### T –

### T-plural

First we meet: we provide a list of criteria the president must adhere to before drone strikes that’s plural.   
  
Second counter interp: “Or” means we chose one war power to limit. “War Powers” refers to chosing among them

That’s better for limits. Forcing the affirmative to prop up multiple planks of the resolution incentivizes shady plan writing

Also most real world. Bills limiting war powers are not tied to one another in legislature, learning about them individually is key

And default to reasonability. Best standard of debate. C/I leads to judge intervention

### Terror:

Not going for it

### Norms:

Their answer is about how US usage of drones is good, this isn’t responsive to any of our modeling arguments.

#### Drones are proliferating now- this undermines us security interests

**Boyle, 13**

**W1) Generated an arms race for drones.**

**W2) U.s. is current model for drone usage.**

**W3) U.S. leadership will fade**

#### Introducing restrictions is the only way to stop drone proliferation that prevents instability.

Roberts 13

W1) Obama has ignored congressional overseers and resisted monitoring.

W2) U.S. usage signals OK for other countries to use drones.

#### Drones increase the likelihood of conflict and accidental conflict

**Sparrow, 9**

**W1) Threshold of conflict will decrease and the risk of accidental war will increase.**

W2) Accidental conflicts escalate easily.

#### Aggressive Chinese drone deployment creates multiple scenarios for Asian war – draws in the US

Gertz, **13**

**W1) China is using drones to posture over Japan and the Senkaku islands.**

**W2) Lack of drones by other regional countries increases tensions.**

**W3) Lack of checks on new Chinese drones encourages outlash.**

#### US/ china war leads to extinction

**Jiakr,** 9-8-**10**

W1) Nukes will be used. Leads to human destruction.

## Solvency

#### Drone courts limit the President’s ability to strike

**Rushforth** 12

W1) Makes investigations more thorough without damaging national security.

W2) More information will be required about the potential target.

W3) All military ops with drones will be reviewed

W4) There must be intelligence against a target that identifies them as actively involved in acts of terrorism.

W5) This information shall include who the target is (if known), what action or information led to this targeting, any informant information, imminent threat analysis, known links to terrorists or terrorist organization, and a distinction and proportionality analysis

W6) Checks executive power

#### Judicial control increases accuracy of target selection and reduces mistaken destruction

**Murphy and Radsan, 9**

W1) Increases accuracy of target selection

### AT: Politics

#### No evidence that says unpopularity causes a decrease in political capital. This completely takes out their politics scenario.

#### Their Flaherty evidence does NOT say that the plan might not pass in the status quo. Uniqueness overwhelms the link.

## Neolib

#### Desire for continued neoliberal growth is innate – poor countries won’t sign onto the alt

Aligica ’03 (Paul Aligica, Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, “The Great Transition and the Social Limits to Growth: Herman Kahn on Social Change and Global Economic Development”, April 21, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=2827)

Stopping things would mean if not to engage in an experiment to change the human nature, at least in an equally difficult experiment in altering powerful cultural forces: "We firmly believe that despite the arguments put forward by people who would like to 'stop the earth and get off,' it is simply impractical to do so. Propensity to change may not be inherent in human nature, but it is **firmly embedded** in most contemporary cultures. People have almost everywhere become curious, future oriented, and dissatisfied with their conditions. They want more material goods and covet higher status and greater control of nature. Despite much propaganda to the contrary, they believe in progress and future" (Kahn, 1976, 164). As regarding the critics of growth that stressed the issue of the gap between rich and poor countries and the issue of redistribution, Kahn noted that what most people everywhere want was visible, rapid improvement in their economic status and living standards, and not a closing of the gap (Kahn, 1976, 165). The people from poor countries have as a **basic goal** the transition from poor to middle class. The other implications of social change are secondary for them. Thus a crucial factor to be taken into account is that while the zero-growth advocates and their followers may be satisfied to stop at the present point, most others are not. Any serious attempt to frustrate these expectations or desires of that majority is likely to **fail and/or create disastrous counter reactions.** Kahn was convinced that "any concerted attempt to stop or even slow 'progress' appreciably (that is, to be satisfied with the moment) **is catastrophe-prone**". At the minimum, "it would probably require the creation of extraordinarily repressive governments or movements-and probably a repressive international system" (Kahn, 1976, 165; 1979, 140-153). The pressures of overpopulation, national security challenges and poverty as well as the revolution of rising expectations could be **solved only in a continuing growth environment**. Kahn rejected the idea that continuous growth would generate political repression and absolute poverty. On the contrary, it is the limits-to-growth position "which creates low morale, destroys assurance, undermines the legitimacy of governments everywhere, erodes personal and group commitment to constructive activities and encourages obstructiveness to reasonable policies and hopes". Hence this position "increases enormously the costs of creating the resources needed for expansion, makes more likely misleading debate and misformulation of the issues, and make less likely constructive and creative lives". Ultimately "it is precisely this position the one that increases the potential for the kinds of disasters which most at its advocates are trying to avoid" (Kahn, 1976, 210; 1984).

