## 1AC

#### Same as texas round 8

## 2AC

### 2AC Aff Key

#### Resolving these forms of virtuous violence is key---it is a key vehicle used to enact violence that they can’t wish away.

Campos 07 (Joseph H. Campos, The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power, google books pg 101)

Later it was discovered that the U.S.' strikes against terrorist facilities in Sudanwere in fact attacks on pharmaceutical facilities. As long as the state maintains and successfully promotes its virtuous violence, it is able to name any action as justified in defense of the state and the security of its citizenry. Terrorist violence, not statist violence, is portrayed as the outlaw component of the international world order. Everything within the control of the state - from vast bodies of water, to borders, and ultimately to the complex working of the individual body - becomes a national security site that must be secured against the violence of terrorism. The state frames terrorists as inhumane individuals who corrupt the battlefields of statist control as it turns the "war" from actual fields of battle with physical space to fields of battle that are indeterminate, unstructured, and malleable. "The enemies of peace cannot defeat us with traditional military means" (Clinton, 1999: 86) and thus they warp time and space "realities" of the state in their production of fear and terror. The "civilized" order is then solidified and enacted by the state in the face of terrorism's "uncivilized" nature.

#### This is particularly true in the context of the 1NC – only the aff solves or else their strategy and politics will be in the cross-hairs

Bloice et al 13 (Carl Bloice is a BlackCommentator.com Editorial Board member, writer and senior activist in San Francisco, a member of the National Coordinating Committee of the Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism, a moderator at portside.org and formerly worked for a healthcare union. Bill Fletcher, Jr. is a long-time racial justice, labor and international activist and writer. He is a Senior Scholar with the Institute for Policy Studies and the immediate past president of TransAfrica Forum. He is the co-author of Solidarity Divided. Jamala is a long-time organizer and writer. She is a 2011 Alston-Bannerman Fellow and author of The Best of The Way I See It & Other Political Writings. She is the co-founder of the Organization for Black Struggle. “Black America and Obama’s Foreign Policy,” <http://www.zcommunications.org/black-america-and-obama-s-foreign-policy-by-bill-fletcher-jr.html>)

Well, this is a partial list, but the point here is that there is something very wrong in Obama’s foreign policy, yet you would not know that from Black America’s response. Foreign policy is not being debated on most African American talk radio programs and very rarely do we hear African American commentators in the mainstream media address the limitations of US foreign policy under Obama. While the Congressional Black Caucus has increasingly criticized the President around domestic policies, particularly the need by the administration to address the economic depression-like conditions of Black America, there is relative silence on foreign policy. This relative silence appears to be rooted in the same general problem that has afflicted Black America since the election of Obama: a belief that criticism and pressure is somehow destructive and disloyal. One can only conclude this in light of the fact that on most foreign policy matters Black America has shown an historic identification with the struggles for liberation and independence, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America. African Americans were the most critical demographic segment of the USA when it came to the US invasion of Iraq, for instance, and we regularly criticize and openly oppose interventionist activities by the USA…except when they are carried out by the Obama Administration. We are not waving our fingers at anyone. Rather we are suggesting that this is a dangerous course of action because it represents a failure to recognize that the Obama administration is not about one individual named Barack Obama. It is an administration overseeing policies, many historically rooted, in the objective of building and sustaining global domination. In other words, this goes way beyond a question of Obama’s personal views and beliefs and speaks to the sort of administration that he constructed, including who were named top officials and who were excluded. By remaining silent in the face of US aggression (and law violations, such as the murder of Awlaki and drone attacks that take the lives of many civilian noncombatants) we are making several mistakes. For one, we are ignoring the precedent that is being set. Kill one US citizen without even an indictment (let alone a trial) and where does it end? Wave our swords at Iran and promote destabilization, and does this result in an all-out war? Send troops to Uganda, and does this become another Vietnam? Cajole military forces in one African country to invade another? None of this benefits Black America—not to mention the rest of the world—in the slightest and under other circumstances many African Americans would be protesting. Paradoxically, it is probably time for us to rethink Obama’s remarks at the Congressional Black Caucus banquet in September. When he said African Americans needed to stop complaining and put on our marching boots, many people became upset and felt insulted. But let’s think about this for a moment. Too many of us have been content to complain—sometimes bitterly—in private about what we fail to see from the Obama administration. So, maybe it is time to put on those marching boots, indeed, and march in protest not only against the demonic activities of the Republicans but as well against US aggression carried out by the first African American President of the United States of America? If not now, when? If not you (us), who?

