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### Contention One-Endless War

#### The United States Government justifies its targeted killing operations with the theory of Just War, the idea that there can be moral justifications for conflict and moral ways of waging war. As the United States Government rationalizes its current wars, it has conversely opened a space for challenging the entire foundation of State killing. Interrogating the justifications for targeted killing operations exposes the inherent contradictions in just war theory.

Provost-Smith 13 (Patrick, former Assistant Professor of the History of Christianity at Harvard Divinity School, Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins; “A Drone’s Eye View: Global Anti-Terrorism and the Existential Crisis of Just War Theory,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 12 no. 3, Spring 2013)

As drones become the new centerpiece of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency warfare, questions regarding their usage have escalated in recent months, particularly in terms of military strategy, political oversight, international relations, and the host of by moral considerations over the inherent scope and scale of the lethal violence that comes with any war. The current administration has purported to take such concerns with seriousness proportionate to what is at stake in a systematic program of targeted killing, now increasingly undertaken through these new technologies.4 It remains unclear exactly how that moral seriousness shapes or delimits the range of possibilities and the kinds of decisions that are made, since authorizing the killing of a particular person suspected of terrorism is not morally significant because of the gravitas of the authorization or who is unable to sleep at night, but because of the reasons for it and their moral intelligibility. The most well-known exponent of that moral seriousness is John Brennan, former national security advisor to the Obama administration, who was entrusted for years by the President with oversight over the UAV program in the Yemen and Africa.5 These programs in their full scope have always been developed and deployed between the diverse armed services and what has become the frankly paramilitary nature of the Central Intelligence Agency. Oversight in Pakistan belonged to the CIA, while deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq fell to the Pentagon. Obama exercised immediate oversight only in the domains of the Yemen and the Sahel - and thus the difficulties of Obama’s assertions that his own moral seriousness in orchestrating the drone program was in some meaningful way illustrative of the level of moral gravitas that accompanied the development and deployment of the new UAVs in any context. Obama’s recent appointment of Brennan to the directorate of the CIA may have been the public occasion for venting the considerable controversies that do exist around the drone programs. But for Obama it provided the administration with the capacity to centralize the programs that did exist into a command structure that would actually control the paramilitary arm of the CIA, never otherwise subject to the Pentagon or the armed services, and to tie those forces together in a way that did at least provide for the potential level of moral scrutiny in the UAV programs that the President envisaged. The appointment was a candid move to place someone in a position of unprecedented power and influence over an incredibly sophisticated and powerful system of covert operations and targeted killings, who was also personally and visibly committed to a similar form of moral scrutiny over targeted killings, and who purportedly shared “the mind of the President” on such matters.6 Drone Warfare and Just War Theory Brennan credits his ethical formation to his Catholicism and his education by the Jesuits at Georgetown University - and that brings into focus a particular kind of moral approach broadly recognizable to many as just war theory. 7 The parameters and core commitments of just war theory have been around long enough and deployed consistently enough, to make explication unnecessary. Just war theory in different guises has been advocated by Catholics and Protestants alike for centuries, and forays into similar or comparable forms of thought in Jewish and Islamic contexts have also emerged. Volumes have streamed forth from academics, policy specialists, and pundits over the last few decades concerning just and unjust wars and the implications of those deliberations for American military deployments. Previous foreign policy “realists”, typified by Henry Kissinger and the architects of the Vietnam War and the Cold War, were less enthralled by this kind of moral scrutiny. Just war theorists after World War II, and especially after Vietnam, have consistently portrayed McNamara, Kissinger, and assorted allies as champions of a potentially vicious Realpolitik in which reasons of state trumped moral deliberation and constraint. The old adage held that all is fair in love and war. 8 Realism in foreign policy has been undoubtedly oversimplified by advocates of just war theory. But just war theory itself has been complicated by the use of modern weapons purportedly to save lives in intractable conflicts. The prevalence of obliteration bombing in Germany and Japan by the Allies during the Second World War, not to mention the decision to drop the newly-developed atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, brought to light the use of just war theory to challenge the propriety of certain kinds of actions on moral grounds in an otherwise justified war.9 But the potential for those new weapons was never recognized by presidents or military planners as an exceptional means of last resort, as the Truman administration frankly understood when it loaded B-52s with atomic bombs to face the standoff produced by the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June of 1948. The development of nuclear weapons by virtually all sides of the Cold War ended that monopoly over prospectively less costly ways to wage wars, and provided the most serious moral crisis for just war theorists since such discourse was invented. The failure of conventional weaponry in Vietnam also had a significant impact upon the moral framework of just war theory. The devastation wrought during that war provoked more moral objection and outrage than any American military campaign since the Philippines, and the heightened influence of just war theorists owes something to this fact.10 Brennan’s fealty to Catholic approaches to just war theory troubles some critics, and religious metaphors have been circulated at least since a Washington Post exposé on the drone program described him as almost a “priest” given his moral gravitas and the seriousness with which he takes the just war tradition.11 Just war theory became a staple of Roman Catholic social thought at least with the First Vatican Council, which canonized Thomas Aquinas as the exemplary theologian for the Church. Early fin de siècle neoThomism underwrote what became in 1944 John Ford’s excoriation of obliteration bombing as a morally defensible tactic for fighting an otherwise just war - and that along with the advocacy of John Courtney Murray served more than any other single instance to cement the perception among just war advocates that the whole program was about moral restraint in a time of conflict. Consequent, as well as controversial, statements issued decades later by Catholic bishops in the United States argued that the use nuclear weapons was never morally permissible under any circumstances because of the very weapons used, and the apparent impossibility of using them discriminately.12 Something deeply disturbing to just war advocates, and indicative of the anti-nuclear positions taken, continued to circulate in the threat postures of “mutually assured destruction” contained in the theory of nuclear deterrence.13 The slip of the nuclear trigger was dangerously close and only circumstantially avoided during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Yet the annual national security reviews published by the United States continue to affirm the right to use nuclear weapons both as deterrence and defense - a point never lost upon the powers who have sought to develop a nuclear capacity as counter-deterrence to the United States or other nuclear powers. And so advocates of just war theory that rose to positions of prominence after Vietnam have nevertheless had to live with the persistent declaration of nuclear deterrence articulated by every presidential administration since the Soviet Union acquired its own weapons of mass destruction. Whatever just war advocacy Brennan brings to the moral perspective regarding drones finds it place in that complex and unsettled landscape of the last century, when entire cities have been leveled by astoundingly brutal military tactics, and the threat of using these tactics continues. The challenge of nuclear weapons exhibited the deep tensions and disagreements that often mark just war theory in any form. To speak of just war theory now as precariously situated in a state of existential crisis is to peel away the layers of intelligibility that come with the oversimplified and reductive understandings most often advocated in contemporary contexts, something Brennan’s own language often mirrors. Existential crises do imply that a particular approach to just war thinking has imploded in very real historical circumstances, and that the familiar ways of understanding the stakes of just war theory have been shaken. Most advocates would shun the description of just war theory as experiencing any form of crisis, especially considering its relative success in shaping public perception and military strategic doctrine. Yet it remains the case, notwithstanding the arguments of some contemporary advocates, that whatever just war theory is today remains quite unlike what it has been before. Weapons technologies have advanced, and the shape of the conceptual ground upon which the morality of wars and the means of waging them has been theorized has shifted substantially since the first Romans first began to speak of the iustum bellum nearly a millennium before St. Augustine’s own influential writings on the topic.14