#### No alt – the system is sustainable –

Jones 11 [Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People on the Left' for 2011, author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change nothing", 2011, [www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html)]

My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits – from Seattle to Prague to Genoa – and the authorities were rattled.¶ Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall Street protests, it's worth pondering what happened to the anti-globalisation movement. Its activists did not lack passion or determination. But they did lack a coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project. With no clear political direction, the movement was easily swept away by the jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after Genoa.¶ Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the West's financial epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes a cliché) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so – as US billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning."¶ The Occupy movement has provoked fury from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who – predictably – labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. But a coherent alternative to the tottering global economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. ¶ Neo-liberalism crashes around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow.¶ There's always a presumption that a crisis of capitalism is good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence of radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its opposition in the 1980s.This time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to defeat. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, the left has never recovered from being virtually smothered out of existence. It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neo-liberal globalisation; and the repeated defeats suffered by the trade union movement.¶ But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left. As US neo-conservative Midge Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye." From the British Labour Party to the African National Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the left wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why, although we live in an age of revolt, there remains no left to give it direction and purpose.

#### Permutation do the plan and the portions of the alt that don’t reject the plan – if the alt can overwhelm the status quo it can overwhelm the minor change that is the plan

#### Alt doesn’t solve the case – institutional focus key

Doran and Barry 6 – worked at all levels in the environment and sustainable development policy arena - at the United Nations, at the Northern Ireland Assembly and Dáil Éireann, and in the Irish NGO sector. PhD--AND-- Reader in Politics, Queen's University School of Politics, International Studies, and Philosophy. PhD Glasgow (Peter and John, Refining Green Political Economy: From Ecological Modernisation to Economic Security and Sufficiency, Analyse & Kritik 28/2006, p. 250–275, http://www.analyse-und-kritik.net/2006-2/AK\_Barry\_Doran\_2006.pdf)

