### 2AC Just War First

#### And tracing the history of just war in relationship to targeted killing and the rest of militarism has to be the starting point – it’s the primary way militarism justifies itself, otherwise we cede academia to the miltiary

Moore 01 (Thomas, An Australian Approach to ethic warfare?, War, Ethics and Justice: New Perspectives on a Post-9/11 World, google books, pg39)

The revival of just war theory in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States reveals the contradictory and contested nature of moral claims about violence within International Relations. If political scientists are often criticised for "fiddling while Rome burns' (Strauss 1962: 327) then the extensive revival of just war theory in public debates about armed intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates the importance of moral reasoning in public deliberation about warfare and violence in International Relations. The extensive deployment of just war theory in the global war on terror raises signi- ficant questions about the contradictory relationship between political practice and political theory within the just war tradition. The strength of the just war tra-dition lies in its capacity to generate an understanding of the communitarian basis of modem militaries and how decisions about warfare are questions for deliberation within political community. Nonetheless, this instrumental view of just war theory thinks of just war as a rational body of conditions that must be satisfied in order to go to war (jus ad bellum) and in the fighting of war (jus in bello) This chapter examines the way in which parliamentary debate about the Iraqi intervention highlights the limitations of the just war theory as a public dis- course of warfare. A failure to examine the 'difficult questions' of just war theory within the official discourse of Australian foreign policy have revealed how the vocabulary of the just war tradition has become a 'permission slip’ for states in justifying the global war on terror. The 'difficult questions' of the just war tradition have been overlooked in the need to provide a moral justification for an intervention that was contrary to international law.

### 2AC Rodriguez

#### Permutation – the aff is a pre-requisite to their kritik – a limited analysis is necessary to produce effective struggles against militarism – without it, their universal struggle will collapse in on itself

Pascal Bruckner 86, Maître de conférence at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, 1986

(Tears of the White Man)

Here again, though, our analysis must be refined. A universal and angelic and limitless fellowship would be disembodied, insufficient to deal with the misfortunes of any particular category or group of people. Through large-scale institutions, unions, political parties, and associations, I can reinforce and enlarge it to global dimensions, and through them I am obliged to make gestures of abstract charity in the form of food, medicine, and money, to countries whose names I do not know. But we choose our causes as our causes choose us, in an inner encounter with the outside world, in which the world proposes as much as we dispose. This is why we cannot honestly embrace all causes and also why we cannot be disinterested in any of them. When we express concern for Poland, we may be scolded by those who would have us also remember El Salvador, Lebanon, or South Africa. We must reply that a thousand causes for outrage are only so many reasons to do nothing, and that if we are urged not to prefer one struggle over another, East or West or South, we are being pushed toward an involvement that has no limits, which is really complete lack of involvement. It would mean the fairyland of solidarity with no concern. I feel solidarity, period, like some mystical and bloodless love that floats in the air. To be effective, solidarity has to be circumscribed and channeled. Other solidarities can be based on it, but only as aims sought by other people. To be effective, responsibility must choose a limited field of action and a specific geographic area (which is not related to its distance). Without that, it is indeterminate, blind. Our need for political action and sympathy beyond national borders must be tailored to the scale of causes in a particular area, beyond which there is nothing but the hubbub and babbling of the news media. In this respect, too much generosity is suspicious. A fellowship that expresses itself in general terms and that is incapable even of saying the name of those people whom it helps is the solidarity of armchair windbags. It dies of its own purity, from choosing everything. It is nothing but a grandiose slogan, like the postwar label “existentialist,” which was invoked everywhere and anytime. It gives support to the most dissimilar causes with the same enthusiasm. The same people who support the PLO in July with similar arguments, and six months later will support some other guerilla movement. Details are minimized in all cases, and common denominators are sought where historical details should call for exact analyses, strict attention to the facts. It is purely sentimental attachment to people in the outside world, and the Cambodians, Palestinians, and Lebanese all march through the square marked “Victim.”; it is the same preordained ritual for different participants. This kind of solidarity is for mercenaries. of the news media who must impartially cover all the active spots on earth. Let us not ask more of the media than what they already do quite well---make us aware of human problems. Our sort of attachment to the outside world cannot follow the rhythm of the news, even if we do care about it. We must learn to detach ourselves from the hassle of the headlines and hot stories, so we can take root somewhere on earth. Newspapers and television cannot possibly serve as a guide to action because, when the TV screen stops talking about a country, it continues to exist. If we based our attention to the world on the pattern of the news media, we would develop the flexibility of public opinion, which is too apt to take a stand for one group one day and another the next. That is a kind of technological solidarity for the busy ~~man~~ who wastes his effort and spreads ~~him~~self too thinly. A hand held out in this way will soon be pulled back; reflex solidarity provides aid, but then takes it back again.