#### And tracing the history of just war in relationship to targeted killing and the rest of militarism has to be the starting point – it’s the primary way militarism justifies itself, otherwise we cede academia to the miltiary

Moore 01 (Thomas, An Australian Approach to ethic warfare?, War, Ethics and Justice: New Perspectives on a Post-9/11 World, google books, pg39)

The revival of just war theory in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States reveals the contradictory and contested nature of moral claims about violence within International Relations. If political scientists are often criticised for "fiddling while Rome burns' (Strauss 1962: 327) then the extensive revival of just war theory in public debates about armed intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates the importance of moral reasoning in public deliberation about warfare and violence in International Relations. The extensive deployment of just war theory in the global war on terror raises signi- ficant questions about the contradictory relationship between political practice and political theory within the just war tradition. The strength of the just war tra-dition lies in its capacity to generate an understanding of the communitarian basis of modem militaries and how decisions about warfare are questions for deliberation within political community. Nonetheless, this instrumental view of just war theory thinks of just war as a rational body of conditions that must be satisfied in order to go to war (jus ad bellum) and in the fighting of war (jus in bello) This chapter examines the way in which parliamentary debate about the Iraqi intervention highlights the limitations of the just war theory as a public dis- course of warfare. A failure to examine the 'difficult questions' of just war theory within the official discourse of Australian foreign policy have revealed how the vocabulary of the just war tradition has become a 'permission slip’ for states in justifying the global war on terror. The 'difficult questions' of the just war tradition have been overlooked in the need to provide a moral justification for an intervention that was contrary to international law.

#### Combining multiple strategies is the best approach to overcoming the contingency of identity and political committments which fractures coalitions to solve oppression.

**Roithmayr, Illinois law professor, 2001**

(Daria, “ARTICLE: Left (Over) Rights”, 5 LTC 407, lexis, ldg)

This essay has proposed that rights talk might yet be rhetorically useful for communities of color, either as a mode of strategic action, or as transgressive performance. This contingent and instrumental use of rights talk may help to make a broader point about an ad hoc, contingency-oriented approach to social action that elsewhere I have described a radical or postmodern pragmatism. (Roithmayr 1998) Postmodern pragmatism looks quite different from the (neo) pragmatism of Rorty or Fish or Radin, or, farther back, the pragmatisms of Pierce and Dewey. n29 Pragmatism in either form has defined "truth" as those practices that collectively proved useful for a particular society or community--something that has some sort of cash value for a community--in contrast to the more conventional definitions of truth that anchor their foundation in logic, moral imperatives or some other sort of objective sounding meta-discourse. (Rorty 1989: 5) Critical race theory appears to adopt a slightly modified version of neo-pragmatism, one which is based on the relationship between usefulness and identity. Like the neo-pragmatists, CRT anchors pragmatic strategies in the needs of a community, but CRT focuses on the needs of a particular identity-based subset of the community. CRT scholar Mari Matsuda has argued that "the perspective from the bottom"--from outsider communities who are at the bottom of the economic, social and political ladder-should drive pragmatic strategies for social change. (Matsuda 1987) But regardless of whether the common thread is disempowerment or cultural [\*441] practices, truth for CRT scholars appears to be that which is useful for communities of color. (Powell 1997: 789; Yamamot 1997: 821) In contrast to both neo-pragmatism and CRT pragmatism, postmodern pragmatism explicitly abandons the CRT notion that it is possible to pinpoint some common identity to unite communities of color, or that policymakers can derive notions of usefulness from whatever that identity may be. But radical pragmatism also abandons the neo-pragmatist idea that usefulness can be determinately defined apart from specific questions about history, geography, community identity and a whole host of other factors. Instead, postmodern pragmatism adopts a contingent, non universalist conception of both usefulness and identity. First, many purportedly collective answers about usefulness--both at the general level and for communities of color--contain the potential for disruption, suppressed dissent, alternative interpretations, pockets of resistance, or deviant and unruly meanings.. (Laclau 1996: 60-61) Moreover, this potential for disruption is structured at least partly on identity-based lines. As Richard Rorty points out, usefulness is a socially-constructed, wholly situated and inevitably contingent concept (Rorty 1989: 48). When one says a strategy is useful, one must also ask, "useful for whom?" Second, and by the same token, as Kennedy highlighted earlier, the idea of community identity is similarly a contested concept that contains suppressed dissent and pockets of resistance. Not only do group members and non-group members often disagree about what constitutes the group's defining features at any particular point in time but communities of color also contain fractured and intersecting sub-communities with conflicting perspectives, as Crenshaw's theory of inter-sectionality illustrates. (Crenshaw 1991: 1241) Moreover, even if common experiences (like the experience of racialized oppression) or cultural practices could define the identity of a particular community, those experiences and investments do not necessarily dictate the kinds of political commitments that such [\*442] a community would find useful. Thus, the concept of community is too contingent to completely determine usefulness, and usefulness is equally unable to serve as the foundation for definitions of community. Postmodern pragmatism embraces this contingency and conflict, to make the following claim: Truth is that which advances contingently defined purposes or political commitments for contingently defined communities of color at a particular time and place (also contingently defined) and for a contingently defined period of time. In this definition, not only are the concepts of identity contingent, but more importantly, they partly reflect and partly constitute one another at the same time. That is, a community is defined at a particular moment in time by a whole host of factors, which includes the set of political commitments that a group finds useful. n30 By the same token, the political commitments that a group finds useful are constructed by a whole host of factors, one of which is the community's pre-existing identity. Of course, in particular circumstances, community identity might itself be understood, like rights discourse, as a rhetorical strategy designed to advance particular political commitments. Ian Haney Lopez has urged Latino/as to embrace an explicitly racialized identity as opposed to an identity based on ethnicity, nationality or culture, because such an identity will advance shared political commitments to anti-subordination. (Haney-Lopez 1998: 1154) In his view, an identity framed in racial terms will draw critical attention to the way in which Latino/as have been oppressed on the basis of the same sort of racialized assumptions about intelligence, virtue and productivity that blacks and other racialized groups have suffered. (1154) Haney Lopez's vision of identity is neither naturalized nor essentialized, but explicitly political, in that it relies on shared political commitments to anti-subordination. But a political commitment to anti-subordination may mean many different things to different groups of Latino/as, depending [\*443] on their nationality, their gender, their sexual orientation, the color of their skin, their history, their age. Adopting a racialized identity for anti-subordination purposes may have far more appeal for dark-skinned Mexican-Americans of indigenous descent than for light-skinned Cubans, who may think of themselves as white and may consider anti-subordination primarily in terms of political resistance to Fidel Castro. Thus, although political commitments, identity and notions of usefulness can all contribute to the pragmatic value of a particular strategy, none can serve as the foundation because each is contingently shaped by the other, and by interaction with many other factors. (Scott 1991: 773) This essay advocates using rights discourse as a mode of strategic action or transgressive performance. Although outcomes cannot be guaranteed in advance, because contingency often precludes closure in advance, that fact should not foreclose engaged activity. To that end, people of color should engage, as Charles Taylor advises, in an "inspired ad hoccery," "regarding each situation of crisis as an opportunity for improvisation." (Taylor 1989: 121) People of color should, from their unstable positions within language and history, generate as many different species of transgressive and strategic performances as possible, using whatever tools we might have at our disposal, to advance our vision of social change.