#### Highlighting the violence of ongoing drone warfare challenges the status quo narrative of humanitarianism- there is no such thing as just war. The idea that modern warfare has become less violent has been used to silence opposition and legitimize war.

Terrell 13 (Brian Terrell is a co-coordinator of Voices for Creative Nonviolence, Drones and Gadflies, Sept 13, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/09/13/drones-and-gadflies/)

My own anti-drone activism began with protests at Creech Air Force Base in the Nevada desert in April, 2009. Even some otherwise well informed people were skeptical, back then, that such things were even possible, much less happening daily. Many who were aware accepted the simple and happy narrative of drone warfare as a precise new high-tech system in which soldiers from a safe distance of thousands of miles can pin point those who mean us imminent harm with little or no collateral damage. Even some among our friends in the peace movement questioned the wisdom of focusing attention on drones. Must we protest every new advance in weaponry? Can’t we allow for methods that are at least improvements on indiscriminate carnage? Is not a precisely aimed and delivered drone attack preferable to carpet bombing? Is it not preferable to invasion? Does it make a difference to the victims, in any case, whether there is a pilot in the plane that bombs them or not? The fact that four years later on the day before my release from prison, the president of the United States was defending the use of drones before the country and the world is truly remarkable. This is not a discussion that he or anyone else in the government, politics or the military encouraged or one that the media was anxious to take on. The fact that the issue is up for discussion at all is due to considerable efforts of the few here in the US and the UK in solidarity with many in the streets in Pakistan, Yemen and Afghanistan protesting this foul weaponry. Communities of protest and resistance in Nevada, New York, California, Missouri, Wisconsin, England and Iowa thrust the issue into local forums, courts and media through creative actions and legal stratagems, effectively demanding that grievance over drone killing be heard. The president’s own speech was itself only rescued from being the cleverly constructed but empty litany of alibi, half-truth and obfuscation that it was intended to be by the interruption by our friend, Medea Benjamin. In his 1963 “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., noted that often a society like ours “bogged down in the tragic attempt to live in monologue rather than dialogue,” requires “nonviolent gadflies” in order to “create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal.” As with the issue of segregation 50 years ago, so today the parameters of discussion allowed by politeness and good manners or sanctioned by the police and courts simply cannot abide the objective appraisal of drone warfare that the times require. The discussion such as it is, is made possible only by some who dare speak out of turn, as Medea, or who use their bodies to intrude on the orderly commission of criminalities in our midst. Before the president’s lecture drone warfare’s approval rating was at the top of the polls but a month later drone pilot Col. Bryan Davis of the Ohio Air National Guard noted a turn of the tide. “We are not popular among the American public, every other base has been protested,” he lamented to a local paper. “It doesn’t make you feel warm inside.” The narrative of humanitarian war via drone had begun to unravel in the public eye in the months leading up to the president’s speech and has since fallen further into disrepute. Months before the president made the assertion in his May 23 speech that “by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life,” his administration had already revised earlier claims that the drone programs in Yemen and Pakistan had yielded zero known noncombatant deaths to one death to finally admitting to a death toll in “single digits.” By almost any accounting the noncombatant tolls in those countries have been at least in the hundreds. Just weeks after the president spoke at the National Defense University, a journal published by that institution published a study that debunked his assurance that “conventional airpower and missiles are far less precise than drones, and likely to cause more civilian casualties and local outrage.” Drone strikes in Afghanistan, the study found, were “an order of magnitude more likely to result in civilian casualties per engagement.” Another assurance given in this speech, that “America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty,” was discredited on June 8 when the US ambassador to Pakistan was summoned by the prime minister of that country angry over a US drone attack that killed nine people. “It was conveyed to the US chargé ď affaires that the government of Pakistan strongly condemns the drone strikes, which are a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” said Pakistan’s ministry of foreign affairs. “The importance of bringing an immediate end to drone strikes was emphasized.” “We act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people.” Formerly the word “imminent” referred to something about to happen at any moment and using the generally accepted definition of the word one might construe in the president’s words a guarantee that drone strikes are used only to stop “terrorists” engaged in acts that would cause immediate harm to Americans. John Brennan, now director of the CIA, suggested in September 2011 that “a more flexible understanding of ‘imminence’ may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups.” This more flexible understanding of imminence justifies the assassination not only of those caught in the act, but also of targets who are suspected of having written something or said something to make someone think that they might have something to do with an attack on the US someday. A person who is caught on the drones video feed from 7,000 miles away as acting in a manner consistent with someone who might harm one day may now be eliminated as an imminent threat. Referring to the killing of Anwar Awlaki, an American citizen in Yemen, the president assured us that “for the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any US citizen — with a drone, or with a shotgun — without due process.” The general usage of the words “due process” would cause the misapprehension that the right of a citizen to have trial by jury before being executed is being reaffirmed here. “This is simply not accurate,” says Attorney General Eric Holder. “‘Due process’ and ‘judicial process’ are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.” The burden of “due process” can now be met when the president decides based on secret evidence that a citizen should die. Drone technology is changing our language beyond redefining terms like “imminence” and “due process.” We have progressed, too, beyond Orwellian euphemisms such as naming an intercontinental nuclear missile “Peacekeeper.” These new “hunter-killer platforms” bear names like “Predators” and “Reapers” and may soon be supplanted by “Avengers” and “Stalkers.” The ordinance they deliver is a missile named “Hellfire.” In Iowa where I live, the Air National Guard unit based in Des Moines has replaced its F-16 fighter planes with a Reaper drone control center. This transformation was marked by changing the unit’s name from the “132nd Fighter Wing” to the “132nd Attack Wing.” This change is more than symbolic- a “fight” by definition has two sides and the word implies some kind of parity. There is such a thing as a fair fight (of course the 132nd’s F-16s were used only on all but disarmed populations in places like Iraq and Panama) and a fight usually has some kind of resolution. An “attack” however, is just that. An attack is one-sided, something that a perpetrator inflicts on a victim. A fighter might sometimes be justified, an attacker, never. There is no “just attack” theory. The parsing out of innocent and guilty drone victims is in a sense a waste of time. All alike are victims. George Kennan, might have seen this coming in a policy paper he wrote for the State Department in 1948. In order to preserve the global disparity of wealth post World War II (“We have about 50% of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3% of its population”) he suggested that “we should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.” While the speech at the National Defense University was an embarrassment of idealistic slogans, it also used chilling pragmatism to deal with straight power concepts. “For me,” the president said on May 23, “and those in my chain of command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live.” Those words had a truer ring a few days later spoken on NBC news by Brandon Bryant, an Air Force drone operator who confessed to being haunted by 1,600 deaths he took part in. Bryant admitted that his actions made him feel like a “heartless sociopath,” and he described one of his first kills, sitting in a chair at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada when his team fired on three men walking down a road in Afghanistan. It was night in Afghanistan, and he remembers watching the thermal image of one victim on his computer screen: “I watch this guy bleed out and, I mean, the blood is hot.” Bryant watched the man die and his image disappear as his body attained the ambient temperature of the ground. “I can see every little pixel, if I just close my eyes.” The remoteness of the drone warrior is no protection from the moral damage of war, and these people are victims as well, and it is on their behalf as well that we protest. We cannot know the hearts of President Obama and those in his inner circle but it is not hard to wonder whether they are truly haunted by the deaths of those killed by drones at their commands. If they may not be haunted by their own consciences, perhaps the responsibility of haunting them falls to us.

#### Just war theory is in the business of legitimizing violence-It controls the conversation and our imagination-Technology and strategy have combined to create a cycle of infinite targets and endless war.

Provost-Smith 13 (Patrick, former Assistant Professor of the History of Christianity at Harvard Divinity School, Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins; “A Drone’s Eye View: Global Anti-Terrorism and the Existential Crisis of Just War Theory,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 12 no. 3, Spring 2013)

