# 1AC – TEXAS

## CONTENTION ONE IS NORMS

#### CIA strikes are modeled internationally – other nations look to the U.S. to determine what action they will take

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The military also cannot conduct overt, hostile action in Pakistan, where the drones have been most active and are practically the only means the United States has to attack terrorists and militants in remote regions. Yes, the pace of strikes has significantly decreased since the 2010 peak of an estimated [122 unmanned attacks](http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis) in Pakistan. But the drones are most certainly still flying. Last week, a drone strike [killed the leader of the Pakistani Taliban](http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/01/taliban_leader_killed_for_the_fifth_time_0), Hakimullah Mehsud, who had a $5 million U.S. bounty on his head for his involvement in a 2009 attack in Afghanistan. Over the summer, a spate of drone strikes killed a [dozen](http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/09/three_drone_strikes_kill_12_suspected_militants_in_yemen) militants in [Yemen](http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/08/the_sudden_and_unexpected_return_of_the_drone_war_yemen). Keeping the drones with the CIA also offers legal cover for drone strikes, former officials argued. By law, the military is not supposed to conduct hostile actions outside a declared war zone, although special forces do so on occasion acting at the CIA's behest. When the White House began floating the idea earlier this year of transferring the drone program to the military, some lawmakers were skeptical, said a former U.S. official. John Brennan -- the White House counterrorism czar turned CIA director -- might have allegedly [grown uncomfortable](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/19/exclusive-no-more-drones-for-cia.html) with the targeted killings that he helped oversee for so long. But the congressmen doubted whether the government of Pakistan would ever allow drone strikes run by the U.S. military to occur in their country. "That was the president's aspirational goal, but no one ever believed the Pakistanis were going to let us do that," said the former official, who was involved in discussions over transferring the drone program to the military. For years, the Pakistani government has given tacit approval to CIA-led strikes. But they were conducted as covert actions under U.S. law, meaning they were never officially acknowledged by U.S. officials. That gave the Pakistanis some wiggle room to tell an angry public, which would never tolerate American troops on the ground, that Pakistani leaders had nothing to do with the strikes on their territory. Even though Obama and other senior U.S. officials now publicly discuss CIA drone strikes, they are still conducted as covert operations. In practical terms, that means it's extremely difficult for journalists and outside researchers to obtain data from the CIA about its drone operations. And they are still briefed to Congress as covert operations, so relatively few lawmakers and congressional staff know about them. The secrecy of drone operations could have far reaching effects on U.S. foreign policy as other nations build and deploy their own drone fleets. "We are setting precedent that other nations will follow," said Micah Zenko, a fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations who [closely follows the CIA drone program](http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434). "If the executive branch wants maximum authority with this very minimal amount of transparency and limited-in-scope oversight, that's a precedent that other countries will look to as well."

**Drone prolif is a conflict magnifier – it will escalate existing conflicts and erode global deterrence without strong norms. This risks multiple scenarios for international conflict.**

Boyle 13. Michael J. Boyle. January 15th, 2013. (Michael Boyle is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia. He was previously a Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St. Andrews. He is also an alumnus of the Political Science Department at La Salle. ) <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12002/abstract>

An important, but overlooked, strategic consequence of the [Obama’s] administration’s embrace of drones is that it has generated a new and dangerous arms race for this technology. At present, the use of lethal drones is seen as acceptable to US policy-makers because no other state possesses the ability to make highly sophisticated drones with the range, surveillance capability and lethality of those currently manufactured by the United States. Yet the rest of the world is not far behind. At least 76 countries have acquired UAV technology, including Russia, China, Pakistan and India.120 China is reported to have at least 25 separate drone systems currently in development.121 At present, there are 680 drone programmes in the world, an increase of over 400 since 2005.122 Many states and non-state actors hostile to the United States have begun to dabble in drone technology. Iran has created its own drone, dubbed the ‘Ambassador of Death’, which has a range of up to 600 miles.123 Iran has also allegedly supplied the Assad regime in Syria with drone technology.124 Hezbollah launched an Iranian-made drone into Israeli territory, where it was shot down by the Israeli air force in October 2012.125 A global arms race for drone technology is already under way. According to one estimate, global spending on drones is likely to be more than US$94 billion by 2021.126 One factor that is facilitating the spread of drones (particularly non-lethal drones) is their cost relative to other military purchases. The top-of-the line Predator or Reaper model costs approximately US$10.5 million each, compared to the US$150 million price tag of a single F-22 fighter jet.127 At that price, drone technology is already within the reach of most developed militaries, many of which will seek to buy drones from the US or another supplier. With demand growing, a number of states, including China and Israel, have begun the aggressive selling of drones, including attack drones, and Russia may also be moving into this market.128 Because of concerns that export restrictions are harming US competitiveness in the drones market, the Pentagon has granted approval for drone exports to 66 governments and is currently being lobbied to authorize sales to even more.129 The Obama administration has already authorized the sale of drones to the UK and Italy, but Pakistan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been refused drone technology by congressional restrictions.130 It is only a matter of time before another supplier steps in to offer the drone technology to countries prohibited by export controls from buying US drones. According to a study by the Teal Group, the US will account for 62 per cent of research and development spending and 55 per cent of procurement spending on drones by 2022.131 As the market expands, with new buyers and sellers, America’s ability to control the sale of drone technology will be diminished. It is likely that the US will retain a substantial qualitative advantage in drone technology for some time, but even that will fade as more suppliers offer drones that can match US capabilities. The emergence of this arms race for drones raises at least five long-term strategic consequences, not all of which are favourable to the United States over the long term. First, it is now obvious that other states will use drones in ways that are inconsistent with US interests. One reason why the US has been so keen to use drone technology in Pakistan and Yemen is that at present it retains a substantial advantage in high-quality attack drones. Many of the other states now capable of employing drones of near-equivalent technology—for example, the UK and Israel—are considered allies. But this situation is quickly changing as other leading geopolitical players, such as Russia and China, are beginning rapidly to develop and deploy drones for their own purposes. While its own technology still lags behind that of the US, Russia has spent huge sums on purchasing drones and has recently sought to buy the Israeli-made Eitan drone capable of surveillance and firing air-to-surface missiles.132 China has begun to develop UAVs for reconnaissance and combat and has several new drones capable of long-range surveillance and attack under development.133 China is also planning to use unmanned surveillance drones to allow it to monitor the disputed East China Sea Islands, which are currently under dispute with Japan and Taiwan.134 Both Russia and China will pursue this technology and develop their own drone suppliers which will sell to the highest bidder, presumably with fewer export controls than those imposed by the US Congress. Once both governments have equivalent or near-equivalent levels of drone technology to the United States, they will be similarly tempted to use it for surveillance or attack in the way the US has done. Thus, through its own over-reliance on drones in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, the US may be hastening the arrival of a world where its qualitative advantages in drone technology are eclipsed and where this technology will be used and sold by rival Great Powers whose interests do not mirror its own. A second consequence of the spread of drones is that many of the traditional concepts which have underwritten stability in the international system will be radically reshaped by drone technology. For example, much of the stability among the Great Powers in the international system is driven by deterrence, specifically nuclear deterrence.135 Deterrence operates with informal rules of the game and tacit bargains that govern what states, particularly those holding nuclear weapons, may and may not do to one another.136 While it is widely understood that nuclear-capable states will conduct aerial surveillance and spy on one another, overt military confrontations between nuclear powers are rare because they are assumed to be costly and prone to escalation. One open question is whether these states will exercise the same level of restraint with drone surveillance, which is unmanned, low cost, and possibly deniable. States may be more willing to engage in drone overflights which test the resolve of their rivals, or engage in ‘salami tactics’ to see what kind of drone-led incursion, if any, will motivate a response.137 This may have been Hezbollah’s logic in sending a drone into Israeli airspace in October 2012, possibly to relay information on Israel’s nuclear capabilities.138 After the incursion, both Hezbollah and Iran boasted that the drone incident demonstrated their military capabilities.139 One could imagine two rival states—for example, India and Pakistan—deploying drones to test each other’s capability and resolve, with untold consequences if such a probe were misinterpreted by the other as an attack. As drones get physically smaller and more precise, and as they develop a greater flying range, the temptation to use them to spy on a rival’s nuclear programme or military installations might prove too strong to resist. If this were to happen, drones might gradually erode the deterrent relationships that exist between nuclear powers, thus magnifying the risks of a spiral of conflict between them. Another dimension of this problem has to do with the risk of accident. Drones are prone to accidents and crashes. By July 2010, the US Air Force had identified approximately 79 drone accidents.140 Recently released documents have revealed that there have been a number of drone accidents and crashes in the Seychelles and Djibouti, some of which happened in close proximity to civilian airports.141 The rapid proliferation of drones worldwide will involve a risk of accident to civilian aircraft, possibly producing an international incident if such an accident were to involve an aircraft affiliated to a state hostile to the owner of the drone. Most of the drone accidents may be innocuous, but some will carry strategic risks. In December 2011, a CIA drone designed for nuclear surveillance crashed in Iran, revealing the existence of the spying programme and leaving sensitive technology in the hands of the Iranian government.142 The expansion of drone technology raises the possibility that some of these surveillance drones will be interpreted as attack drones, or that an accident or crash will spiral out of control and lead to an armed confrontation.143 An accident would be even more dangerous if the US were to pursue its plans for nuclear-powered drones, which can spread radioactive material like a dirty bomb if they crash.144 Third, lethal drones create the possibility that the norms on the use of force will erode, creating a much more dangerous world and pushing the international system back towards the rule of the jungle. To some extent, this world is already being ushered in by the United States, which has set a dangerous precedent that a state may simply kill foreign citizens considered a threat without a declaration of war. Even John Brennan has recognized that the US is ‘establishing a precedent that other nations may follow’.145 Given this precedent, there is nothing to stop other states from following the American lead and using drone strikes to eliminate potential threats. Those ‘threats’ need not be terrorists, but could be others— dissidents, spies, even journalists—whose behaviour threatens a government. One danger is that drone use might undermine the normative prohibition on the assassination of leaders and government officials that most (but not all) states currently respect. A greater danger, however, is that the US will have normalized murder as a tool of statecraft and created a world where states can increasingly take vengeance on individuals outside their borders without the niceties of extradition, due process or trial.146 As some of its critics have noted, the Obama administration may have created a world where states will find it easier to kill terrorists rather than capture them and deal with all of the legal and evidentiary difficulties associated with giving them a fair trial.147 Fourth, there is a distinct danger that the world will divide into two camps: developed states in possession of drone technology, and weak states and rebel movements that lack them. States with recurring separatist or insurgent problems may begin to police their restive territories through drone strikes, essentially containing the problem in a fixed geographical region and engaging in a largely punitive policy against them. One could easily imagine that China, for example, might resort to drone strikes in Uighur provinces in order to keep potential threats from emerging, or that Russia could use drones to strike at separatist movements in Chechnya or elsewhere. Such behaviour would not necessarily be confined to authoritarian governments; it is equally possible that Israel might use drones to police Gaza and the West Bank, thus reducing the vulnerability of Israeli soldiers to Palestinian attacks on the ground. The extent to which Israel might be willing to use drones in combat and surveillance was revealed in its November 2012 attack on Gaza. Israel allegedly used a drone to assassinate the Hamas leader Ahmed Jabari and employed a number of armed drones for strikes in a way that was described as ‘unprecedented’ by senior Israeli officials.148 It is not hard to imagine Israel concluding that drones over Gaza were the best way to deal with the problem of Hamas, even if their use left the Palestinian population subject to constant, unnerving surveillance. All of the consequences of such a sharp division between the haves and have-nots with drone technology is hard to assess, but one possibility is that governments with secessionist movements might be less willing to negotiate and grant concessions if drones allowed them to police their internal enemies with ruthless efficiency and ‘manage’ the problem at low cost. The result might be a situation where such conflicts are contained but not resolved, while citizens in developed states grow increasingly indifferent to the suffering of those making secessionist or even national liberation claims, including just ones, upon them. Finally, drones have the capacity to strengthen the surveillance capacity of both democracies and authoritarian regimes, with significant consequences for civil liberties. In the UK, BAE Systems is adapting military-designed drones for a range of civilian policing tasks including ‘monitoring antisocial motorists, protesters, agricultural thieves and fly-tippers’.149 Such drones are also envisioned as monitoring Britain’s shores for illegal immigration and drug smuggling. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued 61 permits for domestic drone use between November 2006 and June 2011, mainly to local and state police, but also to federal agencies and even universities.150 According to one FAA estimate, the US will have 30,000 drones patrolling the skies by 2022.151 Similarly, the European Commission will spend US$260 million on Eurosur, a new programme that will use drones to patrol the Mediterranean coast.152 The risk that drones will turn democracies into ‘surveillance states’ is well known, but the risks for authoritarian regimes may be even more severe. Authoritarian states, particularly those that face serious internal opposition, may tap into drone technology now available to monitor and ruthlessly punish their opponents. In semi-authoritarian Russia, for example, drones have already been employed to monitor pro-democracy protesters.153 One could only imagine what a truly murderous authoritarian regime—such as Bashar al-Assad’s Syria—would do with its own fleet of drones. The expansion of drone technology may make the strong even stronger, thus tilting the balance of power in authoritarian regimes even more decisively towards those who wield the coercive instruments of power and against those who dare to challenge them.