The aim of this article is to offer a draft of a realistic, but critical, version of green political economy to underpin the economic dimensions of radical views of sustainable development. It is written explicitly with a view to encouraging others to respond to it in the necessary collaborative effort to think through this aspect of sustainable development. Our position is informed by two important observations. As a sign of our times, the crises that we are addressing under the banner of sustainable development (however inadequately) render the distinction between what is ‘realistic’ and ‘radical’ problematic. It seems to us that the only realistic course is to revisit the most basic assumptions embedded within the dominant model of development and economics. Realistically the only longterm option available is radical. Secondly, we cannot build or seek to create a sustainable economy ab nihilo, but must begin—in an agonistic fashion—from where we are, with the structures, institutions, modes of production, laws, regulations and so on that we have. We make this point in Ireland with a story about the motorist who stops at the side of the road to ask directions, only to be told: “Now Ma’m, I wouldn’t start from here if I were you.” ¶ This does not mean simply accepting these as immutable or set in stone— after all, some of the current institutions, principles and structures underpinning the dominant economic model are the very causes of unsustainable development— but we do need to recognise that we must work with (and ‘through’—in the terms of the original German Green Party’s slogan of “marching through the institutions”) these existing structures as well as changing and reforming and in some cases abandoning them as either unnecessary or positively harmful to the creation and maintenance of a sustainable economy and society. Moreover, we have a particular responsibility under the current dominant economic trends to name the neo-liberal project as the hegemonic influence on economic thinking and practice. In the words of Bourdieu/Wacquant (2001), neoliberalism is the new ‘planetary vulgate’, which provides the global context for much of the contemporary political and academic debate on sustainable development. For example, there is a clear hierarchy of trade (WTO) over the environment (Multilateral Environmental Agreements) in the international rules-based systems. At the boundaries or limits of the sustainable development debate in both the UK and the European Union it is also evident that the objectives of competitiveness and trade policy are sacrosanct. As Tim Luke (1999) has observed, the relative success or failure of national economies in head-to-head global competition is taken by ‘geo-economics’ as the definitive register of any one nation-state’s waxing or waning international power, as well as its rising or falling industrial competitiveness, technological vitality and economic prowess. In this context, many believe ecological considerations can, at best, be given only meaningless symbolic responses, in the continuing quest to mobilise the Earth’s material resources. ¶ Our realism is rooted in the demos. The realism with which this paper is concerned to promote recognises that the path to an alternative economy and society must begin with a recognition of the reality that most people (in the West) will not democratically vote (or be given the opportunity to vote) for a completely different type of society and economy overnight. This is true even as the merits of a ‘green economy’ are increasingly recognised and accepted by most people as the logical basis for safeguards and guarantees for their basic needs and aspirations (within limits). The realistic character of the thinking behind this article accepts that consumption and materialistic lifestyles are here to stay. (The most we can probably aspire to is a widening and deepening of popular movements towards **ethical consumption, responsible investment**, and fair trade.) And indeed there is **little to be gained** by proposing alternative economic systems which start from a complete rejection of consumption and materialism. The appeal to realism is in part an attempt to correct the common misperception (and self-perception) of green politics and economics requiring an excessive degree of self-denial and a puritanical asceticism (see Goodin 1992, 18; Allison 1991, 170– 78). While rejecting the claim that green political theory calls for the complete disavowal of materialistic lifestyles, it is true that green politics does require the collective re-assessment of such lifestyles, and does require new economic signals and pedagogical attempts to encourage a delinking—in the minds of the general populus—of the ‘good life’ and the ‘goods life’. This does not mean that we need necessarily require the complete and across the board rejection of materialistic lifestyles. It must be the case that there is room and tolerance in a green economy for people to choose to live diverse lifestyles—some more sustainable than others—so long as these do not ‘harm’ others, threaten long-term ecological sustainability or create unjust levels of socio-economic inequalities. Thus, realism in this context is in part another name for the acceptance of a broadly ‘liberal’ or ‘post-liberal’ (but certainly not anti-liberal) green perspective.2¶ 1. Setting Out¶ At the same time, while critical of the ‘abstract’ and ‘unrealistic’ utopianism that peppers green and radical thinking in this area, we do not intend to reject utopianism. Indeed, with Oscar Wilde we agree that a map of the world that does not have utopia on it, isn’t worth looking at. The spirit in which this article is written is more in keeping with framing green and sustainability concerns within a ‘concrete utopian’ perspective or what the Marxist geographer David Harvey (1996, 433–435) calls a “utopianism of process”, to be distinguished from “closed”, blueprint-like and abstract utopian visions. Accordingly, the model of green political economy outlined here is in keeping with Steven Lukes’ suggestion that a concrete utopianism depends on the ‘knowledge of a self-transforming present, not an ideal future’ (Lukes 1984, 158).¶ It accepts the current dominance of one particular model of green political economy—namely ‘ecological modernisation’ (hereafter referred to EM)—as the preferred ‘political economy’ underpinning contemporary state and market forms of sustainable development, and further accepts the necessity for green politics to positively engage in the debates and policies around EM from a strategic (as well as a normative) point of view. However, it is also conscious of the limits and problems with ecological modernisation, particularly in terms of its technocratic, supply-side and reformist ‘business as usual’ approach, and seeks to explore the potential to radicalise EM or use it as a ‘jumping off’ point for more radical views of greening the economy. Ecological modernisation is a work in progress; and that’s the point. ¶ The article begins by outlining EM in theory and practice, specifically in relation to the British state’s ‘sustainable development’ policy agenda under New Labour.3 While EM as currently practised by the British state is ‘weak’ and largely turns on the centrality of ‘innovation’ and ‘eco-efficiency’, the paper then goes on to investigate in more detail the role of the market within current conceptualisations of EM and other models of green political economy. In particular, a potentially powerful distinction (both conceptually and in policy debates) between ‘the market’ and ‘capitalism’ has yet to be sufficiently explored and exploited as a starting point for the development of radical, viable and attractive conceptions of green political economy as alternatives to both EM and the orthodox economic paradigm. We contend that there is a role for the market in innovation and as part of the ‘governance’ for sustainable development in which eco-efficiency and EM of the economy is linked to non-ecological demands of green politics and sustainable development such as social and global justice, egalitarianism, democratic regulation of the market and the conceptual (and policy) expansion of the ‘economy’ to include social, informal and noncash economic activity and a progressive role for the state (especially at the local/municipal level). Here we suggest that the ‘environmental’ argument or basis of green political economy in terms of the need for the economy to become more resource efficient, minimise pollution and waste and so on, has largely been won. What that means is that no one is disputing the need for greater resource productivity, energy and eco-efficiency. Both state and corporate/business actors have accepted the environmental ‘bottom line’ (often rhetorically, but nonetheless important) as a conditioning factor in the pursuit of the economic ‘bottom line’.

