## Case

### Overview

#### The string of pearls is broken- only 5 of those in congress showed up to hear Rafiq ur-Rehman’s testimony of the drone strike that killed his mother, showing an inherent failure in the current political system

#### Violence is intimately tied into ourselves- we know who we are by who we are not. Since 9/11, this process has been hijacked by the terrorist discourse of government controlled reality, making violence towards the other inevitable. Individually, this is the violence that allows my friend to be called a terrorist in the lunch room and school kids to be targeted for wearing a debutta. Structurally, this legitimizes the assassinations committed by the u.s., preventing any form of outrage or reaction. Our affective engagement is necessary to disrupt the vocabularies that prevent recognition of the other end of the drone screen.

#### ROB- the role of the ballot is to open up the debate space to the discourses of the periphery

### Util

**Rights First – survival is meaningless without dignity. Extinction is only an impact because we value rights.**

**Shue 89** – **Professor of Ethics and Public Life, Princeton University (Henry, “Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, pp. 141-2)**

Given the philosophical obstacles to resolving moral disputes, there are at least two approaches one can take in dealing with the issue of the morality of nuclear strategy. One approach is to stick doggedly with one of the established moral theories constructed by philosophers to “rationalize” or “make sense of” everyday moral intuitions, and to accept the verdict of the theory, whatever it might be, on the morality of nuclear weapons use. A more pragmatic alternative approach assumes that trade-offs in moral values and principles are inevitable in response to constantly changing threats, and that the emergence of novel, unforeseen challenges may impel citizens of Western societies to adjust the way they rank their values and principles to ensure that the moral order survives. Nuclear weapons are putting just such a strain on our moral beliefs. Before the emergence of a nuclear-armed communist state capable of threatening the existence of Western civilization, the slaughter of millions of innocent human beings to preserve Western values may have appeared wholly unjustifiable under any possible circumstances. Today, however, it may be that Western democracies, if they are to survive as guardians of individual freedom, can no longer afford to provide innocent life the full protection demanded by Just War morality. It might be objected that the freedoms of Western society have value only on the assumption that human beings are treated with the full dignity and respect assumed by Just War theory. Innocent human life is not just another value to be balanced side by side with others in moral calculations. It is the raison d’etre of Western political, economic, and social institutions. A free society based on individual rights that sanctioned mass slaughter of innocent human beings to save itself from extinction would be “morally corrupt,” no better than soviet society, and not worth defending. The only morally right and respectable policy for such a society would be to accept destruction at the hands of tyranny, if need be. This objection is partly right in that a society based on individual rights that casually sacrifices innocent human lives for the sake of common social goods is a contradiction in terms. On the other hand, even Just War doctrine allows for the unintentional sacrifice of some innocent human life under certain hard-pressing circumstances. It is essentially a consequentialist moral doctrine that ascribes extremely high – but not absolute – value to innocent human life. The problem for any nonabsolute moral theory, of course, is where to draw the line.

#### Utilitarian justifications lead to the security threats they aim to prevent. An unconditional stance demanding transparency is a prerequisite for utilitarian calculus.

PAUL GOWDER J.D., 2000, Harvard Law School SYMPOSIUM: FEDERAL SECRECY POLICY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE FUTURE OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: Introductory Essay: Secrecy as Mystification of Power: Meaning and Ethics in the Security State Winter, 2005-2006 2 ISJLP 1

The academic (particularly legal academic) and public discourse on government secrecy is overwhelmingly produced in the mode of utilitarian expediency. The underlying assumption seems to be that secrecy is merely a question of strategy, or instrumental reason, and that we are free to conceal the behavior of the State from its citizens if the costs of such action outweigh the benefits. Thus, the typical discussion of secrecy -- even from opponents of secrecy -- limits itself to analyzing the effect of secrecy on one or more of a fairly well-trod set of "goods," ordinarily: state security, physical safety, efficient markets, scientific research, judicial accuracy, public trust in government, or official accountability. **[2](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ef91f29c251d4ed72763e65880313918&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=1bebc42cadd931bfb62fb867753a731a" \l "n2" \t "_self)** Even those that choose to term their approaches "ethical" **[3](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ef91f29c251d4ed72763e65880313918&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=1bebc42cadd931bfb62fb867753a731a" \l "n3" \t "_self)** provide a loophole not only for [\*3] grudgingly using secrecy, but even for endorsing it: if the act is "really necessary," we hold open the possibility of calling the act "justifiable." **[4](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ef91f29c251d4ed72763e65880313918&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=1bebc42cadd931bfb62fb867753a731a" \l "n4" \t "_self)** At times, even those opposing other forms of governmental overreaching in a consequentialist mood find themselves opening the door to extreme versions of secrecy. **[5](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ef91f29c251d4ed72763e65880313918&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=1bebc42cadd931bfb62fb867753a731a" \l "n5" \t "_self)** Yet utilitarian conceptions of secrecy miss something important -- our distinguishing human value, the root of the "good" that they seek to maximize: meaning. Even if the "good" at issue is "preference satisfaction," the question remains: where is the self transcendent value? Phrased differently, what reason have we to believe that the products of human consciousness are worth something, in some non-solipsistic calculus, to make our preferences worth satisfying? [6](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ef91f29c251d4ed72763e65880313918&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=1bebc42cadd931bfb62fb867753a731a" \l "n6" \t "_self) This is [\*4] a question that utilitarians are traditionally not very good at answering, but one that, I suggest, gives us a path into a non-utilitarian ethics that may be suited to an examination of state secrecy. The non-utilitarian approach actually has a utilitarian justification. As a practical matter, utilitarian arguments in favor of secrecy are likely to be given irrationally disproportionate weight in the political marketplace versus utilitarian arguments against secrecy, regardless of their relative merit. **[7](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ef91f29c251d4ed72763e65880313918&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=1bebc42cadd931bfb62fb867753a731a" \l "n7" \t "_self)** Current psychological research suggests that the public is likely to react irrationally to the unusual salience of the September 11, 2001 attacks. **[8](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ef91f29c251d4ed72763e65880313918&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=1bebc42cadd931bfb62fb867753a731a" \l "n8" \t "_self)** Researchers have found empirical evidence that 9/11 salience affects our voting behavior. **[9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ef91f29c251d4ed72763e65880313918&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=1bebc42cadd931bfb62fb867753a731a" \l "n9" \t "_self)** More generally, mortality salience has been shown to increase people's in-group identification and consequent hostility toward perceived outsiders (like Muslims) -- and this is hardly an optimistic scenario **[10](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ef91f29c251d4ed72763e65880313918&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=1bebc42cadd931bfb62fb867753a731a" \l "n10" \t "_self)** for dealing with secrecy (particularly if believed to be likely to [\*5] manifest as profiling of disfavored groups) on a cost-benefit basis. **[11](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ef91f29c251d4ed72763e65880313918&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=1bebc42cadd931bfb62fb867753a731a" \l "n11" \t "_self)** As a consequence, it is unlikely that a public motivated by fear and mortality salience will make political decisions relating to perceived terror risk in accordance with the principle of utility maximization, even with the benefit of a full consequentialist public discourse on the matter. **[12](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=ef91f29c251d4ed72763e65880313918&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=1bebc42cadd931bfb62fb867753a731a" \l "n12" \t "_self)** On the other hand, approaching the question on the basis of universal deontological ethical duties might cause the public and policymakers to pause and consider their policies in a mode beyond hasty reaction to fearful events. The mere act of publicly considering the non-utilitarian ethics of state secrecy (and other political responses to terror) might serve to moderate the rush to policies driven by in-group identification and mortality salience.

