## Case

#### Drones create public apathy for warfare, makes war inevitable

Judah A. Druck, B.A., Brandeis University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013. Cornell University Law Review. “DRONING ON: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE NUMBING EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE”. http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf

The practical effects of this move toward a technology-driven, and therefore limited, proxy style of warfare are mixed. On the one hand, the removal of American soldiers from harm’s way is a clear benefit, 124 as is the reduced harm to the American public in general. For that, we should be thankful. But there is another effect that is less easy to identify: public apathy. By increasing the use of robotics and decreasing the probability of harm to American soldiers, modern warfare has “affect[ed] the way the public views and perceives war” by turning it into “the equivalent of sports fans watching war, rather than citizens sharing in its importance.” 125 As a result, the American public has slowly fallen victim to the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare; when the risks of harm to American soldiers abroad and civilians at home are diminished, so too is the public’s level of interest in foreign military policy. 126 In the political sphere, this effect snowballs into both an uncaring public not able (or willing) to effectively mobilize in order to challenge presidential action and enforce the WPR, and a Congress whose own willingness to check presidential military action is heavily tied to public opinion. 127 Recall, for example, the case of the Mayaguez, where potentially unconstitutional action went unchecked because the mission was perceived to be a success. 128 Yet we can imagine that most missions involving drone strikes will be “successful” in the eyes of the public: even if a strike misses a target, the only “loss” one needs to worry about is the cost of a wasted missile, and the ease of deploying another drone would likely provide a quick remedy. Given the political risks associated with making critical statements about military action, especially if that action results in success, 129 we can expect even less congressional WPR enforcement as more military engagements are supported (or, at the very least, ignored) by the public. In this respect, the political reaction to the Mayaguez seems to provide an example of the rule, rather than the exception, in gauging political reactions within a technology-driven warfare regime. Thus, when the public becomes more apathetic about foreign affairs as a result of the limited harms associated with technology-driven warfare, and Congress’s incentive to act consequently diminishes, the President is freed from any possible WPR constraints we might expect him to face, regardless of any potential legal issues. 130 Perhaps unsurprisingly, nearly all of the constitutionally problematic conflicts carried out by presidents involved smaller-scale military actions, rarely totaling more than a few thousand troops in direct contact with hostile forces. 131 Conversely, conflicts that have included larger forces, which likely provided sufficient incentive for public scrutiny, have generally complied with domestic law. 132 The result is that as wars become more limited, 133 unilateral presidential action will likely become even more unchecked as the triggers for WPR enforcement fade away. In contrast with the social and political backlash witnessed during the Civil War, World War I, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War, contemporary military actions provide insufficient incentive to prevent something as innocuous and limited as a drone strike. Simply put, technology-driven warfare is not conducive to the formation of a substantial check on presidential action. 134

#### We don’t need to exclude the aff

Cuomo 96 (Chris J. Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and Director of the Institute for Women's Studies at the Univerity of Georgia, “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence”, Published in Hypatia 11.4 nb, pp. 31-48)

I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states**.'** Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

### Anti Politics

#### Are framework is that the aff should get to weigh the benefits of the plan.

**The sole purpose of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question: Is the outcome of the enactment of a topical plan better than the status quo or a competitive policy option?**

**This is best:**

**1) Fairness --- the grammar of the resolution is decisively policy-oriented**

**Grammar is critical to fairness ---**

1. **ignoring it justifies throwing out the resolution altogether, destroying predictability.**
2. **Alternative frameworks are infinite, lack clear criteria increasing judge intervention, and are biased toward the Neg by allowing them to pick any one representation in the 1AC to criticize for 9 minutes.**
3. **Fairness outweighs --- it’s critical for our ability to engage their arguments in the first place.**

**2) Plan-focus-**

**a. only ‘policy debate’ teaches a logical method for real-world policymaking --- their’s will privilege form over substance, creating illegal outcomes where good ideas are negated.**

**b. This undermines the singular logical purpose of debate: the search for the best policy.**

**c. Logical policymaking is the biggest educational impact --- any other learning is worthless because it can’t be applied to the real world.**

**3) That’s a voter for fairness and education**

**Advocacy of specific reforms that can’t be implemented in this debate is a valuable educational and political strategy – emphasis on fiat being illusory only traps them in the status quo**

