# 1NC

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#### A. Interpretation – debate requires the aff to have a defense of the USFG increasing restrictions on the war powers authority of the President in one of the following: targeted killing, indefinite detention, offensive cyber operations, and introduction of US armed forces in hostilities

#### --‘resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### --“United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Restrictions on authority must prohibit actions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### B. They don’t meet –

#### C. Reasons to prefer:

#### Debate games open up dialogue which fosters information processing – they open up infinite frameworks making the game impossible

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, 51 presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### The opening of infinite frameworks destroys stasis – agreement on the topic as the starting point for debate creates a platform of argumentative stability that is the crucial foundation for deliberation and makes debate meaningful

O’Donnell 4 (Dr. Tim, Director of Debate – Mary Washington U., “And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate”, Debater’s Research Guide, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/ DRGArticles/Framework%20article%20for%20the%20DRG%20final2.doc)

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary,* a framework consists of “a set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions” that govern behavior. When we speak of frameworks in competitive academic debate we are talking about the set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions that generate the question that the judge ought to answer at the end of the debate. Given that there is no agreement among participants about which standards, beliefs, or assumptions ought to be universally accepted, it seems that we will never be able to arrive at an agreeable normative assumption about what the question ought to be. So the issue before us is how we preserve community while agreeing to disagree about the question in a way that recognizes that there is richness in answering many different questions that would not otherwise exist if we all adhered to a “rule” which stated that there is one and only one question to be answered. More importantly, how do we stop talking past each other so that we can have a genuine conversation about the substantive merits of any one question? The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis.[[1]](#endnote-1) Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.[[2]](#endnote-2) How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.[[3]](#endnote-3)

#### Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

Steinberg and Freeley 13 (David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, *Argumentation and Debate*

*Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote weII-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Simulated national security law debates preserve agency, enables activism, enhances decision-making, and avoids cooption – only legal deliberative action solves

Donohue 13 (Laura K. Donohue, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11, “National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations”, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf)

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying doctrinal material and creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. This is the most important determination, because the substance of the doctrinal portion of the course and the simulation follows from this decision. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. This, then, becomes a guide for the doctrinal part of the course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised in the current conversation. Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion simulations, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may provide an important way forward. Such simulations also cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it does provide a starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

#### Effective decision-making outweighs – it’s the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems – being relevantly informed is key

Lundberg 10 (Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311)

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, **debate builds capacity for** critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change**, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it **builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry** to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology **for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities**. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a **crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life**. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of **meaningful political engagement** and **new articulations of democratic life.** Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to **produce revisions of democratic life** that are **necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive**. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; wholesale **environmental destruction** and the potential for **rapid climate change**; emerging **threats to international stability** in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing **challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an **informed and active citizenry that** deliberates with greater skil**l** and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the **existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### 1NC

#### Transition to environmental authoritarianism’s coming now---solves extinction

Beeson 10, Mark Beeson, Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science & International Studies, University of Birmingham, 2010, “The coming of environmental authoritarianism,” Environmental Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, DOI:10.1080/09644010903576918

The environment has become the defining public policy issue of the era. Not only will political responses to environmental challenges determine the health of the planet, but continuing environmental degradation may also affect political systems. This interaction is likely to be especially acute in parts of the world where environmental problems are most pressing and the state's ability to respond to such challenges is weakest. One possible consequence of environmental degradation is the development or consolidation of authoritarian rule as political elites come to privilege regime maintenance and internal stability over political liberalisation. Even efforts to mitigate the impact of, or respond to, environmental change may involve a decrease in individual liberty as governments seek to transform environmentally destructive behaviour. As a result, ‘environmental authoritarianism’ may become an increasingly common response to the destructive impacts of climate change in an age of diminished expectations.

#### Social control is the only hope of solving extinction – the affirmative rolls back bio-political control, guaranteeing destruction

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The portrait of the psyche that emerges is cautionary. As much as contemporary humans would like to believe that we have transcended our evolutionary origins, our animal nature lives on within us — **in our genes and** in our **minds**. Witness the architecture of the human brain, in which the cerebral cortex enfolds a mammalian limbic system wrapped around a reptilian core. Hence, said Jung, Every civilized human being, however high his conscious develop- ment, is still an archaic man at the deeper levels of his psyche. Just as the human body connects us with the mammals and displays numerous vestiges of earlier evolutionary stages going back even to the reptilian age, so the human psyche is a product of evolution which, when followed back to its origins, shows countless archaic traits. 2 In effect, Jung concludes, a “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” dwells in all of us. Even the distinctively human part of our nature associated with the cortex is irredeemably Paleolithic. 3 As a consequence, men and women are constantly agitated by primordial drives and conﬂicting emotions that they only partly understand and struggle to control — and that they are usually not even aware of. Much is healthy and good in human beings, but we have propensities for sickness and evilthat must not be ignored. Anthropology supports this bleak assessment of the human psyche. With few exceptions, there are no harmless people, and the savage mind, whatever its virtues, is often prey to unconscious forces and raw emotions (and is therefore the author of savage behavior). A review of the anthropological literature reveals three seemingly universal tendencies of the human mind: we are **prone to superstition** and magical thinking, we are **predisposed to paranoia**, **and we project our own hostility onto others**. 4 In essence, says Melvin Konner, chronic fear pervades the psyche and drives human behavior. 5 Although the last word has yet to be spoken, there seems to be an emerging scientiﬁ c consensus: we humans are a volatile mix of animal, primal, and civil — a tangle of emotions and drives that all but guarantees inner and outer conﬂ icts. That human nature is partly animal nature is not entirely a bad thing. Instinct is necessary for a healthy psyche and a moral society. But for human beings to live peacefully in crowded civilizations, the more bestial and savage aspects of man ’ s nature have to be actively discouraged by society. Konner puts it more forcefully. Because of our fear-driven antisocial propensities, we humans are “ evil ” by nature and therefore **need a “ Torah, ” or** an equivalent **ethical code, to forestall the** war of all against all. 6 In practice, this means that mores are essential because they tip the balance between good and evil in human nature. Good ones turn fal- lible, passionate men and women into reasonably upright members of society, while bad ones turn them into feral menaces to society. This conclusion does not follow from theory alone; it has been empirically demonstrated. The social psychologist Stanley Milgram showed how simple it is to create little Adolf Eich- manns who obediently inﬂ ict severe pain on hapless experi- mental subjects. 7 In an even more frightening experiment, his colleague Philip Zimbardo contrived to convert ordinary, presumably decent students into punitive monsters. In the infamous Stanford prison experiment, student volunteers were randomly assigned to be either guards or prisoners. In a matter of days, the former turned harsh and sadistic, the latter cringing or rebellious, and the experiment had to be aborted to avert physical harm to the prisoners. 8 In effect, psychology has rediscovered what were once called “ the passions ” — the welter of conﬂicting and potentially **dangerous impulses and emotions** that lurk in every human breast and that threaten to erupt under the slightest provocation unless they are kept in check by personal character or social control. Recall the words of Burke: “ Society cannot exist unless a controlling power on will and appetite be placed some- where. ” The choice is between self-imposed “ moral chains ” or externally imposed “ fetters. ” In his Politics , Aristotle identiﬁ ed the essential political challenge: For as man is the best of the animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and justice . . . [because he] is born possessing weapons for the use of wisdom and virtue, which it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence, when devoid of virtue man is the most unholy and savage of animals. 9 When individuals gather in crowds, the challenge increases by orders of magnitude because fear, greed, and anger are contagious. As Gustave Le Bon pointed out long ago, crowds amplify every human defect and manifest many new ones of their own. “ The masses, ” said Jung, “ always incline to herd psychology, hence they are easily stampeded; and to mob psychology, hence their witless brutality and hysterical emo- tionalism. ” 10 Nietzsche was even more scathing: “ Insanity in individuals is something rare — but in groups, parties, nations, and epochs it is the rule. ” 11 The greatest Weapon of Mass Destruction on the planet is therefore the collective human ego. History teaches that the human capacity for evil is virtually unlimited. Unless wisdom and virtue are deployed to counteract ego ’ s potential for destruction, actual destruction is inevitable as men and women forget their better nature and become unholy and savage animals. This new yet old understanding of human nature is enough by itself to demolish modern hubris. Inﬁ nite social progress is as much of a chimera as inﬁ nite material progress. The “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” is what he is and will not be improved, only tamed. Indeed, at this point in human history, the essential task is forestalling racial suicide, not pursuing social perfection. To this cautionary portrait of human nature, we must now add the limits of human cognition. As has been shown, the human perceptual apparatus is a trickster. We are in touch not with reality but with a kind of shadow play **projected onto the screen of the psyche** **by** invisible deep structures. We have also seen that even the ﬁnest intellects struggle to comprehend complex, self-organizing systems, for nature does not make it easy for us to know reality. But the fault does not lie in nature. The human mind was simply not created to unravel the mys- teries of quantum mechanics or to comprehend the intricate dynamics of the global climate regime. It was instead cobbled together and then honed to perfection by evolution for one speciﬁ c purpose — survival as hunter-gatherers on the African savannah. We are Jung ’ s “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” not just emotionally but also cognitively. We are hardwired to perceive in certain ways and not in others. Above all, human cognition is “ designed ” for concrete perception, so primal peoples are masters of what anthropolo- gist Claude L é vi-Strauss called “ the sciences of the concrete. ” 12 This is by no means an inferior mode of thought. The savage is not, as we tend to think, a mere captive of strange fancies and outlandish beliefs. He is actually more of an empiricist than the physicist because he perceives his world directly and immediately whereas the latter ﬁ lters nature through an elabo- rate intellectual apparatus made up of mathematical, theoreti- cal, and technological lenses. So the abstraction associated with literacy, civilization, and, above all, scientiﬁ c investiga- tion is not natural but acquired — and only with great difﬁ culty after years of schooling. Even schooling cannot entirely eradicate the innate pro- pensity for concreteness in the human mind. For instance, **we daily commit the** epistemological sin **of** reiﬁcation — regarding abstractions or ideas, such as energy or the market, as if they were somehow as real as rocks and trees rather than constructs that help us understand complex phenomena. Likewise, our opinions have a tendency to become “ set in concrete, ” resist- ing all evidence to the contrary. 13 But perhaps the most egregious instance of what Whitehead called “ the fallacy of misplaced concreteness ” is that so many otherwise sane human beings believe in the absolute, literal truth of the manifestly mythological accounts contained in various scriptures — refusing to accept archeological and historical evidence to the contrary or even to entertain the possibility that these accounts could be ﬁngers pointing at the ineffable rather than expressions of concrete truth. 14 Sadly, many, if not most, human beings are not capable of rising very far above Piaget ’ s concrete operational stage of cognition. 15 Hence they cannot be said truly to comprehend the social and physical reality of life in complex civilizations — a life far removed from the comparatively simple and concrete existence of the hunter-gatherer, which centered on day-to-day survival amid an intimate circle of kinsmen and friends. As a corollary, the untutored human mind focuses on the present and the dramatic. The imperative of survival on the savannah made us sensitive to immediate or striking dangers — but comparatively oblivious to long-term trends, risks, and consequences, especially ones that are inconspicuous. Our attention is not grabbed by the creeping destruction of habitat, the imperceptible extinction of species, the continual accumu- lation of pollutants, the gradual loss of topsoil, the steady depletion of aquifers, and the like. Rather, we tend to ﬁ xate on dramatic symptoms (such as the occasional major oil spill) while ignoring the far greater long-term threat to ecosystems posed by quotidian events (such as the daily dribble of petro- chemicals from a multiplicity of sources, which is far greater and much more damaging over the long term). Unfortunately, dribbles are not the stuff of melodrama and so tend not to register strongly, even when brought to our attention by the media. So it takes a crisis to thrust stealthy perils into full awareness. Unfortunately, says biologist Richard Dawkins, the human brain was simply not built to understand slow, cumulative processes like evolutionary or ecological change, which demand an acute sensitivity to the long-term consequences of small changes. 16 Since long-term observation and planning were not critical for our early survival, these mental attributes were not reinforced by evolutionary selection. Ecology and its implications are therefore poorly understood, even by the informed public. More generally, the human mind ’ s inability to escape the clutches of the present leads to the habitual, shortsighted pursuit of current advantage to the detriment of future well-being. In addition, the survival imperative endowed us with a host of cognitive shortcuts — unconscious mental algorithms that may have been essential on the savannah but that must be consciously set aside if we humans are to live sanely in civiliza- tion. For example, the human mind tends to be quick to decide. Like any animal, we are emotionally wired for ﬁ ght or ﬂ ight, which means that our savage minds are also cognitively wired to jump to conclusions. When early humans spotted a tan shape lurking in the elephant grass, the minds that decided “ lion ” soonest had the best chance to pass their genes down to posterity. The human mind is also dualistic, so it is constrained, if not compelled, to choose one pole or the other — ﬁ ght or ﬂ ight, black or white, right or wrong — not the middle ground. This has been experimentally demonstrated at the perceptual level: when humans look at a classical optical illusion, they see either the lady or the vase, never both at once. In other words, the human mind naturally dichotomizes, creating the common oppositions of “ good ” and “ bad, ” “ us ” versus “ them, ” the “ two sides ” of any issue, “ left ” against “ right ” in politics, and so on. Unfortunately, as F. Scott Fitzgerald noted, it takes a ﬁ rst-rate intelligence to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still continue to function, so untutored minds readily afﬁx themselves to one of the poles and oppose the other. **This explains** the **perennial conﬂict** between believers and inﬁdels that has occasioned untold historical misery.

#### **Disciplinary society is the only hope to controlling ecological devastation – the aff takes out the one chance at survival we have**