### Reality

#### Debates in the squo are controlled by DOD created reality- this frame must be broken before a productive discussion can take place

Judith Butler, 09- “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Pg. 65-66

In her final book, Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan¶ Sontag remarks that this practice of embedded reporting¶ begins some twenty years earlier, with the coverage of the¶ British Campaign in the Falklands in 1982, when only two¶ photojournalists were permitted to enter the region and no television broadcasts were allowed.4 Since that time,¶ journalists have increasingly agreed to comply with the¶ exigencies of embedded reporting in order to secure access¶ to the action itself. But what is the action to which access¶ is thus secured? In the case of the recent and current wars,¶ the visual perspective that the US Department of Defense¶ permitted to the media actively structured our cognitive¶ apprehension of the war. And although restricting how or¶ what we see is not exactly the same as dictating a storyline,¶ it is a way of interpreting in advance what will and will¶ not be included in the field of perception. The very action¶ of the war, its practices and its effects, are meant to be¶ established by the perspective that the Department of¶ Defense orchestrates and permits, thereby illustrating the¶ orchestrative power of the state to ratify what will be called¶ reality: the extent of what is perceived to exist.

## Topicality

#### w/m- grief restricts the power of detached violence towards the other

#### C/I- The affirmative must defend the desirability of a reduction in the president's authority

#### We are the state- power is formed from individual social relations

Judith Butler, 00- “Contingency, Hegemony, Universality”.

This problem of a structural approach to the founding limits of the subject becomes important when we consider possible forms of opposition. If hegemony denotes the historical possibilities for articulation that emerge within a given political horizon, then it will make a significant difference whether we understand that field as historically revisable and transformable, or whether it is given as a field whose integrity is secured by certain structurally identifiable limits and exclusions. If the terms of both dominance and opposition are constrained by such a field of articulability, the very possibility of expanding the possible sites of articulation for justice, equality, universality will be determined in part by whether we understand this field as subject to change through time. My understanding of hegemony is that its normative and optimistic moment consists precisely in the possibilities for expanding the democratic possibilities for the key terms of liberalism, rendering them more inclusive, more dynamic and more concrete. If the possibility for such change is precluded by a theoretical over determination of the structural constraints on the field of political articulability, then it becomes necessary to reconsider the relation between history and structure to preserve the political project of hegemony. I believe that however else we may disagree, Laclau, Zizek and I do agree on the project of radical democracy and on the continuing political promise of the Gramscian¶ notion of hegemony. Distinct from a view that casts the operation of power in the political field exclusively in terms of discrete blocs which¶ vie with one another for control of policy questions, hegemony emphasizes the ways in which power operates to form our everyday understanding of social relations, and to orchestrate the ways in which we consent to (and reproduce) those tacit and covert relations of power. Power is not stable or static, but is remade at various junctures within everyday life; it constitutes our tenuous sense of common sense, and is ensconced as the prevailing epistemes of a culture. Moreover, social transformation occurs not merely by rallying mass numbers in favour of a cause, but precisely through the ways in which daily social relations are rearticulated, and new conceptual horizons opened up by anomalous or subversive practices.

**Standards**-

**Predictable Ground** - We still answer the resolutional question, so they should be prepared. Sustains the direction of core negative ground like drones and authority good.

#### Limits- only a few authorities affect the ability to use drones, our interpretation keeps the research burden in tact. The resolution doesn’t specify why restrictions are placed. The aff meets their burden. Our limits are good enough, you should default to reasonability.

**Education** - outweighs fairness. Unique education is useful, the fairness they want results in stale politics debate with no benefit.