**Streeten 99** (Paul, Econ prof @ Boston, 1999, Development, v. 42, n. 2, p 118)

First, Utopian thinking can be useful as a framework for analysis. Just as physicists assume an atmospheric vacuum for some purposes, so policy analysts can assume a political vacuum from which they can start afresh. The physicists’ assumption plainly would not be useful for the design of parachutes, but can serve other purposes well. Similarly, when thinking of tomorrow’s problems, Utopianism is not helpful. But for long-term strategic purposes it is essential. Second, the Utopian vision gives a sense of direction, which can get lost in approaches that are preoccupied with the feasible. In a world that is regarded as the second-best of all feasible worlds, everything becomes a necessary constraint. All vision is lost. Third, excessive concern with the feasible tends to **reinforce the status quo**. In negotiations, it strengthens the hand of those opposed to any reform. Unless the case for change can be represented in the same detail as the case for no change, it tends to be lost. Fourth, it is sometimes the case that the conjuncture of circumstances changes quite suddenly and that the constellation of forces, unexpectedly, turns out to be favourable to even radical innovation. Unless we are prepared with a carefully worked out, detailed plan, that yesterday could have appeared utterly Utopian, the reformers will lose out by default.Only a few years ago nobody would have expected the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the break-up of Yugoslavia, the marketization of China, the end of apartheid in South Africa. And the handshake on the White House lawn between Mr Peres and Mr Arafat. Fifth, the Utopian reformers themselves can constitute a pressure group, countervailing the selfinterested pressures of the obstructionist groups. Ideas thought to be Utopian have become realistic at moments in history when large numbers of people support them, and those in power have to yield to their demands. The demand for ending slavery is a historical example**.** It is for these five reasons that Utopians should not be discouraged from formulating their proposals and from thinking the unthinkable, unencumbered by the inhibitions and obstacles of political constraints. They should elaborate them in the same detail that the defenders of the status quo devote to its elaboration and celebration. Utopianism and idealism will then turn out to be the most realistic vision**.** It is well known that there are three types of economists: those who can count and those who can’t. But being able to count up to two, I want to distinguish between two types of people. Let us call them, for want of a better name, the Pedants and the Utopians. The names are due to Peter Berger, who uses them in a different context. The Pedants or technicians are those who know all the details about the way things are and work, and they have acquired an emotional vested interest in keeping them this way. I have come across them in the British civil service, in the bureaucracy of the World Bank, and elsewhere. They are admirable people but they are conservative, and no good companions for reform. On the other hand, there are the Utopians, the idealists, the visionaries who dare think the unthinkable. They are also admirable, many of them young people. But they lack the attention to detail that the Pedants have. When the day of the revolution comes, they will have entered it on the wrong date in their diaries and fail to turn up, or, if they do turn up, they will be on the wrong side of the barricades. What we need is a marriage between the Pedants and the Utopians, between the technicians who pay attention to the details and the idealists who have the vision of a better future. There will be tensions in combining the two, but they will be creative tensions. We need Pedantic Utopian Pedants who will work out in considerable detail the ideal world and ways of getting to it, and promote the good cause with informed fantasy. Otherwise, when the opportunity arises, we shall miss it for lack of preparedness and lose out to the opponents of reform, to those who want to preserve the status quo.

**Focus on discourse trades off with direct action, meaning we must put policy before reps to have any solvency**

**Taft-Kaufman 95 (**Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”, p pq)

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice**.** In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries thissituation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror **(**what else do we do but speak?**),** but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) Therealm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols**.(**4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting pointfor organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.**,**

**Only the permutation solves - challenging representations without challenging institutional forms of domination furthers oppression**

**Tuathail 96** – Prof in the Department of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute

(Gearoid, Political Geography, 15(6-7), 664)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized **together** with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

**Reps don’t come first and placing them first shatters real world change**

**Dewsbury 3** (John-David Dewsbury -- School of Geographical Studies, University of Bristol -- Environment and Planning A 2003, volume 35, pages 1907-1932 -- http://www.sages.unimelb.edu.au/news/mhgr/dewsbury.pdf)