#### No impact – every credible measure proves the world is getting better now

Ridley, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, 2010

(Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet **average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times**. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. **But even if you break down the world into bits**, **it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955**. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, **the outcome for the world is** remarkably, astonishingly, **dramatically positive**. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. **Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951**. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. **The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000**. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. **Despite a doubling of the world population**, even **the raw number of people living in absolute poverty** (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) **has fallen since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

#### Specificity matters – rejecting neoliberalism as a monolithic entity undermines the alt

Duffy and Moore 10

Article: Neoliberalizing nature? Elephants as imperfect commodities Author: Duffy, R Journal: Antipode ISSN: 0066-4812 Date: 2010 Volume: 42 Issue: 3 Page: 742

Note: from 1 September 2012 I take up the post of Professor of Conservation Politics at the Durrell Institute of Conservation Ecology (DICE) in the School of Anthropology and Conservation, University of Kent.

I am Professor of International Politics, and I held posts at Edinburgh University and Lancaster University before joining Manchester in 2005. I take a deliberately interdisciplinary approach to understanding conservation; my work is located at the intersection between international relations, geography and sociology. My work examines the debates on global environmental governance, especially the roles of international NGOs, international treaties, international financial institutions and epistemic communities. I am particularly interested in how global environmental management regimes play out on the ground, how they are contested, challenged and resisted by their encounter at the local level. I focus on wildlife conservation, tourism and illicit trading networks to understand the local level complexities of global environmental management. I have undertaken a number of ESRC funded research projects on Peace Parks, gemstone mining and national parks,and on ecotourism (more details are under 'research interests'. My most recent book, Nature Crime: How We're Getting Conservation Wrong (Yale University Press, 2010) examines how global dynamics of wealth and poverty shape conservation outcomes. More information is on my personal wesbite 'Conservation Politics' <http://conservationpolitics.wordpress.com/>

However, it is critically important not to reify neoliberalism and ascribe it a greater level of coherence and dominance than it really deserves (Bakker 2005; Castree 2008a; Brenner and Theodore 2002; Mansfield 2004; McCarthy and Prudham 2004). Instead it is important to interrogate how neoliberalism plays out “on the ground”, to probe its complexities, unevenness and messiness (see Peck and Tickell 2002). In this paper we concentrate on comparing the practices of neoliberalism in order to draw out these messy entanglements; this demonstrates how neoliberalism can be challenged, resisted and changed by its encounter with nature (Bakker 2009; Castree 2008b:161). Therefore, we do not rehearse the well worn debates on definitions of neoliberalism, but rather take up the challenge of comparative research on “actually existing neoliberalisms”, which involves engaging with contextual embeddedness in order to complicate neat theoretical debates. As Brenner and Theodore (2002:356–358) suggest, to understand actually existing neoliberalism we must explore the path-dependent, contextually specific interactions between inherited regulatory landscapes and emergent forms of neoliberalism. As such, the neat lines and models generated via theoretical debates can be traced, refined, critiqued and challenged through engagement with specific case studies (Bakker 2009; Castree 2008b).