### 2AC A2: FG

#### Try or die for utilization of the state – advocacy of transforming structures of just war is key and extricating yourself prevents us from being able to constrain those that participate in systems of oppressive violence – we’re not distinterested

Young 13 (Kelly Michael Young, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics, Wayne State University, “Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers,” http://public.cedadebate.org/node/13)

When we wrote the paper, we argued that the topic would make for good debate because it was timely “but not too timely.” Little could we have anticipated a number of events that occurred since April 22 that would make us somewhat regret this statement. First, on May 23, President Obama gave an important speech at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. that publicly outlined a number of new guidelines for UAV strikes and repeated his call on Congress to begin closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention center (http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-23/politics/39467399\_1\_war-and-peace-cold-war-civil-war). While none of these procedures or calls fundamentally changed the Obama administration’s rationale or legal defense for these policies (http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2013/0524/Has-Obama-tightened-US...), the speech certainly raised the profile of the debate over executive war powers considerably. Second, on June 14, The Guardian newspaper released information obtained from whistleblower Richard Snowden, a U.S. programmer for the National Security Agency (NSA), which revealed the existence of secret NSA programs that collected telephone metadata and internet surveillance programs such as PRISM (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data). Third, on August 31, Obama announced that he would seek congressional approval for a military strike against Syria (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html). Although the President made clear in his announcement that he believed he had the constitutional authority to strike without approval, for some commentators (http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/319827-obama-breaks-from-precedent-on-syria/), Obama’s announcement represented a complete reversal in presidential war making precedent, especially in light of the 2011 Libyan intervention. As the commentary and reaction to this announcement and the other recent events of the past four months continue to play out, we believe that these events will produce a robust and dynamic context for a year-long collegiate debate about presidential war powers and congressional oversight. While we are amazed that so much has happened in such a short time, we believe that the core of the controversy – should Congress or the Courts impose additional restrictions on presidential war powers—remains fundamentally the same. Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States. Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

