# Off

#### Syria deal saved Obama’s capital- foreign policy issues trade off with Obama’s negotiating clout and push the debt ceiling out of priority position- undermines market confidence

Bohan 9-11 [Caren, Writer for Reuters, “Delay in Syria vote frees Obama to shift to hefty domestic agenda” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/us-usa-obama-agenda-idUSBRE98A0Z920130911]

Putting off a decision on military strikes on Syria allows President Barack Obama to shift his attention back to a weighty domestic agenda for the fall that includes budget fights, immigration and selecting a new chairman of the Federal Reserve. Obama and his aides have immersed themselves for a week and a half in an intensive effort to win support in Congress for U.S. military action in Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack last month killed more than 1,400 people. But the effort, which included meetings by Obama on Capitol Hill on Tuesday followed by his televised speech to Americans, seemed headed for an embarrassing defeat, with large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans expressing opposition. The push for a vote on Syria - which has now been delayed - had threatened to crowd out the busy legislative agenda for the final three months of 2013 and drain Obama's political clout, making it harder for him to press his priorities. But analysts said a proposal floated by Russia, which the Obama administration is now exploring, to place Syria's weapons under international control may allow Obama to emerge from a difficult dilemma with minimal political damage. "He dodges a tough political situation this way," said John Pitney, professor of politics at Claremont McKenna College in California. Pitney said the delay in the Syria vote removes a big burden for Obama, given that Americans, who overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in Syria, will now be able to shift their attention to other matters. He said Obama could suffer some weakening of his leverage with Congress. The administration's "full court press" to try to persuade lawmakers to approve military force on Syria was heavily criticized and did not yield much success. "He probably has suffered some damage in Congress because there are probably many people on (Capitol Hill) who have increasing doubts about the basic competence of the administration and that's a disadvantage in any kind of negotiation," Pitney said. BUDGET BATTLES Among Obama's most immediate challenges are two looming budget fights. By September 30, Congress and the president must agree on legislation to keep federal agencies funded or face a government shutdown. Two weeks later, Congress must raise the limit on the country's ability to borrow or risk a possible debt default that could cause chaos in financial markets. On the first budget showdown, Obama may be at a strategic advantage because of divisions among opposition Republicans about whether to use the spending bill to provoke a fight over Obama's signature health care law, known as Obamacare. House Republican leaders are trying to rally the party around a temporary spending measure that would keep the government funded until December 15 but are facing resistance within their own caucus from some conservatives who want to cut off funding for Obamacare, even if it means a government shutdown. The debt limit fight could end up going down to the wire and unnerving financial markets. Republicans want to use that standoff to extract concessions from the Democratic president, such as spending cuts and a delay in the health law. But Obama has said he has no intention of negotiating over the borrowing limit.

#### Reducing Obama’s war powers causes a crippling loss of credibility- causes republicans to put up a more concerted fight on the debt ceiling which would wreck the markets

Seeking Alpha 9-10

[“Syria Could Upend Debt Ceiling Fight” http://seekingalpha.com/article/1684082-syria-could-upend-debt-ceiling-fight]

Unless President Obama can totally change a reluctant public's perception of another Middle-Eastern conflict, it seems unlikely that he can get 218 votes in the House, though he can probably still squeak out 60 votes in the Senate. This defeat would be totally unprecedented as a President has never lost a military authorization vote in American history. To forbid the Commander-in-Chief of ~~his~~ primary power renders him all but impotent. At this point, a rebuff from the House is a 67%-75% probability. I reach this probability by looking within the whip count. I assume the 164 declared "no" votes will stay in the "no" column. To get to 218, Obama needs to win over 193 of the 244 undecided, a gargantuan task. Within the "no" column, there are 137 Republicans. Under a best case scenario, Boehner could corral 50 "yes" votes, which would require Obama to pick up 168 of the 200 Democrats, 84%. Many of these Democrats rode to power because of their opposition to Iraq, which makes it difficult for them to support military conflict. The only way to generate near unanimity among the undecided Democrats is if they choose to support the President (recognizing the political ramifications of a defeat) despite personal misgivings. The idea that all undecided Democrats can be convinced of this argument is relatively slim, especially as there are few votes to lose. In the best case scenario, the House could reach 223-225 votes, barely enough to get it through. Under the worst case, there are only 150 votes. Given the lopsided nature of the breakdown, the chance of House passage is about one in four. While a failure in the House would put action against Syria in limbo, I have felt that the market has overstated the impact of a strike there, which would be limited in nature. Rather, investors should focus on the profound ripple through the power structure in Washington, which would greatly impact impending battles over spending and the debt ceiling. Currently, the government loses spending authority on September 30 while it hits the debt ceiling by the middle of October. Markets have generally felt that Washington will once again strike a last-minute deal and avert total catastrophe. Failure in the Syrian vote could change this. For the Republicans to beat Obama on a President's strength (foreign military action), they will likely be emboldened that they can beat him on domestic spending issues. Until now, consensus has been that the two sides would compromise to fund the government at sequester levels while passing a $1 trillion stand-alone debt ceiling increase. However, the right wing of Boehner's caucus has been pushing for more, including another $1 trillion in spending cuts, defunding of Obamacare, and a one year delay of the individual mandate. Already, Conservative PACs have begun airing advertisements, urging a debt ceiling fight over Obamacare. With the President rendered hapless on Syria, they will become even more vocal about their hardline resolution, setting us up for a showdown that will rival 2011's debt ceiling fight. I currently believe the two sides will pass a short-term continuing resolution to keep the government open, and then the GOP will wage a massive fight over the debt ceiling. While Obama will be weakened, he will be unwilling to undermine his major achievement, his healthcare law. In all likelihood, both sides will dig in their respective trenches, unwilling to strike a deal, essentially in a game of chicken. If the House blocks Syrian action, it will take America as close to a default as it did in 2011. Based on the market action then, we can expect massive volatility in the final days of the showdown with the Dow falling 500 points in one session in 2011. As markets panicked over the potential for a U.S. default, we saw a massive risk-off trade, moving from equities into Treasuries. I think there is a significant chance we see something similar this late September into October. The Syrian vote has major implications on the power of Obama and the far-right when it comes to their willingness to fight over the debt ceiling. If the Syrian resolution fails, the debt ceiling fight will be even worse, which will send equities lower by upwards of 10%. Investors must be prepared for this "black swan" event. Looking back to August 2011, stocks that performed the best were dividend paying, less-cyclical companies like Verizon (VZ), Wal-Mart (WMT), Coca-Cola (KO) and McDonald's (MCD) while high beta names like Netflix (NFLX) and Boeing (BA) were crushed. Investors also flocked into treasuries despite default risk while dumping lower quality bonds as spreads widened. The flight to safety helped treasuries despite U.S. government issues. I think we are likely to see a similar move this time. Assuming there is a Syrian "no" vote, I would begin to roll back my long exposure in the stock market and reallocate funds into treasuries as I believe yields could drop back towards 2.50%. Within the stock market, I think the less-cyclical names should outperform, making utilities and consumer staples more attractive. For more tactical traders, I would consider buying puts against the S&P 500 and look toward shorting higher-beta and defense stocks like Boeing and Lockheed Martin (LMT). I also think lower quality bonds would suffer as spreads widen, making funds like JNK vulnerable. Conversely, gold (GLD) should benefit from the fear trade. I would also like to address the potential that Congress does not vote down the Syrian resolution. First, news has broken that Russia has proposed Syria turn over its chemical stockpile. If Syria were to agree (Syria said it was willing to consider), the U.S. would not have to strike, canceling the congressional vote. The proposal can be found here. I strongly believe this is a delaying tactic rather than a serious effort. In 2005, Libya began to turn over chemical weapons; it has yet to complete the hand-off. Removing and destroying chemical weapons is an exceptionally challenging and dangerous task that would take years, not weeks, making this deal seem unrealistic, especially because a cease-fire would be required around all chemical facilities. The idea that a cease-fire could be maintained for months, essentially allowing Assad to stay in office, is hard to take seriously. I believe this is a delaying tactic, and Congress will have to vote within the next two weeks. The final possibility is that Democrats back their President and barely ram the Syria resolution through. I think the extreme risk of a full-blown debt stand-off to dissipate. However, Boehner has promised a strong fight over the debt limit that the market has largely ignored. I do believe the fight would still be worse than the market anticipates but not outright disastrous. As such, I would not initiate short positions, but I would trim some longs and move into less cyclical stocks as the risk would still be the debt ceiling fight leading to some drama not no drama. Remember, in politics everything is connected. Syria is not a stand-alone issue. Its resolution will impact the power structure in Washington. A failed vote in Congress is likely to make the debt ceiling fight even worse, spooking markets, and threatening default on U.S. obligations unless another last minute deal can be struck.

