# 1NC

### T

#### Targeted killings are distinct from drone strikes – precise definitions are key

Uebersax 12 (John, psychologist, writer and former RAND Corporation military analyst, "The Four Kinds of Drone Strikes," http://satyagraha.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/the-four-kinds-of-drone-strikes/)

We must begin with clear terms, and that is the purpose of the present article. Drone strikes, that is, the launching of explosive missiles from a remotely operated aerial vehicle, come in four varieties: targeted killings, signature strikes, overt combat operations, and covert combat operations. We shall consider each in turn.¶ Targeted killing. This occurs when a drone strike is used to kill a terrorist whose identity is known, and whose name has been placed on a hit list, due to being deemed a ‘direct and immediate threat’ to US security. The government would like people to think this means these strikes target a terrorist literally with his or her hand on a detonator. But, in actuality, the only real criterion is that the government believes the target is sufficiently closely affiliated with terrorist organizations (e.g., a propagandist or financier) to justify assassination. This is likely the rarest form of drone strike. However it receives the most publicity, because the government likes to crow when it kills a high-ranking terrorist.¶ Signature strikes. In signature strikes, the target is a person whose name is not known, but whose actions fit the profile (or ‘signature’) of a high-ranking terrorist. There is some ambiguity concerning the meaning of this term. Some use it in the sense just stated — i.e., a strike against an anonymous terrorist leader. Others use it more broadly to include killing of any non-identified militants, whether high-ranking or not. However from the moral standpoint it makes a major difference whether an anonymous targeted victim is a high-level leader, or simply an anonymous combatant. For this reason it is advantageous to restrict the term “signature strike” to the targeting of anonymous high-level leaders, and to assign strikes against anonymous non-leaders to the two further categories below.¶ Overt combat operation. This category includes drone strikes conducted as part of regular military operations. These strikes are presumably run by uniformed military personnel according to codes of military conduct, and are, logically and legally, not much different from ordinary air or artillery strikes. As a part of routine warfare, such strikes are subject to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Three items of the Geneva Conventions are of special interest here: (1) strikes should occur only in the context of a legally declared war; (2) they should be conducted by lawful combatants (which, many experts believe, excludes use of non-uniformed, civilian contractor operators); and (3) standard provisions concerning the need to report casualties, especially civilian casualties, are in effect.¶ Covert combat operation. Finally, there are covert combat operations. These, like the former category, are launched against usual military targets – e.g., any hostile militant, not just high-ranking ones. But why should these strikes be covert? The obvious answer is: to mask something shady. Covert combat strikes can evade all those irritating constraints on military tactics imposed by the Geneva Conventions, International Law, public opinion, and basic human decency.¶ The specific terms used above to distinguish these four kinds of strikes are admittedly arbitrary, and perhaps some other nomenclature would be more advantageous. But we need some fixed set of terms to refer to these fundamentally different kinds of strikes. Without such terms, the US government will continue to have its way by relying on public confusion and terminological sophistry. For example, if there is only a single generic term, the government may issue a claim such as “drone strikes comply with international law.” This is perhaps technically true for, say, overt military drone strikes, but it is not true for signature strikes. With more precise terms, it would be more difficult for the government to mislead the public.

#### Vote neg –

#### Predictable limits – our definition is exclusive and has an intent to define – expanding targeted killing to unknown terrorist identities makes the term limitless, destroying in depth education

### T

#### A. Interpretation – Statutory restrictions must directly prohibit activities currently under the president’s war powers authority – this excludes regulation or oversight

#### Statutory restrictions prohibit actions

Lamont 5 (Michael, Legal Analyst @ Occupational health, "Legal: Staying on the right side of the law," http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/01/04/2005/29005/legal-staying-on-the-right-side-of-the-law.htm#.UgFe\_o3qnoI)

It will be obvious what 'conduct' and 'redundancy' dismissals are. A statutory restriction means that the employee is prevented by law from doing the job - for example, a driver who loses his driving licence. 'Some other substantial reason' means "Parliament can't be expected to think of everything".

#### Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### B. Vote Neg –

#### 1. Limits – Regulation and oversight of authority allows a litany of new affs in each area – justifies indirect effects of statutory policies and affs that don’t alter presidential authority – undermines prep and clash

#### 2. Ground – Restriction ground is the locus of neg prep – their interpretation jacks all core disads – politics, presidential powers, and any area based disad because an aff doesn’t have to prevent the president from doing anything

### DA

#### Shutdown will be avoided now

Yglesias 9/18/13 (Matthew, business/economics correspondent @ Slate, "The Odds of a Government Shutdown Are Falling, Not Rising," http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/09/18/government\_shutdown\_odds\_falling\_not\_rising.html)

But read on to the second graf of the piece and you'll see that the odds are not rising at all. What's happening is that John Boehner is preparing to pass an appropriations bill that also defunds Obamacare that he knows perfectly well stands no chance of passing, and he's hoping that doing this will placate the right wing of the his caucus for when he surrenders.¶ Here they explain:¶ House leaders are hoping the vote on the defunding measure will placate conservatives once the Democratically controlled Senate rejects it. The House, they are betting, would then pass a stopgap spending measure unencumbered by such policy baggage and shift the argument to the debt ceiling, which must be raised by mid-October if the government is to avoid an economically debilitating default.¶ The key thing to remember here is that the House, as a discretionary decision, operates by the "Hastert Rule" in which only bills that are supported by a majority of GOP members can be brought to the floor for a vote. There is no Hastert-compliant appropriations bill that can pass the Senate. But there very likely is majority support in the House for the kind of "clean" funding bill that can also pass the Senate. All that has to happen is for John Boehner to violate the Hastert Rule. And the Hastert Rule isn't actually a rule, it's something Boehner has put aside many times. But it's also a rule he can't flagrantly ignore, lest his caucus get too grumpy and depose him. The operating theory here is that if Boehner has the whole House GOP indulge the maximalist faction by all passing a defuding bill, that creates enough room to move to later violate the Hastert Rule and pass a continuing resolution.¶ If anything is happening to the odds of a shutdown, in other words, they're falling, not rising.

#### Obama fights the plan – strongly supports war powers

Rana 11 (Aziz – Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, “TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099, lexis)

Thus, for many legal critics of executive power, the election of Barack Obama as President appeared to herald a new approach to security concerns and even the possibility of a fundamental break from Bush-era policies. These hopes were immediately stoked by Obama's decision before taking office to close the Guantanamo Bay prison. n4 Over two years later, however, not only does Guantanamo remain open, but through a recent executive order Obama has formalized a system of indefinite detention for those held there and also has stated that new military commission trials will begin for Guantanamo detainees. n5 More important, in ways small and large, the new administration remains committed to core elements of the previous constitutional vision of national security. Just as their predecessors, Obama officials continue to defend expansive executive detention and war powers and to promote the centrality of state secrecy to national security.

#### Presidential war power battles expend capital – it’s immediate and forces a trade-off

O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis)

a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by first-hand accounts of information battles and by the conclusions of experts who study them. Participants in such battles report that short-term political calculations consistently trump the constitutional interests at stake. One veteran of the first Bush White House, for example, has explained that rational-choice theory predicts what he in fact experienced: The rewards for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the office of the presidency would be largely abstract, since they would consist primarily of fidelity to a certain theory of the Constitution... . The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency, however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs would include the expenditure of political capital that might have been used for more pressing purposes, [and] the unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies. n182 Louis Fisher, one of the leading defenders of the political branches' competence and authority to interpret the Constitution independently of the courts, n183 acknowledges that politics and "practical considerations" typically override the legal and constitutional principles implicated in information disputes. n184 In his view, although debate about congressional access and executive privilege "usually proceeds in terms of constitutional doctrine, it is the messy political realities of the moment that usually decide the issue." n185 Indeed, Professor Peter Shane, who has extensively studied such conflicts, concludes that their successful resolution in fact depends upon the parties focusing only on short-term political [\*1123] considerations. n186 When the participants "get institutional," Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187

#### Capital key

Dumain 9/18/13 (Emma, Roll Call, "Will House Democrats Balk at Sequester-Level CR?," http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/will-house-democrats-balk-at-sequester-level-cr/)

What would be helpful for the duration of the political battle over the CR between now and the end of the month, however, is if Obama more frequently took to the “bully pulpit” to blast Republicans and bolster Democrats, the aide said.¶ “The more the better,” he said.

#### Shutdown makes us vulnerable to a cyber-attack

Sideman 11 (Alysia, Federal Computer Week Contributor, “Agencies must determine computer security teams in face of potential federal shutdown” Federal Computer Week, http://fcw.com/Articles/2011/02/23/Agencies-must-determine-computer-security-teams-in-face-of-shutdown.aspx?Page=1)

With the WikiLeaks hacks and other threats to cybersecurity present, guarding against cyberattacks has become a significant part of governing -- especially because most government agencies have moved to online systems.¶ As a potential government shutdown comes closer, agencies must face new questions about defining “essential” computer personnel. Cyber threats weren’t as significant during the 1995 furlough as they are today, reports NextGov. The publication adds that agencies need to buck up and be organized. ¶ In late January, government officials, NATO and the European Union banded together in Brussels to formulate a plan to battle cyber bandits, according to Defense Systems.¶ Leaders there agreed that existing cybersecurity measures were incomplete and decided to fast-track a new plan for cyber incident response.¶ Meanwhile, observers are wondering whether the U.S. government has a plan to deal with cyberattacks in the case of a shutdown.¶ The lists of essential computer security personnel drawn up 15 years ago are irrelevant today, computer specialists told NextGov.¶ In 1995, the only agencies concerned about cybersecurity were entities such as the FBI and CIA. Today, before any potential government shutdown happens, a plan of essential IT personnel should be determined, the specialists add.¶ Agencies should be figuring out which systems will need daily surveillance and strategic defense, as well as evaluating the job descriptions of the people operating in those systems, former federal executives told NextGov.¶ Hord Tipton, a former Interior Department CIO, agrees. “If they haven’t done it, there’s going to be a mad scramble, and there’s going to be a hole in the system,” he told the site. ¶ All government departments are supposed to have contingency plans on deck that spell out essential systems and the employees associated with them, according to federal rules.¶ Meanwhile, some experts say determining which IT workers are essential depends more on the length of the shutdown.¶ Jeffrey Wheatman, a security and privacy analyst with the Gartner research group, tells NextGov that a shutdown lasting a couple of weeks “would require incident response personnel, network administrators and staff who monitor firewall logs for potential intrusions.”¶ If a shutdown lasted a month or longer, more employees would need to report, he said, adding: “New threats could emerge during that time frame, which demands people with strategy-oriented job functions to devise new lines of defense.”¶ Employees who are deemed “essential” are critical to national security.¶ Cyber warfare or holes in cybersecurity can threaten a nation’s infrastructure. In particular, the electric grid, the nation’s military assets, financial sector and telecommunications networks can be vulnerable in the face of an attack, reports Federal Computer Week.

#### Nuclear war.

**Lawson 9** (Sean, Assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, *Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict Escalation*, May 13th 2009, http://www.seanlawson.net/?p=477)

Introduction At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk recently, “The Problem with Cyber War,” that took a critical look at a number of the assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the United States. He addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue of conflict escalation–i.e. the possibility that offensive use of cyber attacks could escalate to the use of physical force. As I will show, his concerns are entirely legitimate as current U.S. military cyber doctrine assumes the possibility of what I call “**cross-domain responses**” to cyberattacks. Backing Your Adversary (Mentally) into a Corner Based on the premise that completely blinding a potential adversary is a good indicator to that adversary that an attack is iminent, Ranum has argued that “The best thing that you could possibly do if you want to start **World War III** is launch a cyber attack. [...] When people talk about cyber war like it’s a practical thing, what they’re really doing is messing with the OK button for starting World War III. We need to get them to sit the f-k down and shut the f-k up.” [2] He is making a point similar to one that I have made in the past: Taking away an adversary’s ability to make rational decisions could backfire. [3] For example, Gregory Witol cautions that “attacking the decision makerÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s ability to perform rational calculations may cause more problems than it hopes to resolveÃ¢â‚¬Â¦ Removing the capacity for rational action may result in completely unforeseen consequences, including longer and bloodier battles than may otherwise have been.” [4] Ã¯Â»Â¿Cross-Domain Response So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns are well founded. But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater concern. It’s not just worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and therefore trigger an irrational response from the adversary. What is also cause for concern is that current U.S. policy indicates that “kinetic attacks” (i.e. physical use of force) are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks. Most worrisome is that current U.S. policy implies that a **nuclear response** is possible, something that policy makers have not denied in recent press reports. The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has increasingly come to see cyberspace as a “domain of warfare” equivalent to air, land, sea, and space. The definition of cyberspace as its own domain of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-space/cyberspace boundary. But thinking logically about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting conclusions. If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define “cyber attacks” (whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war. But what happens if the U.S. is attacked in any of the other domains? It retaliates. But it usually does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked. Rather, responses are typically “cross-domain responses”–i.e. a massive bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g. think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor) might lead to air strikes against the attacker. Even more likely given a U.S. military “way of warfare” that emphasizes multidimensional, “joint” operations is a massive conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all domains (air, land, sea, space), simultaneously. The possibility of “kinetic action” in response to cyber attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006) National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [5]: Of course, the possibility that a cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply constitutes possibly the ultimate in “cross-domain response.” And while this may seem far fetched, it has not been ruled out by U.S. defense policy makers and is, in fact, implied in current U.S. **defense policy documents**. From the National Military Strategy of the United States (2004): “The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical ‘weapons’. They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.” [6] The authors of a 2009 National Academies of Science report on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying, “Coupled with the declaratory policy on nuclear weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the United States will regard certain kinds of cyberattacks against the United States as being in the same category as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with devastating impacts) may be possible. It also sets a relevant scale–a cyberattack that has an impact larger than that associated with a relatively small release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or greater seriousness.” [7] Asked by the New York Times to comment on this, U.S. defense officials would not deny that nuclear retaliation remains an option for response to a massive cyberattack: “Pentagon and military officials confirmed that the United States reserved the option to respond in any way it chooses to punish an adversary responsible for a catastrophic cyberattack. While the options could include the use of nuclear weapons, officials said, such an extreme counterattack was hardly the most likely response.” [8] The rationale for this policy: “Thus, the United States never declared that it would be bound to respond to a Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional invasion with only American and NATO conventional forces. The fear of escalating to a nuclear conflict was viewed as a pillar of stability and is credited with helping deter the larger Soviet-led conventional force throughout the cold war. Introducing the possibility of a nuclear response to a catastrophic cyberattack would be expected to serve the same purpose.” [9] Non-unique, Dangerous, and In-credible? There are a couple of interesting things to note in response. First is the development of a new acronym, WMD/E (weapons of mass destruction or effect). Again, this acronym indicates a weakening of the requirement of physical impacts. In this new definition, mass effects that are not necessarily physical, nor necessarily destructive, but possibly only disruptive economically or even psychologically (think “shock and awe”) are seen as equivalent to WMD. This new emphasis on effects, disruption, and psychology reflects both contemporary, but also long-held beliefs within the U.S. defense community. It reflects current thinking in U.S. military theory, in which it is said that U.S. forces should be able to “mass fires” and “mass effects” without having to physically “mass forces.” There is a sliding scale in which the physical (often referred to as the “kinetic”) gradually retreats–i.e. massed forces are most physical; massed fire is less physical (for the U.S. anyway); and massed effects are the least physical, having as the ultimate goal Sun Tzu’s “pinnacle of excellence,” winning without fighting. But the emphasis on disruption and psychology in WMD/E has also been a key component of much of 20th century military thought in the West. Industrial theories of warfare in the early 20th century posited that industrial societies were increasingly interdependent and reliant upon mass production, transportation, and consumption of material goods. Both industrial societies and the material links that held them together, as well as industrial people and their own internal linkages (i.e. nerves), were seen as increasingly fragile and prone to disruption via attack with the latest industrial weapons: airplanes and tanks. Once interdependent and fragile industrial societies were hopelessly disrupted via attack by the very weapons they themselves created, the nerves of modern, industrial men and women would be shattered, leading to moral and mental defeat and a loss of will to fight. Current thinking about the possible dangers of cyber attack upon the U.S. are based on the same basic premises: technologically dependent and therefore fragile societies populated by masses of people sensitive to any disruption in expected standards of living are easy targets. Ultimately, however, a number of researchers have pointed out the pseudo-psychological, pseudo-sociological, and a-historical (not to mention non-unique) nature of these assumptions. [10] Others have pointed out that these assumptions did not turn out to be true during WWII strategic bombing campaigns, that modern, industrial societies and populations were far more resilient than military theorists had assumed. [11] Finally, even some military theorists have questioned the assumptions behind cyber war, especially when assumptions about our own technology dependence-induced societal fragility (dubious on their own) are applied to other societies, especially non-Western societies (even more dubious). [12] Finally, where deterrence is concerned, it is important to remember that a deterrent has to be credible to be effective. True, the U.S. retained nuclear weapons as a deterrent during the Cold War. But, from the 1950s through the 1980s, there was increasing doubt among U.S. planners regarding the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence via the threat of “massive retaliation.” As early as the 1950s it was becoming clear that the U.S. would be reluctant at best to actually follow through on its threat of massive retaliation. Unfortunately, most money during that period had gone into building up the nuclear arsenal; conventional weapons had been marginalized. Thus, the U.S. had built a force it was likely never to use. So, the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s saw the development of concepts like “flexible response” and more emphasis on building up conventional forces. This was the big story of the 1980s and the “Reagan build-up” (not “Star Wars”). Realizing that, after a decade of distraction in Vietnam, it was back in a position vis-a-viz the Soviets in Europe in which it would have to rely on nuclear weapons to offset its own weakness in conventional forces, a position that could lead only to blackmail or holocaust, the U.S. moved to create stronger conventional forces. [13] Thus, the question where cyber war is concerned: If it was in-credible that the U.S. would actually follow through with massive retaliation after a Soviet attack on the U.S. or Western Europe, is it really credible to say that the U.S. would respond with nuclear weapons to a cyber attack, no matter how disruptive or destructive? Beyond credibility, deterrence makes many other assumptions that are problematic in the cyber war context. It assumes an adversary capable of being deterred. Can most of those who would perpetrate a cyber attack be deterred? Will al-Qa’ida be deterred? How about a band of nationalistic or even just thrill-seeker, bandwagon hackers for hire? Second, it assumes clear lines of **command and control**. Sure, some hacker groups might be funded and assisted to a great degree by states. But ultimately, even cyber war theorists will admit that it is doubtful that states have complete control over their armies of hacker mercenaries. How will deterrence play out in this kind of scenario?

