by humanitarian constraints on war-fighting presuppose a vanished order of European public law. The fact is that in nine years of conventional war, the United States has significantly bracketed war-fighting, even against enemies who do not recognize duties of reciprocity. n60 This may frustrate current lawfare critics who complain that American soldiers in Afghanistan are being forced to put down their guns. Bracketing warfare is a decision--Schmitt might call it an existential decision--that rests in part on values that transcend the friend-enemy distinction. Liberal values are not alien extrusions into politics or evasions of politics; they are part of politics, and, as Stephen Holmes argued against Schmitt, liberalism has proven remarkably strong, not weak. n61 We could choose to abandon liberal humanitarianism, and that would be a political decision. It would simply be a bad one.

#### Strategic planning to prevent crisis escalation avoids future spirals of insecurity. Total descuritization is impossible.

PH **Liotta**, Pell Center for IR & Public Policy, **‘5** [*Security Dialogue* 36.1, “Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security,” p. 65-6]

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory **but fail in practice.** While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environ- mental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago:

National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to water-sheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer to addressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come– is perhaps **the only appropriate first response**. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be **decades** and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, **military engagement.**  Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), **we ought to be justifying investment.**

Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of **what forms of security** are **relevant** and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly **remarkable tectonic shift might** take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs.

Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and estab- lished the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increas- ingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action.

Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international com- munity, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories. As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’. While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the mirror image of national security. Yet, these contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to **confronting and solving them.** One approach, which might avoid the **massive tidal** impact of creeping vulnerabilities, is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward **strategic planning**, strategic investment, and strategic attention. Clearly, the time is now to **reorder our** entire **approach** to how we address – or fail to address – security.

#### Alternative fails – critical theory has no mechanism to translate theory into practice

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Lecturer in the Department of International Politics – University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond **grandiose statements of intent**. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the **mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a **fatally flawed** enterprise.

#### Security key to avoid fascism—We should manage violence instead of trying to create a metapolitics of difference and peace.

Ole **WAEVER** Senior Research Fellow @ Copenhagen Peace Research Inst. **‘2K** in *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration* eds. Kelstrup and Williams p. 284-285

The other main possibility is to stress responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts - and not shy away into long-range or principled trans- formations. The meta-political line **risks** (despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other) **implying** that **politics can be contained within large 'systemic' questions**. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical transformation), there will he no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post- structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order - it is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds ny concrete solution and re-inserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions; there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies.

In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engagement' (Derrida 1996: R3). In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida $994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engagement' (Derrida 1996: 3),

Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges - and **avoid 'the worst'** (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', '1 have assumed my responsibilities' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of another nation, of one family to the detriment of another family, of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would he no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.) and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? Often, our reply will he to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics, but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally means invoking/producing 'structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of **pre- empting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization** that could lead to security dilemmas and **escalations,** violence and mutual vilification.

# 2NC

## 2NC Round 6

### 2NC Overview

#### turns the case – only process-based deliberation and decision-making can create institutional war power reform – seriously – the aff does nothing to solve the war on terror

Koh 95 (Harold Hongju – Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Director, Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School, “WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: A SYMPOSIUM ON CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE AUTHORITY TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES: War and Responsibility in the Dole-Gingrich Congress”, 1995, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, lexis)

But there is a second, substantive critique of the legal process school, which has been put forward at this symposium and elsewhere by Professor Jules Lobel. Indeed, Lobel first sounded this theme in a prescient book review written half a decade ago. n32 Echoing Laurence Tribe's critique of Ely's process-based theory of judicial review, n33 Lobel argued that war powers scholars should focus not on process, but on substance. The problem with our foreign policymaking, he argued, has [\*8] not been our process of decisionmaking, but our substantive goals, which Lobel ultimately identified as extending American hegemony. Post-Vietnam efforts to reform our national security system have failed, he argued, because they sought to reform process without modifying these substantive goals. Thus, Lobel concluded, we cannot regain constitutionalism in foreign policy through procedural tinkering with legal rules; what we need instead is to mobilize popular movements to restrain America's hegemonic impulses. While I concede that process and substance cannot be entirely separated, I do not believe that we can work a fundamental transformation of the substance of foreign policymaking, when the process of making that policy is so fundamentally defective. In my view, a well-functioning process is the prerequisite to any kind of political agreement on substance. The goal of a constitutional process should not be to specify policy results, but to force the institutional players into a dialogue about which political ends they collectively seek and which they prefer to avoid. If interbranch dialogue occurs, it may produce a consensus for war (as occurred, for example during the Gulf War); but if no dialogue occurs, the Constitution mandates peace as the default position. The problem with our current process is that such institutional dialogue almost never occurs. As Ely's book points out, debates about war powers are rare, most debates are not "dialogue," but largely for show, and the branches almost never talk about our national goals regarding military intervention. Worst of all, as Ely shows, our current law, particularly the War Powers Resolution, lets them get away with it. A process-based view envisions a very different, three-step political procedure: one in which decisions to make war are preceded by intrabranch debate and deliberation, interbranch dialogue, and the creation and delineation of institutional precedent. Again, the exception that proves the rule was the debate over the congressional authorization of Operation Desert Storm, one of the few cases where judicial action helped force a dialogue about prior legislative approval before it was too late. n34 In that case, both the executive and legislative branches engaged in lengthy intrabranch deliberation before ultimately committing to war, an interbranch dialogue ensued that culminated in the congressional resolution authorizing use of force in Iraq, and the episode helped delineate an important institutional precedent which has served as a touchstone for subsequent deliberations. Regardless of what one thinks of the substance of the current Dole-Gingrich legislation, the process is at least working to the extent that after nearly two decades, Congress is once again proposing new framework legislation to govern war powers, which the [\*9] President may sign, veto, construe, or execute, and which the courts may end up interpreting. Even when the branches do not conduct direct dialogue, another lesson recent history has taught is that academic debate can force valuable "shadow dialogue" between private parties and the government, particularly when lawyers and academics challenge particular government legal interpretations. The debate over the correct interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was one famous recent example. n35 But the best recent illustration was the Clinton Administration's military incursion into Haiti in the fall of 1994, based on dubious legal authority. Instead of sending troops without justification, the Attorney General's lawyer, Walter Dellinger of the Office of Legal Counsel (and Duke Law School), put forward a legal explanation of the invasion of Haiti. That opinion letter responded to both public and congressional pressure and two joint letters from a group of law professors that had argued for the opposite position. n36 By sending the letter, the academics placed a burden of explanation upon the executive branch, forced internal debate within the legal circles of the executive branch, and prompted development of a nuanced governmental legal position, which not only clarified the precedential value of the episode for the future, but also made clear what legal claims the executive branch was not relying upon in Haiti (e.g., the claim that the President could commit troops abroad without congressional approval, based solely on United Nations Security Council authorization). n37 In sum, legal process is hardly irrelevant to politics in the war powers area. We simply cannot develop new substantive goals for our foreign policy without a better process, one that requires the active institutional participation of all three branches and that promotes the creation and internalization of legal norms. Far from being peripheral to politics, legal process can cabin politics. Properly designed process thus makes political actors accountable, by forcing them to live up to their constitutional responsibilities.

#### Fairness outweighs—debate is played for its own sake—fairness outweigh all other concerns.

Villa 96—Dana Villa Political Theory @ UC Santa Barbara [*Arendt and Heidegger: the Fate of the Political* p. 37]

If political action is to be valued for its own sake, then the content of political action must be politics “in the sense that political action is talk about politics.” The circularity of this formulation, given by George Kateb, is unavoidable. It helps if we use an analogy that Kateb proposes, the analogy between such a purely political politics and a game. “A game,” writes Kateb, “is not ‘about’ anything outside itself, it is its own sufficient world…the content of any game is itself.” What matters in a game is the play itself, and the **quality of this play** is **utterly** **dependent** upon the **willingness** and ability of the **players** to **enter the “world” of the game**. The Arendtian conception of politics is one in which the spirit animating the “play” (the sharing of words and deeds) comes **before all else**—before personal concerns, groups, interests, and even moral claims. If allowed to dominate the “game,” these elements detracts from the play and from the performance of action. A good game happens only when the players submit themselves to its spirit and **do not allow subjective or external motives to dictate the play**. A good game, like genuine politics, is played for its own sake.