#### Destroys the global economy.

Milstead 9-12 [David, Writer for the Globe and Mail, “The under-the-radar threat to U.S. stocks” Factiva]

Conventional wisdom holds that the chief risk to the high-flying U.S. stock market is “tapering,” the potential cutback of the Federal Reserve's bond-buying program. It's an understandable view, given how the Fed's monetary policy has propped up the country's economy for years by helping to keep long-term interest rates at ultra-low levels. But it's also wrong. The greatest immediate hazard to stocks isn't the direction the six governors of the Federal Reserve will take. It's what the 535 members of Congress will do in the coming weeks when faced with two budgetary issues that ought to be routine – but will likely be anything but. The first issue is approving a federal budget for the fiscal year that begins Oct. 1, or at least a resolution that will keep the government open in its absence. The second is authorizing a new, higher number for the U.S. government's borrowing before Washington hits its debt ceiling, once again, possibly by mid-October. In the absence of such a vote, the U.S. must simply stop spending – and, in essence, default on its debt. If this sounds familiar, it's because we went through a similar showdown two years ago, in the summer of 2011. Yet it's easy to forget now how that fiscal gridlock roiled the markets. In the first day of trading after Standard & Poor's downgraded U.S. debt in early August, the S&P 500 fell nearly 7 per cent. The day after, the index was nearly 19 per cent below the level of early July. The rhetoric suggests this fiscal showdown could inflict similar damage. Eighty House Republicans recently signed a letter urging their leadership to use any new government-funding bill to cut all necessary money for President Barack Obama's signature accomplishment, the Affordable Care Act, more popularly known as Obamacare. The Republican House leadership, it is said, does not support such a move. That's apparently because they prefer to make it part of the showdown over the debt ceiling. (The National Review, one of the U.S.'s leading conservative publications, reported Tuesday that Eric Cantor, the House Majority Leader, told Republicans they will be demanding a one-year delay of Obamacare in exchange for an increase in the debt ceiling.) Failing to raise the debt ceiling doesn't mean default, its opponents argue. The Treasury can just do a better job of “prioritizing,” paying the creditors while axing other expenses. In the absence of a higher debt ceiling, the U.S. could pay the interest on Treasury securities, and keep on footing the tab for Medicare and Medicaid, Social Security, national defence and a handful of aid programs, according to the Bipartisan Policy Centre. But, starting Oct. 15, it won't be able to afford the salaries of other federal workers, or perform functions like road construction and air traffic control, or run the federal court system. Ted Yoho, the improbably named Republican representative from Florida, said this about a failure to raise the debt ceiling, according to a recording of one of his summertime town hall meetings leaked to the Huffington Post: “So they say that would rock the market, capital would leave, the stock market would crash … I think our credit rating would do better.” Better, I think, to take the U.S. Treasury's position that the markets will view the U.S. picking and choosing which bills to pay as an admission it simply can't pay them all. Deputy secretary Neil Wolin said during the last debt-ceiling showdown, in 2011, that it “would merely be default by another name.” That, however, is the view from the reality-based community, rather than the deeply irrational, anti-intellectual element that has hijacked the Republican Party and turned ordinary budgetary procedure into a partisan brawl. The liberal economic writer Jonathan Chait recently wrote “the chaos and dysfunction have set in so deeply that Washington now lurches from crisis to crisis, and once-dull, keep-the-lights-on rituals of government procedure are transformed into white-knuckle dramas that threaten national or even global catastrophe.” And yet stocks seem to be priced as if Democrats, Republicans and President Obama will come together to work something out. There is great faith that the United States will overcome its challenges and take the right path in the end. Investors could suffer double-digit losses in the coming weeks if that faith is misplaced.

#### Nuclear war.

Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving *the use of nuclear weapons*. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

# Off

#### a. the 1ac speech act orients itself towards pain and death as knowable metaphysical truths

Gianni **Vattimo**, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Turin “Nihilism and Emancipation” trans. William McCuaig 20**04** pg. 74-75

The "flaw" in metaphysics seen from a Heideggerian perspec­tive is the idea that, at the basis of things, there is a stable order, a structure necessary, eternal, and hence rational, which it is our task to gain knowledge of and adopt as a norm (even this much barely holds up: if it is a necessary datum, why a norm? This is an instance of what is improperly called "Hume's law": we cannot derive a norm from a fact, it simply makes no sense). For the Hei­degger of *Being and Time,* to think of true Being in this "objec­tivistic" manner implies that a) the historicity of human existence "is" not; b) authentically to be would mean escaping from this historicity—to conform to a necessary rational order; c) of which the implicit corollary would be the project for a rationalized soci­ety, overriding the quirks of individuality—the society that Adorno characterized as "total organization" and that Chaplin depicted in *Modern Times.* These are themes found in existential­ism and in the early-twentieth-century avant-garde; they pro­vided inspiration to Heidegger and in him more than in other thinkers they justify his polemic against metaphysics. But historicity, the opening up of human existence, the refusal to let it be reduced to the eternal structure of true Being (true because immutable)—all these signify mortality. In brief, then: **a** nonmetaphysical consideration of pain demands a non-metaphysical consideration of death**.** This is what Heidegger is striving to attain when, in his work of 1927, he gives a central place in his own teaching to the idea of "being-for-death" and the resolute anticipation of one's own death as the key to the authenticity of existence. Since the world is given as world only to the gaze that man is, to his "thrown project" (a position that Kantism had already reached), and this project is precisely finite, is born and dies, the conclusion must be that Being is not eter­nal structure given once and for all, set before *(ob-jectum)* the mind, which through ascesis becomes capable of seeing it. It is event, happening, historicity. From such a perspective, 'pain and death—we may reason­ably take the two terms as virtual synonyms: we are always suffering from and for mortality; even physical evil is a sign, consequence, and symptom of mortality—are both insuperable and irredeemable. They are beyond explanation or justification because they give no access to a truer truth; instead, they are what sets us free from slavery and resentment vis-à-vis any truer truth (a law of Being, God as creator or judge, baleful des­tiny). What Jesus said about the man born blind might even apply: it is not his fault, or that of his parents, but only "thus it pleased.... " These words should be taken to mean that it was an absolute happenstance. There is no reason for pain, not even a specific and mysterious divine will. With this the foundation has been laid for a twofold, non-metaphysical conception of and treatment for pain. On one hand, pain has no dignity, it merits no respect as such, it is only something that happens, and inasmuch as it is always some­thing that happens without our wishing for it (unlike things that happen for which we have wished, like pleasure and suc­cess), it is pure accident in every sense of the term, it is event *schlechthin,* pure and simple. (Sartre wrote some fine pages on death understood as senseless occurrence, in the belief, proba­bly mistaken, that in so doing he was critiquing Heidegger.)

#### b. reject the affirmative claims of absolute universal truth— otherwise extinction is inevitable

Gianni **Vattimo**, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Turin “Nihilism and Emancipation” trans. William McCuaig 20**04** pg. 55-56

If we do not want—as indeed we cannot, except at the risk of terrible new wars of extinction—to give way to the temptation of resurgent fundamentalisms grounded in race, religion, or even the defense of individual national cultures against invasion by "foreigners," we will have to imagine a humanity with at least some of the characteristics of Nietzsche's Ubermensch*.* The superficial image of some sort of brawny strongman prevailing in the process of natural selection through sheer muscle power need not detain us. Nietzsche said explicitly that he was no Darwinian ass, and what he means by the *Ubermensch* is someone who does have the capacity to move about like a tourist in the park of his­tory, in other words one who is able to look at many cultures with a gaze more esthetic than "objective" and truth seeking. Many ethical positions advanced in our time appear to incorporate an image of this kind; the first name that comes to mind is that of Michel Foucault, for whom morality is at bot­tom the construction of one's own life as a coherent work of art. This stance does not derive from decadentism or D'Annunzio; what Foucault means is the preoccupation with a choice of style and a coherence no less binding than an ethical imperative in the current sense of the term. But Foucault was certainly a thinker profoundly influenced by Nietzsche. If we turn our attention instead to the work of many analytic thinkers in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, we see that for them the task is to bring out the implications of concrete moral options with arguments along these lines: If you accept such and such a behavior, that entails also wishing for this or that consequence, but then you have to decide whether that is the outcome you really do desire. Except for some forms of utilitarianism too dogmatic and abstract ever to be applied, no ultimate foundation for impera­tives and maxims is ever supplied. The real goal of this approach, though, is a certain coherence: not necessarily just the coherence of an arbitrary, individual project but—and this holds for the moral styles of Foucault as well—coherence mostly with historical situations, with tables of shared values. The same is true of moral action as seen from the perspective of Kantian thinkers like Habermas, Hare, and Rawls: here the aim is to choose maxims of action that one could reasonably adopt vis-a-vis all possible interlocutors, with no claim to the status of apodictic proofs. Are we really to conclude that these ethical stances of today must be rejected because of some contamination by profound estheticism? In my opinion, we ought rather to heed this "esthetic" tendency in order to see how the culture of today can and should reconcile social peace with liberty. What we really need to do—and this does not necessarily have to conflict with religiosity, especially Christian religiosity—is to say farewell to claims to absolute truth. In a society in which we are more and more likely to encounter ethical and religious positions and cul­tural traditions unlike the ones we were born into and grew up with, the best stance to adopt is that of a "tourist" in a history park. The real enemy of liberty is the person who thinks she can and should preach final and definitive truth.