### CP

#### Text: The Executive Branch of the United States should require that all remotely piloted aircraft targeting entities in the area known as Pakistan have prior consent from the government of Pakistan.

#### Self-restraint solves and is more effective than the plan

Posner and Vermeule 10 (Eric A. Posner is the Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law @ the University of Chicago School of Law and Editor of the Journal of Legal Studies, Adrian Vermeule is a legal scholar, Oxford University Press, “The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic”, Google Books)

A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they ¶ involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in ¶ particular, those that involve self-binding.**74** Can a president bind himself to respect ¶particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is “yes, at least to the same ¶ extent that a legislature can.” Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds ¶ even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated**,** thereby establishing a new ¶ legal status quo.75 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to ¶ create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical ¶ sense**,** presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term ¶ project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own ¶future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules ¶or policies.

### K

#### The aff doesn’t provide real reform – continued crisis discourse allows a re-expansion of executive authority

Scheuerman 12 -- Professor of Political Science and West European Studies at Indiana University (William E., Summer 2012, "Emergencies, Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy," Law & Social Inquiry 37(3), EBSCO)

IV. REFORMISM'S LIMITS Bruce Ackerman, one of our country's most observant analysts of its clunky constitutional machinery, is similarly impatient with the "comforting notion that our heroic ancestors" created an ideal constitutional and political system (2010, 10). He even agrees that the US model increasingly seems to overlap with Schmitt's dreary vision of executive-centered plebiscitarianism motored by endless crises and emergencies (2010, 82). In sharp contrast to Posner and Vermeule, however, he not only worries deeply about this trend, but he also discards the unrealistic possibility that it might be successfully countered without recourse to legal and constitutional devices. Although Madison's original tripartite separation of powers is ill-adjusted to the realities of the modern administrative state, we need to reinvigorate both liberal legalism and checks and balances. Unless we can succeed in doing so, US citizens are likely to experience a "quantum leap in the presidency's destructive capacities" in the new century (2010, 119). Despite its alarmist tenor, for which he has been—in my view—unfairly criticized,'' Ackerman's position is grounded in a blunt acknowledgment of the comparative disadvantages of the US constitutional system. More clearly than any of the other authors discussed in this article, he breaks cleanly with the intellectual and constitutional provincialism that continues to plague so much legal and political science research on the United States. In part because as "late developers" they learned from institutional mistakes in the United States and elsewhere, more recently designed liberal democracies often do a better job than our Model T version at guaranteeing both policy effectiveness and the rule of law (2010, 120-22). Following the path-breaking work of his colleague Juan Linz, Ackerman offers a critical assessment of our presidential version of liberal democracy, where an independently elected executive regularly finds itself facing off against a potentially obstructionist Congress, which very well may seek to bury "one major presidential initiative after another" (2010, 5; see also Linz 1994). In the context of either real or imagined crises, executives facing strict temporal restraints (i.e., an upcoming election), while claiming to be the people's best protector against so-called special interests, will typically face widespread calls for swift (as well as legally dubious) action. "Crisis talk," in part endogenously generated by a flawed political system prone to gridlock rather than effective policy making, "prepares the ground for a grudging acceptance of presidential unilateralism" (2010, 6). Executives everywhere have much to gain from crisis scenarios. Yet incentives for declaring and perpetuating emergencies may be especially pronounced in our presidential system. The combination of temporal rigidity (i.e., fixed elections and terms of office) and "dual democratic legitimacy" (with both Congress and the president claiming to speak for "we the people") poses severe challenges to law-based government (Linz 1994). Criticizing US scholarship for remaining imprisoned in the anachronistic binary contrast of "US presidentialism vs. Westminster parliamentarism," Ackerman recommends that we pay closer attention to recent innovations achieved by what he describes as "constrained parliamentarism," basically a modified parliamentary system that circumvents the worst design mistakes of both Westminster parliamentarism and US presidentialism. As he has argued previously in a lengthy Harvard Law Review article, constrained parliamentarism—as found, for example, in recent democracies like Germany and Spain—locates law making in a Westminster-style popular assembly. But in contrast to the UK model, "legislative output is constrained by a higher lawmaking process" (2000, 666). The German Eederal Republic, for example, rests on a written constitution (e.g., the Basic Law) and has a powerful constitutional court. In Ackerman's view, constrained parliamentarism lacks many of the institutional components driving the growth of executive-dominated emergency govemment. Not surprisingly, he posits, it suffers to a reduced degree from many of the institutional pathologies plaguing US-style presidentialism. Ackerman argues that, in contrast, US-style presidential models have regularly collapsed elsewhere (e.g., in Latin and South American countries, where US-style presidentialism has been widely imitated [Linz and Valenzuela 1994]), devolving on occasion into unabated authoritarianism (2000, 646). Ackerman now seems genuinely concerned that a similar fate might soon befall its original version. Even if his most recent book repeats some earlier worries, he has now identified additional perils that he thinks deserve immediate attention. Not surprisingly, perhaps, his anxiety level has noticeably increased. Even Schmitt's unattractive vision of presidential authoritarianism appears "a little old-fashioned," given some ominous recent trends (2010, 82). To an extent unfathomable in Schmitt's day, the executive can exploit quasi-scientific polling data in order to gauge the public pulse. Presidents now employ a small but growing army of media gurus and consultants who allow them to craft their messages in astonishingly well-skilled—and potentially manipulative—ways. Especially during crisis moments, an overheated political environment can quickly play into the hands of a "White House propaganda machine generating a stream of sound bites" (2010, 33). Pundits and opinion makers already tend to blur the crucial divide between polling "numbers" and actual votes, with polls in both elite and popular consciousness tending not only to supplement but increasingly displace election results.'^ The decline of the print media and serious joumalism—about which Ackerman is understandably distressed—means that even the most fantastic views are taken seriously. Thus far, the Internet has failed to pick up the slack; it tends to polarize public opinion. Meanwhile, our primary system favors candidates who successfully appeal to an energized partisan base, meaning that those best able to exploit public opinion polling and the mass media, but out of sync with the median voter, generally gain the party nomination. Linz earlier pointed out that presidentialism favors political outsiders; Ackerman worries that in our emerging presidential model, the outsiders will tend to be extremists. Polling and media-savvy, charismatic, and relatively extreme figures will colonize the White House. In addition, the president's control over the massive administrative apparatus provides the executive with a daunting array of institutional weapons, while the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and Office of Counsel to the President offer hyperpoliticized sites from which distinctly executive-centered legal and constitutional views now are rapidly disseminated. Ackerman raises some tough questions for those who deem the OLC and related executive organs fundamentally sound institutions that somehow went haywire under David Addington and John Yoo. In his view, their excesses represent a logical result of basic structural trends currently transforming both the executive and political system as whole. OLC's partisan and sometimes quasi-authoritarian legal pronouncements are now being eagerly studied by law students and cited by federal courts (2010, 93). Notwithstanding an admirable tradition of executive deference to the Supreme Court, presidents are better positioned than ever to claim higher political legitimacy and neutralize political rivals. Backed by eager partisan followers, adept at the media game, and well armed with clever legal arguments constructed by some of the best lawyers in the country, prospective presidents may conceivably stop deferring to the Court (2010, 89). Ackerman's most unsettling amendment to his previous views is probably his discussion of the increasingly politicized character of the military—an administrative realm, by the way, ignored by other writers here, despite its huge role in modern US politics. Here again, the basic enigma is that the traditional eighteenth-century tripartite separation of powers meshes poorly with twenty-first-century trends: powerful military leaders can now regularly play different branches of govemment against one another in ways that undermine meaningful civilian oversight. Top officers possess far-reaching opportunities "to become an independent political force—allowing them to tip the balance of political support in one direction, then another," as the competing branches struggle for power (2010, 49). For Ackerman, the emergence of nationally prominent and media-savvy figures such as Colin Powell and David Petraeus, who at crucial junctures have communicated controversial policy positions to a broader public,'^ suggests that this long-standing structural flaw has recently gotten worse. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1996, for example, transformed the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from a mediator for the competing services into the military's principal—and hugely influential—spokesperson within the National Security Council (2010, 50). Not only does the military constitute a hugely significant segment of the administrative machinery, but it is now embodied—both in govemment and the public eye—in a single leader whose views carry tremendous weight. The fact that opinion surveys show that the officer corps is increasingly conservative in its partisan orientation, Ackerman notes, only adds to the dangers. Americans need not fear an imminent military putsch, along the lines that destroyed other presidential regimes elsewhere. Nonetheless, we would do well not to be "lulled into a false sense of security" (2010, 87). Having painted a foreboding portrait of institutional trends, Ackerman points to paths we might take to ward off the worst. In light of the obvious seriousness of the illness he has diagnosed, however, his antidotes tend to disappoint: he proposes that we treat cancer with some useful but limited home remedies. Like Shane, Ackerman wants to improve popular deliberation by reforming the mass media and institutionalizing "Deliberation Day" (2010, 125-40). Yet how such otherwise potentially appealing initiatives might counteract the symbiotic relationship between presidentialism and crisis government remains ambiguous. A modernized electoral college, for example, might simply engender executives better positioned to claim to stand in for "we the people" than their historical predecessors. Given Ackerman's own worries about plebiscitarianism, this reform might compound rather than alleviate our problems. More innovatively, Ackerman endorses the idea of a quasi-judicial check within the executive branch, a "Supreme Executive Tribunal" given the task of expeditiously determining the legality of proposed executive action, whose members would be appointed to staggered terms and subject to Senate confirmation. Forced to gain a seal of approval from jurists relatively insulated from sitting presidents, the executive tribunal would act more quickly than an ordinary court and thereby help put a "brake on the presidential dynamic before it can gather steam" (2010,143). Before the president could take the first political move and potentially alter the playing field, he or she might first have to clear the move with a body of legal experts, a requirement that presumably over time would work to undergird the executive branch's commitment to legality. The proposed tribunal could allow the president and Congress to resolve many of their standoffs more expeditiously than is typical today (2010, 146). Congressional representatives, for example, might rely on the tribunal to challenge executive signing statements. Existing exemptions for a significant number of major executive-level actors (e.g., the president's National Security Advisor) from Senate confirmation also need to be abandoned, while the military should promulgate a new Canon of Military Ethics, aimed at clarifying what civilian control means in contemporary real-life settings, in order to counteract its ongoing politicization. Goldwater-Nichols could be revised so as better to guarantee the subordination of military leaders to the Secretary of Defense (2010, 153-65). Ackerman also repeats his previous calls for creating an explicit legal framework for executive emergency action: Congress could temporarily grant the president broad discretionary emergency powers while maintaining effective authority to revoke them if the executive proved unable to gain ever more substantial support from the legislature (2010, 165-70; see also Ackerman 2006). Each of these suggestions demands more careful scrutiny than possible here. Nonetheless, even if many of them seem potentially useful, room for skepticism remains. Why, for example, would the proposed executive tribunal not become yet another site for potentially explosive standoffs between presidents and Congress? Might not highlevel political conflicts end up simply taking the forms of destructive (and misleadingly legalistic) duels? To the extent that one of the tribunal's goals is to decelerate executive decision making, its creation would perhaps leave our already sluggish and slow-moving political system even less able than at the present to deal with fast-paced challenges. Faced with time constraints and the need to gain popular support, executives might then feel even more pressed than at present to circumvent legality. As Ackerman knows, even as it presently operates, the Senate confirmation process is a mess. His proposal to extend its scope might simply end up reproducing at least some familiar problems. Last but not least, given the perils he so alarmingly describes, his proposed military reforms seem unsatisfying. Why not instead simply cut our bloated military apparatus and abandon US imperial pretensions? The obvious Achilles heel is that none of the proposals really deals head-on with what Ackerman himself conceives as the fundamental root of executive-centered government: an independently elected president strictly separated from legislative bodies with which he periodically clashes in potentially destructive ways. Despite Ackerman's ambition, his proposals do not provide structural reform: he concludes that US-based reformers should "take the independently elected presidency as a fixture" (2010, 124). Thus, presidential government is here to stay; reformers can also forget about significantly altering our flawed system of presidential primaries, activist government, and powerful military that intervenes frequently abroad (2010, 124). Given contemporary political developments, one can certainly appreciate why Ackerman is skeptical that the US system might finally be ripe for a productive institutional overhaul. Nonetheless, this just makes an already rather bleak book look even bleaker. His book's title. The Decline and Fall of the Arnerican Republic, is out of step with the somewhat upbeat reformist proposals detailed in its final chapters. Regretfully, the title better captures his core message. Only Ackerman's ultimately disturbing book both adeptly rejects the tendency among recent students of executive power to revert to constitutional nostalgia while forthrightly identifying the very real dangers posed by recent institutional trends. In an age of permanent or at least seemingly endless emergencies, where the very attempt to cleanly distinguish dire crises from "normal" political and social challenges becomes exceedingly difficult, the executive threatens to become an even more predominant— and potentially lawless—institutional player Unfortunately, US-style presidential democracy may be particularly vulnerable to this trend. Ackerman proves more successful than the other authors discussed here because he is best attuned to a rich body of comparative constitutional and political science scholarship that has raised legitimate doubts about the alleged virtues of US-style liberal democracy. Not surprisingly, some of his own reform ideas—for example, his proposed system of emergency law making—draw heavily on foreign examples, including Canada and new democracies such as South Africa. He convincingly argues that we might at least ameliorate the widespread tendency among presidents to manipulate crises for narrow partisan reasons, for example, by relying on the clever idea of a supermajoritarian escalator, which would require every legislative renewal of executive emergency authority to rest on ever more numerous supermajorities (2006). Ackerman is right to suggest that the United States needs to look abroad in order to improve our rather deficient system of emergency rule (Scheuerman 2006, 2008). Our system is broken; it is time to see what can be learned from others. Ackerman's latest book's overly cautious reformism thus seems especially peculiar in light of his own powerful and indeed enthusiastic defense of constrained parliamentarism, which he quite plausibly describes as potentially offering a superior approach to emergency government. The key point is not that we can be absolutely sure that the "grass is greener" in new democracies such as postwar Germany or post-Franco Spain; existing empirical evidence offers, frankly, a mixed picture. Contemporary Germany, for example, has certainly experienced its own fair share of emergency executive excesses (Frankenberg 2010). Scholars have criticized not only the empirical thesis that presidentialism and a strict separation of powers can help explain the substantial growth of executive discretion (Carolan 2009; Gross and Ni Aolain 2006), but also more farreaching assertions about their alleged structural disadvantages (Cheibub 2006). Still others argue that parliamentary regimes even of the "old type" (i.e., the UK Westminster model) have done relatively well in maintaining the rule of law during serious crises (Ewing and Gearty 2000; Bellamy 2007, 249-53). Unfortunately, we still lack wellconceived empirical studies comparing constrained parliamentarism with US-style presidentialism. Too much existing scholarship focuses on single countries, or relies on "foreign" cases but only in a highly selective and anecdotal fashion. Until we have more properly designed comparative studies, however, it seems inaccurate to assume a priori that core institutional features of US presidential democracy are well equipped to tackle the many challenges at hand. As I have tried to argue here, a great deal of initial evidence suggests that this simply is not the case. Admittedly, every variety of liberal democracy confronts structural tendencies favoring the augmentation of executive power: many of the social and economic roots (e.g., social acceleration) of executive-centered crisis govemment represent more-or-less universal phenomena, likely to rattle even well-designed constitutional systems. One can also easily imagine that in decades to come, extreme "natural" catastrophes— increasingly misnamed, because of their links to human-based climate change— justifying declarations of martial law or states of emergency will proliferate, providing novel possibilities for executives to expand their authority.^° So it would be naive to expect any easy constitutional or political-institutional fix. However, this sobering reality should not lead us to abandon creative institutional thinking. On the contrary, it arguably requires of us that we try to come up with new institutional models, distinct both from existing US-style presidentialism and parliamentarism, constrained or otherwise.