### Zappen

#### We literally can’t know the aff is true without rigorous testing—they prevent that

Zappen 4—James Zappen, Professor of Language and Literature at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute [“The Rebirth of Dialogue: Bakhtin, Socrates, and the Rhetorical Tradition,” p. 35-36]

Finally, Bakhtin describes the Socratic dialogue as a carnivalesque debate between opposing points of view, with a ritualistic crownings and decrownings of opponents. I call this Socratic form of debate a contesting of ideas to capture the double meaning of the Socratic debate as both a mutual testing of oneself and others and a contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives. Brickhouse and Smith explain that Socrates' testing of ideas and people is a mutual testing not only of others but also of himself: Socrates claims that he has been commanded by the god to examine himself as well as others; he claims that the unexamined life is not worth living; and, since he rarely submits to questioning himself, "it must be that in the process of examining others Socrates regards himself as examining his own life, too." Such a mutual testing of ideas provides the only claim to knowledge that Socrates can have: since neither he nor anyone else knows the real definitions of things, he cannot claim to have any knowledge of his own; since, however, he subjects his beliefs to repeated testing, he can claim to have that limited human knowledge supported by the "inductive evidence" of "previous elenctic examinations." This mutual testing of ideas and people is evident in the Laches and also appears in the Gorgias in Socrates' testing of his own belief that courage is inseparable from the other virtues and in his willingness to submit his belief and indeed his life to the ultimate test of divine judgment, in what Bakhtin calls a dialogue on the threshold. The contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives and their ritualistic crowning/decrowning is evident in the Gorgias in Soocrates' successive refutations and humiliations of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.

### War Powers Legal Education Good (Topic) – 2NC\*\*\*

#### Prefer specificity—simulation about war powers legal discussions is uniquely empowering – can prevent abuse

Donohue 13 (Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11, “National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations”, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf)