Swirling in the circularity of the justificans bellum, increasingly aided by developments in artificial intelligence and information technology, whoever is curious as to what just war theory is all about looks in vain for what jus is meant to do when it qualifies war in the first place, or for how it functions in the grammar of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello at all. Just war proponents have held positions in every major military academy, dominated think tanks and policy circles, and written as pundits on whether this or that war has met the appropriate criteria upheld by the tradition for more than a couple of decades. As a result, the moral framework has yielded unanticipated success in the public sphere. Yet it is one thing to weigh the causes and means for waging wars in the framework of just war theory, and another to be in the business of justifying wars, strategies, tactics, and new technologies. One may entertain informed suspicions, but evaluation of the huge outpouring of just war argumentation appearing in the last three or four decades might help decide the question of whether the enterprise has been fundamentally about the justification of wars, or about whatever it means to constrain violence by subjection of such things to moral scrutiny - ironically, a task for which data mining technologies might prove immensely helpful. Something is amiss when a moral tradition that understands itself to have been formed by an appeal to moral restraint in the declaring and waging of wars now finds itself in becoming an ethics panel writ large for politicians, policy makers, military strategists, and makers of military hardware. In reality, it seems to be about experts advancing a strategic objective as far as is possible before the just warriors intervene and stop them just short of crossing the line dividing morally permissible from morally culpable action. The boundary is sufficiently flexible to permit the ethics panelists to empower the soldier to approach that line more closely than might have otherwise been the case. Consequently, the circle of legitimate means for fighting a war just got enlarged, and the fighting of it just got escalated. The argument for restraint only works when a proposed very real, concrete action is contrasted with an imagined outcome weighed out as an inevitability. The upshot is that just warriors now find themselves more than ever in the business of establishing the outer moral limit of wars and means for waging them by imagining the boundaries for an imaginary war. Conceptual claims about what technology can and cannot do have not only been shallow and ill-conceived, they enable the next round of technology to scale up the range of possibilities for fighting wars dangerously close to crossing the moral border markers. Smart bombs are no more an innovation fostering moral discrimination any more than rifled barrels for firearms did in the century before the last. The question hardly needs to be raised whether more people have died from rifles and modern propellants than black powder muskets. The concentration of lethal power, along with new and transformative technologies for wielding it, in the hands of an intelligence-based regime appears to be not simply the brute necessity of waging a war on terror at the behest of humanitarian intervention, nor simply the extension of the analogy of self-defense to preposterous lengths. It is the formation of a new approach to foreign policy underwritten by a new way of fighting a potentially perpetual war against threats to the interests of the United States in which the use of covert and secretive lethal force is the new preferred means for sustaining it. Ironically, if just war theory has always been a theory of sovereignty, and its immediate history has been underwritten by notions of the sovereign nation-state, then it also becomes apparent that the new case for perpetual war for the sake of perpetual peace is much closer than realized to a frankly postmodern project predicated on the collapse of sovereignty invested in the modern nation state. Clandestine drone wars wreak havoc upon the legacy of Westphalia. They have ceased to be remotely related to Kant’s prescriptions for perpetual peace upon which just warriors have relied for over two centuries. A war without borders against persons with no national identity is not a modern war. It is a consequence of the failure of modern wars to deal with the problems that have haunted the modern project, and those are about religious more than national or ethnic identities. The drone program, according to Obama and his subordinates, is here to stay, and the technologies that have enabled it are likewise set to transform the American way of war into something that war has never before been. The reach of technologically enabled covert operations is now theoretically infinite when abstracted from the constraints of having intelligence or special operations forces on the ground. The range of targets is theoretically endless and how they are singled out and on what basis they are targeted will only a select few be privy to. New data and computational capacities may mean that no one really knows those bases at all. Hence the response to the perceived infinity of evil presenting as terrorism is the infinite reach of lethal force, and an infinite war posture to sustain it. The dilemma associated with contemporary wars, which frame religion in the modern world as collared and leashed by the demands of secularity and modernity, is that for a good many people of faith the notion of God’s sovereignty ultimately implies that only God is worth killing for. It is not evident that such a view furthers violence more than whatever is enabled by the natural right to self-defense and its legal analogs - especially in a time of war. At the very least it would prohibit the now accepted and legally justified practice of killing over theft or threats to private property, and it might make exclusive national control over global resources untenable. It may be that in wars in defense of national interests everything that has drawn geographical borders around the concept of sovereignty have proven to be the impultrix violentia of contemporary warfare in ways that belie the modern presumption to have solved endemic religious violence through politics. There is good historical evidence for the suspicion that religions may be better prepared to form wise men who love peace than the modern state. The suspicion itself cannot be contained in a context presumed to have been secularized long ago. It instead indicates that religion in the modern globalized world will find means of negotiation with the demands of all kinds of societies in all kinds of places other than those that enforce privatization of religious sensibilities and commitments, which is precisely the modern project. To the extent just war theory cannot freely concede that “religious extremism” - the conflict between global and globalizing religions and the shape of the nation-state - is in essence the primary moral and political problem it addresses , it betrays its own profound existential crisis, and ceases to become relevant any longer in today’s world. That world is now shaped by perpetual wars against infinite targets in infinite places with the hubris of infinite power relentlessly driven by the technological imagination. It is no longer difficult to imagine a future in which critics of a previous generation’s investment in the “archaic” theory of just and unjust wars are merely proclaiming the obvious.

#### Highlighting the issue of drone warfare is a useful starting point for a larger interrogation of State killing-Exposing the history of targeted killing is an important mechanism for challenging the secret global war on terrorism.

Noble 12 (Doug, activist with the Upstate Coalition to Ground the Drones, Assassination Nation, July 19, http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/07/19/assassination-nation/)