No link to institutions

Michael Eber 5, former Director of Debate at Michigan State University, “Everyone Uses Fiat”, April 8th, <http://www.opensubscriber.com/message/edebate@ndtceda.com/1077700.html>

**It is shocking to me how**, after literally a DECADE of debates, **no one seems to understand *what the hell fiat is***. **Policy teams foolishly defend "role playing" even though *they do not role play*.** And critique teams reject fiat even though almost every single K alternative relies on a utopian imaginary that necessitates a greater degree of fiat than the reformist Aff. **Debate is about *opinion formation, not role-playing. Affirmative policy teams do not pretend to BE the federal government. They merely IMAGINE the consequences of the government enacting the plan as a means of determining whether it SHOULD be done***. **All fiat represents is the step of imagining hypothetical enactment of the plan as an intellectual tool for deciding whether WE should endorse it.**"**How should we determine whether or not to ENDORSE lifting sanctions on Cuba?**" "**Well, what would happen if the government did that**?" "**Let's** ***IMAGINE*** **a world where sanctions are lifted**. **What would that world look like? Would it be better than the status quo**?" "Is that world better than competitive alternatives?"***This conversation does NOT posit the discussants AS the federal government. They do not switch identities and act like Condaleeza*** and Rummy. ***They do not give up the agency to decide something for themselves - the whole point is simply to use the imagination of fiat to determine OUR OPINION.***"**I think sanctions should be removed [by the government] because IT IS A GOOD IDEA. It would save lives**." "I think sanctions should not be removed because that policy would help Castro and make things worse" ***It is nonsensical to***simultaneously ***say "Aff = fiat = bad"*** a**nd then defend alternatives that are only coherent/debatable/endorsable BY USING THE IMAGINITIVE TOOL** OF FIAT. "Our alternative is revolution against capitalism" "Why do that? How should we determine whether or not to ENDORSE revolution against capitalism?" "Well, what would happen if we did that?" "Let's IMAGINE a world of revolution against capitalism [or us demanding revolution, or whatever]. Would that be a good thing?" ***It is NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, and certainly irresponsible, to have a debate about whether to reject capitalism without imagining what would happen if we did***. It is also incoherent to say something like "we will defend the consequences of our plan, but not fiat." ***The imagination of "what would happen if" IS FIAT.***If you want to make framework debates better, then never again utter the stupid phrases "pre-fiat" and "post-fiat."

### 2AC druck

#### --we cant talk about drones in the abstract- that cedes their control to the executive- public deliberation about actual technology is critical

Druck-J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School-10

Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare. Cornell Law Review, 98(1), 209-238.