## \*\*Drones DA\*\*

#### The Executive’s independent authority to conduct drone strikes is crucial to their operational effectiveness.

Steven Groves 13, is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. April 10, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad

What the U.S. Should Do The U.S. drone program and its practices regarding targeted strikes against al-Qaeda and its associated forces are lawful. They are lawful because the United States is currently engaged in an armed conflict with those terrorist entities and because the United States has an inherent right to defend itself against imminent threats to its security. Moreover, the available evidence indicates that U.S. military and intelligence forces conduct targeted strikes in a manner consistent with international law. Military and intelligence officials go to great lengths to identify al-Qaeda operatives that pose an imminent threat and continually reassess the level of that threat. Decisions on each potential target are debated among U.S. officials before the target is placed in the “disposition matrix.” In conducting targeted strikes U.S. forces strive to minimize civilian casualties, although such casualties cannot always be prevented. The United States will continue to face asymmetric threats from non-state actors operating from the territory of nations that are either unwilling or unable to suppress the threats. To confront these threats, the United States must retain its most effective operational capabilities, including targeted strikes by armed drones, even if U.S. forces degrade al-Qaeda and its associated forces to such an extent that the United States no longer considers itself to be in a non-international armed conflict. Moreover, the United States must continue to affirm its inherent right to self-defense to eliminate threats to its national security, regardless of the presence or absence of an armed conflict recognized by international law. To that end, the United States should: Continue to affirm existing use-of-force authorities. During the past three years, senior officials of the Obama Administration have publicly set out in significant detail U.S. policies and practices regarding drone strikes. The Administration should continue to do so, emphasizing that U.S. policies adhere to widely recognized international law. Critics of the United States will continue to claim that a lack of transparency surrounds U.S. policy and actions. Such critics will likely never be satisfied, not even with full disclosure of the relevant classified legal memoranda, and their criticism will not cease until the United States abandons its practice of targeting terrorist threats in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere. However, consistent repetition of the U.S. legal position on targeted drone strikes may blunt such criticism. Not derogate from the AUMF. At the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, NATO agreed that the vast majority of U.S. and other NATO forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, a time frame that President Obama confirmed during this year’s State of the Union address. Some critics of U.S. drone policy will inevitably argue that due to the drawdown the United States may no longer credibly claim that it remains in a state of armed conflict with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and its associated forces, whether they are located in Afghanistan, the FATA, or elsewhere. Congress should pass no legislation that could be interpreted as a derogation from the AUMF or an erosion of the inherent right of the United States to defend itself against imminent threats posed by transnational terrorist organizations. Not create a drone court. The concept of a drone court is fraught with danger and may be an unconstitutional interference with the executive branch’s authority to wage war. U.S. armed forces have been lawfully targeting enemy combatants in armed conflicts for more than 200 years without being second-guessed by Congress or a secret “national security court.” Targeting decisions, including those made in connection with drone strikes, are carefully deliberated by military officers and intelligence officials based on facts and evidence gathered from a variety of human, signals, and imagery intelligence sources. During an armed conflict, all al-Qaeda operatives are subject to targeting; therefore, a drone court scrutinizing targeting decisions would serve no legitimate purpose. Rather than creating a special tribunal that is ill equipped to pass judgment on proportionality and military necessity, and that will never fully assuage the concerns of the critics of drone strikes, Congress should continue to leave decisions pertaining to the disposition of al-Qaeda terrorists—including U.S. citizens—with military and intelligence officials. Conclusion The debate within the international legal, academic, and human rights communities on the legality and propriety of drone strikes will likely continue unabated. To surrender to the demands of such critics would be equivalent to forgetting the lessons of September 11, when a small, non-state terrorist organization operating from a nation with which the United States was not at war planned and launched an attack that killed almost 3,000 Americans. The United States should preserve its ability to use all of the tools in its arsenal to ensure that the plots hatched by terrorist organizations do not become successful attacks on the U.S. homeland. Armed drones have proved to be one of the most effective and discriminating tools available to U.S. forces, and their lawful use should continue until such time as non-state, transnational terrorist organizations no longer present an imminent threat to the United States.

#### Drones prevent Al Qaeda attacks on the homeland and alternatives would result in worse civilian casualties.

Clinton Watts 12, Senior fellow with the George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute and consultant at Navanti Group, May 29, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/al-qaeda-in-yemen/understanding-yemens-al-qaeda-threat/

… I believe the escalation in drone and SOF [Special Operations Forces] operations has kept AQAP in check during a time when the U.S. has been absent an effective Yemeni counterterrorism partner that can effectively resist the terror group. Today, members of AQAP in Yemen are plotting terrorist attacks against U.S. targets as seen by this past month’s revelation of Ibrahim al-Asiri developing a third generation underwear bomb likely able to pass through airport security. The U.S. has no other effective option for countering AQAP’s current threat to the U.S. homeland. AQAP’s repeated attempts to attack the U.S. necessitate a persistent counterterrorism response. Inaction is not an option. Media reports and anti-drone advocates have rightly noted that civilian casualties have occurred from drone strikes and increases in these casualties enrage local populations and bolster support for AQAP. However, drones provide the most effective and least casualty-producing method for engaging AQAP. Any other option that could apply equal military pressure on AQAP would likely inflict far more civilian casualties on the Yemeni population. [See this post at KingsOfWar for some appropriate comparison.]

#### Extinction

Yonah Alexander 10, Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Sciences, “Maghreb & Sahel Terrorism: Addressing the Rising Threat from al-Qaeda & other Terrorists in North & West/Central Africa,” January, <http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/524_Maghreb%20Terrorism%20report.pdf>