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Politeia is the means for realizing the ends of therapeia and paideia . Wisdom and virtue do not arise spontaneously in human beings, especially those who reside in complex civiliza- tions, so morality must be institutionalized and inculcated by a polity dedicated to fostering and upholding society ’ s norms and mores. The polity’s role is to govern — to direct affairs in a way that citizens are encouraged to **follow a moral code** or are swiftly checked when they fail to do so. (All the rest of what we call politics is politicking, policing, and administra- tion.) Provided that the code reﬂ ects an elevated ideal, such as excellence or wisdom, the result will be a rule of life that is relatively sane and humane. We live at a historical juncture that will challenge govern- ments as never before. Liberal society owes its existence to the bubble of ecological afﬂuence fueled by the “ discovery ” of the New World and the exploitation of the stored solar energy in fossil fuels. 2 Those who have grown up in afﬂ uent societies have therefore enjoyed unprecedented opportunities and freedoms, as well as levels of comfort and plenty all but unimaginable to our ancestors. But the impending return of ecological scarcity means that the expectations and aspirations of billions of indi- viduals cannot be met and that individual wants will increasingly be subordinated to collective needs. Governments now confront the **Herculean task** **of effecting an epochal** economic, social, and political transition from the industrial age to the age of ecology. The question is whether this can be achieved without lapsing into totalitarian tyranny or religious despotism. To escape such a fate will require us to break decisively with our habitual response to societal problems: passing laws that give governments ever more administrative power. The extraor- dinary nature of the challenge exposes us to the eternal and inescapable dilemma of politics in a particularly acute form. As Lord Acton observed, because power inevitably corrupts, no can be entrusted with it: “ The danger is not that a particular class is unﬁ t to govern. Every class is unﬁ t to govern. ” 3 The maxim “ That government is best which governs least ” follows as a matter of course. As John Stuart Mill says in concluding On Liberty , A government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individual exertion and development. The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activities and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs. 4 So the proper function of government **is to facilitate, not dominate**; to **make the rules, not play the game**. By its nature, big government — whoever exercises power and whatever their intentions — is bound to be less responsive or efﬁ cient than small. In addition, any problems that emerge quickly become the rationale for further extensions of administrative power. But the more the government intrudes into the life of the citi- zenry, the more burdensome and expensive it becomes. More important, because power corrupts, it will inevitably tend to become overbearing as well. Because men and women have a surfeit of passion and a deﬁ cit of reason, a substantial degree of governance is indis- pensable for civilized life. It alone can constrain the one and supply the other. So government is a necessary evil — and the more it departs from what is truly indispensable, the greater the evil. Our aim must therefore be to construct a political regime that is sufﬁ cient to the desired end without exceeding what is strictly necessary. Instituting a necessary evil is not for the squeamish, but we shirk the task at our peril. Pascal likened political philosophy to “ lay[ing] down rules for an insane asylum. ” 5 The metaphor is apt. At best, even in comparatively well-ordered polities, political life is a kind of Bedlam characterized by shared delusion, cold-blooded self-seeking, and an aggressive will to power. At worst, it becomes a barely sublimated civil war one step removed from a Hobbesian state of nature. And Pope to the contrary notwithstanding, good rules are indeed necessary for a good politics lest we turn into a well-administered con- centration camp. Depending on the rules and the ways in which the rules are administered, the asylum will be more or less peaceful, more or less benign, and more or less conducive to individual sanity and welfare. Politics is not everywhere and always an unmitigated evil. As Aristotle and others point out, participation in politics can enhance the self-development of individuals. What is too often forgotten, however, is that only small, simple, face-to- face societies permit genuine participation. In the wrong set- ting — a society that is large, complex, or divided — **participatory politics** is likely to become what Plato said it was: an ignorant and impassioned mob **ﬁghting over the tiller of the ship** of state, with potentially disastrous consequences. The essen- tial task is therefore to foster a social and economic setting conducive to a politics that is sane, humane, participatory, and ecological. Nothing I say here should be construed as approving a dictatorial remaking of our civilization. We do not need a Lenin or even an Ataturk. We require a new moral, legal, and political order that cannot be imposed from the top down but that must instead percolate up as the consequence of an intel- lectual and moral reformation. The aim of this reformation should be to create the kind of society desired by Burke and Taine — a **self-regulating society** in which individuals bind themselves with moral chains and thereby become their own constables. To return to the theme of the noble lie, the ideal animating the machinery of government, not the machinery itself, con- stitutes a polity. Institutions do not create an ethos: witness the bootless attempts in the postcolonial era to graft the trap- pings of representative democracy onto traditional societies for whom democracy and liberty are alien ideals. The reverse is actually true: those who possess an ethos will naturally establish institutions that reﬂect it. Politics is not about elections, ofﬁces, or laws. It is about the deﬁnition of reality: what epistemology, ontology, and ethic shall constitute our rule of life? It is about the master metaphor that frames the manner of thought and the character of institutions at lower levels. At the heart of any political battle — from the general direction of society to particular policy issues — is a ﬁ ght to make a particular idea prevail: the invisible hand or the class struggle, a right to life or freedom of choice? 6 In consequence, said David Hume, it is always opinion that governs: nothing appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few. . . . When we inquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall ﬁ nd, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular. 7 The French jurist J. M. A. Servan made the same point more cynically: A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly by the chain of their own ideas. . . . [T]his link is all the stronger in that we do not know what it is made of. 8 This ancient problem was adumbrated by Plato in The Republic and has been much studied in modern times by soci- ologists of knowledge: the human mind produces opinions that may have only a passing resemblance to reality. In the political arena, the problem manifests as Karl Marx ’ s “ false consciousness. ” On one side, a majority is unskilled in think- ing but hungry for meaning, and on the other, a smaller minor- ity is skilled at mental manipulation and hungry for power. The latter normally succeeds in imposing its ideas on the former — “ What luck for rulers that men do not think, ” said Adolf Hitler 9 — and these ideas, backed up as necessary by the gendarmerie and secret police, constitute the mainstay of any regime. The political dramas that occupy our newspapers and television screens **are** therefore largely **irrelevant**. As long as the basic metaphor remains the same, it is business as usual, no matter who wins elections or what policies are adopted. However, let one metaphor displace another, and “ reality ” shifts accordingly. According to Archibald MacLeish, “ A world ends when its metaphor has died. ” 10 When the consent of the governed supplanted the divine right of kings as master metaphor, the consequence was a radically new and different political order. The usual understanding of false consciousness, especially among Marxists, is that the falsity is due to cynical political manipulation combined with deliberate intellectual obfusca- tion, which leads the masses to be cunningly imprisoned in a set of beliefs that serve the interests of the ruling class. The usual solution proposed by modern thinkers is therefore sci- entiﬁ c. Science — whether the laws of dialectical materialism that govern the unfolding of human history, the best means of fostering economic growth, or the right way to feed babies — will provide objectively truthful answers to all questions and thereby liberate us from false consciousness once and for all. But there is no such thing as objectively true consciousness. Science may indeed provide us with true opinion concerning certain aspects of human nature and the natural world so that we can choose a rule of life that does not ﬂ out reality. But it cannot tell us what reality ultimately is, and it cannot choose the rule for us. **Everything** depends on the master metaphor we use to construct reality. The image of the machine leads to one kind of society — individualistic, acquisitive, exploitative — whereas the image of Gaia points in a very different direction. Again, we come face to face with the enormous power and reach of metaphor. It can liberate us, or it can enclose us in a mental prison — either one of our own making or one imposed on us by powerful others. The essential political struggle of our time is **not to pass laws that reduce pollution and conserve energy** so that the machine can keep running until it self-destructs, taking human- ity along with it. Instead, it is to ﬁght to make ecology the master science and Gaia the ruling metaphor — to abandon an ignoble lie and embrace a nobler new ﬁction that offers the means of long-term survival and the prospect of a further advance in civilization. This conclusion that a new ﬁ ction is the key to political change is supported by systems analysis. As Donella H. Meadows points out, the most effective leverage point for changing a system ’ s behavior is its fundamental mind set or paradigm, for this determines its goals, structure, and rules. 11 Unfortunately, this is also where resistance to change is ﬁ ercest. The required strategy of change, says Meadows, is to expose the anomalies, contradictions, and failures of the old paradigm while at the same time offering a new and better one. 12 The essence of the politeia that follows from this new ﬁ ction has already been stated. It is a politics of consciousness grounded in ecology and dedicated to inner cultivation instead of outer conquest. But what does this imply? The sages, prophets, poets, and philosophers who have gone against the grain of civilization by urging men and women to pursue wisdom and virtue instead of wealth and power have generally agreed on the means necessary to this end. They all envisioned a way of living that is materially and institutionally simple but culturally and spiritually rich — and therefore more generally free, egalitarian, and fraternal than life in complex societies devoted to continuous accumula- tion and expansion. The case for material and institutional simplicity takes several forms. The negative argument is that as societies grow larger and more complex, self-regulation breaks down, so they develop chronic and intractable problems. Politicians respond with laws and regulations that purport to be solutions. But when society has reached a certain level of complexity, solu- tions are either far from obvious or too painful to implement or even contemplate. Leaders resort to simplistic, merely expedient “ reforms ” that fail to solve the old problems and generate new ones that then require stronger measures. As a consequence, government grows ﬁ rst powerful, then intrusive, and ﬁ nally overbearing or even tyrannical, and the people themselves are corrupted and made dependent. Under such conditions, liberty decays, equality declines, and fraternity fades, often dramatically. The solution is for men and women to live in relatively small and simple societies that encourage them to be upright and independent, that preserve them from oppression, that keep them on a relatively equal footing with their fellow citizens, and that allow them to participate mean- ingfully in civic life. The positive argument is that men and women should live close to the earth and to each other in relatively simple and stable small communities because this is what the archetypal needs of the “ 2,000,000-year-old man ” require. A simpler and more natural existence will tend to maximize an individual ’ s chances of enjoying the good life — deﬁ ned as a way of living that is ﬁ lled with nature, beauty, family, friendship, leisure, education, and, for those inclined to it, philosophy in the Platonic sense of personal and spiritual self-development. These things, not material goods, bring true felicity. It follows that the aim of economic life must be sufﬁ ciency, which supports such felicity — not great wealth, which is its enemy. Sufﬁ ciency is also important for political reasons. Besides forestalling the growth of tyranny, a simple economy is relatively transparent, so individuals can see their own inter- ests as well as the common interest and act on them. Sufﬁ - ciency combined with ample opportunity for self-development also reconciles the tension between equality and excellence. If each human being attains his or her unique excellence and is recognized by others for having done so, then the best can in principle rule without creating either dependency or resent- ment among the ruled. This brief overview touches on important issues that are further addressed below, but we must ﬁ rst respond to the objection that a small-is-beautiful prescription for political salvation is utterly utopian and therefore not worthy of being taken seriously. In fact, what has always been philosophically commendable is about to become practically obligatory. The manifold pressures of ecological scarcity will soon compel us to live in smaller, simpler communities that are closer to the land than the megacities of industrial civilization. In the next few decades, well before we have completely exhausted the capital stocks of fossil fuels and mineral ores on which the current industrial order depends, matter and energy will become increasingly scarce and expensive. If deployed skill- fully and in a timely manner, technology can shape and moder- ate this inexorable trend, but it **cannot forestall it**. Our future way of life will of necessity be more simple, frugal, local, agricultural, diversiﬁ ed, and decentralized than at present. Our task must be to make a virtue of this necessity. When we recognize its necessity, we shall see that a simpler way of life might indeed be more virtuous and happy than the one we now believe represents the acme of human progress. In the ﬁrst place, industrial civilization has become too complex and interlinked for its own good. As Joseph Tainter points out, an excess of complexity, usually aggravated by other factors, has spelled the downfall of previous civilizations. 13 The costs of increasing complexity grow disproportionately until they eventually reach a point of diminishing or even declining returns. The civilization therefore has to run harder and harder to make further progress or even to stay in the same place. In addition, a civilization already stressed by the high costs of complexity may **no longer be resilient** enough to respond to further challenges. It risks a cascade of failure should a critical link fail for whatever reason. The interconnected insti- tutions of a highly complex society are like mountain climbers tied to one rope with no belay: **the fall of one can trigger the death of all**. For example, the world ﬁ nancial system experi- ences periodic crises when the failure of one bank brings down a host of counterparties. Similarly, a sudden or signiﬁ cant increase in the price of a critical commodity, such as petro- leum, can choke an industrial superstructure predicated on cheap and abundant energy. The further danger is that such a crisis can trigger psychological panic and social pandemo- nium. In short, the higher we build the ediﬁ ce of civilization, the more vulnerable we become to catastrophe. A simpler, more resilient way of life would therefore be advisable on prudential grounds alone. But our primary concern here is politeia , and the political argument for cultural simplicity is that great size and complex- ity produce a debased politics. When a polity grows beyond certain bounds, oligarchy in the bad sense is inescapable, the burden of bureaucracy grows ever more stiﬂ ing, and genuine consent of the governed is practically unattainable. A vicious circle fostering ever greater centralized planning, administra- tive intervention, and political control takes over. If democracy survives at all, it will be a **token democracy** shadowed by the lurking menace of **mob rule**. In the United States today, for instance, a **tiny** circulating policy elite makes all the important decisions in ways that align the interests of government, ﬁ nance, and business. Since the system is “ democratic, ” the elite has to take into account the passions of the mob, which can erupt if its ox is palpably gored. So as long as the American ruling class provides the bread of afﬂuence and an entertaining media circus, it can do pretty much as it likes. Having long since outgrown the relatively simple conditions required to support its constitu- tional design, the United States has therefore **become an imperial polity** bearing no resemblance whatsoever to the original American republic. Such is the political price of great size and complexity. To cast the problem in more philosophical terms, let us turn to Jean-Jacques Rousseau ’ s On the Social Contract , which argues that the central task of politics is to uphold the “ general will. ” This is what any reasonable person, putting aside his or her prejudice and self-interest, would agree is in the public interest because it beneﬁ ts the community as a whole. Rousseau contrasts the general will with the “ will of all, ” which is the mere summation of all the private wills of the individuals composing the polity. The difference between the general will and the will of all is best seen through examples. If people are carrying a contagious disease, the general will may demand that they be quarantined in some fashion. We do not allow a Typhoid Mary to work in restaurants because preventing the spread of illness to the general population trumps her loss of liberty. Similarly, we do not permit individuals to urinate and defecate just anywhere. We oblige them to practice good hygiene by using sanitary facilities, both to prevent a public nuisance and to preserve public health. We also make immunization mandatory for schoolchildren because we know that the gain to society from herd immunity outweighs not only parental preference but even the slight risk of harm to any particular child. In this critical area of public health, we compel individuals to follow the general will rather than their private will because to do otherwise would produce a diseased will of all. In these cases, the difference between the general will and the will of all is clear, and the argument for the former is, to most people, compelling. However, this same dynamic applies at every level within the polity — albeit usually in a more atten- uated form that can make it hard to achieve or even discern the general will, especially in advance. As Rousseau points out, “ One always wants what is good for oneself, but one does not always see it. ” 14 Even where there is no evil intention but simply **the natural urge to fulﬁll individual desire**, people following their private will almost always create a will of all contrary to the general will. For example, the individual preference for private automo- biles leads to a host of public ills — trafﬁ c-choked and polluted cities that are friendlier to cars than people, thousands of dead and injured people every year, the threat of climate disruption, the loss of good farmland to suburban sprawl, foreign policy dilemmas or even wars, and so forth. Similarly, private demand for exotic woods causes the destruction of tropical rainforests, an ecological tragedy whose costs we all bear. Likewise, indi- viduals seeking longer life through state-of-the-art medical care threaten to bankrupt the public purse, to mention only the ﬁ scal cost of extended life spans. In other words, perfectly reasonable and legitimate private desires and actions aggregate into global outcomes that no reasonable person would want. Unless the general will is identiﬁ ed and upheld by the polity, ill-advised microdecisions motivated by private interest will add up to an unwanted or even ruinous macrodecision. The “ tragedy of the commons, ” the “ public-goods problem, ” the phenomenon of “ market failure, ” and a number of other dilemmas much studied by contemporary social sci- entists are instances of the general problem identiﬁ ed by Rous- seau. The same essential conﬂ ict occurs within each individual human being. We all know we would be healthier if we ate less and exercised more (the general will), but instead we indulge appetite (the private will) and cause an epidemic of obesity (the will of all). As a matter of both principle and practice, modern political economies are based explicitly on the will of all — that is, they are designed to satisfy private desire, not to achieve the public good. To put it the other way around, the public good has been redeﬁ ned as the outcome of the invisible hand of the economic and political marketplace. In fact, any attempt to uphold the commonweal is likely to be dismissed out of hand as special pleading or denounced as hostile to liberty. The practical outcome of modern political economy is almost bound to be what economist John Kenneth Galbraith called “ private afﬂ u- ence and public squalor ” — that is, a state in which individuals gratify their petty desires without regard to the unwanted or even destructive consequences of their private acts. 15 Worse yet, the reality of any marketplace is that partici- pants constantly strive to tip the invisible hand in their dir- ection, so the legislative process is likely to be subverted. As Rousseau put it, “ the basest interest brazenly adopts the sacred name of the public good . . . and iniquitous decrees whose only goal is the private interest are falsely passed under the name of laws. ” 16 The resulting will of all is therefore not pure but crooked. It has been bent to favor some interests over others. For Rousseau, the will of all is not primarily a practical problem to be solved but a moral failure to be overcome. When we follow our private will oblivious to or even in deﬁ ance of the general will, we injure society and degrade ourselves. His conclusion is expressed in stark terms by the epigraph to this chapter: since “ the impulse of appetite alone is slavery, ” we must be “ forced to be free ” by being made obedient to laws that align our private wills with the general will. Rousseau attempts to reconcile the obvious conﬂ ict between individual liberty and the higher freedom we gain in following the general will by saying that we are obeying laws that we, as reasonable beings, have prescribed for ourselves. But he acknowledges that the problem is like squaring the circle — ultimately unsolvable. As Rousseau says, it is simply a given of the human condition that “ the private will acts incessantly against the general will, ” so it is inconceivable that the two will ever be perfectly aligned. 17 But there is an approximate solution for squaring the politi- cal circle: by simplifying the setting of politics, we can make the private will and the general will coincide to a much greater degree than they do in large and complex societies. Rousseau ’ s political ideal is a gathering of peasants deciding their simple affairs under an oak tree. The smaller and simpler the polity, the more likely it is that those deciding will understand the issues, see what would best serve their mutual interest, and choose to implement this collective decision even if it does not fully satisfy their private preferences. There is an almost mathematical relationship: the further away a society is from Rousseau ’ s ideal, the less apparent or compelling the general will is to any given individual, and the greater the likelihood of the polity ’ s lapsing into an undesirable will of all. In short, if you want to achieve a rough approximation of the general will, make your polity small and simple. It follows that the setting of politics is crucial. Rousseau does not want a totalitarian reign of virtue, as some critics allege. He uses the doctrine of the general will not to justify authoritarianism but to show why it is necessary to establish social conditions that give rise to a natural reign of virtue. Unless the polity is relatively small and simple, the doctrine of the general will can be perverted to legitimate the tyranny of a majority or the dictatorship of a central committee — precisely what happened during and after the French Revolution. Rousseau ’ s “ law one has prescribed for oneself ” is not a statute law to be enforced by the authorities but a moral law that embodies the general will. This makes mores the sine qua non of a good politics. Unless the moral law is given concrete form, individuals will tend to go their own way without regard to the general will. Mores, says Rousseau, are the “ unshakeable keystone ” of politics. 18 Unfortunately, in large, complex, impersonal societies beyond any person ’ s ken or control, the temptation to ignore or ﬂ out the mores of the community becomes overwhelming. Only a relatively small, face-to-face community can exert suf- ﬁ cient moral pressure to make individuals consistently obedi- ent to the mores that force them to be “ free. ” If you want citizens to be upright and law-abiding, make your polity small and simple. Last but far from least, freedom for Rousseau is not the ability to gratify appetite but the absence of dependence. As he says in É mile , There are two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature; dependence on men, which is from society. Dependence on things, since it has no morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices. Dependence on men, since it is without order [i.e., it is morally degrading], engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are mutually corrupted. 19 In other words, a large, wealthy, complex, hierarchical social order reduces the vast majority to a state of dependence and therefore destroys freedom. So if you want citizens instead of slaves, make your polity small and simple. Rousseau ’ s doctrines may sound shockingly “ illiberal ” to the contemporary ear, but consider John Locke ’ s discussion of freedom: The Freedom then of Man and Liberty of acting according to his own Will, is grounded on his having Reason , which is able to instruct him in that Law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrain ’ d Liberty, before he has Reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his Nature, to be free; but to thrust him out amongst Brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a Man, as theirs. 20 So even the author of the liberal tradition says that freedom is not “ an unrestrain ’ d Liberty. ” Despite their considerable differences, Locke and Rousseau therefore agree on this fun- damental point: man ’ s private will must be made subject to “ that Law he is to govern himself by, ” a law discovered by “ Reason. ” To frame the issue in terms of Burke ’ s syllogism, if we do not bind ourselves with moral chains, then others will do the job for us (and not necessarily to our advantage). There must be a structure of benign control to teach self-control — in other words, community mores. Locke, who made a strong civil society the linchpin of his political theory, therefore differs only in degree with Plato, Rousseau, and others (such as the psychologist B. F. Skinner) who contend that since social con- ditioning is already pervasive and controls human behavior unconsciously, we must strive to do it more consciously, com- passionately, and responsibly. It also should be said that neither Locke nor Adam Smith would approve of the ends to which their liberal doctrines have been perverted. Both are actually closer in spirit to Rousseau than to contemporary liberals because they envisaged small-hold, independent pro- prietors enjoying strong but limited property rights, not gar- gantuan, globe-straddling corporations exploiting the same rights to dominate both economy and polity.

### 1NC

#### The 1ac functions as a criticism of the status quo US foreign policy creating a rhetoric that risks unraveling the current unipolar world. Each criticism contributes to neo-isolationist tendencies that create a potential foil to American predominance.