#### There’s a couple net benefits to the permutation that are also disadvantages to the alternative –

#### First, Can’t protest what you don’t know – we must evaluate targeted killing before anything else – Provost-Smith says that drone technology is shrouded in secrecy because of its technological masking capability – it makes it so public opposition to militaristic violence writ large is impossible

Shaw 13 (Ian G., Lecturer in Human Geography, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare,” Geopolitics, 00:1–24, 2013, <http://www.unice.fr/crookall-cours/iup_geopoli/docs/predator-drones.pdf>)

While the Predator Empire may be assembled with dozens rather than hundreds of flight orbits, it is essential that the wholesale psychological damage that is being wrought upon thousands of people is never eclipsed by a technological enframing that so often shields the unbearable humanity of it all. Targeted killings are quickly becoming a "post-political" background issue and a noise that few listen to. This is why the civilian voices from Pakistan and elsewhere need to be heard, since they signify the fundamental "worldly" damage caused by drone strikes, well beyond the "surgical" metaphors that circulate in official state narratives. Indeed. Washington's permanent war is not even an ethical issue for most of the public: It is simply "common sense" to solve complex problems with Predators. An intervention is therefore needed to reposition what counts as human security away from this entrenched logic of "death-as-success."

#### The national security state relies on public silence and distance to normalize its warfare – targeted killing is key

Druck-J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School-10

Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare. Cornell Law Review, 98(1), 209-238.