#### Causes global destruction

**Der Derian 98** (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori  argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

#### The alternative is to reject dominant security discourse – no one policy solves every problem – good theory now drives better policies later

Bruce 96 (Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### DA

#### Obama’s war powers maintain his presidential power

Rozell 12

[Mark Rozell is Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University, and is the author of Executive Privilege: Presidential Power, Secrecy and Accountability, From Idealism to Power: The Presidency in the Age of Obama, 2012,, <http://www.libertylawsite.org/book-review/from-idealism-to-power-the-presidency-in-the-age-of-obama/>]

And yet, as Jack Goldsmith accurately details in his latest book, President Barack Obama not only has not altered the course of controversial Bush-era practices, he has continued and expanded upon many of them. On initiating war, as a candidate for the presidency in 2007, Obama said that “the president doesn’t have the power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack,” yet that is exactly what he did in exercising the war power in Libya. He has also said that he will exercise the power to act on his own to initiate military action in Syria if it’s leader ever crosses the “red line” (i.e., use of chemical weapons). He has issued a number of signing statements that directly violate congressional intent. He has vastly expanded, far beyond Bush’s actions, the use of unconfirmed and unaccountable executive branch czars to coordinate policies and to make regulatory and spending decisions. The president has made expanded use of executive privilege in circumstances where there is no legal merit to making such a claim and he has abused the principle of the state secrets privilege. His use of the recess appointment power on many occasions has been nothing more than a blatant effort to make an end-run around the Senate confirmation process. He has continued, and expanded upon, the practice of militarily detaining persons without trial or pressing charges (on the condition that the detention is not “indefinite”). In a complete reversal of his past campaign rhetoric, the president on a number of occasions has declared his intention to act unilaterally on a variety of fronts, and to avoid having to go to Congress whenever he can do so. There are varied explanations for the president’s total reversals. The hard-core cynics of course simply resort to the “they all lie” explanation. Politicians of all stripes say things to get elected but don’t mean much of it. Recently I saw a political bumper sticker announcing “BUSH 2.0” with a picture of Obama. Many who enthusiastically supported Obama are profoundly disappointed with his full-on embrace of Bush-like unilateralism and this administration’s continuation of many of his predecessor’s policies. Goldsmith, a law professor who led the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel from October 2003 to June 2004, during George W. Bush’s first term, says that there were powerful forces at work in the U.S. governmental system that ensured that the president would continue many of the policies and practices of his predecessor. The president reads the daily terrorism threat reports, which has forced him to understand that things really do look differently from the inside. From this standpoint, Obama likely determined that many of Bush’s policies actually were correct and needed to be continued. “The personal responsibility of the president for national security, combined with the continuing reality of a frightening and difficult-to-detect threat, unsurprisingly led Obama, like Bush, to use the full arsenal of presidential tools,” writes Goldsmith. He further argues that Obama lacked leeway to change course in part because many of Bush’s policies “were irreversibly woven into the fabric of the national security architecture.” For example, former president Bush’s decision to use the Guantanamo detention facility created an issue for Obama that he otherwise never would have confronted. And the use of coercion on suspects made it too complicated to then employ civilian courts to try them. In perhaps the most telling example of the limits of effecting change, Obama could not end what Bush had started, even though the president issued an executive order (never carried out) to close the detention center. Here Goldsmith somewhat overstates his case. Obama was not necessarily consigned to following Bush’s policies and practices, although undoubtedly his options may have been constrained by past decisions. But consider the decision whether the government should have investigated and then taken action against illegal and unconstitutional acts by officials in the Bush Administration, particularly in the DOJ, NSA, and CIA. President Obama said it was time to look forward, not backward, thus sweeping all under the rug. Nothing “irreversibly woven” there, but rather the new president made a choice that he absolutely did not have to make. Finally, Goldsmith adds that Obama, like most of his predecessors, assumed the executive branch’s institutional perspective once he became president. If it is true about Washington that where you stand on executive powers depends on where you sit, then should it be any surprise that President Obama’s understanding differs fundamentally from Senator Obama’s? Honestly, I find that quite sad. Do the Constitution and principles of separation of powers and checks & balances mean so little that we excuse such a fundamental shift in thinking as entirely justified by switching offices? Goldsmith’s analysis becomes especially controversial when he turns to his argument that, contrary to the critiques of presidential power run amok, the contemporary chief executive is more hampered in his ability to act in the national interest than ever before. In 2002, Vice President Richard Cheney expressed the view that in his more than three decades of service in both the executive and legislative branches, he had witnessed a withering of presidential powers and prerogatives at the hands of an overly intrusive and aggressive Congress. At a time when most observers had declared a continuing shift toward presidential unilateralism and legislative fecklessness, Cheney said that something quite opposite had been taking place. Goldsmith is far more in the Cheney camp on this issue than of the critics of modern exercises of presidential powers. Goldsmith goes beyond the usual emphasis on formal institutional constraints on presidential powers to claim that a variety of additional forces also are weighing down and hampering the ability of the chief executive to act. As he explains, “the other two branches of government, aided by the press and civil society, pushed back against the Chief Executive like never before in our nation’s history”. Defenders of former president Bush decry what they now perceive as a double standard: critics who lambasted his over expansive exercises of powers don’t seem so critical of President Obama doing the same. Goldsmith makes the persuasive case that in part the answer is that Bush was rarely mindful of the need to explain his actions as necessities rather than allow critics to fuel suspicions that he acted opportunistically in crisis situations to aggrandize power, whereas Obama has given similar actions a “prettier wrapping”. Further, Obama, to be fair, on several fronts early in his first term “developed a reputation for restraint and commitment to the rule of law”, thus giving him some political leeway later on. A substantial portion of Goldsmith’s book presents in detail his case that various forces outside of government, and some within, are responsible for hamstringing the president in unprecedented fashion: Aggressive, often intrusive, journalism, that at times endangers national security; human rights and other advocacy groups, some domestic and other cross-national, teamed with big resources and talented, aggressive lawyers, using every legal category and technicality possible to complicate executive action; courts thrust into the mix, having to decide critical national security law controversies, even when the judges themselves have little direct knowledge or expertise on the topics brought before them; attorneys within the executive branch itself advising against actions based on often narrow legal interpretations and with little understanding of the broader implications of tying down the president with legalisms. Just as he describes how a seemingly once idealistic candidate for president as Barack Obama could see things differently from inside government, so too was Goldsmith at one time on the inside, and thus perhaps it is no surprise that he would perceive more strongly than other academic observers the forces that he believes are constantly hamstringing the executive. But he is no apologist for unfettered executive power and he takes to task those in the Bush years who boldly extolled theories of the unitary executive and thereby gave credibility to critics of the former president who said that his objective was not merely to protect the country from attack, but to empower himself and the executive branch. Goldsmith praises institutional and outside-of-government constraints on the executive as necessary and beneficial to the Republic. In the end, he sees the balance shifting in a different direction than many leading scholars of separation of powers. And unlike a good many presidency scholars and observers, he is not a cheerleader for a vastly powerful chief executive. Goldsmith’s work too is one of careful and fair-minded research and analysis. He gives substantial due to those who present a counter-view to his own, and who devote their skills and resources to battling what they perceive as abuses of executive power. Whereas they see dangers to an unfettered executive, Goldsmith wants us to feel safe that there are procedural safeguards against presidential overreaching, although he also wants us to be uncomfortable with what he believes now are intrusive constraints on the chief executive’s ability to protect the country. Goldsmith may be correct that there are more actors than ever involved in trying to trip up the president’s plans, but that does not mean that our chief executives are losing power and control due to these forces. Whether it is war and anti-terrorism powers, czars, recess appointments, state secrets privilege, executive privilege, signing statements, or any of a number of other vehicles of presidential power, our chief executives are using more and more means of overriding institutional and external checks on their powers. And by any measure, they are succeeding much more than the countervailing forces are limiting them.

#### Congressional statutes restricting executive war powers destroy broader presidential powers

Freeman 7 -- JD @ Yale Law School (Daniel J., 11/1/2007, "The Canons of War," Yale Law Journal 117(280), EBSCO)

Outside the confines of partisan absolutism, determining the scope of executive war power is a delicate balancing act. Contrasting constitutional prerogatives must be evaluated while integrating **framework statutes**, executive orders, and quasi-constitutional custom. The Supreme Court’s preferred abacus is the elegant three-part framework described by Justice Jackson in his concurrence to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.9 When the President and Congress act in concert, the action harnesses the power of both branches and is unlikely to violate the principle of separation of powers. When Congress has failed either to authorize or to deny authority, the action lurks in a “zone of twilight” of questionable power. **When the President and Congress act in opposition,** the President’s power is “at its lowest ebb,” and the action raises conspicuous concerns over the separation of powers.10 Therein lies the rub. Justice Jackson wrote soon after the tremendous growth of the executive during the New Deal and World War II, but the scope of legislation expanded dramatically in subsequent decades. Congress waged a counteroffensive in the campaign over interbranch supremacy by legislating extensively in the fields of foreign relations and war powers. Particularly in the post-Watergate era, Congress filled nearly every shadowy corner of the zone of twilight with its own imprimatur.11 That is not to say that Congress placed a relentless series of checks on the executive. Rather, Congress strove to establish ground rules, providing a limiting framework such as the War Powers Resolution12 for each effusive authorization like the Patriot Act.13 This leaves Jackson’s second category essentially a dead letter.14 **The most sensitive questions** concerning the **effective distribution of governmental powers** and the **range of permissible executive action are** thereforeproblems of statutory interpretation. The question becomes more complicated still when successive Congresses act in apparent opposition. While recent executives have consistently pushed to expand their authority,15 shifting patterns of political allegiance between Congress and the President yield a hodgepodge of mandates and restraints.16 Whether an action falls into Jackson’s first or third category requires one to parse the complete legislative scheme. This question is most pointed in connection with the execution of authorized war powers. Presidential power in this area is simultaneously subject to enormously broad delegations and exacting statutory limitations, torn between clashing constitutional values regarding the proper balance between branches. On one side lie **authorizations for the use of military force** (AUMFs), statutes empowering the President to “**introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities** or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated.”17 On the other side lie framework statutes, enactments **defining the** mechanisms and **boundaries of the execution of those war powers**. Nevertheless, when faced with a conflict between an authorization for the use of military force and a preexisting framework, the Supreme Court must determine the net authorization, synthesizing those statutes while effectuating the underlying constitutional, structural, and historical concerns.

#### Multiple scenarios for nuclear war

Yoo 06

[John, Law Professor at University of California, Berkeley and Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (OLC), during the George W. Bush administration, Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (OLC), during the George W. Bush administration, Energy in the Executive: Re-examining Presidential Power in the Midst of the War on Terrorism, 8/24/06, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/04/energy-in-the-executive-reexamining-presidential-power-in-the-midst-of-the-war-on-terrorism>]

Aside from bitter controversy over Vietnam, there appeared to be significant bipartisan consensus on the overall strategy of containment, as well as the overarching goal of defeating the Soviet Union. We did not win the four-decade Cold War by declarations of war. Rather, we prevailed through the steady presidential application of the strategy of containment, supported by congressional funding of the necessary military forces. On the other hand, congressional action has led to undesirable outcomes. Congress led us into two "bad" wars, the 1798 quasi-war with France and the War of 1812. Excessive congressional control can also prevent the U.S. from entering conflicts that are in the national interest. Most would agree that congressional isolationism before World War II harmed U.S. interests and that the United States and the world would have been far better off if President Franklin Roosevelt could have brought us into the conflict much earlier. Congressional participation does not automatically, or even consistently, produce desirable results in war decision-making. Critics of presidential war powers exaggerate the benefits of declarations or authorizations of war. What also often goes unexamined are the potential costs of congressional participation: delay, inflexibility, and lack of secrecy. Legislative deliberation may breed consensus in the best of cases, but it also may inhibit speed and decisiveness. In the post-Cold War era, the United States is confronting several major new threats to national security: **the proliferation of WMD**, **the emergence of rogue nations**, **and the rise of international terrorism**. Each of these threats may require pre-emptive action best undertaken by the President and approved by Congress only afterwards. Take the threat posed by the al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Terrorist attacks are more difficult to detect and prevent than those posed by conventional armed forces. Terrorists blend into civilian populations and use the channels of open societies to transport personnel, material, and money. Despite the fact that terrorists generally have no territory or regular armed forces from which to detect signs of an impending attack, weapons of mass destruction allow them to inflict devastation that once could have been achievable only by a nation-state. To defend itself from this threat, the United States may have to use force earlier and more often than was the norm during the time when nation-states generated the primary threats to American national security. In order to forestall a WMD attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike at a terrorist cell, **the executive branch needs flexibility to act quickly,** possibly in situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act on the intelligence. By acting earlier, perhaps before WMD components have been fully assembled or before an al-Qaeda operative has left for the United States, **the executive branch might also be able to engage in a more limited, more precisely targeted, use of force**. Similarly, the least dangerous way to prevent rogue nations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction may depend on secret intelligence gathering and covert action rather than open military intervention. Delay for a congressional debate could render useless any time-critical intelligence or windows of opportunity.

## Shariff

### Pakistan Economy Answers

**Their economy is strong and resilient and US cooperation high- newest evidence**

Desk ’13 (Web Desk, The Express Tribune, “Economic stability of Pakistan an encouraging sign: Olson”, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/491648/economic-stability-of-pakistan-an-encouraging-sign-olson>, January 9, 2013)

ISLAMABAD: US Ambassador to Pakistan Richard Olson in a meeting with finance minister Dr Abdul Hafeez Sheikh on Wednesday said that economic stability of Pakistan is an encouraging sign, Radio Pakistan reported. Dr Sheikh said that despite energy scarcity and security issue in the country‚ economic indicators are showing positive trends which reflect resilience of the economy. The Finance Minister added that due to economic policies of the government‚ Pakistan is currently witnessing the lowest inflation rate in the region and the Karachi Stock Exchange has emerged as the best performing Stock Exchange in the world. Both the sides reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing economic relations. Olson said that the United States is assisting Pakistan in many public welfare projects and will continue to do so in future to further cement the relations between the two people. The Ambassador said that the US values its relations with Pakistan and would continue to move forward in a number of mutually beneficial areas.

#### Loans solve econ collapse

AP 08 (10/4, Herald Tribune, “US$500 million loan to shore up Pakistan economy,” http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/04/business/AS-Pakistan-Economy.php

Pakistan's central bank says it has received a US$500 million loan from the Asian Development Bank to help shore up the country's ailing economy. Central bank spokesman Syed Wasimuddin said Saturday the money is the first installment of a US$1.5 billion loan designed to support economic development in Pakistan. The funds will top up Pakistan's foreign currency reserves and help restore some confidence in its sagging currency. Pakistan also faces high inflation and slowing growth. The United States, which counts Pakistan as a key ally in its war on terror, also is pledging more economic support. Pakistan is also seeking assistance from Saudi Arabia.

#### Doesn’t cause collapse

Mohan 5 (C. Raja, Strategic Affairs Editor – Indian Express and Member of the National Security Advisory Board – India, “What If Pakistan Fails? India Isn’t Worried…Yet”, Washington Quarterly, Winter, <http://www.twq.com/05winter/docs/05winter_mohan.pdf>)

Indian skepticism toward applying state-failure theory to Pakistan is rooted in the complex evolution of the triangular relationship among the United States, India, and Pakistan. Notwithstanding the historical baggage that surrounds India’s assessments of Pakistan, the Indian view that the Pakistani state is nowhere near collapsing has some merit. One of the problems with the theory of state failure lies in the fundamental difficulty of distinguishing between the range of problems that arise during the state-building process in postcolonial societies and the potential for actual state failure. A postcolonial nation’s inability to address general developmental goals it set for itself nearly five decades ago does not necessarily mean that it is approaching collapse. State failure of the kind in Somalia, for example, is nowhere near likely on the subcontinent. Across South Asia, civil societies, standing apart from the state, remain fairly strong. **Despite the current political turbulence, social cohesion endures thanks to the inherited structures of an old civilization**. Many states in South Asia, including Pakistan, have not fully measured up to popular expectations or presumed state responsibility in meeting the aspirations of the people. South Asia may have slipped into the unenviable position at the bottom of the list for a number of world social indicators. This does not necessarily imply, however, that failure is inevitable in all South Asian states. The collapse of the state might certainly be a possibility in Nepal, where the Maoist insurgency has gained control of a large swath of territory outside the Kathmandu Valley, which hosts the capital and the ruling elite, and threatens to overrun the old order. In Bangladesh as well, state failure seems a long-term possibility. There, an unbridled confrontation divides Dhaka between the two leading political parties, driven not only by irreconcilable personal animosity between their leaders but also numerous disputes, including one over the history of the state’s creation. These types of conflicts, however, are not characteristic of the Pakistani situation**. No serious and organized popular challenge to state authority exists in Pakistan, nor do people question the basis for the organization of the Pakistani state and its ideology**. The attempted car bombings against President Gen. Pervez Musharraf by Islamic extremist groups at the end of 2003 also do not suggest any impending failure of the Pakistani state. Although these groups might be motivated by ideology, they scarcely enjoy popular support. Political assassination, in any case, has long been a tradition in South Asia. Although it has often weakened states temporarily, it has rarely led to the collapse of state structures in the subcontinent. A primary feature of failing states is a fatal weakening of the central authority. Although India appreciates the many problems that Pakistan faces today, Indian leaders do not believe that the Pakistani state is in its terminal stages. On the contrary, many in India **point to the extraordinary strength of Pakistan’s army, which lies at the core of the Pakistani nation-state**. The army is capable of disciplining any particular section of society at any given moment. The expansion of its profile in national politics since Musharraf’s coup in 1999 has faced little resistance from the established political parties. Musharraf’s ability to exile the leader of the largest political party in Pakistan— Benazir Bhutto of the People’s Party of Pakistan—and to destroy the base of support of the next most popular political leader—Nawaz Sharif of the Muslim League—speaks volumes about the political dominance of the army and the rapid erosion of the two major political parties’ credibility.

### Link Turn

#### Plan link turns the advantage -- Pakistan loses deniability about drone strikes – crushes political capital

**Markey**, Council on Foreign Relations, 7-16-**13**

(Daniel, “A New Drone Deal For Pakistan,” accessed 7-30-13, <http://troubledkashmir.com/kashmir/?p=5370>,

Admittedly, this final compromise option would be painful for both Islamabad and Washington. Pakistani leaders would finally have to come clean to their people about authorizing drone strikes. That would eliminate even the thin veneer of deniability that past leaders have maintained to protect themselves from political fallout. It would also place Sharif's party firmly on the blacklists of the Pakistani Taliban and other targeted groups, which to date have enjoyed slightly more ambiguous relationships.

### India Defense

#### India growth high and resilient

Mishra 12/17/12 (Asit, Wall St Journal, "India’s economy poised to recover, says government," http://www.livemint.com/Politics/ZzgEmv958po9HI3JcVD8rI/Govt-lowers-growth-forecast-says-on-track-for-deficit.html)

While acknowledging the slow growth trends in the first half (H1) of the current fiscal, the mid-year review of the Indian economy claims: “There are, however, reasons to believe that the slowdown has bottomed out and the economy is headed towards higher growth in the second half (H2) of 2012-13.”¶ The report, which was presented in Parliament, follows a slowdown in economic growth to 5.3% in the quarter ended September from 5.5% in the preceding three months. Inflation is still above RBI’s comfort zone, while the elevated cost of money has forced companies to hold back on investments.¶ However, the review reasoned that a positive upturn in the Business Expectation Index in the October-December quarter, a higher Purchasing Managers’ Index in November, buoyancy in the capital market, improved internal accruals of the corporate sector in July-September and a resurgence of growth in the manufacturing sector suggest that the economy is poised for a moderate acceleration in H2.¶ It, therefore, concludes that the overall growth of gross domestic product (GDP) would be 5.7-5.9% for 2012-13, implying growth in H2 of the fiscal will be in the range of 6-6.4%. In H1 (April-September), growth averaged 5.4%. The economy grew 6.5% in the last fiscal.

#### Indian economic growth strong now – economists and markets are optimistic about 2013

Times of India 12/8/12 ("Indian economy may beat expectations in 2013: Goldman Sachs," http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Indian-economy-may-beat-expectations-in-2013-Goldman-Sachs/articleshow/17548362.cms)

NEW DELHI: India's GDP may exceed all expectations next year as there are signs that policymakers might spring up positive surprises, Goldman Sachs has said. ¶ "India in many ways remains the most complex of the four (BRIC nations), with its demographics giving it the best potential GDP growth rate, but its inability to introduce effective policy change is a persistent source of disappointment" leading international fund house Goldman Sachs Asset Management chairman Jim O'Neill said. ¶ "This being said, there are lots of policy changes being discussed and the Indian stock market seems to be quite excited about something. ¶ "We think 2013 Indian GDP will probably exceed expectations, as there are indeed signs that policymakers might also positively surprise," O'Neill said in a research note, but did not put any figures to his estimates.

#### Indian economy resilient

BBC10/25/08(BBC Monitoring South Asia Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. “PM says global crisis to lower Indian growth rate to 7-7.5 per cent.” Lexis.)