Why an Unconstrained Executive Matters Today If public scrutiny acts as a check on presidential action by pressuring Congress into enforcing domestic law (namely, the WPR), then that check has weakened given the increased use of technology-driven warfare abroad.135 As a result, fewer checks on presidential military actions exist, implying that we will see more instances of unilateral presidential initiatives. But if the new era of warfare removes the very issues associated with traditional warfare, should we be concerned about the American public’s increasing numbness to it all? The answer is undoubtedly yes. First, from a practical standpoint, the psychology surrounding mechanized warfare makes it easier for the United States to enter hostilities initially.136 Without having to worry about any of the traditional costs of war (such as a draft, rationing, casualties, etc.), the triggers that have historically made the public wary of war are now gone. When machines, rather than human beings, are on the front lines, the public (and, as a result, politicians and courts) will not act to stop the continued use of drones. In other words, people will simply stop caring about our increased actions abroad, regardless of their validity, constitutionality, or foreign harm. But again one must wonder: should we care? After all, even if we increase the number of military conflicts abroad, the repercussions hardly seem worth worrying about. For example, worrying that WPR violations will cause significant harm to the United States seems somewhat misplaced given the limited nature of technology-driven warfare. Granted, this style of warfare might make it easier to enter hostilities, but the risk of subsequent harm (at least to the United States) is low enough to mitigate any real danger. Furthermore, even if the effects of warfare might become increasingly dulled, any use of force that would eventually require traditional, Vietnam-esque types of harms as the result of technology-driven warfare would in a sense “wake up the populace” in order to check potentially unconstitutional action.137 Thus, if our level of involvement requires machines and only machines, why worry about a restrained level of public scrutiny? The answer is that a very real risk of harm exists nonetheless. War by its very nature is unpredictable.138 Indeed, one of the major grievances concerning the war in Vietnam was that we ended up in a war we did not sign up for in the first place.139 The problem is not the initial action itself but the escalation. Therefore, while drone strikes might not facially involve any large commitment, the true threat is the looming possibility of escalation.140 That threat exists in the context of drones, whether because of the risk of enemy retaliation or because of a general fear that an initial strike would snowball into a situation that would require troops on the ground.141 In both cases, an apparently harmless initial action could eventually unravel into a situation involving harms associated with traditional warfare.142 Worse yet, even if that blowback was sufficient to incentivize the populace and Congress to mobilize, the resulting involvement would only occur after the fact.143 If we want restraints on presidential action, they should be in place before the United States is thrown into a war, and this would require public awareness about the use of drones.144 As such, whether it is unforeseen issues arising out of the drones themselves145 or unforeseen consequences stemming from what was ostensibly a minor military undertaking, there is reason to worry about a populace who is unable to exert any influence on military actions, even as we shift toward a more limited form of warfare.146 Another issue associated with a toothless WPR in the era of technology-drive warfare involves humanitarian concerns. If one takes the more abstract position that the public should not allow actions that will kill human beings to go unchecked, regardless of their legality or underlying rationale, then that position faces serious pressure in the era of technology-driven warfare. As the human aspect of warfare becomes more attenuated, the potential humanitarian costs associated with war will fade out of the collective consciousness, making it easier for the United States to act in potentially problematic ways without any substantial backlash. Rather than take note of whom we target abroad, for example, the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare forces the public to place “enormous trust in our leaders” despite the fact that good faith reliance on intelligence reports does not necessarily guarantee their accuracy.147 Accordingly, as the level of public scrutiny decreases, so too will our ability to limit unwarranted humanitarian damage abroad.148 At the very least, some dialogue should occur before any fatal action is taken; yet, in the technology-driven warfare regime, that conversation never occurs.149 Of course, this Note has argued that the issues associated with technology-driven warfare (an increased level of military involvement abroad, potential for escalation, humanitarian difficulties, etc.) though very real, are less prominent than the harms associated with traditional warfare. But perhaps this premise is incorrect; that is, perhaps technology-driven warfare does present sufficient harm to trigger social and political scrutiny. For example, pecuniary harms are very real contemporary concerns, and they seem to play an increased role in determining a country’s standing.150 In this respect, given the financial costs of drone strikes (and military spending in general),151 perhaps we need not be worried about an absence of public scrutiny. Yet given the traditional costs of war, pecuniary harm hardly seems like the type of concern sufficient to create the type of political checks present in the Civil War, World War I, Vietnam, or Iraq. In all four situations, American lives were at stake, entire households faced life-changing effects of war in a very real way, and the entire country saw major social and political transformations. Economic harm is certainly an issue worth considering, especially as the United States takes on more and more debt; yet, whether that sort of harm rises to the level sufficient to trigger mass citizen mobilization remains to be seen.152 Indeed, if the recent actions in Libya are any indication, financial harm is far too attenuated to create any sort of substantial backlash. Future technology-driven conflicts will likely create a clearer picture of the role of pecuniary damage, but as it stands, this sort of harm fails to “rally the troops” for public attentiveness.

#### The alternative fails – we must discuss the implementation of executive war power authority through legal justifications before anything else

Aziz Rana 12, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; PhD., Harvard University, Connecticut Law Review July, 2012, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417, “COMMENTARY: NATIONAL SECURITY: LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?” lexis nexis

Despite over six decades of reform initiatives, the overwhelming drift of security arrangements in the United States has been toward greater-not less-executive centralization and discretion. This Article explores why efforts to curb presidential prerogative have failed so consistently. It argues that while constitutional scholars have overwhelmingly focused their attention on procedural solutions, the underlying reason for the growth of emergency powers is ultimately political rather than purely legal. In particular, scholars have ignored how the basic meaning of "security" has itself shifted dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War in line with changing ideas about popular competence. Paying special attention to the decisive role of actors such as Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter and Pendleton Herring, co-author of 1947's National Security Act, this Article details how emerging judgments about the limits of popular knowledge and mass deliberation fundamentally altered the basic structure of security practices. Countering the pervasive wisdom at the founding and throughout the nineteenth century, this contemporary shift has recast war and external threat as matters too complex and specialized for ordinary Americans to comprehend. Today, the dominant conceptual approach to security presumes that insulated decision-makers in the executive branch (armed with the military's professional expertise) are best equipped to make sense of complicated and often conflicting information about safety and self- defense. The result is that the other branches-let alone the public writ large-face a profound legitimacy deficit whenever they call for transparency or seek to challenge coercive security programs. Not surprisingly, the tendency of legalistic reform efforts has been to place greater decision-making power in the other branches and then to watch those branches delegate such power back to the executive.