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Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did during the Cold War, lest the entire international system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget —- even if most of the rest of the world does not —- just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling**.**

#### Withdrawal is bad – causes war

Brooks et al 13

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A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

#### The alternative is to reject the aff as a signal of commitment to US imperial resolve .Maintaining support for hegemony in academic institutions is key

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(John, Professor Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Security, Summer, p. 93)

The discussion of institutions up to now has a distinct academic flavor. However, the debate over whether institutions cause peace is not just a dispute about international relations theory; it also has significant real-world consequences. For example, the Clinton administration and many European policymakers publicly maintain that states should not worry about the balance of power – that is “old thinking,” they say – but should instead rely on institutions to protect them. This perspective makes sense only if there is evidence that institutions can get the job done. But so far, the evidence indicates that institutions do not provide a sound basis for building a stable post-Cold War world. Institutions failed to prevent or shut down the recent wars in Bosnia and Transcaucasia, and failed to stop the carnage in Rwanda; there is little reason to think that those same institutions would do better in the next trouble spot. The bottom line on institutions seems clear: despite all the rhetoric about their virtues, there is little evidence that they can alter state behavior and cause peace. States temporarily led astray by the false promise of institutional rhetoric eventually come to their senses and start worrying about the balance of power. Surely Bosnian policymakers now recognize their mistake in trusting institutions like the UN and the EC to pull their chestnuts out of the fir. In the meantime, however, a state that ignores the balance of power can suffer enormous damage. Thus, it would seem to make sense, from both a moral and a strategic perspective, for institutionalists to tone down their claims about the peace-causing effects of institutions until they have solid evidence to support their positions

### Case

#### Evaluate consequences – allowing violence for the sake of moral purity is evil

**Isaac 2** (Jeffrey C., Professor of Political Science – Indiana-Bloomington, Director – Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, Ph.D. – Yale, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the **clean conscience** of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about **unintended consequences** as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### No impact to biopower

**Nielson, 2004** (Brett, University of Western Sydney, “Potenza Nuda? Sovereignty, Biopolitics, Capitalism”, Contretemps, December 5, p. 68)

In these articulations with Hardt, Negri’s disagreement with Agamben stems from an equation of constituent power with living labour and a refusal to ground ontology in the condition of bare life. If, in Empire, this quarrel with Agamben is relatively marginal (confined to footnotes and passing comments), it assumes prominence in a subsequent essay, “Il mostro politico. Nuda vita e potenza”. In this place, which traces the philosophical and historical consequences of eugenics (from classical Greece to contemporary biotechnology), **the concept of bare life is** understood as **an ideological device for neutralizing the transgressive potentiality of human existence.** Here Negri’s criticism of Agamben is more rhetorical and direct: “Were the Vietnamese combatants or the blacks who revolted in the ghettos naked? Were the workers or the students of the 1970s naked? It doesn’t seem so if you look at photos. At least if the Vietnamese weren’t denuded by napalm or the students hadn’t decided to give witness naked as a sign of their freedom.” **Human struggle,** by this account, **cannot be held ransom to the biopolitical machine** that produces bare life. **Even in the case of Nazi camps,** Negri contends , **it is mistaken to equate bare life with powerlessness**. **The mussulmani** (or denuded concentration camp victims) of whom Agamben writes in Remnants of Auschwitz, (1999) **are humans before they are naked. And to make bare life an absolute and assimilate it to the horrors of Nazism is a ruse of Ideology.** “Life and death in the camps represents nothing more than life and death in the camps – an episode of the civil war of the twentieth century, a horrific spectacle of the destiny of capitalism and the ideological masking of its will, of the capitalist motive against every instance of liberty.” For Negri, **the concept of bare life denies the potentiality of being.** Like Hobbe’s Leviathan, which promotes a vision of life as subjugated and unable to resist, **the theory of bare life represents a kind of foundation myth for the capitalist state. It is a cry of weakness that constructs the body as a negative limit and licenses a nihilistic view of history.**

#### Their version of “truth” results in insulating their claims from challenge – turns the whole aff

**Lynn ’99** (Laurence, Sid Richardson Research Prof. in LBJ School of Public Affairs @ UT Austin, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, “A Place at the Table: Policy Analysis, Its Postpositive Critics, and the Future of Practice”, 18:3)

Policy analysis, says Torgerson, is “haunted” by its original “dream” which, as he tells it, bearing “the unmistakable imprint of the positivist heritage,” is of the abolition of politics (p. 34, emphasis added). “Professional policy analysis,” he says, “is not really of this world—this all-too-human world of conflict, confusion, and doubt. . . . [T]he analyst . . . becomes one who performs remote operations on an essentially alien object” (p. 35). Because the goals of policy are matters of value, not facts and logic, goals cannot be included within the scope of what the policy analyst knows about. As a result, conventional policy analysis is “blinded to political reality” (p. 37). The policy analysts’ “dream,” he says, must be seen for the nightmare that it is: Huxley’s Brave New World, Orwell’s 1984. Writing in 1986, Torgerson was optimistic that the “spell of positivism” might be broken by the postpositive turn in social science. The policy analyst is succumbing to the temptation to join society and develop the “participatory potential” of policy analysis. Intellectual sustenance for this movement was being provided by Majone’s thinking on policy analysis, which helps shatter “the technocratic expectation of precise and certain solutions” (p. 44). New fields such as impact assessment, says Torgerson, invite broader evaluation of technocratic solutions. Postpositive policy analysts will come to have “an acute awareness of their own frailty and fallibility” and will “make their humanity apparent” (p. 51). The telling of the story is continued by others. Positivism has been severely shaken, if not vanquished, said William Ascher when stepping down as editor of Policy Sciences [Ascher, 1987]. The “importance of contextual, interdisciplinary, problem-oriented inquiry” has been successfully reasserted (p. 3). The field is now aware that the policy analyst is part of the policy process, and the analysts’ quixotic fixation on universal laws is being abandoned. It gets even better. Durning (in this issue) quotes Dryzek and Torgerson as saying that postpositivist policy analysis “now occupies the intellectual high ground in the policy field.”3 In general, as I read it, the postpositivist animus against unreconstructed policy analysis has two primary causes. The first is the presumed adherence by policy analysts to the positivist dogma that facts and values must be kept strictly separate and that facts and facts alone are the province of the policy analyst. Policy analysts cum positivists are said to be determined to identify and apply universal laws (presumably including the “law of supply and demand”) to the “objective facts” of social life. They are indicted for clinging to the hope that “policy debate can be confined to technical questions on which experts can agree,” for believing that there are objective rules of behavior that will automatically lead to optimal results [Danziger, 1995, p. 440]. Forrester [1993] evaluates and finds wanting the staples of conventional policy planning practice: means-ends models of instrumental rationality; problem-solving, rationalistic, “scientific” models; cybernetic, information-processing models; and “satisficing” models of “bounded rationality” (p. 19). These practices, he says, fail to address ethical and normative issues associated with policymaking in a systematic manner. The postpositivist counterargument is twofold: (1) facts and values cannot and should not be separated in democratic deliberation; policy analysts must take a “value critical approach” in which, as deLeon puts it, “ideology, values, and belief become part and parcel of the formal analysis” (deLeon, 1997, p. 79); and (2) facts are social constructions, not objective features of the material world awaiting discovery, and any representation of “true facts” must be recognized as essentially arbitrary, pseudodiscoveries that disguise a social, political agenda. There are no social facts that exist independent of investigators as sociopolitical beings. Science is not “passive reception and organization of sense data,” but rather itself a product of the social world, “grounded in and shaped by normative suppositions and social meanings” [Fischer, 1993, p. 167]. Postpositivists would subject all values to explicit analysis, using approaches such as Q-methodology for this purpose, and analyses of values would be at the heart of policy analysis practice. Postpositivists variously favor an interpretive or hermeneutic or narrative understanding of the material and social world. Who Is “of This World”? The second source of postpositive animus against policy analysis practice is the clientelism of policy analysis. Postpositivists view the partnership between policy analysis and the hierarchical state as devastating to democracy and to the policies that would otherwise emerge from unimpeded discussion among informed, autonomous citizens. Postpositivists attack the hierarchical structures of a top-down, mass society that enact elitist policies favoring the few [Fischer, 1993, p. 166] and indict policy analysts as handmaidens of power. They would substitute for bureaucracy what is variously termed “authentic democracy,” “unimpeded inquiry,” and “ethically illuminating, communicative practice.” With this argument, we shift from epistemology to politics. Peter deLeon quotes Torgerson as follows: “It should . . . be recognized that the adoption of any methodological posture—whether right or wrong—is inescapably a form of political action” [deLeon, 1997, p. 86]. Traditional policy analysts differ sharply from their postpositive critics in political posture, which is seen most closely in the differences in their counterfactuals. To policy analysts, the counterfactual is the world that frustrated Charles Schultze and Alice Rivlin, a world with no one at the table to add clarity, thoughtful analysis, and an awareness of alternatives and opportunity costs to the discussion, a world dominated by the inertia of government and by “military requirements,” professional medical judgment, the sanctity of subsidies, and the superiority of sentiment. To the postpositivists, the counterfactual appears to be a politics wholly reconstituted around empowered and informed citizens. Postpositivists evidently believe that eliminating positivist practice and the institutions that sustain it will improve the prospects for unimpeded discourse and deliberation undistorted by elite bias. This difference seems to me to be captured in the following thought experiment. Suppose that conventional, positivist policy analysis, wherever and by whomever it is currently practiced, could be surgically removed from the body politic. That is, suppose that policy analysis as practiced in the planning, program development, and budget offices of federal, state, and local agencies; in the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the Congressional Budget Office; in The Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute; at the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, Mathematica Policy Research, the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, and the Urban Institute; at the Institute for Research on Poverty and the Joint Center for Poverty Research—together with its most prominent practitioners—Henry Aaron, Mary Jo Bane, David Ellwood, Judith Gueron, Robert Greenstein, Rebecca Maynard, Robert Reischauer, Alice Rivlin, and Isabelle Sawhill, with their positivist penchant for facts, causal models, instrumental rationality, evaluation of alternatives and evidence-based practice—could be excised from government and sent to the collective farm to do honest work. Postpositivists, who cast such institutions and individuals as either ineffectual or the enemies of democracy, would, I assume, argue that the elimination of these “tools of tyranny” would contribute toward improving the climate and prospects for communicative practice based on postpositivist epistemologies. There would be grounds for greater optimism concerning policies that reflect the values and ideas of informed citizens. Bias against the policies, constituencies, and power of the centralized state would no longer be able to distort public dialogue, reify agency views of the world, and stifle the processes of deliberation. In contrast, traditional policy analysts would view the consequences very differently. Send policy analysts to the collective farm and, in an inevitably interestdominated, hierarchical political world, nontransparent methods would again go unchallenged and become even more pervasive. Secrecy, obscurantism, corruption, deception, distortion, unfounded assertion, dishonesty, narrow ambition, ideological excess, and all the other temptations to which flesh is heir might well be even more widely and securely practiced. The postpositivist dream of “unimpeded discourse” could easily become a nightmare of discourse impeded not by policy analysts claiming expertise but by a host of other antidemocratic elements inimical to informed discussion and empowered citizens. Careful attention must be paid to the design of institutions that promote cooperation at various levels of social discourse [Ostrom, 1998], but this is a positivist project that postpositivists could scarcely be expected to endorse. Policy analysts have a deeper worry about postpositivism. Notwithstanding her own positivist-tinged acknowledgment that “better arguments” should prevail, Danziger approvingly cites Stanley Fish as conceding that postpositivist convictions are “unsupported by absolute standards external to themselves” [Danziger, 1995, p. 448]. That this is true should not undermine the postpositivist’s defense of those convictions, however. In Fish’s words “the rhetorical and constructed nature of things does not compromise their reality but constitutes it, constitutes it in a form that is as invulnerable to challenge as it is unavailable to verification” [Fish, 1989, pp. 552–553]. If having convictions that are invulnerable to challenge and unavailable to verification is a virtue, then, it seems to me, postpositivists are urging us to reenter a dark, pre-enlightenment age dominated by the clash of metaphysical absolutes in which issues are settled by essentialist assertions, power and maneuver, and deliberate distortion or outright suppression of issues and opposition. It will be a politics of absolutist claims, bad numbers, and worse arguments; of emotion and unreason; of the survival of the most determined with the most to gain. Conservatives who set about dismantling the data-collection capacity of executive agencies in order to rob liberal policy analysis of its life’s blood, who are acting on what they believe to be a normative and critical analysis of social dysfunction (e.g., a retreat from God), and who advocate deliberation among citizens that is uncorrupted by the kind of social science research too readily available in The Green Book, would seem to be exempt from most postpositivist criticism. Presumably, if, following rules of discourse and choice agreed to by all, a community wishes to misinvest public resources, silence politically incorrect or divisive voices, and allow self-appointed local elites to pursue their ambitions without restraint, then their wisdom neither should be criticized nor contested by postpositivists. Indeed, as far as I can tell, there are no valid grounds for doing so. Grassroots intimidation and prejudice expressed through shouting in ordinary language are, at least, authentic. Who Is Telling the Truth? If it is to be persuasive and influential, a critique of policy analysis must be based on a history that “hears” the voices of its teachers and practitioners and that observes closely the contexts and products of practice. As Dryzek and Leonard put it, “What remains . . . is histories that would sort out the lessons of the past in a way that future practitioners—and publics—might find useful” [1988, p. 1258]. If such an engagement leads to a counternarrative, voices that speak in persuasive rebuttal to the voices representing policy analysis as taught and practiced, then professional practice might be induced to move more courageously in new directions. By this standard, the postpositivist derogation is a failure. The postpositive caricature of policy analysis is chilling, but false; it is so strained, so far removed from the ethos of policy analysis as generally taught and practiced, that most practitioners are justified in paying little or no attention to what they regard as esoteric, pedantic irrelevance. Moreover, the postpositivist penchant for constructing, as Edmund Wilson might put it, “imaginary systems [that are] as antithetical to the real one as possible” and for using these imaginary systems as a normative template for practice is so obviously subservient to a political agenda as to void its claim to authority as an undistorted epistemological critique of actual practice. THE CENTER WILL HOLD Policy analysis as a professional practice has been and must continue to be ethically committed to (1) improving public policy through “bringing to the table” an informed voice undistorted by a material interest in policy outcomes and (2) public policy discourse, both internal and external to agencies, that is conducted with intellectual integrity and a respect for democratic institutions. Policy analysts are obligated to recognize and adapt to changes in the environments and contexts of their practice, to acknowledge well-founded criticisms of their methods and professional conduct, and to being realistic concerning both the advantages and limitations of the tools at their disposal. Policy analysis is and will remain pragmatic and crafty. For this reason policy analysis practice will continue to be driven by problems as they arise in context. Admittedly, these contexts are more often than not hierarchical, often polarized, and always interest-driven rather than the kind of idealized contexts envisioned by postpositivists. But public policymaking is far less “federal” and hierarchical than it used to be, and decades of right-of-center politics have shifted interest decisively from public programs to incentives, choice, and quasi-markets. The exigencies of the political world will continue to insure a reality check on practice, and practice will evolve accordingly. Fortunately, too, the production of policy analysis is continuously refreshed by new cohorts of researchers and trained practitioners who bring fresh perspectives to the enterprise. Welfare studies today—for example, the multidisciplinary, field-oriented research of Julia Henly, Judith Levine, Marcia Meyers, and Jodi Sandfort—scarcely resemble those of the 1960s. For these and other reasons, the world of practice has and will continue to change, but the center will hold. Acknowledging its adaptability, David Weimer, overgenerously I think, labels policy analysis practice as “prepostpositivist” [1998]. Peter deLeon helpfully urges balance in appropriating the good ideas and useful practices from practitioners of various persuasions. Although a radical, Marie Danziger makes the reasonable argument that policy analysts “should be concerned that all relevant parties have access to sufficient data and a level of understanding that will enable them to be true players in the policy process” [1995, p. 445], what Linda and Peter deLeon call a “policy sciences of democracy.”

#### Unrestricted drones key to airpower and stopping terrorism

Brown 13 (Stuart S. Brown, Professor of Economics and International Relations in the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs*The Future of US Global Power,* p. 37-38)

US air power is perhaps best evidenced by its virtual monopoly of advanced drones and their current deployment in as many as six countries. The Pentagon uses approximately 7,000 aerial drones today compared with fewer than 50 a decade ago and these numbers will continue to climb (Bumiller and Shanker, 201 1). These drones range in size from that of an insect, to wings the length of a football field. The Predator, which can stay in the air for up to 20 hours, is increasingly being replaced by the Reaper, which can carry 3,000 lb of munitions. During the Obama administration's first two years, 85 per cent of those reportedly killed by drones were militants compared with 60 per cent during the Bush administration (Bergen and Tiedemann, 2011).5 Drones have reportedly killed more than 1,900 insurgents in Pakistan's tribal areas since 2006 (Bumiller and Shanker, 2011). And the CIA used a new bat-winged stealth drone, the RQ-170 Sentinel, to spy on Osama bin Laden's compound. While these technologies have been successfully deployed to target insurgents and terrorists, their accuracy depends critically on boots in the field. They obviously provoke public outrage when they tragically take the lives of innocent civilians. In sum, drones present significant legal and ethical issues (Singer, 2011).