**These conflicts go nuclear.**

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**Where do you see the main challenges for the international community regarding the use of armed un~~man~~ned systems by the military**. What are the specific challenges of autonomous systems as compared to current telerobotic systems? **The main challenge is in deciding whether the present trend should continue and expand to many more countries and to many more types of armed uninhabited vehicles** (in the air, on and under water, on the ground, also in outer space**), or whether efforts should be taken to constrain this arms race and limit the dangers connected to it**. Here not only governments, but non-governmental organisations and the general public should become active. **Autonomous systems obviously would open many new possibilities for war by accident** (possibly **escalating up to nuclear war) and for violations of the international laws of warfare**. A human decision in each single weapon use should be the minimum requirement

#### .Perceived democratic accountability crucial to US credibility on drones and sets a model for checks and balances.

Peter J **Fusco 12**, McGill University, http://archive.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/America's\_Drone\_Strikes\_Setting\_Dangerous\_Precedent\_

The **Obama** administration **is setting a very dangerous global precedence for sending drones** over borders to kill enemies (sometimes innocents). **These drone strikes lack the congressional oversight of the executive branch while Congress does little to oppose it**. At the same time, **employing drones qualifies as a "moral hazard." Drone warfare**, like all developments of new military technologies, **require close examination of their ethical, legal, and political implications.** **The world's first encounter with the use of drones in warfare by** the **Obama** Administration **has set a dangerous precedent for two reasons**. **First, because of the questionable ethics of drone warfare itself and second, because the administration has sidestepped federal checks and balances**. In the coming decades, **this tech**nology **will inevitably diffuse into other nation's military arsenals**, **American policy in the use of drones must change and the model set by** the **Obama** administration **must not be followed**. A recent New York Times blog post co-written by John Kaagand & Sarah Kreps, argues that **drone warfare checks all the boxes to qualify as a "moral hazard."** A moral hazard is an ethical situation in which costs incurred by risks are barely felt, if at all, by those taking the risk. **Drones**, accordingly, minimize or **eliminate government's incentive to prudently exercise lethal force**. **Greater and greater risks are taken,** as the risk taker is able to avoid or minimize taking-on costs. The **Obama** administration**'s** **use of drones is a moral hazard because it allows an unchecked branch of government to wage a counter-terrorism war** **without** the risk of American casualties and limited economic **costs.** **Moral hazards are at the root of many foreign and military policy decisions but they must be subject to checks and balances to prevent gross abuses of executive power**. The Obama Administration fails to acknowledge this and offers a bunk ethical justification instead: drones have the capacity to kill much more efficiently and with less collateral damage. This is not truly a justification because it fails to make a fact-value distinction. Just because we can easily and cheaply carry out targeted killings by the use of drones does not mean we ought to. But, neither the moral hazard created by the use of drones nor the lack official justifications categorically damns drones as unethical. With it's ethical status in limbo, it illustrates the caution with which this new type of weapon must be treated and the need for new policy controlling its usage**. The discourse surrounding the use of drones shows that** our administration and **our society have not engaged with the ethical subject matter sufficiently to warrant the prolif**eration **of drone warfare**. Furthermore, the Obama administration has not used caution nor even followed existing policy. In June 2011, **the Administration released a statement to Congress offering legal justification for sidestepping the** 1973 War Powers Resolution. **This resolution states that in order to maintain the spirit of Constitutional checks and balances, military operations initiated by the executive branch must be disclosed and justified to the Congress** within 48 hours. Operations lasting beyond 60 days require congressional approval. **The administration's statement, outlining the use of drones in Libya, stated that because the drones does not "involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof" their use does not fall under the War Powers Resolution's jurisdiction.** Thus, **the executive branch has complete control over these classified operations without Congressional oversight.** **As political scientist** Peter W. **Singer** in a recent New York Times Magazine article rightly **points out, this is entirely undemocratic.** **Congress has been circumvented and with the public burden of warfare removed there is almost no public stake in drone military action**. **The dangerous precedent set by** the **Obama** administration **is to ignore the ethical hazards of drone warfare, which demand governmental and public checks, balances, and scrutiny.** In the near future, **drone tech**nology **will cheapen and diffuse into the arsenals of other nations.** The ability to kill more precisely and more cheaply will become widespread**. Other nations must ignore the way in which the Obama Administration first used drones in order to prevent concentrations of power, uphold democratic procedures, preserve the whole idea of taking costly measures to avoid war and protect international diplomacy.**

#### Chinese drone aggression in the south china sea will spark a nuclear conflict.

Hastings 1-4-14. <http://www.nation.com.pk/international/04-Jan-2014/is-world-war-three-about-to-start-by-accident> (Sir Max Hastings is an author, journalist and broadcaster whose work has appeared in every British national newspaper.  He now writes regularly for the Daily Mail and Financial Times, and reviews books for the Sunday Times and New York Review of Books.  He has published twenty-three books)