#### And our political strategy must include the criticism of the state - standing outside risks exclusion

**Krause et al., Oxford philosophy professor, 1997**

(Keith, “Critical security studies: concepts and cases”, xv-xvi, ldg)

These and other critical perspectives have much to say to each other in the construction of a critical theory of international relations and, in turn, to contemporary security studies. While elements of many approaches may be found in this volume, no one perspective dominates. If anything, several of the contributions to this volume stand more inside than outside the tradition of security studies, which reflects our twofold conviction about the place of critical perspectives in contemporary scholarship. First, to stand too far outside prevailing discourses is almost certain to result in continued disciplinary exclusion. Second, to move toward alternative conceptions of security and security studies, one must necessarily reopen the questions subsumed under the modern conception of sovereignty and the scope of the political. To do this, one must take seriously the prevailing claims about the nature of security. Many of the chapters in this volume thus retain a concern with the centrality of the state as a locus not only of obligation but of effective political action. In the realm of organized violence, states also remain the preeminent actors. The task of a critical approach is not to deny the centrality of the state in this realm but rather, to understand more fully its structures, dynamics and possibilities for reorientation. From a critical perspective, state action is flexible and capable of reorientation, and analyzing state policy need not therefore be tantamount to embracing the statis assumptions orthodox conceptions. To exclude a focus on state action from a critical perspective on the grounds that it plays inevitably within the rules of existing conceptions simply reverses the error of essentializing the state. Moreover, it loses the possibility of influencing what remains the most structural capable actor in contemporary world politics

**Monbiot, M.A. in zoology and guardian columnist, 2004**

(George, Manifesto for a New World Order, pg. 11-13)

The quest for global solutions is difficult and divisive. Some members of this movement are deeply suspicious of all institutional power at the global level, fearing that it could never be held to account by the world’s people. Others are concerned that a single set of universal prescriptions would threaten the diversity of dissent. A smaller faction has argued that all political programmes are oppressive**:** our task should not be to replace one form of power with another, but to replace all power with a magical essence called ‘anti-power’. But most of the members of this movement are coming to recognize that if we propose solutions which can be effected only at the localor the nationallevel, we remove ourselves from any meaningful role in solving precisely those problems which most concern us. Issues such as cli­mate change, international debt, nuclear proliferation, war, peace and the balance of trade between nations can be addressed only globally or internationally. Without global measures and global institutions, it is impossible to see how we might distribute wealth from rich nations to poor ones, tax the mobile rich and their even more mobile money, control the shipment of toxic waste, sustain the ban on landmines, prevent the use of nuclear weapons, broker peace between nations or prevent powerful states from forcing weaker ones to trade on their terms. If we were to work only at the local level, we would leave these, the most critical of issues, for other people to tackle. Global governance will take place **whether we participate** in it **or not**. Indeed, it must take place if the issues which concern us are not to be resolved by the brute force of the powerful**.** That the international institutions have been designed or captured by the dictatorship of vested interests is not an argument against the existence of international institutions, but a reason for overthrowing them and re­placing them with our own. It is an argument for a global political system which holds power to account. In the absence of an effective global politics, moreover, local solutions will always be undermined by communities of interest which do not share our vision. We might, for example, manage to persuade the people of the street in which we live to give up their cars in the hope of preventing climate change, but unless **everyone**, in all communities, either shares our politics or is bound by the same rules, we simply open new road space into which the neighbouring communities can expand. We might declare our neighbour­hood nuclear-free, but unless we are simultaneously work­ing, at the international level, for the abandonment of nuclear weapons, we can do **nothing** to prevent ourselves and everyone else from being threatened by people who are not as nice as we are**.** We would deprive ourselves, in other words, of the power of restraint. By first rebuilding the global politics, we establish the **political space** in which our local alternatives can **flourish**. If, by contrast,we were to leave the governance of the necessary global institutions to others, then those institutions will pick off our local, even our national, solutions one by one. There is little point in devising an alternative economic policy for your nation, asLuis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva,now president of Brazil, once advocated, if the International Monetary Fund and the financial speculators have not first been overthrown**.** There is little point in fighting to protect a coral reef from local pollution, if nothing has been done to prevent climate change from destroying the conditions it requires for its survival.

