#### The string of pearls is broken- only 5 of those in congress showed up to hear Rafiq ur-Rehman’s testimony of the drone strike that killed his mother, showing an inherent failure in the politics of the status quo

#### Violence is intimately tied into ourselves- we know who we are by who we are not. Since 9/11, this process has been hijacked by the terrorist discourse of government controlled reality, making violence towards the other inevitable. Individually, this is the violence that allows my friend to be called a terrorist in the lunch room and school kids to be targeted for wearing a debutta. Structurally, this legitimizes the assassinations committed by the u.s., preventing any form of outrage or reaction. Our affective engagement is necessary to solve, we need to feel something towards the other before we can recognize that there is a person on the other end of the drone screen. The lack of feeling allows all life to go unrecognized.

### Inclusion DA

#### The negatives rate of delivery necessary precludes the inclusion of individuals with disabilities in the debate space, this has two implications

#### They allow future violence- their engagement with this activity is founded upon a violent hierarchy of norms that reject certain individuals from debating. Prevents any form of an inclusive activity

#### Turns their politics- the engagement they are looking for is mired in ableist constructs, preventing any truly progressive forms of change. This is an independent

## Nietzsche

#### Case outweighs-

* Internalization of violence- Butler says that recognizing the voices of others is key to stop the violence that has become internalized in ourselves, that allows destruction to take place.
* Collapse of agency- Kappeler says that informing ourselves with the voices of others is necessary to re-energize ourselves to take action

#### Perm do both - solves your offense – Nietzsche’s view of life assumes aggression to be primary – he fails to consider the 1AC as an act of generosity outside of the realm of law

Judith **Butler**, **2005**(Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkley) FordhamUniversity Press, New York Giving An Account of Oneself p. 13-14

Nietzsche’s’ view does not fully take into account the scene of address through which responsibility is queried and then either accepted or denied. He assumes that the query is made from within a legal framework in which punishment is threatened as an equivalent injury for the injury committed in the first place. But not all forms of address originate from this system and for this reason. The system of punishment he describes is based on revenge, even what that is valorized as “justice.” That system does not recognize that life entails a certain amount of suffering and injury that cannot be fully accounted for through recourse to the subject as a causal agent. Indeed, for Nietzsche aggression is coextensive with life, so that if we sought to outlaw aggression, we would effectively be trying to outlaw life itself. He writes that “life operates essentially, that is in its basic functions, through injury, assault, exploitation, destruction and cannot be thought of at all without this character” (GM, 76). “Legal conditions,” he writes further on, “constitute a partial restriction on the will of life,” a will that is defined by struggle. The legal effort to obliterate struggle would be, in his words, “ an attempt to assassinate the future of man” (ibid). At stake for Nietzsche is not simply the prevalence of a morality and legal order he opposes but a coerced crafting of the “human” in opposition to life itself. His view of life, however assumes that aggression is more primary than generosity and thatconcerns for justice emerge from a revenge ethic. He fails to consider the interlocutory scene in which one is asked what one has done, or a situation in which one tries to make plain, to one who is waiting to know, what one has done, and for what reason.**Alt can’t solve- it does nothing with the violence we internalize but make us think its ok, allowing for the destruction of everything external**

#### They freeze our consciousness and justify brutal inactivity – even when progressive action is feasible – and ask us to forget memories of pain and suffering; this does not make the suffering disappear, but rather stops us from confronting it

Ketels 96

[Violet B. – prof English Temple, former director Intellectual Heritage Program – 548 Annals 45 (lexis)]

THE political bestiality of our age is abetted by our willingness to tolerate the deconstructing of humanist values. The process begins with the cynical manipulation of language. It often ends in stupefying murderousness before which the world stands silent, frozen in impotent "attentism"--a wait-and-see stance as unsuited to the human plight as a pacifier is to stopping up the hunger of a starving child. We have let lapse our pledge to the 6 million Jewish victims of the Holocaust that their deaths might somehow be transfiguring for humankind. We allow "slaughterhouse men" tactical status at U.N. tables and "cast down our eyes when the depraved roar past." n1 Peacemakers, delegated by us and circumscribed by our fears, temporize with thugs who have revived lebensraum claims more boldly than Hitler did. In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, criesfor help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence. We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it--only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large.n2In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience. "Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills," n3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rageagainst mimesis and content," n4 monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge. n5Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the [\*47] humanist soul," n6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts." n7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue. Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now. The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face. n8 Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying. Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety?