That someone includes us -- the social scientists, the researchers, and the writers. In some way we are all false witnesses to what is there.(2) So, even though the philosophical drive moves against the apparently sterile setup of totalizing representations, the presentation of ideas istrapped within the structure it is trying to critique. In my opinion, this sterility is only apparent. Significantly, this appearance is valid from both sides: from the side of representational theory because of the belief in the representational structure as being able to give an account of everything; and from the side of nonrepresentational theory because of the danger of getting carried away with an absolute critique of representations. The apparent sterility comes from this last point: that in getting carried away with critique you fail to appreciate that the building blocks of representation are not sterile in themselves -- only when they are used as part of a system.The representational system**,** its structure and regulation of meaning, is not complete -- it needs constant maintenance, loyalty, and faith from those who practice it. In this regard, its power is in itspragmatic functions: easy communication of ideas (that restricts their potential extension), and sustainable, defensible, and consensual agreement on understanding (a certain kind of understanding, and hence a certain type of knowledge). The nonrepresentational argument comes into its own in asking us to revisit the performative space of representation in a manner that is more attuned to its fragile constitution. The point being that representation left critically unattended only allows for conceptual difference and not for a concept of difference as such. The former maintains existing ideological markers whilst the latter challenges us to invent new ones. For me, the project of nonrepresentational theory then, is to excavate the empty space between the lines of representational meaning in order to see what is also possible. The representational system is not wrong: rather, it is the belief that it offerscomplete understanding **--** and that only it offers any sensible understanding at all --that is critically flawed.

#### We recognize that Ari and I are from privilege. We can still do the affirmative and recognize that we come from the lense of privilege. We go to a University instead of entering the military. As their evidence says, we did not choose to be born into privilege. Voting us down because they say we are privileged is not a fair way to interpret the debate. Putting the burden on Ari to admit privilege in the 1AC would put an unfair burden on the affirmative. We should be able to admit privilege in the 2AC because their interp would require that the aff would have to pre-empt every possible k scenario in the 1AC.

#### When we endorse things that are personal instead of political, we cede the political. We don’t engage in political activism, instead only debate philosophy. It leaves the people who don’t care about philosophy in charge of the government.

Simulation of different roles through fiat encourages learning and empowerment

Innes and Booher ’99 (Judith, Director – Institute of Urban and Regional Development and Professor at UC Berkeley and David, Visiting Scholar at the Institute, Journal of the American Planning Association, Winter, Vol. 65, Iss. 1)

Our observation and practice of consensus building suggests that the analogy to role-playing games will help to illuminate the dynamic of effective consensus processes. Even when the dispute seems intractable, role playing in consensus building allows players to let go of actual or assumed constraints and to develop ideas for creating new conditions and possibilities. Drama and suspension of reality allows competing, even bitterly opposed interests to collaborate, and engages individual players emotionally over many months. Scenario building and storytelling can make collective sense of complexity, of predicting possibilities in an uncertain world, and can allow the playful imagination, which people normally suppress, to go to work. In the course of engaging in various roles, participants develop identities for themselves and others and become more effective participants, representing their stakeholders' interests more clearly. In many of their most productive moments, participants in consensus building engage not only in playing out scenarios, but also in a kind of collective, speculative tinkering, or bricolage, similar in principle to what game participants do. That is, they play with heterogeneous concepts, strategies, and actions with which various individuals in the group have experience, and try combining them until they create a new scenario that they collectively believe will work. This bricolage, discussed further below, is a type of reasoning and collective creativity fundamentally different from the more familiar types, argumentation and tradeoffs.[sup11] The latter modes of problem solving or dispute resolution typically allow zero sum allocation of resources among participants or finding the actions acceptable to everyone. Bricolage, however, produces, rather than a solution to a known problem, a new way of framing the situation and of developing unanticipated combinations of actions that are qualitatively different from the options on the table at the outset. The result of this collective tinkering with new scenarios is, most importantly, learning and change among the players, and growth in their sophistication about each other, about the issues, and about the futures they could seek. Both consensus building and roleplaying games center on learning, innovation, and change, in a process that is entertaining and-when conducted effectively-in some fundamental sense empowers individuals.