## 1AR

### Perm

#### Critiquing the language and rhetoric of just war is solves the reason nonviolence is bd

Newman 12(Saul Newman is a Professor of Political Theory and renowned post-anarchist thinker at Goldsmiths, London, Saul Newman – Violence Against Violence, http://historiesofviolence.com/reflections/saul-newman-violence-against-violence/)

So we can see the anarchist social revolution as a form of counter-violence, a violence against violence. The violence of the state – a violence that is much more excessive in any case than any form of violence opposed to it – can only be met with a counter-violence; but here violence is transformed into a kind of radical non-violence. This is not to confuse it with peace, because, as the anarchist analysis shows, the peaceful coexistence that is achieved by the state is only a crystallization of violence and conquest. Rather, in order to unmask the violence that the state rests upon, the state can only be confronted with another kind of violence. Yet, what might be proposed is a kind ethical or symbolic violence, rather than a direct physical violence against persons. A similar transformation of violence was suggested by Georges Sorel in his notion of the proletarian general strike, which embodied the language of war and war-like virtues of heroism and discipline, but which, for that very reason, was a bloodless ethical and symbolic violence against existing social and political structures. This was to be distinguished from what Sorel called ‘bourgeois force’, in which the Jacobin project of mastering and utilizing state power resulted in real and savage bloodletting. So we see here a curious paradox, where the violent metaphor of war and confrontation is precisely what makes possible the radical transformation of violence into non-violence; whereas it is the involvement of the state, that instrument of social pacification, which leads to the shedding of blood. We find a similar attempt to radically rethink violence in Walter Benjamin’s notion of ‘divine violence’, which distinguishes itself from ‘mythic violence’ – as that which produces a continual oscillation between violence and law – and which instead embodies, it should be noted, the anarchist project of the abolition of the state: On the breaking of this cycle maintained by mythic forms of law, on the suspension of law with all the forces on which it depends as they depend on it, finally therefore on the abolition of state power, a new historical epoch is founded. So, it is not a question of whether or not a revolution against state power will be violent – against such overwhelming violence and power, it cannot be anything other than violent. Rather it is a question of how exactly revolutionary violence is understood, and whether it is possible to have a form of violence that is at the same time non-violent. Anarchism (and indeed all forms of revolutionary politics) will always be violent, precisely because of its implacable opposition to state power and its desire to transform social relations; however, this need not entail the shedding of blood. The key point here is that the transcendence of violence is only possible, at the same time, through invoking and drawing upon the language and the symbolic violence of war. Indeed, the idea of war is something that, at some level, animates all radical politics. Perhaps we can say that a radical critique of existing social and political structures presupposes the possibility of war, in the same way that Carl Schmitt believed that the political opposition between friend and enemy depended on the possibility of violence.

#### Highlighting the compatability between movements is key—the permutation makes it more likely that people join up with their struggle.

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These studies suggest that scholars should more systematically examine how individual activists navigate a social world where activists may move among policy domains. Entry into activism through one movement gives an individual access to a larger array of allied movements. It is natural to then ask about the factors that encourage activists to switch or combine issues and the outcomes associated with particular activism trajectories. The rest of this paper examines activism trajectories, which we define as the temporal sequence of participation in one or more movements. That is, an "activist trajectory" is a list of the movements that someone has joined over time. Some trajectories may be simple; an activist may prefer to participate in immigration rallies and nothing else. Other trajectories may be highly complex. An activist may have begun their political career by joining a civil rights movement march in the 1960s, then joined a women's group in the early 1970s. Later, the activist may have moved away from civil rights altogether and joined an immigration rights organization in the 1980s. Multiple studies of activist biographies (Jasper 1999; Carroll and Ratner 1996; Heaney and Rojas 2010) show that a substantial group of people migrate among movements or simultaneously participate in multiple movements. We consider two questions about activist trajectories. First, how does initial mobilization affect a subsequent activism trajectory? In other words, does it matter how an activist got involved in politics? Entry into activism may affect a subsequent trajectory through numerous mechanisms. The recruiting movement may have a relatively central position in the wider social movement field. Some movements may have many connections to other movements. For example, historical and sociological accounts of the civil rights movement have documented its many overlaps with the women’s rights movement, the Vietnam War movement, and others (e.g., Minkoff 1997) . In contrast, some movements may have a more circumscribed role. Bearman and Everett’s (1993) study of Washington, DC organizations also showed that some movements occupied more peripheral positions in activist networks. Thus, entry through more central movements would be associated with trajectories where activists associate with many different movements.