Air power deters aggressive states – solves war

Andres 13

[Richard, professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College and senior fellow and the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Recapitalizing the U.S. Air Force: Pay Now, Or Pay Later, 3/18/13, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1397]

America’s reputation for invincibility in conventional war, stemming from its superior airpower, has led aggressive states around the world to fear using their militaries as an instrument of foreign policy. Potential opponents understand that the U.S. military can quickly determine the outcome of most state-on-state wars. More than that, though, they know that the cost in U.S. lives is likely to be so low that America will be willing to act as long as a postwar occupation is not required. Before the airpower revolution, this was not the case. In 1990, Saddam Hussein argued that attacking Iraq’s million-man army would result in Vietnam-like casualties. Today, no country believes fear of casualties will deter the United States from using airpower. As a result, for the past two decades state leaderships have been largely unwilling to use cross-border violence or threats of violence against the United States or its friends and allies. This fear of conventional U.S. military power has resulted in one of the longest periods of peace among nations in recorded history. Some argue that this phenomenon derives from some inherent normative impulses toward pacification, but **this peace is likely to last only so long as America continues to project an aura of military invincibility.** That aura will dissipate the first time a country believes that its fighters or surface-to-air missiles can defeat U.S. airpower

#### We should act as if truth exists. We can’t PROVE truth but their “truth games” don’t allow us to arrive at meaningful conclusions

**Backhouse ’97** (Roger, Prof. History and Philosophy of Economics at University of Birmingham, “Truth and Progress in Economic Knowledge”, p. 44-45)

Post-modernism argues that knowledge has to be understood in relation to specific discourse communities, and that there is nothing to be said about knowledge in general. This perspective shades rapidly into relativism: the doctrine that the real world, and evidence about it, do little to constrain our beliefs. All evidence, it is argued, is dependent on a conceptual framework, which undermines any claim to objectivity or to truth in anything other than a purely local sense. Although it may not be as satisfactory a response as we would like, it is quite coherent to argue that although we cannot refute these claims, they can be ignored. Consider the following argument about scepticism in philosophy. How important is it to defeat scepticism? How central is it to the tasks of epistemology? There is an attitude towards epistemological issues that can be expressed thus: Although we cannot answer the sceptical arguments, we are unconvinced by them. No one genuinely doubts his beliefs about his surroundings on the grounds that he cannot show that he is not a brain suspended in a vat of nutrients, sustained and manipulated by a brilliant scientist. Indeed, **the more convinced we are that the arguments cannot be met head on, the more they look like pointless philosophical games**. Consequently, let us leave them behind, and, making the best use we can of our knowledge of the history of science and the psychology of cognition, **construct a plausible, scientifically informed, account of how we know as much as (we all agree) we do know**. This view exploits the fact that our puzzlement by sceptical arguments is apparently 'insulated' from our first order practice of conducting inquiries and forming beliefs. Since they have no impact on this practice, we can ignore these arguments when we search for a philosophical understanding of our success in obtaining knowledge of reality. (Hookway, 1990, p. 130)2 The challenge posed by scepticism to epistemology is not quite the same as the challenge to economic methodology posed by post-modernist arguments, but the parallels are sufficiently close that we could respond in a similar way. Whilst it is certainly the case that knowledge is constructed, and that much of our knowledge of economic events is conditioned by what we take for granted as members of particular discourse communities, it is going too far to argue that there is no such thing as empirical evidence. Post-modernist arguments end up treating all knowledge as similar in kind, whereas in practice this is not the case. Economic knowledge comprises statements which differ markedly as regards the certainty with which they are held. In many cases it may, in practice, be unproblematic to take the existence of objective empirical evidence for granted. We could then use our knowledge of contemporary economics and the history of economic thought, together with such ideas from philosophy or any other relevant discipline, to explore the nature of economic knowledge and to make such generalizations as we can concerning the way in which economic knowledge progresses. Though the results of such inquiries will always remain, to a greater or lesser extent, conjectural, there is no reason in principle why they should not be used as the basis for methodological prescriptions. Such prescriptions will, inevitably, be only as strong as the arguments on which they are based, but that is no reason why they should not be made and debated.

#### Disproving particular meta-narratives doesn't disprove them all – don’t allow them to group all of our arguments under the heading of “you’re wrong”

**Uduigwomen ‘5** (Andrew, Prof. in Dept. Religious Studies and Philosophy – U. Calabar, Quodlibet Journal, “Philosophical Objections to the Knowability of Truth: Answering Postmodernism”, 7:2, April-June, http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/uduigwomen-postmodernism.shtml)

Postmodernism is incredulous to metanarratives. A metanarrative is a story of mythic proportion that is big enough to pull together philosophy and other disciplines and give them a unifying sense of direction. Good examples here are the Marxist political theory of class struggle and revolution, the Enlightenment’s intellectual story of rational progress and the Christian religious story about God working out his will on earth. Postmodernism is not saying that all people have ceased to believe in all stories, but that the stories are no longer working, partly because there are too many of them. It holds that claims to metanarratives (Universal truth) are oppressive and must be resisted. Postmodernism dismisses as logocentric all global worldviews, be they social, political, or religious. It reduces to the same order all totalizing theories: Christianity, Marxism, Feminism, Islam, Capitalism, Socialism, Secular humanism, Stalinism, Modern Science , and all totalizing metanarratives that anticipate all questions and provide predetermined answers. They equate all such systems of thought with witchcraft, magic, voodoo, astrology and primitive cults. The goal of postmodernism is not to provide an alternative set of assumptions but to demonstrate the impossibility of establishing any such underpinning for knowledge. We can debunk the position above by arguing that though there are many sorts of metanarratives, we should not however lump all narratives as though all of them are the same. Granted that some of the metanarratives are dubious, we should not however dismiss or reject all grand narratives. Again, postmodernists reject grand narratives because they are simplistic and reductionist. They offer us a theory of postmodern condition which presupposes a dramatic break from modernity. But certainly, the concept of postmodernism presupposes a totalizing perspective. While postmodernists reject grand narratives, it is logically impossible to see how one can have a theory of postmodernism without one.

#### Drones strikes are ethically obligatory

Shane 12 (Scott, National Security Reporter @ NYT, "The Moral Case for Drones," 7/14, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/the-moral-case-for-drones.html?\_r=0)

But most critics of the Obama administration’s aggressive use of drones for targeted killing have focused on evidence that they are unintentionally killing innocent civilians. From the desolate tribal regions of Pakistan have come heartbreaking tales of families wiped out by mistake and of children as collateral damage in the campaign against Al Qaeda. And there are serious questions about whether American officials have understated civilian deaths.¶ So it may be a surprise to find that some moral philosophers, political scientists and weapons specialists believe armed, unmanned aircraft offer marked moral advantages over almost any other tool of warfare.¶ “I had ethical doubts and concerns when I started looking into this,” said Bradley J. Strawser, a former Air Force officer and an assistant professor of philosophy at the Naval Postgraduate School. But after a concentrated study of remotely piloted vehicles, he said, he concluded that using them to go after terrorists not only was ethically permissible but also might be ethically obligatory, because of their advantages in identifying targets and striking with precision.¶ “You have to start by asking, as for any military action, is the cause just?” Mr. Strawser said. But for extremists who are indeed plotting violence against innocents, he said, “all the evidence we have so far suggests that drones do better at both identifying the terrorist and avoiding collateral damage than anything else we have.”¶ Since drone operators can view a target for hours or days in advance of a strike, they can identify terrorists more accurately than ground troops or conventional pilots. They are able to time a strike when innocents are not nearby and can even divert a missile after firing if, say, a child wanders into range.¶ Clearly, those advantages have not always been used competently or humanely; like any other weapon, armed drones can be used recklessly or on the basis of flawed intelligence. If an operator targets the wrong house, innocents will die.¶ Moreover, any analysis of actual results from the Central Intelligence Agency’s strikes in Pakistan, which has become the world’s unwilling test ground for the new weapon, is hampered by secrecy and wildly varying casualty reports. But one rough comparison has found that even if the highest estimates of collateral deaths are accurate, the drones kill fewer civilians than other modes of warfare.¶ AVERY PLAW, a political scientist at the University of Massachusetts, put the C.I.A. drone record in Pakistan up against the ratio of combatant deaths to civilian deaths in other settings. Mr. Plaw considered four studies of drone deaths in Pakistan that estimated the proportion of civilian victims at 4 percent, 6 percent, 17 percent and 20 percent respectively.¶ But even the high-end count of 20 percent was considerably lower than the rate in other settings, he found. When the Pakistani Army went after militants in the tribal area on the ground, civilians were 46 percent of those killed. In Israel’s targeted killings of militants from Hamas and other groups, using a range of weapons from bombs to missile strikes, the collateral death rate was 41 percent, according to an Israeli human rights group.¶ In conventional military conflicts over the last two decades, he found that estimates of civilian deaths ranged from about 33 percent to more than 80 percent of all deaths.¶ Mr. Plaw acknowledged the limitations of such comparisons, which mix different kinds of warfare. But he concluded, “A fair-minded evaluation of the best data we have available suggests that the drone program compares favorably with similar operations and contemporary armed conflict more generally.”¶ By the count of the Bureau of Investigative Journalism in London, which has done perhaps the most detailed and skeptical study of the strikes, the C.I.A. operators are improving their performance. The bureau has documented a notable drop in the civilian proportion of drone casualties, to 16 percent of those killed in 2011 from 28 percent in 2008. This year, by the bureau’s count, just three of the 152 people killed in drone strikes through July 7 were civilians.

# 2NC

### Effective Deliberation Outweighs – 2NC

#### Framework turns the case – only process-based deliberation and decision-making can create institutional war power reform

Koh 95 (Harold Hongju – Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Director, Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School, “WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: A SYMPOSIUM ON CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE AUTHORITY TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES: War and Responsibility in the Dole-Gingrich Congress”, 1995, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, lexis)

But there is a second, substantive critique of the legal process school, which has been put forward at this symposium and elsewhere by Professor Jules Lobel. Indeed, Lobel first sounded this theme in a prescient book review written half a decade ago. n32 Echoing Laurence Tribe's critique of Ely's process-based theory of judicial review, n33 Lobel argued that war powers scholars should focus not on process, but on substance. The problem with our foreign policymaking, he argued, has [\*8] not been our process of decisionmaking, but our substantive goals, which Lobel ultimately identified as extending American hegemony. Post-Vietnam efforts to reform our national security system have failed, he argued, because they sought to reform process without modifying these substantive goals. Thus, Lobel concluded, we cannot regain constitutionalism in foreign policy through procedural tinkering with legal rules; what we need instead is to mobilize popular movements to restrain America's hegemonic impulses. While I concede that process and substance cannot be entirely separated, I do not believe that we can work a fundamental transformation of the substance of foreign policymaking, when the process of making that policy is so fundamentally defective. In my view, a well-functioning process is the prerequisite to any kind of political agreement on substance. The goal of a constitutional process should not be to specify policy results, but to force the institutional players into a dialogue about which political ends they collectively seek and which they prefer to avoid. If interbranch dialogue occurs, it may produce a consensus for war (as occurred, for example during the Gulf War); but if no dialogue occurs, the Constitution mandates peace as the default position. The problem with our current process is that such institutional dialogue almost never occurs. As Ely's book points out, debates about war powers are rare, most debates are not "dialogue," but largely for show, and the branches almost never talk about our national goals regarding military intervention. Worst of all, as Ely shows, our current law, particularly the War Powers Resolution, lets them get away with it. A process-based view envisions a very different, three-step political procedure: one in which decisions to make war are preceded by intrabranch debate and deliberation, interbranch dialogue, and the creation and delineation of institutional precedent. Again, the exception that proves the rule was the debate over the congressional authorization of Operation Desert Storm, one of the few cases where judicial action helped force a dialogue about prior legislative approval before it was too late. n34 In that case, both the executive and legislative branches engaged in lengthy intrabranch deliberation before ultimately committing to war, an interbranch dialogue ensued that culminated in the congressional resolution authorizing use of force in Iraq, and the episode helped delineate an important institutional precedent which has served as a touchstone for subsequent deliberations. Regardless of what one thinks of the substance of the current Dole-Gingrich legislation, the process is at least working to the extent that after nearly two decades, Congress is once again proposing new framework legislation to govern war powers, which the [\*9] President may sign, veto, construe, or execute, and which the courts may end up interpreting. Even when the branches do not conduct direct dialogue, another lesson recent history has taught is that academic debate can force valuable "shadow dialogue" between private parties and the government, particularly when lawyers and academics challenge particular government legal interpretations. The debate over the correct interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was one famous recent example. n35 But the best recent illustration was the Clinton Administration's military incursion into Haiti in the fall of 1994, based on dubious legal authority. Instead of sending troops without justification, the Attorney General's lawyer, Walter Dellinger of the Office of Legal Counsel (and Duke Law School), put forward a legal explanation of the invasion of Haiti. That opinion letter responded to both public and congressional pressure and two joint letters from a group of law professors that had argued for the opposite position. n36 By sending the letter, the academics placed a burden of explanation upon the executive branch, forced internal debate within the legal circles of the executive branch, and prompted development of a nuanced governmental legal position, which not only clarified the precedential value of the episode for the future, but also made clear what legal claims the executive branch was not relying upon in Haiti (e.g., the claim that the President could commit troops abroad without congressional approval, based solely on United Nations Security Council authorization). n37 In sum, legal process is hardly irrelevant to politics in the war powers area. We simply cannot develop new substantive goals for our foreign policy without a better process, one that requires the active institutional participation of all three branches and that promotes the creation and internalization of legal norms. Far from being peripheral to politics, legal process can cabin politics. Properly designed process thus makes political actors accountable, by forcing them to live up to their constitutional responsibilities.

#### Only portable skill obtained from debate ---means our framework turns case and decision making is the only offensive argument in this debate

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition. Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

### Argument Testing – 2NC

#### Argument testing provides a pathway to knowledge – solves affirmative concerns that legal debates collapse into violence

Steinberg & Freeley 8 \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

If we assume it to be possible without recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of man and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14 I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of man in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13 Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained. Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually. When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided: A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision… The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision… It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16 John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors. We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

### A2: Rules / Limits Bad

#### This form of difficulty is an educational end in itself

Hurka 6 – philosopher who serves as the Jackman Distinguished Chair in Philosophical Studies at the University of Toronto (Thomas, 2006, "Games and the Good," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 80, http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~thurka/docs/pass\_games.pdf)

But though Suits defines the generic concept of game-playing, this is not what he defends as the supreme intrinsic good. His argument, recall, is that in utopia, where all instrumental goods are provided, game-playing would be everyone’s primary activity. But this description of utopia implies that it would contain no professional players; since no one would need to play a game as a means to anything, all players would be amateurs who chose the game for itself. But then they would have Rashdall’s lusory attitude of accepting the rules because they make the game difficult, and Suits explicitly agrees. He describes how one utopian character decides to build houses by carpentry rather than order them up telepathically because carpentry requires more skill. And he starts his discussion of utopia by saying he will defend the value of game12 playing as a specific form of play, where he has earlier denied that playing a game necessarily involves playing: to play is to engage in an activity for its own sake, and a pure professional does not do that.10 So the activity Suits defends as supremely good is game-playing that is also play, or what I will call “playing in a game.” And that activity involves accepting the rules not just because they make the game possible, but also because they make it difficult. I will follow Suits here and narrow my thesis further: not only will I explain the value only of playing good games, I will explain the value only of playing in these games, or of playing them with an at least partly amateur attitude. But this is not in practice much of a restriction, since most people do play games at least partly for their own sakes. Consider Pete Rose, an extremely hard-nosed baseball player who was disliked for how much he would do to win. Taking the field near the end of the famous sixth game of the 1975 World Series, and excited by the superb plays that game had involved, he told the opposing team’s third base coach, “Win or lose, Popeye, we’re in the fuckin’ greatest game ever played”; after the game, which his team lost, he made a similar comment about it to his manager. Intensely as he wanted to win, Pete Rose also loved baseball for itself.11 So the game-playing whose value I will explain involves accepting the rules of the game because they make it difficult. But then the elements that define this type of game-playing are internally related: the prelusory goal and constitutive rules together give it a feature, namely difficulty, and the lusory attitude chooses it because of this feature. More specifically, if difficulty is as such good, the prelusory goal and rules give it a good-making feature and the lusory attitude chooses it because of that good-making feature. This connects the lusory attitude to an attractive view that has been held by many philosophers, namely that if something is 13 intrinsically good, the positive attitude of loving it for the property that makes it good, that is, desiring, pursuing, and taking pleasure in it for that property, is also, and separately, intrinsically good. Thus, if another person’s happiness is good, desiring, pursuing, and being pleased by her happiness as happiness is a further good, namely that of benevolence; likewise, if knowledge is good, desiring, pursuing, and being pleased by knowledge is good. Aristotle expressed this view when he said that if an activity is good, pleasure in it is good, whereas if an activity is bad, pleasure in it is bad,12 and it was accepted around the turn of the 20th century by many philosophers, including Rashdall, Franz Brentano, G.E. Moore, and W.D. Ross. And it applies directly to playing in games, which combines the good of difficulty with the further good of loving difficulty for itself. The prelusory goal and constitutive rules together give playing in games one ground of value, namely difficulty; the lusory attitude in its amateur form adds a related but distinct ground of value, namely loving something good for the property that makes it so. The second ground depends on the first; loving difficulty would not be good unless difficulty were good. But it adds a further, complementary intrinsic good. When you play a game for its own sake you do something good and do it from a motive that fixes on its good-making property.

#### 2. Debate allows for a dialogue between different voices which is uniquely empowering

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The previous sections sketched the outline of a dialogical game pedagogy. Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

#### 3. Games occur in a fixed space with precise rules that are the source of enhanced performance

Garris et al 2 – research psychologist with the Science and Technology Division of the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division (Rosemary, Robert Ahlers, PhD, research psychologist with the Science and Technology Division of the Naval AirWarfare Center Training Systems Division, James Driskell, PhD, president and senior scientist of Florida Maxima Corporation and adjunct professor of psychology at Rollins College, December 2002, "Games, motivation, and learning: A research and practice model," Simulation and Gaming, 33(4), http://www.thaisim.org/articles/Garris%20et%20al%20-%202002%20-%20Games,%20motivation,%20and%20learning%20-%20441.pdf)

Although game activity takes place apart from the real world, it occurs in a fixed space and time period with precise rules governing game play. Caillois (1961) noted that in a game, the rules and constraints of ordinary life are temporarily suspended and replaced by a set of rules that are operative within the fixed space and time of the game. Moreover, when play violates these boundaries, when the ball goes out of bounds or the person responds out of character, play is stopped and brought back into the agreed boundaries. The rules of a game describe the goal structure of the game. One of the most robust findings in the literature on motivation is that clear, specific, and difficult goals lead to enhanced performance (Locke & Latham, 1990). Clear, specific goals allow the individual to perceive goal-feedback discrepancies, which are seen as crucial in triggering greater attention and motivation. That is, when feedback indicates that current performance does not meet established goals, individuals attempt to reduce this discrepancy. Under conditions of high goal commitment (i.e., the individual is determined to reach the goal), this discrepancy leads to an increase in effort and performance (Kernan & Lord, 1990). Therefore, game contexts that are meaningful and that provide welldifferentiated, hierarchical goal structures are likely to lead to enhanced motivation and performance.