Beijing, 24 October: Two days after forecasting that the outlook for the Indian economy was "somewhat cloudy", Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Friday [24 October] said the global economic crisis would slow down the nation's growth to 7 to 7.5 per cent this fiscal. "India's economy is sound and is likely to grow at 7 to 7.5 per cent," Singh told an august gathering of world leaders here at the opening of the 7th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) meeting Friday. On Wednesday, in the Japanese capital, Tokyo, 76-year-old Singh, the economist-turned-politician, had said that the short-term outlook for the Indian economy was somewhat cloudy. "The short-term outlook is somewhat cloudy but I am confident that the Indian economy has the resilience to sustain its growth momentum in the medium run," he had said. "We hope to build on India's many inherent strengths as an emerging market economy that is now ready for rapid and sustained growth. Over the past four years, we have averaged nine percent G.D.P. growth per year. "It looks like slowing down in the current year because of conditions in the global economy. But, once normalcy returns, we can and we are determined to regain the nine per cent growth trajectory," Singh had said. The prime minister had also assured foreign investors that India has taken several measures recently to ensure adequate liquidity and confidence in the financial system. "The fundamentals of Indian economy have been and continue to be strong. Our banking system is well capitalised. But, we have experienced a shrinking of liquidity and we are responding by injecting additional liquidity to ensure that the rhythm of economic activity is not disrupted."The Reserve Bank of India stands ready to respond quickly to address the emerging needs of our economy," the prime minister had said in Tokyo

### No Econ War

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425)]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

#### No escalation

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

## Stability

### Stability High Now – 1nc

#### Stability high

Deford 13 (Mac, GlobalPost, "Sharif’s election gives US an opening to help stabilize Pakistan," http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/commentary/sharif-s-election-gives-us-opening-help-stabilize-pakistan)

OWL’S HEAD, Maine — There's not much good news coming out of the broader Middle East these days and so the successful election this past weekend in Pakistan is cause for at least muted elation. It is, after all, the first time in Pakistan's beleaguered 65-year history that a democratically elected government has been replaced by a democratically elected government.¶ So that's the good news. Toss in the fact that the voter turnout, the highest for parliamentary elections in nearly two generations, was spurred upward by women and younger voters, and was not deterred by Taliban attacks, then add that Pakistan does have a remarkably free press and a quite independent judiciary and, obviously, a military that now is willing to let democracy play out — and things don't look so bad.¶ Pakistan's support of extremist groups like the Taliban, and its high-level decision to keep Osama bin Laden hidden in plain sight, are the clearest evidence of Pakistan perversity.¶ Pakistan-US relations were so low last year that an article in the establishment journal Foreign Affairs suggested that the US should treat Pakistan the same way it treats other "hostile powers," such as Iran and North Korea.¶ As has been well documented, Dick Holbrooke, handpicked by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to oversee the Afghan-Pakistan theatre, got no support from the president for the two years he was in the role, until his death at the end of 2010.¶ A key part of the problem has been Obama's apparent belief — or at least the belief of his advisors — that Pakistan is a client state, that it needs us more than we need them.¶ A failed Pakistan or one infiltrated by the Taliban or other extremists could cause dangerous problems for the US. At the end of next year, we'll be pulling our last fighting forces out of Afghanistan. But it's never really been about Afghanistan. Pakistan is the key. Has the White House finally learned that?¶ The Arab Middle East faces decades of collapsing regimes, civil wars and even re-drawn borders. Obama's hands-off reaction to the most dangerous current aspect of the failed Arab Spring, Syria's bloody civil war, illustrates not just our relative retreat from our role as the world's night-watchman but as well a realistic assessment of the diminishing importance of the Middle East. And while Israel's concerns about a nuclear-armed Iran — and indeed Saudi Arabia's and its Gulf neighbors as well — may yet explode the area, the most dangerous region in today's world is Pakistan and its environs.¶ For starters, Pakistan has a couple hundred nuclear weapons. It has the Taliban, an insurgency movement that it mid-wifed and returned to haunt it. Strategically, Pakistan is the center of a complex web of relationships that entangle half the world's population.¶ The US sees China as a down-the-road threat to our primacy in Asia. India and China, the world's two most populous countries, have long been rivals, not so much because of their border clashes in the high Himalayas as their regional strategic ambitions.¶ As it moved out of its non-aligned leadership role, India aligned itself more closely with the US. China has long courted close relations with Pakistan, which has been reciprocated as an obvious way for both to counter India's pre-eminent position in the sub-continent.¶ Afghanistan only came into US purview through al-Qaeda and 9/11. But Pakistan has long exercised influence in Afghanistan, where the populous Punjab was arbitrarily split between the two by the Durand Line drawn up by the British colonial enterprise. India, naturally, has numerous consulates throughout Afghanistan for the primary purpose of offsetting Pakistan's influence.¶ The Taliban and nuclear weapons have created a potentially high stakes situation. A failed state, or just a couple of nuclear bombs in the wrong hands, would prompt a somewhat different response from the Obama administration than the understandable waffling on how to deal with Syria's chemical weapons.¶ So, as Nawaz Sharif takes control of Pakistan for the third time, what can the US hope for? And, more importantly, how can the US work with Sharif to reinforce Pakistan's stability? What must Obama do to keep Pakistan out of the "lost" column?¶ The good news is that Sharif, although a religious conservative and a two-time recipient of a military overthrow, is a sophisticated businessman who understands capitalism. He wants to improve relations with India; he wants to help the US negotiate a deal with the Afghan Taliban that would facilitate a peaceful US departure.¶ Pakistan has enormous economic problems: its infrastructure has been unable to keep pace with its rapid population growth; in the larger cities, electricity is cut 12 hours or more each day. Its education system is so weak that millions of Pakistani children end up at religious madrasas, often being taught extremist Islamism.¶ Sharif understands the economic problems that were as much as anything responsible for the overwhelming defeat of current Prime Minister Zardari's party. Sharif knows that for his party to remain in power, economic growth is essential.¶ He's realistic when it comes to India, hoping, as he did the last time he was prime minister, to improve relations. Indeed, he's invited his Indian counterpart to his inauguration. Better relations with India not only lower the overall military decibels but enhanced trade could provide a big boost to that economic bounce Sharif needs.

### Drones Solve Stability

#### Drones key to stability

Raja 11 (Raza Habib, Economist at a leading development finance institution, Huff Post, "The Case for Drones," <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raza-habib-raja/the-case-for-drones_b_897428.html>)

Is the sovereignty really violated? The answer is a tricky one because in purely theoretical terms perhaps it is. But realistically it is not violated because the areas where drones are aimed do not have the effective writ of the Pakistani state. In real terms sovereignty is not there in the first place because if it was there those areas would not have become open sanctuaries for the militants. Sovereignty is underpinned by state's monopoly over physical violence and virtual absence of state in a state syndrome. And those areas depict failure when measured against these yardsticks.¶ Over the years the Pakistani establishment and a series of governments have literally watched helplessly as militants use those safe sanctuaries to promote terrorism in the mainland. If anything, the actual violation of sovereignty is being carried out by the militants rather than the drones which are aimed at eliminating them! Realistically speaking drones are helping the Pakistani state to establish sovereignty. Of course due to the widespread anti-American sentiments, which are continuously whipped up by the mainstream media, it is impossible for a large number of urban middle class to understand it. Over the years, the urban population has developed a knee jerk reaction where anything connected with the US always ends up provoking hyper emotions which in turn makes it impossible to have rational deliberation.

### Pak Stability

#### No impact to Pakistan instability- their ev is hype

**Hundley ’12** (Before joining the Pulitzer Center, Tom Hundley was a newspaper journalist for 36 years, including nearly two decades as a foreign correspondent for the Chicago Tribune. During that time he served as the Tribune’s bureau chief in Jerusalem, Warsaw, Rome and London, reporting from more than 60 countries. He has covered three wars in the Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rise of Iran’s post-revolutionary theocracy. His work has won numerous journalism awards. He has taught at the American University in Dubai and at Dominican University in River Forest, Illinois. He has also been a Middle East correspondent for GlobalPost and a contributing writer for the Chicago News Cooperative. Tom graduated from Georgetown University and holds a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania. He was also National Endowment for the Humanities journalism fellow at the University of Michigan. Published September 5, 2012

With both sides armed to the teeth, **it is easy to exaggerate the fears** and much harder to pinpoint where the real dangers lie. For the United States, the nightmare scenario is that some of Pakistan's warheads or its fissile material falls into the hands of the Taliban or al Qaeda -- or, worse, that the whole country falls into the hands of the Taliban. For example, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA officer now at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, has warned of the "lethal proximity between terrorists, extremists, and nuclear weapons insiders" in Pakistan. This is a reality, but on the whole, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal appears to be reasonably secure against internal threats, according to those who know the country best. To **outsiders**, Pakistan **appears** to be permanently teetering on the **brink** of collapse. The fact that large swaths of the country are literally beyond the control of the central government is not reassuring. But a weak state **does not mean** a **weak society**, and **powerful internal dynamics based** largely on kinship and tribe **make it highly unlikely** that Pakistan would **ever fall** under the control of an outfit like the Taliban. During the country's intermittent bouts of democracy, its civilian leaders have been consistently incompetent and corrupt, but **even in the worst of times,** the military has maintained a high standard of professionalism. And there is **nothing** that **matters more** to the Pakistani military than keeping the nuclear arsenal -- **its crown jewels** -- out of the hands of India, the United States, and homegrown extremists. "Pakistan struggled to acquire these weapons against the wishes of the world. Our nuclear capability comes as a result of great sacrifice. It is our most precious and powerful weapon -- for our defense, our security, and our political prestige," Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani lieutenant general, told me. "We keep them safe." Pakistan's nuclear security is in the responsibility of the Strategic Plans Division**,** which appears to function pretty much as **a separate branch** of the military. It has its **own training facility and an elaborate set of controls** and screening proceduresto keep track of **all warheads and fissile material** and to monitor **any blips** in the behavior patterns of its personnel. The 15 or so sites where weapons are stored **are the mostly heavily guarded** in the country. **Even if** some group managed to steal or commandeer a weapon, **it is highly unlikely the group would be able to use it**. The greater danger is the theft of fissile material, which could be used to make a crude bomb. "With 70 to 80 kilos of highly enriched uranium, it would be fairly easy to make one in the basement of a building in the city of your choice," said Pervez Hoodbhoy, a distinguished nuclear physicist at Islamabad's Quaid-i-Azam University. At the moment, Pakistan has a stockpile of about 2.75 tons -- or some 30 bombs' worth -- of highly enriched uranium. It does not tell Americans where it is stored. "All nuclear countries are conscious of the risks, nuclear weapons states especially so," said Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, who speaks with the been-there-done-that authority of a man who has served as both chairman of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and head of the ISI, its controversial spy agency. "Of course there are concerns. Some are genuine, butmuch of what you read in the U.S. media is **irrational and reflective of paranoia**. Rising radicalism in Pakistan? Yes, this is true, and the military is very conscious of this." Perhaps **the most credible endorsement** of Pakistan's nuclear security regime comes from its **most steadfast enemy.** The **consensus among India's top generals and defense experts** is that Pakistan's nukes are pretty secure. "No one can be 100 percent secure, but I think they are **more than 99 percent secure**," said Shashindra Tyagi, a former chief of staff of the Indian Air Force. "They keep a very close watch on personnel. All of the steps that could be taken have been taken. This business of the Taliban taking over -- it can't be ruled out, but I think **it's unlikely**. **The** Pakistani **military understands the threats** they face better than anyone, **and** they **are smart enough to take care it."** Yogesh Joshi, an analyst at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, agrees: "Different states have different perceptions of risk. The U.S. has contingency plans [to secure Pakistan's nukes] because its nightmare scenario is that Pakistan's weapons fall into terrorist hands. The view from India over the years is that **Pakistan,** probably **more than any other nuclear** weapons **state, has taken measures to secure its weapons.** At the political level here, there's a lot of confidence that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are secure."

### Low Risk of Nuclear War

#### No nuclear instability

Bloomberg 13 ("What Pakistan Needs Most from the U.S.," http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-01/what-pakistan-needs-most-from-the-u-s-.html)

Nevertheless, Pakistan poses a crucial challenge. The country will soon have the world’s fifth-largest population, and its army is already the seventh-largest. Its huge nuclear arsenal is growing, and it has, in India, a nuclear-armed archenemy. The chances of a nuclear weapon falling into the hands of a terrorist group or of an outright nuclear war breaking out may be small -- but they are greater in Pakistan than anywhere else.

### Afghan Stability

#### No Afghan impact

**Silverman ‘9 -** PhD in international relations-government and, as a Ford Foundation Project Specialist (11/19/09, Jerry Mark, The National Interest, “Sturdy Dominoes,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22512)

Many advocates of continuing or racheting up our presence in Afghanistan are cut from the same domino-theory cloth as those of the Vietnam era. They posit that losing in Afghanistan would almost certainly lead to the further "loss" of the entire South and central Asian region. Although avoiding explicit reference to "falling dominos," recent examples include S. Frederick Starr [3] (School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University); Sir David Richards [4] (the UK's relatively new Chief of the General Staff); and, in The National Interest, Ahmed Rashid [5]. The fear that Pakistan and central Asian governments are too weak to withstand the Taliban leads logically to the proposition-just as it did forty years ago-that only the United States can defend the region from its own extremist groups and, therefore, that any loss of faith in America will result in a net gain for pan-Islamist movements in a zero-sum global competition for power. Unfortunately, the resurrection of "falling dominos" as a metaphor for predicted consequences of an American military withdrawal reflects a profound inability to re-envision the nature of today's global political environment and America's place in it. The current worry is that Pakistan will revive support for the Taliban [6] and return to its historically rooted policy of noninterference in local governance or security arrangements along the frontier. This fear is compounded by a vision of radical Islamists gaining access to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Those concerns are fueled by the judgment that Pakistan's new democratically elected civilian government is too weak to withstand pressures by its most senior military officers to keep its pro-Afghan Taliban option open. From that perspective, any sign of American "dithering" would reinforce that historically-rooted preference, even as the imperative would remain to separate the Pakistani-Taliban from the Afghan insurgents. Further, any significant increase in terrorist violence, especially within major Pakistani urban centers, would likely lead to the imposition of martial law and return to an authoritarian military regime, weakening American influence even further. At its most extreme, that scenario ends with the most frightening outcome of all-the overthrow of relatively secular senior Pakistani generals by a pro-Islamist and anti-Western group of second-tier officers with access to that country's nuclear weapons. Beyond Pakistan, advocates of today's domino theory point to the Taliban's links to both the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union, and conclude that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would encourage similar radical Islamist movements in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In the face of a scenario of increasing radicalization along Russia's relatively new, southern borders, domino theorists argue that a NATO retreat from Afghanistan would spur the projection of its own military and political power into the resulting "vacuum" there. The primary problem with the worst-case scenarios predicted by the domino theorists is that no analyst is really prescient enough to accurately predict how decisions made by the United States today will affect future outcomes in the South and central Asian region. Their forecasts might occur whether or not the United States withdraws or, alternatively, increases its forces in Afghanistan. Worse, it is entirely possible that the most dreaded consequences will occur only as the result of a decision to stay. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the earlier domino theory falsely represented interstate and domestic political realities throughout most of Southeast Asia in 1975. Although it is true that American influence throughout much of Southeast Asia suffered for a few years following Communist victories in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, we now know that while we viewed the Vietnam War as part of a larger conflict, our opponent's focus was limited to the unification of their own country. Although border disputes erupted between Vietnam and Cambodia, China and the Philippines, actual military conflicts occurred only between the supposedly fraternal Communist governments of Vietnam, China and Cambodia. Neither of the two competing Communist regimes in Cambodia survived. Further, **no serious threats** to install Communist regimes **were initiated outside** of Indochina, and, most importantly, the current political situation in Southeast Asia now conforms closely to what Washington had hoped to achieve in the first place [7]. It is, of course, unfortunate that the transition from military conflict in Vietnam to the welcome situation in Southeast Asia today was initially violent, messy, bloody, and fraught with revenge and violations of human rights. But as the perpetrators, magnitude, and victims of violence changed, the level of violence eventually declined. This time around, there are at least two questionable assumptions underlying the resurrection of the domino theory. First, the Taliban is no longer the unified group that emerged during 1994. Instead, the term "Taliban" is applied to several groups engaged in the current insurgency against the Karzai government and NATO forces. Those groups collaborate through a complex set of shifting alliances that extend across the disputed Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Second, given that local Taliban have demonstrated their capacity to effectively engage NATO forces without the equivalent of NATO military and civilian trainers or logistical support, other indigenous groups opposed to the Taliban and/or al-Qaeda are also **likely to be stronger than domino theorists assume and are likely to proactively defend themselves** against radical Islamists once we are no longer there to do it for them. A retrospective view of America's involvement in Vietnam and its ultimate consequences for U.S. interests reinforces the aphorism that all politics are local. **That truism seems lost on American foreign-policy decision makers who tend to see international threats in global rather than local terms**. Further, the danger remains that the metaphor of falling dominos might resonate with governments in the region that face their own increasingly radical domestic opposition. Our fears of regional collapse might also speak to Russian and Chinese policy makers fearful of potentially greater instability along their borders. But such regional threats, even if they do arise, **do not threaten** the **core national interests** of the United States-the substantially exaggerated fears of terrorist "safe-havens" notwithstanding. Those worries simply do not justify the overwhelmingly disproportionate and financially ruinous military **response** that has characterized our involvement there. The "fall of dominos" is no more inevitable in South and central Asia now than it was in Southeast Asia more than a half century ago. True, the earlier circumstances in Vietnam and Southeast Asia are not, in most respects, similar to the current situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the remainder of South and central Asia. Nonetheless, the emphasis in both cases on external interstate threats-rather than on autonomous non-state actors-has been a mistake because it does not reflect the actual source of most violent conflicts since the 1960s. In an exponentially complex world characterized by multiple actors, the domino **theory does not help predict the future** course of political relations in the region-nor would any other simplistic metaphor. Despite the view that the alliance between various Taliban and al-Qaeda factions is both strategic and long-term, a consensus is forming that most Taliban groups are either nationalists who want to seize formal authority within recognized sovereign-states, or more localized groups that merely want to be left alone by any pretenders to centralized state-authority. Perversely, the desire of nationalist Taliban to seize sovereign-state power represents an acceptance of a largely secular European system of interstate relations. In that conversion will likely be found the seeds of their eventual undoing-as local community-based groups continue to oppose any attempts, whether sponsored by Americans or Islamic radicals, to establish centralized state authority there.

