# Framework

#### w/m- individuals are the federal government, and we defend that we do a point of action

#### C/I- The affirmative must defend the desirability of a reduction in the president's power

**Standards**-

**Predictable Ground** - We still answer the resolutional question, which means they should be prepared. Sustains the direction of core negative ground like drones good.

**Limits** - We preserve directionality without forcing everyone to run affs that displace us from our personal ethics and social location. The stasis of the resolution checks under-limiting while our interp allows unique education. Even if we don't provide perfect limits, they are good enough - default to reasonability.

* Limits are impossible in an ambiguous world- wakes one reactor aff prove this

**Education** - outweighs fairness. The fair debate they want is the same stale XO and politics debates that happen every year. Fairness must be tossed out before we can refocus a truly educational topic

#### Role playing positions the white, able-bodied, male as the ideal citizen, violently rejecting any forms of difference. A new approach to policy engagement is necessary

Dilts, 13- “Incurable Blackness: Criminal Disenfranchisement, Mental Disability, and the White Citizen”. Disability Studies Quarterly. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Loyola Marymount. <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3268/0>

The Maryland State Constitution states that its General Assembly may, "regulate or prohibit the right to vote of a person convicted of infamous or other serious crime or under care or guardianship for mental disability." In a single sentence, the link between criminality and mental disability is invoked in order to draw an internal boundary around those who can take part in the project of representative government. Through a close reading of one particular moment in the history of Maryland's disenfranchisement provisions, I show how these restrictions could buttress prevailing racial hierarchies. Delegates to Maryland's nineteenth century constitutional conventions explicitly understood disenfranchisement as a practice that managed the boundaries of full citizenship through the courts' power to determine criminal guilt and mental competence. In defining "exceptions" to the franchise, the delegates were additionally shoring up the increasingly unstable conception of whiteness. The figure of the "free negro" was persistently invoked to do this work, marked through criminality and insanity as civically disabled in order to both reduce the threat that s/he posed to the standing of white workers and to shore up the purity of whiteness itself as innocent, able, and fit to rule. In so far as disenfranchisement is an instrument of racial oppression, it continues to operate racially not just in spite of color-blind liberalism, but also precisely through its ability to disarm claims of racial animus. The norms that drove the adoption of disenfranchisement in the nineteenth century continue to ground these exclusions to the vote, meaning that the ideal figure of the American citizen continues to be compulsorily white, male, heterosexual, and able-bodied. Ending this legacy of social and political hierarchization requires that we remove disenfranchisement provisions, but also move beyond the logic of inclusion, divesting the vote as a location that finalizes, essentializes, and fixes the boundaries of the polity.

#### The 1AC presents a number of DA’s to their framework:

**Socialization-**

**Inevitable violence-** Butler says that we are socialized through violence. Restricting the debate to governmental policy prevents our ability to confront the violence we do, making the impact inevitable. These personal discussions must be allowed for any solvency

#### Next is Responsibility-

**Allows violence**- Kappeler says that the way their framework approaches warfare as a problem of the govt, not the citizens of the u.s. allows violence on the individual level, while denying it ever happens. The hatred that spread after 9/11 was done by individuals, their int. prevents confronting it.

**And leads to depoliticization-** the gap between citizen and government the neg envisions convinces us that power is something we don’t hold, silencing the masses. This denies any proactive advocacy, as we think it’s out of our hands and forget.

**Political discourse**- Butler says that the political discourse their framework rests upon is a vacillation between reverence and destruction of life. We celebrate drone courts while forgetting about those still being obliterated, champion force restrictions and forget millions still abroad. The successes of their political discourse are merely downtimes between inherent violence.

**Affective engagement**- their framework prevents an emotional connection to those killed, denying their humanity. Our personal engagement forms an emotive connection that puts a face to those who have targeted

**These impact turn their education claims**- Their education teaches us how to deny our part and continue the violence, keeping us in a permanent state of destructive xenophobia exemplified by the post-9/11 drive to cleanse the world of all enemies

**Tiebreaker - Race to the middle**- our interpretation allows their type of education, but theirs excludes ours. Voting for the counter-interp solves their offense and unique education.