### SSD Good – 2NC

#### Contradictory positions crucial to solve authoritarian pedagogy and lead to critical thinking - outweighs because only education spills over and is the only way to solve the aff

Lewis and Dehler 00

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Teaching with paradox requires “walking the talk.” If students are truly going to be inspired to think outside the box, we need not only to help them critique the box of oversimplified, polarized frames but also to model paradoxical thinking ourselves. As Farson (1996) noted, paradoxical thinking taps the power of uncertainty and ambiguity: “Absurdly, our most important human affairs—marriage, education, leadership—do best when there is an occasional loss of control and an increase in personal vulnerability, times when we do not know what to do” (p. 38). Recalling our earlier discussion of the control/flexibility paradox, the paradox of teaching with paradox lies in the need to provide order and foster creative tension. In this regard, we have found that teaching with paradox offers a valuable learning opportunity for instructors as well as students. By being self-reflective ourselves, we have become highly conscientious of our own defenses—our desire to control the classroom—and the paradoxical need to allow, even cultivate, an element of confusion to enable more insightful experiences. This requires resisting the temptation to overuse teaching paradigm tactics, that is, refraining from merely telling students about paradoxes and regulating their experiences and instead constructing boundaries within which they may comfortably question inadequacies of their understandings. Such needs complement and extend those of other learning paradigm strategies. For instance, Mallinger (1998) recently wrote of the need to give up control, to maintain control when using collaborative learning approaches, whereas Dennehy, Sims, and Collins (1998) examined the conflicting needs of experiential learning. Ambiguity is necessary so that individuals are personally stretched to apply concepts to real situations. It may seem paradoxical that the pursuit of a conceptual model for debriefing is urged, yet ambiguity is also urged, to meet the subjective needs of individuals. Both requirements (structure and ambiguity), however, can be met if the management educator is cognizant of . . . the debriefing model and uses it as a road map to facilitate discussion so that all learning states are experienced. (p. 18) Barrett’s (1998) seven injunctions of the “Paradox Mind-Set” remind instructors to be purposeful, open, skeptical, contrary, paralogical, imaginative, and courageous, as they encourage students to do likewise. Modeling paradoxical thinking entails remaining focused on the process and objectives of intentional learning while displaying curiosity, honesty, and selfreflection. By provoking insightful debate, conflict can become a source of creativity, and playing devil’s advocate may help students identify their underlying assumptions and more complicated questions to move beyond which alternative is “right” (Dehler &Welsh, 1993). Critiquing oversimplified explanations and taken-for-granted, often nonsensical, conventions, students can be inspired to seek and accommodate opposing views, to creatively make sense of contradictions by transcending either/or logic and overcoming fears of sounding absurd. Finally, the potential value of students’ leaving the classroom with some confusion or dissatisfaction should not be overlooked as a constructive tactic. Palmer (1998) proposed that “good education is always more process than product . . . [and] may leave students deeply dissatisfied, at least for a while” (p. 94). Likewise, French (1997) explained that teachers may use anxiety to foster creative tension and energy while avoiding an excess that freezes students within their defenses. Using the learning space provided by paradox requires staying with the uncertainty long enough to explore contradictions rather than suppress them, examining the ambivalence of mixed feelings, conflicting demands, and uncertainty. Rather than providing oversimplified closure to a complicated discussion, leaving a class with unresolved questions may spur further exploration to reduce confusion and complexity. A degree of unresolved tension or “dissatisfaction may be a sign that real education has happened” (Palmer, 1998, p. 94).

### A2: State Bad

#### 2. Educational gaming through dramatic rehearsal of specific institutions is simply our inquiry as social actors – we develop socially in relation to a generalized other

Haghoj 8 – PhD, affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, asst prof @ the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol (Thorkild, 2008, "PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming," PhD dissertation @ Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies, University of Southern Denmark, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

According to the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey, the meaning-making processes of learning, thinking, deliberating, and playing games all involve inquiry as social actors must be able question and explore situated problems in order to construct and reconstruct different aspects of knowledge (Dewey, 1916). For Dewey, the outcomes or “warranted assertions” of an inquiry are contingent as they – in principle – are constantly open to new inquiries (Dewey, 1938a: 9). In this way, no final criteria exist for validating knowledge. Moreover, the process of inquiry is holistic as it both involves logical thinking and creative imagination as well as individual and social dimensions. Dewey also describes the process of inquiry as a “dramatic rehearsal” of “various competing possible lines of action”, which refers to the tension between acts “tried out in imagination” and actual events (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This means that educational games represent problem-based scenarios as they allow participants to actively imagine, explore and project the problems, knowledge aspects and contingent outcomes of a particular game world in relation to real-world phenomena. By combining Barth and Dewey’s perspectives, the assertions of educational game scenarios can also be described as epistemological models intended (designed) to be realised through meaningful interaction – both in relation to a teacher perspective (facilitation) and a student perspective (participation). Arguing along similar lines, the interactionist perspectives offered by Erving Goffman and George Herbert Mead describe and illuminate the social organisation of educational games. Mead assumes that the self is developed socially by adopting and playing with roles in relation to a “generalized other” (Mead, 1934: 154). Thus, in order to learn from educational games, students must be able to relate their roles to a more generalised perspective, i.e. that of a politician. Partly building upon Mead, Goffman’s dramaturgical sociology assumes that individuals “perform” and present themselves through different forms of “impression management”, i.e. in order to avoid losing “face” as a professional politician (Goffman, 1959). Moreover, Goffman analyses games as “focused gatherings” where game participants are expected to mutually sustain the rules and validate the on-going social interaction in relation to the interpretive “frames” of a particular game encounter (Goffman, 1961a, 1974). In this way, the process of playing games – and educational gaming in particular – cannot be reduced to an end in itself since game encounters are always open 23 to the possibility that exterior issues may transform the meaning of the game. Seen from this interactionist perspective, the social organisation of educational gaming represents an on-going negotiation between everyday teacher-student roles and the assigned roles of a particular game scenario. Finally, Barth’s focus on communicative knowledge can be further developed through the dialogical philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin. According to Bakhtin, human communication is dialogical in the sense that it presupposes mutual understanding and responsiveness (Bakhtin, 1981). Furthermore, Bakhtin assumes that we always communicate through various speech genres where speakers and listeners position themselves in relation to different aspects of referentiality, expressivity and addressivity, i.e. the semantic “content” of political ideologies, the expressive language of political discourse, and modes of addressing an audience in a parliamentary debate (Bakhtin, 1986). Thus, educational games challenge the speaker-hearer relationships of an educational setting as teachers and students are expected to position themselves in relation to the particular speech genres, ideological voices and semiotic resources of a given game scenario. In this way, educational games are able to create dialogical spaces (Wegerif, 2007) involving both ideological tensions and discursive criteria for validating the knowledge communicated between the game participants.

## Case

### A2: Utility Rationalizes Evil

#### -- Extreme examples don’t apply – utility promotes equality and maximum good

Harsanyi 82 (John, Professor of Economics – University of California, Berkeley, Utilitarianism and Beyond, Ed. Sen and Williams, p. 26-27)

Some further notes on this suggestion will be in place here. First, it is sometimes alleged that justice has to be at odds with utility. But if we ask how we are to be just between the competing interests of different people, it seems hard to give any other answer than it is by giving equal weight, impartially to the interests of everybody. And this is precisely what yields the utility principle. It does not necessarily yield equality in the resulting distribution. There are certainly very good utilitarian reasons for seeking equality in distribution too; but justice is something distinct. The utilitarian is sometimes said to be indifferent between equal and unequal distributions provided that total utility is equal. This is so; but it conceals two important utilitarian grounds for a fairly high degree of actual goods (tempered, of course, as in most systems including Rawls’s by various advantages that are secured by moderate inequalities). The second is that inequalities tend to produce, at any rate in educated societies, envy hatred and malice whose disutility needs no emphasizing. I am convinced that when these two factors are taken into account, utilitarians have no need to fear the accusation that they could favor extreme inequalities of distribution in actual modern societies. Fantastic hypothetical cases can no doubt be invented in which they would have to favor them; but as, as we shall see, this is an illegitimate form of argument.

#### -- Their examples assume short-run value – but utility ensures long-run compassion and respect for life

Ratner 84 (Leonard, Professor of Law – University of Southern California, Hofstra Law Journal, Spring, p. 751-752)

The survival costs of clearly “asocial” behavior exceed the survival value of fulfillments derived from such behavior. The anger or hatred of a murderer , the gratification of a sadist, the malice of a defamer, and the greedy indolence of a thief lacks significant long-run survival values and are therefore subordinated to the existence , health, dignity, and productivity of the victims. The gratification derived by a few from the torture of animals not only lacks survival value; it may stimulate an appetite for infliction of pain on humans, whit countersurvival consequences, while concern for needless suffering of living creatures contributes to long-run human survival.

#### -- Utilitarianism doesn’t justify evil

Ratner 84 (Leonard, Professor of Law – University of Southern California, Hofstra Law Journal, Spring, p. 753-754)

Some nonutilitarians derive the possibility of a monstrous utilitarian result from the premise that the social benefit of monstrous conduct could conceivably exceed the social harm. In such a case, they insist utilitarians must either approve the monstrous conduct or cease to be utilitarians. The premise, however, is fallacious. First, if such a case is conceiveable, nonutilitarians have the burden of conceiving it, and the conception must be viable, .i.e., consistent with reality and in sufficient detal to permit a utilitarian costbenefit analysis. The fulfillment consequences of fanciful or conclusory assumptions cannot be ascertained. Second, the required utilitarian evalution resolves the pseudo dilemma. Conduct that reduces long-run per capital fulfillment is indisputably objectionable, whether or not labeled “monstrous.” Conduct that is necessary to such fulfillment, i.e., to facilitate long-run human survival, is not socially perceived as monstrous.

#### -- No one will be sacrificed

Scarre 96 (Geoffrey, Professor of Philosophy – University of Durham, Utilitarianism, p. 184)

Utilitarians, then, can respond to the charge that they fail to draw sufficiently strong protective barriers around individuals by showing that on a suitably refined view of what makes lives go as well, there will rarely be a case for sacrificing the crucial interests of some individuals for the sake of others’ benefit. A utilitarian may favour making a millionare disgorge his surplus wealth in order to help the needy, but that is no more than what most civilized countries do anyway, through their tax systems. (The practice can be justified on the ground that while enough is as good as a feat, less than enough means starvation). Harming people in regard to their essential interests is another matter. Not only does this hardly ever produce a positive balance of utility: it can also subtly damage the seeming beneficiaries, by undermining the basis of their self-respect. How this happens will be explained below.

#### -- Extinction mandates consequentialism

Bok 88 (Sissela, Professor of Philosophy – Brandeis College, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. Rosenthal and Shehadi, p. 202-203)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake.For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously—perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

#### -- Utility maximizes value to life and precludes zeroing anyone out

Dworkin 77 (Ronald, Professor of Law and Philosophy – New York University, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 274-275)

Utilitarian arguments of policy, however, would seem secure from that objection. They do not suppose that any form of life is inherently more valuable than any other, but instead base their claim, that constraints on liberty are necessary to advance some collective goal of the community, just on the fact that that goal happens to be desired more widely or more deeply than any other. Utilitarian arguments of policy, therefore, seem not to oppose but on the contrary to embody the **fundamental right** of equal concern and respect, because they treat the wishes of each member of the community on a par with the wishes of any other, with no bonus or discount reflecting the view that the member is more or less worthy of concern, or his views more or less worthy of respect, than any other.

### No Impact

#### No impact to biopower

**Dickinson 4** (Dr. Edward Ross, Professor of History – University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About ‘Modernity’”, Central European History, 37(1), p. 18-19)

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault’s ideas have “fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its ‘microphysics.’”48 The “broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus” on “technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science” was the focus of his interest.49 But the “power-producing effects in Foucault’s ‘microphysical’ sense” (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of “an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice” ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the völkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been **constrained** by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they **did not proceed** tothe next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and murder of the “defective.” Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But **neither** the **political structures** of democratic states **nor** their **legal and political principles** **permitted** such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a **democratic** political **context** they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

#### Biopower doesn’t cause exception or violence, but maintains life

Ojakangas 2005

[Mike, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, “Impossible Dialogues on Bio-Power: Agamben and Foucault,” *Foucault Studies* 2 (5-28), [www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf](http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf), acc. 9-24-06//uwyo-ajl]

The bio-political paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but, rather, the present-day welfare society and, instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the bio-political society can be seen, for example, in the middle-class Swedish social-democrat. Although this figure is an object – and a product – of the huge bio-political machinery, it does not mean that he is permitted to kill without committing homicide. Actually, the fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest “crime” against the machinery. (In bio-political societies, death is not only “something to be hidden away,” but, also, as Foucault stresses, the most “shameful thing of all”. ) Therefore, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying. In fact, the bio-political machinery does not want to threaten him, but to encourage him, with all its material and spiritual capacities, to live healthily, to live long and to live happily – even when, in biological terms, he “should have been dead longago”. This is because biopower is not bloody power over bare life for its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the living, the condition of all life – individual as well as collective – that is the measure of the success of bio-power.

\*we do not endorse gendered language

# 1NR

### 2ac- Sustainable

#### 2. Heg is completely sustainable- their authors are incorrect

**Beckley 12**

[Michael Beckley, research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “China’s Century?”, Winter 2012]

Hegemony is indeed expensive and provocative, but these declinist arguments tell only part of the story. The United States is both “system-maker and privilege-taker”—it pays a large share of system-maintenance costs but takes a disproportionate share of the benefiªts.36 The basic claim of the alternative perspective is that these benefiªts outweigh the costs. Most obvious, the United States, as hegemon, possesses an array of tools with which to reward and punish. It can provide, restrict, or deny access to the U.S. market, technology, foreign aid, support for membership in international organizations, bribes, and White House visits. These tit-for-tat bargains with individual states, however, are not as consequential as the United States’ power over aspects of the international system itself. In the alternative perspective, hegemony is not just preponderant power, it is “structural power.”37 It is the power to set agendas, to shape the normative frameworks within which states relate to one another, and to change the range of choices open to others without putting pressure directly on them. It is, at once, less visible and more profound than brute force. Seen in this light, the United States is neither benevolent nor feeble, but coercive and capable, and the goods it produces “are less collective goods than private ones, accruing primarily to the hegemon and thus helping maintain its hegemony.”38 Military superiority, for example, allows the United States to employ “force without war,” pressuring other countries into making concessions by shifting military units around or putting them on alert.39 It also allows the United States to run a protection racket, garnering inºfluence through the provision of security. As Joseph Nye explains, “Even if the direct use of force were banned among a group of countries, military force would still play an important political role. For example, the American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen’s minds.”40 To be sure, the costs of maintaining U.S. military superiority are substantial. By historical standards, however, they are exceptionally small.41 Past hegemons succumbed to imperial overstretch after ªfighting multifront wars against major powers and spending more than 10 percent (and often 100 or 200 percent) of their GDPs on defense.42 The United States, by contrast, spends 4 percent of its GDP on defense and concentrates its enmity on rogue nations and failed states. Past bids for global mastery were strangled before hegemony could be fully consolidated. The United States, on the other hand, has the advantage of being an extant hegemon—it did not overturn an existing international order; rather, the existing order collapsed around it. As a result, its dominant position is entrenched to the point that “any effort to compete directly with the United States is futile, so no one tries.”43 The dollar’s global role may handicap American exports, but it also comes with perks including seigniorage,44 reduced exchange rate risks for U.S. ªfirms involved in international commerce, competitive advantages for American banks in dollarized ªfinancial markets, and the ability to delay and deºflect current account adjustments onto other countries.45 More important, foreign governments that hold dollar reserves depend on U.S. prosperity for their continued economic growth and are thus “entrapped,” unable to disentangle their interests from those of the United States.46 Rather than seeking to undermine the American economy, they invest in its continued expansion.47 Finally, given its position at the top of the world trade regime, the United States can distort international markets in its favor.48 Declinists expect the hegemon to use its power magnanimously. According to the alternative perspective, however, American foreign economic policy involves the routine use of diplomatic leverage at the highest levels to create opportunities for U.S. ªfirms.49 U.S. trade offiªcials, “acting as self-appointed enforcers of the free trade regime, asserted the right with their own national law to single out and punish countries they judged to be unfair traders.”50 Globalization, therefore, may not be a neutral process that diffuses wealth evenly throughout the international system, but a political process shaped by the United States in ways that serve its interests.