This striking new transparency, the official acknowledgment for the first time of a broad-based US assassination and targeted killing program, has resulted from the unprecedented and controversial visibility of drone warfare. Drones now make news every day, and those of us who have been protesting their use for years have heightened their visibility in the public eye, forcing official acknowledgment and fostering worldwide scrutiny. This new scrutiny focuses not only on drone use but also, and perhaps more importantly, on the targeted killing itself – and the “kill lists” that make them possible. This new exposure has set off a firestorm of reaction around the globe. Chris Woods of the Bureau of Investigative Journalism told Democracy Now! “The kill list got really heavy coverage … newspapers have all expressed significant concern about the existence of the kill list, the idea of this level of executive power.” [5] A Washington Post editorial noted that “No president has ever relied so extensively on the secret killing of individuals to advance the nation’s security goals.” [6] Becker and Shane of the Times pronounced Obama’s role “without precedent in presidential history, of personally overseeing the shadow war …” [7] And former president Jimmy Carter insisted, in a recent editorial in The New York Times, “We don’t know how many hundreds of innocent civilians have been killed in these [drone] attacks, each one approved by the highest authorities in Washington. This would have been unthinkable in previous times.” [8] Really? In fact, US assassination and targeted killing, with presidential approval, has been going on covertly for at least half a century. Ironically, all this drone killing now offers us a new opportunity: to pry open the Pandora’s box hiding long-held secrets of covert US assassination and targeted killing, and to expose them to the light of day. What we would find is that the only things new in the latest, more publicized revelations about kill lists and assassinations are the use of drones, the president’s hands-on approach in vetting targets, and the global scope of the drone killing. Those of us in the Upstate Coalition to Ground the Drones, Code Pink and other groups protesting US drones for years have correctly focused on the use of drones as illegal, immoral and strategically counterproductive. We have abhorred the schizophrenic ease of remote killing, the uniquely frightening horror of a drone strike, and the unavoidable (even intentional) killing of countless civilian “terrorist suspects” in “signature strikes.” We have also warned of the proliferation of drones in countries around the globe and of their procurement by US police forces and border patrols, for surveillance and “non-lethal” targeting. But drones are not the only, or even the most important, concern. It’s the targeted killing itself, past and present. In this article I start to unravel what the latest demands for transparency should lead us to investigate fully: the fifty year history of US assassination and targeted killing that has resulted, quite directly, in the present moment. Those who are mortified by the latest revelations of Obama’s kill list have much to learn from a more comprehensive, historical perspective on US killing around the globe. Who knows: Perhaps someone in Congress might even be prodded to do what Senators Fulbright and Church did in years past: hold hearings on this continuing execration taking place in our name. Until then, what follows is an introduction to this ongoing horror story. Section 1 of this article briefly reviews the lethal history of the US Phoenix Program in Vietnam, the original source of subsequent US counter terrorist tactics and strategies. Section 2 revisits briefly the well-worn history of US kill lists and assassinations in Latin American countries, followed by the somewhat less-well-known history of US kill lists and assassinations in countries on other continents. Section 3 traces the direct legacy of Phoenix, even its explicit resurrection by the key architects of the US targeted killing programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in a growing number of “countries we are not at war with.” One point of clarification and definition. It is well known that in recent history the US has orchestrated assassination attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, on major world leaders. Examples include: Lumumba under Eisenhower, Castro and Diem under Kennedy, Gaddhafi under Reagan, Saddam Hussein under Bush, and Allende under Nixon. [9] The term “assassination” is typically restricted to such killings of political leaders, and President Ford’s executive order banning assassination applies only to the assassination of foreign heads of state. [10] The focus of this article is different. Here we discuss the US-generated kill lists used over the last half century, under direct presidential authority, for the targeted killing of thousands of civilians suspected of being or harboring terrorists/ insurgents, from Vietnam to Guatemala, from Indonesia to Iraq, right up to the present day. The Phoenix Program The US Phoenix Program was a secret, large scale counter terrorist effort in Vietnam. Developed in 1967 by the CIA, the Phoenix Program, called Phung Hoang by the Vietnamese, aimed a concerted effort to “neutralize” the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI) consisting of South Vietnamese civilians suspected of supporting North Vietnamese or Viet Cong soldiers. The euphemism “neutralize” meant to kill or detain indefinitely. Then CIA Director William Colby, while insisting in 1971 Congressional hearings that “the Phoenix program is not a program of assassination,” nonetheless conceded that Phoenix operations killed over 20,000 people between 1967 and 1972. [11] Phoenix targeted civilians, not soldiers. Operations were carried out by “hunter-killer teams” consisting both of US Green Berets and Navy Seals and by South Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), units of mercenaries set up for assassination and “counter terror.” A Newsweek article in January 1970 described Phoenix as “a highly secret and unconventional operation that counters VC terror with terror of its own.” [12] Robert Kaiser of the Washington Post reported Phoenix being called “an instrument of mass political murder…sort of Vietnamese Murder Inc.,” designed to terrorize the civilian population into submission.” [13] Until 1970 the computerized VCI blacklist was a unilateral