A. Why an Unconstrained Executive Matters Today If public scrutiny acts as a check on presidential action by pressuring Congress into enforcing domestic law (namely, the WPR), then that check has weakened given the increased use of technology-driven warfare abroad.135 As a result, fewer checks on presidential military actions exist, implying that we will see more instances of unilateral presidential initiatives. But if the new era of warfare removes the very issues associated with traditional warfare, should we be concerned about the American public’s increasing numbness to it all? The answer is undoubtedly yes. First, from a practical standpoint, the psychology surrounding mechanized warfare makes it easier for the United States to enter hostilities initially.136 Without having to worry about any of the traditional costs of war (such as a draft, rationing, casualties, etc.), the triggers that have historically made the public wary of war are now gone. When machines, rather than human beings, are on the front lines, the public (and, as a result, politicians and courts) will not act to stop the continued use of drones. In other words, people will simply stop caring about our increased actions abroad, regardless of their validity, constitutionality, or foreign harm. But again one must wonder: should we care? After all, even if we increase the number of military conflicts abroad, the repercussions hardly seem worth worrying about. For example, worrying that WPR violations will cause significant harm to the United States seems somewhat misplaced given the limited nature of technology-driven warfare. Granted, this style of warfare might make it easier to enter hostilities, but the risk of subsequent harm (at least to the United States) is low enough to mitigate any real danger. Furthermore, even if the effects of warfare might become increasingly dulled, any use of force that would eventually require traditional, Vietnam-esque types of harms as the result of technology-driven warfare would in a sense “wake up the populace” in order to check potentially unconstitutional action.137 Thus, if our level of involvement requires machines and only machines, why worry about a restrained level of public scrutiny? The answer is that a very real risk of harm exists nonetheless. War by its very nature is unpredictable.138 Indeed, one of the major grievances concerning the war in Vietnam was that we ended up in a war we did not sign up for in the first place.139 The problem is not the initial action itself but the escalation. Therefore, while drone strikes might not facially involve any large commitment, the true threat is the looming possibility of escalation.140 That threat exists in the context of drones, whether because of the risk of enemy retaliation or because of a general fear that an initial strike would snowball into a situation that would require troops on the ground.141 In both cases, an apparently harmless initial action could eventually unravel into a situation involving harms associated with traditional warfare.142 Worse yet, even if that blowback was sufficient to incentivize the populace and Congress to mobilize, the resulting involvement would only occur after the fact.143 If we want restraints on presidential action, they should be in place before the United States is thrown into a war, and this would require public awareness about the use of drones.144 As such, whether it is unforeseen issues arising out of the drones themselves145 or unforeseen consequences stemming from what was ostensibly a minor military undertaking, there is reason to worry about a populace who is unable to exert any influence on military actions, even as we shift toward a more limited form of warfare.146 Another issue associated with a toothless WPR in the era of technology-drive warfare involves humanitarian concerns. If one takes the more abstract position that the public should not allow actions that will kill human beings to go unchecked, regardless of their legality or underlying rationale, then that position faces serious pressure in the era of technology-driven warfare. As the human aspect of warfare becomes more attenuated, the potential humanitarian costs associated with war will fade out of the collective consciousness, making it easier for the United States to act in potentially problematic ways without any substantial backlash. Rather than take note of whom we target abroad, for example, the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare forces the public to place “enormous trust in our leaders” despite the fact that good faith reliance on intelligence reports does not necessarily guarantee their accuracy.147 Accordingly, as the level of public scrutiny decreases, so too will our ability to limit unwarranted humanitarian damage abroad.148 At the very least, some dialogue should occur before any fatal action is taken; yet, in the technology-driven warfare regime, that conversation never occurs.149 Of course, this Note has argued that the issues associated with technology-driven warfare (an increased level of military involvement abroad, potential for escalation, humanitarian difficulties, etc.) though very real, are less prominent than the harms associated with traditional warfare. But perhaps this premise is incorrect; that is, perhaps technology-driven warfare does present sufficient harm to trigger social and political scrutiny. For example, pecuniary harms are very real contemporary concerns, and they seem to play an increased role in determining a country’s standing.150 In this respect, given the financial costs of drone strikes (and military spending in general),151 perhaps we need not be worried about an absence of public scrutiny. Yet given the traditional costs of war, pecuniary harm hardly seems like the type of concern sufficient to create the type of political checks present in the Civil War, World War I, Vietnam, or Iraq. In all four situations, American lives were at stake, entire households faced life-changing effects of war in a very real way, and the entire country saw major social and political transformations. Economic harm is certainly an issue worth considering, especially as the United States takes on more and more debt; yet, whether that sort of harm rises to the level sufficient to trigger mass citizen mobilization remains to be seen.152 Indeed, if the recent actions in Libya are any indication, financial harm is far too attenuated to create any sort of substantial backlash. Future technology-driven conflicts will likely create a clearer picture of the role of pecuniary damage, but as it stands, this sort of harm fails to “rally the troops” for public attentiveness.

#### Second, Starting somewhere is better than talking from nowhere – just war and targeted killing are now one and the same in the American context – they reify one another and to take a universal stance obscufates necessary criticism against

Sullins 10 (John P., Ph.D @ Binghamton University in Philosophy, Computers, and Cognitive Science, “Aspects of Telerobotic Systems” <http://www.xn--bundesheer-sterreich-ebc.org/pdf_pool/publikationen/20101105_et_ethical_and_legal_aspects_of_unmanned_systems_sullins.pdf>)