#### Role playing positions the white, able-bodied, male as the ideal citizen, violently rejecting any forms of difference. A new approach to policy engagement is necessary

Dilts, 13- “Incurable Blackness: Criminal Disenfranchisement, Mental Disability, and the White Citizen”. Disability Studies Quarterly. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Loyola Marymount. http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3268/0

The Maryland State Constitution states that its General Assembly may, "regulate or prohibit the right to vote of a person convicted of infamous or other serious crime or under care or guardianship for mental disability." In a single sentence, the link between criminality and mental disability is invoked in order to draw an internal boundary around those who can take part in the project of representative government. Through a close reading of one particular moment in the history of Maryland's disenfranchisement provisions, I show how these restrictions could buttress prevailing racial hierarchies. Delegates to Maryland's nineteenth century constitutional conventions explicitly understood disenfranchisement as a practice that managed the boundaries of full citizenship through the courts' power to determine criminal guilt and mental competence. In defining "exceptions" to the franchise, the delegates were additionally shoring up the increasingly unstable conception of whiteness. The figure of the "free negro" was persistently invoked to do this work, marked through criminality and insanity as civically disabled in order to both reduce the threat that s/he posed to the standing of white workers and to shore up the purity of whiteness itself as innocent, able, and fit to rule. In so far as disenfranchisement is an instrument of racial oppression, it continues to operate racially not just in spite of color-blind liberalism, but also precisely through its ability to disarm claims of racial animus. The norms that drove the adoption of disenfranchisement in the nineteenth century continue to ground these exclusions to the vote, meaning that the ideal figure of the American citizen continues to be compulsorily white, male, heterosexual, and able-bodied. Ending this legacy of social and political hierarchization requires that we remove disenfranchisement provisions, but also move beyond the logic of inclusion, divesting the vote as a location that finalizes, essentializes, and fixes the boundaries of the polity.

#### Aff choice solves- they can be as topical as they want when they’re aff

#### The 1AC presents a number of DA’s to their framework:

#### DA’s-

#### Affect is key- Butler says the detached forms of debate they ask for allow limitless individual violence

#### Scholarship- Ahmed says the western scholarship they want leads to bad forms of policy that legitimated the Iraq war

#### Frames of violence- rejecting the aff means the negative cannot break out of the frames that allow countless individuals to be lost in the fold. Narratives key to solve

#### Socialization- Butler says that violence has become intimated into ourselves, and will be spread inevitably without confrontation. Aff is key

#### Economy of fear- Ahmed says that the U.S. has labeled everything other as a “could be terrorist” and open to destruction. This topic legitimates that through discussions of terrorism

#### State implementation is the squo- aff is key to make sure it is done ethically

**These impact turn their education claims**- Their education teaches us how to deny our part and continue the violence, keeping us in a permanent state of destructive xenophobia exemplified by the post-9/11 drive to cleanse the world of all enemies

**Tiebreaker- neither interpretation can end the war, but our disruption of the frames that allow destruction to continue unnoticed creates the conditions for a more general call for an end to violence, that’s Butler.**

### A2 Stasis

#### The aff is a controversial action in the direction of the topic- controversy makes sure a debate can happen. We are grounded in the topic, the 1ac is an action to stop violent drone policy. They should be prepared to discuss this.

#### Collapse of debate is false- advent of cp’s and the k prove, people adapt not quit.

#### The aff leads to creativity- instead of pulling out the backfiles people actually have to engage with our discussion. Leads to better critical thinkers and a debate space that teaches real world skills we don’t need to be policy makers to use.

### A2 Limits/predictability

#### Limits are impossible- wake’s one reactor aff last year prove

De Cock 1 (Christian De Cock, Professor of Organizational behaviour, change management, creative problem solving, 2001, “Of Philip K. Dick, reflexivity and shifting realities Organizing (writing) in our post-industrial society” in the book “Science Fiction and Organization”)