American operation. After the devastating 1968 Tet offensive, South Vietnamese President Thieu declared: “The VCI must be eliminated…and will be defeated by the Phoenix program.” [14] Phoenix became a ruthless “bounty hunting” program to eliminate the opposition. [15] The US and South Vietnamese created a list of tens of thousands of suspects for assassination. These names were centralized and distributed to Phoenix coordinators. From 1965-68 U.S. and Saigon intelligence services maintained an active list of Viet Cong cadre marked for assassination. The program for 1969 called for “neutralizing” 1800 a month. The VCI blacklist became corrupted by officers inserting their personal enemies’ names to get even. Due process was nonexistent. Names supplied by anonymous informers showed up on blacklists. [16] CIA Director Colby admitted in 1971 that the blacklists had been “inaccurate.” [17] Few senior VCI leaders were caught in the Phoenix net. Instead its victims were typically innocent civilians. A Pentagon-contract study found that, between 1970 and 1971, ninety-seven per cent of the Vietcong targeted by the Phoenix Program were of negligible importance. [18] By 1973, Phoenix generated 300,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam. Military operations such as My Lai used Phoenix intelligence; in fact, the My Lai massacre, hardly an isolated incident, was itself a Phoenix operation. [19] Apologists have offered rationales for Phoenix that sound eerily similar to those used to defend current drone attacks. Phoenix was typically referred to as a “scalpel” replacing the “bludgeon” of search and destroy, aerial bombardment or artillery barrages. Alternatively, it was called a precision “rifle shot rather than a shotgun approach to target key political leaders … and activists in VCI.” [20] Military historian Dale Andrade explains, “Both SEALS and PRUs killed many VCI guerrillas – that was war. They also inevitably killed innocent civilians – that was regrettable….but [Phoenix] operations were much more discerning than the massive affairs launched by conventional …forces. That fact was often lost in the rhetoric of assassination and murder …”[21] Phoenix was created, organized, and funded by the CIA. Quotas were set by Americans. Informers were paid with US funds. The national system of identifying suspects, the elaboration of numerical goals and their use as measures of merit, was designed and funded by Americans. One former US Phoenix soldier conceded, “It was “heinous,” far worse than the things attributed to it.” [22] Kill Lists from Phoenix to Latin America The US intelligence community formalized the lessons of the Phoenix Program in Vietnam by commissioning Project X, the Army’s top-secret program for transmitting Vietnam’s lessons to South America. [23] By the mid-1970s, the Project X materials were going to armies all over the world. These were textbooks for global counterinsurgency and terror warfare. These included a murder manual, “Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare,” which openly instructed in the assassination of public officials, and was distributed to the Nicaraguan Contras. Another manual, “Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual,” was used widely in Honduran counterrorism efforts. Use of the Project X material was temporarily suspended by Congress and the Carter administration for probable human rights violations, but the program was restored by the Reagan administration in 1982. By the mid-1980s, according to one detailed history, “counterguerrilla operations in Colombia and Central America would thus bear an eerie but explicable resemblance to South Vietnam.” [24] What follows is a brief sketch of the widespread application of US-promulgated Phoenix-derived reigns of terror, kill lists, and death squads throughout Latin America and beyond. Much of this is familiar territory to many activists and scholars, and is merely the tip of the iceberg, but it merits review as a backdrop for the current context of kill lists and targeted assassination. [25] US KILL LISTS AND ASSASSINATION IN LATIN AMERICA The U.S. Army’s School of Americas (SOA), started in 1946, trained mass murderers and orchestrated coups in Peru, Panama, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico. The SOA trained more than 61,000 Latin American officers implicated in widespread slaughter of civilian populations across Latin America. From 1966-1976 the SOA trained hundreds of Latin American officers in Phoenix-derived methods. Between 1989-1991 the SOA issued almost 700 copies of Project X handbooks to at least ten Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Honduras. In 2001, SOA was renamed Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHISC), but peace activists know it as School of Assassins. [26] The CIA trained assassination groups such as Halcones in Mexico, the Mano Blanca in Guatemala, and the Escuadron de la Muerte in Brazil. In South America, in 1970-79, Operation Condor, the code-name for collection, exchange and storage of intelligence, was established among intelligence services in South America to eradicate Marxist activities. Operation Condor promoted joint operations including assassination against targets in member countries. In Central America, the CIA-supported death toll under the Reagan presidency alone exceeded 150,000. The CIA set up Ansesal and other networks of terror in El Salvador, Guatemala (Ansegat) and pre-Sandinista Nicaragua (Ansenic). Honduran death squads were active through the 1980s, the most infamous of which was Battalion 3–16, which assassinated hundreds of people, including teachers, politicians, and union leaders. Battalion 316 received substantial CIA support and training, and at least 19 members graduated from the School of the Americas. In Colombia, about 20,000 people were killed since 1986 and much of U.S. aid for counternarcotics was diverted to what Amnesty International labeled “one of the worst killing fields.” The US State Department also supported the Colombian army in creating a database of subversives, terrorists and drug dealers. In Bolivia, Amnesty International reported that from 1966-68 between 3,000 and 8,000 people were killed by death squads. The CIA supplied names of U.S. and other foreign missionaries and progressive priests. In Ecuador, the CIA maintained what was called the lynx list, aka the subversive control watch list of the most important left-wing activists to arrest. In Uruguay. Every CIA station maintained a