Regarding the impact of telerobotic weapon systems on warfare, where do you see the main challenges in the field of just war theory and how should the armed forces respond to these challenges? Just war theory is by no means uncontroversial but I use it since there are no rival theories that can do a better job than just war theory even with its flaws. It is, of course, preferable to resolve political differences through diplomacy and cultural exchange, but I do think that if conflict is inevitable, we must attempt to fight only just wars and propagate those wars in an ethical manner. If we can assume our war s just, then in order for a weapons system to be used ethically in that conflict, it must be rationally and consciously controlled towards just end results. Telerobotic weapons systems impact our ability to fight just wars in the following ways. First they seem to be contributing to what I call the normalization of warfare. Telerobots contribute to the acceptance of warfare as a normal part of every- day life. These systems can be controlled from across the globe so pilots living in Las Vegas can work a shift fighting the war in the Middle East and then drive home and spend time with the family. While this may seem like it is preferable. I think it subtly moves combat into a normal everyday activity in direct confrontation with just war theory that demands that warfare be a special circumstance that is propa- gated only in an effort to quickly return to peaceful relations. Also, telerobots contribute to the myth of surgical warfare and limit our ability to view one's enemies as fellow moral agents. That last bit is often hard for people to understand, but moral agents have to be given special regard even when they are your enemy. Just war attempts to seek a quick and efficient end to hostilities and return to a point where the enemy combatants can again respect one another's moral worth. For instance, look how many of the European belligerents in WWII are now closely allied with each other. The way one conducts hostilities must not be done in a way that prevents future cooperation. Telerobotic weapons seem to be doing just the opposite. The victims of these weapons have claimed that they are cowardly and that far from being surgical, they create devas- tating civilian casualties. These allegations may or may not be true, but they are the image that much ot the world has ot those countries that are using these weapons tan- ning the (lames of intergenerational hatred between cultures. So what you are saying is, that the current method of using UAVs might actually endanger one of the principles of just war theory, the probability of obtaining a lasting peace (iustus finis), in other words the short term military achieve- ments might curb the long term goals of peace? Yes, that is exactly right. People who have had this technology used against them are unlikely to torgive or reconcile. When these technologies are used to strike in areas that are not combat zones they tend to fan the flames of future conflict even if they might have succeeded in eliminating a current threat. This can cause a state of perpetual warfare or greatly exacerbate one that is already well underway. For in- stance, we can see that the use of remote controlled bombs, missiles and drones by both sides of the conflict in Palestine are not ending the fight but are instead building that conflict to new highs of vio- lence. The armed forces should respond to this by understanding the long- term political costs that come with short-term political expediency. Right now, a drone strike that cau- ses civilian casualties hardly raises concern in the home audience. But in the rest ol the world it is a source of great unease. It is also important to resist the temptation to normalize telerobotic combat operations. I would suggest backing off on using these weapons for delivery of lethal force and move back to reconnais- sance missions. And yes. I do know that that will never happen, but at least we should use these weapons only under tight scrutiny, in declared combat zones, with the intent both to justly propagate the conflict and eliminate non combatant casualties. One question connected to the normalization ot warfare through telerobotics, is the so called shift- work fighting. Where do you see the main challenges in the blending of war and civilian life and how could this be countered? I need to be careful here so that I am not misunderstood. I do under- stand that these technologies take the war fighters that would have had to risk their own lives in these missions out of danger and put in their place an easily replaceable machine. That is a moral good. But what I want to emphasize is that it is not an unequivocal good. Even if our people are not getting hurt, there will be real human agents on the other end of the cross hairs. Making a shoot or don't shoot decision is one of the most profound a moral agent can be called on to make. It can not be done in an unthinking or business-as-usual way. When we blend war fighting with daily life we remove these decisions from the special moral territory they inhabit in just war theory and replace it with the much more casual and pragmatic world of daily life. Realistically I do not think there is anyway to counter this trend. It is politically expedient from the viewpoint of the com- manders, it is preferable to the individual war fighters, and there does not seem to be any interna- tional will to challenge the coun- tries that are using UAVs in this way. As the technology advances we will see more and more naval craft and armoured fighting vehi- cles operated teleroboticaly and semi autonomously as well. For instance, this is a major plank of the future warfare planning in America and quite a bit of money is being directed at making it a real- ity. It is my hope though, that these planners will take some of these critiques seriously and work to keep the operators of these future machines as well trained and pro- fessional as possible and that they operate them with no cognitive dissonance. By that I mean the operators should be well aware that they are operating lethal ma- chinery in a war zone and that it is not just another day at the office.

