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**The affirmatives description of war is a disembodied one. This is bad – war is a visceral event that is always dependent on the body. Their faulty ontology means all their evidence is suspect, and their failure to accurately describe war causes ontological violence.**

**McSorley** **13**

Kevin McSorley is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Portsmouth. He convened the War and the Body conference at the Imperial War Museum in June 2010, and co-­ organized the accompanying War and the Body exhibition at Blackall Studios, London. His expertise includes contemporary social and cultural theory; technology and the body; the sociology of war and violence. He has recently edited a special issue of the Journal of War and Culture Studies on ‘War and Embodiment: Military and Cultural Practices’. He is currently conducting ethnographic research on the global arms trade and working on the monograph Violence, War and Society. McSorley, Kevin (Editor). War, Politics and Experience : War and the Body : Militarisation, Practice and Experience. Pg. 10 BSHIZZLE

**This** book **places the body at the centre of critical thinking about war**, **giving embodiment and bodily issues an analytic recognition they have** often **been denied in the annals and ontology of conventional war scholarship**. **The reality of war is not** just **politics by any other means but politics incarnate**, **politics written on and experienced through** the **thinking, feeling bodies** of men and women. From steeled combatants to abject victims, from the grieving relative to the exhausted aid worker, war occupies innumerable bodies in a multitude of ways, profoundly shaping lives and ways of being human. The opening description of war provides one vivid illustration of how war ‘makes sense’ at a fundamentally embodied and affective level. For the young Mozambican narrator, war is an anticipatory nervousness that constantly ‘lives inside’ her, a somatic knowing that underpins her every thought and move. As Nordstrom (1998: 108) argues, **something ‘far more complex, multifaceted and enduring than the formal boundaries of war demarcated in military cultures takes root in the quotidian life of a country at war’. It is this ontology of war** **that** the **scholarship** in this book **seeks to elucidate and explore** – **the countless affective, sensory and embodied ways through which war lives and breeds**. 1 Shaw (2005: 40– 1) argues that ‘**the defect of most social theory of war and militarism is . . . that it has not considered war as practice, i.e. what people actually do in war’**. This book aims to address that omission via an explicit focus upon the embodied practices, structures of feeling and lived experiences through which war and militarism take place. While this will include the examination of specific modes of embodying force and practices of ‘warfighting’, the analysis extends both temporally and spatially to consider the bodily preparations for, and the corporeal aftermaths of, war – both within militaries and beyond. Indeed, a**n analytic focus upon the body tends to render any clear demarcation of discrete war zones and times problematic,** 2 **emphasising** instead **the enactment and reproduction of war through affective dispositions, corporeal careers, embodied suffering and somatic memories** that endure across time and space. 3 Furthermore, **it is not just the bodies of combatants and victims that are produced by and central to war**, **but the bodies of veterans, witnesses, pacifists, patriots and many others. Given the global nature of contemporary economic, migratory and media flows**, **few in today’s** interconnected **world remain** completely **isolated from war’s touch** (Sylvester 2011). While in post-­ conscription Western states with increasingly professionalised and privatised militaries, there may be less direct disciplinary engagement with civilian bodies – leading some commentators to have proposed the existence of ‘post-­ military society’ (Shaw 1991) and ‘post-­ heroic warfare’ (Luttwak 1995) – many such **states have been marked by a profound re-­ militarisation at a wider political and cultural level in recent decades, a mobilisation that has often been intensely embodied and emotiona**l. Ó Tuathail (2003: 859), for example, describes the political channelling of ‘**the affective tsunami unleashed by** the terrorist attacks of 2001’. He argues that 9**/11 was processed by many** Americans **in a fundamentally visceral manner, becoming a ‘somatic marker’** – effectively a ‘gut instinct’ **shaping perception and judgement below the threshold of rational, deliberative discussion** **– that would** **subsequently be appropriated to legitimate the military invasion of Iraq in 2003.** Stahl (2010) relatedly understands the inculcation of contemporary consumers into the burgeoning interactive culture of ‘militainment’ **in terms of affective and kinaesthetic entrainment, a seduction whose pleasures are ultimately felt at the expense of developing any other critical capacities to engage with matters of military might. It is through such mundane cultural practices that the legitimacy of having vast military force** – what the anthropologist Catherine Lutz (2009) refers to as the ‘military normal’ – **assumes an implicitness, becomes something not thought but routinely felt in everyday life**. **Such examples point to the need to think about the reproduction of war, and war readiness, in terms of a militarisation of sensation, affect and the body that operates over time and across multiple and broad constituencies**. 4 The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on exploring the relative neglect of embodiment in many conventional discussions of war and the increasingly problematic and paradoxical status of the body in recent Western wars.