'As Marx might have said more generally, 'all that is built or all that is "natural" melts into image' in the contemporary global economies of signs and space' (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 326). The opinion seems to be broadly shared among both academics and practitioners that traditional conceptions of effective organizing and decision-making are no longer viable because we live in a time of irredeemable turbulence and ambiguity (Gergen, 1995). The emerging digital or 'new' economy seems to be a technologically driven vision of new forms of organizing, relying heavily on notions of flexibility as a response this turbulence. Corporate dinosaurs must be replaced with smart networks that add value. Words such as 'cyberspace' 3 and 'cyborganization' drip easily from tongues (e.g. Parker and Cooper, 1998) and 'the organization' becomes more difficult to conceptualize as it 'dissipates into cyberspace' and 'permeates its own boundaries' (Hardy and Clegg 1997: S6). Organizations are losing important elements of permanence as two central features of the modern organization, namely the assumption of self-contained units and its structural solidity, are undermined (March, 1995). Even the concept of place becomes increasingly phantasmagoric as locales get thoroughly penetrated by social influences quite distant from them (Giddens, 1990). In this new organizational world 'reality' seems to have become only a contract, the fabrication of a consensus that can be modified or can break down at any time (Kallinikos, 1997) and the witnessing point - the natural datum or physical reference point - seems to be in danger of being scrapped (Brown, 1997). This notion that reality is dissolving from the inside cannot but be related with feelings of disorientation and anxiety. Casey (1995, pp. 70-1), for example, provides a vivid description of the position of 'the self' within these new organizational realities. This is a world where everyone has lost a sense of everyday competence and is dependent upon experts, where people become dependent on corporate bureaucracy and mass culture to know what to do. The solidity (or absence of it) of reality has of course been debated at great length in the fields of philosophy and social theory, but it remains an interesting fact that organizational scholars have become preoccupied with this issue in recent years. Hassard and Holliday (1998), for example, talk about the theoretical imperative to explore the linkages between fact/fiction and illusion/reality. It is as if some fundamental metaphysical questions have finally descended into the metaphorical organizational street. Over the past decade or so, many academics who label themselves critical management theorists and/or postmodernists (for once, let's not name any names) have taken issue with traditional modes of organizing (and ways of theorizing about this organizing) by highlighting many irrationalities and hidden power issues. These academics have taken on board the idea that language has a role in the constitution of reality and their work is marked by a questioning of the nature of reality, of our conception of knowledge, cognition, perception and observation (e.g. Chia, 1996a; Cooper and Law, 1995; Czarniawska, 1997). Notwithstanding the importance of their contributions, these authors face the problem that in order to condemn a mode of organizing or theorizing they need to occupy an elevated position, a sort of God's eye view of the world; a position which they persuasively challenge when they deconstruct the claims of orthodox/modern organizational analyses (Parker, 2000; Weiskopf and Willmott, 1997). Chia, for example, writes about the radically untidy, ill-adjusted character of the fields of actual experience - 'It is only by … giving ourselves over to the powers of "chaos", ambiguity, and confusion that new and deeper insights and understanding can be attained' (Chia, 1996b, p. 423) - using arguments which could not be more tidy, analytical and precise. This of course raises the issue of reflexivity: if reality can never be stabilized and the research/theorizing process 'is always necessarily precarious, incomplete and fragmented' (Chia, 1996a, p. 54), then Chia's writing clearly sits rather uncomfortably with his ontological and epistemological beliefs. In this he is, of course, not alone (see, e.g., Gephart et al.., 1996; Cooper and Law, 1995). This schizophrenia is evidence of rather peculiar discursive rules where certain ontological and epistemological statements are allowed and even encouraged, but the reciprocate communicational practices are disallowed. Even the people who are most adventurous in their ideas or statements (such as Chia) are still caught within rather confined communicational practices. To use Vickers' (1995) terminology: there is a disjunction between the ways in which organization theorists are ready to see and value the organizational world (their appreciative setting) and the ways in which they are ready to respond to it (their instrumental system). When we write about reflexivity, paradox and postmodernism in organizational analysis, it is expected that we do this unambiguously. 4 And yet, the notion that 'if not consistency, then chaos' is not admitted even by all logicians, and is rejected by many at the frontiers of natural science research - 'a contradiction causes only some hell to break loose' (McCloskey, 1994, p. 166). contradiction causes only some hell to break loose' (McCloskey, 1994, p. 166).

### A2 T version of the aff

#### No topical version- the topic pigeon-holes the aff, preventing discussion of the systems of violence that allow individuals to be targeted in america

#### T-version of the aff is a joke- centering the state prevents new forms of thinking outside of its power

Judith Butler, 09- “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Pg. 149

The operation of state power takes place within an ontological horizon saturated by power that precedes and exceeds state power. As a result, we cannot take account of power if we always place the state at the center of its operation. The state draws upon non-statist operations of power and cannot function without a reserve of power that it has not itself organized. Further-and this is not particularly new-the state both produces and presupposes certain operations of power that work primarily through establishing a set of "ontological givens." Among those givens are precisely notions of subject, culture, identity, and religion whose versions remain uncontested and incontestable within particular normative frameworks. So when we speak about "frameworks" in this respect, we are not simply talking about theoretical perspectives that we bring to the analysis of politics, but about modes of intelligibility that further the workings of the state and, as such, are themselves exercises of power even as they exceed the specific domain of state power.

### Spectator DA

#### Debate turns us into spectators- unaffected by violence we see

Mitchell, Ass’t. Prof. of Communications at Pittsburgh, 1998 [Gordon, "Pedagogical Possibilities for Argumentative Agency in Academic Debate," Argumentation and Advocacy, Fall, ProQuest]

The sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture is highlighted during episodes of alienation in which debaters cheer news of human suffering or misfortune. Instead of focusing on the visceral negative responses to news accounts of human death and misery, debaters overcome with the competitive zeal of contest round competition show a tendency to concentrate on the meanings that such evidence might hold for the strength of their academic debate arguments. For example, news reports of mass starvation might tidy up the "uniqueness of a disadvantage" or bolster the "inherence of an affirmative case" (in the technical parlance of debate-speak). Murchland categorizes cultivation of this "spectator" mentality as one of the most politically debilitating failures of contemporary education: "Educational institutions have failed even more grievously to provide the kind of civic forums we need. In fact, one could easily conclude that the principle purposes of our schools is to deprive successor generations of their civic voice, to turn them into mute and uncomprehending spectators in the drama of political life" The sense of argumentative agency produced through action research is different in kind from those skills that are honed through academic simulation exercises such as policy debate tournaments. Encounters with broader public spheres beyond the realm of the academy can deliver unique pedagogical possibilities and opportunities. By anchoring their work in public spaces, students and teachers can use their talents to change the trajectory of events, while events are still unfolding. These experiences have the potential to trigger significant shifts in political awareness on the part of participants. Academic debaters nourished on an exclusive diet of competitive contest round experience often come to see politics like a picturesque landscape whirring by through the window of a speeding train. They study this political landscape in great detail, rarely (if ever) entertaining the idea of stopping the train and exiting to alter the course of unfolding events. The resulting spectator mentality deflects attention away from roads that could carry their arguments to wider spheres of public argumentation. However, on the occasions when students and teachers set aside this spectator mentality by directly engaging broader public audiences, key aspects of the political landscape change, because the point of reference for experiencing the landscape shifts fundamentally.