subversive control watch list of most important left wing activists. From 1970-72 the CIA helped set up the Department of Information and Intelligence (DII), which served as a cover for death squads, and also co-ordinated meetings between Brazilian and Uruguayan death squads. In Nicaragua, the US provided illegal funds to the Contras, and Marine intelligence helped maintain a list of civilians marked for assassination when Contra forces entered the country. In Chile, 1970-73, CIA-created unions organized CIA-financed strikes leading to Allende’s overthrow and subsequent suicide. By late 1971 the CIA was involved in the preparation of lists of nearly 20,000 middle-level leaders of people’s organizations, scheduled to be assassinated after the Pinochet coup. In Haiti, U.S. officials with CIA backgrounds in Phoenix-like program activities coordinated with the Ton-Ton Macoute, “Baby Doc” Duvalier’s private death squad, responsible for killing at least 3,000 people. For over thirty years the US military and the CIA helped organize, train, and fund death squad activity in El Salvador. From 1980-93, at least 63,000 Salvadoran civilians were killed, mostly by the government directly supported by the U.S. The CIA routinely supplied ANSESAL, the security forces, and the general staff with electronic, photographic, and personal surveillance of suspected dissidents and Salvadorans abroad who were later assassinated by death squads. US militray involvement in El Salvador allowed “the lessons learned in Vietnam to be put into practice … assisting an allied country in counterinsurgency operations.” [27] In Guatemala, as early as 1954, the U.S. Ambassador, after the CIA-orchestrated overthrow of the Arbenz government, gave to the new Armas government lists of radical opponents to be assassinated. Years later, throughout Guatemala’s 36-year civil war, Washington continuously to supported the Guatemalan military’s excesses against civilians, which killed 200,000 people. US Assassination Programs Exported to Other Countries In Indonesia, 1965-66, the US embassy and the CIA provided the Indonesian military with lists of the names of PKI militants, which were used by Suharto to crush the PKI regime. This resulted in “one of the worst episodes of mass murder of the twentieth century,” with estimates as high as one million deaths. [28] In Thailand, in 1976, the new junta used CIA-trained forces to crush student demonstrators during coup; two right-wing terrorist squads suspected for assassinations tied directly to CIA operations. In Iran, the CIA launched a coup installing the shah in power and helped establish the lethal secret police unit SAVAK. [29] The CIA and SAVAK then exchanged intelligence, including information and arrest lists on the communist Tudeh party. Years later, in 1983, the CIA gave the Khomeni government a list of USSR KGB agents and collaborators operating in Iran, which the Khomeni regime used to execute 200 suspects and close down the communist Tudeh party. In the Philippines, in 1986, Reagan increased CIA involvement in Philippine counterinsurgency operations, carried out by more than 50 death squads. In 2001, before 9/11, the Bush administration sent a unit of SOF to the Philippines “to help train Philippine counter terrorist forces fighting against Muslim separatists” within groups like Abu Sayyaf. After 9/11 US-Filipino cooperation was stepped up and the ongoing separatist conflict was cast, to the benefit of both sides, as “the second front in the war on terror.”[30] In Feb, 2012, a US drone strike targeting leaders of Abu Sayyaf and other separatist groups killed 15 people, the first use of killer drones in Southeast Asia. [31] A “global Phoenix Program”: drone targets worldwide “A global Phoenix program … would provide a useful start point” for “a new strategic approach to the Global War on Terrorism.” –David Kilcullen [32] IRAQ Despite the US-perpetrated counter terrorist slaughter in Latin America and elsewhere in the 1970s-1990s, the US Special Forces debacle in Mogadishu in 1993, popularized in the film Black Hawk Down, severely impacted US willingness to use Special Forces in counter terrorist missions for the next decade. But then, after 9/11, things changed drastically. On September 17, 2001, President Bush signed a secret Presidential finding authorizing the C.I.A. to create paramilitary teams to hunt, capture, detain, or kill designated terrorists almost anywhere in the world. The pressure from the White House, in particular from Vice-President Dick Cheney, was intense, and in the scramble, a search of the C.I.A.’s archives turned up – the Phoenix Program. [33] In July , 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sent an order for a plan to make sure that special forces could be authorized to use lethal force ‘in minutes and hours, not days and weeks.’” [34] Rumsfeld prompted Bush to authorize the military to “find and finish” terrorist targets. Here he was referring to “the F3EA targeting cycle” used in anti-infrastructure operations by Special Operations Forces. F3EA, an abbreviation of find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, utilizes comprehensive intelligence to “find a target amidst civilian clutter and fix his exact location . . . . enabling surgical finish operations … to catch a fleeting target.” [35] Lt General William (Jerry) Boykin, Delta commander in Mogadishu, deputy undersecretary for Defense for Intelligence and a key planner of the Special Forces offensive in Iraq, announced, “We’re going after these people. Killing or capturing them … doing what the Phoenix program was designed to do, without all the secrecy.” [36] Back in 1963, the CIA had supplied lists of communists to the Baath party coup so that communists could be rounded up and eliminated. [37] Now, forty years later, it was the Baathists’ turn to be rounded up by Special Forces and CIA and executed. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. military notoriously developed a set of playing cards to help troops identify the most-wanted members of Saddam Hussein‘s government, mostly high-ranking Baath Party members. Less well-known was the secret targeted killing of thousands of Baathist civilians by US Special Forces. Seymour Hersh wrote in 2003 that “The Bush Administration authorized a major escalation of the Special Forces covert war in Iraq. … Its highest priority [being] the neutralization of the Baathist insurgents, by capture or assassination. [38] A former C.I.A. station chief described the strategy: “The only way we can win is to go unconventional. We’re going to have to play their game. Guerrilla versus guerrilla. Terrorism versus terrorism. We’ve got to scare the Iraqis into submission.” [39] The US even hired thousands of contract killers previously responsible for US-sponsored extra-judicial killings and death squad activity in Latin America. The operation—called “preëmptive manhunting” by one Pentagon adviser—had, according to Hersh, “the potential to turn into another Phoenix Program.” [40] Global Phoenix In 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored a paper by the National Defense Research Institute entitled “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency.” The paper notes, “The persistent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated fresh interest among military officers, policymakers, and civilian analysts in the history of counterinsurgency. The Phoenix Program in Vietnam—the U.S. effort to improve intelligence coordination and operations aimed at identifying and dismantling the communist underground—is the subject of much renewed attention.” [41] The paper continues, “As the United States and its allies shift their focus to Afghanistan and weigh counterinsurgency alternatives for that country, decisionmakers would be wise to consider how Phoenix-style approaches might serve to pry open Taliban and Al-Qaeda black boxes.” [42] Two key architects of the current Phoenix-style global counterinsurgency efforts by the US are David Kilcullen and Michael Vickers. David Kilcullen has been counterinsurgency advisor to two former Middle East commanders, General Stanley McChrystal (formerly head of Special Operations) and General David Petraeus, now CIA Director. Michael G. Vickers, made famous in the book and film Charlie Wilson’s War about the CIA’s anti-Soviet Afghan campaign of the 1980s, is currently Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, wielding such vast authority over the US war on terror that, according to a Washington Post profile, Pentagon colleagues refer to as his “take-over-the-world-plan.” [43] Kilcullen wrote in a much-quoted 2004 paper entitled “Countering Global Insurgency” that “Counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have reawakened official and analytical interest in the Phoenix Program.” He proposed that “a global Phoenix program … would provide a useful start point” for “a new strategic approach to the Global War on Terrorism,” one which would focus on “interdicting links … between jihad theatres, denying sanctuary areas, … isolating Islamists from local populations and … disrupting inputs” from others. [44] Vickers issued a Phoenix-style directive in December 2008 to “develop capabilities for extending U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through indigenous foreign forces or by conducting low visibility operations.” “It’s not just the Middle East. It’s not just the developing world. It’s not just non-democratic countries – it’s a global problem. Threats can emanate from Denmark, the United Kingdom, you name it.” [45] According to a Washington Post profile, “the most critical aspect of Vicker’s plan targeting al-Qaeda-affiliated networks around the world involves US Special Forces working through foreign partners to uproot and fight terrorism.” [46] US military and Special Operations forces would “pay indigenous fighters and paramilitaries who work with them in gathering intelligence, hunting terrorists, fomenting guerrilla warfare or putting down an insurgency.” [47] Pentagon colleagues have said of Vickers, “he tends to think like a gangster.” [48] Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell revealed that getting Bin Laden in Pakistan was Vicker’s “baby,” and “more than anyone else in the department, he drove the issue.” [49] 2011 New York Times Vickers summarizes his strategy this: “You make a deal with the devil to defeat another devil.”[50] “I just want to kill those guys.” [51] A 2011 Such is the megalomaniacal mission underlying the US global war on terror, its kill lists and worldwide program of targeted assassination. Killer Drones Revisited “Engaging in any assassination blurs the line between the good guys and the bad.” It is also “a proclamation of weakness and an admission of failure.” –John Jacob Nutter, The CIA’s Black Ops [52] The purpose of this article is to reframe the current attention on killer drones and Obama’s “kill list” within an historical perspective. The goal here is not to discourage the escalating protest against killer drones or against Obama’s targeted assassination program around the globe. As stated at the outset, the unprecedented visibility of these nefarious activities and of the outraged public response to them is precisely what is needed at this time. This heightened awareness also affords a perfect opportunity to revisit the extraordinary history of US assassination and targeted killing that has led directly and explicitly to these activities. Focus on the drones alone will not be sufficient. For even the major counter terrorist mastermind David Kilcullen himself, an avid proponent of the global targeted killing program, has argued against the use of drones. In a 2009 New York Times editorial he argues that “The goal should be to isolate extremists from their communities; [they] must be defeated by indigenous forces…Drone strikes make this harder, not easier.” He adds, “The use of drones displays every characteristic of a tactic – or, more accurately, a piece of technology – substituting for a strategy, [with minimal understanding] of the tribal dynamics of the local population. This creates public outrage and a desire for revenge.” [53] Scholar Maria Ryan, in a 2011 article entitled “War in Countries We Are Not at War With,” writes: “In 2006 the Pentagon announced that it had sent small teams of Special Operations troops to US embassies to gather intelligence on terrorism in Africa, South East Asia and South America…There is, then, a covert side to the Global War on Terrorism that is not visible and not currently knowable in the absence of whistleblowers, leaks, or things gone wrong.” [54] The heightened public attention paid to drone killing might very well, in time, lead to some welcome success in curtailing their use. But too narrow a focus on the US deployment of Predator and Reaper drones might also distract us from other forms of Phoenix-derived targeted killing still being perpetrated globally – and covertly – by our Assassination Nation.