**Additionally, The Performance of the 1AC assumes an able-bodied standpoint. It is impossible to separate our discussions and our encounters from our relationship to disability.**

**Boys 2008** (Jos, “challenging the 'normal': towards new conceptual frameworks”, http://www.sowhatisnormal.co.uk/challenging)

**This shifts** the **inquiry from representations** (**on the body**, **in the space**) **to relationships, processes and contexts**. **Any encounter is necessarily mediated by who is there, who is not, why they are there** (or why not), **what they bring to the situation and w hat they take away. Such events involve meanings-in-the-making through a process in space and over time**. Importantly encounters are not just a space of sharing and recognition but also of conflict, differentiation and negotiation**. They involve interpretations, talk, gestures, bodily relationships, and actions**. So how do encounters work? In each case we now have two questions which allow the exploration of disability beyond being a stereotypical marker of identity or difference. **What embodied knowledge and experience do we the participants bring to the encounter**? **What are the routine social and spatial practices which frame the encounter?** **Here, disabled and ‘non-disabled’ participants are not separated out; all have parity in the space of the encounter itself.** **But the impact of framing disabled people in ways not of their making remains central to the investigation**. As Davis writes: **Disability is not so much the lack of a sense or the presence of a physical or mental impairment as it is the reception and construction of that difference**. Davis 2002 p50

**The Impact is epistemological and ontological destruction. The body is the source and the shaping force of all knowledge and meaning.**

**Creal 1999** (Lee Davis, “THE "DISABILITY OF THINKING"

THE "DISABLED" BODY”, Course Paper for Ambiguous Bodies: Studies in Contemporary Sexuality, York University, http://www.broadreachtraining.com/advocacy/artcreal.htm)

In "Lived Bodies: Phenomenology and the Flesh," Elizabeth Grosz cites the work of Merleau-Ponty in her discussion of corporeal phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty, she says, seeks to understand the relationship between consciousness and nature and between interiority and exteriority. **He reorients the tradition of the** **question** "**how can there be a world for a subject**?" **by locating subjectivity not in** mind or **consciousness but in the body;** he argues that **the mind and body are not separate entities but interrelated** and that **the mind is based on corporeal and sensory relations.** **The body**, according to Merleau-Ponty, **is a phenomenon experienced by the one who lives in it and it** (the body) **is the location which places one in the world and makes possible relationships between oneself and other objects and subjects**. We understand and know our body only by living in it. **It is a subject and lived reality for oneself and an object for others but it is never simply object nor simply subject**. Merleau-Ponty says the **body is "sense-bestowing" and "form-giving**," **and is "my being-to-the-world and as such is the instrument by which all information and knowledge is received and meaning is generated**" (Grosz: 87). This resonates with Lennard Davis who says **the body is not only a physical object but is "a way of organizing through the realm of the senses the variations and modalities of physical existence as they are embodied into being through a larger social/political Matrix**" (Davis: 14).

**The Alternative is to recognize Invisible Disability. It is time to stop pretending that if we can’t see it, it doesn’t exist. Disability consciousness is the first step toward changing the question from should there be access to how should there be access.**

**As an educator, you should adopt an ethic of care. Once we recognize the ableist structures of debate and society writ large, it is our responsibility to do something about it. An ethic of care provides a framework for inclusion and accessibility.**

**Here is our vision for debate – we think the form that the 1AC chose to use was exclusionary. We think the 1AC has perpetuated certain structures in debate that are problematic.**

**Speed – The unrealistic rate of delivery has cut off access to this activity for many people with disabilities. People living with dyslexia, speech impediments, having to use interpreters are put at a structural disadvantage or simply altogether excluded from these debates.**

**Physical Inaccessibility – The very buildings and classrooms that debates take place in are inaccessible. Older buildings lack basic things like functioning elevators or ramps into foyers. Newer building have structural problems within classrooms that make it difficult for some people to engage because of the environment they are in.**