And this is why a shiver will have run through the leaderships of Asia and of the Western powers this week when **China’s ambassador** to London **argued that Japan risks ‘a serious threat to global peace’** by ‘rekindling’ the bellicose attitude that hastened the expansion of World War II into a global conflict. He even compared Japan today to Lord Voldemort, the arch villain in the Harry Potter novels. This comes just a few weeks after **China - with absolutely no warning - declared hundreds of thousands of square miles of airspace above the East China Sea as its own Air Defence Zone**. This includes the eight tiny uninhabited pimples, called the Senkaku Islands by Japan and Diaoyu by China. Taiwan also has a claim to the islands - nationalised by Japan from private sellers in 2012, much to the anger of China. The United States responded to this bitter dispute between Tokyo and Beijing by dispatching two USAAF B-52s bombers to overfly the islands, emphasising its commitment to the right of free navigation. Japan’s prime minister, **Shinzo Abe,** declared gravely that China had started ‘a whole new game’. His government **threatened to shoot down any Chinese drones that appeared over the Senkakus. Beijing responded that this would be an act of war.** Nobody, including the Chinese, wants armed conflict. Indeed, an analyst for the International Institute Of Strategic Studies has said that China ‘aims to push rather than break limits’. Yet **the tensions between Tokyo, Washington and Beijing have been increasing for years.** For the moment, China, the US and Japan still maintain courtesies between governments. Most crucially, Beijing holds trillions of dollars of US debt. But **many of history’s wars have been triggered by miscalculations while nations have been testing each other’s strengths**. Indeed, there is a profound fear in Washington, in Tokyo, and maybe also in Beijing, that one day something unspeakably ghastly could happen by mistake. Remember that in 1914 before the outbreak of World War I, Britain and Germany were each other’s largest trading partners. China has an ever-growing fleet of missile-armed warships - thought to number around 80, as well as nearly 300 amphibious assault ships - including fast-attack craft specifically designed as ‘carrier-killers’, to engage the US Navy’s behemoths. In response, the huge US Andersen air force base on the Pacific Ocean island of Guam has become host to a £10?billion reinforcement programme. As a result, its hangars now hold B-2 and B-52 bombers, air-to-surface and cruise missiles, Global Hawk drones, F-15 and F-22 fighters, the latter just a 20-minute flight from the Taiwan Strait. Amitai Etzioni, professor of international relations at George Washington University, declares bleakly: ‘**There are increasing signs that the United States and China are on a collision course.’** What is not disputed is that **China is determined to assert its new status as a major regional power,** while the US is equally bent upon deterring or deflecting Chinese expansionism, and especially aggressiveness. This was the reason behind President Obama’s 2010 decision to rebalance American strategic assets towards the Pacific. The American case is as readily made as was the British one, for resisting quite similar German posturing before 1914. Washington’s attitude is: ‘We and our allies are democracies, while China is an autocracy which denies respect for human rights or international law.’ As for the contrary view from Beijing itself, China’s leaders cherish a profound grievance about the Tokyo government’s persistent refusal to confront the reality of Japan’s mid-20th century war crimes in Asia. For the Tokyo government asserts that the time has passed for any Japanese apologies or even discussion of its historical record. An example of this defiance is the military museum that is situated next door to Tokyo’s Yasakuni shrine, where so many Japanese war criminals’ ashes lie and to which many Japanese politicians visit to pay homage. While it is deemed unforgivable - and even criminal - across most of the world to deny the existence of the Nazi Holocaust of six million Jews, almost the entire Japanese nation denies its own barbarities across Asia. This intransigence helps to explain why South Korea, for instance, recently refused to conclude an intelligence-sharing security agreement with Japan, because public opinion remains so alienated by its former oppressors’ lies about the past. For its part, the US is impatient for Japan to abandon the controversial Article 9 of its post-war constitution (imposed by America after the end of World War II), which forces the country to renounce war and restricts its armed forces to a self-defence role. Times have changed and Washington now wants to see the Japanese accept a much larger share of the responsibility for containing China. But more than a few prominent Asians are wagging a warning finger at the Americans, urging: ‘Be careful what you wish for.’ The truth is that many of Japan’s Asian neighbours - not to mention the Chinese - will never trust Tokyo until it comes clean about its dreadful history, as it seems determined not to do. On the specific issue of the disputed Senkaku islands, China points out that Tokyo has held them only since the late 19th century, when Japan became an early entrant into the race for an Asian empire. There are economic issues at stake, too. Sovereignty claims are based on a desire to exploit the area’s rich resources in fish and hydrocarbons. Above all, though, the tension is based on much bigger ambitions. China argues, just as Germany did before 1914 in respect of Britain’s maritime supremacy, that now it is one of the big players in Asia, there is no reason why it should accept America’s claims to Pacific hegemony. Why should Beijing tolerate US warships and aircraft conducting close surveillance of the Chinese coast? Such a presence is unjustified in an age of satellites and simply reflects a wish by America to parade its military might at the expense of Chinese dignity. Such arguments have spread to cover debate about freedom of the internet. A Chinese army general recently dismissed American drum-banging about the importance of preserving ‘global internet freedom.’ He said that Washington was using this as an excuse to preserve its own ‘cyber-hegemony’. He added: ‘In the information era, seizing and maintaining superiority in cyberspace is more important than was seizing command of the sea and air in World War II’. Even if we British, as American allies, ultimately reject some of these arguments, we should acknowledge that the US often seems clumsy, patronising and over-bearing in its attitude to other nations. China is a newly rich, increasingly mighty nation, which is bent upon elbowing aside the Americans, in the Pacific region at least, to assert its own claims as a Great Power. This makes it inevitable that there will be rows, confrontations, crises, some involving both nations’ armed forces. The Pacific rim is ever more densely strewn with the toys of war. **The risk of some local turf dispute exploding into a great power collision will remain alarmingly real.**

#### Current C.I.A. drone usage is setting a precedent for conflict escalation.

Japan times 12-29-13 <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/12/29/editorials/drones-getting-closer-to-home/#.UseqifRDvO6>

On Oct. 18, a U.N. report stated that 33 drone strikes carried out around the world had resulted in civilian casualties in possible violation of international humanitarian law. The report by the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism, Ben Emmerson, examined incidents in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Gaza. Japanese should not assume that remotely controlled unmanned aerial vehicles for military purposes are being used only in remote parts of the world. In May, a report prepared for the U.N. Human Rights Commission by Christof Heyns, a South African professor of human rights, said that the United States, Britain, Israel, South Korea and Japan have developed various types of fully or semi-autonomous weapons, including drones. **Japan**ese citizens and politicians also **need to be aware of the danger that a Chinese drone flying near the Senkaku Islands** in the East China Sea **may lead to an accidental military clash**. **Remotely controlled weapons are** not only causing humanitarian problems but also **leading to a new type of arms race**. Currently **there are no clear international rules to govern their** production, capabilities and **use.** At the very least, the international community should work out rules to control such weapons by taking into consideration the various problems and aspects related to them. **Drone attacks are mainly carried out by the U.S**. and Britain against members of global terrorist organization al-Qaida and the Taliban, a Islamic fundamentalist political movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Emmerson’s report said that, in Pakistan, up to 2,200 people have been killed in 330 drone strikes since 2004, including at least 400 civilians, and that more than 30 civilians were killed in drone attacks in Afghanistan in 2012 and 2013. It added that, in Yemen, 58 civilians are thought to have been killed. The report noted that **the involvement of the CIA** in U.S. drone operations in Pakistan and Yemen “**has created an almost insurmountable obstacle to transparency.**” On Oct. 25, Emmerson called on the U.S. and other countries that use drones such as Britain and Israel to declassify as much as possible “information related to their lethal extra-territorial counterterrorism operations and to release its own data on the level of civilian casualties inflicted through the use of drones.” Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons agreed Nov. 15 in Geneva to start discussions on “lethal autonomous weapons systems,” also known as killer robots, in May 2014. But the U.S. and Britain insist that their drones are not killer robots since they don’t automatically identify and attack enemies. The number of countries in possession of drones increased from 41 in 2005 to 76 in 2011, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. A report by the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution says that currently 87 countries have drones and that at least 26 of them have larger systems like the U.S.’s Predator used for offensive operations**. Japan is considering introducing** the Global Hawk, the U.S.-made reconnaissance **drone, for use by the Self-Defense Forces**. South Korea has already decided to adopt the system. On Sept. 9, what is believed to be a Chinese drone entered Japan’s air defense identification zone near the Senkaku Islands, and an Air Self-Defense Force fighter scrambled against it. In recognition of the fact that **the absence of international rules on drones is making the situation around the Senkakus prone to an accidental military clash**, Japan should join other nations in promptly writing such rules, although imposing an immediate ban on the use of drones may be difficult.

**Specifically, the American drones precedent is used by China as a pre-text to militarize the Senkaku Islands dispute with drone technology.**

**Bodeen 13,** Christopher, Huffington Post, “China's Drone Program Appears To Be Moving Into Overdrive”, 5/13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/03/china-drone-program\_n\_3207392.html

**Chinese aerospace firms have developed dozens of drones,** known also as unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs. Many have appeared at air shows and military parades, including some that bear an uncanny resemblance to the Predator, Global Hawk and Reaper models used with deadly effect by the U.S. Air Force and CIA. Analysts say that although China still trails the U.S. and Israel, the industry leaders, **its technology is maturing rapidly and on the cusp of widespread use for surveillance and combat strikes**. "My sense is that China is moving into large-scale deployments of UAVs," said Ian Easton, co-author of a recent report on Chinese drones for the Project 2049 Institute security think tank. **China's move into large-scale drone deployment displays its military's growing sophistication and could challenge U.S. military dominance in the Asia-Pacific**. It also could elevate the threat to neighbors with territorial disputes with Beijing, including Vietnam, Japan, India and the Philippines. China says its drones are capable of carrying bombs and missiles as well as conducting reconnaissance, potentially turning them into offensive weapons in a border conflict. **China's increased use of drones also adds to concerns about the lack of internationally recognized standards for drone attacks**. **The U**nited **S**tates **has widely employed drones as a means of eliminating terror suspects** in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula. **"China is following the precedent set by the U.S. The thinking is that, `If the U.S. can do it, so can we.** **They're a big country with security interests and so are we',"** said Siemon Wezeman, a senior fellow at the arms transfers program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden, or SIPRI. "The justification for an attack would be that Beijing too has a responsibility for the safety of its citizens. There needs to be agreement on what the limits are," he said**. Though China claims its military posture is entirely defensive, its navy and civilian maritime services have engaged in repeated standoffs with ships from other nations in the South China and East China seas**. India, meanwhile, says Chinese troops have set up camp almost 20 kilometers (12 miles) into Indian-claimed territory. It isn't yet known exactly what China's latest drones are capable of, because, like most Chinese equipment, they remain untested in battle. The military and associated aerospace firms have offered little information, although in an interview last month with the official Xinhua News Agency, Yang Baikui, chief designer at plane maker COSIC, said Chinese drones were closing the gap but still needed to progress in half a dozen major areas, from airframe design to digital linkups. Executives at COSIC and drone makers ASN, Avic, and the 611 Institute declined to be interviewed by The Associated Press, citing their military links. The Defense Ministry's latest report on the status of the military released in mid-April made no mention of drones, and spokesman Yang Yujun made only the barest acknowledgement of their existence in response to a question. "Drones are a new high-tech form of weaponry employed and used by many militaries around the world," Yang said. "China's armed forces are developing weaponry and equipment for the purpose of upholding territorial integrity, national security and world peace. It will pose no threat to any country**." Drones are already patrolling China's borders**, and a navy drone was deployed to the western province of Sichuan to provide aerial surveillance following last month's deadly earthquake there. **They may also soon be appearing over China's maritime claims, including Japanese-controlled East China Sea islands that China considers its own. That could sharpen tensions in an area where Chinese and Japanese patrol boats already confront each other on a regular basis and Japan frequently scrambles fighters to tail Chinese manned aircraft**. Retired Maj. Gen. Peng Guoqian told state media in January that **drones were already being used to photograph and conduct surveillance over the islands, called Diaoyu by China and Senkaku by Japan**.