#### Alt fails – entrenches neoliberalism as monolithic entity and ignores postliberal transition

Tsianos et al. ‘8 Vassilis, teaches sociology at the University of Hamburg, Germany, Dimitris Papadopoulos teaches social theory at Cardiff University, Niamh Stephenson teaches social science at the University of New South Wales. “Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century” Pluto Press

Postliberalism appropriates this solution - and in this sense postlib- eralism is also the heir to the crisis of sovereignty and relies on the same organisational substratum as transnationalism. But postliberalism attempts to initiate a strategic rearrangement of the transnationalist horizontal and networked organisation of space: in the midst of an even plane of global action it establishes vertical aggregates of power. The break occurs when postliberalism leaves nationalist imperialist geopolitics behind irrevocably. Instead it uses the global transnational space to install dominant hegemonic alliances which cannot be simply reduced to the imperialist geopolitics of entire nation states. Rather these new postliberal aggregates reconnect different segments of nation states and different social actors who have emerged in the phase of transnational governance into new condensations of power. Although postliberal sovereignty feeds on the horizontal transnational order of power, it introduces a new hegemonic strategy with a project of global corporativism. Postliberalism involves the verticalisation of horizontal transnational geopolitics. Transnationalism is the legal algorithm of post-Fordist, neoliberal globalisation. And in this sense, transnationalism is hegemonic on a global scale. What postliberal sovereignty does now is to hegemonise hegemony, that is, to insert and realise conflict in the hegemonic project of transnational neoliberalism. In the years from 1970 to 2000, we used to think of the neoliberal globalisation which transnational governance made possible as a more or less unified project of domination on a planetary scale (Held, 1995; Urbinati, 2003). However, the concept of postliberal sovereignty is an attempt to contest this position and to trace the internal conflicts and ambivalences of this project. The globalisation of transnational neoliberalism can no longer be characterised as a bloc of global power; this notion does not help us to understand or to gain any purchase on the political constitution of the present. Although it is the hegemonic form of geopolitics today, the globalisation of transnational neoliberalism is not unified. Rather it contains conflicting alliances of diverse interests which try to dominate the process of transnational neoliberal globalisation. In this sense, postliberal vertical aggregates attempt to appropriate the space which was created by transnational governance and in so doing they conflict with other vertical aggregates attempting to do the same. The concept of postliberal sovereignty gives us the possibility to move beyond a simplistic understanding of globalisation as a matter of dominant neoliberal forces being opposed by the rest of the world. Rather global domination is itself a diverse and conflicted process. The conflict emerges through the formation of vertical aggregates which try to seize more power with the global unfurling of transnational neoliberalism.

#### And, consumption practices are sustainable and prove no environment impact

#### **Norberg, 3** (Johan Norberg, Senior Fellow at Cato Institute, “In Defense of Global Capitalism”, p. 223)

It is a mistake, then, to believe that growth automatically ruins the environment. And claims that we would need this or that number of planets for the whole world to attain a Western standard of consumption—those “ecological footprint” calculations—are equally untruthful. Such a claim is usually made by environmentalists, and it is concerned, not so much with emissions and pollution, as with resources running out if everyone were to live as we do in the affluent world. Clearly, certain of the raw materials we use today, in present day quantities, would not suffice for the whole world if everyone consumed the same things. But that information is just about as interesting as if a prosperous Stone Age man were to say that, if everyone attained his level of consumption, there would not be enough stone, salt, and furs to go around. Raw **material consumption is not static**. With more and more people achieving a high level of prosperity, we start looking for ways of using other raw materials. Humanity is constantly improving technology so as to get at raw materials that were previously inaccessible, and we are attaining a level of prosperity that makes this possible. New innovations make it possible for old raw materials to be put to better use and for garbage to be turned into new raw materials. A century and a half ago, oil was just something black and sticky that people preferred not to step in and definitely did not want to find beneath their land. But our interest in finding better energy sources led to methods being devised for using oil, and today it is one of our prime resources. Sand has never been all that exciting or precious, but today it is a vital raw material in the most powerful technology of our age, the computer. In the form of silicon—which makes up a quarter of the earth's crust— it is a key component in computer chips. There is a **simple market mechanism that averts shortages**. If a certain raw material comes to be in short supply, its price goes up. This makes everyone more **interested in economizing** on **that resource**, in finding more of it, in reusing it, and in trying to find substitutes for it.