**Role-playing good –**

**a. Devil’s advocate – debating both sides forces us to understand the arguments that our opponents make – this refines our strategies and improves advocacy – Malcolm X’s prison debates prove this**

**Branham 95** (Robert, Professor Rhetoric at Bates College, Argumentation and Advocacy, "`I Was Gone On Debating': Malcolm X's Prison Debates And Public Confrontations," Winter, vol. 31, no. 3, p.117)

**As Malcolm X sought new outlets for his** heightened **political consciousness, he turned to** the weekly formal **debates** sponsored by the inmate team. "**My reading had my mind like steam under pressure,"** he recounted; "**Some way, I had to start telling the white man about himself to his face. I decided to do this by** putting my name down to **debate**" (1965b, p. 184). **Malcolm X's** prison **debate experience allowed him to bring his** newly acquired historical knowledge and **critical ideology to** bear on **a wide variety of social issues**. "Whichever side of the selected subject was assigned to me, I'd track down and study everything I could find on it," wrote Malcolm X. "**I'd put myself in my opponent's place and decide how I'd try to win if I had the other side; and then I'd figure out a way to knock down those points"** (1965b, p. 184). Preparation for each debate included four or five practice sessions.

**b.  Role-playing is uniquely empowering --- this imagination is critical to understand how the government reaches decisions, how to hold it accountable and determine how we should act  
Rawls 99** (John, Professor Emeritus – Harvard University, The Law of Peoples, p. 54-7)

Developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, **we work out** the **ideals** and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people. I distinguish between the public reason of liberal peoples and the public reason of the Society of Peoples. **The first is** the **public reason** of equal citizens of domestic society **debating the constitutional essentials** and matters **of** basic justice concerning **their own government**; **the second is the public reason of free and equal liberal peoples debating their mutual relations as peoples**. The Law of Peoples with its political concepts and principles, ideals and criteria, is the content of this latter public reason. Although these two public reasons do not have the same content, the role of public reason among free and equal peoples is analogous to its role in a constitutional democratic regime among free and equal citizens. Political **liberalism proposes that**, in a constitutional democratic regime, comprehensive **doctrines of truth or of right are to be replaced in public reason by** an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as **citizens**. Here note the parallel: public reason is invoked by members of the Society of Peoples, and its principles are addressed to peoples as peoples. They are not expressed in terms of comprehensive doctrines of truth or of right, which may hold sway in this or that society, but in terms that can be shared by different peoples. 6.2. Ideal of Public Reason. **Distinct from the idea of public reason is the ideal of public reason. In domestic society this ideal is realized**, or satisfied, **whenever** judges, **legislators**, chief executives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, **act from** and follow **the idea of public reason** and explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental political questions in terms of the political conception of justice that they regard as the most reasonable. In this way they fulfill what I shall call their duty of civility to one another and to other citizens. Hence whether judges, legislators, and chief executives act from and follow public reason is continually shown in their speech and conduct. How is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who are not government officials? **In a representative government, citizens vote for representatives**-chief executives, legislators, and the like-not for particular laws (except at a state or local level where they may vote di¬rectly on referenda questions, which are not usually fundamental ques¬tions). To answer this question, we say that, **ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes**, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, **they** **would** think it most reasonable to **enact**.7l When firm and widespread, **the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators**, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, **forms** part of **the** political and social **basis of liberal democracy** and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech.

#### Critique alone cedes the political to elites which causes slavery and imperialist wars

Boggs 2k (CAROL BOGGS, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE – SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 00, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1)

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or dangerous**,** the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as toodeeply embeddedin the social and institutional matrix of the **time** to be the target ofoppositional political action**.** If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through**,** then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of “conventional wisdom”. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshott’s view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshott’s minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear from people’s lives. Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that**,** the fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshott’s Burkean muddling-through theories.

**Endorsing the personal as political means they link to anti-politics**

**Boggs ’97** (CARL BOGGS – Professor and Ph.D. Political Science, National University, Los Angeles -- Theory and Society 26: 741-780)

Fromm believed the psychological impulses toward escape would in- tensify as impersonal forces within bureaucratic mass society came to overwhelm the individual, giving rise to even greater loneliness, anxiety, and fear ^ especially in the midst of economic crisis. Personal integrity can seemingly be revitalized through identification with a powerful (or all-powerful) external force, as Adorno suggested in the case of astrology. But **this ``submission to extra-personal ends'' ulti- mately demands retreat from active engagement in the concrete public realm insofar as subjectivity is now transferred elsewhere**.28 **Here the self achieves a (false) sense of independence** and power that is lacking in the worldly domain of material and psychological struggles. **Meta- physics**, like more overtly authoritarian ideologies, **can give the person a feeling of catharsis** that comes with submitting to the unfathomable power of ``anonymous totality'' referred to by Adorno. **But the** active self, the **self of citizenship** and collective subjectivity, **winds up sub- merged in the process**.