**Technical Focus – The dependence on specialized and technical jargon, as well as the reliance on the idea of tech over truth, has reduced debate to a chess game where the pedagogical potential has been replaced with a win loss column. We think debates should center on large ideas instead of hyper specific drops like “Vague Alts Bad” “Condo Good” or “Try-or-Die”. Modeling debate of actual policy debates that occur would greatly increase accessibility. If a potential lawmaker or constituent can’t understand the 1AC, then it should not be seen as a persuasive speech that supports a specific policy or action.**

**Finally, this is not a comprehensive list of the problems in debate. We thing there are other issues that prevent access, like a broken case list or certain tournament practices, that can and should be changed. We think the practices that we have outlined are good places to start to make change. We understand that debate will not change overnight, but we do think that there are forms and methods that have occurred in this round that should be changed.**

### Case

#### The 1ac rests on a distinction of american losses are prevented at all cost while the rest of the world can be exterminated with no recourse

Butler 4 – PhD, Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School  
Judith, 2004, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence” p. XIV-XV. http://butlerphile.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/butler\_judith\_-\_precarious\_lif.pdf

The second piece “Violence, Mourning, Politics,” takes up a psychoanalytic understanding of loss to see why aggression sometimes seems so quickly to follow. The essay pursues the problem of a primary vulnerability to others, one that one cannot will away without ceasing to be human. It suggests as well that contemporary forms of national sovereignty constitute efforts to overcome an impressionability and violability that are ineradicable dimensions of human dependency and sociality. I also consider there how certain forms of grief become nationally recognized and amplified, whereas other losses become unthinkable and ungrievable. I argue that a national melancholia, understood as a disavowed mourning, follows upon the erasure from public representations of the names, images, and narratives of those the US has killed. On the other hand, the US’s own losses are consecrated in public obituaries that constitute so many acts of nation-building. Some lives are grieveable, and others are not; the differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and must be grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human: what counts as livable life and a grievable death?

#### The impact is unending warfare, fueled by the naked worship of violence that is american politics. Everything other counts as sub-human and liable to destruction

Kaustuv Roy, 08- “Neighborhoods of the Plantation: War, Politics and Education”. Professor of social and political theory in the College of Education at *Louisiana State* University, Baton Rouge. <https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/683-neighborhoods-of-the-plantation.pdf>

In this context, one State document worth studying is the National Security Strategy of 2002 announced by the current U.S. regime which must take credit as the most aggressive and supremacist documents ever put out by a democratic nation as a statement of its foreign policy. The U.S. administration openly declares its war on the world: It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge...To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of US forces. (United States, 2002, p. 29, emphasis added) This vindicates Benjamin’s assertion earlier that one need not be amazed at the naked worship of violence, but understand it as basic to the organization of state power. The word “defenses” is an obvious euphemism for offensive capacity to carry on the endless war that began in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the US took on the mantle of global policeman, all the way through the Cold War and up to the most recent proposed “missile shields” in Poland and the Czech Republic announced in 2007 that is widely seen as the beginning of a new arms race. 14 Chomsky notes: [There is] a new norm for the use of military force. This new norm was articulated in general terms by the White House in September 2002 when it announced the new National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The report proposed an unusually extreme doctrine on the use of force in the world... a doctrine that doesn’t begin to have any grounds in international law, namely, preventive war. That is, the United States will rule the world by force, and if there is any challenge to its domination―whether it is perceived in the distance, invented, imagined, or whatever―then the United States will have the right to destroy that challenge... (Chomsky, 2005, pp. 1-2) Read closely, the security document is a new Romanus Pontifex, a declaration of war against one and all in the establishment of a world order in the service of the western political and financial elite and its plantations all over the world. We have seen its immediate application and consequence in the invasion and erasure of Iraq. The intentionality, or the confluence of the discourses of freedom/progress/rationality/terror, keeps the world gripped in a dialectic of violence with increasing stakes that is needed to maintain the world-as-estate. 15 Let us go back once more to the National Security Strategy document. Some of the key phrases are the “essential role” of the military and the necessity of its establishment “beyond challenge.” It is here that the writers of the official manifesto betray their intentionality in terms of the absolutist horizon that has little relation to the historical basis of the democratic state; here we see the military as the rational-pragmatic arm of the absolute State or the State of terror. 16 To rule an empire America had to maintain a vast military machine and institutions such as the CIA and the NSA which operated under a blanket of secrecy. The public was increasingly excluded from the decision-making process.... The pernicious feature in all this was not only the expansion of military influence into civilian areas... but the injection of the militarist élan throughout our society―a constant pressure directing American life toward the reactionary. As defined by a conservative expert, Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard, military values are exactly the opposite of ‘the Lockeian liberalism...’ Whereas the nation was built on the philosophical ‘ideals of liberty, democracy, equality, and peace,’ the basic military principles are ‘authority, hierarchy, obedience, force, and war’. (Lens, 1987, p. 22) Once again we see the operation of the dyarchy. Vast secret organizations such as the CIA, whose operations are exempt from public scrutiny and who therefore become the terror arm of the political oligarchy, are unleashed upon the world in the name of national security in order to maintain servility and compliance on the global plantation. Declassified documents show the role of the CIA, for example, in the overthrow as well as assassinations of political leaders around the world who refused to tow Washington’s line (see Chomsky, 2003 and 2005). When “democracies” are run by means of secret organizations they become despotisms. Besides, if democracy is taken to mean the primacy of the constitutive role of the collective then militarism has little place in it. Militarism, instead, trumps democracy insisting on the primacy of the State and its commissars in the life of the people. The uncrowned monarchs parade military glory in a desperate bid to hide the real bankruptcy and fragility of the social condition. The message is that if the killing machine is state-of-the-art then society is safe. Nothing of course could be more ridiculous and untrue: the endless concern with death and mechanisms of death is what Agamben (2000) has called “thanatopolitics,” a breakdown so profound that it cannot be detected easily. Militarist despotism is the prime vehicle by means of which the State legitimizes itself convening violence and terror while maintaining a silence on real issues of livability. The more the need for that silence grows, the more the people must be banned from the public sphere, that is, from true political participation, and decisions must be taken by the ruling cabal in secrecy reinforcing the formalism of the State and the mystification of power. The security state thus becomes shrouded in secrecy; all relevant information on the basis of which informed decisions can be made is kept from the public as state secret. This is the state of diarchy; parallel processes are set up, one for the rulers and another for the governed, the separation yielding the necessary room for limitless violence.