### 1ar- Public Opinion

#### The American unipolar era is durable – despite America’s low approval rating, everyone still looks to America to solve global problems and there is no potential challenger

Kagan 6

[Robert, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, writes a monthly column for The Post, “Still the Colossus,” The Washington Post, 1-15, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/13/AR2006011301696\_pf.html]

The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. Bush's United States, the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. 11 and the Iraq war. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -- which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -- has simply not occurred. On the contrary, in Europe the idea has all but vanished. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline, and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. But if they really feared American power, Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate, even with an administration they allegedly despise. Western Europe will not be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War, because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. Nevertheless, the current trend is toward closer cooperation. Germany's new government, while still dissenting from U.S. policy in Iraq, is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in Afghanistan, most notably by continuing to supply a small but, in German terms, meaningful number of troops. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo, indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. For Eastern and Central Europe, the growing threat is Russia, not America, and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO? In East Asia, meanwhile, U.S. relations with Japan grow ever closer as the Japanese become increasingly concerned about China and a nuclear-armed North Korea. China's (and Malaysia's) attempt to exclude Australia from a prominent regional role at the recent East Asian summit has reinforced Sydney's desire for closer ties. Only in South Korea does hostility to the United States remain high. This is mostly the product of the new democracy's understandable historical resentments and desire for greater independence. But even so, when I attended a conference in Seoul recently, the question posed to my panel by the South Korean organizers was: "How will the United States solve the problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons?" The truth is, America retains enormous advantages in the international arena. Its liberal, democratic ideology remains appealing in a world that is more democratic than ever. Its potent economy remains the driving wheel of the international economy. Compared with these powerful forces, the unpopularity of recent actions will prove ephemeral, just as it did after the nadir of American Cold War popularity in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There are also structural reasons why American indispensability can survive even the unpopularity of recent years. The political scientist William Wohlforth argued a decade ago that the American unipolar era is durable not because of any love for the United States but because of the basic structure of the international system. The problem for any nation attempting to balance American power, even in that power's own region, is that long before it becomes strong enough to balance the United States, it may frighten its neighbors into balancing against it. Europe would be the exception to this rule were it increasing its power, but it is not. Both Russia and China face this problem as they attempt to exert greater influence even in their traditional spheres of influence. It remains the case, too, that in many crises and potential crises around the world, local actors and traditional allies still look primarily to Washington for solutions, not to Beijing, Moscow or even Brussels. The United States is the key player in the Taiwan Strait. It would be the chief intermediary between India and Pakistan in any crisis. As for Iran, everyone on both sides of the Atlantic knows that, for all the efforts of British, French and German negotiators, any diplomatic or military resolution will ultimately depend on Washington. Even in the Middle East, where hostility to the United States is highest, American influence remains remarkably high. Most still regard the United States as the indispensable player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Bush administration's push for democracy, though erratic and inconsistent, has unmistakably affected the course of events in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon -- never mind Iraq. Contrary to predictions at the time of the Iraq war, Arab hostility has not made it impossible for both leaders and their political opponents to cooperate with the United States. This does not mean the United States has not suffered a relative decline in that intangible but important commodity: legitimacy. A combination of shifting geopolitical realities, difficult circumstances and some inept policy has certainly damaged America's standing in the world. Yet, despite everything, the American position in the world has not deteriorated as much as people think. America still "**stands alone as the world's indispensable nation**," as Clinton so humbly put it in 1997. It can resume an effective leadership role in the world in fairly short order, even during the present administration and certainly after the 2008 election, regardless of which party wins. That is a good thing, because given the growing dangers in the world, the intelligent and effective exercise of America's benevolent global hegemony is as important as ever.

### Heg Solves Oppression – 2AC

#### US hegemony prevents global oppression and prevents more war than it causes – all their impacts assume occasional missteps

Jacoby 11 (Jeff – Boston Globe, graduate of George Washington University and the Boston University School of Law, “The world's best policeman”, 6/22, Washington Post, Factiva)

America may be the world's "indispensable nation," as Bill Clinton said in his second inaugural address, but most Americans, most of the time, are uncomfortable with the idea of US global hegemony. John Quincy Adams wrote long ago that America "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy." As the polls consistently suggest, that isolationist sentiment still resonates. But in Adams's day America was not the mightiest, wealthiest, and most influential nation on the face of the earth. Today it is. The United States is the world's only superpower, and if we shirk the role of global policeman, no one else will fill it. By nature Americans are not warmongering empire-builders; their uneasiness about dominating other countries reflects a national modesty that in many ways is admirable - and that belies the caricature of Uncle Sam as arrogant bully or "great Satan." Nevertheless, with great power come great responsibilities, and sometimes one of those responsibilities is to destroy monsters: to take down tyrants who victimize the innocent and flout the rules of civilization. If neighborhoods and cities need policing, it stands to reason the world does too. And just as local criminals thrive when cops look the other way, so do criminals on the world stage. Nazi Germany had conquered half of Europe and Japan was brutalizing much of Asia by the time America finally entered World War II. If America hadn't rescued Kuwait from Saddam Hussein in 1990, no one else would have, either. If America hadn't led NATO in halting Serbia's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, no one else would have, either. If America hadn't faced down the Soviet Union during the long years of the Cold War, no one else would have, either - and hundreds of millions of human beings might still be trapped behind the Iron Curtain. There is no realistic alternative to America as the world's policeman. It clearly isn't a job the United Nations can do. Can an organization that makes no distinction between tyranny and democracy rein in the world's monsters? As the UN's bloody trail of failure from Bosnia to Somalia to Rwanda makes clear, UN "peacekeeping" offers no protection against predators. None of this is to say that America-as-Globocop is a perfect solution to the world's ills, nor that the United States hasn't made many grievous mistakes in its actions abroad. But as the historian Max Boot argues, "America's occasional missteps should not lead us to abdicate our indispensable role, any more than the NYPD should stop doing its vital work, simply because cops occasionally do the wrong thing. On balance, the NYPD still does far more good than harm, and so does the United States of America." To say that America must be the world's policeman is not to call for waging endless wars against all the world's bad actors. Police officers carry weapons, but they fire them only infrequently. The cops' main function is not to gun down criminals, but to suppress crime and reduce fear by patrolling the streets and maintaining a visible presence in the community. Similarly, a well-policed world is one with less combat, not more. The purpose of America's nuclear umbrella and its global network of military bases is not to foment war on all fronts, but to prevent it - **by deterring aggression, maintaining the flow of commerce, and upholding human rights**. We don't do it perfectly, not by a long shot. We don't always live up to our own standards, we sometimes confuse police work with social work, and we are often rewarded not with thanks but resentment. A policeman's lot is not a happy one. It is, however, essential. Our world needs a policeman. And whether most Americans like it or not, only their indispensable nation is fit for the job.

### Truth Turn

#### The arg that they have a defense of their truth-claims is contradictory

**Uduigwomen ‘5** (Andrew, Prof. in Dept. Religious Studies and Philosophy – U. Calabar, Quodlibet Journal, “Philosophical Objections to the Knowability of Truth: Answering Postmodernism”, 7:2, April-June, http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/uduigwomen-postmodernism.shtml)

1. Truth Does Not Correspond To Reality : For the postmodernist, a true sentence is not true because it corresponds to reality. Truth is not established by the correspondence of an assertion with objective reality or by the internal coherence of the assertions themselves. There is no need to worry about what sort of reality a given assertion corresponds to. Instead of searching for truth we should be content with interpretations. The postmodernist shares with the positivist the Baconian and Hobbesian notion that knowledge is merely a tool or power for coping with reality. In place of the notion of truth as correspondence with reality, he avers that modern science does not enable us to cope because it corresponds, but simply because it enables us to cope. For him, because we are surrounded by so many truths, we must necessarily revise our concept of truth itself, that is, our beliefs about belief. This implies that truth is made rather than found. Truth is constructed by the mind, not simply perceived by it, and since many of such constructions are possible, none necessarily is sovereign. It follows then that the nature of truth is ambigious and that there is no such thing as true reality out there to discover. Grenz highlights the position of postmodernism thus: Post modern thinkers no longer find this grand realist ideal (that truth ultimately corresponds to reality) tenable. They reject the fundamental assumption on which it is based – namely, that we live in a world consisting of physical objects that are easily identifiable by their inherent properties. They argue that we do not simply encounter a world that is ‘out there’ but rather that we construct the world using concepts we bring to it. They contend that we have no fixed vantage point beyond our own structuring of the world from which to gain a purely objective view of whatever reality might be out there (McDowell, 614). The implication of this is that postmodernism rejects the assumption that the knowing autonomous subject arrives at truth by simply establishing a correspondence of reality that is objectively given and the thoughts or assertions of the knower. Such correspondence is impossible because our access to ‘objective’ reality is limited by our own linguistic and conceptual constructions. In reply or answer to the objection above, it can be argued that the postmodernist assertion that truth does not correspond to reality is self-defeatist. For one thing, the postmodern view can be seen as another arbitrary social construction like other ideologies that it sets forth to debunk. We have, therefore, no compelling reason to accept the theory as tenable. We can simply dismiss it as the creative work of some extremely cynical people. For another, if postmodernism can be shown to be true, then its main thesis (rejection of objective truth) is wrong. It is tantamount to saying that there is at least one objective truth and, that is, that postmodernism is true. In either case, the postmodernist rejection of rational objectivity is self-defeatist, self- refuting or self-destructive. It is either that it denies the plausibility of its own position or it presumes the reliability of reason and the objectivity of truth. To claim, for instance, as postmodernists do, that the ‘history of philosophy is closed’, or that ‘metaphysics has come to an end’ is self-refuting. The reason is that postmodernism cannot avoid using philosophy and metaphysics in such statements. How do they know this unless we can know something? What sort of epistemological status should we give to such statements? If they were true, they would be false. If they are mere poetical protests, then they do not destroy objective meaning or metaphysics (Geisler, 193-194). To disbelieve in truth is self-contradictory, whereas to believe means to accept that something is true. To say that ‘it is true that nothing is true’ is intrinsically meaningless. The very assertion that ‘there is no absolute truth’ is an absolute truth itself. Craig, as quoted in McDowell, levels this atack on postmodernism: To assert that ‘the truth is that there is no truth’ is both self-refuting and arbitrary. For if this statement is true, it is not true since there is no truth. So-called deconstructionism thus cannot be halted from deconstructing itself. Moreover, there is no reason for adopting the postmodern perspective rather than, say, the outlooks of Western Capitalism, male chauvinism, white racism and so forth, since postmodernism has no truth to it than these perspectives. Caught in this self-defeating trap, some postmodernists have been forced to the same recourse as Buddhist mystics: denying that postmodernism is really a view or position at all. But then, once again, why do they continue to write books and talk about it? They are obviously making some cognitive claims and if not, then they literally have nothing to say and no objection to our employment of the classical canons of logic (McDowell, 620).

#### Human survival depends on directly engaging the material world as social science understands it

**Morris ’97** (Brian, Prof. Anthropology – Goldsmiths College, Critique of Anthropology, “In Defence of Realism and Truth: Critical Reflections on the Anthropological followers of Heidegger”, 17:3, p. 316-320)

It has long been known, of course, well before postmodernism came upon the anthropological scene, that we do not perceive or experience the world in pristine fashion. For our engagement with the world is always mediated by our personal interests, by our state of mind, by language and cultural conceptions, and, above all, by social praxis. As an early and important his¬torian of science put it in 1838: 'there is a mask of theory over the whole face of nature' (Megill, 1994: 66). The anthropologist Ruth Benedict in her classic anthropological text Patterns of Culture long ago emphasized that a person's ideas, beliefs and attitudes are largely culturally constituted. As she wrote: `No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees it edited by a definitive set of customs and institutions and ways of thinking' (1934: 2). But as with Dilthey, her important mentor, this affirmation did not in the least imply a denial of the reality of the material world. This important insight which has been part of the common currency of the social sciences ever since the time of Marx, has, in recent decades, been taken up by philosophers and postmodernist anthropologists. But they seem to have taken this important insight to extremes, and in a `veritable epidemic' of `social constructivism' and `world making' have propounded a latter-day version of Kantian idealism, going even further than Kant in denying the reality of the material world, the `things-in-themselves'. Cultural idealism in its various guises, is thus now all the rage in the halls of academia, and has been adapted by a wide range of scholars — Kuhn, Althusser, Goodman, Rorty, Hindess and Hirst, Douglas, as well as postmodernist anthropologists (Devitt, 1984: 235). Such constructivism combines two basic Kantian ideas: that the world as we know it is constituted by our concepts; and that an independent world is forever beyond our ken (Devitt, 1984: ix). But, as already mentioned, many anthropologists go even further in an anti-realist direction, and deny the independent existence of a world beyond our cognition, a world that has causal powers and efficacy. With the free use of the term `worlds' they invariably conflate the cognitive reality which is culture — `discourses' is now the more popular term — and the material world that is independent of humans. Thus anthropologists now tell us that there is `no nature, no culture', or that nature, sex, emotions, the body, the senses, are purely social `constructs' or human `artefacts', or even that they do not `exist' outside of Western discourses. The suggestion that `nature' is a human construct or artefact (rather than being simply constituted or `edited'), or that it has 'disappeared' or does not `exist' are highly problematic notions. Derrida writes that 'nature, that which words . . . name, have always already escaped, have never existed' (1976: 159). Although making an important point about the nature of language, this phrase simply indicates just how alienated from nature contemporary philosophers seem to be. They seem unable to recognize that human beings are, as Nigel Pennick puts it 'rooted in the earth' (1996: 7). In a gleeful phrase, John Passmore notes that it is the French intellectual's dream `of a world which exists only in so far as it enters into a book' (1985: 32). Now either one means by `nature' the existential world in which we find ourselves — the trees, the clouds, the sky, the animals and plants, the rocks, and all those natural processes which are independent of human cognition, and on which human life depends. To suggest that this is a human creation or artefact, or does not exist, is plainly absurd. Or, on the other hand, one means by nature the highly variable `concept' of nature; to suggest that this is a social construct is rather banal, though the suggestion is dressed up as if it was some profound anthropological insight. Reacting against the notion that there is an isomorphic — reflective — relationship between consciousness (language) and the world — so-called logocentrism' — postmodernist anthropologists now seem to embrace a form of cultural (or linguistic) idealism, and deny the reality of the material world (nature), or sex or the senses. Although some anthropologists deny that `sex' exists (as there is nothing `pre-social', Moore, 1994: 816-19 affirms) baboons in Malawi have no difficulty at all in distinguishing between male and female humans (cf. Caplan, 1987, for a more balanced perspective). Realism, as many philosophers have insisted, is a metaphysical doctrine. It is about what exists in the world, and how the world is constituted. Contrary to what Kirsten Hastrup writes (1995: 60), it is not a theory of knowledge, or of truth, but of being, and so does not aim at providing a `faithful reflection to the world'. Realism, as a doctrine, is thus separate from semantic issues relating to truth and reference, and from issues dealing with our knowledge of the world (epistemology) — both human and natural. Roy Bhaskar has critiqued what he describes as the 'epistemic fallacy', the notion that ontological issues can be reduced to, or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge (epistemology) (1989: 13). Everyone, of course, is a `realist' or Toundationalise in some sense, making ontological assumptions about what is 'real' and what 'exists'. Metaphysics is thus not something that one can dispense with, or put an 'end' to — as both positivists and Heidegger and his acolytes suggest. For Plato, `ideas' or universals were 'real'; for Descartes, the transcendental ego was `real'; for some eco-feminists the mother goddess is `real'; while for empiricists it is sense impressions. As used here, realism entails the view that material things exist independently of human sense experience and cognition. It is thus opposed to idealism which either holds that the material world does not exist, or is simply an emanation of spirit, or that external realities do not exist apart from our knowledge or consciousness of them. Outside of philosophy departments, and among some religious mystics and anthropologists, realism is universally held by everybody, and forms the basis of both common sense and empirical science. Common sense, of course, sensus communis, can be interpreted in Aristotelean fashion as a kind of sixth sense that draws together the localized senses of sight, touch, taste, smell and hearing. It is this sixth sense, as Arendt writes, that gives us a sense of realness regarding the world (1978: 49). Like Arendt, Karl Popper critically affirmed the importance of common sense. He wrote: `I think very highly of common sense. In fact, I think that all philosophy must start from common sense views and from their critical examination.' But what, for Popper, was important about the common-sense view of the world was not the kind of epistemology associated with the empiricists - who thought that knowledge was built up out of sense impressions - but its realism. This is the view, he wrote, `that there is a real world, with real people, animals and plants, cars and stars in it. I think that this view is true and immensely important, and I believe that **no valid criticism of it has ever been proposed'** (Miller, 1983: 105). Science therefore was not the repudiation of common-sense realism, but rather a creative attempt to go beyond the world of ordinary experience, seeking to explain, as he put it, 'the everyday world by reference to hidden worlds'. In this it is similar to both religion and art. What characterizes science is that the product of the human imagination and intuition are controlled by rational criticism 'Criticism curbs the imagination but does not put it in chains' (1992a: 54). Science is therefore, for Popper, `hypothetico-deductive'. What exists, and how the world is constituted, depends, of course on what particular ontology or `world view' (to use Dilthey's term) is being expressed, although in terms of social praxis **the reality of the material world is always taken for granted for human survival depends on acknowledging and engaging with this world**. As Marx expressed it, we are always engaged in a `dialogue with the real world' (1975: 328). It is important then to defend a realist perspective, one Marx long ago described as historical materialism. It is a metaphysics that entails the rejection both of contemplative materialism (the assumption that there is a direct unmediated relationship between consciousness [language] and the world) and constructivism. The latter is just old-fashioned idealism in modern guise, the emphasis being on culture, language and discourses, rather than on individual perception (Berkeley) or a universal cognition (Kant). This approach may also be described as dialectical naturalism (Bookchin, 1990), transcendental or critical realism (Bhaskar, 1978: 25; Collier, 1994), or constructive realism (Ben-Ze'ev, 1995: 50) - recognizing the significant social and cognitive activity of the human agent, but acknowledging the ontological independence and causal powers of the natural world. As Mark Johnson simply puts it: 'How we carve up the world will depend both on what is "out there" independent of us, and equally on the referential scheme we bring to bear, given our purposes, interests, and goals' (1987: 202). Our engagement with the world is thus always mediated. Equally important is the fact that we are always, as Marx put it, engaged in a 'dialogue' with the material world. It is thus necessary to reject both idealism (constructivism) and reductive materialism (positivism, objectivism) as many classical sociologists and human scientists have insisted (see my account of anthropological studies of religion, Morris, 1987). Again, Johnson expresses this rather well: Contrary to idealism, we do not impose arbitrary concepts and structure upon an undifferentiated, indefinitely malleable reality — we do not simply construct reality according to our subjective desires and whims. Contrary to objectivism, we are not merely mirrors of nature that determines our concepts in one and only one way. (1987: 207) The 'end' of metaphysics is, of course, simply an intellectual posture of the positivists and the Heideggerians, for we all affirm in our beliefs and writings certain ontological assumptions about the world. What Flax means by the 'end' of 'metaphysics' is a rejection of a certain kind of idealist, or absolutist metaphysics, one of course, that the social sciences rejected long, long ago.