#### Third, Trivializing the mandates of the 1AC – all war is targeted killing, so we aren’t as specific as they say we are – we say we should abolish the idea that violence is virtuous and never use it because it produces self-fulfilling prophecies of destruction

Chernus last updated 13 (Ira Chernus PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER “REINHOLD NIEBUHR'S CRITIQUE OF NONVIOLENCE” http://www.colorado.edu/ReligiousStudies/chernus/Niebuhr.htm)

Their theological mentor soon began to complain that they had missed his point. He protested that his ideas were being used to justify the kind of self-righteousness that he most opposed. He pointed out that the U.S., in its effort to protect the "free world," sometimes accepted injustices as bad as those it was opposing. In the last years of his life, he criticized the Vietnam War as the most egregious example of U.S. good intentions gone awry. But it was too late. His words had helped to set in motion political changes that he could not control. Ironically, his own theories could explain why this would happen and why it would be inevitable. Niebuhr always appreciated the ironies of human life. For him, they were the clearest evidence that we are all finite, fallible creatures whose best efforts for good are always mixed with evil, beyond our control. Yet he could never accept the irony that his Christian "realism" and his rejection of nonviolence, however well-intentioned, had helped to bring the U.S. to moral disasters like the Vietnam War, and the world to the brink of nuclear destruction. However, this outcome may be less ironic than it appears. There is a clear logical line leading from Niebuhr's initial premises to the horrors of the cold war and the nuclear age. Niebuhr's thinking starts out from a world divided between one transcendent, infinite Creator and many lowly, finite creatures. It is a hierarchical world, with an inevitable tension between the ruler and the ruled. The same kinds of divisions and tensions mark the relationships among the creatures. They experience themselves as essentially separate from each other. They are like the separate pots produced by the potter, all lined up one by one on the shelf. They have no pre-existing connections as part of their essential being. So they must struggle to make connections. But precisely because they feel so small and isolated, each creature tries to aggrandize itself at the expense of others. So the struggle to make connections becomes an arena of conflict and domination. The hierarchical structure of the cosmos is replicated in every human society, from the nuclear family on up to the family of nations. The ruler dominates, hoping to preserve at least a minimal degree of order. The ruled resist domination. The cycle of conflict and violence has no end. What is to prevent such a world from degenerating into all-out chaos? The only answer Niebuhr could offer is some combination of a bit of reason and a bit of humility, as preached by religious leaders like himself. But his own theory predicts that reason and humility will always be overwhelmed by human passions. The only real limit to the destructiveness of social conflict is the limit set by the state of destructive technology. Unfortunately for Niebuhr, during his lifetime technology surpassed all limits in its ability to destroy. The specter of nations threatening each other with total obliteration, using weapons on hair-trigger alert, was actually Niebuhr's own picture of human society as a jungle, taken to its extreme. From the viewpoint of the nonviolence tradition, this tragedy flows inexorably from Niebuhr's premises. If the basic fact of reality is not connectedness but separation, if the basic structure of reality is not freedom but subjection to hierarchical authority, then there is no way to escape from conflict, violence, and destruction. Niebuhr often described the human condition as "tragic." The nonviolence tradition would suggest that the tragedy is not in some unalterable human condition, but in a description of human life that makes tragedy the only possible outcome. The fate of Niebuhr's writings, leading to results he neither expected nor approved, shows that every view of human life can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Any words that describe human life and human society help to create the kind of life and the kind of society that they describe. The nonviolence tradition is based on descriptions of human life quite different from Niebuhr's. They allow the possibility of escaping from tragedy into a more cooperative, harmonious, and peaceful life. And precisely because they allow for that possibility, they may make it more possible.