#### The alternative is imperialist- anti-altruism is only possible in the global west, the rest of the world can’t engage under constant threat of the us

#### Alt doesn’t solve – nihilism will always fail to emancipate life – even when we accept that suffering is inevitable, such an affirmation denies human freedom to prevent suffering

Crosby in 88

(Donald A., Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State University, *The specter of the absurd : sources and criticisms of modern* ***nihilism*)**

The second observation is that a considerable portion of human suffering is produced by the stable, predictable natural environment without which we could not implement our freedom. These orderly processes of the environment enable us to produce the automobiles that extend our freedom of movement, but that also constitute new sources of pain or death, as in the example above. The same can be said of many of the other technological inventions that enhance our freedom in today's world. But even without elaborate technologies, people can be hurt by the regularities of nature, as when someone tumbles from a cliff or is drowned in the sea. Where would we be without the pull of gravity or the properties of water, both of which usually sustain us but may on some occasions injure us or kill us? Could there be dependable regularities that work on our behalf and provide the necessary means for the expression of our freedom that would not also, in some circumstances, bring us to grief? A nihilism that decries this ambiguity in an ordered universe appears to be demanding something that, in the very nature of the case, is impossible, at least if human freedom is to remain a reality. If there are alternatives to such ambiguity, they are by no means easy to conceive; furthermore, one would still have to show that they would be better overall. Here we are reminded of the critical discussions in Chapter Six of the seductive dream of a heavenly paradise. Despite the many elements of contingency and hazard in this world to which we all are consigned, the world also provides us with the protection and dependability necessary to life and freedom. Does it make any sense to demand the benefits and yet to expect to have none of the potential liabilities?

#### No link- the affirmative is not an attempt to end suffering, just to put all life on the same plane

#### Nietzsche encourages rape, domination, murder, political oppression and violence, saying they are all noble traits.

Kelly **Ross 2003**. (Friedrich Nietzsche, July 5, 2007, http://www.friesian.com/NIETZSCH.HTM)

The lack of rights for the dark underclasses brings us to the principal theme of *The Genealogy of Morals*: The morality of "good and evil" has been invented out of hatred and resentment by the defeated and subjugated races,especially the Jews. People who love Nietzsche for his celebration of creativity and his dismissal of the moralism of traditional religion, mainly meaning Christianity, usually seem to think of going "beyond good and evil" as merely legitimizing homosexuality, drugs, abortion, prostitution, pornography, and the other desiderata of progressive thinking. They don't seem to understand that Nietzsche wasn't particularly interested in things like that, but, more to the point, legitimizing rape, murder, torture, pillage, domination, and political oppression by the strong. The only honest Nietzschean graduate student I ever met frankly stated, "To be creative, you must be evil." We get something similar in the recent Sandra Bullock movie, *Murder by Numbers* [2002], where the young Nietzschean student simply says, "Freedom is crime." The story of the movie is more or less that of Leopold and Loeb, the Chicago teenagers who in 1924 murdered a young boy (Bobby Franks) to prove that they were "beyond good and evil." Leopold and Loeb understood their Nietzsche far better than most of his academic apologists.And we are the first to admit that anyone who knew these "good" ones [nobility] only as enemies would find them evil enemies indeed.For these same men who, amongst themselves, are so strictly constrained by custom, worship, ritual, gratitude, and by mutual surveillance and jealousy, who are so resourceful in consideration, tenderness, loyality, pride and friendship, when once they step outside their circle become little better than uncaged beasts of prey.Once abroad in the wilderness, they revel in the freedom from social constraint and compensate for their long confinement in the quietude of their own community. They revert to the innocence of wild animals: we can imagine them returning from an orgy of murder, arson, rape, and torture, jubilant and at peace with themselves as though they had committed a fraternity prank -- convinced, moreover, that the poets for a long time to come will have something to sing about and to praise. Deep within all the noble races there lurks the beast of prey, bent on spoil and conquest. This hidden urge has to be satisfied from time to time, the beast let loose in the wilderness.This goes as well for the Roman, Arabian, German, Japanese nobility as for the Homeric heroes and the Sandinavianvikings. The noble races have everywhere left in their wake the catchword "barbarian." .....their utter indifference to safety and comfort, their terrible pleasure in destruction, their taste for cruelty -- all these traits are embodied by their victims in the image of the "barbarian," and "evil enemy," the Goth or the Vandal. The profound and icy suspicion which the German arouses as soon as he assumes power (we see it happening again today [i.e. 1887]) harks back to the persistent horror with which Europe for many centuries witnessed the raging of the blond Teutonic beast (although all racial connection between the old Teutonic tribes and ourselves has been lost). [pp.174-175, boldface added]The "noble races" are thus ennobled by no *restraint* or *consideration* shown for the persons or possessions, let alone feelings, of those helpless strangers who come within their power. "Spoil and conquest," rape and torture, are fun. Kaiser Wilhelm got in the spirit of things by telling German troups to act like the "Huns of Attila" on their mission to Peking in 1900. No Nietzschean has any business, for example, damning Christopher Columbus for enslaving the Caribs. While Nietzsche actually seems to think that the "blond Teutonic beast" was gone from Germany, and Hitler, as noted, hardly fills the bill, there is actually no lack of blonds in the "Nordic" nations, and Nietzsche himself here seems to have a relatively expansive notion of racial superiority. While he apparently thought of the Roman nobility as themselves of Aryan extraction, he can hardly have thought the same of the Arabians or Japanese. This acknowledgment would have been of material advantage in World War II, when many Arabs preferred the Germans to the British (or to the Zionist Jews of Palestine) -- while the Japanese, even today, often think of themselves as a pure and superior race. As actual German Allies in World War II, the Japanese where in close competition with Germany for atrocities against civilians and prisoners-of-war (though the Germans were relatively considerate of American and British prisoners, while brutal to Russians and others, as the Japanese were to all).