### Central Asia War

**Powers will cooperate - contains the impact - empirically proven**

**Collins and Wohlforth 4** (Kathleen, Professor of Political Science – Notre Dame and William, Professor of Government – Dartmouth, “Defying ‘Great Game’ Expectations”, Strategic Asia 2003-4: Fragility and Crisis, p. 312-313)

Conclusion **The** popular **great game lens** for analyzing Central Asia **fails to capture the** declared **interests of the great powers** aswell as the best reading of their objective interests **in security and** economic **growth**. Perhaps more importantly**, it fails to explain their actual behavior** on the ground, as well the specific reactions of the Central Asian states themselves**. Naturally, there are competitive elements** in great power relations. Each country’s policymaking community has slightly different preferences for tackling the challenges presented in the region, and the more influence they have the more able they are to shape events in concordance with those preferences. **But** these **clashing preferences concern the means to serve ends** that **all the** great **powers share.** To be sure, policy-makers in each capital would prefer that their own national firms or their own government’s budget be the beneficiaries of any economic rents that emerge from the exploitation and transshipment of the region’s natural resources. But the scale of these rents is marginal even for Russia’s oil-fueled budget. And for taxable profits to be created, the projects must make sense economically—something that is determined more by markets and firms than governments. Does it matter? The great game is an arresting metaphor that serves to draw people’s attention to an oft-neglected region. The problem is the great-game lens can distort realities on the ground, and therefore bias analysis and policy. For when great powers are locked in a competitive fight, the issues at hand matter less than their implication for the relative power of contending states. Power itself becomes the issue—one that tends to be nonnegotiable. Viewing an essential positive-sum relationship through zero sum conceptual lenses will result in missed opportunities for cooperation that leaves all players—not least the people who live in the region—poorer and more insecure. While cautious realism must remain the watchword concerning an impoverished and potentially unstable region comprised of fragile and authoritarian states, our analysis yields at least conditional and relative optimism**. Given** the confluence of **their** chief strategic **interests, the major powers** are in a better position to **serve as a stabilizing force than analogies to the Great Game** or the Cold War would suggest. It is important to stress that **the region’s response to the profoundly destabilizing shock of** coordinated **terror attacks was increased cooperation** between local governments and China and Russia, and—multipolar rhetoric notwithstanding—between both of them and the United States. If this trend is nurtured and if the initial signals about potential SCO-CSTO-NATO cooperation are pursued, **another destabilizing shock might generate more rather than less cooperation** among the major powers. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan [The Stans] are clearly on a trajectory that portends longer-term cooperation with each of the great powers. As military and economic security interests become more entwined, there are sound reasons to conclude that “great game” politics will not shape Central Asia’s future in the same competitive and destabilizing way as they have controlled its past. To the contrary, mutual interests in Central Asia may reinforce the broader positive developments in the great powers’ relations that have taken place since September 11, as well as reinforce regional and domestic stability in Central Asia.

**No Central Asian impact**

**Reuters 11** (“Riches, Fear Ensure Central Asia Stability,” Feb 9th, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/riches-fear-ensure-central-asia-stability/430628.html>,

ALMATY, Kazakhstan — **Central Asia’s authoritarian leaders, having crushed dissent during decades in power, are likely to use a mixture of oil** and gas **revenues, repression and cosmetic reforms to meet any threat of** Egyptian-style **protests.**  **Few** in the strategic region, which covers an area twice the size of Saudi Arabia, **expect their entrenched** and aging **leaders to succumb to** the wave of **public anger sweeping** parts of **the Arab world.**  However, in a region riven by ethnic tensions and poverty, where one country — Kyrgyzstan — has twice overthrown a president, authorities would be remiss in ignoring this warning, political analysts and opposition politicians say. “The most important lesson? Don’t take your country to the brink,” said Mukhiddin Kabiri, chairman of the opposition Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan. **Authoritarian presidents rule four of the five** ex-Soviet **states in Central Asia**, a resource-rich and majority Muslim region, which serves as a key supply conduit for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. **Kazakhstan** holds slightly more than 3 percent of the world’s recoverable oil reserves, while the world’s fourth-largest reserves of natural gas lie under the desert of Turkmenistan. These **resources generate prosperity.** Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy, boasts per capita gross domestic product of more than $9,000, four times that of Egypt. **In** Ashgabat, capital of **Turkmenistan, low utility bills help appease a population** in a country where **political dissent is not tolerated**. “We have free gas, water and lighting,” said Aibibi, 34, a bookseller in an Ashgabat market. Inflation remains a region-wide threat. Unrest in Kyrgyzstan led to a colossal 19.2 percent surge in prices last year, while in Kazakhstan food prices rose 3 percent in January alone. Turkmen pensioner Gulsenem, 57, said, “To cook with our free gas, we also need meat — and that’s becoming more expensive.” The riches of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan can be spread among relatively small populations, but Uzbekistan, a top-10 world gold miner and major cotton exporter, is home to 28 million people. State figures portray a robust economy and the International Monetary Fund forecast 8 percent GDP growth in 2010. However, perhaps nowhere in Central Asia are fear and repression more apparent. President Islam Karimov, 73, says tough measures are needed to curb the threat of Islamist militancy. Human rights activists speak of religious persecution and torture. Mukhammad Salikh, 61, stood against Karimov in a 1991 election. He now lives in exile in Norway. “The danger of a social explosion has not only existed for the last 20 years. It has grown bigger with every year,” Salikh said in a recent interview with Ferghana News Agency, a private, Russian-language agency covering Central Asian affairs. Could an “explosion” take place in Uzbekistan, immune to Western criticism of its rights record, where state television is strictly controlled and a mainly rural population has limited access to the Internet? United Nations data show 36 percent of Uzbekistan’s population is urbanized, compared with 43 percent in Egypt. In Tunisia, whose president was ousted in a popular uprising in January, the figure is 67 percent. **Fear is a strong deterrent to would-be demonstrators. Uzbek government troops shot into crowds** that took to the streets of Andijan in 2005. Witnesses say hundreds were killed. In Tajikistan, protests in Dushanbe in 1992 lit the fuse for a five-year civil war in which tens of thousands of **people** were killed. Taxi driver Turakul, 55, **would rather swallow** his **discontent** with President Emomali Rakhmon **than risk a repetition.** “I’ll never go out on the streets,” he said. “I have food on the table and my four sons work in Russia. We’ll tolerate this as long as we have our small wages.”

### 1NC Terror

#### No impact to terror

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

It seems increasingly likely that the official and popular reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been substantially deluded—massively disproportionate to the threat that al-Qaida has ever actually presented either as an international menace or as an inspiration or model to homegrown amateurs. Applying the extensive datasets on terrorism that have been generated over the last decades, we conclude that the chances of an American perishing at the hands of a terrorist at present rates is one in 3.5 million per year—well within the range of what risk analysts hold to be “acceptable risk.”40 Yet, despite the importance of responsibly communicating risk and despite the costs of irresponsible fearmongering, just about the only official who has ever openly put the threat presented by terrorism in some sort of context is New York’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who in 2007 pointed out that people should “get a life” and that they have a greater chance of being hit by lightning than of being a victim of terrorism—an observation that may be a bit off the mark but is roughly accurate.41 (It might be noted that, despite this unorthodox outburst, Bloomberg still managed to be re-elected two years later.) Indeed, much of the reaction to the September 11 attacks calls to mind Hans Christian Andersen’s fable of delusion, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” in which con artists convince the emperor’s court that they can weave stuffs of the most beautiful colors and elaborate patterns from the delicate silk and purest gold thread they are given. These stuffs, they further convincingly explain, have the property of remaining invisible to anyone who is unusually stupid or unfit for office. The emperor finds this quite appealing because not only will he have splendid new clothes, but he will be able to discover which of his officials are unfit for their posts—or in today’s terms, have lost their effectiveness. His courtiers, then, have great professional incentive to proclaim the stuffs on the loom to be absolutely magnificent even while mentally justifying this conclusion with the equivalent of “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Unlike the emperor’s new clothes, terrorism does of course exist. Much of the reaction to the threat, however, has a distinctly delusionary quality. In Carle’s view, for example, the CIA has been “spinning in self-referential circles” in which “our premises were flawed, our facts used to fit our premises, our premises determined, and our fears justified our operational actions, in a self-contained process that arrived at a conclusion dramatically at odds with the facts.” The process “projected evil actions where there was, more often, muddled indirect and unavoidable complicity, or not much at all.” These “delusional ratiocinations,” he further observes, “were all sincerely, ardently held to have constituted a rigorous, rational process to identify terrorist threats” in which “the avalanche of reporting confirms its validity by its quantity,” in which there is a tendency to “reject incongruous or contradictory facts as erroneous, because they do not conform to accepted reality,” and in which potential dissenters are not-so-subtly reminded of career dangers: “Say what you want at meetings. It’s your decision. But you are doing yourself no favors.”42 Consider in this context the alarming and profoundly imaginary estimates of U.S. intelligence agencies in the year after the September 11 attacks that the number of trained al-Qaida operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000.43 Terrorist cells, they told reporters, were “embedded in most U.S. cities with sizable Islamic communities,” usually in the “run-down sections,” and were “up and active” because electronic intercepts had found some of them to be “talking to each other.”44 Another account relayed the view of “experts” that Osama bin Laden was ready to unleash an “11,000 strong terrorist army” operating in more than sixty countries “controlled by a Mr. Big who is based in Europe,” but that intelligence had “no idea where thousands of these men are.”45 Similarly, FBI Director Robert Mueller assured the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 11, 2003, that, although his agency had yet to identify even one al-Qaida cell in the United States, “I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing,” a sentence rendered in bold lettering in his prepared text. Moreover, he claimed that such unidentified entities presented “the greatest threat,” had “developed a support infrastructure” in the country, and had achieved both the “ability” and the “intent” to inflict “signi ficant casualties in the US with little warning.”46 Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.

### 1NC Indo-Pak War

#### -- No India/Pakistan war –Deterrence

Giorgio et al 10 (Maia Juel, Tina Søndergaard Madsen, Jakob Wigersma, Mark Westh, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An Assessment of Deterrence and Stability in the Indian – Pakistan Conflict,” Global Studies, Autumn, http://dspace.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/6041/1/Project%20GS-BA%2c%20Autumn%202010.pdf)

To what extent has nuclear deterrence enhanced stability in the India-Pakistan conflict? Recalling the logical structure of the paper, we here wish to reconcile the three analyses and offer a coherent synthesis of the results in relation to the research question. In order to gather the threads it is beneficial to shortly reflect upon the main results of the three analyses. Firstly, the aim with the thesis was to explore if there is nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, based upon Waltz three requirements. After having undertaken this analysis, we can conclude that Waltz’s requirements for effective nuclear deterrence are in fact fulfilled in both countries. Thus, from a neorealist perspective, is it then possible to deduce that stability reigns between India and Pakistan as a result of nuclear deterrence? Taking a point of departure in neorealist assumptions and nuclear deterrence theory, there is indeed stability between India and Pakistan, as no major war has taken place between the countries, and more importantly, nuclear war has been avoided. Nuclear deterrence has thus been successful in creating stability on a higher structural level.

### Pak Terror

**No terror internal link**

**Chaudhary ’11** (India faces chronic low-grade terror threat, but Pakistan relationship is safe Posted By Ian Bremmer Wednesday, September 14, 2011 - 4:45 PM Share By Shamila N. Chaudhary Shamila N. Chaudhary is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Asia practice.

The Sept. 7 bombing of the Delhi High Court that killed 13 underscores the ever-present security threat from militants in India's major cities. But while relatively small attacks are likely to be a fact of life for the foreseeable future, **they do not fundamentally change the security picture.** The opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is, however, likely to ramp up its criticism of the Congress government. More importantly, the attacks **will not cause a strategic shift in the Indian government's relationship** with Pakistan, despite the claims of responsibility from radical Islamist groups with connections to Pakistan. It's still unclear who is responsible for the attack. A member of the Pakistan and Bangladesh based Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) terror group purportedly sent an email claiming responsibility for the blast. But another email on Sept. 8 claimed responsibility for the Indian Mujahideen (IM), the main suspect in the July 13 bombings in Mumbai. HuJI's email claimed the purpose of the attack was to coerce the Indian government into commuting the death sentence of Afzal Guru, convicted of conspiracy in the 2001 attack on India's parliament building. Both groups have executed a number of similar attacks in India over the last several years. The Indian government has not identified the group responsible for the blast, but three Kashmiri men have been arrested. Regardless of which group is culpable, the attack may boost limited domestic pressure on the Congress government, but will have little effect on India's relationship with Pakistan. Immediately after the attack, Prime Minister Manmohan **Singh called for cooperation, not accusations**, in the face of the **growing terror threat** in India. This message may have been intended more for domestic audiences than targeted at Pakistan, given the political pressures the Congress party currently faces in light of a series of corruption scandals and the July Mumbai bombings. While national elections will not be held until 2014, the BJP is likely to once again make the government's poor handling of terrorism a campaign issue despite calls for additional intelligence gathering. The fragile nature of the ongoing dialogue with Pakistan also factors into Singh's calculus. Singh perceives the dialogue as one of his legacy issues, but enjoys little political support in the Indian government outside a handful of senior officials and aides. But any derailment of the dialogue with Pakistan limits India's ability to influence Islamabad for more progress on the trials related to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. India is also likely to mute its response because of its desire to sustain its development and diplomatic presence in Afghanistan without threat from Pakistan-based groups. Pakistan will also manage its message closely, as its damaged relationship with the United States is still on the mend. Neither does the resurgence of hostile rhetoric with India serve the interests of the civilian and military leadership, which are both desperate to improve their domestic image after the May 2 raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

### Drone Strikes Decreasing

#### Strikes down now

Farshori 8/27/13 (Kokab, Voice of America News, "Are US Drone Strikes in Pakistan Winding Down?," http://www.voanews.com/content/drone-strikes/1737799.html)

WASHINGTON — For more than a decade, the United States has been using unmanned drones to strike at al-Qaida and Taliban militants in western parts of Pakistan that border on Afghanistan. The drone strikes, begun under President George W. Bush, dramatically increased after President Obama took office.¶ ¶ But now, more than four years later, the number of drone strikes is way down. ¶ ¶ According to the New America Foundation, which tracks the strikes, there have only been 17 drone strikes this year so far. In the first eight months of last year, there were 36 strikes, while the number of drone strikes in the first eight months of 2011 and 2010 there were 56 and 57 respectively. ¶ ¶ Under the Bush administration, there were 46 strikes in Pakistan from 2004 to 2008. The total number of strikes carried out by the Obama administration from 2009 to 2012 was 297. ¶ ¶ Experts in Washington offer a variety of reasons for the shrinking number of drone strikes in recent months. Stephen Tankel, a counter-terrorism expert and an assistant professor at American University in Washington D.C., says one of the reasons is that there aren’t many high-value targets left to be hit in the Pakistan and Afghanistan region. ¶ ¶ Tankel also says the pressure from Pakistan and international human rights organizations may be at play as well. ¶ ¶ “I think there is certainly pressure from Pakistan, from human rights organizations, and quite frankly from elements within the U.S. that the drone strikes should be reduced, if not ended entirely,” he said.

# 2NC

## T

### T – Must Be Prohibit – 2NC Overview

Rowland 84 (Robert C., Debate Coach – Baylor University, “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective, Ed. Parson, p. 53-54)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

### T – Must Be Prohibit – A2: We Meet

#### There's a clear brightline---restrictions require a floor and a ceiling---oversight is a floor but doesn't set a cap on the President's potential actions

USCA 77, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 564 F.2d 292, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 10899,. 1978 Fire & Casualty Cases (CCH) P317

Continental argues that even if the Aetna and Continental policies provide coverage for the Cattuzzo accident, that coverage should [\*\*8] be limited to a total of $300,000 because Atlas agreed to procure "not less than" $300,000 coverage. The District Court properly found that the subcontract language does not support a restriction on the terms of Continental's policy because the subcontract only sets a floor, not a ceiling, for coverage.

#### Statutory restrictions means to forbid – conclusive evidence proves

Randolph 96 (Judge, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, 77 F.3d 1414; 316 U.S. App. D.C. 235; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4493, Arthur David Clifford, et al., Appellants v. Federico F. Pena, Secretary, United States Department of Transportation, et al., Appellees; Consolidated with 95-5239, 95-5240, lexis)

A § 804(b) waiver relieves an operator of the restrictions imposed under § 804(a), the provision barring the operation of foreign-flag vessels competing with American-flag vessels in essential services. We must assume that § 804(a) implements at least some of the objectives set forth in § 1101. And yet we must also assume that requiring strict adherence to § 804(a) could turn out to be counterproductive. Otherwise Congress would have had no reason to enact § 804(b). It therefore does no good for the union to complain that the waiver granted to APL will not accomplish everything the Act set out to achieve, or that permitting APL to operate foreign-flag ships will contradict some of § 1101's objectives. Any waiver of a [\*\*11] statutory restriction will, by definition, allow something otherwise forbidden.

#### Statutory restrictions on authority must prohibit

Becker 74 (Edward, Judge @ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, 374 F. Supp. 564; 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12196; 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P75,271, lexis)

The power of title insurance companies to insure titles is statutorily defined, § 910-8. There are also further statutory restrictions on their business. They are prohibited from guaranteeing the payment of mortgages on real property, §§ 910-9, 910-10; from engaging in the banking business, § 910-11; from acting [\*\*7] as a trustee, guardian, or similar fiduciary, § 910-12; and from issuing insurance other than title insurance, § 910-13. The foregoing regulation aimed primarily at the structure and powers of title insurance companies is accompanied by extensive regulation of their title insurance operations.