#### And even if we cannot resolve militarism – their inability to resolve drone strikes at the intersection of just war means that there is a continuous erasure of difference that homogenizes entire populations to justify exterminating them – independent violence DA against the alt

Wall and Monahan 11 (Tyler Wall is Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Eastern Kentucky University. Torin Monahan is Associate Professor of Human & Organizational Development and Associate Professor of Medicine at Vanderbilt University. “Surveillance and violence from afar: The politics of drones and liminal security-scapes,” http://torinmonahan.com/papers/UAVs\_Wall-Monahan.pdf)

The desire for omniscience through total vision is a common motif in theoretical treatments of surveillance (e.g. Foucault, 1977). It is also a product of an Enlightenment rationality that aspires toward reason and progress through the cold, objective pursuit of knowledge. As feminist science-studies scholars remind us, these longings for pure knowledge, which seek to eviscerate bias and politics, are nonetheless ‘marked’ forms of knowledge that simply deny the values and prejudices inherent in their modes and addresses of production (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1991; Monahan and Fisher, 2010). These rationalities of so-called objective knowledge valorize the status quo while enforcing an exclusionary politics that denies or subjugates alternative ways of knowing. In the case of drone surveillance in combat settings, the exclusionary politics of omniscient vision not only harm ethnic and cultural others with great prejudice, but they also instigate an additional violence of radically homogenizing local difference, lumping together innocent civilians with enemy combatants, women and children with wanted terrorist leaders. From the sky, differences among people may be less detectable, or—perhaps more accurately—the motivations to make such fine-grained distinctions may be attenuated in the drive to engage the enemy. When these mechanisms and logics of surveillance are imported to non-combat settings, such as borderzones and civilian territories, they may in turn further the violent dehumanization and non-differentiation of people while expanding the scope of who could be included in the drone’s gaze. It is to these noncombat geographies and their populations that we next turn.

#### Fourth, Abstraction precludes action – Nobel evidence says that the intersection of Just War is now localized at the site of specifics – it is manipulated because specific technology allows for the maintenance of a virtuous violence – only with in-depth interrogation on a particular piece of just war can we unravel the whole system since the system adds new subsets to continue maintaining itself – Specific demands are key- their call for universal opposition to war is doomed to fail

Simpich 13 (Bill Simpich, Reader Supported News “It Will Take a New Antiwar Movement to Free Bradley Manning,” http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/304-justice/19023-it-will-take-a-new-antiwar-movement-to-free-bradley-manning)

However, the lack of an organized antiwar political force is the enduring tragedy of our times. It means that there is no effective entity that can hold Obama accountable for the trillion dollar defense budget that decimates human needs and any hope for economic, environmental, and spiritual renewal. This behemoth funds the garrison state of fourteen hundred US bases around the world, the continuing war in Afghanistan, and the drone attacks throughout the world. The lack of an organized movement is caused by an old split in political forces that haunts us right up to the present day. During the Vietnam War, the strategic disagreement was between the single-issue call of "out now" versus the multi-issue call for addressing racial and economic issues as well as war. My analysis is that although the multi-issue approach won out, the vision of what it takes to build a successful social movement was lost in the scuffle. To spare the reader a litany of outrages, let it just be said that the battle has steadily devolved around far less important issues. Meanwhile, the antiwar troops despaired of any end to the squabbling and stopped attending anyone's events. There is no longer even the annual "march against all bad things" that we used to joke about as our various formations moved together toward the local symbol of power. After all these years of organized challenge to the war machine, there is silence in the streets.

#### Fifth, They can’t access the process – 1AC McClintok says that militarism is a process that is universal but manifests itself through particular changes – the only way to dismantle it is to eliminate each particular process that allows it to sustain itself in particular contexts