Their framework is heavily soaked with conservative ideology—the procedural “bracketing out” of our alternative of radical structural change is only meant to safeguard the status quo.

Meszaros, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, 89

(Istvan, Chair of philosophy @ U. of Sussex, The Power of Ideology, p. 232-234 GAL)

Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality – the self-proclaimed *Wertfeihert* or value neutrality of so-called ‘rigorous social science’ – stronger than in the field of methodology. Indeed, we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated methodological framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are systematically excluded (or suitably ‘bracketed out’) by the scientifically adequate method itself, thereby saving one from unnecessary complication and securing the desired objectivity and uncontestable outcome. Claims and procedures of this kind are, of course, extremely problematical. For they circularly *assume* that their enthusiasm for the virtues of ‘methodological neutrality’ is bound to yield ‘value neutral’ solutions with regard to highly contested issues, without first examining the all-important question as to the conditions of *possibility* – or otherwise – of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plane of methodology itself. The unchallengeable validity of the recommended procedure is supposed to be *self-evident* on account of its *purely methodological* character. In reality, of course, this approach to methodology is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance. Since, however, the plane of *methodology* (and ‘meta-theory’) is said to be *in principle* separated from that of the *substantive* issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed. Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the criteria laid down is supposed to establish the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of ‘rational discourse’. Yet, curiously enough, the proposed methodological tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are *a priori* excluded from this rational discourse as ‘metaphysical’, ‘ideological’, etc. The effect of circumscribing in this way the scope of the one and only admissible approach is that it automatically disqualifies, in the name of *methodology* itself, all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse. As a result, the propounders of the ‘right method’ are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities as they necessarily arise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and the rival sets of values associated with them**.** This is where we can seemore clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure**.** For – far from offering an adequate scope for criticalenquiry – the advocated general adoption of the allegedly neutral methodological framework is equivalent, in fact, to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter. Instead, the stipulated ‘common’ methodological procedure succeeds in transforming the enterprise of ‘rational discourse’ into the dubious practice of producing *methodology for the sake of methodology*: a tendency more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point a new knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for its own sake continues to be pursued. And that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose. Naturally, to speak of a ‘common’ methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society torn by irreconcilable social interest and ensuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best, notwithstanding all talk about ‘ideal communication communities’. But todefine the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of transubstantiating into ‘ideal types’ (or by putting into methodological ‘brackets’) the discussion of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality. For such treatment of the major areas of conflict, under a great variety of forms – from the Viennes version of ‘logical positivism’ to Wittgenstein’s famous ladder that must be ‘thrown away’ at the point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the Popperian principle of ‘little by little’ to the ‘emotivist’ theory of value – inevitably always favours the established order. And it does so by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the given society ‘out of bounds’ to the potential contestants, on the authority of the ideally ‘common’ methodology. However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake it ought to be **fairly** obvious that to consent *not* to question the fundamental structural framework of the established order is *radically* different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of that order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail)of that order**.** Consequently, to establish the ‘common’ identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded hierarchical order – by means of the reduction of the people who belong to the contending social forces into fictitious ‘rational interlocutors’, extracted from their divided real world and transplanted into a beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse – would be nothing short of a methodological miracle. Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational communality, the elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given orderof societyin *substantive* terms**.** This would imply the articulation of the relevant problemsnot on the plan of self-referential theory and methodology, but as inherently *practical* issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes.In other words, it would require the explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and meta-theoretical neutrality. But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of ‘fact and value’, ‘theory and practice’, ‘formal and substantive rationality’, etc., the conflict-transcending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of ‘rational discourse’ in the humanities and social sciences, in the interest of the *ruling ideology*. What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its value-commitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to bring them into the focus of the discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole. For the conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and semantic/analytical terms. And who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable – methodologically sanctioned – credentials of ‘procedural rules’, ‘models’ and ‘paradigms’?