### T – Must Be Prohibit – A2: Counter-interpretation

#### More evidence –

#### Statutory restrictions on authority mean laws must prevent presidential actions

Peterson 11 (Todd, Prof @ GW School of Law, Student Bar Association - George Washington School of Law, "Separation of Powers," http://www.gwsba.com/outlines/Separation%20of%20Powers/Separation%20of%20Powers%20-%20Peterson%20-%20Fall%202011.doc)

Power of each branch

* + 3 zones of executive power (J. Jackson)
    - Most authority with explicit statutory power
    - Intermediate authority (inherent power)
    - Least authority statute take away power
  + Generally, for statutory enhancements of power, the Court is more formalist
  + Generally, for statutory restrictions of power, the Court is more functionalist (Does statute prevent the branch from accomplishing its constitutional function?)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Executive | Legislative | Judicial |
| Statutory Authority | Congress can delegate, box can grow indefinitely | Congress passes statutes to give itself more authority  Limited by bicameralism and presentment | Limited by case or controversy |
| No statute | President’s inherent power: In Re Neagle | Appropriations power |  |
| Statutory Restriction | Congress passes statutes to limit the president’s power |  |  |

#### Statutory restrictions must constrain presidential actions

Barron and Lederman 8 (David and Martin, Prof of Law @ Harvard + Visiting Prof of Law @ Georgetown, "ARTICLE: THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB - FRAMING THE PROBLEM, DOCTRINE, AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING," 121 Harv. L. Rev. 689, lexis)

Since at least the Vietnam War, discussions of constitutional war powers have consistently depicted a Congress so fearful of taking responsibility for wartime judgments that it hardly acts at all. Although there is an important element of truth in this common understanding, it is also misleading. In particular, whatever utility the scholarly paradigm of congressional abdication might once have had, it is inadequate in the special context of the so-called "war on terrorism." n1 The specific methods and means of warfare that this conflict privileges; the unusual and geographically transient nature of the nonstate enemy that it targets; and a host of other factors all conspire to ensure that the President's prosecution of the conflict against al Qaeda will bump up against statutory regulations more often than has been the case in traditional military operations. Moreover, the congressional abdication paradigm is not even adequate to explain important war powers issues that now often arise in more traditional military contexts. It is commonly thought that the de facto expansion since the Korean War of unilateral executive authority to use military force confirms Congress's timidity. But if a war goes badly, or if concerns about its wisdom become significant, the modern Congress has been willing - more than in previous eras - to temper or constrain the President's preferred prosecution of the war, and sometimes even to contract or end the conflict contrary to the President's wishes. For this reason, the Commander in Chief increasingly confronts disabling statutory restrictions even in conducting conventional military operations abroad.

#### Authority is the exercise of power over others

OED 13 (http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/13349)

authority, n.

I. Power to enforce obedience.

a. Power or right to enforce obedience; moral or legal supremacy; the right to command, or give an ultimate decision.

b. in authority: in a position of power; in possession of power over others.

### T – Must Be Prohibit – A2: Reasonability

#### It’s arbitrary and undermines research

Resnick 1 Evan- assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

## Executive CP

### Solvency – 2NC – Congress

#### Only the CP solves – the President will refuse the plan’s limitation

Prakash 8 (Saikrishna – Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law, “The Executive's Duty To Disregard Unconstitutional Laws”, 2008, Georgetown Law Journal, 96 Geo. L.J. 1613, lexis)

Perhaps most ominously, Presidents might decline to abide by statutes that are meant to constrain presidential authority. Citing a duty to disregard unconstitutional statutes, a President might elude all manner of constraints that Congress imposed upon presidential power. n28 Indeed, such complaints have been made against President George W. Bush. n29 When Congress has tried to tie his hands, the President has declared an unwillingness to abide by such statutory limitations on the grounds that they are unconstitutional.

### Solves – Global Signaling – 2NC

#### Mechanism – Executive orders send a stronger signal than the plan – Presidential connections and symbolism amplify the commitment of the nation

Sovacool 9 (Benjamin – Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization and Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, “Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States”, 2009, 34 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 333, lexis)

3. Symbolism Executive Orders can often send a stronger signal - both [\*387] domestically and globally - than either legislation or court action. The Office of the President holds deep symbolic meaning for many Americans. Presidential action can influence public opinion, especially since most citizens perceive the President as the paradigmatic leader of the country as the Commander-in-Chief of its armed forces. n299 Presidential leadership, coupled with its frequent monopoly of media attention, means that presidential action brings with it an enhanced level of effectiveness. n300 Moreover, presidential action often has greater international significance. The President and cabinet officials meet with foreign leaders and officials far more frequently than do agents of Congress or the courts, and they do so in smaller and less-public settings, meaning that their actions are more likely to influence the global agenda. n301 In this type of a situation, when entrenched interests and shortsightedness have bogged down policymaking, Presidential action can promote progressive change and justice. Thomas Jefferson issued an Executive Order in 1803 to complete the Louisiana Purchase; President Lincoln issued an Executive Order in 1863 to free the slaves (an action later known as the "Emancipation Proclamation"); President Truman used an Executive Order to force the racial integration of the armed forces; President Eisenhower used one to force all federal contractors to post public notice of their nondiscrimination in hiring; Presidents Kennedy and Johnson used Executive Orders to require affirmative action in federal contracting and to ban racial discrimination in federal housing; and President Nixon used an Executive Order to create the EPA. n302

### Politics – XO – 2NC

#### Executive orders save political capital – recent empirics

Warshaw 6 (Professor of Political Science at Gettysburg College, Spring 2006, Extensions, The Administrative Strategies of President George W. Bush)

However, in recent administrations, particularly since the Reagan administration, presidents have often bypassed Congress using administrative actions. They have opted for a strategy through administrative actions that is less time-consuming and clearly less demanding of their political capital. Using an array of both formal and informal executive powers, presidents have effectively directed the executive departments to implement policy without any requisite congressional authorization. In effect, presidents have been able to govern without Congress. The arsenal of administrative actions available to presidents includes the power of appointment, perhaps the most important of the arsenal, executive orders, executive agreements, proclamations, signing statements, and a host of national security directives. More than any past president, George W. Bush has utilized administrative actions as his primary tool for governance.

#### Executive orders avoid backlash – prior framing

Mayer 1 (Ken Mayer 01, Princeton University Press, “With the Stroke of a Pen”, page 90.)

For the same reasons, presidents who have low levels of public approval may be more likely to resort to executive orders. Doing so offers a way of getting around other institutional actors who might be emboldened in their opposition to what they perceive as a weak white house, and also provides presidents with a method of position taking, framing policy questions, or delivering on promises made to key constituencies.

### Object Fiat – 2NC

#### 2. It’s vital to fairness, particularly on this topic – most neg lit is about how restrictions are put in place by the executive vs. other branches

Fisher 3 (Louis – Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. Ph.D., New School for Social Research, “A Constitutional Structure for Foreign Affairs”, 2003, 19 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1059, lexis)

It is conventional, and I suppose convenient, to divide scholars on the war power and foreign affairs into "pro-congressionalists" and "propresidentialists." Their writings may seem to demonstrate a sympathy for one branch over another. However, scholarship is shallow if it merely latches itself onto one branch of government while shooting holes in the other. Analysis of the war power and foreign affairs demands a higher standard: recognizing institutional weaknesses along with institutional strengths, appreciating that the democratic process requires deliberation and collective action, and promoting policies that can endure rather than attempting short-term, unilateral solutions that fail. Moreover, the important point is not which branch has the political power to prevail. If that were the standard, we would always side with autocratic and even totalitarian regimes, or perhaps, in the current United States, an elected monarch. More fundamental to the discussion are the principles and procedures that support and sustain constitutional government.

#### 3. Inter-branch politics are crucial in the context of war powers – it's the reason restrictions exist – makes the counterplan educational and necessary ground

Jenkins 10 (David – Assistant Professor of Law, University of Copenhagen, “Judicial Review Under a British War Powers Act”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, May, 43 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 611, lexis)

In this pragmatic way, the Constitution attempts to balance the efficiency of centralized, executive military command with heightened democratic accountability through legislative debate, scrutiny, and approval. n28 Therefore, despite the Constitution's formal division of war powers between the executive and the legislature, disputes over these powers in the U.S. are usually resolved politically rather than judicially. n29 This constitutional arrangement implicitly acknowledges that both political branches possess certain institutional qualities suited to war-making. n30 These include the dispatch, decisiveness, and discretion of the executive with the open deliberation of the legislature and localized political accountability of its members, which are virtues that the slow, case specific, and electorally isolated courts do not possess. n31 The open, politically contestable allocation of [\*618] war powers under the Constitution not only permits differing and perhaps conflicting interpretations of the legal demarcations of branch authority but also accommodates differing normative preferences for determining which values and which branches are best-suited for war-making. n32 Furthermore, this system adapts over time in response to inter-branch dynamics and shifting value judgments that are themselves politically contingent. Thus, the American war powers model is an intrinsically political - not legal - process for adjusting and managing the different institutional capabilities of the legislative and executive branches to substantiate and reconcile accountability and efficiency concerns. A deeper understanding of why this might be so, despite the judiciary's power to invalidate even primary legislation, can inform further discussions in the United Kingdom about the desirability and advisability of putting the Crown's ancient war prerogative on a statutory footing.

## Stability

#### Balochistan evidence is a question, not an argument

**Democracy Digest, 5-29-12**

(Democracy Digest, “Balochistan conflict tests Pakistan’s state legitimacy, integrity,” <http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2012/05/balochistan-conflict-tests-pakistans-state-legitimacy-integrity/>, Accessed 9-13-12, CJB)

A “little-known dirty war” is emerging as a threat to the integrity and legitimacy of the Pakistani state and a major test of the country’s fragile democracy. The conflict in Balochistan may prompt Pakistan’s restive military to impose martial law if the government fails to implement the Constitution, the Chief Justice warned this week. “Not much is heard about the little-known, dirty war simmering in Balochistan, a parched land of broken hills where militants seeking the unlikely goal of independence are locked in a vicious showdown with the state,” the FT’s Matthew Green writes from Karachi. “A trail of hundreds of bullet-riddled bodies of Baloch activists, students and even poets, provides a clue to the biggest question hanging over Pakistan’s future. Can the fragile state garner the legitimacy needed to beat its many challengers, or is the nuclear-armed country locked in a spiral of violent decline?”

### 2NC Central Asia War – No Escalation

#### SCO checks war

Maksutov in ‘6 (Ruslan, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian Perspective”, August, http://www.sipri.org/contents/worldsec/Ruslan.SCO.pdf/download)

As a starting point, it is fair to say that all Central Asian countries—as well as China and Russia—are interested in security cooperation within a multilateral framework, such as the SCO provides. For Central Asia this issue ranks in importance with that of economic development, given the explosive environment created locally by a mixture of external and internal threats. Central Asia is encircled by four of the world’s eight known nuclear weapon states (China, India, Russia and Pakistan), of which Pakistan has a poor nuclear non-proliferation profile and Afghanistan is a haven for terrorism and extremism. Socio-economic degradation in Central Asian states adds to the reasons for concern and makes obvious the interdependence between progress in security and in development. Some scholars argue that currently concealed tendencies evolving in various states of Central Asia—such as the wide-ranging social discontent with oppressive regimes in the region, and the growing risks of state collapse and economic decline—all conducive to the quick growth of radical religious movements, could have far-reaching implications for regional stability once they come more into the light. 41 At first sight, the instruments established by the SCO to fulfil its declared security- building objectives seem to match the needs that Central Asian states have defined against this background. While the existence of the SCO further reduces the already remote threat of conventional interstate war in the region, 42 it allows for a major and direct focus on the non-state, non-traditional and transnational threats that now loom so large by comparison.

#### No escalation—no vital interests for great power war in Central Asia.

Richard Weitz, senior fellow and associate director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute, Summer 2006. The Washington Quarterly, lexis.

Central Asian security affairs have become **much more complex** than during the original nineteenth-century great game between czarist Russia and the United Kingdom. At that time, these two governments could largely dominate local affairs, but today a variety of influential actors are involved in the region. The early 1990s witnessed a vigorous competition between Turkey and Iran for influence in Central Asia. More recently, India and Pakistan have pursued a mixture of cooperative and competitive policies in the region that have influenced and been affected by their broader relationship. The now independent Central Asian countries also invariably affect the region's international relations as they seek to maneuver among the major powers without compromising their newfound autonomy. Although Russia, China, and the United States substantially affect regional security issues, they cannot dictate outcomes the way imperial governments frequently did a century ago. Concerns about a renewed great game are thus **exaggerated**. The contest for influence in the region **does not directly challenge the vital national interests of China, Russia, or the U**nited **S**tates, the most important extraregional countries in Central Asian security affairs. Unless restrained, however, competitive pressures risk impeding opportunities for beneficial cooperation among these countries. The three external great powers have incentives to compete for local allies, energy resources, and military advantage, but they also share substantial interests, especially in reducing terrorism and drug trafficking. If properly aligned, the major multilateral security organizations active in Central Asia could provide opportunities for cooperative diplomacy in a region where bilateral ties traditionally have predominated.

#### -- No great power escalation

Weitz 6 (Richard, Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies – Hudson Institute, “Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia”, Washington Quarterly, 29(3), Summer, Lexis)

Concerns about a renewed great game are thus exaggerated. The contest for influence in the region does not directly challenge the vital national interests of China, Russia, or the United States, the most important extraregional countries in Central Asian security affairs. Unless restrained, however, competitive pressures risk impeding opportunities for beneficial cooperation among these countries. The three external great powers have incentives to compete for local allies, energy resources, and military advantage, but they also share substantial interests, especially in reducing terrorism and drug trafficking. If properly aligned, the major multilateral security organizations active in Central Asia could provide opportunities for cooperative diplomacy in a region where bilateral ties traditionally have predominated.

#### -- Every power has interests in stability

Smith 96 (Diane, “Central Asia: A New Great Game?”, Military Net, 6-17, http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm)

Is there a new "Great Game" being played out in Central Asia? Boris Rumer argues that the successor states to the Russian and British empires have renewed the struggle for hegemony in the center of the Asian continent. As the world shifts from a bipolar to a multipolar focus, the nations of Asia search for new trans-regional security arrangements. More specifically, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the creation of five Central Asian republics[2](http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm#N2) (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), have complicated the security relations of the Asian states. (See [Figure](http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1f1.htm) 1.) But, this new struggle is not a repeat of the 19th century "Great Game," by which the Central Asian states are but pawns of great powers as they jockey for power and position. Instead, the Central Asian states themselves are active players in this struggle for power, in a unique geo-strategic position to influence immediate neighbors Russia, China, and Iran, and even beyond into the Indian subcontinent. Once considered a backwater of little importance during the Soviet era, Central Asia could play a pivotal role in Asian politics in the next decade. Enlargement and Engagement set domestic political stability, regional peace, and the maturation of market economies in the five Central Asian states as policy goals of the United States. The key to Asian, especially Central Asian, regional security is economic. A strong, vibrant market economy is a prerequisite for political stability and the growth of democracy. Political stability, however, is itself a key element to economic development; peace in the region, especially in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir, must be gained before that economic takeoff can occur. Serious political, economic, ethnic, religious, and social challenges confront the five new Central Asian states in this quest for regional security. How each state is able to confront and resolve these problems will determine its ability to emerge as a viable force in this struggle for influence, in this new "Great Game." Instability might seem to provide opportunities for states such as Iran or China to expand their influence, but the risks that such instability would ricochet back on them are too great. Thus, Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia and China each seek, in their own way, to promote stability within Central Asia while expanding their own regional influence.

### 2NC Central Asian War – Instability Inev

#### Alt causes – internal instability makes Central Asian war inevitable

Smith 96 (Dianne L., Team Chief for Central Asia, National Military Intelligence Collection Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, “Central Asia: A New Great Game?”, 6-17, http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm)

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Instability might seem to provide opportunities for states such as Iran or China to expand their influence, but the risks that such instability would ricochet back on them are too great. Thus, Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia and China each seek, in their own way, to promote stability within Central Asia while expanding their own regional influence. Implications for American security from this struggle derive from the U.S. desire to prevent existing problems within Central Asia from escalating into crises that might engage Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia or China.[3](http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm#N3) Therefore, we must first identify those centrifugal forces threatening Central Asia, then review each of these states in turn, to analyze their behavior, identify their regional objectives and state policies in relation to Central Asia, and evaluate the impact of Central Asia upon their own security. Doing so offers a better perspective on our own strategic interests in post-Cold War Asia. Threats to Central Asia. The greatest threats to Central Asian security are internal. The painstaking process of nation-building, the legitimacy crisis, rapid social and economic transformation, decolonization, ethnic diversity, border disputes, and a catalogue of other issues are all sources of instability in the post-Soviet republics.[4](http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm#N4) The core issue is the ethnic composition of each state. Since no nation-states existed in the centuries before Russian conquest, substantial transmigration of ethnic groups characterized the region. As a result, major concentrations of ethnic minorities reside within countries other than their titular[5](http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm#N5) nation, to include: one million Uzbeks in the Khojent province of Tajikistan, half a million in the Osh area of the Fergana valley in Kygyzstan, and 280,000 in the Chimkent region of Kazakhstan; one to two million Tajiks in Samarkand and Bukhara, Uzbekistan; nearly a million Kazakhs in Uzbekistan; and roughly eight million (a number declining daily due to emigration) Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans in the northern part of Kazakhstan.[6](http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm#N6) The percentage of the titular nationality (and the ruling elite) in each republic may be less than half.[7](http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm#N7) Ethnic populations are also split by international boundaries; for example, there are more ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan than in Tajikistan itself.[8](http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm#N8) These titular nationalities are caught outside their home republic because artificial boundaries, established during the Stalinist era, purposefully cut across nationalities, to "divide and conquer."[9](http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/cenasap1.htm#N9) Central authorities meant these boundaries as internal administrative lines of demarcation--no one dreamed the Soviet Socialist Republics would ever become actual states. This ethnic mix was further complicated when the area became a wartime dumping ground for exiled nationalities, such as Volga Germans, as well as the relocation of war industries during the early 1940s, the Virgin Land program of the 1950s, and Moscow's systematic immigration of ethnic Slavs (to dilute the titular nationality) after Stalin's death. All five republics have suffered sharp economic dislocation since gaining independence. They were suddenly cut off from the centralized command economy that directed their resource allocation, long-range planning, investment funding, and management. Exploitation of rich natural energy and mineral resources has been stalled; no longer a part of the Soviet Union, the five republics are all landlocked, and goods must transit through a second nation via transportation networks that do not yet exist (other than through Russia). Economic reform and movement toward a market economy have been uneven, as states fear that further economic dislocation will produce massive internal unrest and political instability. The lack of modern financial systems, transportation networks, banking institutions, and enforceable legal systems all hamper foreign investment. Migration of ethnic Slavs to Russia has cost the republics a large cadre of skilled technicians and managers; migration of ethnic Germans has cost the republics the group most responsible for cultivated agriculture. Many local nationalities are a generation or two from being nomads or herdsmen. At the same time, overpopulation pressures from large Central Asian families (often having five to six times the birth rate of urbanized Slavic states) have produced an underclass of poor un- or under-employed, less-educated workers whose dissatisfaction in the 1980s often provoked the riots leading up to independence. Ethnic discrimination during the Soviet era produced few senior, local leaders in the military, industrial, legal, diplomatic, or managerial fields from the Central Asian republics.