### 1AR-Public Sphere-TOD

#### A vibrant public sphere is ONLY WAY to check gross forms of national security utilitarianism

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The classic Frankfurt School diagnosis of American culture is grim and pessimistic. Jurgen Habermas rebels against the pessimism that pervades Dialectic of the Enlightenment, but he does not repudiate the essential diagnosis found there, though he surely seeks to deepen it with what he regards as a more nuanced investigation into the true roots of Enlightenment rationality. 157 For our purposes, to this observation of humanity's destructive fetish with means-ends rationality, we may add Habermas's emphasis on the public sphere as an optimistic source of rationality. 158 In the idealized vision that Habermas presents, the public sphere consists of voluntary associations dedicated to promoting unconstrained rational interchange among free and equal participants of good will. 159 It is in the public sphere, if truly healthy (free from the [\*93] distortions of domination), that the common good can be gleaned. 160 It is in the public sphere that government overreaching can be checked and averted. 161 On this view, world public opinion, cultivated within vibrant public spheres that somehow escape the distortions of governmental and corporate propaganda, may function, in this post-Cold War era that has bled into the Age of Terror, as the only potential countervailing force to the dominant super-power, the United States. What a vibrant public sphere provides are tools to resist naturalistic illusions undergirding social institutions and practices that preserve and promote spheres of inequality and regimes of domination, but that seem to be socially necessary. The idea here is well-rehearsed in the literature of critical theory: that which is socially constructed is made to appear fixed and natural; that which serves narrow interests of power and privilege is made to appear to serve everyone. 162 A culture beholden to means-ends thinking is a culture that has lost its capacity for critical theorizing, and such a culture is, as a result, at the mercy of its illusions. A vibrant public sphere that successfully exposes illusions, which conceal unhealthy conditions for society, is crucial to social change, for the exposing of such illusions is exactly what loosens the screws that keep unworthy social institutions intact. 163 A vibrant public sphere is the environment for rendering institutions malleable and open to change, which is why thinkers from Kant to Habermas regard "the public sphere as the definitive institution of democracy." 164

### 1AR-AntiWar Good

#### **Anti-war activism is a gateway to all other forms of social activism- it’s a key entry point for all social justice.**

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Leslie Cagan is a stalwart of the antiwar movement. Born in 1947, she was raised by an activist family and attended "Ban the Bomb" rallies in the 1950s. As a college student at New York University, she was the key organizer for her campus' sizeable delegation to the October 1967 March on the Pentagon. Cagan was a lead organizer of an anti-nuclear rally in Central Park that was attended by hundreds of thousands of people and was National Coordinator of the National Campaign for Peace in the Middle East during the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991. With the anticipation of a new war in Iraq, Cagan became National Coordinator of United for Peace and Justice in 2002, the nation's largest and broadest peace coalition during the presidency of George W. Bush, a role that she filled until 2009 (Cagan 2008). Despite Cagan's impeccable credentials as an antiwar activist, it would be a mistake to think of her only as an antiwar activist. She has managed political campaigns and been active in other social movements, such as the lesbian-gay rights movement and the campaign to normalize U.S. relations with Cuba (Hedges 2003). Like many peace activists, Cagan steered her efforts toward other causes during times of relative peacetime. Yet her antiwar stance informs these efforts: "the undercurrent of it all is that . . . sense that without peace, and until there is peace, it'll be virtually impossible to really bring full economic justice, social justice? (Cagan 2008). Like Cagan, many other antiwar activists bring peace frames to their involvement in other movementse (Carroll and Ratner 1996). Activism changes people's lives (McAdam 1989). Previous scholarship has demonstrated that the paths that people take into and through activism affect how their lives are changed (Blee 2011; Fisher 2006; Fisher and McInerney 2012; Han 2009; Munson 2010; Viterna 2006). For example, how people are recruited into activism (Fisher 2006; Fisher and McInerney 2012) and the organizations that they join (Han 2009; Munson 2008) makes a difference for how long they remain involved in activism and what types of activities they engage in. These studies, however, have failed to distinguish between movements in terms of how participation in one movement may influence an individual’s activist path differently than participation in another movement. Activists live in a world of multiple, interacting social movements (Evans and Kay 2008; Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Isaac, McDonald, and Lukasik 2006; McAdam 1995; Minkoff 1997; Voss and Sherman 2000; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Meyer and Whittier 1994). In this article, we examine the paths that activists navigate in switching from movement to movement over time. In particular, we argue that antiwar activists pursue distinctive paths in comparison to other progressive activists. This article proceeds, first, by considering the extant scholarship on paths to and through activism. Second, it argues that antiwar activists are likely to pursue paths that diverge from those of other progressive activists. Third, it examines the methods and rationale for conducting a survey of 691 activists who attended the 2010 US Social Forum, one of the largest assemblies of progressive activists in the United States. Fourth, it explains sequence analysis as an approach to analyzing data on activist paths. Fifth, it demonstrates the distinctiveness of antiwar activists? paths using regression analysis. The article concludes by explaining the aggregate consequences that these paths they have for the broader environment of progressive activists.