#### Obama will lie, secrecy prevents any checks

Branfman 13 Fred, Director of Project Air War, interviewed the first Lao refugees brought down to Vientiane from the Plain of Jars in northern Laos, visited U.S. airbases in Thailand and South Vietnam, talking with U.S. Embassy officials. 6/9

Whatever his personal beliefs prior to becoming President Mr. Obama, as the Executive's titular leader, has necessarily signed up to support the secrecy, lying, and disinformation it employs to enjoy maximum flexibility from democratic oversight in order to pursue its policies of overt and covert violence. Two important new books - Jeremy Scahill's Dirty Wars and Mark Mazzetti's The Way of the Knife - describe how, in near-total secrecy, the U.S. Executive is a world of its own. Over the last 12 years, Executive officials have unilaterally and secretly launched, escalated or deescalated wars; installed and supported massively corrupt governments, savage warlords, or local paramilitary forces, and overthrown leaders that have displeased it; created the first unit of global American assassins and fleets of machines waging automated war; engaged in vicious turf wars for more money and budget; spied on Americans including the media and activists on a scale unmatched in U.S. history; compiled 3 different sets of global "kill lists" independently operated by the White House, CIA and Pentagon/JSOC; used police-state tactics while claiming to support democracy, e.g. when it fed retina scans, facial recognition features and fingerprints of over 3 million Iraqi and Afghani males into a giant data base; incarcerated and tortured, either directly or indirectly, tens of thousands of people without evidence or trial; and much more. All of these major activities are conducted entirely by the Executive Branch, without meaningful Congressional oversight or the knowledge of the American people. The foundational principle of the U.S. Constitution is that governments can only rule with the "informed consent" of the people. But the U.S. Executive Branch has not only robbed its people of this fundamental right. It has prosecuted those courageous whistleblowers who have tried to inform them. The U.S. mass media, dependent upon the Executive for their information and careers, and run by corporate interests benefiting from Executive largesse, predominately convey Executive Branch perspectives on an hourly basis to the American people. Even on the relatively few occasions when they publish information the Executive wishes to keep secret, it has little impact on Executive policies while maintaining the illusion that the U.S. has a "free press". The U.S. Executive is essentially free to conduct its activities as it wishes. In future articles in this space we will explore three key features of the U.S. Executive Branch: (1) Evil - If evil consists of murdering, maiming, and making homeless the innocent, and/or waging the “aggressive war” judged the “supreme international crime” at Nuremberg, the U.S. Executive Branch is today clearly the world’s most evil institution. It has killed, wounded or made refugees of an officially-estimated 21 million people in Iraq and Indochina alone, far more than any other institution since the time of Stalin and Mao. President Obama is the first U.S. President to acknowledge, in his recent "counterterrorism" speech, that this number has included killing "hundreds of thousands" of civilians in Vietnam whom it officially claimed it was trying to protect. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara put the total number of Vietnamese killed at 3.4 million. [38] (2) Lawlessness - If illegality consists of refusing to obey the law, the Executive is clearly the most lawless institution in the world. It routinely violates even timid legislative attempts to control its unilateral war-making. And no nation on earth has signed fewer international laws, and so failed to observe even those it has signed. These include measures like those intended to clean up the tens of millions of landmines and cluster bombs [39] with which it has littered the world, refused to clean up, and which continue to murder and maim tens of thousands of innocent people until today. (3) Authoritarianism - And if "authoritarianism" consists of a governing body acting unilaterally, regularly deceiving its own citizenry, neutering its legislature ,and prosecuting those who expose its lies, the U.S. Executive is clearly the most undemocratic institution in America. Indeed its deceiving its own people - keeping its activities secret and then lying about and covering them up when caught - throws its very legitimacy into question.