### A2: Ayson

#### Ayson concludes no retaliation

Ayson 10 (Robert Ayson, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. . Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7 July 2010 , pages 571 – 593. InformaWorld.)

Even if the actual perpetrators of the nuclear violence and any leaders of the terrorist group were identified and could be targeted militarily, it does not necessarily follow that such a reaction would need to be enormously violent. One possible option would be an attempt to seize the terrorist leadership alive and have them tried for crimes against humanity, even if some sort of retrospective international legal arrangements might be needed to cover the actions of a non-state group. Another option would be a “surgical” strike, including perhaps by the use of drones, if the attacked country still felt it necessarily to highlight an asymmetry between the indiscriminate and illegitimate violence of the attackers and the carefully crafted response of the attacked country. Any violent action against states that had been harboring or assisting the terrorists might also be limited so as to protect the international reputation of the victim. The importance of limiting the use of force might grow if there was some uncertainty about the identity of the attacking group and their state (and non-state) supporters, to reduce the political costs should that identification later prove to have been erroneous. Alternatively if the terrorist group was thought to possess additional nuclear weapons, some might counsel a cautious military response in case any violent response led to further attacks. However, one would expect this last argument to get fairly short shrift: few would want to be accused of appeasing proven nuclear terrorists.  Of course the state victim of the nuclear attack might well decide to use much higher levels force against the terrorist group and any of its state supporters, (and especially if any of the latter were considered to have helped the group acquire the nuclear weapon that had been used). If the leadership of the terrorist group that authorized the attack were thought to be operating from a particular overseas location, one might expect aerial bombing and missile attacks, the deployment of a battle group task force offshore (depending on the geography) and then perhaps the insertion of larger numbers of regular forces. Of course, this begs the assumption that the state victim was a country such as the United States whose armed forces do have the global reach these options could require (although there is also the very real possibility that the United States might respond in this way even if it had not been the direct victim of the nuclear terrorist attack).  Indeed, the precedent of the international response to the 9/11 attacks suggests that a large international military coalitionin support of the state victim could be organized reasonably quickly. But it is not obvious that this coalition would be presented with a carbon copy of the Al Qaeda-Taliban nexus as a readily available target for its mission. In any case, it is likely that a number of governments would want to join together in what would amount to a significant show of force.

#### One of their Pakistan impacts is from a Slate columnists with no qualifications

#### Rosenbaum, Slate columnist, 7

(Ron, "Talkin' World War III," Slate, www.slate.com/articles/life/the\_spectator/2007/11/talkin\_world\_war\_iii.single.html, accessed 10-25-11, mss)

And now we have the crisis in Pakistan, one that portends a nightmare scenario in which Pakistan's so-called "Islamic bomb" falls into the hands of al-Qaida sympathizers. Such an outcome would put us on a fast-track route to World War III, because logic would dictate an immediate attack on those Pakistani nukes before they could be dispersed or launched, and logic on the other side would dictate that their new possessors launch or disperse them as soon as possible under a "use it or lose it" threat. Finally, there was the almost unprecedented declassification of an element of the U.S. nuclear war plan formerly known as the Strategic Integrated Operating Plan, now called OPLAN 8044. The heavily redacted document, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Hans M. Kristensen, a nuke specialist at the Federation of American Scientists, is almost completely blanked out, save for a few headings suggesting that we have off-the-shelf plans for nuking "regional" states, a phrase Kristensen believes applies to states that have weapons of mass destruction programs, such as North Korea and Iran. Soon, if not already, one can be sure, there will be "robust contingency plans" for Pakistan, as Martin Walker put it recently in the New YorkTimes. And—as if demonstrating a kind of synchronicity in the collective unconscious—the cultural realm has begun to break out with World War III talk. We've had publication of two new books, Richard Rhodes' history of the Cold War nuclear arms race, Arsenals of Folly, which takes us up to 1986 and the failure of the superpowers to ban the bomb, and Jonathan Schell's utopian revival of the cause of nuclear abolitionism in The Seventh Decade. In somewhat less serious but no less noteworthy instances, this month has also seen the release of a deranged but somehow appealing film, Southland Tales, which envisions World War III beginning with a nuclear attack on Abilene, Texas. Add to that the prerelease announcement of Tom Clancy's EndWar, a World War III video game ("for advanced systems only"). And, oh, yes, the folk singer at the Atlantic magazine's anniversary party and his World War III ballad. (I'll get to that.) World War III hasn't broken out, but an apprehensive foreboding about it certainly has. Of course, World War III has never gone away, in the sense that there are some 500 Minuteman missiles alone, lurking out there in underground silos below the northern great plains; all of them, according to Kristensen, "on high alert"—meaning ready to fire on command in 15 minutes or less—and many more on submarines and ready to load on bombers. They're no longer targeted on the former Soviet Union but are easily re-targetable. As the saying goes, nuclear war has until recently been "forgotten but not gone," the ghost at the feast. First, there was the decade-long "holiday from history," from the fall of the Wall to the fall of the Twin Towers. And then a different kind of nightmare supplanted nuclear war, the one that went by the name "the next 9/11." Let's pause here for a bit of comparative nightmare-ology. Not to diminish the horror of a "next 9/11," but 3,000 died that day. At the height of the Cold War, the estimate for the number of killed in a U.S.-USSR nuclear war ranged from a low of 200 million to a high of everyone, the death of the human species from an Earth made uninhabitable by nuclear winter. Or, as one nuclear strategist once memorably put it, "the death of consciousness." It didn't happen back then, in part, we now know, because of blind luck (misleading radar warnings on both sides that could have been, but weren't, taken as signals for launch). And because back then, despite the madness of Mutually Assured Destruction deterrence doctrine, there were only two main players, both semirational monoliths with an interest in their own survival. Now, there are at least eight nuclear nations and who knows how many "nonstate actors," as the euphemism for terrorist groups goes. And some of these nonstate actors have adopted an ideology of suicidal martyrdom, even when it comes to nukes, and thus can't be deterred by the reciprocal threat of death. That's what's so sad about Jonathan Schell's admirable, idealistic book. He wants to believe that the genie can be put back in the bottle, that we can unring the bell, and, if not "disinvent" nuclear weapons, then make them disappear with well-meaning treaties. And yet, in the beginning of his book, he makes what seems like an irrefutable case that the end of his book—a plea for total abolition of nuclear weapons—seems to ignore. At the beginning of the book he notes that, yes, nuclear weapons can be destroyed, disabled, and decommissioned, but never disinvented. Ballistic-missile disarmament is relatively easy to monitor because missiles are so large. But bombs are different. Once information on how to make them gets out there, no matter what efforts good people employ to make them go away, bad people will keep building them. There is no foolproof inspection regime that wouldn't involve panopticonlike total surveillance of every human being on the planet to prevent what's known in the arms control trade as the "break-out" scenario, in which a group or nation takes advantage of a nuclear-disarmed world by assembling bombs clandestinely, and then putting their nuclear superiority to use. In other words, I hate to say it this way, but if nuclear arms are outlawed, only outlaws will have nuclear arms. Even gun-control advocates, and I am one, don't believe that the abolition of all guns is possible or necessarily desirable. An outlaw with a gun can rob a gas station. If nukes are outlawed, an outlaw with nukes can rule or destroy the world, or blackmail it at the very least. Do we want a world where the only nondisarmed nuclear power is al-Qaida? What's to prevent such an outcome in the abolitionist scheme? I don't want to be alarmist (actually I do, or rather I'd like you to share my sense of alarm), but I'm surprised there isn't a greater sense of concern about those Pakistani nukes. Forget Iran and Israel (Bush's hypothetical route to World War III). Pakistani nukes now represent the **quickest shortcut** to a regional nuclear war that could escalate to a **global nuclear war.** The instability of the Musharraf regime and uncertainty about its control of its "Islamic bomb"—actually an arsenal of nukes, including, reportedly, the long-range missiles they can be mounted on—has been a particular concern since 9/11. The key "unknown unknown" in the decision to invade Afghanistan was whether the considerable bloc of radical Islamist Taliban (if not al-Qaida) sympathizers within the Pakistani military and its notorious intelligence service, the ISI (which in fact helped create al-Qaida), would destabilize the Musharraf government. We dodged a bullet then. But now the once-shaky Musharraf regime is on the brink of collapse. Musharraf has survived assassination attempts before, and there is little likelihood that the forces behind those attempts have a diminished appetite for his demise, literal or political. And consider this: In recent years entire regions of Pakistan have become safe havens for al-Qaida and (quite likely) Osama. Is it not possible that instead of pursuing elaborate schemes to buy nukes on the black market or smuggle an improvised radioactive "dirty bomb" into the United States, al-Qaida has been biding its time, burrowing its way into Pakistan, waiting for the Islamic bomb to drop into Bin Laden's lap? (I know: not a great choice of metaphor.) Because he thinks long term, he doesn't have to try to scrounge up some "loose nuke" from the former Soviet "stans"; he can just wait. He's one coup—or one bullet—away from being handed the keys to an entire arsenal of nuclear weapons. Those keys: Throughout the years since 9/11, when Pakistan was supposedly our valiant ally against terrorism, various leaks and hints have offered false reassurances that the United States had in some way "secured" the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. That we were virtually in the control rooms with a hand on the switch. But then, in the wake of the new threats to Musharraf's precarious regime, came the New York Times front-pager on Nov. 18 (one month after Bush's "World War III" pronouncement in the White House) on the nature of U.S. "control" over Pakistani nukes. The Times had held this story for more than three years at the behest of the Bush administration. This time, when discussion of the issue in Pakistan became more public in the midst of the crisis and the Times told the administration it wanted to publish, the White House withdrew its request for a hold. If people in the administration withdrew their request because they thought the story would be in any way reassuring, they are, to put it mildly, out of their minds. The rumors circulating that the United States was somehow in Pakistani launch control rooms, presumably exercising some control, turn out to be—the Times story revealed—wishful thinking. In fact, the American efforts appear to have been aimed at preventing an "unauthorized" launch, a scenario in which al-Qaida or some terrorist group steals a weapon and tries to use it. But the real danger is not "unauthorized" launches but unwelcome "authorized" ones. The real worry is what happens when Musharraf falls, which seems at least a good possibility. What happens if the authority to authorize alaunch falls into the hands of either al-Qaida-sympathizer elements in the military and intelligence service or, worst case, al-Qaida itself? After all, polls in Pakistan have consistently shown Bin Laden to be more popular than Musharraf. From a cave to a nuclear control room is not an utterly unforeseeable nightmare. I think this is the urgent debate question that should be posed to both parties' candidates. What happens if Pakistan falls into the hands of al-Qaida-inclined elements? What happens if Musharraf hands over the launch authorization codes before he's beheaded? Don't kid yourself: At this very moment, there's a high probability that this scenario is being wargamed incessantly in the defense and intelligence ministries of every nuclear nation, most particularly the United States, Russia, and Israel. War is just a shot away, a well-aimed shot at Musharraf. But World War III? Not inevitably. Still, in any conflict involving nukes, the steps from regional to global can take place **in a flash**. The new "authorized" users of the Islamic bomb fire one or more at Israel, which could very well retaliate against Islamic capitals and perhaps bring retaliation upon itself from Russia, which may have undeclared agreements with Iran, for instance, that calls for such action if the Iranians are attacked.

### 2NC Terror

#### No risk of terrorism – a Harvard professor says to prefer our study

Walt 12 (Stephen, Belfer Professor of International Affairs – Harvard University, “What Terrorist Threat?,” Foreign Policy, 8-13, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/13/what\_terrorist\_threat)

Remember how the London Olympics were supposedly left vulnerable to terrorists after the security firm hired for the games admitted that it couldn't supply enough manpower? This "humiliating shambles" forced the British government to call in 3,500 security personnel of its own, and led GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney to utter some tactless remarks about Britain's alleged mismanagement during his official "Foot-in-Mouth" foreign tour last month. Well, surprise, surprise. Not only was there no terrorist attack, the Games themselves came off rather well. There were the inevitable minor glitches, of course, but no disasters and some quite impressive organizational achievements. And of course, athletes from around the world delivered inspiring, impressive, heroic, and sometimes disappointing performances, which is what the Games are all about. Two lessons might be drawn from this event. The first is that the head-long rush to privatize everything -- including the provision of security -- has some obvious downsides. When markets and private firms fail, it is the state that has to come to the rescue. It was true after the 2007-08 financial crisis, it's true in the ongoing euro-mess, and it was true in the Olympics. Bear that in mind when Romney and new VP nominee Paul Ryan tout the virtues of shrinking government, especially the need to privatize Social Security and Medicare. The second lesson is that we continue to over-react to the "terrorist threat." Here I recommend you read John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart's The Terrorism Delusion: America's Overwrought Response to September 11, in the latest issue of International Security. Mueller and Stewart analyze 50 cases of supposed "Islamic terrorist plots" against the United States, and show how virtually all of the perpetrators were (in their words) "incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational and foolish." They quote former Glenn Carle, former deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats saying "we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are," noting further that al Qaeda's "capabilities are far inferior to its desires." Further, Mueller and Stewart estimate that expenditures on domestic homeland security (i.e., not counting the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan) have increased by more than $1 trillion since 9/11, even though the annual risk of dying in a domestic terrorist attack is about 1 in 3.5 million. Using conservative assumptions and conventional risk-assessment methodology, they estimate that for these expenditures to be cost-effective "they would have had to deter, prevent, foil or protect against 333 very large attacks that would otherwise have been successful every year." Finally, they worry that this exaggerated sense of danger has now been "internalized": even when politicians and "terrorism experts" aren't hyping the danger, the public still sees the threat as large and imminent. As they conclude: ... Americans seems to have internalized their anxiety about terrorism, and politicians and policymakers have come to believe that they can defy it only at their own peril.  Concern about appearing to be soft on terrorism has replaced concern about seeming to be soft on communism, a phenomenon that lasted far longer than the dramatic that generated it ... This extraordinarily exaggerated and essentially delusional response may prove to be perpetual." Which is another way of saying that you should be prepared to keep standing in those pleasant and efficient TSA lines for the rest of your life, and to keep paying for far-flung foreign interventions designed to "root out" those nasty jihadis.

#### No nuclear terror – operation, cohesion and coordination

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12 The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14 In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15 Although the efforts of would-be terrorists have often seemed pathetic, even comical or absurd, the comedy remains a dark one. Left to their own devices, at least a few of these often inept and almost always self-deluded individuals could eventually have committed some serious, if small-scale, damage.16

### 2NC Indo-Pak War

#### No war—both sides want a negotiated solution

Tellis 07(Ashley, Senior Associate @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11/27. “Four Crises and a Peace Process,” Brookings Institution.)

The first change, I think, is that there is a growing recognition on both sides that the use of force to resolve their disputes has really hit the aspect of the curve that there are diminishing returns. Although the use of force may have a cathartic kind of quality where you feel the need to hit out in order to send a message, I think both sides have come to the recognition that beyond that, beyond satisfying that cathartic need, there are no clear political objectives that would be solved by the actual use of force. I think that is really very important because as long as the leaderships on both sides are [as] minimally rational as they have been, that acts as a very powerful break with respect to unleashing the use of force. The second element, which again I see as part of the structural changes occurring in the subcontinent, is that there is a very slow but very important transformation in Pakistan’s definition of what it believes the Kashmir dispute is. I think the Pakistanis are moving in an evolutionary form from thinking of Kashmir as a territorial dispute where the solutions must involve territorial changes to something that is more subtle. President Musharraf has, of course, been critical actually in shaping this new recognition. If this new recognition holds and continues to take root, I think we could be moving to a new kind of a status quo where resolution of this issue actually becomes possible over the longer term. The third element is the changes that are taking place at the Indian end. In the old days, the Indian position on Kashmir was there is no problem. There’s nothing to discuss. The only issue out there is the return of territory which Pakistan controls, which New Delhi believes is rightfully its own.p31

## Pakistan Politics

### Their ev

#### Alt cause – poverty and unemployment – NRG deals can’t solve

**Northam, NPR staff writer, 12**

(Jackie, 10/4, “Faltering Economy Threatens Pakistan's Stability,” accessed: 9/5/2013, <http://www.npr.org/2012/10/04/162232742/faltering-economy-threatens-pakistans-stability>, ADC)

If you want to gain a good insight into Pakistan's economic situation, just look at a few of the country's newspaper headlines on any given day. The language says it all: prices soar, stocks plunge, budget deficit swells, foreign investment evaporates — and the list goes on. Now, analysts are increasingly worried that the faltering economy could join Pakistan's pervasive insurgency and repeated political upheavals as another serious threat to the country's stability. A recent report issued at the World Economic Forum says Pakistan ranks in the bottom 20 out of the world's economies. Nadeem Ul Haque, deputy chairman of the state Planning Commission, says nobody really wants to talk about economic reform, or draw up new fiscal policies. "The debate is always so charged with religion and geopolitics and war on terror, just talking about economics takes second place — in fact fifth place, in fact seventh place, 10th place," Haque says. "Nobody really wants to talk about economics." And while the government avoids making difficult economic policy decisions, key industries in Pakistan are taking a hit. A Target For Extremist Recruitment At the Sitara textile mill in the eastern city of Faisalabad, huge panels of cotton are imprinted with pictures of Spider-Man and Justin Bieber. They will be turned into duvet covers and sent to the U.S., says the plant's general manager, Ashfaq Ahmad. He says his mill is the only one in Pakistan that has two machines for doing flatbed printing — but only one of them is running. The other is closed, he says, because of a gas shutdown. Ahmad says serious gas and electricity shortages mean that this and other plants in Faisalabad can only operate four days a week. Power outages can last up to six hours a day. Rehan Naseem Bharara, vice president of Faisalabad's Chamber of Commerce, says many textile factories have shut down, and another just recently reduced staff. "They had about 13,000 people in their factory three years back, but now only 3,400 people are working," Bharara says. He says the cutbacks have had a huge impact on the community, especially the jobless, who become an "easy target for ... people who promote terrorism in this country." Western analysts say the decaying economy is as much of a threat to Pakistan's stability as the Taliban because widespread poverty and unemployment could lead to more political instability and an increase in extremism. Security forces fired above a large crowd during recent demonstrations over an anti-Islam video. Most of those involved were young people. Pakistan has one of the world's fastest-growing populations, and job prospects for young people are growing dimmer. Elusive Growth To Combat 'Youth Bulge' Take a group of university students, who lounge on a bench and play guitar at an abandoned Islamabad train station on a recent day. Until six months ago, freight trains used to make regular stops at the station. Now the tracks are overgrown. The station is closed because of the rising cost of fuel and a shortage of train engines in the country. The university students use the area for relaxation, dating and talking politics. Taheer Walid studies business, but he knows the chances of finding a job when he's finished with school are slim to none. "Currently, if you talk about Pakistan, yes, this is the time to make a revolution," Walid says. "I mean, uncertainties are totally there ... political uncertainties and everything." Haque, the deputy planning commissioner, says the country is currently growing at just over 3 percent, but that's not nearly enough to deal with what he calls the "youth bulge."