#### The Alternative is vague – it’s a voting issue

#### - Can’t determine the political implications of the alternative- justifies the PERM

#### - Can skew out of any offense we read – block clarification is illegitimate

#### - Justifies severance and intrinsic PERMs to preserve reciprocity and test the alternative

#### Perm – do the aff and embrace the alt through the frame of radical perspectivism– the net benefit is that this allows us to move past absolute Truths

Makedon 1992

(Alexander, Chicago State University, <http://members.aol.com/abacuspubl/homepg.html>)

Underlying radical perspectivism is the assumption that no one assumption about the world ismore true than another, although all of them collectively are "true" about the world.This is so because the world is equally all of its parts, and therefore one can be no more partial toward any one of them in trying to understand the world, than the world is more one part than another. Similar to perspectivist drawing in art or architecture, so is philosophical perspectivism angular in its approach, spherical in its process, and unifying in its conclusions. By including the perspectives of other world-parts in our interpretations of the world, such as, other animals, plants, nature (mountains, planets), or even human-made artifacts, we include the world, and as a result our conclusions can be no less "worldly."         More than "multicultural," radical perspectivism requires an open mind not only toward other cultures, but also non-human perspectives. Less the colonizer, and more the reinterpreter, the perspectivist human lives in harmony with the universe simply to live. As a philosophy, radical perspectivism prepares humans for the cosmic age, where their view of themselves as reinterpreters is colored by their understanding of the universe. Their recently acquired technical skills, such as, the ability to travel away from planet earth, may allow them to "see" the world from remotely human perspectives, and therefore to really begin to see it. For example, seeing the "blue planet" from a perspective outside earth, they may come to realize how much lacking in perspective their treatment of the earth so far may have been. At the same time, there is the danger that they may become too scientific to really "see" the world, as they may fail to realize how much more world there is that can't be discovered through science.         Psychologically, the perspectivist's sense of self expands to include the universe as a whole. As possibly the last frontier in his intellectual odyssey, theradical perspectivist expands his horizons to includethose world perspectives which in the modern western world have been either ridiculed or ignored, but which may bring him back home to himself. He may begin to see the significance of empathizing with the world, as have several non-western cultures (Native American, African, South American, or Asian). The further away he travels from himself, through what he can see through the microscope, telescope, or spacecraft window, the more he may find out about himself that he could have known even if he had never left the earth behind. Ironically, the more advanced he becomes technologically, the more he may come to identify with those world beliefs and rituals which presently are held in "primitive" societies that have none of his highly technical capacities.         As a method of questioning, radical perspectivism extends the socratic "torpedo shock" well beyond anything that humans may have experienced: it brings to surface those non-human perspectives that humans have always sensed are "true," but either took too seriously in the past, or not seriously enough, especially in the modern age, to allow the world to play them. Ironically, the same play element that they find ludicrous in non-human perspectives, is the attitude required of them to "seriously" understand the world. Their seriousness under radical perspectivism is no more "serious," than is a child's absorption in his role-play, or for that matter, the adult audience identifying with the characters in a drama.         Aware of their ability to tell lies, invent illusions with which to feel secure in a threatening world, or teach the young how to role-play, nevertheless humans relegate their ability to role-play to myth, religion, theater, or children's stories, but not also to their social or political life, or, for that matter, to education. Instead of using the world to build their institutions, write their laws, or shape the attitudes of their young, they feel they must use themselves as the standard by which to change the world, or even "conquer" it to survive. Modern humans have failed to realize that to understand the world, if not live to understand it, they must become a little more like a child, that is, playful, imaginative, and open-minded.   Radical perspectivism can cause our view of the world to change. In this, it is no different than any of the other philosophical systems with radically different world views. For example, regarding science, radical perspectivism requires that we supplement scientific technique with role-play, even if that means that we role-play the scientific method. In the process of role-playing the other, we allow other world-parts to re-enlist our imagination in reinterpreting them, or in re-educating ourselves or our young to "identify" with nature. Under the tenets of radical perspectivism, our views on morality, science, education, language, method, religion, or truth change drastically to enable us to perceive the world from universal perspectives. In the end, radical perspectivism brings us back into the universal fold without denying us our humanity, if not salvage it from the mire of self-centered assumptions about the world that threaten to destroy us.