Current and future perpetrators include the following: “freelance” and sub-state terrorist groups; individual terrorists; mentally deranged “crusaders” or “martyrs”; single-issue political extremists; ideological-based groups; ethnic, racial, and religious movements; nationalist and separatist actors; criminal and political mercenaries; and international networks, particularly al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Terrorists’ impulses cover a broad range of motivations. These consist of political discontent— ideological (anarchism, ambitions, radicalism) and nationalistic (resistance, separatism, irredentism)— economic discontent (low living standards, lack of opportunity, unfulfilled expectations, loss or squandered resources); and cultural discontent (class constraints, ethnic discrimination, religious intolerance, technological and environmental irritants). There is also a long record of governments that provide terror groups both direct and indirect support (e.g., financing, training, intelligence, operations, and weaponry). A rogue nation utilizes terrorist proxies to further its own country’s interests. As formal, open, and direct malevolent actions undertaken by a government would call immediate attention to state sponsors, using terrorist groups to carry out operations such as assassinations and bombings enables the government sponsor to deny any claim. The roles played by Iran, Sudan, Cuba, previously Libya, and North Korea in such events come to mind. Currently, Iran and North Korea are of particular concern to the international community because of their nuclear ambitions. In addition, the latest focus of concern is so-called “failed states” wherein there are no effective government institutions to intercede and prevent the spread of terrorist facilities within a country. These lawless zones are increasingly becoming target-rich opportunities for the consolidation of terrorist assets and ventures. Current Trends Modern terrorism is characterized by an ideological and theological fanaticism, an education in hatred toward one’s enemy, which has coupled with rapid technological advancements in communications (e.g., the internet), transportation (e.g., modern international air travel), as well as conventional and unconventional weaponry to create a truly lethal threat. Indeed, this threat has become much more decentralized as it now emanates not only from established terrorist organizations but also from freelance individuals with the motives, means, and opportunity to visit harm upon civil society. Because of these developments, contemporary terrorism presents a multitude of threats to all nations, large and small. One measurement of evaluating the terrorist threat is to calculate the enormous cost to all societies in terms of the number of incidents, the human toll, and the economic damage. Indeed, since the 1960s, modern society has suffered dearly from the global disease of terrorism, a reality that grows in scope and brutality with every passing year. For example, in the 1970s, a total of 300 domestic and international terrorist attacks were recorded worldwide. Today, almost 40 years later, the count totals more than 80,000 incidents. Clearly, no community, country, or region is immune from the impact of terrorism. In the 9/11 attacks in New York City, citizens from 78 countries were killed. That year alone, 3,537 people died. During the period between 2002-2008, more than 113,000 persons perished and hundreds of thousands were wounded in terrorist attacks throughout the world. The economic, political, psychological, and strategic costs must also be considered in this assessment. Criminal-Terrorist Nexus Globalization and the information revolution have enabled criminals and organized crime to do business and engage in a broad range of criminal activities. For instance, “white collar” crimes are expanding. These crimes target sectors such as antitrust law, securities, commodities futures, environmental activities, maritime business, gaming, the internet, intellectual property, and tax customs. Trafficking in human beings (e.g., buying and selling of women and children, usually for sexual exploitation) represents another “new,” substantive, and transnational offense. In addition, serious organized criminal threats facing the international community (e.g., the Maghreb and Sahel regions) consist of current and emerging challenges to law enforcement, including drug trafficking (particularly in heroin, both powder and crack cocaine, and ecstasy), organized immigration crime, fraud (particularly in revenue fraud), money laundering, counterfeiting, illicit weapons possession and sales, and high-tech criminal activity (e.g., the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear smuggling network). Legitimate companies support terrorists and criminals—directly and unwittingly—to initiate their illicit activities. Numerous identifiable forums of these relationships include the following interfaces: funding and money laundering; employment and accessibility of personnel and equipment; generic tools (e.g., trucks); instruments of terror (e.g., dynamite or explosives); information about local landmarks and prospective targets (e.g., highlighting vulnerabilities and access to targets); communications, resources, and contacts; work permits (particularly for immigration-related criminal activity); and sponsorship (e.g., employment and resources). Terrorist groups and criminals also use front companies, which combine both legitimate and illicit sources of revenue, and shell companies, opaque firms used to hide a legitimate owner’s interests, to finance unlawful operations. In addition to the foregoing, terrorists and criminals feed off each other in a wide variety of criminal activities, including counterfeiting currency, credit card theft, misappropriating and using credit card information, forging documents, identity theft, money laundering, drug trafficking, corruption, and commercial espionage. Terrorist groups use a variety of means—from the simple to the complex—to secure funding for their activities. The initial sources of terrorist funding include both legal (e.g., personal savings and legitimate business revenue) and illicit avenues (e.g., criminal activity such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, and financial fraud). Once the funds are raised, they are distributed to various factions of terrorist groups through a variety of means. These include the use of traditional and alternative financial services entities (e.g., banks and hawalas—informal money-transfers systems firmly established in Asia and the Middle East), nonprofit organizations trading in commodities (e.g., “conflict diamonds” and gold), bogus financial instruments, smuggling of currency and products, wire transfers, drug trafficking, extortion, money laundering, securities fraud, and other scams. Future Outlook: Super Terrorism What is of particular concern is that unconventional weapons—biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear—are slowly emerging upon the contemporary terrorist scene. That is, as technological developments offer new capabilities for terrorist groups, the modus operandi of these groups may subsequently alter most drastically. Reportedly, at least a dozen terrorist groups, in addition to al-Qaeda’s network, have shown an interest in acquiring or actively attempting to obtain nuclear weapons, which is a significant threat throughout the world. Thus, while the probability of nuclear terrorism remains low in comparison to the use of other weapons of mass destruction, the consequences of “super” terrorism could be enormous. If a nuclear bomb is stolen (or built by a terrorist group with reasonable resources and talent), it could result in massive devastation. For example, an explosion of about one kiloton (one-twentieth the power of the Hiroshima attack) in any major city has the potential to cause more than 100,000 fatalities and result in damage totaling billions of dollars. Another dangerous emerging trend of contemporary international life is the growing threat of cyberterrorism. The expanding concern is that not only criminal hackers but also terrorists will intensify the utilization of this form of electronic warfare as an equalizer weapon. It is evident that the threat of “non-explosive” terrorist assaults is growing with every passing day. Three contributing factors account for the reality. First, the “globalization” of the internet makes government and industry efforts to control cyber attacks much more challenging than ever before. Second, there are now tens of thousands of hacker-oriented sites on the internet resulting in “democratization” of the tools used for disruption and destruction. With their systematic cyber “cookbooks,” the exploitation of Trojan horses, logic bombs, and other electric modus operandi alternatives are becoming a permanent fixture of international life. Third, terrorist organizations have broken away from their place within the formerly bipolar world and have become multidirectional, causing further complications to our technologically vulnerable societies. These new developments have enhanced the threats and capabilities of terrorist groups to the degree in which they could forever alter our planet’s existence.

#### Drones prevent US retrenchment

Michael A. Reynolds 2013, Associate Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton, Global Discourse, Vol. 3, No. 1

The absence of a large, easily identifiable challenge raised the peril that Americans would be lulled into a false sense of security and turn inward and withdraw from world affairs. This would allow multiple new threats to incubate and emerge on the margins. These threats would be small and easily overcome. But they would also be persistent and recurring. Gradually, the American public would tire of ceaseless campaigning against minor powers and petty challengers in remote areas of marginal significance, much as a lion would tire of swatting at flies. Yet, if it ignored those tertiary threats, they would multiply, and, unlike flies, metastasize and eventually overwhelm the lion. In short, America would face a classic dilemma of a hegemon. The absence of a large enemy would breed complacency. In the meantime, a procession of small challengers would cause the hegemon eventually to exhaust himself, abandon the field to his enemies out of weariness, and ultimately succumb. The solution is to maintain a deterrent capability that does not merely underscore the unassailable might of the hegemon but also demonstrates the unyielding determination of the hegemon to vanquish all his foes. The classical method of imperial deterrence against minor but innumerable challengers was through example: to so thoroughly and mercilessly annihilate one challenger that no other would dare chance the same fate. Athens' devastation of Melos, immortalized by Thucydides, illustrates this principle. The catch is that, in order to work, this strategy demands cruelty and the use of vastly disproportionate force (Rosen 2003). It would be exceedingly difficult for a liberal democracy to employ such a strategy over the long term in an age of television and instant media, not to mention in an age of international humanitarian law. The Revolution in Military Affairs, however, suggested a potential way out of this dilemma. First, the development of vastly more accurate weapons promised to make it possible to destroy in detail any challengers while limiting the so-called collateral damage. Second, by leveraging superior technology, the United States could dispense with its comparatively cumbersome standing volunteer armed forces, which ultimately were still dependent on reservists for any extended deployment. A smaller force composed of highly trained soldiers equipped with the latest technology, by contrast, would be more mobile, more powerful, and, not least important, more deployable. The President could deploy it at his sole discretion and render the innately irresolute voices of Congress and public opinion irrelevant. By combining great speed with high accuracy – and thus overwhelming – firepower, such a force could be used to quash emerging threats as soon as they emerged with minimal disruption of life at home. For a brief span of time between 2001 and 2003, it appeared that this technological-military revolution had arrived. In Afghanistan, a handful of American Special Forces soldiers and CIA officers mounted on horses and equipped with laptop computers oversaw a blistering rout and collapse of Afghanistan's Taliban government. In Iraq, General Tommy Franks oversaw the application of the doctrine of ‘shock and awe’ that showcased on live television broadcast around the world American technological proficiency in using aircraft and cruise missiles to strike targets in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq at will. It is worth noting the use of cruise missiles – a weapons system adopted by the US originally for the delivery of nuclear warheads but then later fitted with conventional high-explosive warheads once sufficiently accurate guidance systems came into existence. Then, with a rapidity perhaps unprecedented in history, American ground forces overran Iraq and captured Baghdad in two weeks. The initial triumphs of American arms and technology in Afghanistan and Iraq appeared smashing successes. They provided stunning demonstrations of the potential of coercive high technology. Overwhelming firepower delivered with extraordinary precision had routed America's foes, causing them to crumble. For a moment, it looked as if America had not simply exorcised the ghost of Vietnam, but had restored the technological balance of the late nineteenth century when European armies by virtue of their modern firearms were virtually unchallengeable. As the character ‘Blood’ in Hillaire Belloc's 1898 poem ‘The Modern Traveller’, expressed it: ‘Whatever happens, we have got/the Maxim Gun, and they have not’. America, it seemed, had reinvented Blood's Maxim gun. The aggressive exploitation of high technology promised to make the world safe for American policing. Technology would allow Washington to field a small and mobile but well-equipped and powerful force that it could deploy rapidly and at will to meet and overwhelm threats, thereby maintaining a formidable deterrent effect against myriad would-be challengers, without having to resort to the politically unpalatable options of indiscriminate use of violence or the deployment of large number of Americans for protracted periods. That vision ultimately proved a mirage. Not content with smiting its foes and feeling compelled to justify its invasions with the ends of democracy promotion, Washington committed itself to transforming Iraq and Afghanistan and occupied the two countries. Armed resistance to the forces of the United States and its allies in those two countries did not abate, but persisted and even grew. The Americans found their edge in weaponry dissipated, not enhanced, by technology as anti-American forces began adapting cell phones and infrared light beams to detonate comparatively cheap improvised explosive devices. The fascination with military technology induced by laptop carrying Special Forces in Afghanistan and ‘shock and awe’ tactics in Iraq quickly dissipated as clever use of off-the-shelf technology in the form of IEDs and suicide bombs came to dominate narratives of the war. The Americans now found themselves on the receiving end of the cycle of weapons innovation, directing their efforts not to exploit their supremacy in advanced technology but rather to neutralize the innovations of their enemies. The US Army thus scrambled to respond to the IED threat by redesigning its Stryker armored fighting vehicle and rushing into the production of an armored vehicle designed specifically to protect against IEDs – the MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicle). Far from summarily defeating foes of the American-led global order with fast and hard strikes, the Americans were bogged down in a frustrating and inconclusive eight-year occupation in Iraq and a more than a decade-old war in Afghanistan. The military travails of the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan and their subsequent economic troubles at home have convinced many that the age of American empire is over (Galloway 2011; Gardner 2013). Technology, to the extent it would impact politics, has come to be seen as subversive of state control. Observers of Iran's Green Revolution and the mass protests and uprisings known as the Arab Spring thrilled to accounts of activists using cyber social networks to organize and orchestrate popular opposition to ruling regimes. Often overlooked in those accounts were the ways in which regimes could and did exploit those same technologies to identify and suppress their opponents. Governments can use platforms like Twitter and Facebook to identify, trace, and track down their opponents and critics. Social media, like any technology, is a two-edged sword, its effect determined not by any innate quality but rather by who wields it and for what purpose. The United States, although it may not have the equivalent of the mythological Maxim gun, has successfully leveraged technology to extend its power and reach into foreign societies in ways that would have been inconceivable to the empires of the high-imperial age. American military personnel, often physically located in the interior of the continental United States, have employed thousands of unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, or drones more popularly, to surveil, track, and kill hostile individuals literally around the globe, particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Libya. From 2004 through 2012, American drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have killed nearly 3500 people (Zenko 2012). Guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists have long protected themselves from the superior firepower of regular armies and police forces by declining to wear uniforms or other open markers of identity and by refusing to fight in the open. These tactics compel states to do one of the two things: either to curb their use of firepower and thereby neutralize their own advantage, or to employ force indiscriminately and thereby risk alienating their population and public opinion around the world with excessive violence. This is the classic dilemma of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. To American strategic planners, surveillance and attack drones hold out the promise that they can, if not overcome this dilemma, at least mitigate it. By employing drones to find, monitor, and track specific individuals, the United States can aspire to identify whether or not those individuals are hostile and then seamlessly employ an attack drone to destroy that individual. Thus, the United States government now routinely uses drones to mount extended and even around-the-clock observation of foreign locales to identify and kill suspected terrorists. To be sure, non-combatants are all too often casualties of such strikes and the use of drones has by no means dissolved the counter-insurgent dilemma. Indeed, some observers argue that the so-called ‘collateral damage’ from drone strikes generate more opponents of the United States than they could kill or intimidate (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law 2012). Nonetheless, it seems clear that drones have reduced the counter-insurgent dilemma. In countries where they fly they certainly have made life for armed opponents of the United States and its allies significantly more difficult. Alongside their utility in locating, tracking, targeting, and destroying individuals, a major appeal of drones is their cost. Drones pose no risk of death to highly trained and valuable pilots and they are comparatively cheap. The Predator, the best-known armed drone, costs a little over $4 million. The more capable Reaper costs $37 million. By comparison, an F-35 fighter costs on the order of $235 million. Relative to their capabilities, drones will likely only grow cheaper as design improves, economies of scale drive costs down, and computer components continue to fall in price. Indeed, observation drones are available for purchase to the general public for only several hundred dollars. When combined with the increasingly sophisticated signals, intelligence capabilities of the United States armed forces and intelligence agencies, drones emerge as a potent tool for monitoring unstable regions and meting out punishment to violent challengers. The drone is, in essence, a tool well-suited to imperial policing, on sea as well as on land. Thus, the withdrawal of American military forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the greater Middle East due to war fatigue and financial constraints will not necessarily equate to an equivalent reduction in America's coercive capabilities. For better or for worse, technology such as drones, satellite surveillance, and improved signals intelligence provide the world's policeman with a more potent, if not bigger, baton for the buck. Further advances in computer technology, imaging, nano-technology, biotechnology, and other fields may be translated into more powerful and effective systems of coercion. Technology makes many things possible. Empire in an age of austerity might well be one of them.

#### Extinction

Thomas Barnett 2011, Professor, Warfare Analysis and Research Dept – U.S. Naval War College, 3/7, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job.  It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II.  Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation.  But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.

# \*\*\*CP\*\*\*

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order to change supervision of the drone program from Title 50 of the United States Code to Title 10, and impose an individual threat assessment with a least harmful means test.

#### Self-binding commission on targeted killing solves

McNeal 3/5/2013 (Gregory, Pepperdine University School of Law, Georgetown Law Journal, "Kill-Lists and Accountability" papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1819583)

The transparency related accountability reforms specified above have the ability to expose wrongdoing; however that’s not the only goal of accountability. Accountability is also designed to deter wrongdoing. By exposing governmental activity, transparency oriented reforms can influence the behavior of all future public officials—to convince them to live up to public expectations 527 The challenge associated with the reforms articulated above is a bias towards the status quo.528 Very few incentives exist for elected officials to exercise greater oversight over targeted killings and interest group advocacy is not as strong in matters of national security and foreign affairs as it is in domestic politics.529 To overcome the bias towards the status quo, Congress should consider creating an independent review board within the executive branch. 530 That review board should be composed of individuals selected by the minority and majority leadership of the House and Senate, thus ensuring bi-partisan representation. The individuals on the review board should be drawn from the ranks of former intelligence and military officers, lending their report enhanced credibility. These individuals should be responsible for publishing an annual report analyzing how well the government’s targeted killing program is performing. The goal would be a strategic assessment of costs and benefits, including the fiscal costs, potential blowback, collateral damage and other details that are currently held deep within the files of the targeting bureaucracy. Such a commission has the potential to be quite successful. As Posner and Vermeule have highlighted, bipartisan independent commissions can be established to review policies before and after the fact, and the president might gain credibility by binding himself to give the commission some authority on some dimension.531 A president might publicly promise to follow the recommendations of such a commission and may give power to a commission to review the success of his policy choices after the fact.532 These commissions can be successful because they signal the executive’s interest in maintaining credibility, winning the support of the public, and a willingness to give up control of information that allows others to subject the executive branch to critiques. The legislature may prefer this solution because it allows them to claim they are holding the executive branch accountable while at the same time shifting the blame for poor accountability decisions to others. The commission could review the program in its entirety, or could conduct audits on specified areas of the program.

# Accountability

### Histricallly disproven and a lot of internals yemen to Syria to draw in—syria is

#### Plan won’t resolve cred issues with drones.

James Traub 5/24/2013 (Analyst for Foreign Policy, "The indispensable nation's indispensable weapon" [www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/indispensible\_weapon\_drones\_obama?page=0,1](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/indispensible_weapon_drones_obama?page=0,1))

Of course, the deep sense of embitterment which citizens of the Islamic world feel towards the United States is not going to be much diminished by Obama's decision to end "signature strikes," or to transfer control of the drone program from the CIA to the Pentagon. Pakistan's leaders will keep feeding their people a steady diet of anti-Americanism even if the Obama administration ends the drone program altogether, and doubles foreign aid. In his speech, Obama was careful to say that the United States had to be humble about what it could do to improve the lives -- and, presumably, the opinions -- of people in the Middle East. But it has no choice save to try. Drones thus illustrate the conundrum of modern diplomacy. They are indispensable weapons whose eerie effectiveness infuriates people, and thus harms U.S. national interests. President Obama has found that he can't live with them and can't live without them. Now he has tried to split the difference. I applaud the decision; but we are not remotely finished with the debate.

#### Blowback thesis isn’t supported by evidence and overstates its impact.

Kenneth Anderson 13, Professor of law at Washington College of Law, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the\_case\_for\_drones\_118548.html

The most prominent critique today, however, is that drone warfare is counterproductive because it produces “blowback.” What is blowback? Blowback comprises the supposed bad consequences of drones that swamp the benefits, if any, of drone warfare itself—the anger of villagers whose civilian relatives have been killed, for instance, or the resentment among larger populations in Pakistan or Yemen over drone strikes. The anger, we are told, is fanned by Islamist preachers, local media, and global Web communities, and then goes global in the ummah about the perceived targeting of Muslims and Islam. This leads to radicalization and membership recruitment where the strikes take place. Or maybe it leads to independently organized violence—perhaps the case of the Boston bombers, though it is too early to say. All this bad public perception outweighs whatever tactical value, if any, drone strikes might have. Blowback can never be dismissed, because it might be true in some cases. But even when true, it would exist as a matter of degree, to be set against the benefits of the drone strikes themselves. By definition, blowback is a second-order effect, and its diffuse nature makes its existence more a matter of subjective judgment than any other evaluation of drone warfare. As a hypothesis, the possibility of blowback arises in two distinct settings: “narrow” counterinsurgency and “broad” global counterterrorism. The narrow blowback hypothesis concerns those in communities directly affected by global counterterrorism drone strikes while the United States is trying to carry out a ground-level counterinsurgency campaign. The question is whether civilians, women and children especially, are being killed by drones in such numbers—because collateral damage is a fact, including from drone strikes—that they make these local communities even more fertile ground for anti-American operations. Do the drone strikes make things unacceptably more difficult for ground forces attempting to carry out a hearts-and-minds campaign to win over the local population? Direct and immediate concerns about villagers’ perceptions during the counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan led, at some points, to extraordinary (from the standpoint of lawful targeting and acceptable collateral damage) measures against using air power and even infantry to fire back at insurgents. But local counterinsurgency is not the long-term concern today; global counterterrorism is. Village-level resentments fueling recruitment might be a concern, but this type of blowback matters far less in terms of war fighting when the United States no longer has infantry in those places (and is no longer making its counterterrorism policy rest upon the chimera of a stable, democratic Afghanistan). It is sharply contested, to say the least, whether and to what extent drone strikes are creating blowback among villagers, or whether and to what extent, as a former British soldier recently returned from Afghanistan remarked to me, villagers are sad to see the Taliban commander who just insisted on marrying someone’s young daughter blown up in an airstrike. There is also debate about the degree to which villagers are aware that the American drones are undertaking strikes that the Pakistani government might otherwise undertake. Critics often neglect to focus on the Pakistani government’s regular and brutal assaults in the tribal zones. Despite a general perception that all of Pakistan is united against drone strikes, voices in the Pakistani newspapers have often made note that the tribal areas fear the Pakistani army far more than they fear U.S. drones, because, despite mistakes and inevitable civilian casualties, they see them as smaller and more precise. But the blunt reality is that as the counterinsurgency era ends for U.S. forces, narrow blowback concerns about whether villages might be sufficiently provoked against American infantry are subsiding. That leaves the broader claim of global blowback—the idea that drone campaigns are effectively creating transnational terrorists as well as sympathy for their actions. That could always be true and could conceivably outweigh all other concerns. But the evidence is so diffuse as to be pointless. Do Gallup polls of the general Pakistani population indicate overwhelming resentment about drone strikes—or do they really suggest that more than half the country is unaware of a drone campaign at all? Recent polls found the latter to be the case. Any causal connections that lead from supposed resentments to actual terrorist recruitment are contingent and uncertain. Discussing global blowback is also an easy stance for journalists writing about U.S. counterterrorism—Mark Mazzetti’s new book, The Way of the Knife, is a good example—because it automatically frames an oppositional narrative, one with dark undertones and intimations of unattractive, unintended consequence. The blowback argument is also peculiarly susceptible to raising the behavioral bar the United States must meet in order to keep the local population happy enough not to embrace suicide bombing and terrorism. It defines terrorist deviancy down, while U.S. and Western security behaviors are always defined up. From a strategic standpoint, however, the trouble with the blowback theory is simple: It will always counsel doing nothing rather than doing something. It’s the kibitzer’s lazy objection. Whether one knows a lot or a little about the action and its possible blowback consequences, whether one has an axe to grind or is reasonably objective, one can always offer the blowback scenario. There might be situations in which to give it priority; Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen expert, for example, says that a particular form of strike in Yemen causes blowback because it hits low-level fighters whose families cannot understand the American justification. (The response is, usually, that we are effectively fighting as the air arm of the Yemen government against its insurgents, including its low-level fighters.) That bears attention; whether it outweighs the strategic concern of supporting the Yemeni government, which does have to fight even low-level insurgents who in effect offer protection to the transnational terrorist wing, is another question. But we should consider it carefully. Blowback is a form of the precautionary principle. But it’s awfully difficult to conduct war, after all, on the basis of “first do no harm.” As it happens, the United States once had a commander driven largely by considerations of blowback from a restive local population. His name was George McClellan. If he had not been replaced by Abraham Lincoln, the Union would have lost the Civil War.

#### Err neg – the level of local anger is lower than they portray.

DANIEL BYMAN August 13 Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs

Such concerns are valid, but the level of local anger over drones is often lower than commonly portrayed. Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by anti-drone organizations, which results in biased samples. Other surveys exclude those who are unaware of the drone program and thus overstate the importance of those who are angered by it. In addition, many Pakistanis do not realize that the drones often target the very militants who are wreaking havoc on their country. And for most Pakistanis and Yemenis, the most important problems they struggle with are corruption, weak representative institutions, and poor economic growth; the drone program is only a small part of their overall anger, most of which is directed toward their own governments. A poll conducted in 2007, well before the drone campaign had expanded to its current scope, found that only 15 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such as seal team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States more popular.

#### Drones have lower civilian casualties than alternatives.

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But even the most unfavorable estimates of drone casualties reveal that the ratio of civilian to militant deaths—about one to three, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism—is lower than it would be for other forms of strikes. Bombings by F-16s or Tomahawk cruise missile salvos, for example, pack a much more deadly payload. In December 2009, the United States fired Tomahawks at a suspected terrorist training camp in Yemen, and over 30 people were killed in the blast, most of them women and children. At the time, the Yemeni regime refused to allow the use of drones, but had this not been the case, a drone’s real-time surveillance would probably have spotted the large number of women and children, and the attack would have been aborted. Even if the strike had gone forward for some reason, the drone’s far smaller warhead would have killed fewer innocents. Civilian deaths are tragic and pose political problems. But the data show that drones are more discriminate than other types of force.

#### Specifically we’d fill-in with cruise missiles – those are worse.

Clinton Watts and Frank J. Cilluffo 12, Homeland Security Policy Institute, June 21, http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/drones.pdf

What do critics of drones misunderstand about drone operations in Yemen? Critics of the U.S. drone campaign in Yemen confusingly lump together disparate issues related to terminology, intelligence processes, legal authorities and terrorist propaganda to justify stopping the use of the U.S.’s most effective counterterrorism technique – all while failing to offer a viable alternative for countering AQAP’s immediate threat to the U.S. Although an imperfect tool, drone strikes suppress terrorists in otherwise denied safe havens and limit jihadists’ ability to organize, plan and carry out attacks. These strikes help shield us from harm and serve our national interests. Doing nothing is simply not an option. Media accounts of attacks in Yemen often mistakenly credit U.S. drones for every explosion in Yemen. Drones represent one of several technology platforms executing airstrikes that include cruise missiles, potentially U.S. or Yemeni fighter aircraft or even helicopter assaults. Drone critics correctly cite instances where poor intelligence leads to the killing of civilians and/or those in opposition to the Saleh regime. However, one of the instances commonly used in calls to end drone use in Yemen is actually not the result of a drone strike. Critics point to the intelligence failures of a cruise missile attack in al Majalah on December 17, 2009.13 As an example, Gregory Johnsen at Princeton University and Yemen expert writing at Waq-al-Waq led his rebuttal of current drone policy, entitled “Drones, Drift and the (New) American Way of War,” with criticisms of drone warfare by citing this December 17, 2009 cruise missile attack.14 Instead of pointing to this incident as justification for halting drone strikes in Yemen, the civilian casualties created by this intelligence failure and use of a cruise missile alternatively suggest the need for the use of drones as a more surgical platform for achieving our counterterrorism objectives while minimizing civilian casualties. Cruise missiles introduce several factors that may contribute to errant targeting. The limitations of cruise missiles, in many ways, provided the impetus for developing the drone platform.15 Cruise missiles 1) require intelligence far in advance of hitting their target, 2) take a considerable amount of time to travel to their target, 3) are difficult to divert from their target once launched and 4) employ large scale and more devastating munitions such as cluster bombs which can lead to increased civilian casualties. In contrast, drones can provide their own targeting intelligence devoid of Yemeni government influence, provide real-time visual surveillance of a target, minimize the time between target engagement and target impact, and use smaller munitions able to reduce civilian casualties. While neither technology platform is a perfect engagement tool, drones vis-à-vis cruise missiles have further improved the U.S. ability to engage terrorists and minimize civilian casualties.

#### Turn – Oversight of targeting killings causes a shift to signature strikes.

Jens David Ohlin 13, Professor at Cornell Law School, http://www.liebercode.org/2013/02/would-federal-district-court-for-drones.html

One of the more interesting recent proposals for curing the "due process" deficit in the Administration's targeted killings program is for Congress to create a federal court to approve drone strikes. Senator Dianne Feinstein, among others, is championing this strategy. I don't think it will work. Here's why. First, the court would be modeled after the super-secret FISA court for approving government requests for surveillance in terrorism cases. Such courts impose a form of judicial review, yes, but there is little transparency and no adversarial process. But there are bigger problems. As some of my colleagues have already explained, it is unlikely and improbable that such a court could authorize specific operational strikes. That would be difficult to implement in real time, and might even be unconstitutional for infringing on the Executive Branch's commander-in-chief power. Rather, such a court would approve the administration's decision to place an individual's name on an approved target list. A court would review the legitimacy of this decision with the power to remove the name if the individual does not meet the standard for being a functional member of al-Qaeda. Although this is more plausible, I still don't think it will work. In the end, I think it would just push the administration to avoid targeted killings and would have the opposite effect. It would increase, not decrease, collateral damage. Let me explain. Suppose the government has previously used the kill list to govern the selection procedure for targeted killings. The list serves as a clearinghouse for debates and ultimately conclusions about who is a high-value target. If the administration decides that the individual should be pursued, he is placed on the list. If the administration decides that the individual is of marginal or no value, he is removed from the list or never placed on it to begin with. Now imagine that a court is requiring that the list be approved by a judicial process. Why would the administration have any incentive at all to keep adding names to the list? Why not stop using it entirely? It could then rely exclusively on signature strikes -- an important legal development well documented by Kevin Heller in his forthcoming JICJ article on the subject. Such strikes would not be banned by the court because the US would not know exactly who it is bombing. (I'm assuming for the sake of argument that the US is still engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the AUMF or some other statutory authorization for the President's pursuit of the conflict would still be in place.) Essentially, this would be a case of willful blindness -- a concept well known to criminal law scholars. The real benefit of targeted killings is that the administration knows the exact threat and only targets one individual. That has changed warfare tremendously. But the court system would push the military back towards the old system: target groups of individuals who are known terrorists or enemy combatants -- but you don't know exactly who they are. You just know they are the enemy. That's the system that reigned in all previous conflicts. And there would be a disincentive to ever acquire more specific information. Why have a drone hover over an area with known terrorists in order to determine, through surveillance, the exact identity of the individual's there? That would only trigger the jurisdiction of the drone court. So ignorance would maintain the legality of the strike. I don't think that is what Congressional staffers have in mind.

## No ME War

#### Empiricism only goes neg.

Kevin **Drum** September 9 200**’7** The Washington Monthly, “The Chaos Hawks”

Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.

#### No great power draw in.

Niall **Ferguson** (**Prof**essor **of History at Harvard** University) July 23 **’6** “This May not be a World War, But It Still Needs a Sense of Urgency”, Telegraph,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/o pinion/2006/07/23/do2302.xml

Such language can - for now, at least - safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle Eastern war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbours, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem to me likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, America's consistent support for Israel is **not matched** by any great power support for Israel's neighbours. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle Eastern war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of state in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli War at 6.15am on October 6, 1973. Half an hour later he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House raised America's state of military readiness to Defcon 3, putting its strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today.

#### And conflicts won’t spillover.

Steven A. **Cook** (fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations) Ray **Takeyh** (fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations) **and** Suzanne **Maloney** (senior fellow at Saban Center) June 28 **’7** “Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

**Mideast threats of escalation maintain high oil prices -- the link is perception**

**Kansas City Star '13**  "As the U.S. maneuvers toward a possible military strike against Syria, oil and gas prices are spiking." Steve Everly, 8/28 http://www.kansascity.com/2013/08/28/4443526/oil-gas-prices-spiking-on-concern.html#storylink=cpy

**Some energy analysts, however, contend that the oil and gas markets are overreacting because Syria doesn’t produce much oil. Still, in the week since a suspected chemical weapons attack against Syrian rebels killed hundreds, oil prices have jumped $7 a barrel** to $110.10. On Wednesday, benchmark West Texas Intermediate crude hit a two-year high on the New York Mercantile Exchange. **That’s a big enough increase to boost gas and diesel prices at the pump by 18 cents a gallon, but pump prices are just now beginning to rise**. In the Kansas City area, average area gas prices increased overnight Tuesday by 10 cents to $3.56 a gallon, according to [GasBuddy.com](http://gasbuddy.com/" \t "_blank). **More increases are on the way.**

#### High oil prices are key to the Russian economy -- post-Fukushima even more so

**Adams '13** Rod, The Energy Collective, "Update on "Highly Radioactive" Water Leaks at Fukushima" 9/8 http://theenergycollective.com/rodadams/268236/another-update-highly-radioactive-water-leaks-fukushima

As John Tucker pointed out in an earlier comment ([http://atomicinsights.com/update-fukushima-water-leaks-unrepresentative-...](http://atomicinsights.com/update-fukushima-water-leaks-unrepresentative-sample-used-support-fear-mongering/#comment-61989)) RT — aka Russia Today — has been particularly creative in making up additional fear mongering stories and inviting people like Chris Busby to spin tales that increase the shell-shocked attitude of the Japanese people. **Russia has been hugely dependent on exporting oil and gas for a major portion of its national income for many years; it is making billions more every year that Japan keeps its functional nuclear plants shut down.** There are plenty of other actors with influence in the media that are engaged in the business of finding, extracting, processing, financing, and transporting oil and natural gas that are also benefiting hugely from the fear that people have about harmless “leaks” of “radioactive” water at Fukushima.

**The impact is nuclear war**

David in ‘99

(Stephen, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Johns Hopkins, Foreign Affairs, “Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars”, January/February, L/N)

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

## India Pakistan

#### A. Impact is small and links

Ball ‘6 (Desmond, prof at the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre at the Australian National Univ, “The Probabilities of On the Beach: Assessing ‘Armageddon Scenarios’ in the 21st Century,” Working Paper No. 401, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/wp/wp\_sdsc\_401.pdf)

On the other hand, the relatively small nuclear stockpiles mean that the resultant casualties would be much less than would have occurred in an all-out US-Soviet strategic nuclear exchange. Pakistan is especially vulnerable. Its total population is about 150 million, of whom more than half are under fifteen years of age and nearly a third are under nine. Only five cities have more than a million people—Karachi (15 million), Lahore (6 million), the Islamabad/Rawalpindi conurbation (2 million), Faisalabad (3 million) and Hyderabad (2 million). In-house studies by India’s nuclear planners have shown that only about 15 weapons would ever be required against these cities.34 Three warheads with nominal yields of only 20 kilotons each targeted on each of the five cities would kill perhaps 2-3 million people. Fifteen 1 megaton weapons, also allocated three to each city, could kill perhaps 10- 12 million. In June 2002 US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited both New Delhi and Islamabad and briefed his counterparts about a Pentagon study that concluded that a nuclear war between the two countries could result in 12 million deaths. A detailed study of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan was published in June 2002. It assumed two scenarios. The first involved the explosion of ten 15 kiloton bombs over five Indian and five Pakistani cities (Bangalore, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and New Delhi in India and Faisalabad, Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi in Pakistan). This produced around 1.7 million immediate deaths and 0.9 million severe injuries in India and 1.2 million deaths and 0.6 million severe injuries in Pakistan. The second scenario involved 24 25 kiloton weapons, 12 detonated on eight Pakistani cities and 12 on seven Indian cities. The immediate deaths from blast and fire were estimated to be around 8 million, but the ground-bursts would also produce substantial fallout. About 22.1 million people would die fairly quickly from exposure to lethal radiation doses, while another eight million would suffer severe radiation sickness; most of the very young, old and infirm would die. About half of the 30-35 million deaths would be in Pakistan and half in India. **About 99 percent of the Indian population and 93 percent of the Pakistani population would survive**.35

#### B. Won’t escalate – other nations won’t get drawn in.

Dyer ‘2 (Gwynne, Ph.D. in war studies from the University of London, serves on the Board of Governors of Canada’s Royal Military College, independent journalist, 5-24, Hamilton Spectator, “Nuclear war a possibility over Kashmir,” lexis)

For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is that the damage would be largely confined to the region. The Cold War is over, the strategic understandings that once tied India and Pakistan to the rival alliance systems have all been cancelled, and no outside powers would be drawn into the fighting. The detonation of a hundred or so relatively small nuclear weapons over India and Pakistan would not cause grave harm to the wider world from fallout.

## Norms

#### Drone use was inevitable regardless of US action and norms won’t solve.

Amitai Etzioni 13, Professor of IR at GWU, March-April, MILITARY REVIEW, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview\_20130430\_art004.pdf

Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries into making and using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK and author of a book about drones argues that, “The proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the precedent that the United States is setting by killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can be little doubt that the fact that drones have served the United States well has helped to popularize them. However, it does not follow that United States should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First of all, this would have meant that either the United States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. Further, the record shows that even when the United States did not develop a particular weapon, others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind that the international environment is a hostile one. Countries—and especially non-state actors— most of the time do not play by some set of self constraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further their interests. The United States correctly does not assume that it can rely on some non-existent implicit gentle~~man~~’s agreements that call for the avoidance of new military technology by nation X or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains from employing that technology. I am not arguing that there are no natural norms that restrain behavior. There are certainly some that exist, particularly in situations where all parties beneﬁt from the norms (e.g., the granting of diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of mass destruction). However drones are but one step—following bombers and missiles—in the development of distant battleﬁeld technologies. (Robotic soldiers—or future ﬁghting machines— are next in line). In such circumstances, the role of norms is much more limited.

## Boyle

#### -- Accidents won’t escalate—no causal connection

**Muller ‘9** (John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State, *Atomic Obsession,* pIOO-OI)

It is a plausible argument that, all other things equal, if the number of nuclear weapons in existence increases, the likelihood one will go off by accident will also increase. But, in fact, all things haven't been equal. **As nuclear weapons have increased in numbers** and sophistication, **so have safety devices and procedures.** Precisely **because** **the weapons are so dangerous. extraordinary** **efforts to keep them from going off by accident** or by an unauthorized deliberate act **have been** instituted, and these measures have. so far, been **effective:** no one has been killed in a nuclear explosion since Nagasaki. Extrapolating further from disasters that have not occurred, **many have been** led to a **concern that. triggered by** a **nuclear weapons accident. a war could** somehow **be started through an act of desperate irrationality** or of consummate sloppiness. Before the invention of nuclear weapons such possibilities were not perhaps of great concern, because no weapon or small set of weapons could do enough damage to be truly significant. Each nuclear weapon, however, is capable of destroying in an instant more people than have been killed in an average war, and the weapons continue to exist in the tens of thousands. However, **even if a bomb, or a few bombs. were to go off. it does not** necessarily **follow that war would result**. For that to happen, it is usually asserted, the accident would have to take place at a time of high war readiness, as during a crisis, when both sides are poised for action and when one side could perhaps be triggered-or panicked-into major action by an explosion mistakenly taken to be part of, or the prelude to, a full attack. 30 This means that the **unlikely happening-a nuclear accident-would have to coincide precisely with an event. a militarized** international **crisis something that is rare to begin with**, became more so as the cold war progressed, and has become even less likely since its demise. Furthermore, **even if the accident takes place during a crisis, it does not follow that escalation** or hasty response **is inevitable. or even** very **likely**. As Bernard Brodie points out, escalation scenarios essentially impute to both sides "a well-nigh limitless concern with saving face" and/or "a great deal of ground in automaticity of response and counter response:' None of this was in evidence during the Cuban missile crisis when there were accidents galore. An American spy plane was shot down over Cuba, probably without authorization, and another accidentally went off course and flew threateningly over the Soviet Union. As if that weren’t enough, a Soviet military officer spying for the West sent a message, apparently on a whim, warning that the Soviets were about to attack.3 None of these remarkable events triggered anything in the way of precipitous response. They were duly evaluated and then ignored.

#### Too many alt causes overwhelm aff solvency.

Aaron David Miller 5/28/2013 (Analyst for Foreign Policy, "Speak No Evil: Why Obama shouldn't have given that big drone speech" www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/28/speak\_no\_evil\_obama\_drone\_speech?page=0,0)

I'll take the word of those who argue that drones are the poster child for the anger Arabs and Muslims feel toward America. I can see why. But the grievances toward the United States in this region run deep, and the source of that anger is not only drones. Don't forget: The Middle East was exasperated with Washington long before droning, and it remains eager to blame America for just about everything. The list of the Arab world's grievances go on and on: America is blamed for supporting the authoritarian Arab kings, blindly backing Israel, not talking to Hamas, not intervening militarily in Syria, intervening militarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, according to Egyptian liberals, for supporting Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. And that's even before we discuss the small but determined minority of Muslims who do, in fact, hate us because of who we are -- not just because of what we do. No nuanced modulation of our approach on drone strikes or the closure of Gitmo is going to change any of that.

#### Data proves there’s no impact to credibility.

Christopher Fettweis, professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Winter 2008, Political Science Quarterly, Ingenta.

There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. ColdWar history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions. While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.

## Heg General

#### Data disproves heg impacts

Christopher J. Fettweis 11, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global police~~man~~. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Can’t solve decline – unipolar moment over.

Gideon Rachman 11, Financial Times chief foreign affairs commentator, Zero-Sum Future, pp 3-4

But the economic crisis that struck the world in 2008 has changed the logic of international relations. It is no longer obvious that globalization benefits all the world's major powers. It is no longer clear that the United States faces no serious international rivals. And it is increasingly apparent that the world is facing an array of truly global problems-such as climate change and nuclear proliferation-that are causing rivalry and division between nations. After a long period of international cooperation, competition and rivalry are returning to the international system. A win-win world is giving way to a zero-sum world. Both as individuals and as a nation, Americans have begun to question whether the "new world order" that emerged after the cold war still favors the United States. The rise of Asia is increasingly associated with job losses for ordinary Americans and with a challenge to American power from an increasingly confident China. The crash has heightened awareness of American economic vulnerability and the country's reliance on continued Chinese and Middle Eastern lending. Of course, even after the crash, the United States remains the most powerful country in the world-with its largest economy, its most powerful military, and its leading universities. But the United States will never recover the unchallenged superiority of the "unipolar moment" that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union

#### Aging makes heg inevitable.

Mark L Haas 7, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University, “A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 1, Summer, p 112-147

**Global population aging will** influence U.S. foreign policies in five major ways in coming decades. First, this phenomenon will **be a potent force for the continuation of U.S. power dominance, both economic and military**. Aging populations are likely to result in the slowdown of states’ economic growth at the same time that governments face substantial pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for elderly care. This double economic dilemma will create such an austere fiscal environment that the other great powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States’ huge power lead. Investments designed to improve overall economic growth and purchases of military weaponry will be crowded out. Compounding these difficulties, although the United States is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all the other great powers. Consequently, the economic and fiscal costs for the United States created by social aging (although staggering, especially for health care) will be significantly lower for it than for potential competitors. **Global aging is** therefore **not only likely to extend U.S. hegemony** (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States’ economic and military power lead), **but deepen it as these others states are likely to fall even farther behind the United States**. Thus despite much recent discussion in the international relations literature and some policymaking circles about the likelihood of China (and to a lesser extent the European Union) balancing U.S. power in coming decades, the realities of social aging and its economic and military effects make such an outcome unlikely.6

#### Their laundry list of vague impacts is academic junk – conflicts can’t just emerge

Fettweis, 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

Assertions that without the combination of U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return to Europe and the Pacific Rim are usually rendered in rather vague language. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “the world will become a more dangerous place and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 From where would this danger arise? Who precisely would do the fighting, and over what issues? Without the United States, would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack mainland China again, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace? With one exception, these questions are rarely addressed. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese regional, must less global, political expansion. Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination. Overestimating Our Importance One of the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we perceive them to be. A great deal of experimental evidence exists to support the notion that people (and therefore states) tend to overrate the degree to which their behavior is responsible for the actions of others. Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both of which would seem to be especially relevant in the U.S. case.55 First, believing that we are responsible for their actions gratifies our national ego (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders. If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States. Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might, it is not possible to fully understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective. The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57 It is natural, therefore, for U.S. policymakers and strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, we are probably not as important to them as we think. The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, with or without the United States.

#### China war is less probable than our impacts and it’s internal to our scenarios.

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One means of improving the prospects for direct defence and reducing the risk of escalation is for the United States to enable the capabilities and buttress the resolve of China's neighbours. Such a strategy should be designed to raise the costs of Chinese use of force and to check Chinese assertiveness at the expense of regional stability and US interests. Such a strategy should not be (or be seen as) a US attempt to encircle or align the region against China, lest it produce greater Chinese hostility. Indeed, a parallel effort should be made to draw China into cooperative security endeavours, not only to avoid the appearance of an anti-China coalition but also to obtain greater contributions to international security from the world's second-strongest power. The United States should also continue to explore cooperative solutions to some of the above-cited sources of conflict. For instance, the collapse of North Korea could become an opportunity for US–Chinese collaboration. The economic consequences of a Sino-American conflict could be historically unparalleled, even if both sides managed to avoid economic warfare. This is a powerful mutual deterrent, one marginally in America's favour at present. Strengthening the US economy is the best way of ensuring that the balance of interdependence and of the associated deterrence does not shift dangerously against the United States over the next several decades. While the risk of conflict with China cannot be ignored, neither should it be exaggerated. Any number of other conflicts are more likely, some in places we cannot even vaguely foresee at present. These more likely conflicts will be with opponents quite different from China and will call for capabilities quite dissimilar from those required to deal with a real peer competitor. Individually, these contingencies will be less consequential than a conflict with China, but collectively they will shape the international environment in which both countries interact, and will fundamentally influence Chinese perceptions of American power and determination. Coping successfully with these smaller challenges may be one of the best ways to ensure that the United States and China never have to fight the larger conflict.

#### No US-Sino war

Rosecrance et al 10 (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, <http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251>)

Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.