#### The Aff’s Discourse of Hegemonic Integration Rehashes The Geographies of Exclusion and Barbarism in Nicer Term - The Discourse of “Global Instability” Versus a Stable US Confirm the Hierarchy of Dominant US Identity.

David Campbell et. al. 7, Prof. of Geography @ Durham, ‘7 [*Political Geography* 26, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy,” p. Wiley]

The concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by both **Kagan and Barnett,** issimilarly at the heart of the current administration's foreign and domestic policies. The former Director of Policy at the US State Department, Richard Haass, articulated the central tenets of the concept when he wondered: Is there a successor idea to containment? I think there is. It is the idea of integration. The goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into these policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more (Haass in Lemann, 1 April 2002, emphasis added). That the US **is no longer** prepared to tolerate regimes that do not mirror its own democratic values and practices, and that it will seek to persuade such major powers to change their policies and behaviours to fit the American modus operandi, is not without historical precedent (Ambrosius, 2006). Nor does the differently imagined geography of integration replace completely previous Manichean conceptions of the world so familiar to Cold War politics. Rather, the proliferation of new terms of antipathy such as ‘axis of evil’, ‘rogue states’, and ‘terror cities’ demonstrate how **integration goes hand in hand with – and is mutually constitutive of – new forms of division.** Barnett's divide between the globalised world and the non-integrating gap is reflected and complemented by Kagan's divide in ways of dealing with this state of affairs. Much of this imagined geography pivots on the idea of ‘the homeland’. Indeed, in the imaginations of the security analysts we highlight here, there is a direct relationship and tension between securing the homeland's borders and challenging the sanctity of borders elsewhere (see Kaplan, 2003: 87). Appreciating this dynamic requires us to trace some of the recent articulations of US strategy. Since September 11th 2001 the US government and military have issued a number of documents outlining their security strategy. Each recites, reiterates and resignifies both earlier strategic statements as well each other, **creating a sense of boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of the world**. Initially there was The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 2002), and then the much broader scope National Security Strategy (The White House, 2002b; see Der Derian, 2003). These were followed by the “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” and particular plans for Military Strategy, Defense Strategy and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” (Department of Defense, 2005a, Department of Defense, 2005b, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004 and The White House, 2002a). These are seen as an interlocking whole, where “the National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS)” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 1); and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” builds “upon the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy” (Department of Defense, 2005b: iii; see also diagram on 6). The updated National Security Strategy (The White House, 2006) presents a further re-elaboration and re-stating of these principles. As with the understandings we highlighted previously, it should be noted that key elements of these strategies pre-date September 11. Significant in this continuity is the link between the Bush administration's strategic view and the 1992 “Defense Planning Guidance” (DPG). Written for the administration of George H. W. Bush by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, the DPG was the first neoconservative security manifesto for the post-Cold War; a blue print for a one-superpower world in which the US had to be prepared to combat new regional threats and prevent the rise of a hegemonic competitor (Tyler, 8 March 1992; see Mann, 2004: 198ff, 212). Initial versions of the DPG were deemed too controversial and were rewritten with input from then Defense Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell (Tyler, 24 May 1992). Nonetheless, Cheney's version still declared that, “we must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role” (Cheney, 1993: 2). What we find in this is the kernel of the policies implemented in the administration of George W. Bush, reworked through the Clinton period by such organizations as PNAC (discussed above). The assemblage of individuals and organizations – both inside and outside the formal state structures – running from the DPG, through PNAC to the plethora of Bush administration security texts cited above (all of which draw upon well-established US security dispositions in the post-World War II era) demonstrates the performative infrastructure through which certain ontological effects are established, and through which certain performances are made possible and can be understood. As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National Security Strategies is their deployment of integration as the principal foreign policy and security strategy. It is telling that Bush's claim of “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001) relies not on a straightforward binary, as is sometimes suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but with us, a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush's most enthusiastic supporters, “shoulder to shoulder” (Blair, 2001; see White & Wintour, 2001). This works more widely through a combination of threats and promises, as in this statement about the Palestinians: “If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state” (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can be found in some of remarks of the British Prime Minister Blair (2004) about the significance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and Iraq. Equally Bush's notorious ‘axis of evil’ speech did not simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its members, but suggested that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush, 2002a, emphasis added). A comparison of the like, alongside the “with the terrorists” is actually a more complicated approach to the choosing of sides and the drawing of lines than is generally credited. Simple binary oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of incorporation and the policy of integration. These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal ‘representative’ democracy and market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an American-centric world. The place of US allies in these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its reflection and reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe's “Old” and “New” – a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 DPG – the dissent of (even some) Europeans is a problem for the US in its world-making endeavours (see Bialasiewicz & Minca, 2005). It is not surprising, then, that following his re-election, George W. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a “bridge-building” tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but “the great alliance of freedom” that unites the United States and Europe (Bush, 2005). For although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the new global scenario, its “right” – and the right of its moral-political “mission” of spreading “freedom and justice” – relies on its amplification and support by allies. The construction of the United States' world role relies also on the selective placement and representation of other international actors who are “**hailed” into specific subject positions** (see Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, & Duvall, 1999). Of course, different actors are granted different roles and different degrees of agency in the global script: the place of key European allies is different from that bestowed upon the peripheral and semi-peripheral states that make part of the “coalition of the willing”. Both, however, are vital in sustaining the representation of the US as the leader of a shared world of values and ideals. Indeed, the ‘lone superpower’ has little influence in the absence of support. Another important dimension of integration as the key strategic concept is its dissolution of the inside/outside spatialization of security policy. The concluding lines of the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” are particularly telling. It contends that the Department of Defense can “no longer think in terms of the ‘home’ game and the ‘away’ game. There is only one game” (Department of Defense, 2005b: 40). In part this is directed at the previous failure to anticipate an attack from within: indeed, the Strategy remarks that the September 11th 2001 attacks “originated in US airspace and highlighted weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and interagency air defense coordination” (2005b: 22). In other words, the US needs to ensure the security of its homeland from within as much as without, to treat home as away. In part, however, such rhetoric also reflects a continuity with and reiteration of broader understandings with a much longer history, promoted by a range of US “intellectuals of statecraft” since the end of the Cold War: understandings that specified increasingly hard **territorialisations of security and identity** both at home and abroad **to counter the “geopolitical vertigo**” (see Ó Tuathail, 1996) of the post-bipolar era. It is important to note here, moreover, that the 2002 National Security Strategy's affirmation that “today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing” (The White House, 2002b: 30) also involves the US treating away as a home, or at least, as a concern. From this we can see how the pursuit of integration enables the territorial integrity of other sovereign states to be violated in its name, as specific places are targeted to either ensure or overcome their exclusion (see Elden, 2005). As an example, consider this statement, which recalls the late 1970s enunciation of an ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to Afghanistan: “There exists an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 5). In his foreword to the 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush declared that “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent” (Bush, 2002b: i). This notion of extension is crucial in understanding the explicitly spatial overtones of this strategy of integration: more than merely about values, democracy and capitalism, it is about a performative geopolitics. Put crudely, it is about specifying the geographies of world politics; it is about specifying “the ways the world (now) is” – a presumably descriptive “geopolitical exercise” but that, as all such exercises, also implicitly contains the prescription for putting the world “right”. Imaginative geographies and popular geopolitics As we have tried to argue, such elaborations of security rely upon the affirmation of certain understandings of the world within the context of which the strategies and understandings advanced by them are rendered believable. What is more, we have tried to highlight how such performances invoke earlier articulations, even as their reiteration changes them. More broadly, we stressed how such articulations provide the conditions of possibility for current – and future – action. Integration thus marks a new performative articulation in US security strategy, but it reworks rather than replaces earlier formulations. One of the ways in which this operates is that the ideal of integration, as we have seen, **necessarily invokes the** idea of exclusion. The imagined divide between the US ‘homeland’ and the threatening ‘frontier’ lands within the circle of Barnett's ‘Non-Integrating Gap’ thus **recalls earlier iterations of ‘barbarism’** even if their identity and spatiality are produced by more than a simple self/other binary. In the final section of this essay, we will make some brief remarks regarding the disjuncture between the theory and the practice of the enactment of such imaginations. First, however, we would like to highlight some other ways in which these deployments of categories of inclusion and incorporation, on the one hand, and exclusion and targeting, on the other, are also performed in the popular geopolitical work done by a wide range of textual, visual, filmic and electronic media supportive of the ‘war on terror’ at home and abroad. These cultural practices resonate with the idea of fundamentally terrorist territories, whilst, at the same time rendering the ‘homeland’ zone of the continental US as a homogenous and virtuous ‘domestic’ community. Such wide-ranging and diffuse practices that are nonetheless imbricated with each other are further indications that we are dealing with performativity rather than construction in the production of imaginative geographies.