#### And to say we need to affirm the shit in existence ignores that inevitable good exists as well. While negative situations may be inevitable, to deny the good in life is itself nihilistic despair – the perm solves by affirming the good with the bad

Crosby 88

(Donald A., Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State University, *The specter of the absurd : sources and criticisms of modern* ***nihilism*)**

These and other abuses of freedom, although matters of utmost concern, need not reduce us to despair. For with the freedom to do evil there is also the freedom to do good. Although we cannot undo the tragedies of the past, we can work to find ways to motivate and assist one another toward more generous and caring relationships in the future. We can try to fashion and maintain institutions that procure greater protection and justice for the innocent against the guilty and that offer firm but constructive treatment for those who succumb—and not always simply through personal malice—to evil desires. This is not to say that we can expect to eliminate altogether the perverse and destructive proclivities of the human spirit; these are a feature of our experience for which no one can convincingly claim to have adequate understanding or solutions. But we can strive to ameliorate these evil impulses in ourselves and others and to find ways to put more positive incentivesin their place—through education, law, moral and religious influence, the transformative power of the arts, persistent psychological and social research, and institutional reforms. We are also free to work toward a more humane treatment of animals, toward creating a climate of concern in which we become more respectful of their needs and more sensitive to their capacity for pain. It is within our power as free beings, then, to reduce the amount of suffering in the world: this is a vision of hope, not of nihilistic despair. The obstacles are formidable and many, but the opportunities are genuine and far-ranging.

#### Perm – do the alternative in every instance other than the plan. We affirm the notion of the plan as a variable contingency in democracy – it is possible to fulfill Nietzsche’s alternative within this framework of chance.

Hatab 2002

(Professor at Old Dominion University, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147, Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans, Project Muse)

How can we begin to apply the notion of agonistics to politics in general and democracy in particular? First of all, contestation and competition can be seen as fundamental to self-development and as an intrinsically social phenomenon. Agonistics helps us articulate the social and political ramifications of Nietzsche's concept of will to power. As Nietzsche put it in an 1887 note, "will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; it seeks that which resists it" (KSA 12, p.424). Power, therefore, is not simply an individual possession or a goal of action; it is more a global, interactive conception. For Nietzsche, every advance in life is an overcoming of some obstacle or counterforce, so that conflict is a mutual co-constitution of contending forces. [End Page 134] Opposition generates development. The human self is not formed in some internal sphere and then secondarily exposed to external relations and conflicts. The self is constituted in and through what it opposes and what opposes it; in other words, the self is formed through agonistic relations. Therefore, any annulment of one's Other would be an annulment of one's self in this sense. Competition can be understood as a shared activity for the sake of fostering high achievement and self-development, and therefore as an intrinsically social activity.10 In the light of Nietzsche's appropriation of the two forms of Eris, it is necessary to distinguish between agonistic conflict and sheer violence. A radical agonistics rules out violence, because violence is actually an impulse to eliminate conflict by annihilating or incapacitating an opponent, bringing the agon to an end. 11 In a later work Nietzsche discusses the "spiritualization of hostility (Feindschaft)," wherein one must affirm both the presence and the power of one's opponents as implicated in one's own posture(TI "Morality as Antinature," 3). And in this passage Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion to the political realm. What this implies is that the category of the social need not be confined to something like peace or harmony. Agonistic relations, therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a social disposition and can thus be extended to political relations. How can democracy in general terms be understood as an agonistic activity? Allow me to quote from my previous work. Political judgments are not preordained or dictated; outcomes depend upon a contest of speeches where one view wins and other views lose in a tabulation of votes; since the results are binding and backed by the coercive power of the government, democratic elections and procedures establish temporary control and subordination—which, however, can always be altered or reversed because of the succession of periodic political contests. . . . Democratic elections allow for, and depend upon, peaceful exchanges and transitions of power. . . . [L]anguage is the weapon in democratic contests. The binding results, however, produce tangible effects of gain and loss that make political exchanges more than just talk or a game. . . . The urgency of such political contests is that losers must yield to, and live under, the policies of the winner; we notice, therefore, specific configurations of power, of domination and submission in democratic politics. 12