#### Fiat solves the link – immediacy of the plan means no time to backlash

#### ---Logical policy maker could do both – vote aff and pass the bill

#### Vote no – solves the link – the 1ac proposed the plan

#### They do not link to their own terminal impact. They say WTO prevents nuke war but the TPA is not what makes the WTO exist.

#### Their terminal impact evidence says that groups like the WTO prevent this. Not that the WTO is uniquely key.

## Deferrence

1. Relations are resilient

China Daily, 03 [2-13 lexis]

During President Jiang Zemin’s visit to the United States last year, he and Bush stated that China and the United States had extensive and crucial common interests and should expand their exchanges and co-operation in various areas to develop a constructive and co-operative Sino-US relationship. Improving Sino-US relations thus became the inevitable option in Washington’s China policy. Since the mid-1980s, economic and trade exchanges have been a vital factor in bilateral ties and remain the most resilient chain. Bearing in mind the huge economic interests arising from China’s entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Bush emphasized the importance of Sino-US economic and trade relations, even when pursuing a hard-line China policy in the initial period of his tenure. History has proved that, despite some twists and turns, common interests have overweighed differences in Sino-US relations.

**2. Single issue solutions fail – their one-shot approach to US-Sino relations is counterproductive**

**Friedberg, 05** (Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3002\_pp007-045\_friedberg.pdf)

Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara have observed that intellectual discourse in the field of international relations has come increasingly to be dominated by “paradigmatic clashes” in which champions extol “the virtues of a specific analytical perspective to the exclusion of others.” Driven by the desire to construct parsimonious theories and to establish the preponderance of one paradigm or school, scholars have often been inclined to adopt an all-or-nothing attitude, asserting the overwhelming importance of the causal mechanisms central to their preferred paradigm while downplaying or ignoring the possible significance of others. Katzenstein and Okawara argue that, whatever else can be said for it, this approach ultimately hinders efforts to understand the complexities of the real world. In its place they urge a posture of “analytical eclecticism” and an awareness that important empirical puzzles in international relations can often best be explained by a combination of forces and factors, including those highlighted by paradigms that are typically regarded as being diametrically opposed to one another.5 If such an approach is helpful in explaining past events and emerging patterns, it is absolutely essential to any attempt to think about the longer-term future of U.S.-China relations. As Robert Jervis pointed out in his post–Cold War meditation on the future of world politics, “Only rarely does a single factor determine the way politics will work out.”6 Instead, significant outcomes are invariably shaped by what John Lewis Gaddis describes as “the convergence or intersection of complementary processes [and] . . . the potential fratricide of contradictory ones.”7 Having catalogued a wide array of such processes, I then speculate on the various ways in which they could converge and combine to mold the future of U.S.-China relations. Before turning to the present and the future, it is helpful for a moment to reflect on the past. In his brilliant analysis of the “rise of the Anglo-German antagonism,” Paul Kennedy describes how an assortment of factors—including bilateral economic relations; shifts in the global distribution of power; developments in military technology; domestic political processes; ideological trends; questions of racial, religious, cultural, and national identity; the actions of key individuals; and the sequencing of critical events—combined to lead Britain and Germany to the brink of World War I. Whether the story turns out well or poorly, tomorrow’s historians will have to do something similar if they are to construct satisfactory explanations for the evolution of U.S.-China relations in the latter part of the twentieth century and the early decades of the twenty-first. As they try to peer into a future that is necessarily obscured from their view, today’s political scientists and foreign policy analysts also need to try to find ways of apprehending the full array of causal forces that are at work, assessing their relative strengths and thinking about the ways in which they are likely to combine with one another.