## Capitalism

#### Perm- do both

#### Case outweighs-

* Violence is individual- the devaluation of life begins with the ability to deny the humanity of others, the war effort has made entire populations disappear
* We’re the root cause- the destruction of life capitalism allows requires that people be made faceless first, done by denying them grief. The affirmative the root cause

#### Aff is key- we must confront our individual complicity before overall structures can change

Kaustuv Roy, 2005- “Power And Resistance: Insurgent Spaces, Deleuze, And Curriculum”. Professor of social and political theory in the College of Education at *Louisiana State* University, Baton Rouge. http://www.edtechpost.ca/readings/Kaustuv%20Roy%20-%20Power%20anb%20Resisjtance%20Insurgent%20Spaces,%20Deleuze,%20and%20Curriculum.pdf

Felix Guattari (1984) once remarked that the October Revolution did not bring about the hoped-for transformation because the relations between the foreman and the worker or the husband and the wife were no different than they were under capitalist relations. No work of resistance, in the sense of an uprising against oppression and indoctrination, can acquire depth and significance without examining to see what elements of the oppressor it has secretly or unknowingly assimilated, what values of the enemy it has admitted against its own best interests, what assumptions have crept in while it was busy looking elsewhere, and what ground was already presumed even before the resistance began. In the history of liberatory political action, few understood this better than Gandhi who led the "Quit India" movement against the British and who changed the very terrain of the conflict. For Gandhi (1961) resisting imperialism could not be accomplished without at the same time ridding the consciousness of the values of the rulers. Writing in the same period as Gandhi's vision was reconstituting Indian politics, but in a very different part of the world, the radical Black educator Carter Woodson (1933/1990) also made the point in supreme fashion that change must come in the very assumptions that form and inform a field. Writing about the education of 27 Power and Resistance the Negro, Woodson demanded a changed cartography of education, asking that a different and original program be created by Black peoples for their own emancipation from within, taking into account their own conditions, and through the systematic rejection of the White mapping of Blackness. Woodson was not talking about an Afrocentric curriculum, but of purging the consciousness of White values as an obligatory step toward freedom.

#### The perm is key to solve- no way everyone stops going to target all of the sudden. The is a necessary first step to show the violence done by the neo-liberal order, and allow a space for the alt

#### The affirmative disagrees with their representation of economics as a monocausal explanation for how power functions – the world is a collection of differences and attempting to impose a singular model of knowing on it paradoxically makes analysis impossible

**Manuel DeLanda, 1997**, Adjunct Associate Professor – Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation – Columbia University, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, p. 46-8