## CP

#### Perm- do both

#### Can’t solve- there’s a whole process to grieving, you can’t just read some cards and say claim to solve

#### Solvency deficits-

* affect
* frames of war
* individual violence

#### Can’t solve the aff- justifies future drone strikes based on current U.S. policy

#### The need to attach a method kills the potential of the aff- key to solve

Raymie E. McKerrow, 89- “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Practice”. Professor of speech communication at the University of Maine, Orono. Communication Monographs. Pg. 102

McGee (1984, 1987) is correct in chastising critics for paying too much attention to methodological concerns. If reading Burke prompts any lesson it is that creative insights are constrained by the systematicity of method. This lesson was lost on legions of academics who, by imposing a system on an unmethodological critic, created their own fiction and termed it a method. Considered as practice, understanding and evaluation are one: “Understanding is impossible without evaluation. Understanding cannot be separated from evaluation: they are simultaneous and constitute a unified integral act…In the act of understanding [unless one is a dogmatist and therefore impervious to change] a struggle occurs that results in mutual change and enrichment” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 142). In this context, “description” implies evaluation by the very fact of choice with respect to what is described, as well as what is not. Burke’s (1966, p. 45) dictum that a selection of reality is also a deflection and a rejection applies to the act of criticism as well as to other symbolic acts that are taken as the object of a critical perspective. This does not mean a critic functions as an anarchist. Rather, it means one operates from a “perspective” (McGee, 1984, p. 47) or an “orientation:” embracing a set of principles does not commit one to prescriptivism any more than it renders the critical act directionless. An orientation is the least restrictive stage from which the critical act might be launched; it maximizes the possibilities of what will “count” as evidence for critical judgment, and allows for creativity in the assessment of the “effects of truth” upon social practices.

#### Recognition=/=apprehension, key to solve

Judith Butler, 09- “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Pg. 7-9

If recognition is an act or practice undertaken by at¶ least two subjects, and which, as the Hegelian frame¶ would suggest, constitutes a reciprocal action, then¶ recognizability describes those general conditions on the¶ basis of which recognition can and does take place. It seems,¶ then, that there are still two further terms to understand:¶ apprehension, understood as a mode of knowing that is not¶ yet recognition, or may remain irreducible to recognition;¶ and intelligibility, understood as the general historical¶ schema or schemas that establish domains of the knowable.¶ This would constitute a dynamic field understood, at least¶ initially, as an historical a priori.3 Not all acts of knowing¶ are acts of recognition, although the inverse claim would not hold: a life has to be intelligible as a life, has to conform¶ to certain conceptions of what life is, in order to become¶ recognizable. So just as norms of recognizability prepare¶ the way for recognition, so schemas of intelligibility¶ condition and produce norms of recognizability.¶ Those norms draw upon shifting schemes of intelligibility,¶ so that we can and do have, for example, histories of life¶ and histories of death. Indeed, we have ongoing debates¶ about whether the fetus should count as life, or a life, or a¶ human life; we have further debates about conception and¶ what constitutes the first moments of a living organism; we¶ have debates also about what constitutes death, whether it¶ is the death of the brain, or of the heart, whether it is the¶ effect of a legal declaration or a set of medical and legal¶ certificates. All of these debates involve contested notions¶ of personhood and, implicitly, questions regarding the¶ "human animal" and how that conjunctive (and chiasmic)¶ existence is to be understood. The fact that these debates¶ exist, and continue to exist, does not imply that life and¶ death are direct consequences of discourse (an absurd¶ conclusion, if taken literally). Rather, it implies that there¶ is no life and no death without a relation to some frame.¶ Even when life and death take place between, outside,¶ or across the frames by which they are for the most part¶ organized, they still take place, though in ways that call into¶ question the necessity of the mechanisms through which¶ ontological fields are constituted. If a life is produced¶ according to the norms by which life is recognized, this¶ implies neither that everything about a life is produced¶ according to such norms nor that we must reject the¶ idea that there is a remainder of "life"-suspended and¶ spectral-that limns and haunts every normative instance¶ of life. Production is partial and is, indeed, perpetually¶ haunted by its ontologically uncertain double. Indeed,¶ every normative instance is shadowed by its own failure,¶ and very often that failure assumes a figural form. The¶ figure lays claim to no certain ontological status, and though it can be apprehended as "living," it is not always¶ recognized as a life. In fact, a living figure outside the¶ norms of life not only becomes the problem to be managed¶ by normativity, but seems to be that which normativity¶ is bound to reproduce: it is living, but not a life. It falls¶ outside the frame furnished by the norm, but only as a¶ relentless double whose ontology cannot be secured, but¶ whose living status is open to apprehension.¶

## Terrorism

#### **No link- the plan doesn’t give up defending against those who wish to harm the U.S., we just incorporate narratives from everyone affected in that fight**

#### **The narrative of “terrorism” creates a one-sided war that legitimates u.s. terror while calling it just and shirking responsibility. Civilian deaths are not lives lost, but signals to aim better.**

Butler 4 – PhD, Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School  
Judith, 2004, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence”. http://butlerphile.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/butler\_judith\_-\_precarious\_lif.pdf