#### The only way to prevent extinction is to show that the government can be useful as done with policy affs

Small 6 (Jonathan, former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition, “Moving Forward,” The Journal for Civic Commitment, Spring, http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.jsp)

What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face these challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say unequivocally that humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility, the new century will present challenges that require collective action, unity, and enlightened self-interest. Confronting global warming, depleted natural resources, global super viruses, global crime syndicates**,** and multinational corporations with no conscience and no accountability will require cooperation, openness, honesty, compromise, and most of all solidarity – ideals not exactly cultivated in the twentieth century. We can no longer suffer to see life through the tiny lens of our own existence. Never in the history of the world has our collective fate been so intricately interwoven. Our very existence depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive society. With humankind’s next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or perish together in alienation. Unlike any other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every single day we are presented the opportunity to change our current course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. Through zealous cooperation and radical solidarity we can alter the course of human events. Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face the challenges of a global, interconnected world, we need to teach cooperation, community, solidarity, balance and tolerance in schools. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power? These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will require a radical transformation of our conception of education. We’ll need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world. In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban setting with a diverse student body. Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity and Excellence in Education. The dynamic interplay between ideas of social justice, civic engagement, and service learning in education will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty. As such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other affects our study. Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality. The idea of social justice in America has been around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically that the government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Social contract theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete expressions of the spirit of social justice. Similar clamor has been made over the appropriate definitions of civic engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, let’s not get bogged down on subtleties. Civic engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate around community issues. There is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some will say that today’s youth are less involved politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement. Others cite high volunteer rates among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement. And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and today’s youth. But one thing is for sure; today’s youth no longer see government and politics as an effective or valuable tool for affecting positive change in the world. Instead of criticizing this judgment, perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it. Author Kurt Vonnegut said, “There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don’t know what can be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president.” Maybe the youth’s rejection of American politics isn’t a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response to their experience. Consequently, the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in the twenty-first century, we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of our challenge becomes convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean government and commerce,have the potential for positive change.Civic engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context. Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service learning is only beginning to define itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves to new points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working in a legislative office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at an environmental group. If service learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern education. Service learning is the natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement, and service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them. However, until we get momentum behind them, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to jumpstart our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that seeks to do just that.

#### Perm do the plan and then the kritik. There is no reason why we can’t pass the plan and then do introspection.

#### The aff is a prerequisite for the kritik. If we can’t engage in informed decisions about wars that are being fought in our names, we can’t access a full level of introspection.

#### The plan is helping a lot of people not get killed by drone strikes.

#### Their interpretation of the debate space creates an us vs. them mentality

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Not infrequently, the term counterpublics is granted too vague a meaning. 2 In the majority of cases, it is used in investigations of minority groups and identity issues. Thus counterpublics refers to disadvantaged, subordinated, or explored groups, which seek to affirm their identities, which were suppressed or distorted by oppressive regimes. In some of these cases, the public sphere is qualified as “black public sphere”, “feminist public sphere”, “gay public sphere” – names that suggest, quite ambiguously (and erroneously) that the debate process takes place in isolation from the rest of society, i.e., without the cooperation of particular groups, including oppressive and inimical ones, or even of wider groups of citizens. By insisting in the contentious character of marginal identities, several studies underestimate the dialogical activities through which minority groups seek to negotiate their stances and perspectives. Such negotiations are carried out not only to challenge institutional and cultural patterns of domination, but also to build solidarity and mutual understanding with majoritarian social groups. This ends up enlarging minority groups’ opportunities to express, in different social domains, their identities and new experiences. Furthermore, in considering only the opposition among groups, such studies tend to focus almost exclusively on marginalized discourses, thus ignoring the means through which dominant discourses become, publicly, peripheral or even irrelevant.