### Norms

#### Ignoring the stories of drone victims and focusing only on the view from capital hill leads to even worse politics – Oversight of targeting killings causes a shift to signature strikes

Jens David Ohlin 13, Professor at Cornell Law School, http://www.liebercode.org/2013/02/would-federal-district-court-for-drones.html

One of the more interesting recent proposals for curing the "due process" deficit in the Administration's targeted killings program is for Congress to create a federal court to approve drone strikes. Senator Dianne Feinstein, among others, is championing this strategy. I don't think it will work. Here's why. First, the court would be modeled after the super-secret FISA court for approving government requests for surveillance in terrorism cases. Such courts impose a form of judicial review, yes, but there is little transparency and no adversarial process. But there are bigger problems. As some of my colleagues have already explained, it is unlikely and improbable that such a court could authorize specific operational strikes. That would be difficult to implement in real time, and might even be unconstitutional for infringing on the Executive Branch's commander-in-chief power. Rather, such a court would approve the administration's decision to place an individual's name on an approved target list. A court would review the legitimacy of this decision with the power to remove the name if the individual does not meet the standard for being a functional member of al-Qaeda. Although this is more plausible, I still don't think it will work. In the end, I think it would just push the administration to avoid targeted killings and would have the opposite effect.It would increase, not decrease, collateral damage. Let me explain. Suppose the government has previously used the kill list to govern the selection procedure for targeted killings. The list serves as a clearinghouse for debates and ultimately conclusions about who is a high-value target. If the administration decides that the individual should be pursued, he is placed on the list. If the administration decides that the individual is of marginal or no value, he is removed from the list or never placed on it to begin with. Now imagine that a court is requiring that the list be approved by a judicial process. Why would the administration have any incentive at all to keep adding names to the list? Why not stop using it entirely? It could then rely exclusively on signature strikes-- an important legal development well documented by Kevin Heller in his forthcoming JICJ article on the subject. Such strikes would not be banned by the court because the US would not know exactly who it is bombing. (I'm assuming for the sake of argument that the US is still engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the AUMF or some other statutory authorization for the President's pursuit of the conflict would still be in place.) Essentially, this would be a case of willful blindness -- a concept well known to criminal law scholars. The real benefit of targeted killings is that the administration knows the exact threat and only targets one individual. That has changed warfare tremendously. But the court system would push the military back towards the old system: target groups of individuals who are known terrorists or enemy combatants -- but you don't know exactly who they are. You just know they are the enemy. That's the system that reigned in all previous conflicts. And there would be a disincentive to ever acquire more specific information. Why have a drone hover over an area with known terrorists in order to determine, through surveillance, the exact identity of the individual's there? That would only trigger the jurisdiction of the drone court. So ignorance would maintain the legality of the strike. I don't think that is what Congressional staffers have in mind.

#### Our argument is not no oversight good, but that even within your own political game, you have the situation wrong - the reason for this is the refusal to look at the totality of experiences of violent exclusion - they decide whose opinions on drones count and whose don't, and in doing so create a false political world for themselves to play in.