**3. Alt. cause – arms sales to Taiwan**

**Wenzhong, 04** (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2-7-2K4. Zhou, “Vigorously Pushing Forward the Constructive and Cooperative Relationship Between China and the United States,” http://china-japan21.org/eng/zxxx/t64286.htm)

Fifth, an appropriate handling of the Taiwan question holds the key to ensuring a stable and growing China-US relationship. The Taiwan question has always been the biggest disruptive factor to a smooth development of China-US relations since diplomatic recognition. With respect to this question, the US government has made some clear-cut commitments in the three communiqués. That is, the US follows a one-China policy; it recognizes that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China, and the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; the people of the US will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan; the US does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arm sales to Taiwan, and it intends to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to final resolution. For years, the US government of both Republican and Democratic administrations all made clear their commitment to the one-China policy and the principles of the three joint communiqués. However, the US government has, time and again, violated the above-mentioned commitment by continuing to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan, upgrading US-Taiwan relations and sending wrong signals to the separatist forces on the island. This is the principal reason why China-US relations have run into snags and even suffered setbacks from time to time. In recent months, the Taiwan authorities have gone out their way to whip up a referendum-frenzy, challenging the one-China principle and peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese government has made it clear that on the Taiwan question, "we will continue to adhere to the basic policy of 'peaceful reunification and one country, two systems', doing our utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification, but we will not tolerate 'Taiwan independence', nor will we allow anyone to separate Taiwan from the rest of China in whatever fashion." We have noted that the US government and President Bush himself have repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to the one-China policy and the three joint communiqués, and their opposition to "Taiwan independence" and words and deeds of the leader of the Taiwan authorities to unilaterally change Taiwan's status quo. We hope that the US side will continue to oppose the separatist activities of the Taiwan authorities under the banner of referendum and making a new constitution, so as to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and the common interests of China and the US with concrete actions.

**4. It’s impossible to make predictions about the future state of US-China relations**

**Friedberg, 05** (Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3002\_pp007-045\_friedberg.pdf)

As far-reaching as its impact may be, however, the future character of the U.S.-China relationship is also profoundly uncertain. Most experts have opinions about this question but, if pressed, few would claim to be sure about what lies ahead. Such modesty is entirely appropriate. Not only are the answers to the questions posed here unknown; they are also, at present, unknowable. Twenty years ago, few people foresaw that the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was about to undergo a radical transformation, and fewer still imagined that the latter might soon cease to exist. As regards their ability to anticipate events, today’s observers are no better equipped than their counterparts of the early 1980s. At this point, scholars and analysts lack the kinds of powerful predictive tools that would allow them to say with any degree of assurance what the state of relations between the United States and China will be in five years time, to say nothing of ten or twenty. And although opinions vary about what kinds of analytical advances are possible, there are good reasons to believe that such instruments are, in fact, unattainable.

## CP

#### Doesn’t solve drone prolif.

#### Future presidents prevent solvency

Harvard Law Review 12, "Developments in the Law: Presidential Authority," Vol. 125:2057, www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol125\_devo.pdf

The recent history of signing statements demonstrates how public opinion can effectively check presidential expansions of power by inducing executive self-binding. It remains to be seen, however, if this more restrained view of signing statements can remain intact, for **it relies on the promises of one branch — indeed of one person — to enforce and maintain the separation of powers**. To be sure, President Obama’s guidelines for the use of signing statements contain all the hallmarks of good executive branch policy: transparency, accountability, and fidelity to constitutional limitations. Yet, in practice, this apparent constraint (however well intentioned) may amount to little more than voluntary self-restraint. 146 Without a formal institutional check, it is unclear what mechanism will prevent the next President (or President Obama himself) from reverting to the allegedly abusive Bush-era practices. 147 Only time, and perhaps public opinion, will tell.

### AT: OLC Mechanism

### AT: ESR (Permutations)

#### Perm do both:

Solves the politics link --- Obama won’t backlash against himself

Solves prez powers – combination ensures just the CP’s mandate is followed

#### Perm do the CP - the plan text says the USFG – CP is just a potential re clarification