#### Rationality will not check escalation. Huge risk of miscalc.

Panda 12-12-13 Ankit Panda <http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/rationalist-explanations-for-war-in-the-east-china-sea/> ([Ankit Panda](http://www.ankitpanda.com/) is Associate Editor of The Diplomat.

He was previously a Research Specialist at Princeton University where he worked on international crisis diplomacy, international security, technology policy, and geopolitics.)

**China and Japan could go to war over the** Senkaku/Diaoyu **islands, even if it meant economic ruin.** Events in the East China Sea since 2009 have thrust to the forefront the following frightening question: will China and Japan imminently go to war? Conventional answers in the affirmative point to **the deep level of historical mistrust** and a certain level of “unfinished business” in East Asian international politics, stemming from the heyday of Showa Japan’s imperialism across Asia. Those on the negative often point to the astronomical economic costs that would follow from a war that pinned the world’s first and third largest economies against its second in a fight over a few measly islands, undersea hydrocarbon reserves be damned.

I can’t pretend to arbitrate between these two camps but I find that far too many observers sympathize with the second camp based on rational impulse. Of course China and Japan wouldn’t fight a war! That’d ruin their economies! I sympathize with the Clausewtizean notion of war being a continuation of politics “by other means,” and the problems caused by information asymmetries (effectively handicapping rational decision-making), but **the situation over the** Senkaku/Diaoyu **islands can result in war even if the top leaders in Tokyo and Beijing are eminently rational.**

Political scientist James D. Fearon’s path-breaking article “[Rationalist Explanations for War](http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2706903?uid=3739808&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103105842061)” provides a still-relevant schema that’s wonderfully applicable to the contemporary situation between China and Japan in the East China Sea. Fearon’s paper was initially relevant because it challenged the overly simplistic rationalist’s dogma: if war is so costly, then there has to be some sort of diplomatic solution that is preferable to all parties involved — barring information asymmetries and communication deficits, such an agreement should and will be signed.

Of course, this doesn’t correspond to reality where we know that **many incredibly costly wars have been fought** (from the first World War to the Iran-Iraq War). So, if wars are costly — as one over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is likely to be — why do they still occur? Well, the answer isn’t Japanese imperialism or because states just sometimes irrationally dislike each other (as the affirmative camp would argue). It’s more subtle.

Fearon’s “bargaining model” assumes a few dictums about state knowledge, behavior and expectations ex ante. I’ll cast the remainder of the model in terms of Japan and China since they’re our subjects of interest (and to avoid floating off into academic abstractions).

First, **China and Japan** both know that there is an actual probability distribution of the likely outcomes of the war. They don’t know what the actual distribution is, but they can estimate what is likely in terms of the costs and outcomes of going to war. For example, Japan can predict that it would suffer relatively low naval losses and would strengthen its administrative control of the islands; China **could predict the same outcome, or** it could **interpret things in** its **favor. In essence, they acknowledge that war is predictable in its unpredictability.**

Second, China and Japan want to limit risk or are neutral to risk, but definitely do not crave risk. War is fundamentally risky so this is tantamount to an acknowledgement that war is costlier than maintaining peace or negotiating an ex ante diplomatic solution. The third assumption is a little dressed up in academic jargon: there can be no “issue indivisibility.” In plain English, this essentially means that whatever the states are fighting over (usually territory, but it could be a pot of gold) can be divided between them in an infinite number of ways on a line going from zero to one. Imagine that zero is Japan’s ideal preference (total Japanese control of the Senkakus and acknowledgement as such by China) and one is China’s ideal preference (total Chinese control of Diaoyu and acknowledgement by Japan). Fearon’s assumption requires that there exist points like 0.23 and 0.83 (and so forth) which set up some sort sharing between the warring parties. Even solutions, such as one proposed by Zheng Wang here at The Diplomat to establish a “[peace zone](http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/how-to-prevent-accidental-conflict-in-the-east-china-sea/),” could sit on this line. If the third assumption sounds the shakiest to you that’s probably because it is. “Issue indivisibility” is a nasty problem and a subject of quite some research. It usually is at the heart of wars that seek to decide which state should control a territory such as a Holy City (the intractability of the Arab-Israeli conflict is said to be plagued by indivisible issues). So, is the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu fundamentally indivisible? Probably in the sense of splitting sovereignty over the islands, but probably not in the sense of some ex ante bargain similar to what Zheng proposed. Even if the set of solutions isn’t infinitely divisible, whatever finite solutions exist might not fall within whatever range of solutions either Japan or China is willing to tolerate — leading to war. Fearon actually doesn’t buy the indivisibility-leading-to-war theory himself. He reasons that generally almost every issue is complex enough to be divisible to a degree acceptable by each party (undermining the infinite divisibility requirement), and that states can link issues and offer payments to offset any asymmetrical outcome. In the Senkaku/Diaoyu case, this would mean a solution could hinge upon Japan making a broader apology for its aggression against China in the 20th century or China taking a harsher stance on North Korea (both unlikely). Relevant to the Air Defense Identification Zone is Fearon’s description of war arising between rational states due to incentives to misrepresent capabilities. China and Japan’s leaders know more about their country’s actual willingness to go to war than anyone else, and it benefits to signal strong resolve on the issue to extract more concessions in any potential deal. Japan announcing its willingness to shoot down Chinese drones earlier this year and its [most recent defense plans](http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/japan-to-approve-new-china-centric-defense-posture/) are example of this, and China’s ADIZ is probably the archetype of such a signal. Instead of extracting a good deal, what such declarations can do is force rational hands to war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Fearon’s final explanation — regarding commitment problems leading to war — is slightly ancillary to the core discussion about the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands given Japan’s constitutional restraints on the use of force (rendering preemptive, preventative, and offensive wars largely irrelevant in the Japanese case). Regardless, the point remains that **even if the** Senkaku/Diaoyu **islands might seem like a terribly silly thing** for the world’s second and third largest economies **to go to war over, war can still be likely**.

As I observe events in the East China Sea, I mostly recall Fearon’s warnings on certain types of signals leading to brinksmanship (the divisibility issue is far murkier). **Both Japan and China don’t seem to be relenting** on these sorts of deleterious signals. Additionally, given that [**Chinese and Japanese diplomats haven’t had high-level contact in fourteen months**](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-japan-and-china-clash-their-diplomats-see-little-chance-to-talk-it-out/2013/12/06/591da5e0-5da2-11e3-8d24-31c016b976b2_story.html?tid=pm_pop&utm_content=buffer3dfaa&utm_source=buffer&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Buffer), even the more primitive rationalist’s explanation, that **war occurs because a lack of communication leads to rational miscalculations,** becomes plausible.

**A reflection on the possible rational reasons for China and Japan to go to war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands highlights the seriousness of the ongoing brinksmanship in the East China Sea. If a war is fought over these long-contested islands, it will have an eminently rational explanation underlying all the historical mistrust and nationalism on the surface. War in the East China Sea is possible, despite the economic costs.**

**US would be drawn in – causes global nuclear war.**

**Eland 7/29**/13, Ivan, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty, The Independent Institute, “Why U.S. Policy in East Asia is Dangerous”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-eland/why-us-policy-in-east-asi\_b\_3671931.html

Even in the more advanced regions during the Cold War, was it rational for the United States to protect these nations with an American nuclear umbrella-- one that ultimately pledged to incur destruction of American cities to save London, Paris, Berlin, and Tokyo from the communist hordes? A communist takeover of any of these places would have not have been a good day, but incineration of American cities would have been even worse. **Yet long after the Cold War is over, the American nuclear shield extends even wider to include a number of countries in Europe and East Asia.** In East Asia, the American nuclear backstop protects Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines formally, and Taiwan and other nations informally. **But what if a local conflict between the Chinese and a U.S. ally inadvertently escalates into a nuclear stand off between China and the United States? And it easily could**. A rising China is an ally of South Korea's nemesis, North Korea. China also claims Taiwan and has disputes with U.S. allies over islands in the South China Sea (with the Philippines) and in the East China Sea (with Japan). In the last case, China has recently upgraded its coast guard. Meanwhile, a new conservative government in Japan is making noises about scrapping Japan's pacifist constitution and obtaining offensive weapons, and recent dangerous confrontations have occurred between Japanese and Chinese forces near the disputed islands. **With a new hawkish and more aggressive government, Japan--like a mouthy little brother standing behind his huge sibling and taunting the opponent--could easily drag the United States into an undesired war with nuclear-armed China. During World War I, outdated alliances dragged the major European powers into a cataclysmic war that nobody wanted. Outdated Cold War alliances could do the same to the United States now in East Asia.**

#### Extinction

Wittner 11—Professor of History @ State University of New York-Albany [Lawrence S. Wittner, “Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?” Huntington News, Monday, November 28, 2011—18:37 pg. http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446]

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China mightend upproviding us with yetanother example of this phenomenon.