Even in this age of huge multinational corporations, the command element in the commercial mixture is far from 100 percent. The economist John Kenneth Galbraith, who sharply differentiates between spontaneous economic activity (markets) and planned economic processes (big business), calculates that today roughly half of the Western economy has been taken over by capitalist hierarchies. The other half comprises the low-profit regions, which those hierarchies willingly abandon to the market. According to Galbraith, what gives capitalism this freedom of motion is economy of scale, which is why since the Middle Ages commercial capitalism has been associated with wholesale and not retail. A large firm is better able to absorb shocks and fluctuations and create the plans and strategies that may win it a degree of independence from market forces, indeed the ability to control and manipulate those forces to a certain degree.     Such considerations led Braudel to the startling conclusion that "we should not be too quick to assume that capitalism embraces the whole of western society, that it accounts for every stitch in the social fabric...that our societies are organized from top to bottom in a 'capitalist system.' On the contrary...there is a dialectic still very much alive between capitalism on one hand, and its antithesis, the 'non-capitalism' of the lower level on the other."56 And he adds that, indeed, capitalism was carried upward and onward on the shoulders of small shops and "the enormous creative powers of the market, of the lower story of exchange.... [This] lowest level, not being paralysed by the size of its plant or organization, is the one readiest to adapt; it is the seedbed of inspiration, improvisation and even innovation, although its most brilliant discoveries sooner or later fall into the hands of the holders of capital. It was not the capitalists who brought about the fast cotton revolution; all the new ideas came from enterprising small businesses."57     There is a misconception, widely shared by economists and philosophers on either side of the political spectrum, that capitalism developed in several stages, being at first competitive and subservient to market forces and only later, in the twentieth century, becoming monopolistic. However, starting in the thirteenth century, capitalists engaged in various noncompetitive practices, in order to create the large accumulations of money that have always characterized the upper levels of the trade pyramid. As we discussed, the early medieval fairs, the meeting points of rich merchants from all over Europe, were veritable hierarchies of meshworks, in which the luxury and money markets dominated the upper echelons. Neither in the long-distance trade of prestige goods nor in the worlds of precious metals and credit did supply and demand reign supreme. On the contrary, most fortunes in these areas were made by the manipulation of these market forces through a variety of noncompetitive practices. There was, of course, intense competition among rich merchants and families, much as today large corporations compote with one another, but these rivalries among oligopolies are fundamentally different from the kind of "anonymous competition" in which small producers and traders engage.58     From the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, not only did individual businesses engage in monopolistic practices, entire cities did too, even groups of cities. By means of noncompetitive practices, a town could greatly aid its merchants and financiers, protecting them from foreign rivals, and stimulating the accumulation of money within its walls. The medieval cities that controlled the Mediterranean and the Baltic and North Seas financed much of their growth from manipulation of markets and by acquiring exclusive control of certain flows, such as spices and silks from the Levant in the case of Venice, or salt in the case of Lübeck. With a monopoly on luxury goods, won and maintained by military force, fourteenth-century Venice dominated the cities around it, not only the small towns constituting its supply regions but other giant towns, such as Florence and Milan. In the north, between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, cities like Lübeck and Bruges formed a meshwork of cities known as the Hanseatic League, which was capable of collective action without a centralized organization behind it. The league also engaged in monopolistic practices to trap the towns within its zone of economic influence in a web of supervision and dependence.59     We will return shortly to other forms of market manipulation which, according to Braudel, have always characterized certain commercial institutions since the Middle Ages. This will make clear how wrong it is to assume (as many economists to the right and center of the political spectrum tend to do) that market power is something that may be dismissed or that needs to be studied only in relation to some aberrant institutional forms such as overt monopolies. But certain conceptions from the left (particularly the Marxist left) also need to be corrected, in particular, a teleological conception of economic history in terms of a linear progression of modes of production. In this Braudel explicitly agrees with Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: capitalism could have arisen anywhere and long before it did in Europe.60 Its emergence must be pictured as a bifurcation, a phase transition that might have taken place somewhere else had the conditions been right (for instance, in the huge camel caravans along the Salk Road in the thirteenth century).61 Moreover, the institutions that emerged after this bifurcation must be viewed not as replacing previous institutions (i.e., markets) but as fully coexisting with them without forming a societywide "system." It is true that prices across Europe were pulsating to the same rhythm from medieval times and this gave the entire continent a certain economic coherence (sometimes referred to as a "world-economy"), but it would be a mistake to confuse world-economies with the "capitalist system," since India, China, and Islam also formed coherent economic areas (as powerful as those of Europe) without giving rise to capitalism.62     The conceptual confusion engendered by all the different uses of the word "capitalism" (as "free enterprise" or as "industrial mode of production" or, more recently, as "world-economy") is so entrenched that it makes an objective analysis of economic power almost impossible. One could, of course, simply redefine the term "capitalism" to include "power to manipulate markets" as a constitutive part of its meaning and to rid it of some of its teleological connotations. But as philosophers of science know well, when a theory begins redefining its terms in an ad hoc way to fit the latest round of negative evidence, it shows by this very act that it has reached the limits of its usefulness. In view of this, it would seem that the only solution is to replace this tired word with a neologism, perhaps the one Braudel suggested, "antimarkets," and to use it exclusively to refer to a certain segment of the population of commercial and industrial institutions.63