#### Nietzsche’ philosophy is racist justifies oppression and segregation

Ross ‘03

[Kelly 2003. Friedrich Nietzsche, July 5, 2007, http://www.friesian.com/NIETZSCH.HTM]

First of all, Nietzsche's racism is unmistakable. The best way to approach this is to let Nietzsche speak for himself. In the quotes that follow, I will simply offer examples from The Genealogy of Moralsalone, as translated by Francis Golffing (in the footnotes I have been adding some passages from Beyond Good and Evil for comparison). The Latinmalus["bad"] (beside which I place melas [Greek for "black"]) might designate the common man as dark, especially black-haired ("hic nigerest"), as the pre-Aryan settler of the Italian soil, notably distinguished from the new blond conqueror race by his color. At any rate, the Gaelic presented me with an exactly analogous case: fin, as in the name Fingal, the characteristic term for nobility, eventually the good, noble, pure, originally the fair-haired as opposed to the dark, black-haired native population. The Celts, by the way, were definitely a fair-haired race; and it is a mistake to try to relate the area of dark-haired people found on ethnographic maps of Germany to Celtic bloodlines, as Virchow does. These are the last vestiges of the pre-Aryan population of Germany. (The subject races are seen to prevail once more, throughout almost all of Europe; in color, shortness of skull, perhaps also in intellectual and social instincts. Who knows whether modern democracy, the even more fashionable anarchism, and especially that preference for the commune, the most primitive of all social forms, which is now shared by all European socialists -- whether all these do not represent a throwback, and whether, even physiologically, the Aryan race of conquerors is not doomed?) [The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956, p.164, boldface added, note] Here we have an unmistakable racism: the good, noble, and blond Aryans, contrasted with the dark and primitive indigenes of Europe. While Nietzsche's thought is often defended as unrelated to the racism of the Nazis, there does not seem to be much difference from the evidence of this passage. One difference might be Nietzsche's characterization of the "commune" as "the most primitive of all social forms." Nazi ideology was totalitarian and "social," denigrating individualism. Nietzsche would not have gone for this -- and the small, dark Hitler is certainly no Aryan -- but then many defenders of Nietzsche these days also tend to prefer a communitarian democracy, which means they might have more in common with the Nazis, despite their usual anti-racism, than Nietzsche himself. This is characteristic of the confusion of contemporary politics, let alone Nietzsche apologetics. The passage above, at least, provides as much aid and comfort for the Nazis as for any other interpretation or appropriation of Nietzsche. Nietzsche's racism might be excused as typical of its age, and criticism of it anachronistic. However, the racism of Thomas Jefferson, a century earlier, involved an explicit denial that physical or intellectual differences between the races (about which Jefferson expressed no certainty) compromised the rights of the inferior races. To Nietzsche, however, the "subject races" have no "rights"; and domination, not to mention all the forms of "oppression" excoriated by the trendy Left, are positive and desirable goods.This anxiety or distemper may be due to a variety of causes. It may result from a crossing of races too dissimilar (or of classes too dissimilar. Class distinctions are always indicative of genetic and racial differences: the European Weltschmerz and the pessimism of the nineteenth century were both essentially the results of an abrupt and senseless mixing of classes)... [p.267, boldface added, note] In the litany of political sins identified by the Left, "racism, classism, and homophobia" are the holy trinity -- with "classism," of course, as a codeword for the hated capitalism. Here we see that for Nietzsche racism and "classism" are identical: the "subject races" form the subject classes. This is good and noble. We also get another aspect of the matter, the "mixing" of races and classes is "senseless" and productive of the pessimism and social problems of modern society. In these terms, Nietzsche can only have approved of the Nazis laws against marriage or even sex between Aryans and Untermenschen.