The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war?

Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”

Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists.

Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan.

At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might?

Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach theUnited States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China.

But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions wouldblot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying ag**riculture,** [and] creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.

To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

## CONTENTION TWO IS HEZBOLLAH TERRORISM

#### CIA Focus on targeted killing trades off with combating Hezbollah – the CIA needs to shift its foucs

Max Fisher, Nov 21, 11, CIA Outsmarted by Hezbollah: Is This the Cost of Counterterrorism?

<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/cia-outsmarted-by-hezbollah-is-this-the-cost-of-counterterrorism/248830/>

Since 2001, the U.S. spy agency has been retooled to fight terror, but what has it lost?

The Lebanese militant group **Hezbollah has unraveled much of the CIA's mission in Lebanon, capturing up to a dozen U.S. spies in the country and effectively shutting down the agency's crucial operations there. "Beirut station is out of business," a source told the Los Angeles Times today. The incident is a major blow to the CIA and to U.S. intelligence. The agency's posting in Lebanon has for decades been one of its most aggressive, most highly valued, and, for its staff, most prestigious.** Though the CIA base there aggressively tracks Hezbollah, it is also a headquarters for monitoring and often countering Syria and Iran**.**¶**How was the CIA outmaneuvered by one of its oldest foes** in one of its proudest outposts? **CIA sources**that spoke to the Associated Press, which broke the story along with the L.A. Times, seem not to fear a strengthening Hezbollah or even to blame the agency's White House overseers, as spy officials often do, but rather **cite a changing culture in the CIA itself. The old CIA mission of counterintelligence, of spy-versus-spy, has taken a back seat to** the new emphasis on **killing terrorists**, they seem to worry, and the agency has suffered as a result.¶ **The Lebanon crisis is the latest mishap involving CIA counterintelligence, the undermining or manipulating of the enemy's ability to gather information**. Former CIA officials have said **that once-essential skill has been eroded as the agency shifted from outmaneuvering rival spy**agencies **to fighting terrorists. In the rush for immediate results,** former officers say, **tradecraft has suffered**.¶ The most recent high-profile example was the suicide bomber who posed as an informant and killed seven CIA employees and wounded six others in Khost, Afghanistan in December 2009.¶ The Khost incident, which was devastating to the CIA, neatly encapsulates how the world's premier spy agency managed to lose so much of its spy skills. Since September 2001, **the agency's mission has been less and less about subterfuge and intelligence-gathering but more and more about killing terrorists. In its growing emphasis on finding targets over finding information, it over-exposed itself** to the double-agent at Khost. This year, **as it was ramping up drone strikes** **in Pakistan, paramilitary operations in Somalia, and targeted killings in Yemen**, **it seems to have lost**some of **its once-prized focus on outwitting** such hostile agencies as **Hezbollah's "spy**combat **unit**."¶ The CIA first began to take a more aggressive posture during the Cold War, when presidents from Kennedy to Reagan used it to arm and train anti-Soviet opposition groups. But even then it remained mostly in the shadows, attempting to manipulate world events in the U.S.'s favor. And its primary tools -- back channels, foreign assets, secret bank accounts, and misinformation -- remained the same, even as the mission evolved. It was not until September 2001, when the U.S. quickly and dramatically changed its national security focus to terrorism, that the CIA began its slow transformation from a spy agency into something that at times more closely resembles a paramilitary organization.¶ How much has the CIA changed since 2001? In the late 1990s, senior officials in the Clinton administration debated endlessly over whether the CIA could legally be granted the authority to kill Osama bin Laden; the agency had been banned from assassinations since 1976, following revelations that it had tried to kill Fidel Castro a decade earlier. Even the idea of a direct presidential order to kill the world's most dangerous terrorist, a man who had already blown up two U.S. embassies, was considered controversial and outside the CIA's normal realm. Yet in the first 20 months of the Obama administration, the CIA's drone program in Pakistan alone killed over 800 people. It runs or helps run drone programs and special operations in several countries and even operates detention centers. Under Obama, the CIA and Pentagon have borrowed one another's methods in Afghanistan and Iraq (not to mention one another's leadership) so regularly that the line between U.S. intelligence and the U.S. military has blurred in unprecedented ways.¶ The change has also been political. In the days immediately after September 11, 2001, the Bush administration decided to put the agency on a much tighter leash, using something it called Top Secret Codeword/Threat Matrix. Intelligence reports were fed directly to the White House, which announced it would begin more directly controlling CIA activities. "The mistake was not to have proper analysis of the intelligence before giving it to the president," National Security Council member Roger Cressey told New Yorker reporter Jane Mayer for her Pulitzer-winning book on U.S. national security policy after September 2001, The Dark Side. "There was no filter. Most of it was garbage. None of it had been corroborated or screened. But it went directly to the president and his advisers, who are not intelligence experts. That's when mistakes got made."¶ That's also when the White House began pushing the CIA in a way that encouraged it to put less emphasis on its long-term information-collection and counterintelligence efforts, slow-boil missions that might takes years or more to yield results and that might be more about detecting future threats than combating existing ones. The White House's new urgency about terrorism and al-Qaeda placed far greater pressure on the CIA to deliver immediate results on known threats. First that meant tracking terrorists, then capturing and "interrogating" them, and within a few years it meant killing them outright. That urgency and pressure has been sustained for over a decade now. Judging by Hezbollah's recent victory over the CIA in Lebanon, which appears to have grown somewhat sloppy in its spycraft, some of the patience from the old days was lost.¶ While some in the CIA have zealously embraced the new mission, some have not, speaking out (though always anonymously) to the press. Ultimately, the CIA is guided by the White House and its prevailing assessment of what threatens the nation and how to fight back. In the 1980s, the CIA was so consumed by the Reagan administration's anti-Soviet fervor that in funneled millions of dollars to mujaheddin fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan without sufficiently considering whether its actions would increase other threats. The agency was so focused on bleeding the Soviets that, while the mission succeeded, it helped fuel a generation of militants who are still fighting against the U.S. around the world. **A similar sense of myopia appears to have returned to CIA policy since September 2001, with the agency and its White House overseers so obsessed with fighting terrorism that other skills go underdeveloped and other threats under-addressed**.¶As in the Cold War, unity of purpose has made the CIA incredibly effective at its central task: al-Qaeda's "central" organization in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been decimated, its Yemen-based branch severely curtailed, and its efforts at expansion left struggling. But as Andrew Exum wrote in response to the story, "It's great to have an intelligence agency with a knife in its teeth, but **the primary mission of an intelligence organization is to gather and analyze intelligence, not to thwack bad guys."**¶ It's not clear if the CIA's "primary mission" has changed as a result of deliberate, top-down decision-making, or if it was simply a slow but inexorable process of mission creep. As the CIA has gotten better at killing, it appears to have simultaneously become worse at spying. Maybe that's the path that the CIA had to take, with instability-fueled insurgencies increasingly able, willing, and interested in attacking U.S. assets and even civilians. **But this changing focus will necessarily leave it, and the U.S., more vulnerable to the non-terrorism threats that the CIA traditionally battles: rogue states, rising powers, and violent but shrewd organizations such as Hezbollah.**¶**Maybe the CIA can continue to handle both its old missions as well as its new, more aggressive tasks. But the agency's embarrassment in Lebanon suggests that it has emphasized paramilitary-style counterterrorism at the expense of spycraft. And while al-Qaeda has certainly posed a significant threat to the U.S., the terrorist group's power is eroding. Meanwhile, the U.S. still has to live in a world with dangerous rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, semi-hostile foreign intelligence services such as Russia's and China's, and anti-American groups from Hezbollah to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence to Mexican drug cartels. At some point, the CIA -- and the White House -- will have to decide whether al-Qaeda and related groups really outweigh all of those threats**

#### Currently, Hezbollah attacks are increasing and will become more deadly

Carafano 13June 7th, 2013. “Hezbollah Plays a Dangerous Game” James Jay Cafano <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/6/james-jay-carafano-hezbollah-plays-a-dangerous-game> (James Jay Carafano, a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges, is The Heritage Foundation’s Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies)