#### Questioning the possibility of truth eliminates the possibility of dissent because right and wrong become inexorably tied to power.

**Lynch ‘4** (Michael, Associate Prof. Phil. – UConn, The Chronicle Review, “Who Cares About The Truth?” 51:3, 9-10, http://chronicle.com/weekly/v51/i03/03b00601.htm)

There are three simple reasons to think that truth is politically valuable. The first concerns the very point of even having the concept. At root, we distinguish truth from falsity because we need a way of distinguishing right answers from wrong ones. In particular, and as the debacle over weapons of mass destruction in Iraq clearly illustrates, we need a way of distinguishing between beliefs for which we have some partial evidence, or that are widely accepted by the community, or that fit our political ambitions, and those that actually end up being right. It is not that we can't evaluate beliefs in all those other ways -- of course we can. But the other sorts of evaluation depend for their force on the distinction between truth and falsity. We think it is good to have some evidence for our views because we think that beliefs that are based on evidence are more likely to be true. We criticize people who engage in wishful thinking because wishful thinking often leads to believing falsehoods. In short, the primary point of having a concept of truth is that we need a basic norm for appraising and evaluating our beliefs and claims about the world. We need a way of sorting beliefs and assertions into those that are correct (or at least heading in that direction) and those that are incorrect. Now imagine a society in which everyone believes that what makes an opinion true is whether it is held by those in power. So if the authorities say that black people are inferior to white people, or love is hate, or war is peace, then the citizens sincerely believe that is true. Such a society lacks something, to say the least. In particular, its people misunderstand truth, and the nature of their misunderstanding undermines the very point of even having the concept. Social criticism often involves expressing disagreement with those in power -- saying that their views on some matter are mistaken. But a member of our little society doesn't believe that the authorities can be mistaken. In order to believe that, they would have to be able to think that what the authorities say is incorrect. But their understanding of what correctness is rules out such a possibility. So criticism -- **disagreement with those in power -- is, practically speaking, impossible**. Recently there has been a revival of interest in George Orwell's 1984. But discussions of the book often miss the point. The most terrifying aspect of Orwell's Ministry of Truth isn't its ability to get people to keep people from speaking their minds, or even to believe lies; it is its success at getting them to give up on the idea of truth altogether. When, at the end of the novel, O'Brien, the sinister representative of Big Brother, tortures the hapless Winston into believing that two and two make five, his point, as he makes brutally clear, is that Winston must "relearn" that whatever the party says is the truth. O'Brien doesn't really care about Winston's views on addition. What he cares about is getting rid of Winston's idea of truth. He is well aware of the point I've just been making. Eliminate the very idea of right and wrong independent of what the government says, and you eliminate not just dissent -- **you eliminate the very possibility of dissent**. That is the first reason truth has political value. Just having the concept of objective truth opens up a certain possibility: It allows us to think that something might be correct even if those in power disagree. Without it, we wouldn't be able to distinguish between what those in power say is the case and what is the case.

### A2 You Have No Defense of Your Facts

#### Yes we do – choosing from empirically grounded claims allows us to arrive at the best representations of reality

**Liu ’96** (Xiuwu, Assistant Prof. Interdisciplinary Studies – Miami U. Ohio, “Western perspectives on Chinese higher education”, p. 22-24, Google Print)

The pervious section goes to some lengths to underscore the plain fact that the studied society exists independently of studies of it. Constructivists may contend that I missed their point. They may say, for example, that they never doubted the independent existence of society and that the thrust of their position lies in denying that we can arrive at the Truth about any aspect of society. Their point about the perspectival nature of knowledge is well taken, and realist constructivism contains that insight. "Anything goes" is a realist or rationalist caricature of relativism (Geertz 1984; Putnam 1990; Rorty 1982) just as talk about Truth is a constructivist caricature of the epistemology of "old-fashioned" scholarship. What I call social ontological realism is part of the general philosophical position of ontological realism, which asserts the mind-independent existence of reality. It asserts the study-independent existence of society and, in cross-cultural inquiry, the study independent existence of other societies. I give it special emphasis for two reasons. First, the concept of social reality has been neglected in recent constructivist works. Sometimes constructivists imply or even insist that there is no reality except that which is represented (Lincoln and Guba 198, chap. 3). For example, in her survey of feminist methods in social research, Shulamit Reinharz discusses a prevalent attitude of feminist ethnographers toward “positivism.”13 Some feminist researchers continue to reject positivism [referring in this context to “testing or large-scale surveys”] as an aspect of patriarchal thinking that separates the scientist from the phenomenon under study. They repudiate the idea of a social reality “out there” independent of the observer. Rather, they think that social research should be guided by a constructivist framework in which researchers acknowledge that they interpret and define reality. (1992, 46)14 This position commits the epistemic fallacy in that it reduces social reality to what is known about it (Bhaskar 1989; Outhwaite 1987, 76). While scholarly understanding of social reality is, to use a catchphrase of hermeneutics, always already interpreted, social reality in itself has its own existence. Because that reality has its own existence, insufficient attention to it will result in unrealistic representations of it. Put differently, realist constructivism attends to both ontological and epistemological aspects of cross-cultural inquiry, redressing the balance brought about by constructivist thinking. How this may be done in one area of empirical cross-cultural studies will be shown in my analyses of Western studies of Chinese education. In the fields of philosophy of science and philosophy of social science a prevalent position on ontological realism (usually called metaphysical realism) is that it is trivial or banal (Hesse 1992; McGinn 1995). This is because once the existence of specific entities (class, in social science, for example) is broached, the discussion becomes theory-laden.15 On the other hand, as Walker and Evers point out, “from the fact that all experience is theory-laden, that what we believe exists depends on what theory we adopt, it does not follow that all theories are evidentially equivalent or equally reasonable” (1988, 33). To reconcile these two insights for the present discussion, I suggest that in cross-cultural inquiry, ontological realism is not so trivial as has been deemed generally, where empirical checks are crucial to producing highly realistic representations of other societies.16 The objection that it is not so much the fact that another society has an independent existence but how that society exists that matters to empirical inquiry, though helpful, ignores the fact that the latter assumes the former. My second reason for emphasizing social ontological realism concerns the requirement that an adequate account of cross-cultural inquiry satisfactorily explains why some statements are realistic while others are not. As the remaining chapters of this book aim to show, in most cases the task is not deciding between an account that is realistic and another that is not. Rather, in actual inquiry, a scholar’s task amounts to choosing from a limited number of plausible accounts what she considers to be the most appropriate one. Nevertheless, in those limiting taken-for-granted cases, social ontological realism does make possible a distinction between realistic statements and unrealistic ones (unrealistic in the sense that they utterly fail to represent or belie an aspect of social reality within a given context). An adequate model for cross-cultural inquiry should account for these limiting cases.

### 1ac- Kritik Pre Empt- Deterrence

**Historical studies prove better than the alt’**

**Moore 4**

Director of the Center for Security Law at the University of Virginia, Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law (John Norton, “Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace,” page 27-31)

As so broadly conceived, there is strong evidence that deterrence, that is, the effect of external factors on the decision to go to war, is the missing link in the war/peace equation. In my War/Peace Seminar, I have undertaken to examine the level of deterrence before the principal wars of the twentieth century.10 This examination has led me to believe that in every case the potential aggressor made a rational calculation that the war would be won, and won promptly.11 In fact, the longest period of time calculated for victory through conventional attack seems to be the roughly six reeks predicted by the German General Staff as the time necessary ) prevail on the Western front in World War I under the Schlieffen Plan. Hitler believed in his attack on Poland that Britain and France could not take the occasion to go to war with him. And he believed his 1941 Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union that “[w]e have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."12 In contrast, following Hermann Goering's failure to obtain air superiority in the Battle of Britain, Hitler called off the invasion of Britain and shifted strategy to the nighttime bombing of population centers, which became known as the Blitz, in a mistaken effort to compel Britain to sue for peace. Calculations in the North Korean attackon South Korea and Hussein’s attack on Kuwait were that the operations would be completed in a matter of days. Indeed, virtually all principal wars in the twentieth century, at least those involving conventional invasion, were preceded by what I refer to as a "double deterrence absence." That is, the potential aggressor believed that they had the military force in place to prevail promptly and that nations that might have the military or diplomatic power to prevent this were not dined to intervene. This analysis has also shown that many of the perceptions we have about the origins of particular wars are flatly wrong. Anyone who seriously believes that World War I was begun by competing alliances drawing tighter should examine the al historical record of British unwillingness to enter a clear military alliance with the French or to so inform the Kaiser! Indeed, this pre-World War I absence of effective alliance and resultant war contrasts sharply with the laterrobust NATO alliance and absence of World War III.14 Considerable other evidence seems to support this historical analysis as to the importance of deterrence. Of particular note, Yale Professor Donald Kagan, a preeminent United States historian who has long taught a seminar on war, published in 1995 a superb book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.15 In this book he conducts a detailed examination of the Peloponnesian War, World War I, Hannibal's War, and World War II, among other case studies. A careful reading of these studies suggests that each war could have been prevented by achievable deterrence and that each occurred in the absence of such deterrence.16 Game theory seems to offer yet further support for the proposition that appropriate deterrence can prevent war. For example, Robert Axelrod's famous 1980s experiment in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, which is a reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations, repeatedly showed the effectiveness of a simple tit for tat strategy.17Such a strategy is at core simply a basic deterrent strategy of influencing behavior through incentives. Similarly, much of thegame-theoretic work on crisis bargaining (and danger of asymmetric information) in relation to war and the democratic peace assumes the importance of deterrence through communication of incentives.18 The well-known correlation between war and territorial contiguity seems also to underscore the importance of deterrence and is likely principally a proxy for levels of perceived profit and military achievability of aggression in many such settings. It should further be noted that the democratic peace is not the only significant correlation with respect to war and peace, although it seems to be the most robust. Professors Russett and Oneal, in recently exploring the other elements of the Kantian proposal for "Perpetual Peace," have also shown a strong and statistically significant correlation between economically important bilateral trade between two nations and a reduction in the risk of war between them. Contrary to the arguments of "dependency theorists," such economically important trade seems to reduce the risk of war regardless of the size relationship or asymmetry in the trade balance between the two states. In addition, there is a statistically significant association between economic openness generally and reduction in the risk of war, although this association is not as strong as the effect of an economically important bilateral trade relationship.° Russett and Oneal also show a modest independent correlation between reduction in the risk of war and higher levels of common membership in international organizations.20 And they show that a large imbalance of power between two states significantly lessens the risk of major war between them.21 All of these empirical findings about war also seem to directly reflect incentives; that is, a higher level of trade would, if foregone in war, impose higher costs in the aggregate than without such trade,22 though we know that not all wars terminate trade. Moreover, with respect to trade, a, classic study, Economic Interdependence and War, suggests that the historic record shows that it is not simply aggregate levels of bilateral trade that matters, but expectations as to the level of trade into the future.23 This directly implicates expectations of the war decision maker as does incentive theory, and it importantly adds to the general finding about trade and war that even with existing high levels of bilateral trade, changing expectations from trade sanctions or other factors affecting the flow of trade can directly affect incentives and influence for or against war. A large imbalance of power in a relationship rather obviously impacts deterrence and incentives. Similarly, one might incur higher costs with high levels of common membership in international organizations through foregoing some of the heightened benefits of such participation or otherwise being presented with different options through the actions or effects of such organizations. These external deterrence elements may also be yet another reason why democracies have a lower risk of war with one another. For their freer markets, trade, commerce, and international engagement may place them in a position where their generally higher level of interaction means that aggression will incur substantial opportunity costs. Thus, the "mechanism" of the democratic peace may be an aggregate of factors affecting incentives, both external as well as internal factors. Because of the underlying truth in the relationship between higher levels of trade and lower levels of war, it is not surprising that theorists throughout human history, including Baron de Montesquieu in 1748, Thomas Paine in 1792, John Stuart Mill in 1848, and, most recently, the founders of the European Union, have argued that increasing commerce and interactions among nations would end war. Though by themselves these arguments have been overoptimistic, it may well be that some level of "globalization" may make the costs of war and the gains of peace so high as to powerfully predispose to peace. Indeed, a 1989 book by John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday,24 postulates the obsolescence of major war between developed nations (at least those nations within the "first and second worlds") as they become increasingly conscious of the rising costs of war and the rising gains of peace. In assessing levels of democracy, there are indexes readily available, for example, the Polity III25 and Freedom House 26 indexes. I am unaware of any comparable index with respect to levels of deterrence that might be used to test the importance of deterrence in war avoidance?' Absent such an accepted index, discussion about the importance of deterrence is subject to the skeptical observation that one simply defines effective deterrence by whether a war did or did not occur. In order to begin to deal with this objection and encourage a more objective methodology for assessing deterrence, I encouraged a project to seek to develop a rough but objective measure of deterrence with a scale from minus ten to plus ten based on a large variety of contextual features that would be given relative weighting in a complex deterrence equation before applying the scaling to different war and nonwar settings.28 On the disincentive side of the scale, the methodology used a weighted calculation of local deterrence, including the chance to prevent a short- and intermediate-term military victory, and economic and political disincentives; extended deterrence with these same elements; and contextual communication and credibility multipliers. On the incentive side of the scale, the methodology also used a weighted calculation of perceived military, economic, and political benefits. The scales were then combined into an overall deterrence score, including, an estimate for any effect of prospect theory where applicable.2 This innovative first effort uniformly showed high deterrence scores in settings where war did not, in fact, occur. Deterring a Soviet first strike in the Cuban Missile Crisis produced a score of +8.5 and preventing a Soviet attack against NATO produced a score of +6. War settings, however, produced scores ranging from -2.29 (Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in the Gulf War), -2.18 (North Korea's decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War), -1.85 (Hitler's decision to invade Poland in World War II), -1.54 (North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords), -0.65 (Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo), +0.5 (the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor), +1.25 (the Austrian decision, egged on by Germany, to attack Serbia, which was the real beginning of World War I), to +1.75 (the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I). As a further effort at scaling and as a point of comparison, I undertook to simply provide an impressionistic rating based on my study of each pre-crisis setting. That produced high positive scores of +9 for both deterring a Soviet first strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO's deterrence of a Warsaw Pact attack and even lower scores than the more objective effort in settings where wars had occurred. Thus, I scored North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords and the German decision to invade Poland at the beginning of World War II as -6; the North Korean/Stalin decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War as -5; the Iraqi decision to invade the State of Kuwait as -4; Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo and the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I as -2; and the Austrian decision to attack Serbia and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor as -1. Certainly even knowledgeable experts would be likely to differ in their impressionistic scores on such pre-crisis settings, and the effort at a more objective methodology for scoring deterrence leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, both exercises did seem to suggest that deterrence matters and that high levels of deterrence can prevent future war. Following up on this initial effort to produce a more objective measure of deterrence, two years later I encouraged another project to undertake the same effort, building on what had been learned in the first iteration. The result was a second project that developed a modified scoring system, also incorporating local deterrence, extended deterrence, and communication of intent and credibility multipliers on one side of a scale, and weighing these factors against a potential aggressor's overall subjective incentives for action on the other side of the scale.3° The result, with a potential range of -5.5 to +10, produced no score higher than +2.5 for eighteen major wars studied between 1939 and the 1990 Gulf War.31 Twelve of the eighteen wars produced a score of zero or below, with the 1950-53 Korean War at -3.94, the 1965-75 Vietnam War at -0.25, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War at -1.53, and the 1990-91 Gulf War at -3.83. The study concluded that in more than fifty years of conflict there was "no situation in which a regime elite/decision making body subjectively faced substantial disincentives to aggressive military action and yet attacked."32

### Epis

#### Epistemology must be secondary to the prior question of political practice

**Jarvis 00** (Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128-9)

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflect our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to support that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, **smacks of intellectual elitism** and **displays** a certain **contempt** for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer **no**. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to support that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or in some way bad—is a **contemptuous position** that abrogates any hope of solving some of the **nightmarish realities that millions confront daily**. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, **“So what?”** To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate. Contrary to Ashley’s assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render and intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places.