Since the events of September 11, we have seen both a rise of anti-intellectualism and a growing acceptance of censorship within the media. This could mean that we have support for these trends within the general population of the United States, but it could also mean that the media functions as “public voices” that operate at a distance from their constituency, that both report the “voice” of the government for us, and whose proximity to that voice rests on an alliance or identification with that voice. Setting aside for the moment how the media act upon the public, whether, indeed, they have charged themselves with the task of structuring public sentiment and fidelity, it seems crucial to note that a critical relation to government has been severely, though not fully, suspended, and that the “criticism” or, indeed, independence of the media has been compromised in some unprecedented ways. Although we have heard, lately, about the abusive treatment of prisoners, and war “mistakes” have been publicly exposed, it seems that neither the justification nor the cause of the war have been the focus of public intellectual attention. Only recently (fall, 2003), have the reasons for waging a preemptive war against Iraq begun to be subjected to public scrutiny. Indeed, thinking too hard about what brought this about has invariably raised fears that to find a set of causes will be to have found a set of excuses. This point was made in print by Michael Walzer, a “just war” proponent, and has worked as an implicit force of censorship in op-ed pages across the country. Similarly, we have heard from Vice-President Richard Cheney and Edward Rothstein of the *New York Times,* among several others, that the time to reassert not only American values but fundamental and absolute values has arrived. Intellectual positions that are considered “relativistic” or “post-“ of any kind are considered either complicitous with terrorism or as constituting a “weak link” in the fight against it. The voice of critical perspectives against the war has become difficult to do, not only because mainstream media enterprises will not publish them (most appear in the progressive or alternative print media or on the internet), but because to voice them is to rick hystericization and censorship. In a strong sense, the binarism that Bush proposes in which only two positions are possible- “Either you’re with us or you’re with the terrorists”- makes it untenable to hold a position in which one opposes both and queries the terms in which the opposition is framed. Moreover, it is the same binarism that returns us to an anachronistic division between “East” and “West” and which, in its sloshy metonymy, returns us to the invidious distinction between civilization (our own) and barbarism (now coded as “Islam” itself). At the beginning of this conflict, to oppose the war meant to some that one somehow felt sympathy with terrorism, or that one saw the terror as justified. But it is surely time to allow an intellectual field to redevelop in which more responsible distinctions might be heard, histories might be recounted in their complexity, and accountability might be understood apart from the claims of vengeance. This would also have to be a field in which the long-range prospects for global cooperation might work as a guide for public reflection and criticism. The Left’s response to the war waged in Afghanistan ran into serious problems, in part because the explanations that the Left has provided to the question “Why do they hate us so much?” were dismissed as so many exonerations of the acts of terror themselves. This does not need to be the case. I think we can see, however, how moralistic anti-intellectual trends coupled with a distrust of the Left as so many self-flagellating First World elites has produced a situation in which our very capacity to think about the grounds and causes of the current global conflict is considered impermissible. The cry that “there is no excuse for September 11” has become a means by which to stifle any serious public discussion of how US foreign policy has helped to create a world in which such acts of terror are possible. We see this most dramatically in the suspension of any attempt to offer balanced reporting on the international conflict, the refusal to include important critiques of the US military effort by Arundhati Roy and Noam Chomsky, for instance, within the mainstream US press. This takes place in tandem with the unprecedented suspension of civil liberties for illegal immigrants and suspected terrorists, and the use of the flag as an ambiguous sign of solidarity with those lost on September 11 and with the current war, as if the sympathy with the one translates, in a single symbolic stroke, into support for the latter. The raw public mockery of the peace movement, and the characterization of anti-war demonstrations as anachronistic or nostalgic, work to produce a consensus of public opinion that profoundly marginalizes anti-war sentiment and analysis, putting into question in a very strong way the very value of contemporary US democratic culture. The articulation of this hegemony takes place in part through producing a consensus on what certain terms will mean, how they can be used, and what lines of solidarity are implicitly drawn through this use. We reserve “acts of terror” for events such as the September 11 attacks on the United States, distinguishing these acts of violence from those that might be justified through foreign policy decisions or public declarations of war. On the other hand, these terrorist acts were construed as “declarations of war” by the Bush administration, which then positioned the military response as a justified act of self-defense. In the meantime, there remains ever-increasing ambiguity introduced by the very use of the term “terrorist,” which is then exploited by various powers at war with independence movements of various kinds. The term “terrorist” is used, for instance, by the Israeli state to describe any and all Palestinian acts of resistance, but none of its own practices of state violence. The term is also used by Putin to describe Chechen struggle for independence, which then casts its own acts of violence against this province as justified acts of national self-defense. The United States, by using the term, positions itself exclusively as the sudden and indisputable victim of violence, even though there is no doubt that it did suffer violence. But it is one matter to suffer violence and quite another to use that fact to ground a framework in which one’s injury authorizes limitless aggression against targets that may or may not be related to the sources of one’s own suffering. The point I would like to underscore here is that a frame for understanding violence emerges in tandem with the experience, and that the frame works both to preclude certain kinds of question, certain kinds of historical inquiries, and to function as a moral justification for retaliation. It seems crucial to attend to this frame, since it decides, in a forceful way, what we can hear, whether a view will be taken as explanation or as exoneration, whether we can hear the difference, and abide by it. There is as well a narrative dimension to this explanatory framework. In the United States, we begin the story by invoking a first-person narrative point of view, and telling what happened on September 11. It is that date and the unexpected and fully terrible experience of violence that propels the narrative. If someone tries to start the story earlier, there are only a few narrative options. We can narrate, for instance, what Mohammed Atta’s family life was like, whether he was teased for looking like a girl, where he congregated in Hamburg, and what led, psychologically, to the moment in which he piloted the plane in the World Trade Center. Or what was bin Laden’s break from his family, and why is he so angry? That kind of story is interesting to a degree, because it suggests that there is a personal pathology at work. It works as a plausible and engaging narrative in part because it resituates agency in terms of a subject, something we can understand, something that accords with our idea of personal responsibility, or with the theory of charismatic leadership that was popularized with Mussolini and Hitler in World War II. This is doubtless easier to hear than that a network of individuals dispersed across the globe conjured and implemented this action in various ways. If there is a network, there must be a leader, a subject who if finally responsible for what others do. Perhaps we can hear, in a limited war, about the way in which the al-Qaeda group makes use of Islamic doctrine, and we want to know, to shore up our liberal framework, that they do not represent the religion of Islam, and that the vast majority of Muslims do not condone them. Al-Qaeda can be “the subject” but do we ask where this comes from? Isolating the individuals involved absolves us of the necessity of coming up with a broader explanation for events. Though we are perhaps perplexed by why there is not a greater repudiation by Muslim leaders (though many organization have done that), we cannot quite understand why it might be difficult for Muslim leaders to join publicly with the United States on this issue even as they condemn quite clearly the acts of violence. Our own acts of violence do not receive graphic coverage in the press, and so they remain acts that are justified in the name of self-defense, by a noble cause, namely, the rooting out of terrorism. At one point during the war against Afghanistan, it was reported that the Northern Alliance may have slaughtered a village: Was this to be investigated and, if confirmed, prosecuted as a war crime? When a bleeding child or dead body on Afghan soul emerges in the press coverage, it is not relayed as part of the horror of war, but only in the service of a criticism of the military’s capacity to aim its bombs right. We castigate ourselves for not aiming better, as if the end goal is to aim right. We do not, however, take the sign of destroyed life and decimated peoples as something for which we are responsible, or indeed understand how that decimation works to confirm the United States as performing atrocities. Our own acts are not considered terrorist. And there is no history of acts that is relevant to the self-understanding we form in the light of these terrible events. There is no relevant prehistory to the events of September 11, since to bring to tell the story a different way, to ask how things came to this, is already to complicate the question of agency which, no doubt, leads to the fear of moral equivocation. In order to condemn these acts as inexcusable, absolutely wrong, in order to sustain the affective structure in which we are, on the one hand, victimized and, on the other, engaged in a righteous cause of rooting out terror, we have to begin the story with the experience of violence we suffered.