"The system was blinking red." That's how the 9/11 Commission Report described the intelligence community's state of concern shortly before the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.¶ "Counterterrorism officials were receiving frequent but fragmentary reports about threats," the commission reported, adding, "Indeed, there appeared to be possible threats almost everywhere the United States had interests--including at home."¶ But not until planes plowed into the Twin Towers did everyone understand what the chatter meant.¶ In a recent speech at The National Defense University, President Obama declared that the transnational terrorism threat is well in hand. But, plenty of signs indicate that's not the case.¶ **Consider Hezbollah. This multi-tentacle stooge of Iran is a Shi'a Islamist terrorist group. It is also a political party that operates a shadow government in Lebanon.¶** For more than a year, **Hezbollah has been increasing the tempo of its attacks on Western and Israeli targets in Asia and Europe**. The Bulgarian government, for example, has connected the group to a bus bombing that killed five Israeli tourists and their driver last year.¶ Most recently, **Hezbollah deployed "foreign fighters" to assist the Assad regime in beating back the opposition in Syria. This offensive further complicated an already complex crisis. It broadened the sectarian nature of the war, pitting Shi'a (Hezbollah, Iran, and the Syrian militias supporting Assad) against Sunni (the rebels).¶** **It has also pitted terrorists groups against one another. Hezbollah is battling Assad's opposition whether they are "freedom fighters" or al Qaeda. Jabhat al-Nusra, the al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, is now pretty much at war with Hezbollah**.¶ That may not sound like a bad thing, **but it means the war will surely spread to Lebanon**. Hezbollah has to expect payback. Car bombs will explode in Beirut, as Jabhat al-Nusra pays back Hezbollah. And, as terrorists kill terrorists, the people of Lebanon will be caught in the crossfire.¶ The Lebanese recognize this--and they are none too happy about it. Already some have expressed resentment over Hezbollah dragging the country into Syria's civil war. The people are seeing the group for what it is, a tool of Tehran.¶ That awareness may bring pain. **Hezbollah's impulse will likely be to turn up the violence even more--while directing as much blame and animosity as possible toward Israel. And that could spark another military confrontation.**¶ While Hezbollah sets the red lights blinking, the West mostly just blinks. The European Union remains bitterly divided over designating the terrorist organization as... a terrorist organization.¶ France, Britain and Germany are going halfsies--pressing the EU to label Hezbollah's armed-militia wing as a terrorist organization, while letting the political arm off the hook.¶ As long as the political arm is excluded, Europe won't be able to shut down terrorist fund-raising and recruiting in its own backyard.¶ The UN is not doing much to help either. Since 1978, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been charged with making sure the Lebanese-Israeli border region is free of any non-governmental armed personnel or weaponry. Clearly it has failed, in part because of self-imposed restrictions. For example, UNIFIL peacekeepers cannot even conduct regular building searches for arms!¶ Transnational terrorism is not in hand. **The U.S. desperately needs to shore up its position in the Middle East**. That means showing real leadership in dealing with Turkey, Israel, Iraq, Jordan and the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council.¶ It means making clear that the "pivot to Asia" does not entail disengaging from the region. It means ramping up, not standing down, our global anti-terrorism initiative.¶ **And it means developing a real strategy to prevent** Islamist **extremists from hijacking the Arab Spring.**

THE A-TEAM OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS

#### Hezbollah is an extremely effective organization that can execute in multiple scenarios leading to nuclear terrorism

Allison 04**.** Graham, Allison. Nuclear terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. 2004. 34-36. Print.

**Before 9/11, the group responsible for the single deadliest terrorist attack on Americans in history was not Al Qaeda but Hezbollah**. A violent Islamic terrorist organization, funded mainly by Syria and Iran, Hezbollah was responsible for the truck-bomb attack on the U.S. Marine barracks near the Beirut Airport on October 23. 1983, which killed 241 servicemen. Soon thereafter, President Ronald Reagan announced a “strategic redeployment” and withdrew U.S. troops from Lebanon. **To this day, the group remains active and powerful in the Middle East. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has called Hezbollah the “A-team of terrorists,” and CIA director Tenet testified in February 2003 that “as an organization with capability and worldwide presence,” Hezbollah is Al Qaedas “equal, if not a far more capable organization.”**42 Hezbollah’s activities have been concentrated in Lebanon. The Israeli army had moved into southern Lebanon in 1982 to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization from the region and continued to occupy part of the country even after that goal was achieved. When Lebanon’s Shiites realized that the Israelis intended to stay, they took up arms. Hezbollah launched a sustained guerrilla war against the Israelis, eventually forcing them to withdraw from Lebanon in May 2000. It was the first time that Arab arms had successfully ousted Israel from occupied territory anywhere in the Middle East, an(l Hezbollah attained heroic status throughout the Arab world. As Lebanon’s president, Emile Lahoud, a Christian, told 60 Minutes: “If it wasn’t for them, we couldn’t have liberated our land. And because of that, we have big esteem for the Hezbollah movement.”’ Flush with victory, the group’s leader, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, drew one conclusion: “This ‘Israel’ that owns nuclear weapons and the strongest air force in this region is more fragile than a spider web.” Hezbollahs rhetoric, and its military success, raise the issue of whether the group might be motivated to carry out a nuclear terrorist attack against Tel Aviv or even New York, which Islamic fundamentalists have called “the Jewish capital of the world.” Some analysts discount the possibility, observing a pattern of growing pragmatism as Hezbollah becomes further invested in day-to-day Lebanese politics.’ (I Hezbollah currently holds twelve seats in Lebanon’s parliament.) Indeed, the group has turned part of its energies to providing social services to destitute Shiites in southern Lebanon, a “bombs and schools” strategy that has served other terrorist groups well, including the Irish Republican Army. But as with AI Qaeda, it is important to examine carefully what Hezbollah says. The group’s 1985 manifesto includes a section titled “The Necessity for the Destruction of Israel,” which declares: “Our struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease-fire, no peace agreements.” Hezbollab’s hatred of Israel extends to the United States: “We see in Israel the vanguard of the United States in our Islamic vorld.” Moreover, this rhetoric cannot be dismissed as out of date. As Nasrallah reiterated in 2003, “Death to America was, is, and will stay our sbgall.”47 The CIA bas concluded that Hezbollah “would likely reactto an attack against it, Syria. or Iran with attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets worldwide.”4 In 2002, Israeli security services foiled two attempts by Hezbollah to explode so-called mega-bombs, able to demolish office towers on the scale of the Vorkl Trade Center. One of these plots targeted the Azrieli Towers, to of Tel Aviv’s tallest buildings, in what could have been a sequel to the attacks of 9/11. **As Gal Luft, one of Israel’s most thoughtful counterterrorism experts, has observed, it is only a matter of time before a “mega-attack” succeeds.49 Under what conditions might Hezbollah escalate to nuclear violence? One possibility involves the Iranian connection. In the early 1980s, Iran created Hezbollah as a proxy force against Israel, and it continues to give the group some $100 million a year. Iran also pro vides training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, and organizational aid.** With Iran actively building the infrastructure of a nuclear weapons program, its leaders fear that Israel could preemptively attack the facilities before they are completed, as it did in 1981 when Israeli aircraft bombed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor at Osirak. Iran has thought carefully about how it could deter such an attack. The Iranian defense minister warned in December 2003: ‘We will strike Israel with all weapons at our (lisposal if the Zionist regime ventures to do so.”° If Hezbollah lab had a suitcase nuclear device and were able credibly to threaten Tel Aviv; would Israel he so quick to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities? **Another possibility is that a splinter group from within Hezbollah could make the move toward nuclear terror. As the current leader ship of Hezbollah becomes further entrenched in domestic Lebanese politics, the group’s more militant operatives may well strike out on their own. Could a plausible threat to destroy Tel Aviv compel Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza or change its behavior? Revenge against the United States for supporting Israel could also spur senseless destruction. For this purpose, Hezbollah might join forces with Al Qaeda, as it did in the 1996 attack on a U.S. military installation, the Khobar Towers, in Saudi Arabia.** Hezbollah’s security chief, Imad Mughniyah (believed to be behind the Marine barracks bombing in 1983 and the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 to Beirut in 1985), has reportedly met more than once with bin Laden and his top aides to establish their common goal of forcing the United States to withdraw from the Middle East. Ah Mohamed, a former U.S. Special Forces member who pled guilty to conspiring with bin Laden on the 1998 bombings of two American embassies in Africa, testified in October 2000, before a U.S. federal district court, that **Hezbollah has provided Al Queda with explosives training and that he provided security for meetings between Mughiuivab and bin Laden.5’ If Hezbollah perceives U.S. policy as threatening its most vital interests, then it could begin to adopt Al Qaeda’s more radical agenda. With its unrivaled technical terror expertise, Hezbollah would be well positioned to escalate to nuclear terrorism.**

#### Nuclear terrorism is extremely likely

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(Zafar Nawaz, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111, dml)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dualuse nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does not eliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Farsighted rationality obligates that one should not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups — whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18).

#### That causes a nuclear war

Ayson 10

(Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against **them**. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

#### Strong CIA intelligence checks conflict – reliable data is key to leverage that mitigates flashpoints

Human Rights First 2011, “Disrupting the Supply Chain for Mass Atrocities How to Stop Third-Party Enablers of Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity”

<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Disrupting_the_Supply_Chain-July_2011.pdf>

**Intelligence collection and analysis are key to identifying threats of mass atrocities and developing responses. Better intelligence on third-party enablers of atrocities would reveal additional policy options to prevent or mitigate violence against civilians. Mapping the actors and dynamics in atrocity situations willclarify the identities of the enablers, their specific roles, and the actors or connections in the supply chain that may be particularly susceptible to pressure. The government alone can accomplish this work; no non-governmental entity, whether in journalism, research, or advocacy, has sufficient money, people, and networks to draw a complete picture.¶ In some cases, the enablers will be the very same actors that interest the United States for their role in other illicit transnational networks. By prioritizing a focus on enablers of atrocities in intelligence collection, and by sharing information and analysis across agencies,intelligence collection can yield high-value information on a broader set of national security challenges such as money laundering, terrorist financing, andnarcotics trafficking**.¶ Policy makers should ensure that the intelligence it routinely analyzes can be used to an even broader extent. For example, the CIA’s office on war crimes contributes to the twice-yearly Atrocities Watch List and supports war crimes tribunals; the information collection and analysis required for those functions, and the Watch List itself, should be expanded to include (if they do not already) not only perpetrators of ongoing atrocities and potential perpetrators in regions listed on the Watch List, but also the third-party actors that enable them. The intelligence community (IC) should also be charged with identifying and collecting intelligence on those enablers that have played roles in recent atrocities, since past behavior— such as the Government of Sudan’s in Darfur—may well continue even in other regions—such as South Kordofan or Abyei. Congress’s oversight function could be used more consistently to ensure that the IC maintains a focus on atrocities as a national security priority. In 2010, then- Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told Congress at a hearing on the ODNI’s Annual Threat Assessment that “over the next five years, a number of countries in Africa and Asia are at significant risk for a new outbreak of mass killing. . . . a new mass killing or genocide is most likely to occur in Southern Sudan.”18 DNI ames Clapper’s February 2011 testimony regarding the Annual Threat Assessment included no such attention to atrocities, despite the ongoing violence in Darfur, the absence of resolution of many problems in Southern Sudan, and violence against civilians in Côte d’Ivoire, Kyrgyzstan, and elsewhere in the previous nine months, as well as worries about violence around upcoming elections in Kenya.¶ While **intelligence on enablers can help policy makers target key actors or interruption points, the coordinated and committed use of the appropriate policy tools— political pressures, economic** sanctions, or even military actions—is also critical to effective action.