#### It’s a link of omission- \_\_\_\_\_\_. The aff is a step in the right direction.

#### Perm is key to solve- alt is still exclusive of other epistemologies, creates new forms of violence

Butler, 1998

(Judith, PhD @ Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at UC Berkeley, New Left Review, Issue 227, January-February 1998, “Merely Cultural”)

**What the resurgent orthodoxy may resent about new social movements is precisely the vitality that such movement are enjoying.** Paradoxically, the very movements that continue to keep the Left alive are credited with its paralysis. Although I would agree that a narrowly identitarian construal of such movements leads to a narrowing of the political field, **there is no reason to assume that such social movements are reducible to their identitarian formations. The problem of unity or**, more modestly, of **solidarity cannot be resolved through the transcendence or obliteration of this field, and certainly not through the vain promise of retrieving a unity wrought through exclusions, one that reinstitutes subordination as the condition of its own possibility. The only possible unity will not be the synthesis of a set of conflicts, but will be a mode of sustaining conflict in politically productive ways, a practice of contestation that demands that these movements articulate their goals under the pressure of each other** without therefore exactly becoming each other. This is not quite the chain of equivalence proposed by Laclau and Mouffe, although it does sustain important relations to it.3 **New political formations do not stand in an analogical relation with one another, as if they were discrete and differentiated entities. They are overlapping, mutually determining, and convergent fields of politicization. In fact, most promising are those moments in which one social movement comes to find its condition of possibility in another. Here difference is not simply the external differences between movements, understood as that which differentiates them from one another but, rather, the self-difference of movement itself, a constitutive rupture that makes movements possible on non-identitarian grounds, that installs a certain mobilizing conflict as the basis of politicization. Factionalization, understood as the process whereby one identity excludes another in order to fortify its own unity and coherence, makes the mistake of locating the problem of difference as that which emerges between one identity and another; but difference is the condition of possibility of identity or, rather, its constitutive limit: what makes its articulation possible at the same time what makes any final or closed articulation possible.** Within the academy, the effort to separate race studies from sexuality studies from gender studies marks various needs for autonomous articulation, but it also invariably produces a set of important, painful, and promising confrontations that expose the ultimate limits to any such autonomy: the politics of sexuality within African-American studies, the politics of race within queer studies, within the study of class, within feminism, the question of misogyny within any of the above, the question of homophobia within feminism, to name a few. This may seem to be precisely the tedium of identitarian struggles that a new, more inclusive Left hopes to transcend. And yet, **for a politics of ‘inclusion’ to mean something other than the redomestication and resubordination of such differences, it will have to develop a sense of alliance in the course of a new form of conflictual encounter. When new social movements are cast as so many ‘particularisms’ in search of an overarching universal, it will be necessary to ask how the rubric of a universal itself only became possible through the erasure of the prior workings of social power. This is not to say that universals are impossible, but rather that they become possible only through an abstraction from its location in power that will always be falsifying and territorializing, and calls to be resisted at every level. Whatever universal becomes possible**—and it may be that universals only become possible for a time, ‘flashing up’ in Benjamin’s sense— **will be the result of a difficult labour of translation in which social movements offer up their points of convergence against a background of ongoing social contestation.**

## Terrorism

#### This debate is about epistemology- nothing we say leaves the community, our words prompting attacks on the us is preposterous. Employing the logic of terrorism in the debate community means that violence becomes ingrained within ourselves and we inevitably spread it

#### **Alternatives to drones are irrelevant- nothing we say is going to change them, the only thing we can change is our relation to violence**

#### The DA is a rigged game- made up scenarios are used to scare you into believing an attack is imminent. This creates the “get them before they get us” mentality allowing limitless violence