2. Factual Chaos and Uncertainty¶ One of the most important skills for students going into national security law is the ability to deal with factual chaos. The presentation of factual chaos significantly differs from the traditional model of legal education, in which students are provided a set of facts which they must analyze. Lawyers working in national security law must figure out what information they need, integrate enormous amounts of data from numerous sources, determine which information is reliable and relevant, and proceed with analysis and recommendations. Their recommendations, moreover, must be based on contingent conditions: facts may be classified and unavailable to the legal analyst, or facts may change as new information emerges. This is as true for government lawyers as it is for those outside of governmental structures. They must be aware of what is known, what is unsure, what is unknown, and the possibility of changing circumstances, and they must advise their clients, from the beginning, how the legal analysis might shift if the factual basis alters. a. Chaos. Concern about information overload in the national security environment is not new: in the 1970s scholars discussed and debated how to handle the sequential phases of intelligence gathering and analysis in a manner that yielded an optimal result.132 But the digital revolution has exponentially transformed the quantitative terms of reference, the technical means of collection and analysis, and the volume of information available. The number of sources of information – not least in the online world – is staggering. Added to this is the rapid expansion in national security law itself: myriad new Executive Orders, Presidential Directives, institutions, programs, statutes, regulations, lawsuits, and judicial decisions mean that national security law itself is rapidly changing. Lawyers inside and outside of government must keep abreast of constantly evolving authorities. The international arena too is in flux, as global entities, such as the United Nations, the European Court of Human Rights, the G-7/G-8, and other countries, introduce new instruments whose reach includes U.S. interests. Rapid geopolitical changes relating to critical national security concerns, such as worldwide financial flows, the Middle East, the Arab Spring, South American drug cartels, North Korea, the former Soviet Union, China, and other issues require lawyers to keep up on what is happening globally as a way of understanding domestic concerns. Further expanding the information overload is the changing nature of what constitutes national security itself.133 In sum, the sheer amount of information the national security lawyer needs to assimilate is significant. The basic skills required in the 1970s thus may be similar – such as the ability (a) to know where to look for relevant and reliable information; (b) to obtain the necessary information in the most efficient manner possible; (c) to quickly discern reliable from unreliable information; (d) to know what data is critical; and (e) to ascertain what is as yet unknown or contingent on other conditions. But the volume of information, the diversity of information sources, and the heavy reliance on technology requires lawyers to develop new skills. They must be able to obtain the right information and to ignore chaos to focus on the critical issues. These features point in opposite directions – i.e., a broadening of knowledge and a narrowing of focus. A law school system built on the gradual and incremental advance of law, bolstered or defeated by judicial decisions and solidified through the adhesive nature of stare decisis appears particularly inapposite for this rapidly-changing environment. An important question that will thus confront students upon leaving the legal academy is how to keep abreast of rapidly changing national security and geopolitical concerns in an information-rich world in a manner that allows for capture of relevant information, while retaining the ability to focus on the immediate task at hand. Staying ahead of the curve requires developing a sense of timing – when to respond to important legal and factual shifts – and identifying the best means of doing so. Again, this applies to government and non-government employees. How should students prioritize certain information and then act upon it? This, too, is an aspect of information overload. b. Uncertainty. National security law proves an information-rich, factuallydriven environment. The ability to deal with such chaos may be hampered by gaps in the information available and the difficulty of engaging in complex fact-finding – a skill often under-taught in law school. Investigation of relevant information may need to reach far afield in order to generate careful legal analysis. Uncertainty here plays a key role. In determining, for instance, the contours of quarantine authority, lawyers may need to understand how the pandemic in question works, where there have been outbreaks, how it will spread, what treatments are available, which social distancing measures may prove most effective, what steps are being taken locally, at a state-level, and internationally, and the like. Lawyers in non-profit organizations, legal academics, in-house attorneys, and others, in turn, working in the field, must learn how to find out the relevant information before commenting on new programs and initiatives, agreeing to contractual terms, or advising clients on the best course of action. For both government and non-government lawyers, the secrecy inherent in the field is of great consequence. The key here is learning to ask intelligent questions to generate the best legal analysis possible. It may be the case that national security lawyers are not aware of the facts they are missing – facts that would be central to legal analysis. This phenomenon front-loads the type of advice and discussions in which national security lawyers must engage. It means that analysis must be given in a transparent manner, contingent on a set of facts currently known, with indication given up front as to how that analysis might change, should the factual basis shift. This is particularly true of government attorneys, who may be advising policymakers who may or may not have a background in the law and who may have access to more information than the attorney. Signaling the key facts on which the legal decision rests with the caveat that the legal analysis of the situation might change if the facts change, provides for more robust consideration of critically important issues. c. Creative Problem Solving. Part of dealing with factual uncertainty in a rapidly changing environment is learning how to construct new ways to address emerging issues. Admittedly, much has been made in the academy about the importance of problem-based learning as a method in developing students’ critical thinking skills.134 Problem-solving, however, is not merely a method of teaching. It is itself a goal for the type of activities in which lawyers will be engaged. The means-ends distinction is an important one to make here. Problemsolving in a classroom environment may be merely a conduit for learning a specific area of the law or a limited set of skills. But problem-solving as an end suggests the accumulation of a broader set of tools, such as familiarity with multidisciplinary approaches, creativity and originality, sequencing, collaboration, identification of contributors’ expertise, and how to leverage each skill set. This goal presents itself in the context of fact-finding, but it draws equally on strong understanding of legal authorities and practices, the Washington context, and policy considerations. Similarly, like the factors highlighted in the first pedagogical goal, adding to the tensions inherent in factual analysis is the abbreviated timeline in which national security attorneys must operate. Time may not be a commodity in surplus. This means that national security legal education must not only develop students’ complex fact-finding skills and their ability to provide contingent analysis, but it must teach them how to swiftly and efficiently engage in these activities. 3. Critical Distance As was recognized more than a century ago, analytical skills by themselves are insufficient training for individuals moving into the legal profession.135 Critical thinking provides the necessary distance from the law that is required in order to move the legal system forward. Critical thought, influenced by the Ancient Greek tradition, finds itself bound up in the Socratic method of dialogue that continues to define the legal academy. But it goes beyond such constructs as well. Scholars and educators disagree, of course, on what exactly critical thinking entails.136 For purposes of our present discussion, I understand it as the metaconversation in the law. Whereas legal analysis and substantive knowledge focus on the law as it is and how to work within the existing structures, critical thought provides distance and allows students to engage in purposeful discussion of theoretical constructs that deepen our understanding of both the actual and potential constructs of law. It is inherently reflective. For the purpose of practicing national security law, critical thought is paramount. This is true partly because of the unique conditions that tend to accompany the introduction of national security provisions: these are often introduced in the midst of an emergency. Their creation of new powers frequently has significant implications for distribution of authority at a federal level, a diminished role for state and local government in the federalism realm, and a direct impact on individual rights.137 Constitutional implications demand careful scrutiny. Yet at the time of an attack, enormous pressure is on officials and legislators to act and to be seen to act to respond.138 With the impact on rights, in particular, foremost in legislators’ minds, the first recourse often is to make any new powers temporary. However, they rarely turn out to be so, instead becoming embedded in the legislative framework and providing a baseline on which further measures are built.139 In order to withdraw them, legislators must demonstrate either that the provisions are not effective or that no violence will ensue upon their withdrawal (either way, a demanding proof). Alternatively, legislators would have to acknowledge that some level of violence may be tolerated – a step no politician is willing to take. Any new powers, introduced in the heat of the moment, may become a permanent part of the statutory and regulatory regime. They may not operate the way in which they were intended. They may impact certain groups in a disparate manner. They may have unintended and detrimental consequences. Therefore, it is necessary for national security lawyers to be able to view such provisions, and related policy decisions, from a distance and to be able to think through them outside of the contemporary context. There are many other reasons such critical analysis matters that reflect in other areas of the law. The ability to recognize problems, articulate underlying assumptions and values, understand how language is being used, assess whether argument is logical, test conclusions, and determine and analyze pertinent information depends on critical thinking skills. Indeed, one could draw argue that it is the goal of higher education to build the capacity to engage in critical thought. Deeply humanistic theories underlie this approach. The ability to develop discerning judgment – the very meaning of the Greek term, 􏰀􏰁􏰂􏰃􏰄􏰅􏰆 – provides the basis for advancing the human condition through reason and intellectual engagement. Critical thought as used in practicing national security law may seem somewhat antithetical to the general legal enterprise in certain particulars. For government lawyers and consultants, there may be times in which not providing legal advice, when asked for it, may be as important as providing it. That is, it may be important not to put certain options on the table, with legal justifications behind them. Questions whether to advise or not to advise are bound up in considerations of policy, professional responsibility, and ethics. They may also relate to questions as to who one’s client is in the world of national security law.140 It may be unclear whether and at what point one’s client is a supervisor, the legal (or political) head of an agency, a cross-agency organization, the White House, the Constitution, or the American public. Depending upon this determination, the national security lawyer may or may not want to provide legal advice to one of the potential clients. Alternatively, such a lawyer may want to call attention to certain analyses to other clients. Determining when and how to act in these circumstances requires critical distance. 4. Nontraditional Written and Oral Communication Skills Law schools have long focused on written and oral communication skills that are central to the practice of law. Brief writing, scholarly analysis, criminal complaints, contractual agreements, trial advocacy, and appellate arguments constitute standard fare. What is perhaps unique about the way communication skills are used in the national security world is the importance of non-traditional modes of legal communication such as concise (and precise) oral briefings, email exchanges, private and passing conversations, agenda setting, meeting changed circumstances, and communications built on swiftly evolving and uncertain information. For many of these types of communications speed may be of the essence – and unlike the significant amounts of time that accompany preparation of lengthy legal documents (and the painstaking preparation for oral argument that marks moot court preparations.) Much of the activity that goes on within the Executive Branch occurs within a hierarchical system, wherein those closest to the issues have exceedingly short amounts of time to deliver the key points to those with the authority to exercise government power. Unexpected events, shifting conditions on the ground, and deadlines require immediate input, without the opportunity for lengthy consideration of the different facets of the issue presented. This is a different type of activity from the preparation of an appellate brief, for instance, involving a fuller exposition of the issues involved. It is closer to a blend of Supreme Court oral argument and witness crossexamination – although national security lawyers often may not have the luxury of the months, indeed, years, that cases take to evolve to address the myriad legal questions involved. Facts on which the legal analysis rests, moreover, as discussed above, may not be known. This has substantive implications for written and oral communications. Tension between the level of legal analysis possible and the national security process itself may lead to a different norm than in other areas of the law. Chief Judge Baker explains, If lawyers insist on knowing all the facts all the time, before they are willing to render advice, or, if they insist on preparing a written legal opinion in response to every question, then national security process would become dysfunctional. The delay alone would cause the policymaker to avoid, and perhaps evade, legal review.141 Simultaneously, lawyers cannot function without some opportunity to look carefully at the questions presented and to consult authoritative sources. “The art of lawyering in such context,” Baker explains, “lies in spotting the issue, accurately identifying the timeline for decision, and applying a meaningful degree of formal or informal review in response.”142 The lawyer providing advice must resist the pressure of the moment and yet still be responsive to the demand for swift action. The resulting written and oral communications thus may be shaped in different ways. Unwilling to bind clients’ hands, particularly in light of rapidly-changing facts and conditions, the potential for nuance to be lost is considerable. The political and historical overlay of national security law here matters. In some circumstances, even where written advice is not formally required, it may be in the national security lawyer’s best interests to commit informal advice to paper in the form of an email, notation, or short memo. The process may serve to provide an external check on the pressures that have been internalized, by allowing the lawyer to separate from the material and read it. It may give the lawyer the opportunity to have someone subject it to scrutiny. Baker suggests that “on issues of importance, even where the law is clear, as well as situations where novel positions are taken, lawyers should record their informal advice in a formal manner so that they may be held accountable for what they say, and what they don’t say.”143 Written and oral communication may occur at highly irregular moments – yet it is at these moments (in the elevator, during an email exchange, at a meeting, in the course of a telephone call), that critical legal and constitutional decisions are made. This model departs from the formalized nature of legal writing and research. Yet it is important that students are prepared for these types of written and oral communication as an ends in and of themselves. 5. Leadership, Integrity and Good Judgment National security law often takes place in a high stakes environment. There is tremendous pressure on attorneys operating in the field – not least because of the coercive nature of the authorities in question. The classified environment also plays a key role: many of the decisions made will never be known publicly, nor will they be examined outside of a small group of individuals – much less in a court of law. In this context, leadership, integrity, and good judgment stand paramount. The types of powers at issue in national security law are among the most coercive authorities available to the government. Decisions may result in the death of one or many human beings, the abridgment of rights, and the bypassing of protections otherwise incorporated into the law. The amount of pressure under which this situation places attorneys is of a higher magnitude than many other areas of the law. Added to this pressure is the highly political nature of national security law and the necessity of understanding the broader Washington context, within which individual decision-making, power relations, and institutional authorities compete. Policy concerns similarly dominate the landscape. It is not enough for national security attorneys to claim that they simply deal in legal advice. Their analyses carry consequences for those exercising power, for those who are the targets of such power, and for the public at large. The function of leadership in this context may be more about process than substantive authority. It may be a willingness to act on critical thought and to accept the impact of legal analysis. It is closely bound to integrity and professional responsibility and the ability to retain good judgment in extraordinary circumstances. Equally critical in the national security realm is the classified nature of so much of what is done in national security law. All data, for instance, relating to the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of special nuclear material, or the use of nuclear material in the production of energy is classified from birth.144 NSI, the bread and butter of the practice of national security law, is similarly classified. U.S. law defines NSI as “information which pertains to the national defense and foreign relations (National Security) of the United States and is classified in accordance with an Executive Order.” Nine primary Executive Orders and two subsidiary orders have been issued in this realm.145 The sheer amount of information incorporated within the classification scheme is here relevant. While original classification authorities have steadily decreased since 1980, and the number of original classification decisions is beginning to fall, the numbers are still high: in fiscal year 2010, for instance, there were nearly 2,300 original classification authorities and almost 225,000 original classification decisions.146 The classification realm, moreover, in which national security lawyers are most active, is expanding. Derivative classification decisions – classification resulting from the incorporation, paraphrasing, restating, or generation of classified information in some new form – is increasing. In FY 2010, there were more than seventy-six million such decisions made.147 This number is triple what it was in FY 2008. Legal decisions and advice tend to be based on information already classified relating to programs, initiatives, facts, intelligence, and previously classified legal opinions. The key issue here is that with so much of the essential information, decisionmaking, and executive branch jurisprudence necessarily secret, lawyers are limited in their opportunity for outside appraisal and review. Even within the executive branch, stove-piping occurs. The use of secure compartmentalized information (SCI) further compounds this problem as only a limited number of individuals – much less lawyers – may be read into a program. This diminishes the opportunity to identify and correct errors or to engage in debate and discussion over the law. Once a legal opinion is drafted, the opportunity to expose it to other lawyers may be restricted. The effect may be felt for decades, as successive Administrations reference prior legal decisions within certain agencies. The Office of Legal Counsel, for instance, has an entire body of jurisprudence that has never been made public, which continues to inform the legal analysis provided to the President. Only a handful of people at OLC may be aware of the previous decisions. They are prevented by classification authorities from revealing these decisions. This results in a sort of generational secret jurisprudence. Questions related to professional responsibility thus place the national security lawyer in a difficult position: not only may opportunities to check factual data or to consult with other attorneys be limited, but the impact of legal advice rendered may be felt for years to come. The problem extends beyond the executive branch. There are limited opportunities, for instance, for external judicial review. Two elements are at work here: first, very few cases involving national security concerns make it into court. Much of what is happening is simply not known. Even when it is known, it may be impossible to demonstrate standing – a persistent problem with regard to challenging, for instance, surveillance programs. Second, courts have historically proved particularly reluctant to intervene in national security matters. Judicially-created devices such as political question doctrine and state secrets underscore the reluctance of the judiciary to second-guess the executive in this realm. The exercise of these doctrines is increasing in the post-9/11 environment. Consider state secrets. While much was made of some five to seven state secrets cases that came to court during the Bush administration, in more than 100 cases the executive branch formally invoked state secrets, which the courts accepted.148 Many times judges did not even bother to look at the evidence in question before blocking it and/or dismissing the suit. In numerous additional cases, the courts treated the claims as though state secrets had been asserted – even where the doctrine had not been formally invoked.149 In light of these pressures – the profound consequences of many national security decisions, the existence of stovepiping even within the executive branch, and limited opportunity for external review – the practice of national security law requires a particularly rigorous and committed adherence to ethical standards and professional responsibility. This is a unique world in which there are enormous pressures, with potentially few external consequences for not acting in accordance with high standards. It thus becomes particularly important, from a pedagogical perspective, to think through the types of situations that national security attorneys may face, and to address the types of questions related to professional responsibility that will confront them in the course of their careers. Good judgment and leadership similarly stand paramount. These skills, like many of those discussed, may also be relevant to other areas of the law; however, the way in which they become manifest in national security law may be different in important ways. Good judgment, for instance, may mean any number of things, depending upon the attorney’s position within the political hierarchy. Policymaking positions will be considerably different from the provision of legal advice to policymakers. Leadership, too, may mean something different in this field intimately tied to political circumstance. It may mean breaking ranks with the political hierarchy, visibly adopting unpopular public or private positions, or resigning when faced by unethical situations. It may mean creating new bureaucratic structures to more effectively respond to threats. It may mean holding off clients until the attorneys within one’s group have the opportunity to look at issues while still being sensitive to the political needs of the institution. Recourse in such situations may be political, either through public statements and use of the media, or by going to different branches of government for a solution. 6. Creating Opportunities for Learning In addition to the above skills, national security lawyers must be able to engage in continuous self-learning in order to improve their performance. They must be able to identify new and emerging legal and political authorities and processes, systems for handling factual chaos and uncertainty, mechanisms to ensure critical distance, evaluating written and oral performance, and analyzing leadership skills. Law schools do not traditionally focus on how to teach students to continue their learning beyond the walls of academia. Yet it is vital for their future success to give students the ability to create conditions of learning.