#### Additionally, Hezbollah weapons transfers cause third Lebanon war – it has embedded military infrastructure throughout the country

Badran 13Tony Badran, 7th March 2013. “A Nifty Conceit: The EU, Hezbollah, and Lebanon.” <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/a-nifty-conceit-the-eu-hezbollah-and-lebanon/> (Tony Badran is a Research Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, DC. He focuses on Lebanon, Syria and Hezbollah. His research includes US policy towards Lebanon and Syria; Syrian foreign policy, with a focus on its regional relations and its ties to militant non-state actors and terrorist groups)

The Hezbollah bus bombing in Bulgaria as well as their foiled operation in Cyprus have put Europe in an uncomfortable position, as pressure increases on the EU to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The plot in Cyprus is especially embarrassing, as the Hezbollah operative there was arrested and is being publicly tried, making it harder for EU officials to deny evidence laid out in the open. Still, it is painfully obvious that Europe would much prefer this whole Hezbollah inconvenience go away. In resisting calls to designate the Shiite group, the Europeans have hid behind a nifty conceit: designating Hezbollah could destabilize Lebanon. Espousing such a seemingly altruistic position is rather convenient. It affords the Europeans the semblance of judicious sagacity, enabling them to skirt the issue altogether, regardless of the evidence. Take for instance what Gilles de Kerchove, the EU’s Counterterrorism Coordinator, had to [say](http://euobserver.com/foreign/118859) about the matter. While strong evidence is a prerequisite for designating the group, Kechrove opined, there’s also a “political assessment.” The EU counterterrorism official then added, “for Hezbollah, you might ask, given the situation in Lebanon, which is a highly fragile, highly fragmented country, is listing it going to help you achieve what you want?” **The proposition that targeting Hezbollah would negatively impact Lebanon presupposes that the group currently contributes to stability. Such a view requires quite the suspension of disbelief. In reality, Hezbollah has thoroughly subverted the country and its citizens in virtually every aspect. Left unmolested, Hezbollah not only undermines Lebanon's security, institutions, and political system, but is also set track to compromise its foreign relations, ruin its financial system, and destroy whatever remains of its social cohesion. The most obvious threat has been and continues to be Hezbollah’s illegal arsenal.** As I have [written](https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/israels_free_hand) in recent weeks, **Hezbollah’s effort to transport into Lebanon the strategic weapons it had stored in Syria is placing the country in tremendous danger. What makes the peril inescapable is the fact that Hezbollah has turned entire population centers into military sites. It has embedded its military infrastructure inside towns and villages all throughout the country**. **The Israelis have already struck one such convoy in Syria. However, eventually Hezbollah may succeed in bringing another convoy across the border. This will surely prompt another Israeli strike, which in turn is sure to result in significant collateral damage**. In his February 16 address, Hezbollah’s Secretary **General Hassan Nasrallah** [declared](http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4345592,00.html) **that any such Israeli strike inside Lebanon would be met with retaliation against Israel’s infrastructure. Nasrallah’s threats, whether or not they’re to be taken seriously, are unlikely to alter Israel’s calculations regarding the smuggling of strategic weapons. Given that Hezbollah will surely attempt to bring in more of these weapons systems stored in Syria, an Israeli strike in Lebanon is, in all likelihood, a matter of time.** **Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria has had other deleterious effects on Lebanon and its fragile social fabric. By joining the war on the side of the Assad regime, Hezbollah is also acting as the regime’s flank in Lebanon. As such, it has taken action against Lebanese Sunnis who are assisting the Syrian opposition**. Whenever the Shiite group could not do so itself, it has relied on its allies in the military and security apparatuses to perform a task on its behalf, as we witnessed in the Arsal [incident](https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/hollow-praise-for-the-laf) several weeks ago. The damage has been, therefore, double. On the one hand, Hezbollah further exacerbated Sunni-Shiite tensions. Already it had brought those communal relations to the brink in May 2008, when it assaulted Sunni neighborhoods of Beirut (and the Druze Shouf Mountains), killing dozens. On the other hand, it pitted the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) against the Sunni community, which has come to view the Party of God’s relationship with the LAF with great suspicion. In addition, not only does Hezbollah provide cover to a host of criminal activities in its areas of influence – keeping them beyond the reach of the law – but also, the Party of God stands accused in the murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Four of its commanders and operatives have been named as suspects, but, naturally, the LAF would never consider moving in to apprehend them. Perhaps the EU would also prefer to abort justice and gloss over political assassination in order to avoid action that would ‘destabilize’ the country. It’s bad enough that [suspicions](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/10/25/irans_bloody_power_play_100309.html) over Hezbollah’s role in other political murders and assassination [attempts](http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/Mar-06/209068-judge-requests-life-in-prison-for-suspect-in-harb-case.ashx) have eaten at the core of communal coexistence and the political system altogether. But the Party of God’s penetration of state institutions has also implicated the Lebanese state in Hezbollah’s activities, both in Lebanon and abroad. Take for instance Hezbollah’s control over General Security. That apparatus is responsible for ports of entry as well as for the issue of travel documents. In recent years, as Hezbollah cells have been uncovered abroad, it came to light that many of its operatives held false identification papers that were nevertheless issued by the government. The case of Sami Shehab, who was [arrested](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/middleeast/14egypt.html) in Egypt in 2009, is but one example. Shehab was in Egypt on an officially issued false passport. Such activities abroad have not only damaged Lebanon’s diplomatic relations, but have also hurt Lebanese expatriates, especially those working in the Gulf Arab states. Most recently, the uncovering of Hezbollah cells in the United Arab Emirates have led to the [deportation of Lebanese resident workers](http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/42441of) in that country. This is hardly the worst economic calamity Hezbollah has brought on Lebanon. **The Party of God’s vast,** [global](http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/hezbollah-acts-local-thinks-global/)**, criminal,** [enterprise](https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/eyes_on_hezbollah) **has infected the backbone of the Lebanese economy: the banking sector.** [The case of the Lebanese Canadian Bank](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/world/middleeast/beirut-bank-seen-as-a-hub-of-hezbollahs-financing.html?pagewanted=all) **is one ominous example. And while it may have been papered over, the potential damage to Lebanese banks, as a result of Hezbollah (and Iranian) money-laundering operations is simply devastating.** The group’s terrorist activities in Bulgaria and Cyprus (with whom Lebanon has critical energy interests) are bad enough. But its involvement in the drug trade and laundering of the proceeds through the banking sector and exchange houses is earning Lebanon the unenviable title of a “veritable money laundering machine,” [as illicit finance expert David Asher put it](http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/17/time_to_get_serious_about_sanctions_on_iran_especially_through_lebanese_banks). Asher also notes that Hezbollah’s money laundering has infiltrated the real estate sector just as much as it has the banking sector. Designating Hezbollah, and purging it from the Lebanese financial system, may be the only way to salvage the critical banking sector down the road. The above is but a quick sample of how Hezbollah has corroded Lebanon’s security, economy, society, politics and state institutions. There is much more, including the [mutilation of the political system by force of arms](https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/the_tyranny_of_the_black_shirts). The bottom line is that the EU rationale for not designating Hezbollah is not only absurd; it is detrimental to Lebanon’s long-term prospects. Lebanon may not in the end survive the metastasis of Hezbollah. But Europe’s refusal to take action against the Party of God will only help ensure Lebanon’s demise.

#### Also, a war in Lebanon would go global and nuclear.

The Earl of Stirling 11, hereditary Governor & Lord Lieutenant of Canada, Lord High Admiral of Nova Scotia, & B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History; M.A. in European Studies, “General Middle East War Nears - Syrian events more dangerous than even nuclear nightmare in Japan”, http://europebusines.blogspot.com/2011/03/general-middle-east-war-nears-syrian.html

**Any Third Lebanon War**/General Middle East War is apt to involve WMD on both side quickly as both sides know the stakes and that the Israelis are determined to end, once and for all, any Iranian opposition to a 'Greater Israel' domination of the entire Middle East. **It will be a case of 'use your WMD or lose them' to enemy strikes. Any massive WMD usage against Israel will result in the usage of Israeli thermonuclear warheads against Arab and Persian populations centers in large parts of the Middle East, with the resulting spread of radioactive fallout over large parts of the Northern Hemisphere.** However, the first use of nukes is apt to be lower yield warheads directed against Iranian underground facilities including both nuclear sites and governmental command and control and leadership bunkers, with some limited strikes also likely early-on in Syrian territory.¶ **The Iranians are well prepared to launch a global Advanced Biological Warfare terrorism based strike against not only Israel and American and allied forces in the Middle East but also against the American, Canadian, British, French, German, Italian, etc., homelands. This will utilize DNA recombination based genetically engineered 'super killer viruses' that are designed to spread themselves throughout the world using humans as vectors.** There are very few defenses against such warfare, other than total quarantine of the population until all of the different man-made viruses (and there could be dozens or even over a hundred different viruses released at the same time) have 'burned themselves out'**. This could kill a third of the world's total population.¶Such a result from an Israeli triggered war would almost certainly cause a Russian-Chinese response that would eventually finish off what is left of Israel and begin a truly global war/WWIII with multiple war theaters around the world. It is highly unlikely that a Third World War, fought with 21st Century weaponry will be anything but the Biblical Armageddon.**