### XT – Truth Turns

#### Denying the possibility of truth makes political change impossible

**McGettigan ’00** (Timothy, Dept. Soc. – U. Southern Colorado, Theory & Science, “Flawed by Design: The Virtues and Limitations of Postmodern Theory”, http://theoryandscience.icaap.org/content/vol001.001/05mcgettigan.html)

In response to the evils that have been proliferated (whether intentionally or not) by the purveyors of modernist science, postmodernists have called for a “humanization” of the collective social endeavor: scientific, economic, and otherwise (Denzin, 1995, 1997; Lather, 1995; Lemert, 1999). Postmodernists have argued that the juggernaut of modernity can be challenged most effectively by rejecting every assertion that knowledge or truth is generalizable (Seidman, 1991). Therefore, where there is no truth, there can be no justification for superimposing Western values and interests; to do so would constitute an unequivocal and unacceptable act of violence. This orientation to the philosophy of knowledge accomplishes a number of important goals for postmodernists. First, by elevating the status of “common knowledge,” the arbitrary, destructive power of science can be offset. Secondly, postmodernists have argued that, as a consequence of eliminating the pre-eminence of truth standards, “learned dialogues” are likely to become populated by a greater number and diversity of voices (Lemert, 1999). Consequently, by creating an environment wherein the oppressed may give voice to their concerns, the rotten core of modernity is more likely to be exposed. Having rejected the modernist emphasis on truth, a variety of postmodern “artistic” practices have been developed for the purpose of steering science in new directions (Brady, 1998; Janesick, 1994; L. Richardson, 1995, 1998; M. Richardson, 1998; Travisano, 1998). Yet, while there have been some noteworthy attempts to organize postmodernists around substantial scientific projects (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, 2000), no clearly defined postmodernist plan of attack has yet emerged. Indeed, the inability of postmodernists to mount a full counteroffensive to modernism has stimulated Lochner (1999) to propose that postmodernism is simply a poorly repackaged version of Dadaism, a nihilistic artistic movement. Lochner notes that, shortly after being recognized as a definable movement in the arts, Dada’s principal artists disbanded: once they had established that their movement was opposed to all forms of standardized control, there was nowhere else for Dadaists to go. Lochner even asserts that certain leading figures in the contemporary postmodern movement (Jean Baudrillard, in particular) have intentionally ignored their debt to Dadaism for two reasons: 1. This would establish that their revolutionary social theory was not, in fact, terribly original. 2. This would also indicate that there was no future for postmodernism—either in theory or practice. Still, while the motives of some postmodernists may be rather dubious, I do not think all the goals of postmodernism should be dismissed. There are many important reasons to question and criticize the modern world. However, as the Dadaists discovered long ago, the tactic of abandoning truth is an entirely unworkable strategy (i.e., one disavows every credible basis upon which to construct or criticize knowledge). Further, it is not possible to base any sort of “movement” on such a relativistic, nihilistic epistemology. Consequently, for postmodernism to move in a more meaningful direction—a move that has been called for by others as well (Brents, 1999; Campbell, 1998; Kincheloe and McLaren, 1994; Lange, 1998; McLaren, 2000)—I believe that postmodernists must reinvigorate the roots of their critique: how is it possible to organize a more just, fair, free, equal, and democratic world? Oddly enough, these should sound like familiar questions because they are precisely the same questions posed by Enlightenment scientists. The philosophy of Enlightenment science was forged to the presumption that the world was changing rapidly, and with the “right” kind of tinkering it could become a better place (Comte, 1896; Durkheim, 1964; Hobbes, 1969; Locke, 1947; Machiavelli, 1999; Marx and Engels, 1998; Rousseau, 1967). Postmodernists have performed the valuable service of pointing out that such tinkering has been managed by neither an exact, nor a very fair world of science. Since science has perpetrated and justified a lot of regrettable tinkering in the modern era, its task now, at the very least, should be to ensure that its worst offenses are not repeated. But how can that be accomplished? Up till now, the crucial flaw in the postmodern strategy has been its unequivocal rejection of universal truth; a strategy that is roughly akin to combating foes by lopping off one’s own head. If postmodernists want to impugn the claims of Enlightenment science, then they must assert a more primary definition of truth. That is, without offering a more convincing definition of “postmodern truth,” then we must accept the modernist definition—if for no other reason than because modernist scientists believe in it. Thus, it is only by asserting an alternate definition of truth that postmodernists will be able to un do modernist science.

#### Some concept of truth is vital to combating the government. We don’t need absolute truth but the inability to divorce truth from value renders political commitment unjustifiable.

**Lynch ‘4** (Michael, Associate Prof. Phil. – UConn, The Chronicle Review, “Who Cares About The Truth?” 51:3, 9-10, http://chronicle.com/weekly/v51/i03/03b00601.htm)

Thus some writers, like Fish, say that since faith in the absolute certainties of old is naïve, truth is without value. Others, like Bennett, argue that since truth has value, we had better get busy rememorizing its ancient dogmas. But the implicit assumption of both views is that the only truth worth valuing is Absolute Certain Truth. That is a mistake. We needn't dress truth up with capital letters to make it worth wanting; plain unadorned truth is valuable enough. Like most left-leaning intellectuals who attended graduate school in the '90s, I have certainly had my own fling with cynicism about truth. I've played the postmodern; I've sympathized -- at length in my previous work -- with relativism. Disgusted by the right's lust for absolutes, many of us retreated from talk of objective truth and embraced the philosopher Richard Rorty's call for an "ironic" stance toward our own liberal sympathies. We stopped caring about whether we were "right" and thought more about what makes the world go round. That made us feel at once more hip and less naïve. The events of the last three years have put the lie to that strategy. The fact that our government has deceived us, misled the nation into war, and passed legislation that threatens to infringe upon our basic human rights doesn't call for ironic detachment. It calls for outrage. But it is hard to justify outrage if your basic intellectual commitments suggest that everything is "just text" -- merely a story that could be retold in myriad ways. It is hard to stand up and fight for a political position that refuses to see itself as any better than any other. So Stanley Fish couldn't be more wrong. Cynicism about truth is confused. And philosophical debates over truth matter because truth and its pursuit are politically important.

#### Denying objectivity makes politics impossible by undermining the basis for confronting government power

**Lynch ‘4** (Michael, Associate Prof. Phil. – UConn, The Chronicle Review, “Who Cares About The Truth?” 51:3, 9-10, http://chronicle.com/weekly/v51/i03/03b00601.htm)

Perhaps that is a truism. But not all truisms are mere words mouthed in empty ritual. In the political arena, it is all too easy to choose expediency over principle. Thus sometimes truisms, while acting as rational platforms on which to criticize our government, also act as reminders. They warn us of what we have to lose. As the philosopher and social critic Michel Foucault aptly noted in an interview in 1984, unless it would impose "the silence of slavery," no government can afford to ignore its obligation to the truth. Neither can intellectuals. By abandoning notions like truth and objectivity, many of us in the academy have forgotten the political value of those concepts. In part, that is because we've fallen into the simple-minded confusions I've discussed here. It is ironic that, in capitulating to many of the assumptions and labels of our conservative critics, we have conflated the pursuit of truth with the pursuit of dogma, pluralism with nihilism, openness to new ideas with detachment toward our own. We need to think our own way past such confusions and shed the cynicism about truth to which

### Yes Predictions

#### Rejecting social-science predictions makes political change impossible – vote neg on presumption

**Chernoff ‘9** (Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1, Sage)

Other reflexivist theorists reject prediction more by omission. For example, Walker and Wendt are less explicit but are still quite clear in their rejections of prediction in IR. While Walker (1993) offers a sustained critique of naturalism and the empiricist (though not empirical) approach to the social sciences, he focuses on the logic of explanation and the presuppositions of the dominant forms of theory rather than questions connected to ‘prediction’. He ignores the notion of ‘prediction’. Wendt is of course one of the principal figures in American constructivism and, like others in that group, emphasizes scientific-style explanation. But at no point does he endorse prediction. Wendt lays out his extensive metatheory in Social Theory of International Politics (1999) but barely even mentions ‘prediction’. Rationalist scholars rarely note the problem that prediction – scepticism creates for the empirical value that IR theory might have. John Mearsheimer is one of the exceptions. He observes that reflexivists hope to improve the world by making it more cooperative and peaceful, which they hold will be advanced by eliminating the ‘hegemonic discourse’ of realism. But, as Mearsheimer points out, if the reflexivists were to eliminate the hegemonic discourse, then, since they do not have any way to predict what would follow in its place, the change may be a shift from realism to fascism.12 There is a related but somewhat more radical implication, which Mearsheimer does not mention, namely that **without any ability to predict in the social world**, it is possible that reflexivists may succeed in creating a more institutionally oriented discourse, but that discourse might **not produce any change whatever in real-world politics**. If they reject causal (probabilistic) connections projected into the future between events, states of affairs, or event-types, then there is no reason to believe that any specific change will lead to any effect at all.13

#### IR predictions are feasible and effective. We should use them.

**Chernoff ‘5** (Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., “The Power of International Theory: Reforging the Link to Foreign Policy-Making through Scientific Enquiry”, p. 157-159, Google Print)

In the social sciences the explanations of state behavior in rational-choice theory, which posits the existence of a rationally behaving state, or in economics, which posits the existence of ‘the rational economic person’, are clearly idealizations. However, these are parallel to – and not completely disconnected from – the postulation of laws governing frictionless machines or ideal gases in the physical sciences. With regard to underlying and immediate causes, Bernstein et al. advance a number of point to be made with respect to the use made by Bernstein et al. of the ‘uncertain relationships between underlying and immediate causes’ is that, in their view, such a connection ‘makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult’ (2000: 47). As will become clear, this chapter argues that IR theorists offer non-point predictions and that such predictions are often of genuine policy value. A statement like ‘a rapid withdrawal of US military forces from Iraq after the defeat of Saddam Hussein is likely to lead to increased violence and long-term instability would not qualify as a point prediction. **Yet it is the sort of prediction that policy-makers typically rely on and it has value for policy-makers**. Bernstein et al. thus commit a straw-person fallacy, as do other critics of ‘predictiveness’ discussed above. They raise the bar of ‘prediction’ much too high. The sort of prediction that policy-makers need is often much less than ‘point prediction’. One may grant Bernstein et al. all of their points seeking to undermine point prediction and still conclude that they have not provided good reason to reject many sorts of statements that satisfy the requirements of prediction, as laid out in the definition on p. 8. With regard to learning, IR differs from predictive natural sciences in that, according to Bernstein et al., ‘[m]olecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do. … We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one’s own and others’ (2000: 47). They argue that US policies vis-à-vis the USSR were a response to the failure of appeasement in the 1930s, and those policies were a response to British leaders’ belief that more aggressive policies failed to keep peace in 1914. They cite concepts like ‘chain reactions’ and ‘contagion effects’ to describe these phenomena and hazard analysis for their measurement. But they charge that these do not succeed in explaining ‘how and why these patterns emerge and persist’ (Bernstein et al. 2000: 47). They note also that theories that attempt t predict the future predict incorrectly in part because groups (often states) react in such a way as to prevent their predictions from obtaining. ‘Human prophecies … are often self-negating’ (Bernstein et al. 2000: 52). Another approach that has considerable explanatory success is cybernetic theory, which lays out mechanisms and may even be viewed as predictive. Cybernetic theory was developed by Wiener (1949) and applied to IR especially by Deutsch et. Al (1957), and specifically to foreign-policy decision-making by Steinbruner (1974), Chernoff (1995) and others. It not only accords with the data but offers a causal mechanism to account for the patterns. Bernstein et al. argue that actors can change ‘the rules of the game’ and consequently ‘general theories of process in international relations will have restricted validity’ (Bernstein et al 2000: 52). Generalisations will apply only to ‘discrete portions’ of history. They add that ‘scholars need to specify carefully the temporal and geographic domains to which their theories are applicable. We suspect those domains are often narrower and more constrained than is generally accepted’ (Bernstein et al. 2000: 52). This is, however, just what one of the most systematic and generalizing of all IR scholars, i.e., Waltz, demands. He maintains that a body of propositions does not even qualify as a theory unless it so specifies. Once these restrictions on domain are specified, theoretical generalizations might have value. For example, Waltz says that whether we are interested in natural sciences or social sciences ‘[n]o matter what the subject, we have to bound the domain of our concern, to organize it, to simplify the materials we deal with, to concentrate on the central tendencies, and to single out the strongest propelling forces’ (1979: 68). He later adds, ‘[t]o be a success … a theory has to show how international politics can be conceived of as a domain distinct from economic, social, and other international domains that one may conceive of’ (1979: 79). So it is not accurate to suggest that IR theorists, at least careful ones, do not bound or constrain the scope of their studies and generalizations. While bounded theories may offer predictions, **the fallible nature of all empirical knowledge and the probabilistic nature of IR laws does restrict what can be predicted.** The longer the chain of reasoning and the greater the number of probabilistic propositions that are conjoined, the less one may rely on the predicted event. But **this is an argument for limitations on certain types of predictions, not an argument against the predictiveness of IR or social science theory**. Bernstein et al. note also that there is the problem of the ‘single case’. They correctly observe that policy-makers often worry about a single instance of an event type (e.g., possible war with our neighbours on our western frontier in the next year) rather than with general propositions (e.g., the problem of war in general, or great-power war, etc.). First, with regards to the relevance of theory to policy, it is important to note that policy-makers do sometimes care about long-run patterns or generalizations in some of their decision-situations. Long-run generalizations are frequently important for policy-makers. For example, in the 1990s, numerous new states emerged in Europe and central Asia due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of its domination of central eastern Europe. Policy-makers had to understand as correctly as possible the truth of generalizations in DP theory in order to decide how much in the way of financial and diplomatic resources should be committed to help promote democratic polities in the region. Policy-makers in 1994 were not primarily worried about a specific war, say, between Hungary and Slovakia, but rather the long-run chances of conflict arising in a Europe with many non-democratic states as compared to a Europe with very few such states. Policy-makers could consider two alternative scenarios of the future. One is a Europe with some democratic states and many non-democratic ones, possible including a non-democratic Russia. The other one envisions a Europe with virtually all democratic states. The generalisations about the effects of democracy on state behavior would allow policy-makers to draw general conclusions about peace and international stability from each scenario.

#### Democratic peace and rational choice modeling prove expert predictions are viable.

**Chernoff ‘9** (Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1, Sage)

When the Cold War came to an end, critics of prediction in IR bolstered their sceptical position by seizing on scholars’ failure to foresee that event — perhaps the most important international development of the second half of the 20th century. James Lee Ray and Bruce Russett responded by arguing that, despite the widespread perception of failure, there were three ‘streams of research’ that, especially when taken together, showed a grasp of the transition taking place and hold promise for predicting political phenomena (Ray and Russett, 1996). These are democratic peace studies, certain sorts of rational choice models, combined (since both of these require inputs or knowledge about domestic politics) with the work of experts in regional and domestic politics. Ray and Russett looked at work published (though considered also some classified material) prior to 1991 as their focus, noting that once predictions are published, it is difficult for authors to ‘fiddle’ with them.17 In assessing the record of, and prospects for, predictive success of IR and political science, we must remember that Ray and Russett are both well-known IR scholars who have argued for some theories as correct (such as those that include the dyadic democratic peace hypothesis) and against others as wrong (e.g. realist theories that reject the dyadic hypothesis relevance of regimetype). Thus like all theorists, they would expect that proponents of inferior theories would fail to produce accurate predictions. So from their point of view it is no surprise that many IR theories, especially realist theories, that pertained to superpower relations and were published prior to the end of the Cold War, should fail to yield correct predictions. With regard to predictions about the end of the Cold War, Ray and Russett cite several individuals whose insights appear to have been impressively on target. They quote a very prescient-looking comment of John Mueller, just 12 months into the Gorbachev era, according to which, ‘there is a great deal in the present situation to suggest that this condition could be on the verge of terminal improvement; the incentives for the Soviet Union to reduce its commitment to worldwide revolution are considerable. This could eventually result in the end of the cold war.’18 However, true to their methodological constraints, Ray and Russett resist the temptation to place a great deal of weight on it in their evaluation of theory-based prediction because Mueller did not make explicit use of theoretical principles. The authors also focus on the examination of democratic peace (DP) hypotheses published by Russett. Those who study the dyadic DP hypothesis generally agree that mature democracies are indeed quite peaceful toward one another. One of the predictions derived from the dyadic DP hypothesis is that, as more states become mature democracies, those states will be less likely to fight wars against one another; another is that, as states become less authoritarian and more democratic, they are less likely to fight wars against mature democracies. As DP studies were first receiving the serious attention of theorists, Russett himself, as early as 1981, offered the conditional prediction that if the USSR were to become more democratic, then a more cooperative relationship with the US would be likely.19 Ray and Russett acknowledge that those works did not study or identify the internal changes taking place inside the Soviet Union; hence the prediction remained conditional (though still satisfying the terms of DEF). However, they point out that scholars who were examining the level of democracy in the USSR after Gorbachev rose to power did indeed publish claims of dramatic changes. They note that the Polity database, which uses a 0–10 ‘institutionalized democracy index’, scored the USSR at a 0 in 1986 and at 5 in 1989 (Ray and Russett, 1996: 460, n. 80). The predictive accuracy of the dyadic DP hypothesis continues past the publication of Ray and Russett’s article. The historical record in the 20 years that followed Russett’s first DP predictions on the subject shows that peaceful relations among democracies continued. Between 1980 and 2001 there were 492 violent interstate disputes, none of which were between mature democracies.20 Ray and Russett go beyond DP studies and endorse the theoretical and methodological merits of other sorts of methods of analysis and theories of IR that are successful in terms of their ability to produce reliable predictions, especially the formal model of Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators. They note that the model had been applied to many different problems over a period of years, producing over 2000 predictions. One source reports that the model ‘consistently outperformed’ predictions of the experts who were supplying the domestic political analysis with roughly a 90 percent success rate.21 Ray and Russett argue that many of the familiar and often-devastating criticisms of rational choice modelling in the social sciences do not apply to the model of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., since the latter model is different from more familiar models in some key respects.22 One difference is that it does not rely exclusively on the nation-state as the principal actor. The model is used at all levels of analysis — interest groups, individuals, political parties, etc., as well as the state. The sort of actor modelled in each case depends upon the particular sort of question about the future that is being asked. A second difference is that the model is not static but rather allows information processing and updating of cognitively relevant factors. And a third difference is that the utility functions are not exogenously given but are based on psychological studies; knowledge about each actor’s attitudes towards risks, threats, etc. is specifically factored into the model. The use of computers allows the model to use multiple-iteration simulations to consider the alternate paths if the data turn out to be faulty. There are many ways in which these models make use of real-world politics and attitudes that are usually absent in simpler rational choice models. The coding of the data is done by those most familiar with the relevant real-world politics (regional, area or national specialists), rather than by modelling specialists. Ray and Russett present a compelling argument within the limits of the journal format but cannot fully explore the methodological complexities, and cannot avoid all of the possible pitfalls, of an evaluation of prediction. Avoiding case selection bias is especially difficult if one uses predictions made in the past about an important potential outcome, like the end of the Cold War, because on an important topic there will be many published works. The Cold War lasted for more than four decades and was, of course, the subject of thousands of publications, many of which addressed questions of what would or could happen in the coming years. Choosing one’s own past predictions, as Russett does, would seem to avoid some of the problems, since it is hard to argue that looking at one’s own past performance amounts to ‘choosing authors in a biased way’. But there are still dangers; for example, one must be vigilant to assess all of one’s past predictions. Moreover, if, as the sceptics argue, whether social scientists predictions are accurate or not is primarily a result of luck, then there remains a problem of self-selection, in which social scientists who made the luckiest guesses — and only those social scientists — will have an incentive to publish self-evaluations at a later date, thus creating a biased set of evaluations.

1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)