### Non-Legal Education Fails (Topic) – 2NC\*\*\*

#### Appeals for institutional restrain are a crucial supplement to political resistance to executive power – any other interpretation fails

David COLE Law @ Georgetown ’12 “The Politics of the Rule of Law: The Role of Civil Society in the Surprising Resilience of Human Rights in the Decade after 9/11” http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Cole%201.12.12.pdf p. 51-53

As I have shown above, **while political forces played a significant role in checking** President **Bush**, what was significant was the particular substantive content of that politics; **it was not just any political pressure**, **but pressure to maintain** fidelity to **the rule of law**. **Politics standing alone is as likely to fuel as to deter executive abuse; consider the lynch mob, the Nazi Party** in Germany, or **xenophobia** more generally. **What we need if we are to check abuses of executive power is a politics that champions the rule of law.** Unlike the politics Posner and Vermeule imagine, **this** type of **politics cannot be segregated neatly from the law**. On the contrary, **it will often coalesce around a distinctly legal challenge, objecting to departures from distinctly legal norms**, heard in a court case, as we saw with Guantanamo. **Congress’s actions make clear that had Guantanamo been left to the political process, there would have been few if any advances**. **The litigation generated and concentrated political pressure on claims for a restoration of the values of legality,** and, as discussed above, **that pressure then played a critical role in the litigation’s outcome, which in turn affected the political pressure for reform. T**here is, to be sure, something paradoxical about this assessment. The rule of law, the separation of powers, and human rights are designed to discipline and constrain politics, out of a concern that pure majoritarian politics, focused on the short term, is likely to discount the long-term values of these principles. Yet without a critical mass of political support for these legal principles, they are unlikely to be effective checks on abuse, for many of the reasons Posner andVermeule identify. **The answer, however, is not to abandon the rule of law for politics, but to develop and nurture a political culture that values the rule of law itself.** **Civil society organizations devoted to such values**, **such as Human Rights Watch, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the American Civil Liberties Union, play a central role in facilitating, informing, and generating that politics**. Indeed, **they have no alternative.** Unlike governmental institutions, civil society groups have no formal authority to impose the limits of law themselves. Their recourse to the law’s limits is necessarily indirect: they can file lawsuits seeking judicial enforcement, lobby Congress for statutory reform or other legislative responses, or seek to influence the executive branch. **But they necessarily and simultaneously pursue these goals through political avenues – by appealing to the public for support, educating the public, exposing abuses, and engaging in public advocacy around rule-of-law values**. Unlike ordinary politics, which tends to focus on the preferences of the moment, **the politics of the rule of law is committed to a set of long-term principles.** **Civil society organizations are uniquely situated to bring these long-term interests to bear on the public debate.** Much like a constitution itself, civil society groups are institutionally designed to emphasize and reinforce our long-term interests. When the ordinary political process is consumed by the heat of a crisis, organizations like the ACLU, Human Rights First, and the Center for Constitutional Rights, designed to protect the rule of law, are therefore especially important. While Congress and the courts were at best compromised and at worst complicit in the abuses of the post-9/11 period, civil society performed admirably. The Center for Constitutional Rights brought the first lawsuit seeking habeas review at Guantanamo, and went on to coordinate a nationwide network of volunteer attorneys who represented Guantanamo habeas petitioners. The ACLU filed important lawsuits challenging secrecy and government excesses, and succeeded in disclosing many details about the government’s illegal interrogation program. Both the ACLU and CCR filed lawsuits and engaged in public advocacy on behalf of torture and rendition victims, and challenging warrantless wiretapping. Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First wrote important reports on detention, torture, and Guantanamo, and Human Rights First organized former military generals and admirals to speak out in defense of humanitarian law and human rights. These efforts are but a small subset of the broader activities of civil society, at home and abroad, that helped to bring to public attention the Bush administration’s most questionable initiatives, and to portray the initiatives as contrary to the rule of law. At their best, civil society organizations help forge a politics of the rule of law, in which **there is a symbiotic relationship between politics and law**: **the appeal to law informs a particular politics, and that politics reinforces the law’s appeal, in a mutually reinforcing relation**. **Posner and Vermeule understand the importance of politics as a checking force in the modern world, but fail to see the critical qualification that the politics must be organized around a commitment to f**

**undamental principles of liberty, equality, due process, and the separation of powers** – in short, the rule of law. Margulies and Metcalf recognize that politics as much as law determines the reality of rights protections, but fail to identify the unique role that civil society organizations play in that process**. It is not that the “rule of politics” has replaced the “rule of law,” but that, properly understood, a politics of law is a critical supplement to the rule of law.** We cannot survive as a constitutional democracy true to our principles without both. And our survival turns, not only on a vibrant constitution, but on a vibrant civil society dedicated to reinforcing and defending constitutional values.

**The aff’s prioritization of politics over law encourages violence – means framework turns the case**

David **COLE** Law @ Georgetown ’**12** “The Politics of the Rule of Law: The Role of Civil Society in the Surprising Resilience of Human Rights in the Decade after 9/11” http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Cole%201.12.12.pdf p. 44-49

If political pressure from civil society, rather than the force of law itself or the separation of powers, is to be credited for the partial restoration of the rule of law in the decade afterSeptember 11, then it is essential that we understand how that politics works. In my view, it is a particular politics – a politics of the rule of law – that is required. And civil society has a peculiar role to play in facilitating and propagating that politics. Thus, a robust civil society devoted to the rule of law may be as important as the more formal elements of the rule of law in checking executive abuse. At the same time, as the Guantanamo cases illustrate, there is a complex interrelationship between this type of politics and more formal legal constraints. Legal disputes form the focal point for political organizing and advocacy for claims founded on rule-of-law values, and that organizing and advocacy in turn can affect the outcomes of legal disputes.

Politics, however, is not sufficient on its own. In The Executive Unbound, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule maintain that a robust political process is sufficient to deter executive abuse in times of crisis. They argue that in the modern era, the rule of law cannot effectively constrain the executive, especially in emergencies, but that the executive is sufficiently limited by political checks. 82

82 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (2010). At first glance the past decade seems to vindicate Posner and Vermeule’s views, as political forces were more effective at checking the president than were Congress or the judiciary. But Posner and Vermeule’s valorization of politics over law overstates the power of politics, understates the force of law, and misses the complicated and essential interplay between the two. Posner and Vermeule may be right that the law alone is not enough, but they fail to see that politics alone is at least as wanting. In the end, the rule of law and politics must work in tandem. When they do, as they arguably did to an important extent in the wake of September 11, they can mount a significant defense of basic human rights and the rule of law against executive overreaching. To Posner and Vermeule, the rule of law and the separation of powers are, for all practical purposes, defunct. In their view, the modern executive cannot possibly be constrained by the legislative and judicial branches, or even by law itself. Like many commentators before them, they attribute this development largely to the growth of the administrative state and to the near constant state of emergency in which modern American government now seems to operate. 83 As a practical matter, the vast and complex matters subject to federal regulation require Congress to cede control to the executive, through broad delegations of authority to administrative agencies. Members of Congress lack the time and experience to micromanage such diverse matters as energy, commerce, transportation, telecommunications, the environment, and immigration. And the executive vastly outnumbers the other branches; about 98 percent of the federal government’s nearly two million employees work in the executive branch. Globalization exacerbates these trends, as the president is the nation’s primary voice abroad, and increasingly addressing our own social problems requires coordination across borders. In emergencies, the executive’s characteristics of speed, flexibility, unified command, and secrecy are especially valued, so Congress tends to delegate even more broadly, and courts in turn typically defer to executive action. Under these conditions, Posner and Vermeule maintain, it’s just not feasible for the other two branches to keep effective tabs on what the executive is up to. But where other commentators view these developments as profound challenges to our constitutional order, Posner and Vermeule insist that they are of little concern because political constraints on the executive render the rule of law unnecessary. That view, however, both underestimates the constraining force of law and overestimates the extent of political limits onexecutive overreaching. Dismissing the role of law, Posner and Vermeule sweepingly claim, sounding almost like critical legal studies scholars, that law is so indeterminate and manipulable as to constitute only a “façade of legality.” 85 But in assessing law’s effect, they look almost exclusively to formal indicia – statutes and court decisions. That approach disregards the possibility that law has a disciplining function long before cases get to court, and even when no case is ever filed, a reality to which anyone who has worked in the executive branch will attest. Executive officials generally cannot know in advance whether court review will be strict or deferential, and that uncertainty itself has a deterrent effect on the choices they make. There are plenty of reasons why executive lawyers generally take legal limits seriously: they take an oath and are acculturated to do so, they know that claims of illegality can undermine their programmatic objectives, and they cannot predict when they will end up in court. Similarly, in focusing on statutes and their enforcement by courts, Posner and Vermeule disregard the considerable checking function that Congress plays through means short of formal statutes, such as by holding oversight hearings, requesting information about or investigations of doubtful executive practices, or restricting federal expenditures. President Obama, who has had to fight tooth and nail with an obstructionist Congress on his every initiative, from economic reform to health care to closing Guantanamo, would certainly be surprised to learn that his power is “unbound.” At the same time, Posner and Vermeule have an unrealistically romantic view of the constraining force of politics. The “politics” they identify consists solely of the fact that presidents must worry about election returns, and must cultivate credibility and trust among the electorate. There are several reasons to doubt that these political realities are sufficient to guard against executive overreaching. First, and most fundamentally, while the democratic process is well designed to protect the majority’s rights and interests, it is terrible at protecting the rights of minorities, and even worse at protecting the rights of foreign nationals, who have no say in the political process. In times of crisis, the executive nearly always selectively sacrifices the rights of foreign nationals, often defending its actions by claiming that “they” don’t deserve the same rights that “we” do. To say the rule of law is superfluous because we have elections is to relegate foreign nationals, and minorities generally, to largely unchecked abuse. The political process did nothing to protect the foreign nationals rounded up during the Palmer Raids of 1919, the Japanese nationals and Japanese Americans interned during World War II, or the Arab and Muslim immigrants detained and abused after September 11Second, the ability of the political process to police the executive is hampered by secrecy. Much of what the executive does, especially in times of crisis, is secret, and even when some aspects of executive action are public, its justifications often rest on grounds that are assertedly secret. Courts and Congress have at least some ability to pierce that veil and to insist on accountability. Absent legal rights, such as those created by the Freedom of Information Act, the public has virtually no ability to do so. Third, the political process is a blunt-edged sword. Presidential elections occur only once every four years, and necessarily encompass a broad range of issues. They are therefore unlikelyto be effective at addressing specific abuses of power. Voters’ concerns about abstract institutional issues such as executive power may clash with their interests on the substantive merits of particular issues, such as whether to use military force in support of Libyan rebels. There is no guarantee that citizens will separate these issues in their minds, and no reason to believe that if they do so, they will favor abstract institutional concerns over specific policy preferences. Fourth, the political process is notoriously focused on the short term, while structural issues of separation of powers generally serve long-term values. It was precisely because ordinary politics tend to be short-sighted that the framers adopted a constitutional democracy. A constitution identifies those values that society understands as important to preserve for the long term, but knows it will be tempted to sacrifice in the short term. If ordinary politics were sufficient to protect such concerns, we would not need a constitution in the first place.

### Topical Version – 2NC

#### A topical version of the aff would solve most of their offense—it’s capable of radical change

Lobel 7 (Orly Lobel, University of San Diego Assistant Professor of Law, 2007, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics,” 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf)

V. RESTORING CRITICAL OPTIMISM IN THE LEGAL FIELD

“La critique est aisée; l’art difficile.”

A critique of cooptation often takes an uneasy path. Critique has always been and remains not simply an intellectual exercise but a political and moral act. The question we must constantly pose is how critical accounts of social reform models contribute to our ability to produce scholarship and action that will be constructive. To critique the ability of law to produce social change is inevitably to raise the question of alternatives. In and of itself, the exploration of the limits of law and the search for new possibilities is an insightful field of inquiry. However, the contemporary message that emerges from critical legal consciousness analysis has often resulted in the distortion of the critical arguments themselves. This distortion denies the potential of legal change in order to illuminate what has yet to be achieved or even imagined. Most importantly, cooptation analysis is not unique to legal reform but can be extended to any process of social action and engagement. When claims of legal cooptation are compared to possible alternative forms of activism, the false necessity embedded in the contemporary story emerges — a story that privileges informal extralegal forms as transformative while assuming that a conservative tilt exists in formal legal paths. In the triangular conundrum of “law and social change,” law is regularly the first to be questioned, deconstructed, and then critically dismissed. The other two components of the equation — social and change — are often presumed to be immutable and unambiguous. Understanding the limits of legal change reveals the dangers of absolute reliance on one system and the need, in any effort for social reform, to contextualize the discourse, to avoid evasive, open-ended slogans, and to develop greater sensitivity to indirect effects and multiple courses of action. **Despite its weaknesses, however, law is an** optimistic discipline. It operates both in the present and in the future. Order without law is often the privilege of the strong. Marginalized groups have used legal reform precisely because they lacked power. Despite limitations, these groups have often successfully secured their interests through legislative and judicial victories. **Rather than experiencing a** disabling disenchantment **with the legal system, we can learn from both the** successes and failures of past models, **with the aim of** constantly redefining the boundaries of legal reform **and making visible law’s broad reach**.

### A2: Role-Playing Bad/Not USFG – 2NC

**1. No link – we don’t think we are the government, we have just proposed an ideal course of action that we think to be valuable – that doesn’t mean we are roleplaying**

Harris 13 (Scott Harris, Director of Debate, Kansas University, 2013, This Ballot, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.0)

While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment on an unrelated argument in the debate. Emporia argued that oppressed people should not be forced to role play being the oppressor. This idea that debate is about role playing being a part of the government puzzles me greatly. While I have been in debate for 40 years now never once have I role played being part of the government. When I debated and when I have judged debates I have never pretended to be anyone but Scott Harris. Pretending to be Scott Harris is burden enough for me. Scott Harris has formed many opinions about what the government and other institutions should or should not do without ever role playing being part of those institutions. I would form opinions about things the government does if I had never debated. I cannot imagine a world in which people don’t form opinions about the things their government does. I don’t know where this vision of debate comes from. I have no idea at all why it would be oppressive for someone to form an opinion about whether or not they think the government should or should not do something. I do not role play being the owner of the Chiefs when I argue with my friends about who they should take with the first pick in this year’s NFL draft. I do not role play coaching the basketball team or being a player if I argue with friends about coaching decisions or player decisions made during the NCAA tournament. If I argue with someone about whether or not the government should use torture or drone strikes I can do that and form opinions without ever role playing that I am part of the government. Sometimes the things that debaters argue is happening in debates puzzle me because they seem to be based on a vision of debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.

# 1NR

## Terror DA

### A2: You need to win uniqueness

#### You are not a prior question – impending problems as a result of the aff need to be considered in its resolution – the aff restricts drone policy and that’s bad – that determines the direction of uniqueness

The squo is goldilocks

WT 10/9 (Washington Times, 10/9/13, “Drone strikes plummet as U.S. seeks more human intelligence,” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/9/drone-strikes-drop-as-us-craves-more-human-intelli/print/)

The number of drone strikes approved by the Obama administration on suspected terrorists has fallen dramatically this year, as the war with al Qaeda increasingly shifts to Africa and U.S. intelligence craves more captures and interrogations of high-value targets. U.S. officials told The Washington Times on Wednesday that the reasons for a shift in tactics are many — including that al Qaeda's senior ranks were thinned out so much in 2011 and 2012 by an intense flurry of drone strikes, and that the terrorist network has adapted to try to evade some of Washington's use of the strikes or to make them less politically palatable. But the sources acknowledged that a growing desire to close a recent gap in actionable human intelligence on al Qaeda's evolving operations also has renewed the administration's interest in more clandestine commando raids like the one that netted a high-value terrorist suspect in Libya last weekend. Capturing and interrogating suspects can provide valuable intelligence about a terrorist network that has been morphing from its roots with a central command in Pakistan and Afghanistan (known as intelligence circles as the FATA) to more diverse affiliates spread most notably across North Africa, officials and analysts said. "Al Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan has been steadily degraded. What remains of the group's core is still dangerous but spends much of its time thinking about personal security," one senior counterterrorism official told The Times, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the secret nature of the drone program. "As the nature of the threat emanating from the FATA changes, it follows that the U.S. government's counterterrorism approach is going to shift accordingly." The decreased reliance on drones was in full view last weekend when one team of commandos from the Army's Delta Force captured long-sought al Qaeda operative Abu Anas al-Libi in Tripoli and a Navy SEAL team failed to take down an al Qaeda affiliate leader in Somalia. The U.S. has carried out nearly 400 drone strikes over the past decade in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, a tactic that killed numerous senior operatives. But al Qaeda leaders have been increasing their own counterintelligence activities and moving to more populated areas in order to increase the risks of civilian casualties, two developments that have made the strikes less politically palatable and effective, analysts and intelligence sources say. As a result, the number of drone strikes carried out against al Qaeda suspects in the Middle East and South Asia has dropped by half over the past year. There were 22 drone strikes on targets in Pakistan during the first 10 months of this year, compared with 47 carried out during 2012 and 74 in 2011, according to data compiled by the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the leading independent body examining the U.S. government's secretive drone program. But intelligence officials and some national security analysts cautioned against reading too deeply into such data, saying the U.S. remains committed to using drones when it makes sense. "Given the clandestine nature of the program, it's impossible to assess the reasons why the number of strikes has decreased over time," said Seth Jones, a political scientist who specializes in counterterrorism studies at the Rand Corp., a research institution with headquarters in California. "We just don't have access to the information," he said. Thirst for new intelligence With U.S. counterterrorism officials eager to pin down fresh and actionable intelligence on what several sources described as a gradually metastasizing and complex network of al Qaeda affiliate groups concentrated in North Africa, most analysts say it would make sense for the Obama administration to begin favoring capture-and-interrogate missions. "Raids allow you to both potentially capture a high-value target and exploit his knowledge through interrogations," said Daniel R. Green, an al Qaeda and Yemen analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. When U.S. soldiers are on the ground for a raid, Mr. Green said, it means they can "collect additional materials of intelligence value from the dwelling, further assisting in the planning of follow-on operations." Others said heavy reliance on drones has only added to America's potentially dangerous deficit of human intelligence on al Qaeda. "If you're not capturing guys to get that intel, then, yeah, you're going to be missing a part of the picture — if not a large part of the picture," said Thomas Joscelyn, a senior fellow focusing on al Qaeda and North Africa at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. "You can rely extensively on electronic intelligence, but you still need that [human intelligence]to put the full picture together," said Mr. Joscelyn, who added that recent years have fostered a "fetish within some parts of the intelligence community for drone attacks because they've succeeded in taking out some very high-level targets. "There are other parts of the American military and intelligence community that understand that drones are not going to win this war," he said. "Drones are a necessary tactic, but they are not a strategy." Last weekend's raids in Libya and Somalia are "evidence that there's more emphasis now on capture than on kill," said Linda Robinson a senior international policy analyst at the Rand Corp. "It is an indication of the shift that was alluded to by the president in May," said Mrs. Robinson, referring to a speech President Obama gave at the National Defense University in which he stressed that "as a matter of policy, the preference of the United States is to capture terrorist suspects." Mrs. Robinson said there is "recognition that, frankly, you get something from raids, which you don't get from drones." Raids allow for capturing a suspect and can lead to an "incredible intelligence dump" from that individual, she said. Drones still on the table During the May speech on terrorism, Mr. Obama acknowledged the use of drones as a central tactic within his administration's war strategy and suggested it will continue. At the time, Mr. Obama said it "not possible for America to simply deploy a team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist." Citing instances in which doing so "would pose profound risks to our troops and local civilians" and where "putting U.S. boots on the ground may trigger a major international crisis," Mr. Obama said the secret May 2011 Navy SEAL operation that resulted in the killing of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden "cannot be the norm." In the shadow of such remarks from the president, some analysts say, such raids likely would pose challenges in Yemen, where the Obama administration has relied heavily on the use of drones. A raid such as the one that netted al-Libi in Tripoli would be "much more difficult" in Yemen "in part because potential targets are far more inland, thus complicating an attack from the sea," said Mr. Green, at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "Also, the Yemeni government is much more capable and would likely detect such a raid, as compared to Libya's anarchic conditions, and al Qaeda is a much more developed force in Yemen, which will have already adapted to this new tactic by U.S. forces," he said. Mrs. Robinson said that "with a raid, of course, you incur more risk for those U.S. forces usually, special operations forces that you're putting on the ground." "I don't think there's a big appetite to go around launching raids unless there is a clear U.S. national security interest to do so," she said. "The political and diplomatic and atmospheric risks or counterproductive effects have to be very much weighed in the equation."

#### And the only other applicable offense is serial policy failure – that’s not a thing

#### Language is clear enough to use common assumptions. Policy and theory do succeed on this basis.

**Harvey ’97** (Frank, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. – Dalhousie U., “The Future’s Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War”, p. 138-139)

Linguistic Relativism. One approach of postmodernists is to point to the complex nature of language and meaning as a critique of positiv¬ism; this critique is, in turn, relevant to the overwhelming amount of work in IR (Phillips 1977; Giddens 1979; George and Campbell 1990). Although a comprehensive assessment of the linguistic relativism debate is beyond the scope of this project, it is possible to address the underlying philosophical argument, which is fairly straightforward. Building on the work of Wittgenstein (1968), the linguistic variant of the criticism contends that any attempt to reduce everyday terms "to a singular essentialist meaning" is problematic given "the multiplicity of meaning to be found in social activity" (George and Campbell 1990, 273). By implication, a concept, term, word, or symbol cannot correspond "to some ... externally derived foundation or object" and ulti¬mately is context-dependent. Similarly, Phillips argues that the validity of theory cannot be determined because "There is no standard or objective reality (always fixed, never changing) against which to com¬pare a universe of discourse ... nothing exists outside of our language and actions which can be used to justify ... a statement's truth or falsity" (1977, 273). Of course, it is not entirely clear how this "multiplicity of meaning" is sufficient to render meaningless an approach that assumes the existence of an objective reality. An important distinction must be drawn between the assertion that these discrepancies might have a significant impact on scientific theorizing and the assertion that they do have such an effect. In most cases, errors of interpretation and generalization produced by linguistic nuances are relatively insignificant and ultimately have very little impact on the generalizability of social theories. There are numerous words, symbols, concepts, and ideas, for example, that are commonly understood, regardless of other linguistic variations, but the implications of this standardized concep¬tual framework are frequently overlooked and ignored in the post¬modern critique. In any case, it is contingent upon the theorist to specify the precise meaning of any variable or symbol that is central to a theory. Although definitions may vary — possibly partly, but not entirely, as a conse¬quence of language — scholars nevertheless are more likely than not to understand and agree on the underlying meaning of most words, symbols and phrases. The point is that theorists generally do have a common starting point and often suspend, at least temporarily, coun¬terproductive debates over meaning in order to shift emphasis towards the strength and logical consistency of the theory itself, a more important issue that has nothing to do with language. Evaluating the internal consistency of the central assumptions and propositions of a theory, that is, criticising from within, is likely to be more conducive to theoretical progress than the alternative, which is to reject the idea of theory building entirely. Finally, the lack of purity and precision, another consequence of linguistic relativism, does not necessarily imply irrelevance of purpose or approach. The study of international relations may not be exact, given limitations noted by Wittgenstein and others, but precision is a practical research problem, not an insurmountable barrier to progress. In fact, most observers who point to the context-dependent nature of language are critical not so much of the social sciences but of the incorrect application of scientific techniques to derive overly precise measurement of weakly developed concepts. Clearly, **our understanding of the causes of international conflict** — and most notably war — **has improved considerably as a consequence of applying sound scientific methods and valid operationalizations** (Vasquez 1987, 1993). The alternative approach, implicit in much of the postmodern literature, is to fully accept the inadequacy of positivism, throw one's hands up in failure, given the complexity of the subject, and repudiate the entire enterprise. The most relevant question is whether we would know more or less about international relations if we pursued that strategy.

### A2: Terror Talk

#### -- Abandoning the term “terrorism” is worse and undermines attempts to check political violence

Sederberg 89 (Peter C., Professor of Government – USC, Terrorist Myths, p. 41-42)

The idea of terrorism, given its irreducible ambiguity and the emotional response it generates, can be made to serve many different political agendas. As few people admit to positive associations, polemicists of varying ideological persuasions, from Libya’s Muammar Qaddafy to Ronald Reagan, use the term to castigate their enemies. Such rhetorical delights, however, contribute little to analysis and understanding. Not surprisingly, given these abuses, some commentators suggest abandoning the term altogether. Such a response, though, **appears premature**. Forms of coercion **can be distinguished from one another**, even if without absolute clarity, and some coercive tactics share certain essential, identifiable characteristics that **justify the label terrorism**. The traits we identified are indiscriminate means and noncombatant targets. These forms of coercion are simply not the same as conventional combatant violence. Their nature and uses deserve particular attention. The distinguishing criteria identified, admittedly, are not absolute. They may be conceived as two sliding scales, the application of which requires the exercise of some judgment. Even though definitive conclusions cannot be reached, the classification of coercive acts is not, therefore an arbitrary, irrational exercise. On the contrary, we can specify the criteria, and can be expected to provide reasons for why we apply them as we do. Despite some irreducible ambiguity as the character of a coercive tactic moves concurrently toward the extremes of these two scales, consensus on its classification should prove easier to reach. Our argument, though, also makes clear that terrorism does not represent a radical break; rather, it is continuous with other forms of coercion that may be used by political contenders. The terrorist temptation afflicts many of our political communities. If we abandon the concept to the ideologues or ignore the differences between terrorism and other forms of coercion, **we** **hamper the possibilities for successful political action to contain, if not eliminate, this form of coercion**.

#### Terror talk is now a structural reality – any alternative hopelessly fails

Zulaika and Douglass 96 (Joseba and William, Professors in the Department of Basque Studies – University of Nevada at Reno, Terror and Taboo, p. 238)

In this book we have argued that the American quest for “terrorism” has had a lot to do with a Beckettian theater of the absurd as well as with the political manipulations of collective fantasies of nuclearism and savagery. It doesn’t take an uncommon sagacity to perceive that the journalistic and academic fashionings of the “thing” itself are flawed and self-deceptive. But, even if we have concentrated on showing the discursive basis of the culture of terrorism, there is a point in which the thing itself (whether the created category is “race” or “ethnicity” or “taboo”), no matter how reified or distorted or banal, becomes a **structural reality** and a **historical force**. It appears that “terrorism” is fast becoming a **dominant medium** through which American society and domestic politics **need to be interpreted**. We may laugh at an American public overwhelmingly obsessed with terrorism during the 1980s—a time when little terrorism actually transpired. Yet the rhetorical forces and foreign policy interests that promoted it in the first place are not becoming a thing of the past. Terrorism is now becoming a **functional reality** of American politics, an autonomous prime mover of enormous consequence affecting national policy and legislation. This is no longer mere phantasmagoria but rather an irreducible dimension of a political ideology that profoundly affects the material reality of American society. Terrorism has been “naturalized” into a constant risk that is omnipresent out there, a sort of chaotic principle always ready to strike and create havoc, and against which society must now marshall all its resources in an unending struggle. Now that it has become a prime *raison d’etat*, its perpetuation seems guaranteed.

### Link – General – 2NC

#### Targeted killing vital to effective counterterrorism---disrupts leadership and makes carrying out attacks impossible

Anderson 13 (Kenneth, Professor of International Law at American University, June 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, Vol. 135, No. 6, http://www.volokh.com/2013/05/22/the-case-for-drones/)

Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities -- but much of the drone's contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties.¶ Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled means to strike directly at terrorist organizations without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens. It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply defensive measures, such as homeland security alone. Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership.¶ If one believes, as many of the critics of drone warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive -- including those that eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law enforcement and criminal law -- then the strategic virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists themselves will seem small. But that has not been American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration -- and not by the Congress of the United States, which has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight the war on terror aggressively. The United States has used many offensive methods in the past dozen years: Regime change of states offering safe havens, counter-insurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common enemies are examples of the methods that are just of military nature.¶ Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target -- one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

#### Targeted killing solves terrorism – degrades terrorist capabilities more than it increases recruitment or retal

Fisher 7 (Jason, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, "Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law," 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 711, lexis)

So does targeted killing provide a net advantage or disadvantage in dealing with terrorism? Recently published statistical studies suggest that, overall, targeted killing is an effective counter-terrorism tactic. n151 While available statistical evidence suggests that targeted killings lead to retaliatory terrorist attacks and increased recruitment, n152 such targeted killings also appear to eliminate terrorists with leadership, planning, and tactical skills, which can render terrorist organizations much less capable of effectively conducting attacks. n153 The statistical evidence indicates that, despite an increase in terrorist attacks, casualties and deaths from such attacks, both in absolute and per-attack terms, have fallen sharply since Israel began regularly employing targeted killing in the al-Aqsa Intifada. n154 Thus, it appears that targeted killing can be an effective counter-terrorism tactic; to date, targeted killing's ability to degrade terrorists' capabilities appears to be outweighing any concomitant increase in terrorist recruitment, retaliation, and cooperation the tactic's use may have spurred.

#### Targeted killing key to effective counter-terrorism

Anderson 9 (Kenneth, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, and Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Member of its Task Force on National Security and the Law, "Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law," http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/11%20counterterrorism%20anderson/0511\_counterterrorism\_anderson.pdf)

Obama was right as a candidate and is correct as president to insist on the propriety of ¶ targeted killings—that is, the targeting of a specific individual to be killed, increasingly ¶ often by means of high technology, remote-controlled Predator drone aircraft wielding ¶ missiles from a stand-off position. The strategic logic that presses toward targeted standoff killing as a necessary, available and technologically advancing part of ¶ counterterrorism is overpowering. So too is the moral and humanitarian logic behind its ¶ use. Just as crucial programs of Predator-centered targeted killing are underway now in ¶ Afghanistan and, with increasing international controversy, Pakistan, over the long term ¶ these programs of stand-off targeted killing will be an essential element in United States ¶ counterterrorism into the future—and with targets having little or nothing to do with ¶ today’s iteration of the war on terror.6¶ Future administrations, even if they naturally ¶ prefer to couch the matter in softer terms, will likely follow the same path. Even if the ¶ whole notion seems to some disturbingly close to arbitrary killing, not open combat, it is ¶ often the most expedient—and, despite civilian casualties that do occur, most ¶ discriminatingly humanitarian—manner to neutralize a terrorist without unduly ¶ jeopardizing either civilians or American forces.

### A2: What Terrorists

**Al Qaeda is still a major threat—predictions of decline are premature and false**

Sinai 13 (Joshua, JINSA Fellow, Washington, DC-based consultant on national security studies, focusing primarily on terrorism, counterterrorism, and homeland security, 3-11-13, “Al Qaeda Threat to U.S. Not Diminished, Data Indicates” The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs) http://www.jinsa.org/fellowship-program/joshua-sinai/al-qaeda-threat-us-not-diminished-data-indicates#.UbaiWvmsiSo

Conventional wisdom holds that the threat to America posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates is greatly diminished compared to 9/11. Today, it is claimed, al Qaeda is less well organized, with many of its top leaders eliminated, and is so broken into geographically disparate franchises that it is unable to recruit, train, and deploy a specialized cell to carry out a comparable catastrophic attack against America. The fact that no al Qaeda terrorist attacks have been carried out in America over the last two years, while some 20 individuals have plotted to carry out attacks but were arrested and convicted during the pre-incident phases, is seen as evidence that this terrorist threat is decreasing domestically. Therefore, according to this thesis, security authorities should prepare for more numerous and frequently occurring but low casualty attacks mounted by less well-trained and capable homegrown operatives, particularly by what are termed "lone wolves." When a more complete compilation of all the components involved in terrorism are taken into account, however, the magnitude of the threat becomes much clearer and includes a higher likelihood of attempts to carry out catastrophic attacks as well as evidence that al Qaeda continues to recruit and prepare terrorist operatives in the United States. Downplaying the terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates also has significant political implications due in part to the more than $70 billion that is spent annually on America's domestic counterterrorism programs (with larger amounts expended for overseas operations), all of which need to be continuously justified as cost effective by Administration planners and Congressional appropriators. Such purported decline in al Qaeda attacks domestically, however, is now being seized upon by those who favor reduced government funding for counterterrorism programs, including weakening the USA PATRIOT Act, to support their position that a reduced threat requires reduced funding and resources. When the trajectory of attacks by al Qaeda and its associates over the years are carefully studied, however, certain patterns recur. Specifically, every time the threat is underplayed, it is invariably followed by a major attack. In the months leading up to the November 2012 elections, the media was filled with pronouncements that al Qaeda's threat had greatly diminished as a result of the elimination of its leadership and the reduced operational role over attacks by what is termed "al Qaeda Central" in Pakistan's tribal areas. While accurate on one level, this did not stop al Qaeda and its affiliates from continuing to launch major terrorist attacks, including that by its Libyan affiliate against the U.S. consulate in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, which led to severe political repercussions for the Administration for its unpreparedness to anticipate such an attack. This was followed by the launching of the devastating cross-border attack against the natural gas facility in eastern Algeria in mid-January by another al Qaeda affiliate in Mali. Thirty-six foreign workers were murdered in that attack, which, again, was unanticipated.Moreover, the fact that a catastrophic attack against America comparable to 9/11 has not occurred over the past 11 years should not suggest that a future one is not being planned. In summer 2006, al Qaeda-linked operatives in London plotted to detonate liquid explosives on board 10 transatlantic airliners flying from the UK to America and Canada. In September 2009, Najibullah Zazi and his associates were arrested for plotting to conduct a suicide bombing attack against the New York City subway system. On Christmas Day, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab failed to detonate plastic explosives while on board an airliner heading to Detroit. Anwar al Awlaki, a former American extremist cleric, reportedly masterminded Abdulmutallab's operation. Awlaki was killed in a drone attack in Yemen on September 30, 2011. The killings of al Awlaki and Samir Khan, another American extremist who had made his way to Yemen in 2009, could well trigger a catastrophic attack by al Qaeda to avenge their deaths.The recent capture of Osama Bin Laden's son-in-law, Sulaiman abu Ghaith, and the decision to try him in New York City, is also likely to trigger a major revenge attack against America. Finally, organizing catastrophic terrorist attacks requires extensive planning, funding and preparation. A terrorist group that feels itself strong will take its time to carefully plan a few but devastating attacks, while a group that regards itself as weak may feel compelled to carry out frequent, but low-casualty attacks to demonstrate its continued relevancy. Some incident databases, such asa recent compilation of data about American al Qaeda terrorists by the UK-based Henry Jackson Society, only account for completed attacks and convictions of those arrested. If such counting is expanded to include other factors, however, then the overall threat becomes much more severe. Other factors, therefore, should include the potential consequences ofthe thwarted attacks had they not been prevented, the number of radicalized Americans who travel overseas to join al Qaeda-affiliated insurgencies, and the extent of radicalized activity by al Qaeda's American sympathizers in jihadi website forums and chatrooms. A more complete accounting of the threat will now reveal that the supportive extremist infrastructure for al Qaeda in America is actually not diminishing and that the purported "lone wolf" actors have actual ties to al Qaeda operatives overseas. We should not, therefore, also be misled into complacencyif catastrophic attacks by al Qaeda do not occur for lengthy periods. Nor so by the comforting but false sense of security that comes with believing that "lone wolf" attacks in the United States are not a product of al Qaeda recruitment and support. It is also possible, nevertheless, that al Qaeda's terrorist planners are considering both types of attacks, infrequent catastrophic and frequent low casualty. This may explain why al Qaeda's propaganda organs are calling on its radicalized followers in the West to take matters into their own hands and embark on any sort of attacks that may be feasible at the moment, but with further surprise attacks of a catastrophic nature still ahead.

#### Threat growing now

Marc Lynch 8/8, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University and an editor of Foreign Policy's Middle East Channel, 8/8/13, "The Gift", Foreign Policy, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/08/the\_gift\_al\_qaeda\_arab\_spring

The failure of most of the Arab uprisings has therefore been an extraordinary gift to al Qaeda. It has restored the potency of the terror organization's arguments, while the distraction or disintegration of state security agencies has given it more space to operate. The shift to armed insurgency in Syria galvanized its moribund global jihad. The spectacular collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood badly weakened its most powerful Islamist rival. It has found unprecedented new opportunities to reposition itself within the turbulent, hyperactive new Arab politics.

## Flex DA

### A2: Prez Flex Bad

#### Congressional restrictions cause adversaries to doubt the credibility of our threats --- causes crisis escalation and emboldens enemies

Waxman 8/25 – Professor of Law @ Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy @ CFR (Matthew, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN)

A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that stronger legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies, because it establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority to follow through on threats. This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that any serious restrictions on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head off explosive confrontations.”178 He continued:¶ In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in advance is perhaps the most important of all the powers in our constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could carry nuclear implications. … [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the circumstance of modern life—the power to make a credible threat to use force in order to prevent a confrontation which might escalate.179

#### Threat credibility flips all your impacts

Waxman 8/25 – Professor of Law @ Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy @ CFR (Matthew, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN)

After the Cold War, the United States continued to rely on coercive force – threatened force to deter or compel behavior by other actors – as a central pillar of its grand strategy. During the 1990s, the United States wielded coercive power with varied results against rogue actors in many cases that, without the overlay of superpower enmities, were considered secondary or peripheral, not vital, interests: Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and elsewhere. For analysts of U.S. national security policy, a major puzzle was reconciling the fact that the United States possessed overwhelming military superiority in raw terms over any rivals with its difficult time during this era in compelling changes in their behavior.104 As Daniel Byman and I wrote about that decade in our study of threats of force and American foreign policy: U.S. conventional and nuclear forces dwarf those of any adversaries, and the U.S. economy remains the largest and most robust in the world. Because of these overwhelming advantages, the United States can threaten **any conceivable adversary** with little danger of a major defeat or even significant retaliation. Yet coercion remains difficult. Despite the United States’ lopsided edge in raw strength, regional foes persist in defying the threats and ultimatums brought by the United States and its allies. In confrontations with Somali militants, Serb nationalists, and an Iraqi dictator, the U.S. and allied record or coercion has been mixed over recent years…. Despite its mixed record of success, however, coercion will remain a critical element of U.S. foreign policy.105 One important factor that seemed to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. coercive threats during this period was that many adversaries perceived the United States as still afflicted with “Vietnam Syndrome,” unwilling to make good on its military threats and see military operations through.106 Since the turn of the 21st Century, major U.S. security challenges have included non-state **terrorist threats**, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and rapidly changing power balances in **East Asia**, and the United States has accordingly been reorienting but retaining its strategic reliance on threatened force. The Bush Administration’s “preemption doctrine” was premised on the idea that some dangerous actors – including terrorist organizations and some states seeking WMD arsenals – are undeterrable, so the United States might have to strike them first rather than waiting to be struck.107 On one hand, this was a move away from reliance on threatened force: “[t]he inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit” a reactive posture.108 Yet the very enunciation of such a policy – that “[t]o forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our *adversaries*, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively”109 – was intended to persuade those adversaries to alter their policies that the United States regarded as destabilizing and threatening. Although the Obama administration pulled back from this rhetoric and placed greater emphasis on international institutions, it has continued to rely on threatened force as a key pillar of its strategy with regard to deterring threats (such as **aggressive Iranian moves**), intervening in humanitarian crises (as in Libya), and **reassuring allies**.110 With regard to East Asia, for example, the credible threat of U.S. military force is a significant element of U.S. strategy for **deterring Chinese and North Korean aggression** as well as reassuring other Asian powers of U.S. protection, to **avert a destabilizing arms race**.111

#### That means even if presidential flex has been bad in some instances it’s a necessary ill to prevent a larger evil – that outweighs your Griffin evidence, which also doesn’t cite anyone newer than Truman

### A2: Rana and SPF

#### Rana’s claim is too sweeping – means any failure also applies to the aff and critique can never be successful

David Cole 12, professor of law at Georgetown, “Confronting the Wizard of Oz: National Security,

Expertise, and Secrecy” 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1617-1625 (2012), <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1085>)

Rana is right to focus our attention on the assumptions that frame modern Americans’ conceptions about national security, but his assessment raises three initial questions. First, it seems far from clear that there ever was a “golden” era in which national security decisions were made by the common man, or “the people themselves,” as Larry Kramer might put it.8 Rana argues that neither Hobbes nor Locke would support a worldview in which certain individuals are vested with superior access to the truth, and that faith in the superior abilities of so-called “experts” is a phenomenon of the New Deal era.9 While an increased faith in scientific solutions to social problems may be a contributing factor in our current overreliance on experts,10 I doubt that national security matters were ever truly a matter of widespread democratic deliberation. § Marked 20:57 § Rana notes that in the early days of the republic, every able-bodied man had to serve in the militia, whereas today only a small (and largely disadvantaged) portion of society serves in the military.11 But serving in the militia and making decisions about national security are two different matters. The early days of the Republic were at least as dominated by “elites” as today. Rana points to no evidence that decisions about foreign affairs were any more democratic then than now. And, of course, the nation as a whole was far less democratic, as the majority of its inhabitants could not vote at all.12 Rather than moving away from a golden age of democratic decision-making, it seems more likely that we have simply replaced one group of elites (the aristocracy) with another (the experts). Second, to the extent that there has been an epistemological shift with respect to national security, it seems likely that it is at least in some measure a response to objective conditions, not just an ideological development. If so, it’s not clear that we can solve the problem merely by “thinking differently” about national security. The world has, in fact, become more interconnected and dangerous than it was when the Constitution was drafted. At our founding, the oceans were a significant buffer against attacks, weapons were primitive, and travel over long distances was extremely arduous and costly. The attacks of September 11, 2001, or anything like them, would have been inconceivable in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Small groups of non-state actors can now inflict the kinds of attacks that once were the exclusive province of states. But because such actors do not have the governance responsibilities that states have, they are less susceptible to deterrence. The Internet makes information about dangerous weapons and civil vulnerabilities far more readily available, airplane travel dramatically increases the potential range of a hostile actor, and it is not impossible that terrorists could obtain and use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.13 The knowledge necessary to monitor nuclear weapons, respond to cyber warfare, develop technological defenses to technological threats, and gather intelligence is increasingly specialized. The problem is not just how we think about security threats; it is also at least in part objectively based.

1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)