#### The DA is a rigged game- made up scenarios are used to scare you into believing an attack is imminent. This creates the “get them before they get us” mentality allowing limitless violence

#### Double bind- if the plan spills up enough to change policy it will take years, the impact happens by then or its not imminent

#### Can’t solve Al-Qaeda and emboldens new enemies in process

Boyle, 13- “The costs and consequences of drone warfare”. Michael J. Boyle, Chatham House. Royal Institute of International Affairs. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf

Yet the evidence that drones inhibit the operational latitude of terrorist groups and push them towards collapse is more ambiguous than these accounts suggest. 57 In Pakistan, the ranks of Al-Qaeda have been weakened significantly by drone strikes, but its members have hardly given up the fight. Hundreds of Al-Qaeda members have fled to battlefields in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. 58 These operatives bring with them the skills, experience and weapons needed to turn these wars into fiercer, and perhaps longer-lasting, conflicts. 59 In other words, pressure from drone strikes may have scattered Al-Qaeda militants, but it does not neutralize them. Many Al-Qaeda members have joined forces with local insurgent groups in Syria, Mali and elsewhere, thus deepening the conflicts in these states. 60 In other cases, drones have fuelled militant movements and reordered the alliances and positions of local combatants. Following the escalation of drone strikes in Yemen, the desire for revenge drove hundreds, if not thousands, of Yemeni tribesmen to join Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as well as smaller, indigenous militant networks. 61 Even in Pakistan, where the drone strikes have weakened Al-Qaeda and some of its affiliated movements, they have not cleared the battlefield. In Pakistan, other Islamist groups have moved into the vacuum left by the absence of Al-Qaeda, and some of these groups, particularly the cluster of groups arrayed under the name Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), now pose a greater threat to the Pakistani government than Al-Qaeda ever did. 62 Drone strikes have distinct political effects on the ecology of militant networks in these countries, leaving some armed groups in a better position while crippling others. It is this dynamic that has accounted for the US decision gradually to expand the list of groups targeted by drone strikes, often at the behest of Pakistan. Far from concentrating exclusively on Al-Qaeda, the US has begun to use drone strikes against Pakistan’s enemies, including the TTP, the Mullah Nazir group, the Haqqani network and other smaller Islamist groups. 63 The result is that the US has weakened its principal enemy, Al-Qaeda, but only at the cost of earning a new set of enemies, some of whom may find a way to strike back. 64 The cost of this expansion of targets came into view when the TTP inspired and trained Faisal Shahzad to launch his attack on Times Square. 65 Similarly, the TTP claimed to be involved, possibly with Al-Qaeda, in attacking a CIA outpost at Camp Chapman in the Khost region of Afghanistan on 30 December 2009. 66

#### No nuclear terrorism –statistically insignificant cumulative probability

John Mueller (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University) 2010 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda” p, 187-190

Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative-though it is done all the time in cost-benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 13-1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the 20 hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion specifically 3.486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same-or even smaller. There may be a few barriers, such as numbers 13 or absolute loyalty trump the one oftechnical competence. This would increase the chances that the bomb-making enterprise would go undetected, while at the same time decreasing the likelihood that it would be successful. However, given the monumentality of the odds confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adjustments for such issues are scarcely likely to alter the basic conclusion. That is, if one drastically slashed the one in 3.5 billion estimate a thousandfold, the odds of success would still be one in 3.5 million. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive. Getting away from astronomical numbers for a minute, Levi points out that even if there are only ten barriers and even if there were a wildly favorable 80 percent chance of overcoming each hurdle, the chance of final success, following the approach used here, would only be 10 percent. Faced even with such highly favorable odds at each step, notes Levi, the wouldbe atomic terrorist might well decide "that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try." Similarly, Jenkins calculates that even if there are only three barriers and each carried a 50/50 chance of success, the likelihood of accomplishing the full mission would only be 12.5 percent.14 Odds like that are not necessarily prohibitive, of course, but they are likely to be mind-arrestingly small if one is betting just about everything on a successful outcome. Multiple Attempts The odds considered so far are for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front, he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults. IS However, few, if any, groups appear to have any interest whatever in striking the United States except for al-Qaeda, an issue to be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But even setting that consideration aside, the odds would remain long even with multiple concerted attempts.16 If there were a hundred such efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one in over 10,000 at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three, it would be about one in nearly 35 million. If there were 1,000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be worse than one in a thousand at the SO/50 level and one in nearly 3.5 million at the one in three level.I7 Of course, attempts in the hundreds are scarcely realistic, though one might be able to envision a dozen or so. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Furthermore, each foiled attempt would likely expose flaws in the defense system, holes the ...,. defenders would then plug, making subsequent efforts that much more dif• ficult. For example, when the would-be peddler of a tiny amount of pur loined highly enriched uranium was apprehended in 2006, efforts were made to trace its place of origin using nuclear forensics. IS ." Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by ... self-interested governments. Already, for example, by all accounts Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were 10 or ~, .-s 15 years ago.19

## Tradeoff DA

#### We control the I/L to violence- denial of grief allows all violent interventions in the squo.

#### The aff is a link turn- by the time grievability is able to affect state policies it will shape the overall war fighting strategies of the U.S. All their link evidence assumes the squo ethical response

#### A political strategy of grief relinquishes the sovereign entitlement of the U.S.

Butler 4 – PhD, Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School  
Judith, 2004, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence” p. 40 http://butlerphile.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/butler\_judith\_-\_precarious\_lif.pdf

I condemn on several ethical bases the violence done against the United States and do not see it as “just punishment” for prior sins. At the same time, I consider our recent trauma to be an opportunity for a reconsideration of United States hubris and the importance of establishing more radically egalitarian international ties. Doing this involves a certain “loss” for the country as a whole: the notion of the world itself as a sovereign entitlement of the United States must be given up, lost, and mourned, as narcissistic and grandiose fantasies must be lost and mourned. From the subsequent experience of loss and fragility, however, the possibility of making different kinds of ties emerges. Such mourning might (or could) effect a transformation in our sense of international ties that would crucially rearticulate the possibility of democratic political culture here and elsewhere.

#### Breaking the status quo frames of war allows us to change the material conditions that make it possible

Judith Butler, 09- “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Pg. 28-29

This work seeks to reorient politics on the Left toward¶ a consideration of precarity as an existing and promising¶ site for coalitional exchange. For populations to become¶ grievable does not require that we come to know the¶ singularity of every person who is at risk or who has,¶ indeed, already been risked. Rather, it means that policy¶ needs to understand precariousness as a shared condition,¶ and precarity as the politically induced condition¶ that would deny equal exposure through the radically¶ unequal distribution of wealth and the differential ways¶ of exposing certain populations, racially and nationally¶ conceptualized, to greater violence. The recognition¶ of shared precariousness introduces strong normative¶ commitments of equality and invites a more robust¶ universalizing of rights that seeks to address basic human¶ needs for food, shelter, and other conditions for persisting¶ and flourishing. We might be tempted to call these¶ "material needs"-and that they surely are. But once we¶ acknowledge that the "frames" through which such needs¶ are affirmed or denied make possible the practices of war,¶ we have to conclude that the frames of war are part of¶ what makes the materiality of war. Just as the "matter"¶ of bodies cannot appear without a shaping and animating¶ form, neither can the "matter" of war appear without a¶ conditioning and facilitating form or frame.

#### It’s irrelevant- the impact is the violence that becomes tied into ourselves

#### That evidence is only about Pakistan- and is not future predictive

#### Strikes are down cus of peace talks- not cus drones are safe

Reuters, 2/4/14- “U.S. sharply curtails drone strikes in Pakistan: report”. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/05/us-pakistan-drones-usa-idUSBREA1405T20140205

(Reuters) - The United States has cut back sharply on drone strikes in Pakistan after the Islamabad government asked for restraint while it seeks peace talks with the Pakistani Taliban, the Washington Post reported on Tuesday.¶ The Post quoted a U.S. official as saying, "That's what they asked for, and we didn't tell them no." The newspaper said there had been a lull in such attacks since December, the longest break since 2011.¶ The newspaper said the Obama administration indicated it would continue carrying out strikes on senior al Qaeda officials if they were to become available or to thwart any immediate threat to Americans.

#### Casualties are up as a whole

Alice K. Ross, 2014- “UN: Civilian drone deaths triple in Afghanistan”. http://www.juancole.com/2014/02/civilian-triple-afghanistan.html

Civilian drone deaths in Afghanistan tripled last year, according to a report by a UN agency. Forty-five civilians died in drone strikes in 2013.¶ The report, by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (Unama), found that drone strikes accounted for at least a third of all civilian deaths in air strikes last year. Unama notes that it is sometimes difficult to establish which type of aircraft carried out a strike, so the true total could be higher.¶ The UK and US are the only countries to operate armed drones in the conflict. A December 2012 report by the Bureau found that the two forces had carried out over 1,000 drone strikes in the country in the previous five years. British drones have carried out over a fifth of all these strikes, despite having a much smaller fleet.