## War Space K

### \*\*\*Other DOC

#### You’ve got the wrong k- our understanding of the precarity of life sees war not as an event but a condition. For those whose lives are ungrievable, war is a state of being, as they can be disposed of at any moment.

#### Our individual critique of warfare is key to solve-

#### War is an embodied experience- our relation of the state of precarity that places bodies in a constant state of threat is necessary to understand the bodily manifestations of warfare

McSorley 13

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This book places the body at the centre of critical thinking about war, giving embodiment and bodily issues an analytic recognition they have often been denied in the annals and ontology of conventional war scholarship. The reality of war is not just politics by any other means but politics incarnate, politics written on and experienced through the thinking, feeling bodies of men and women. From steeled combatants to abject victims, from the grieving relative to the exhausted aid worker, war occupies innumerable bodies in a multitude of ways, profoundly shaping lives and ways of being human. The opening description of war provides one vivid illustration of how war ‘makes sense’ at a fundamentally embodied and affective level. For the young Mozambican narrator, war is an anticipatory nervousness that constantly ‘lives inside’ her, a somatic knowing that underpins her every thought and move. As Nordstrom (1998: 108) argues, something ‘far more complex, multifaceted and enduring than the formal boundaries of war demarcated in military cultures takes root in the quotidian life of a country at war’. It is this ontology of war that the scholarship in this book seeks to elucidate and explore – the countless affective, sensory and embodied ways through which war lives and breeds. 1 Shaw (2005: 40– 1) argues that ‘the defect of most social theory of war and militarism is . . . that it has not considered war as practice, i.e. what people actually do in war’. This book aims to address that omission via an explicit focus upon the embodied practices, structures of feeling and lived experiences through which war and militarism take place. While this will include the examination of specific modes of embodying force and practices of ‘warfighting’, the analysis extends both temporally and spatially to consider the bodily preparations for, and the corporeal aftermaths of, war – both within militaries and beyond. Indeed, an analytic focus upon the body tends to render any clear demarcation of discrete war zones and times problematic, 2 emphasising instead the enactment and reproduction of war through affective dispositions, corporeal careers, embodied suffering and somatic memories that endure across time and space. 3 Furthermore, it is not just the bodies of combatants and victims that are produced by and central to war, but the bodies of veterans, witnesses, pacifists, patriots and many others. Given the global nature of contemporary economic, migratory and media flows, few in today’s interconnected world remain completely isolated from war’s touch (Sylvester 2011). While in post-­ conscription Western states with increasingly professionalised and privatised militaries, there may be less direct disciplinary engagement with civilian bodies – leading some commentators to have proposed the existence of ‘post-­ military society’ (Shaw 1991) and ‘post-­ heroic warfare’ (Luttwak 1995) – many such states have been marked by a profound re-­ militarisation at a wider political and cultural level in recent decades, a mobilisation that has often been intensely embodied and emotional. Ó Tuathail (2003: 859), for example, describes the political channelling of ‘the affective tsunami unleashed by the terrorist attacks of 2001’. He argues that 9/11 was processed by many Americans in a fundamentally visceral manner, becoming a ‘somatic marker’ – effectively a ‘gut instinct’ shaping perception and judgement below the threshold of rational, deliberative discussion – that would subsequently be appropriated to legitimate the military invasion of Iraq in 2003. Stahl (2010) relatedly understands the inculcation of contemporary consumers into the burgeoning interactive culture of ‘militainment’ in terms of affective and kinaesthetic entrainment, a seduction whose pleasures are ultimately felt at the expense of developing any other critical capacities to engage with matters of military might. It is through such mundane cultural practices that the legitimacy of having vast military force – what the anthropologist Catherine Lutz (2009) refers to as the ‘military normal’ – assumes an implicitness, becomes something not thought but routinely felt in everyday life. Such examples point to the need to think about the reproduction of war, and war readiness, in terms of a militarisation of sensation, affect and the body that operates over time and across multiple and broad constituencies. 4 The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on exploring the relative neglect of embodiment in many conventional discussions of war and the increasingly problematic and paradoxical status of the body in recent Western wars.