#### Independently, bioterror causes extinction

Myhrvold**,** July13 [Nathan, formerly Chief Technology Officer at Microsoft, is co-founder of Intellectual Ventures—one of the largest patent holding companies in the world, “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action”, The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>, BJM]

Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential threats. Nor is it clear that anyone is even trying. In addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other parameters can be played with, given that the infectious power of an epidemic depends on many properties, including the length of the latency period during which a person is contagious but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each new case to spread to more people and thus makes the virus harder to stop. This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by HIV , which is very difficult to transmit compared with smallpox and many other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The balancing factor is that HIV can take years to progress to AIDS , which can then take many more years to kill the victim. What makes HIV so dangerous is that infected people have lots of opportunities to infect others. This property has allowed HIV to claim more than 30 million lives so far, and approximately 34 million people are now living with this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15 A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or months—and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV . It could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and **kill a large part of humanity with it**. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race— or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes **only a handful of individuals** to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological **science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost**, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included. The 9/11 attacks involved at least four pilots, each of whom had sufficient education to enroll in flight schools and complete several years of training. Bin Laden had a degree in civil engineering. Mohammed Atta attended a German university, where he earned a master’s degree in urban planning—not a field he likely chose for its relevance to terrorism. A future set of terrorists could just as easily be students of molecular biology who enter their studies innocently enough but later put their skills to homicidal use. Hundreds of universities in Europe and Asia have curricula sufficient to train people in the skills necessary to make a sophisticated biological weapon, and hundreds more in the United States accept students from all over the world. Thus it seems **likely** that sometime in the near future a small band of terrorists, or even a single misanthropic individual, will **overcome our best defenses** and do something truly terrible, such as fashion a bioweapon that **could kill millions or even billions** **of people**. Indeed, **the creation of such weapons within the next 20 years seems to be a virtual certainty**. The repercussions of their use are hard to estimate. One approach is to look at how the scale of destruction they may cause compares with that of other calamities that the human race has faced.

#### CIA is trying to stop Syria weapons spillover, but efforts have been unsuccessful

Lake 12.Eli Lake, July 19th 2012. “Syria’s Next Act” <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/19/syria-s-next-act.html> (Eli Lake is the senior national-security correspondent for The Daily Beast. He previously covered national security and intelligence for The Washington Times. Lake has also been a contributing editor at The New Republic since 2008 and covered diplomacy, intelligence, and the military for the late New York Sun. He has lived in Cairo and traveled to war zones in Sudan, Iraq, and Gaza. He is one of the few journalists to report from all three members of President Bush’s axis of evil: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea)

With the days and weeks of the Syrian government appearing numbered, **the Central Intelligence Agency is scrambling to get a handle on the locations of the country’s chemical and biological weapons,** while assessing the composition, loyalties, and background of the rebel groups poised to take power in the event President Bashar al-Assad falls. Obama administration officials tell The Daily Beast that **the CIA has sent officers to the region to assess Syria’s weapons program. One major task for the CIA right now is to work with military defectors to find out as much information on Syria’s weapons of mass destruction, according to one U.S. official with access to Syrian intelligence. Another focus will be to sort through reams of intercepted phone calls and emails, satellite images, and other collected intelligence to find the exact locations of the Syrian weapons,** this official said. This task has become more urgent in recent days. Last week, The Wall Street Journal [reported](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303644004577523251596963194.html) that the Syrian military was moving its chemical weapons out of storage. On July 17, Nawaf Fares, Syria’s ex-ambassador to Iraq, [told the BBC](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18864629) the regime would not hesitate to use chemical weapons against the rebel fighters. On Wednesday, a bomb killed the Syrian defense minister and the brother-in-law of President al-Assad in Damascus. The blow to the al-Assad cabinet raised the prospect that the Syrian regime may be on its last legs. Rep. Mike Rogers, the Republican chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, declined to provide details on what intelligence assets have been sent to Syria or to say whether the CIA has sent officers on the ground there. He said that the administration had recently deployed "the resources necessary to collect the information that we need to make a good decision on chemical and biological [weapons], opposition groups and leadership transition strategies." But, he added, "We don’t know nearly what we need to know to be completely effectiveif the regime were to implode tomorrow." A CIA spokesman Thursday declined to comment. Syria never signed the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans the use, stockpiling, or production of chemical weapons. Steven Heydemann, a senior adviser for Middle East initiatives at the U.S. Institute of Peace, a nonpartisan think tank, said he understands Syria’s stockpiles to be “massive.” Brian Sayers, the director of government relations for the Syria Support Group, a new lobby in Washington that is pressing the Obama administration to give guns and training to Syria’s opposition said, “We believe that **if the United States does not act urgently, there is a real risk of a political vacuum in Syria, including the possibility of a dispersion of chemical weapons to rogue groups such as Hezbollah.”** **P**aula DeSutter, who served as assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance, and implementation between 2002 and 2009 and is now retired, said biological weapons could be a bigger a concern. A 2011 [State Department report](http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/170447.htm) on the compliance of countries with arms control and nonproliferation agreements said it "remained unclear" whether Syria would use biological weapons as a military option or whether Syria had violated the Biological Weapons Convention. DeSutter also said she would want the U.S. and international community to secure any remaining nuclear-related equipment from the al-Kibar reactor destroyed in 2007 by Israeli jets. Also unclear is what, if anything, Iraq transferred to Syria before the 2003 U.S. invasion. “That is the wild card,” said DeSutter. Whether or not sensitive weapons technology was moved to Syria is a hotly disputed question in the intelligence community. James Clapper, now the Director of National Intelligence and formerly the director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, said in 2003 that he believed materials had been moved out of Iraq in the months before the war and cited [satellite imagery](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-10-29/news/0310290219_1_illicit-weapons-clapper-weapons-inspector). Obama administration officials say the White House has yet to decide on how it will respond if pro-al-Assad forces use chemical weapons against the Syrian population or a neighboring country. The administration has told senior regime officials that they will be held responsible if they fail to secure chemical weapons. DeSutter said the U.S. should remain vague about the exact consequences. “You could say we will target the president of Syria if they are used and we will target any military organization that used them,” DeSutter said. “I would let them wonder. You might want to drop the word ‘Israel’ in the conversation, too, as a subtle point.” Hydemann said, “There is absolutely no question there has been a great deal of attention in different agencies of the government to the location and security of the chemical weapons stockpiles.” He says the U.S. has done some contingency planning on securing Syria’s borders as well as airports and sea ports to make sure sensitive weapons or terrorist and regime officials do not escape in the event of the regime’s collapse. Other issues pending at the White House include who in the current Syrian government could remain in place if the regime falls and what the U.S. will do to protect Syrian religious and ethnic minorities. While several government agencies and departments are drawing up contingency plans and drafting policy memos, the White House has ultimate control of the policy process and has yet to make a decision. “We are still waiting for red lines,” one Obama administration official who works on Syria issues told The Daily Beast. “This is a decision for the president.” Up until now, the Obama administration has preferred to influence events in Syria from behind the scenes. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has helped create a group of states known as “Friends of Syria” that seek a managed transition through financial support for the opposition. The State Department is also providing nonlethal aid to Syria’s opposition such as communications equipment. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice has pushed for U.N. Security Council resolutions and sanctions targeting President al-Assad and his top aides. A resolution authorizing military intervention in Syria was vetoed Thursday by China and Russia at the United Nations.

#### Creating effective Intelligence gathering is key to stop weapons transfers

Riedel 12Bruce Riedel. December 12th, 2012. “Syria and Chemical Weapons: What Can the U.S. do now? “<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/12/12-syria-chemical-weapons-us-riedel> (Bruce Riedel is senior fellow and director of the [Brookings Intelligence Project](http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/intelligence), part of Brookings’ new [Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/security-and-intelligence). Riedel also serves as a senior fellow in the [Saban Center for Middle East Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/saban). Riedel joined Brookings following a 30-year career at the Central Intelligence Agency, a tenure which included multiple overseas postings. He served as a senior advisor to the last four U.S. presidents on South Asia and the Middle East, working as a senior member of the National Security Council)

**Syria has the Arab world’s most lethal arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, hundreds of chemical warheads, dozens of Scud missiles and bombs which can deliver them anywhere in the Levant. Stopping them from falling into terrorist hands should be our top intelligence priority.** Syrian scientists developed an effective chemical weapons program using primarily the nerve agent sarin, a substance 500 times more toxic than cyanide, in the 1980s. Syria mated the nerve agent with Scud missiles and with bombs and artillery shells. When Israel learned of the Syrian program it considered military action to destroy it but concluded the program was too disbursed to be susceptible to air attacks without an unacceptable risk that Syria would respond by firing chemicals into Tel Aviv. Securing all of the arsenal today would require a very large military intervention. As Syria collapses further into chaos over the next few months the most immediate danger is that al-Qaeda’s Syrian wing, the al-Nusra front, will take control of a military facility with a cache of chemical weapons. They could use them against Assad’s forces, or more likely spirit them into a third country to attack an American target. Jordan foiled an al-Qaeda plot to attack our Embassy in Amman this fall with mortar fire. How well al-Qaeda could maintain and use chemicals is unknown. Chemical weapons in amateur hands can be very dangerous both to the amateur and his enemy. We don’t want to take the chance**. The key to stopping al-Qaeda or Hezbollah gaining control of a cache is good real time actionable intelligence. The CIA and Mossad have had almost two years to ramp up intelligence collection on Syria but it’s a formidable challenge. U.S. and Jordanian commandoes need to be ready to secure any loose bombs**.

## Plan

#### The Congress of the United States Federal Government should place a statutory ban on drone operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency.