## \*\*\*1AC

Same as round 1 at Harvard

## \*\*\*2AC

### 2AC Weaponitis

#### Critiquing drone policy is transformative

Druck-J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School-10

Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare. Cornell Law Review, 98(1), 209-238.

A. Why an Unconstrained Executive Matters Today If public scrutiny acts as a check on presidential action by pressuring Congress into enforcing domestic law (namely, the WPR), then that check has weakened given the increased use of technology-driven warfare abroad.135 As a result, fewer checks on presidential military actions exist, implying that we will see more instances of unilateral presidential initiatives. But if the new era of warfare removes the very issues associated with traditional warfare, should we be concerned about the American public’s increasing numbness to it all? The answer is undoubtedly yes. First, from a practical standpoint, the psychology surrounding mechanized warfare makes it easier for the United States to enter hostilities initially.136 Without having to worry about any of the traditional costs of war (such as a draft, rationing, casualties, etc.), the triggers that have historically made the public wary of war are now gone. When machines, rather than human beings, are on the front lines, the public (and, as a result, politicians and courts) will not act to stop the continued use of drones. In other words, people will simply stop caring about our increased actions abroad, regardless of their validity, constitutionality, or foreign harm. But again one must wonder: should we care? After all, even if we increase the number of military conflicts abroad, the repercussions hardly seem worth worrying about. For example, worrying that WPR violations will cause significant harm to the United States seems somewhat misplaced given the limited nature of technology-driven warfare. Granted, this style of warfare might make it easier to enter hostilities, but the risk of subsequent harm (at least to the United States) is low enough to mitigate any real danger. Furthermore, even if the effects of warfare might become increasingly dulled, any use of force that would eventually require traditional, Vietnam-esque types of harms as the result of technology-driven warfare would in a sense “wake up the populace” in order to check potentially unconstitutional action.137 Thus, if our level of involvement requires machines and only machines, why worry about a restrained level of public scrutiny? The answer is that a very real risk of harm exists nonetheless. War by its very nature is unpredictable.138 Indeed, one of the major grievances concerning the war in Vietnam was that we ended up in a war we did not sign up for in the first place.139 The problem is not the initial action itself but the escalation. Therefore, while drone strikes might not facially involve any large commitment, the true threat is the looming possibility of escalation.140 That threat exists in the context of drones, whether because of the risk of enemy retaliation or because of a general fear that an initial strike would snowball into a situation that would require troops on the ground.141 In both cases, an apparently harmless initial action could eventually unravel into a situation involving harms associated with traditional warfare.142 Worse yet, even if that blowback was sufficient to incentivize the populace and Congress to mobilize, the resulting involvement would only occur after the fact.143 If we want restraints on presidential action, they should be in place before the United States is thrown into a war, and this would require public awareness about the use of drones.144 As such, whether it is unforeseen issues arising out of the drones themselves145 or unforeseen consequences stemming from what was ostensibly a minor military undertaking, there is reason to worry about a populace who is unable to exert any influence on military actions, even as we shift toward a more limited form of warfare.146 Another issue associated with a toothless WPR in the era of technology-drive warfare involves humanitarian concerns. If one takes the more abstract position that the public should not allow actions that will kill human beings to go unchecked, regardless of their legality or underlying rationale, then that position faces serious pressure in the era of technology-driven warfare. As the human aspect of warfare becomes more attenuated, the potential humanitarian costs associated with war will fade out of the collective consciousness, making it easier for the United States to act in potentially problematic ways without any substantial backlash. Rather than take note of whom we target abroad, for example, the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare forces the public to place “enormous trust in our leaders” despite the fact that good faith reliance on intelligence reports does not necessarily guarantee their accuracy.147 Accordingly, as the level of public scrutiny decreases, so too will our ability to limit unwarranted humanitarian damage abroad.148 At the very least, some dialogue should occur before any fatal action is taken; yet, in the technology-driven warfare regime, that conversation never occurs.149 Of course, this Note has argued that the issues associated with technology-driven warfare (an increased level of military involvement abroad, potential for escalation, humanitarian difficulties, etc.) though very real, are less prominent than the harms associated with traditional warfare. But perhaps this premise is incorrect; that is, perhaps technology-driven warfare does present sufficient harm to trigger social and political scrutiny. For example, pecuniary harms are very real contemporary concerns, and they seem to play an increased role in determining a country’s standing.150 In this respect, given the financial costs of drone strikes (and military spending in general),151 perhaps we need not be worried about an absence of public scrutiny. Yet given the traditional costs of war, pecuniary harm hardly seems like the type of concern sufficient to create the type of political checks present in the Civil War, World War I, Vietnam, or Iraq. In all four situations, American lives were at stake, entire households faced life-changing effects of war in a very real way, and the entire country saw major social and political transformations. Economic harm is certainly an issue worth considering, especially as the United States takes on more and more debt; yet, whether that sort of harm rises to the level sufficient to trigger mass citizen mobilization remains to be seen.152 Indeed, if the recent actions in Libya are any indication, financial harm is far too attenuated to create any sort of substantial backlash. Future technology-driven conflicts will likely create a clearer picture of the role of pecuniary damage, but as it stands, this sort of harm fails to “rally the troops” for public attentiveness.

#### Specific demands key

Pascal Bruckner 86, Maître de conférence at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, 1986

(Tears of the White Man)

Here again, though, our analysis must be refined. A universal and angelic and limitless fellowship would be disembodied, insufficient to deal with the misfortunes of any particular category or group of people. Through large-scale institutions, unions, political parties, and associations, I can reinforce and enlarge it to global dimensions, and through them I am obliged to make gestures of abstract charity in the form of food, medicine, and money, to countries whose names I do not know. But we choose our causes as our causes choose us, in an inner encounter with the outside world, in which the world proposes as much as we dispose. This is why we cannot honestly embrace all causes and also why we cannot be disinterested in any of them. When we express concern for Poland, we may be scolded by those who would have us also remember El Salvador, Lebanon, or South Africa. We must reply that a thousand causes for outrage are only so many reasons to do nothing, and that if we are urged not to prefer one struggle over another, East or West or South, we are being pushed toward an involvement that has no limits, which is really complete lack of involvement. It would mean the fairyland of solidarity with no concern. I feel solidarity, period, like some mystical and bloodless love that floats in the air. To be effective, solidarity has to be circumscribed and channeled. Other solidarities can be based on it, but only as aims sought by other people. To be effective, responsibility must choose a limited field of action and a specific geographic area (which is not related to its distance). Without that, it is indeterminate, blind. Our need for political action and sympathy beyond national borders must be tailored to the scale of causes in a particular area, beyond which there is nothing but the hubbub and babbling of the news media. In this respect, too much generosity is suspicious. A fellowship that expresses itself in general terms and that is incapable even of saying the name of those people whom it helps is the solidarity of armchair windbags. It dies of its own purity, from choosing everything. It is nothing but a grandiose slogan, like the postwar label “existentialist,” which was invoked everywhere and anytime. It gives support to the most dissimilar causes with the same enthusiasm. The same people who support the PLO in July with similar arguments, and six months later will support some other guerilla movement. Details are minimized in all cases, and common denominators are sought where historical details should call for exact analyses, strict attention to the facts. It is purely sentimental attachment to people in the outside world, and the Cambodians, Palestinians, and Lebanese all march through the square marked “Victim.”; it is the same preordained ritual for different participants. This kind of solidarity is for mercenaries. of the news media who must impartially cover all the active spots on earth. Let us not ask more of the media than what they already do quite well---make us aware of human problems. Our sort of attachment to the outside world cannot follow the rhythm of the news, even if we do care about it. We must learn to detach ourselves from the hassle of the headlines and hot stories, so we can take root somewhere on earth. Newspapers and television cannot possibly serve as a guide to action because, when the TV screen stops talking about a country, it continues to exist. If we based our attention to the world on the pattern of the news media, we would develop the flexibility of public opinion, which is too apt to take a stand for one group one day and another the next. That is a kind of technological solidarity for the busy ~~man~~ who wastes his effort and spreads ~~him~~self too thinly. A hand held out in this way will soon be pulled back; reflex solidarity provides aid, but then takes it back again.

#### More evidence – Specific demands are critical—the antiwar movement loses momentum when its goals are too universal

Simpich 13 (Bill Simpich, Reader Supported News “It Will Take a New Antiwar Movement to Free Bradley Manning,” http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/304-justice/19023-it-will-take-a-new-antiwar-movement-to-free-bradley-manning)

However, the lack of an organized antiwar political force is the enduring tragedy of our times. It means that there is no effective entity that can hold Obama accountable for the trillion dollar defense budget that decimates human needs and any hope for economic, environmental, and spiritual renewal. This behemoth funds the garrison state of fourteen hundred US bases around the world, the continuing war in Afghanistan, and the drone attacks throughout the world. The lack of an organized movement is caused by an old split in political forces that haunts us right up to the present day. During the Vietnam War, the strategic disagreement was between the single-issue call of "out now" versus the multi-issue call for addressing racial and economic issues as well as war. My analysis is that although the multi-issue approach won out, the vision of what it takes to build a successful social movement was lost in the scuffle. To spare the reader a litany of outrages, let it just be said that the battle has steadily devolved around far less important issues. Meanwhile, the antiwar troops despaired of any end to the squabbling and stopped attending anyone's events. There is no longer even the annual "march against all bad things" that we used to joke about as our various formations moved together toward the local symbol of power. After all these years of organized challenge to the war machine, there is silence in the streets.

#### Limited demands good- rejecting specific calls against militarism shatters the anti-war movement.

Lovell 82 (ed Sarah Lovell, Tasks of the SWP in the Antiwar Movement, [Resolution of the Fourth Internationalist Caucus in the National Committee submitted to the December 4-8, 1982, plenum], http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/document/fit/antiwar.htm)

In addition, we as revolutionary Marxists call for the total abolition of the imperialist military budget. But we will not hesitate to work with others who are willing to fight around specific demands for the elimination of individual military programs (such as the MX missile) or for the partial reduction of the war budget in order to fund socially useful programs. These different aspects of the fight against war today are not contradictory, but complementary. We believe that a serious antiwar organization cannot avoid taking up all of them. However, this understanding cannot be an excuse for a sectarian approach toward forces which begin to emerge around one or another part of the struggle, and which do not yet see the whole picture. We should welcome every manifestation of opposition to the U.S. government’s war plans, no matter how limited. Where we have the ability to participate in such struggles we should do so with all enthusiasm. One of our tasks must be to educate in the context of active involvement in the movement—to explain the interconnections and unity of different sides of the question. But we will not get a serious hearing for our ideas from those we are trying to influence if we seem to be sideline critics who refuse to involve themselves in the real day-to-day tasks of building an antiwar movement in this country. One of our primary contributions is an approach to organizing which does not tie the movement into one or another wing of the Democratic or Republican parties. The lack of understanding on this question today is one of the biggest obstacles to mobilizing an effective antiwar fight. It has allowed the capitalist politicians to parade as champions of peace, particularly on the antinuclear issue. We recognize that although there are specific proposals we can make to antiwar activists about how to organize an independent struggle even within the present context of a bourgeois electoral monopoly, the fact of that monopoly creates severe limitations. This situation provides important opportunities for us to explain our ideas on independent working class electoral action to those activists. The biggest challenge the antiwar movement faces is the creation of an organizational vehicle which can provide a real alternative to the posturing of the politicians and can break out of the framework created by the bilateral freeze. There is no ready-made solution to this problem. In some places committees which formed around the freeze will be receptive to our ideas on how to develop the antiwar struggle on the basis of a broader and more correct political focus — one clearly mobilizing opposition to our own government. It is likely that we will especially find forces receptive to this perspective in campus committees. It will be necessary to develop a serious set of proposals for teach-ins, rallies, demonstrations, etc., around specific political slogans such as those mentioned above which can provide a positive alternative to bilateralism. A major focus for this effort in the next few weeks, especially on the West Coast, should be the call issued by the Tijuana solidarity conference for demonstrations in San Diego and Tijuana on January 22. In those parts of the country where distance will make travel to San Diego difficult we should make every effort to have solidarity actions called by local groups and coalitions. It is also important that we not ignore the role of already existing solidarity groups like CISPES. Although the perspectives of this organization have been limited, and it has not by and large seen the need to tap the broad anti-interventionist sentiment in this country (focusing on political support to the goals of the Salvadoran revolutionists), it nevertheless has a great deal of authority, a layer of healthy activists, and has staged some impressive actions. CISPES varies quite a bit from one city to another. Also, there is a large milieu of religious, pacifist, and civil liberties-type organizations and individuals which, given a proper perspective, can play a role in building the movement. Such a correct perspective, which can mobilize the American people in effective action against war, will not arise spontaneously. If revolutionary Marxists do not participate fully, in every way we can (even within organizations which do not yet have a clear political outlook) undertaking a serious effort to educate and win people over to that correct perspective, we cannot expect any other force to emerge which will do it for us.

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#### ---C/I-Increasing requires a pre-existing premium to determine the exact increase

Jeremiah Buckley et all, (attorney Amicus Curiae Brief, Safeco Ins. Co. of America et al v. Charles Burr et al) 2006. http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme\_court/briefs/06-84/06-84.mer.ami.mica.pdf)

First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word “increase” is “to make something greater,” which it believed should not “be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.” 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the definition offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion. Because “increase” means “to make something greater,” there must necessarily have been an existing premium, to which Edo’s actual premium may be compared, to determine whether an “increase” occurred. Congress could have provided that “ad-verse action” in the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse action in terms of an “increase.” That def-initional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93 n.10 (1979) (“[a] defin-ition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is not stated”). Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words “existing or applied for,” Congress intended that an “increase in any charge” for insurance must “apply to all insurance transactions – from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held policy.” 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation reads the words “exist-ing or applied for” in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer had an existing policy of insurance, such as a “cancellation,” “reduction,” or “change” in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-existing policy, and under usual canons of statutory construction the term “increase” also should be construed to apply to increases of an already-existing policy. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it”) (citation omitted).

### 2AC K

#### ---Policy planning is life affirming and imbedded within imminence --- Only the negative’s blanket rejection of change reduces the chaos of the world to a knowable ‘status quo’ that the plan deviates from.

Campbell 1993

David, Politics Without Principle, pg. 97-98

To be engaged with the world, whether as an individual or a state, is thus a matter of acting in a way that seeks to affirm life. The specific nature of the plans, policies, or proclamations that can work toward this end require debate and negotiation attuned to the context they seek to address; they cannot be specified in the abstract. One important point can be made, however. Because of the pervasive influence of instrumental rationality upon international political discourse, action tends to be endorsed and embarked upon only when it can be said to clearly lead toward a solution. To be sure, the nature of the action and its chances for success are obviously important considerations. In the first instance, however, it is the fact of action in response to the recognition of one’s engagement— though the action be no more than a strong declaration of one’s position— that is the most important step.

#### ---Nietzsche’s alternative risks extinction --- Ethical norms are the only check on technological apocalypse.

Fasching 1993

Darrell J., Professor of Religious Studies at University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, pg. 28-29

The Nazi vision of the pure Aryan society represents a utopian vision of demonic proportionsa vision that inspired an apocalyptic revolutionary program of genocide. It reveals at once both a time of "The Death of God" in the Nietzschean sense and yet the resurgence of religion, that is, a demonic religiosity that creates a new public order in which all pluralism is eliminated from the public square and in which virtually nothing is sacred not even human life. The period of the Holocaust stands as prophetic warning to a technological civilization that has no other norm than the will to power. If Auschwitz embodies the demonic use of technology against targeted populations to commit genocide, Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent the last such use of technology. For with the coming of Nuclear warfare, technology has outstripped human intentionality so that if the bomb is ever used again, genocide will be transformed into collective suicide or omnicide the destruction of all life. Having enemies is a luxury no community on the face of the earth can any longer afford. If there is a next time, it will not matter who is right and who is wrong, we shall all perish in the flames. Auschwitz and Hiroshima suggest that the millennium which brought us the utopian age of progress threatens to bring itself to an abrupt apocalyptic conclusion. The age of the bomb seems to have shattered and restructured the millennial myth. No longer can we imagine that apocalypse will be followed by utopia. The myth of unfolding stages seems to have broken apart into an absolute Either-Or: either Apocalypse or Utopia. Not wishing to face the terror of the first option we enthusiastically (although uneasily) embrace the second. Through a somewhat forced utopian euphoria we try to repress the prophetic warnings of Auschwitz and Hiroshima which remind us that a normless world will inevitably end in apocalyptic self-destruction.

#### ---Their critique of slave morality is incoherent --- Fighting against oppression is a prime source of vitality and energy, and Nietzsche’s critique of weakness is based on health metaphors that cannot be generalized beyond his personal experience.

Solomon 1994

Robert C., Quincy Lee Centennial Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Richard Schacht, pg. 111-112

Consider, then, the so-called slaves—those who are group-oriented, mu­tually dependent, ambitious, but frustrated by obstacles not of their own making. The slave has an ideal image of the world—perhaps even an ide­ology—which (not surprisingly) emphasizes some of one’s own (perceived) virtues and raises general (rather than merely personal) narcissism. They have legitimate, justified complaints about the state of the world and their own position in it—complaints that include systematic features (if not uni­versal principles) encompassing others who may be much worse off than themselves. Consequently, they become envious, rebellious, and resentful. They react against a world that they did not make, which is not just, which is ruled by people who—even by the standards they themselves espouse— do not deserve their advantages. Like Camus’s Sisyphus, they may continue in their duties, made tolerable by “scorn and defiance.” Yet they recognize not the absurdity but the injustice of their situation. This is the crux of my doubts about Nietzsche’s thesis—his refusal to acknowledge resentment as an essential ingredient in our sense of justice (and his corresponding restriction of ‘justice” to a virtue of the powerful and privileged). (More on this in the final section.) There are, to be sure, certain moralities that drain or squander our energies with needless inhi­bitions, moralities that distract us or demean our bodily needs and delights; and much of Nietzsche’s attack—especially his well-focused critique of as­ceticism in the Third Essay of the Genealogy—is (like the work of a corporate time-study man) designed to lay their inefficiencies bare. But the sense of oppression and injustice—no matter how “reactive”—can be a powerful source of energy and well-directed vitality; and thus at least one form of slave morality and resentment would seem to escape his harsh and one-sided critique. The metaphors Nietzsche most often uses in talking about strength are medical metaphors, health and sickliness, “physiological” images. Master morality is healthy; slave morality is sickly. Strength as health is clearly a personal and not a competitive virtue. It has much to do with one’s meta­bolic fund of energy, expressed in a spontaneity that is not so much thoughtless or carefree as robust. Weakness as sickliness is above all a lack of energy, a lethargy caused by exhaustion. But Nietzsche’s vision here is often of a very different kind; and it is not health as such but the response to ill-health that is the measure of strength. His famous (but clearly false) comment that “what does not overcome me makes me stronger” is em­blematic of a certain way of thinking about strength and heroism, mani­fested recently in all of those made-for-television movies about brave souls with AIDS or cancer, or a child tragically ill with leukemia. One need not speculate or search very far for the personal origins of Nietzsche’s concern about health and his rather complex conceptions of the proper response to illness. Having sampled the gamut of such reactions ourselves during a week-long bout with a virulent flu, most of us can easily understand how such mixed and obsessive feelings are possible. But they don’t add up to a philosophy, much less a consistent criterion of strength. That which does not overcome me typically leaves me weaker, no matter how noble and stalwart my resistance has been. It is all well and good to desire good health; but, as Aristotle noted, health is a presupposition of virtue and not itself a virtue that deserves admiration. It is certainly admi­rable that Nietzsche defied ill-health and insomnia and wrote ten brilliant pages a day; but this is hardly the mark of the spontaneously healthy “mas­ter” that emerges in those pages. The medical metaphor, accordingly, is a rather bewildering place to look for his conceptions of strength and weak­ness.

#### Just war co-option

Moore 01 (Thomas, An Australian Approach to ethic warfare?, War, Ethics and Justice: New Perspectives on a Post-9/11 World, google books, pg39)

The revival of just war theory in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States reveals the contradictory and contested nature of moral claims about violence within International Relations. If political scientists are often criticised for "fiddling while Rome burns' (Strauss 1962: 327) then the extensive revival of just war theory in public debates about armed intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates the importance of moral reasoning in public deliberation about warfare and violence in International Relations. The extensive deployment of just war theory in the global war on terror raises signi- ficant questions about the contradictory relationship between political practice and political theory within the just war tradition. The strength of the just war tra-dition lies in its capacity to generate an understanding of the communitarian basis of modem militaries and how decisions about warfare are questions for deliberation within political community. Nonetheless, this instrumental view of just war theory thinks of just war as a rational body of conditions that must be satisfied in order to go to war (jus ad bellum) and in the fighting of war (jus in bello) This chapter examines the way in which parliamentary debate about the Iraqi intervention highlights the limitations of the just war theory as a public dis- course of warfare. A failure to examine the 'difficult questions' of just war theory within the official discourse of Australian foreign policy have revealed how the vocabulary of the just war tradition has become a 'permission slip’ for states in justifying the global war on terror. The 'difficult questions' of the just war tradition have been overlooked in the need to provide a moral justification for an intervention that was contrary to international law.

#### And our scholarship produces empathy that breaks up a self-fulfilling cycle of violence against those that are exploited and marginalized by domestic and international militarism

Allen 7 (Douglas Allen Department of Philosophy, University of Maine “Mahatma Gandhi on Violence and Peace Education,” Project Muse)

Gandhi’s peace-education approach offers possibilities for conflict resolution when contradictions become exacerbated and individuals, groups, or nations are on the brink of overt violence. Gandhi’s own life is replete with illustrations of how he was able to intervene through listening, sympathizing, engaging in dialogue, fasting, being willing to suffer, and other forms of nonviolent intervention and resistance in order to defuse very tense, violent situations. Peace education can teach us how to empathize with what the other is feeling, change our language, and practice nonviolent interventions that can break escalating causal cycles of violence that are about to explode. If someone intent on inflicting violence confronts me, Gandhian peace education offers many responses that may prove effective in preventing violence. If I manage to limit my ego, achieve a larger perspective, and empathize with the other’s feelings, this may allow for dialogue and for creating nonthreatening relations with the other. In addition, Gandhi repeatedly emphasizes that intellectual approaches with rational analysis often have no transformative effect on the other, but approaches of the heart, involving deep personal emotions and feelings, often have profound relational and transformative effects. If I refuse to strike back and am willing to embrace sacrifice and suffering, this can disrupt the expectations of the violent other, lead to a decentering and reorienting of an extremely violent situation, and touch the other’s heart. Throughout his writings on satyagraha and other methods for resisting and transforming violence, Gandhi proposes numerous ways for relating to short-term violence and moving toward a conflict resolution grounded in truth and nonviolence.

#### Their pessimism creates the conditions for a self-fulfilling prophecy of violence and can’t transform the structures it attempts to criticize – the black cyborg will never be able to transcend institutions of domestic militarism and will be pigeon-holed into a status of social death

Chernus last updated 13 (Ira Chernus PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER “REINHOLD NIEBUHR'S CRITIQUE OF NONVIOLENCE” http://www.colorado.edu/ReligiousStudies/chernus/Niebuhr.htm)

Their theological mentor soon began to complain that they had missed his point. He protested that his ideas were being used to justify the kind of self-righteousness that he most opposed. He pointed out that the U.S., in its effort to protect the "free world," sometimes accepted injustices as bad as those it was opposing. In the last years of his life, he criticized the Vietnam War as the most egregious example of U.S. good intentions gone awry. But it was too late. His words had helped to set in motion political changes that he could not control. Ironically, his own theories could explain why this would happen and why it would be inevitable. Niebuhr always appreciated the ironies of human life. For him, they were the clearest evidence that we are all finite, fallible creatures whose best efforts for good are always mixed with evil, beyond our control. Yet he could never accept the irony that his Christian "realism" and his rejection of nonviolence, however well-intentioned, had helped to bring the U.S. to moral disasters like the Vietnam War, and the world to the brink of nuclear destruction. However, this outcome may be less ironic than it appears. There is a clear logical line leading from Niebuhr's initial premises to the horrors of the cold war and the nuclear age. Niebuhr's thinking starts out from a world divided between one transcendent, infinite Creator and many lowly, finite creatures. It is a hierarchical world, with an inevitable tension between the ruler and the ruled. The same kinds of divisions and tensions mark the relationships among the creatures. They experience themselves as essentially separate from each other. They are like the separate pots produced by the potter, all lined up one by one on the shelf. They have no pre-existing connections as part of their essential being. So they must struggle to make connections. But precisely because they feel so small and isolated, each creature tries to aggrandize itself at the expense of others. So the struggle to make connections becomes an arena of conflict and domination. The hierarchical structure of the cosmos is replicated in every human society, from the nuclear family on up to the family of nations. The ruler dominates, hoping to preserve at least a minimal degree of order. The ruled resist domination. The cycle of conflict and violence has no end. What is to prevent such a world from degenerating into all-out chaos? The only answer Niebuhr could offer is some combination of a bit of reason and a bit of humility, as preached by religious leaders like himself. But his own theory predicts that reason and humility will always be overwhelmed by human passions. The only real limit to the destructiveness of social conflict is the limit set by the state of destructive technology. Unfortunately for Niebuhr, during his lifetime technology surpassed all limits in its ability to destroy. The specter of nations threatening each other with total obliteration, using weapons on hair-trigger alert, was actually Niebuhr's own picture of human society as a jungle, taken to its extreme. From the viewpoint of the nonviolence tradition, this tragedy flows inexorably from Niebuhr's premises. If the basic fact of reality is not connectedness but separation, if the basic structure of reality is not freedom but subjection to hierarchical authority, then there is no way to escape from conflict, violence, and destruction. Niebuhr often described the human condition as "tragic." The nonviolence tradition would suggest that the tragedy is not in some unalterable human condition, but in a description of human life that makes tragedy the only possible outcome. The fate of Niebuhr's writings, leading to results he neither expected nor approved, shows that every view of human life can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Any words that describe human life and human society help to create the kind of life and the kind of society that they describe. The nonviolence tradition is based on descriptions of human life quite different from Niebuhr's. They allow the possibility of escaping from tragedy into a more cooperative, harmonious, and peaceful life. And precisely because they allow for that possibility, they may make it more possible.

#### No link---the alternative does not eliminate agonims, it eliminates violent antagonism, there is still a political that has opponents and proponents who can form disagreement and dissent, we just object to KILLING those opponents.

Ben-Asher 10 (NOA BEN-ASHER is a Assistant Professor of Law, Pace Law School, “Legalism and Decisionism in Crisis ,” http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/lawjournal/issues/volume71/number4/ben-asher.pdf)

It is difficult to fully translate the ethical principles of friendship and hospitality into current legal and political theories. Friendship and hospitality appear utopian, naïve, unrealistic, certainly non-Schmittian, and generally inadequate as political assumptions. Nonetheless, I argue that if we were to at least consider letting these principles inform the politics of current decisionmaking, we might begin a shift away from our current Schmittian politics.256 We could start by considering a politics of friendship and hospitality alongside (if not instead of) Schmittian politics of enmity. At the very least, friendship and hospitality at the level of nations must involve responsibility towards non-violent individuals who are harmed by hostile actions undertaken by Western governments in the name of the national security of their own citizens. This may be viewed as a nondiscrimination principle at the multi-national level. A politics of friendship and hospitality treats equally the lives of all innocent people regardless of national origins or geographical boundaries. Thus, in the context of the current “war on terror,” a politics of friendship and hospitality demands responsibility toward all the innocent civilian victims of the violent “war on terror” declared by the United States. I will later offer applications of this point.

#### The case is a disad to the alternative – we must speak out against the military industrial apparatus and its justifications or else we face a world constitutive of structural violence

Ayers and Tarrow 11 (Jeffrey Ayres is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Saint Michael’s College, and Sidney Tarrow is Professor Emeritus of Government at Cornell , FROM GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY TO GLOBAL WAR: A DECADE OF DISEQUILIBRIUM, http://essays.ssrc.org/10yearsafter911/from-global-civil-society-to-global-war-a-decade-of-disequilibrium/)

Ten years after 9/11, we also are struck by the marked imbalance in state–civil society relations, as we have just experienced a massive growth in the powers of the US government. This decade has witnessed the growth of an invisibly expanding web of non-military but partially militarized industries around Washington, DC. In a series of investigative articles, the Washington Post in July 2010 described the vast national-security apparatus created since 9/11, one that “has become so large, so unwieldy, and so secretive” that it “amounts to an alternative geography of the United States, a Top Secret America hidden from public view and lacking in thorough oversight.”5 Seven decades ago, political scientist Harold Lasswell worried about the growth of what he called the “garrison state.”6 Lasswell’s worry was not only the growth of the military and its increasing intrusion on what had been civilian functions of government; he was also concerned at the militarization of sectors of civilian society. According to Lasswell, writes Samuel Fitch, “In the twentieth century the political elite of industrial societies has become increasingly dominated by specialists in violence. These are typically not traditional military elites, but modern military professionals with extensive expertise in management, technical operations, and public relations. . . . National security therefore requires a conscious effort to maintain domestic morale and legitimates symbolic manipulation and coercion as necessary instruments for internal control.”7 The momentum of global activism and the potential for political agency also have receded against a backdrop of both seemingly unrelenting global economic turbulence and a resurgent US state that has intensified to an unprecedented degree its preparation for and practice of warfare. Writing in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, we did not anticipate the extra-constitutional ramifications of the Bush Doctrine: the operationalization of preventive war, extraordinary rendition, warrantless domestic surveillance, “enhanced interrogation,” presidential signing statements, and the legacy of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. When we suggested somewhat hopefully that there was little need for pessimism—that globally oriented activists always worked most effectively on native ground, supported by the opportunities and resources of their home societies—we could never have expected that a Democratic president elected with a platform that rejected the Bush administration’s policies would further expand US military spending and counterterrorist overseas activity. The costs of this decade of the global War on Terror go beyond revived debates over the separation of powers and the entrenchment of the “Imperial Presidency.” It truly has been an unprecedented decade in many respects for the military-industrial complex. It is remarkable, for example, that the Pentagon’s budget has risen for thirteen consecutive years. Overall spending on defense between 2001 and 2009 increased by 70 percent, US defense spending over this decade rose from 30 percent to 50 percent of total worldwide defense spending, and US spending on defense averaged $250 billion more annually than it did during the height of the Cold War.8 A new 2011 report issued by Brown University’s Costs of War project estimates that ten years after the declaration of the War on Terror, the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have cost approximately 225,000 lives and between $3.2 trillion and $4 trillion.9 And perhaps it will come as no surprise to anyone concerned about growing US indebtedness that the costs of the wars have been financed almost entirely by borrowing, with $185 billion in interest already paid on war spending and another $1 trillion in interest possibly accruing by 2020.10 And yet, the targets of the War on Terror only continue to expand—from Pakistan, to Somalia, to the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Yemen—while the means of delivering reprisals against purported terrorists undergo further modernization. Indeed, it is the Obama administration’s penchant for increased use of drone warfare in growing numbers of asymmetrical conflicts that further distinguishes this past decade from earlier eras, especially the Cold War. Without underemphasizing the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, the dramatic increase in defense spending and the burgeoning costs of war are unprecedented, and drone warfare marks a further radical turn in the history of war. With little public discussion, the United States has further erased the boundaries of war’s beginning and end, as unmanned drone aircraft have now been used in airstrikes to kill suspected militants in at least six countries: Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen.11 What we find especially troubling—beyond reports of increased loss of civilian lives along with those of the militants targeted in counterterrorist drone strikes—is the lack of sustained public debate over the many legal and moral questions surrounding drone warfare, as well as, more broadly, the major public-policy trade-offs associated with the construction of this national-security state. This escalating process of historically unprecedented spending, modernization, and expansion of US warfare, intelligence gathering, and surveillance capabilities is one of the more notable contributions to what we would call the “Great Disequilibrium.” By this term we refer to a palpable imbalance that has evolved in many different spheres of life today in the United States, a sense that we are missing counterbalancing forces that might respond correctively to trends and events that have destabilized the American regime and democratic process. The list is long (and herein not conclusive): the record length of and skyrocketing spending on warfare, including the unrestrained forays into extrajudicial killing via drone warfare; deepening inequality not seen since the 1920s, accompanied by growing poverty and increasing and near-record unemployment from the ongoing effects of the Great Recession; growing national indebtedness, crumbling infrastructure, decaying schools, spiraling higher-education costs, and declining public investment; and deteriorating federal and state government revenues at a time when the richest Americans (and multinationals) pay a considerably lower share of their incomes in taxes than at any time since World War II. Half a century ago, citizens looked to the state and to domestic actors and policies—political parties, the labor and civil rights movements, regulations supportive of social protections—as countervailing forces designed to limit national tendencies toward extreme economic or political disequilibrium. Today, in the midst of such visible deterioration in income, opportunity, and even national image, these countervailing forces are in retreat, with a surreal politics of theater playing out across the American political spectrum that exacerbates a growing democratic deficit. From the 2010 Supreme Court Citizens United ruling that removed barriers to massive corporate funding and manipulation of electoral campaigns, to cratering public confidence (especially toward Congress) in the capacity of our political parties and politicians to find meaningful solutions to the serious challenges facing the country, to the recent debate in Congress over raising the debt ceiling—where a tiny Tea Party minority provided cover to a Republican Party unwilling to compromise on any revenue increases despite widespread and significant public majority support—there is a gnawing sense that our political regime may no longer be up to the task of responding pragmatically to the myriad of challenges facing us in the twenty-first century. Is a New Transnational Politics Possible? On the eve of 9/11, while we remained somewhat skeptical, many observers held out great expectations that global democratic collective action would provide a new countervailing force to counter the inequities of globetrotting multinationals and fluid capital. In the age of neoliberal globalization, much faith was placed in an emerging constellation of global civil society forces as a new means for helping to recover citizen control over public life. We do recognize that there have been, over this past decade, remarkable changes in world politics as non-state actors, WikiLeaks networks, and communications technologies via Facebook and Twitter have challenged the primacy of the state in the international system. Yet, while arguably a more plural and differentiated international system is evolving, the developments in the United States since 9/11, the expanding War on Terror, and continued global economic turbulence have seemed to confirm our misgivings about the transformative potential of the global civil society project. For those who care about transnational activism, then, our reflections herein cannot hold out much hope. Yet here and there are stirrings from unexpected quarters that give us some hope for a possible renaissance of transnational activism. First, although the American wing of the global justice movement has been much weaker than advocates had expected, that movement is still lively in Western Europe and Latin America and shows signs of spreading to Africa, where two of the recent meetings of the World Social Forum have been held.12 Second, some observers have taken heart from the launching of an American wing of the World Social Forum, in Atlanta in 2007 and Detroit in 2010.13 Notably, the US Social Forum process in Detroit provided space for the organizational efforts of dozens of groups that formed the People’s Movement Assembly on Food Sovereignty—eventually evolving into the US Food Sovereignty Alliance—whose work today contributes to the transformative efforts of the transnational food movement to promote popular democratic control over the global food system.14Third, the extraordinary spread of digital media over the decade since we first wrote may have many—and contradictory—outcomes, but at a minimum, it is creating a new form of “connective action” alongside older forms of collective action based on social-movement organizations and NGOs.15 These may seem like thin reeds on which to build a new edifice of transnational organizing, but when we think of the surprisingly rapid transnational diffusion of the Middle Eastern and North African revolutions in early 2011, which have now toppled dictators from Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, we should be prepared for surprises.

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#### ---C/I-Restriction is a prohibition

Supreme Court of Delaware 83 (THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF NEW CASTLE, a municipal corporation of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. ROLLINS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., Defendant Below, Appellee, No. 155, 1983, 475 A.2d 355; 1984 Del. LEXIS 324, November 21, 1983, Submitted, April 2, 1984, Decided)

The term "restrict" is defined as: To restrain within bounds; to limit; [\*\*9] to confine. Id. at 1182. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that HN5the term "regulate" necessarily entails a possible prohibition of some kind. That Court has stated: "It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition." Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592, 8 L. Ed. 2d 130, 82 S. Ct. 987 (1962). The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in reviewing a statute containing language similar to that found in 22 Del.C. § 301 (which empowered municipalities to "regulate and restrict" outdoor advertising on public ways, in public places, and on private property within public view) held that the statute in question authorized a town to provide, through amortization, for the elimination of nonconforming off-site signs five years from the time the ordinance was enacted. The court held that the Massachusetts enabling act: Conferred on the Legislature plenary power to regulate and restrict outdoor advertising . . . . Although the word "prohibit" was omitted from [the enabling act], it was recognized that the unlimited and unqualified power to regulate and restrict can be, for practical purposes, the power to prohibit [\*\*10] "because under such power the thing may be so far restricted that there is nothing left of of it." (Citations omitted.) The court continued its discussions of the two terms by stating: The distinction between regulation and outright prohibition is often considered to be a narrow one: "that regulation may take the character of prohibition, in proper cases, is well established by the decisions of this court" . . . quoting from United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 425, 63 L. Ed. 337, 39 S. Ct. 143 (1919). John Donnelly and Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board, Mass. Supr., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975). We hold that, through Article II, Section 25 of the Delaware Constitution and 22 Del.C. § 301, the General Assembly has authorized New Castle to terminate nonconforming off-site signs upon reasonable notice, that is, by what has come to be known as amortization. We hold that the power to "regulate and restrict" as such term applies to zoning matters includes the power, upon reasonable notice, to prohibit some of those uses already in existence.

### Solvency

#### Our specific demand is a critical starting point to creating a policy; what that is is i

Nagler 11 (Michael, co-founded the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at Berkeley, also the founder of the Metta Center for Nonviolence Love In Action: Their weapons don’t scare us, Nov 1, http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/their-weapons-dont-scare-us/)

I have long argued that nonviolence works best when it deals not with mere symbols but with real things that have symbolic power. Gandhi’s Salt March was an outstanding example; another is the ongoing actions of Palestinian farmers, oftentimes organized and supported by the Palestine Solidarity Project, to plant and replant olive trees that are uprooted, poisoned, and otherwise destroyed by Israeli settlers or the military. There is something primordial, and even beautiful about a direct confrontation of something real and true — and especially a living thing — with the destructive power of human delusions. The olive tree is both a symbol and an actual source of Palestinian well-being, and hence of Palestinian hopes and dignity. To uproot them, which is contrary to Jewish law, is to enact one’s own violence in a way that even the perpetrator is forced to understand the evil that person is perpetrating. This “forcing reason to be free,” as Gandhi called it, is an important part of nonviolent dynamics. Not long ago, a courageous woman who ran a shelter for destitute mothers with children in Delhi was told by city authorities that she would have to pay taxes that up until then had been waived. She explained that they were a shoestring operation and if the taxes were imposed at least three of her women would have to be turned out on the street. “We can’t help that,” said the men. “All right,” she replied, but then took them through the door to the large dorm where her charges were housed, and said, “You choose which ones to turn out.” The men left and the tax waiver remained in place. In the important film Bringing Down a Dictator that chronicles the 2000 Otpor (‘Resist!’) uprising, which in one dramatic day turned Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic out of office (after eleven weeks of NATO bombings that only consolidated his hold on power), student leader Srdja Popovic explained, “we won because we were on the side of life.” This symbolic valence might be said to be missing from the present occupation movement. Fun, music, and face paint may say “life” to some people more than business suits and portfolios, but they don’t quite evoke the reality and urgency that enabled the oppressed Serbian population to rise up against harsh police brutality and is enabling the Palestinians and their international supporters to face even fatal resistance in Beit Omar, Surif, and other West Bank villages. Proudly declaring that “their weapons don’t scare us,” the message of the Palestinian Solidarity Project, which is coordinating not only the olive-tree planting but roadblock removal, and apartheid wall demonstrations, is quite accurate: Peace and security are rights not just for some of us, but for all the people of the world. Controlling another person’s life, possessions, future, and thoughts is a crime and a humiliation. We have dreams and hopes of freedom, so we are inviting all the people of the world to stand with us and share in our struggle for freedom. For any such struggle to succeed — be it that of the Palestinians or of Occupy Wall Street or even a larger movement for peace — it must be able to counter the power of the Apocalyptic myths that have driven the post-9/11 wars and brought the U.S. to a point of near ruin financially and morally. These prevailing narratives of militarism revolve around the powerful archetype of good and evil, order vs. chaos; but they can be overcome by an even more powerful myth, if you will (I taught mythology for many years at U.C. Berkeley), which is the struggle for life itself against death. The answer is to take back not just our incomes and some civic spaces, but the “spaces” in our minds and our public discourse. In practice, this would mean making common cause with the Palestinian struggle and looking for other ways to show, patiently but insistently, that in opposing greed and militarism we are on the side of life — which would have the added advantage of being true.

#### Our drone-focused scholarship ITSELF is a critical act in defense of nonviolence.

Butigan 11 (Ken, director of Pace e Bene, a nonprofit organization fostering nonviolent change through education, community and action. He also teaches peace studies at DePaul University and Loyola University in Chicago, Chalmers Johnson and the activism of research, http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/chalmers-johnson-and-the-activism-of-research/)

Nick Turse has published a revealing overview of the dramatic proliferation of US Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Unmanned Aerial Systems entitled “Inside our drone base empire.” As Turse, a senior editor of Alternet.org, writes: They increasingly dot the planet. There’s a facility outside Las Vegas where “pilots” work in climate-controlled trailers, another at a dusty camp in Africa formerly used by the French Foreign Legion, a third at a big air base in Afghanistan where Air Force personnel sit in front of multiple computer screens, and a fourth at an air base in the United Arab Emirates that almost no one talks about. And that leaves at least 56 more such facilities to mention in an expanding American empire of unmanned drone bases being set up worldwide. Despite frequent news reports on the drone assassination campaign launched in support of America’s ever-widening undeclared wars and a spate of stories on drone bases in Africa and the Middle East, most of these facilities have remained unnoted, uncounted, and remarkably anonymous — until now. Run by the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and their proxies, these bases — some little more than desolate airstrips, others sophisticated command and control centers filled with computer screens and high-tech electronic equipment — are the backbone of a new American robotic way of war. They are also the latest development in a long-evolving saga of American power projection abroad — in this case, remote-controlled strikes anywhere on the planet with a minimal foreign “footprint” and little accountability. Turse’s reference to drones and their “base empire” got me thinking again about the late Chalmers Johnson, the Cold Warrior who found himself making a fundamental shift in his later years. In so doing, he helped pull back the curtain on what he termed the United States’ “base world.” Turse’s depiction of the growing presence of drone bases is just another piece of the puzzle that Johnson, who died last November, spent the last years of his life documenting and sounding the alarm about. I was a latecomer to Chalmers Johnson. It was not until I read John Dominic Crossan’s book, God and Empire that I learned about this academic and former CIA consultant who underwent a profound metamorphosis and who produced a series of remarkable books peeling back much that hides the truth about the imperial musculature of this country. Johnson had served in the US military during the Korean War, authored numerous books, and rose through the ranks of academia to become a department chair at the University of California at Berkeley. He later founded the Japan Policy Research Institute. His awakening came after the USSR collapsed. He was stunned to see that, instead of demobilizing its forces, the US strengthened them, and has carried on with one war after another since then. His intellectual honesty being what it was, he had to re-think everything. The result was a trilogy that outlines how the US empire is not rooted in colonies but what he names a “base world”—in 2005, he documented 737 US bases around the planet that function to establish and maintain US military, political, and economic preeminence. (Since then, Nick Turse has documented that the US now likely possesses over 1,000 bases worldwide.) Johnson is somber about the karma this entails—the equal and opposite reaction this base world sparks and the whirlwind it will reap. Hence the weight and meaning of his three books: Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire; The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic; and Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic. There are many ways to “wage nonviolence.” Chalmers’ activism was rooted in his cogent and painstaking academic research, the results of which he not only published but promoted in numerous venues. He connected the dots of American empire and offered us a more clear understanding of the infrastructure of total dominance and its consequences. This in itself was a profound act of nonviolent resistance and nonviolent change. Such active analysis will be crucial to what I like to call the “nonviolent shift”—the long-term process of creating a culture of justice and peace using tools of nonviolent transformation. It is not the process of creating a utopia. Instead, it is a slow construction of an environment—a human “family system” —that entertains the nonviolent option as the default. Building such a culture entails political, sociological, psychological, and artistic work. But these must, in turn, be grounded in a deep spiritual transformation—what eco-philosopher Joanna Macy calls The Great Turning. This is why I regard Chalmers Johnson’s work as a critical step in a required existential therapy of our time. It brings the reality with which we must contend into sharp focus. For Gandhi, Johnson’s chilling analysis would lead, first, to the question: In what ways have I propped this up? What implicit or explicit consent? What is it inside that has helped keep this going? How are we supporting this? And how do we loosen those chains inside – so that we may remove the pillars of support that keep such a policy in place? Chalmers Johnson’s legacy invite us to glimpse the Wizard of Oz behind the curtain. Then, in the spirit of Gandhi, it prompts us to explore all the ways we have consented to and supported this macabre charade. Finally, it calls us to act—to recognize that we are at the crossroads and to take action to renounce the lethal allure and accelerating momentum of empire. This will be no simple thing. But the task is made just a bit easier by the kind of engaged research that Chalmers Johnson—and others like Nick Turse—have gifted us with. May we have many more examples of this form of nonviolent action.

### Schmitt

#### Friend enemy relations are unstable

Reinhard 13 (Kenneth, “The Neighbor: Three Inquiries Into Political Theology,” Chapter one, “Toward a Political Theology of the Neighbor,” Google Books, pgs 17-19)

Derrida's argument in The Politics of Friendship is not so much that we have entered into a historical period where the friend-enemy polarity has broken down, but that it is an inherently unstable opposition. Derrida's account of how the enemy and friend come to displace and infect each other in his reading of Schmitt leads him to propose "a step (not) beyond the political": Let us not forget that the political would precisely be that which thus endlessly binds or opposes the friend-enemy/enemy-friend couple in the drive or decision of death.... A hypothesis, then: and what if another lovence (in friendship or in love) were bound to an affirmation of life, to the endless repetition of this affirmation, only in seeking its way ... in the step beyond the political, or beyond that political as the horizon of finitude ... the philein beyond the political or another politics for loving. M This other "politics for loving" that Derrida hypothesizes, this love both beyond and not-beyond the political, must still remain in the vicinity of the theological if it is to be significant, in Schmitt's terms, and not merely a fantasy of some purely secular politics. I would like to suggest that such a politics can be located in the figure of the neighbor—the figure that materializes the uncertain division between the friend/family/ self and the enemy/stranger/other. There is an element of this political theology of the neighbor that we can already point to in Derrida's comments on Schmitt's reference to Jesus's call to "love your enemies" in Matthew. For Schmitt, this biblical reference points to a linguistic distinction in Greek and Latin (but not German or English) between the private inimicos, who may indeed be loved or hated, and the public hostis, the political enemy, who, according to Schmitt, is not an object of affect. But as Derrida points out in a reading of this passage in The Gift of Death, the full line from Matthew that Schmitt refers to involves a crucial reference to the neighbor: "Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you ..." (5:43-44). Jesus cites Leviticus 19:18, the commandment to "love thy neighbor as thyself," but adds to it something not present in the Hebrew Bible, a directive to "hate thine enemy," in order to make it seem that he is undoing a piece of legal vengeance and, in proclaiming Love your enemies, is asserting its opposite. In fact, the biblical passage in Leviticus Jesus refers to has just specifically forbidden ven- geance.1 \* Jesus acts here as a sovereign, in declaring an exception ("love your enemies") to a law ("hate thine enemy") that he himself has confected; Jesus's commandment to love the enemy must be perceived as not merely new, but antinomian, in violation of the preexisting legal code. Jesus's act of suspending a law that did not previously exist is not merely his exercise of the sovereign prerogative of exception, but an act of political-theological creation ex mhilo, truly a polemical "miracle." Although Jesus's rhetorical technique here would seem to be that of paradoxical reversal, the first part of the verse, the injunction to love the neighbor, is not challenged, but persists, extended in the series of acts of love that follows ("bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you"). Indeed, rather than being inverted, it will be purified of particularism and appropriated as a central tenet of the new Christian political theology. For Schmitt, the line from Matthew is meant to clarify the difference between the public enemy and the various enmities that occur privately and are not part of the political as such. Jesus, he points out, uses the word inimicm or ekhthros for the enemy we arc enjoined to love, and this must be distinguished from the true enemy, the hostis or polemics. As Derrida indicates, Schmitt's disturbing example is that the Christian state can have Islam as its enemy, but still love the Muslim as its neighbor.16 But Derrida argues that it is precisely in this enemy, the one who constitutes the political for Schmitt, that the trace of the neighbor materializes: "An identifiable enemy—that is, one who is reliable to the point of treachery, and thereby familiar. One's fellow man, in sum, who could almost be loved as oneself. . . . This adversary would remain a neighbor, even if he were an evil neighbor against whom war would have to be waged."17 The implication of Derrida's comment is that the neighbor who is to be loved as ourself cannot be relegated to a private, pre- or extrapolitical realm, insofar as a similar, if not identical, structure of reflexivity also determines the relationship to the public enemy, who, as reliably "identifiable," is loved (or hated) as ourself. Thus, Derrida points out a possibility of "semantic slippage and inversion" in Schmitt's political theology: the enemy can also be a friend, and the friend is sometimes an enemy. The border between them, and between the public and private realms they are associated with, is "fragile, porous, con- testable," and to this extent "the Schmittian discourse collapses" and against the threat of that ruin, it takes form.18

#### 3. Humans are inclined to cooperation, not aggression, it’s a conditioned behavior

Goldstein, ’87 - Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland (Joshua S., International Studies Quarterly (1987) 31, 36, “The Emperor’s New Genes: Sociobiology and War,” University of Southern California)

Humans are not inherently aggressive but are more often cooperative. Dobzhansky (1962) suggests that "the fittest may also be the gentlest." 15 Morgan (1972: 58-59) and others point out that most human beings, even most males, never participate in wars (and even the participants act more like "sheep" than "wolves")-thus to "write of war as . . . a biological imperative like breathing and eating . . . is absurd." Montagu (1976: 3) rejects the idea that "human beings are inescapably killers" or "genetically and instinctively aggressive. '16 Indeed, the bias of biology is not toward aggression but cooperation, as Montagu (1976: 87, 185) states: In humans, cooperation and altruism have been at a much higher selective premium than in other primates. . Aggression, the existing evidence suggests, occurs only in cultures in which the individual is conditioned in aggressive behavior.