### AT Pakistan

#### Asian Development Bank and US loans prevent economic collapse

AP 08 (10/4, Herald Tribune, “US$500 million loan to shore up Pakistan economy,” http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/04/business/AS-Pakistan-Economy.php

Pakistan's central bank says it has received a US$500 million loan from the Asian Development Bank to help shore up the country's ailing economy. Central bank spokesman Syed Wasimuddin said Saturday the money is the first installment of a US$1.5 billion loan designed to support economic development in Pakistan. The funds will top up Pakistan's foreign currency reserves and help restore some confidence in its sagging currency. Pakistan also faces high inflation and slowing growth. The United States, which counts Pakistan as a key ally in its war on terror, also is pledging more economic support. Pakistan is also seeking assistance from Saudi Arabia.

#### Alt caus – Western financial crisis

Sheikh 08 (Nawal, 10/28, “Global financial recession and Pakistan,” The Nation http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Opinions/Columns/29-Oct-2008/Global-financial-recession-and-Pakistan/1)

It seems as if the world is going wayward. All across the globe stock markets have fallen, financial institutions have collapsed or at the verge. Even the wealthiest nations including the sole superpower, arc designing programmes and introducing packages to boost and save their financial systems. It is feared and rightly so that the global financial meltdown will affect the livelihoods of almost everyone in this, now inter-connected world. In case of developing countries including Pakistan the concerns are grave. The rise in food and every day commodities' prices coupled with the high fuel prices and approaching global slump has worried the nation collectively. We are witnessing our stock markets suffering, banks sans deposits and our currency going on a downward trend. In addition to this, Pakistan gets most of its FDI's (Foreign Direct Investment) from the west like all other Asian countries. Pakistani products are also global, and a slowdown in the west means slowdown here as well.

### 2NC Pakistan Instability – No Coup

#### Pakistan stable

Clapper 3/12 -- US Director of National Intelligence (James R., 2013, "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community," Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, http://intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf)

Pakistan is preparing for national and provincial assembly elections, which must be held no later than May 2013, and a presidential election later in the year. Pakistani officials note that these elections are a milestone—the first time a civilian government has completed a five-year term and conducted a transfer to a new government through the electoral process. Islamabad is intently focused on Afghanistan in anticipation of the ISAF drawdown. The Pakistani Government has attempted to improve relations with Kabul and ensure that its views are taken into consideration during the transition period. The military this year continued operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and, as of late 2012, had forces in place for an operation against anti- Pakistan militants in the North Waziristan Agency of the FATA. There were fewer domestic attacks by the Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan this year than in the previous several years.

#### Almost zero risk of an Islamist coup—military is too powerful.

Julian Schofield and Michael Zekulin, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Concordia University and doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary, March 2007. “Appraising the Threat of Islamist Take-Over in Pakistan,” Notes de recherches 34, www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/NOTE34.pdf.

The concurrent proliferation of nuclear weapons and rise of militant pan-Islamic terrorism have made observers concerned about the threat of a Jihadist take-over in Pakistan. Such an anti- Western and militantly Islamic regime, armed with nuclear weapons, would be in a position to spread nuclear weapons technology and terrorism throughout much of Asia. However, we argue that the probability of extremist religious groups obtaining control in Islamabad is **very low**. This paper does not dispute the growing organization, funds and influence of militant Jihadist and non-militant Islamist movements in Pakistan, but asserts that the military, particularly the army, is too well organized and equipped to be infiltrated or overthrown. Our argument proceeds by surveying three possible scenarios, all inspired by false-analogies: a Jihadist revolution, an Islamist electoral victory, and a Jihadist coup from within the military. They draw on historical demonstration effects, that have worried outside observers, but none of which applies well to Pakistan: the Iranian revolution, the electoral victory of the Islamists in Algeria, and the Islamist Egyptian soldiers who assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. We conclude that despite what appears to be a vibrant environment for such an occurrence, a Jihadist or a non-militant Islamist takeover in Pakistan is **currently remote**.

#### -- Extremists have no support – risk of coup is low

Hamid 7 (Shadi, Director of Research – Project on Middle East Democracy and Associate – Truman National Security Project, “The Nuclear Scenario in Pakistan”, Democracy Arsenal, 12-27, http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2007/12/the-nuclear-sce.html)

Well, yes it might be. But the chances of the 'nuclear scenario' actually happening is so slim that treating it as the overriding policy question is, at best, a diversion and distraction from the real risks Pakistan faces. How exactly did this become the conventional wisdom? On one hand, you have Al-Qaeda and other associated terrorist groups. Al-Qaeda - I hope I am stating the obvious - is not going to take over the Pakistani government anytime soon. Extremist groups have the capability to terrorize the population, assassinate leaders, and destablize the country, but there are few indications that they have made enough inroads into the military or ISI to threaten an actual internal coup. The other possibility is that the various Islamist parties might somehow come to power through free elections. Maybe this is what people are really referring to when they talk about an "Islamist takeover," a term which has long been a staple of Middle East-related fearmongering, and one that has been employed to great effect by the Muslim world's predominantly secular (and often brutal) dictators, including many of our allies. Well, the chances of this scenario occurring are even slimmer. Islamist parties in Pakistan have not made much an effort to moderate (in contrast to their Arab and Turkish counterparts), and they are, in fact, a frightening bunch. However, they do not command significant support in a country dominated by well-established secular parties. Their peak electoral support is around 15%, give-or-take. In other words, not much of a threat. With all that said, we are talking about the Muslim world, an area of the world that tends to surprise when surprises are least expected and not particularly welcome. So I could be wrong. But the point remains that we shouldn't overexaggerate the threat of nuclear oblivion ushered in by Pakistan's Islamic extremists. And then there's the other question of why Islamic extremists have been able to wreak so much havoc in the first place. Didn't Mush promise us he would defeat the extremists or something? Oh, wait. Every dictator in the Muslim world promises us that. And, every time, we end up dissapointed.

### 2Nc Pakistan Instability – No Escalation

#### -- Past experience proves no impact to Pakistani unrest

Stolar 7 (Alex Jr., Peace Fellow in the South Asia Program – Stimson Center, “The Implications of Unrest in Pakistan for Nuclear Security”, 5-18,

http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?SN=SA200705181263)

It has been a very painful week in Pakistan. On May 12th, over forty died when violence broke out in Karachi between political factions supporting and opposing President Musharraf. Three days later, a suicide bomber entered a hotel restaurant in Peshawar and detonated the explosives strapped to his body, killing at least twenty persons. Recent turbulence has renewed fears that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials may be vulnerable to breakdowns in command and control or theft. The good news is that these nightmare scenarios are unlikely to occur during the current political unrest. The bad news is that Pakistan’s domestic unrest will continue and grow worse without the restoration of a representative government, and that extremists have many ways to further destabilize Pakistan. Are Pakistan’s bombs safe? In theory, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could be vulnerable to theft, illicit transfer, or unintentional use if the army’s discipline and command and control structure faltered. Concerns about the security of Pakistan’s weapons are greatest in the West when Pakistani politics enter a rough patch and during leadership changes. Fortunately, these worst case scenarios are highly unlikely. Pakistan has been through worse passages of political unrest. Intimidation, politically-driven violence, and sectarian strife are all too common in Pakistani politics. If past experience is any guide, the current unrest will not lead to anarchy or chaos in Pakistan. The vast majority of Pakistanis desire a moderate and stable state, and the army has an institutional interest to prevent the breakdown of national authority and cohesion. Pakistan’s weapons were secure during previous periods of political instability, and they are likely to remain the most protected national assets during the current unrest. There are no signs of a breakdown in command and control in the Pakistan Army.

### AT India

#### Basu evidence is about neighboring countries not global economy

**Basu, Cornell University Economics professor, 12**

(Kaushik, 8/25, “The Indian Economy: Rising to Global Challenges,” accessed: 9/5/2013, <http://www.kaushikbasu.org/K.%20R.%20Narayanan%20Oration.pdf>, ADC)

The dramatic change in the structure of the Indian economy over the last decade or two has made it incumbent on us to move from being a reactive to a pro-active agent in the international domain. There is a need to define our national prerogatives in the international arena and pursue these actively. India has to move from being a nation that accepts or rejects agenda developed by others to a nation that creates some of that agenda and begins to take up the role of initiator in some of these foreign policy and strategic economic matters. It is important for India to do some strategic thinking in terms of who should be our partners and friends in the global space and then take the first steps to bring these to fruition, instead of waiting for all the initiative to come from elsewhere. It is in this spirit and not just to celebrate the location of the Narayanan lecture that I suggested the need to promote greater economic and strategic engagement with Australia. The need for pro-active engagement is true in many different ways—ranging from policies in our neck of the woods to larger international issues such as the ones that come up in G20 meetings. Our neck of the woods refers to South Asia, where India needs to play a much more active role than it does currently. The scope for collaboration and trade in South Asia is vast. Trade routes opened up through India’s north-eastern neighbours—such as Bangladesh and Myanmar—can energize our neighbouring economies and unleash the potential of India’s own north-eastern states which have, for far too long, relied on dole outs from Delhi. This is a region of India with high literacy and plenty of enterprise. Once we facilitate the development of the region, it will move on auto pilot. There are lessons to be learnt from the success of cooperation in the Mekong Delta. Power generation using Nepal’s unexploited potential for hydro power can help Nepal and India. All such projects require strategic activism, involving the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of External Affairs and the Export Import Bank of India. Done correctly, this can promote development not only in India but in our neighbouring countries. Given that South Asia is among the poorest regions of the world, this is worthwhile from a purely global, humanitarian point of view. In addition, this can contribute to political stability and peace in the region. But I put this thought on the table not merely for engagement with South Asia and South East Asia but the world, and emphasize the need for India to take a more active role in choosing its strategic partners and promoting humanitarian global objectives.

#### Indian economic growth has slowed but remains steady - multiple econ prove

Mishra 12/17/12 (Asit, Wall St Journal, "India’s economy poised to recover, says government," http://www.livemint.com/Politics/ZzgEmv958po9HI3JcVD8rI/Govt-lowers-growth-forecast-says-on-track-for-deficit.html)

While acknowledging the slow growth trends in the first half (H1) of the current fiscal, the mid-year review of the Indian economy claims: “There are, however, reasons to believe that the slowdown has bottomed out and the economy is headed towards higher growth in the second half (H2) of 2012-13.”¶ The report, which was presented in Parliament, follows a slowdown in economic growth to 5.3% in the quarter ended September from 5.5% in the preceding three months. Inflation is still above RBI’s comfort zone, while the elevated cost of money has forced companies to hold back on investments.¶ However, the review reasoned that a positive upturn in the Business Expectation Index in the October-December quarter, a higher Purchasing Managers’ Index in November, buoyancy in the capital market, improved internal accruals of the corporate sector in July-September and a resurgence of growth in the manufacturing sector suggest that the economy is poised for a moderate acceleration in H2.¶ It, therefore, concludes that the overall growth of gross domestic product (GDP) would be 5.7-5.9% for 2012-13, implying growth in H2 of the fiscal will be in the range of 6-6.4%. In H1 (April-September), growth averaged 5.4%. The economy grew 6.5% in the last fiscal.

### 2NC No Econ War

#### Tir – countries don’t lash out because they don’t have resources, cites empirical statistics

#### No more wars from economic collapse – we’re in a state of turboparalysis

Lind 12 -- co-founder of the New America Foundation, policy director of the Economic Growth Program, graduate of the University of Texas and Yale, taught at Harvard and Johns Hopkins, been an editor or staff writer for The New Yorker, Harper’s, The New Republic and The National Interest (Michael, 12/15, "The age of turboparalysis," <http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8789631/the-age-of-turboparalysis/>)

More than half a decade has passed since the recession that triggered the financial panic and the Great Recession, but the condition of the world continues to be summed up by what I’ve called ‘turboparalysis’ — a prolonged condition of furious motion without movement in any particular direction, a situation in which the engine roars and the wheels spin but the vehicle refuses to move.¶ The greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression might have been expected to produce revolutions in politics and the world of ideas alike. Outside of the Arab world, however, revolutions are hard to find. Mass unemployment and austerity policies have caused riots in Greece and Spain, but most developed nations are remarkably sedate. Scandal and sputtering economic growth appear unlikely to prevent another peaceful transition of power within the Communist party of China. And in the US, the re-election of President Obama and the strengthening of his Democratic party in the US Senate reflect long-term demographic changes in an increasingly non-white and secular American electorate, not the endorsement of a bold agenda for the future by the Democrats. They don’t have one.¶ In the realm of ideas, turboparalysis is even more striking. On both sides of the Atlantic, political and economic debate proceed as though the bursting of the global bubble economy did not discredit any school of thought. Right, left and centre, the players are the same and so are their familiar moves. Public debate is dominated by the same three groups — market fundamentalists, centrist neoliberals, and mildly reformist social democrats — who have been debating one another since the 1980s. Someone who went to sleep like Rip Van Winkle in the 1980s when Reagan and Thatcher were in power and awoke today would find nothing new in the way of economic theories or political doctrines.¶ By now one might have expected the emergence of innovative and taboo-breaking schools of thought seeking to account for and respond to the global crisis. But to date there is no insurgent political and intellectual left, nor a new right, for that matter. In the US, the militant Tea Party right, many of whose candidates went down to defeat in this year’s elections, represents the last gasp of the Goldwater-Reagan coalition, not something fresh. The American centre-left under Obama is intellectually exhausted and politically feeble, reduced to rebranding as ‘progressive’ policies like the individual mandate system (‘Obamacare’) and tax cuts for the middle class which originated on the moderate right a generation ago. In Britain, the manifestos of various ‘colour revolutions’ — Blue Labour, Red Tory and so on — have the feel of PR brochures promoting rival cliques of ambitious apparatchiks rather than the epochal thinking the times require.¶ Why has a global calamity produced so little political change and, at the same time, so little rethinking? Part of the answer, I think, has to do with the collapse of the two-way transmission belt that linked the public to the political elite. Institutions such as mass political parties, trade unions, and local civic associations, which once connected elected leaders to constituents, have withered away in more individualistic and anonymous societies. One result is a perpetual crisis of legitimacy on the part of political elites, who owe their electoral successes increasingly to rich donors and skilful advertising consultants. New political movements are hard to found. At the same time, anachronistic movements can continue to raise funds or entertain audiences, even if, like America’s conservative movement, they lose election after election.¶ But there is a deeper, structural reason for the persistence of turboparalysis. And that has to do with the power and wealth that incumbent elites accumulated during the decades of the global bubble economy.¶ In essence, the bubble economy was a dysfunctional marriage of export-driven economies like China, Japan and Germany and debt-addicted nations like the US and many of Germany’s European neighbours. As international trade imbalances built up, from the 1980s to the 2000s, so did the wealth and power of elites who profited from the system, from Chinese Communist princelings with a stake in overbuilt export industries to the financiers of Wall Street and the City of London.¶ A global economic system that relied on excessive borrowing by consumers, particularly in the US, was bound to grind to a halt when fearful consumers switched from borrowing to saving. But the crash was only the first stage of the adjustment. The second stage is rebalancing. Countries like China and Germany must rely more on domestic consumption; countries like the US and UK must rely less on private consumer debt and shift resources from finance and housing to productive, traded industries.¶ But these reform agendas, from the downsizing of the overbuilt industrial sectors of mercantilist Asian nations to the pruning of finance in the Anglo-American world, threaten the very interests that profited from the preceding bubble and now glare defensively at a changing world, like Fafnir crouched upon his hoard. In the US, the wealth of the bubble-swollen financial sector has been transmuted into political power via campaign contributions. While Mitt Romney, the candidate of Wall Street, lost his bid for the presidency, the American financial industry overall has been successful in blocking reforms like the nationalising of failed banks (rather than government bailouts with few conditions) and the restructuring of private household mortgage debt. These reforms, along with a dose of moderate inflation and much more aggressive fiscal policies like massive investment in infrastructure, would have helped the economy recover more rapidly. But they would have imposed significant costs on economic elites who have wielded their power to thwart them.¶ For their part, the masses seldom unite against the classes in democracies because they are divided among themselves. When nations realise that they will be collectively poorer in the future than they had expected, the usual result is not solidarity but rather civil war, by means of ballots and sometimes bullets. Confronted by a crisis like the Great Recession, each section of society uses its political influence to try to maintain its share of the national wealth, while forcing the cost of economic adjustment to others. The rich try to shift adjustment costs to the middle class, who in turn try to pay for their own subsidies and entitlements by cutting the programmes of the poor.History is sobering, in this regard. The Great Recession, which continues despite a technical ‘recovery’, can be viewed as the third great economic collapse of the industrial era, following the ‘Long Depression’ of the 1870s-1890s and the Great Depression of the 1930s. The earlier two episodes of global economic crisis witnessed setbacks for liberalism, democracy and free trade and the flourishing of illiberal nationalism, racism, imperialism and beggar-thy-neighbour economics. While slow growth combined with national rivalries have not yet engendered anything like the autarkic economics of the earlier two crises, it would be premature to predict the survival of present levels of financial and economic integration in a world that wobbles between feeble recoveries and renewed recessions.¶ Nowhere is there greater potential for conflict than in the relationship between the two poles of the now-collapsed bubble economy — the US, which specialised in exporting debt to China, and China, which specialised in exporting manufactured goods to the US. Since the Great Recession began, American attitudes toward China have grown strikingly more negative. The much-discussed ‘pivot’ in American strategy away from fighting jihadists in the Middle East and Central Asia towards unnamed great power rivals in East Asia is manifestly a shift toward greater military containment of China.¶ And in the recently concluded US elections, both candidates competed in promising to protect American producers from unfair Chinese competition. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, from which China is excluded, combines military and trade concerns in a single set of America-centred Asian alliances. Gone is the Clinton-era vision of China as a liberalising and democratising partner of the US in a world of great-power harmony.¶ The last global depression was brought to an end by the second world war. This time a ‘hot’ war is extremely unlikely and a cold war merely possible. Nevertheless, geopolitics may do what domestic politics has failed so far to do and free the world’s leading countries from ongoing turboparalysis.

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Don’t have this doc – it was shutdown politics