#### This infinite war will culminate in planetary extinction.

Hanrahan 11 (Clare, Militarism and the "Economics of Extinction," http://warisacrime.org/content/militarism-and-economics-extinction

War is an all out assault on life. Every living being is in peril. The interrelated systems that sustain life are approaching total collapse from resource depletion, wanton killing and the environmental degradation of centuries of senseless war. The single most egregious and unrelenting source of ecocide is the Pentagon, an agency that consumes nearly 50 percent of each U.S. tax dollar extorted from the workers in the name of national defense. More than fifty years ago U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned that "the problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without." We have gone way too far—beyond the limits of law, morality and of sane self interest. With the Pentagon's practices of obfuscation and denial, it is a daunting task to uncover and document the staggering facts of just how severe—and in some instances irreversible—is the ecological damage brought on by militarism. What is known of the grim statistics is a stunning indictment of the woefully misnamed Department of Defense. How did this happen? What is the extent of the poisoning? Who will clean up the mess? Is it too late to turn this around? Warfare has never been easy on the earth, yet throughout thousands of years of recorded military history, this living planet has managed to recover and adjust to a succession of trampling armies encroaching with roads, leveling forests, damming rivers, polluting the air, the soil and water, digging entrenchments, bombarding and poisoning the lands, destroying habitat and crops, ~~raping~~, pillaging and eliminating uncounted species of plants and animals. The human cost in war has also been high but in past centuries was limited mostly to combatants. That is no longer the reality. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimated in the 1990s that civilian deaths constituted 90 percent of all deaths in war. In recent decades more children have been killed than soldiers and more deaths occur after the battlefield is abandoned than during combat. In almost every U.S. community where the Department of Defense and its corporate military contractors employ millions in the production, maintenance, and storage of "conventional," chemical, and nuclear weapons, the health of the workers and the natural environment is sacrificed. According to a 1989 US General Accounting Office report, the US Military produces more than 400,000 tons of hazardous waste each year. That figure is most certainly a low estimate. With astounding obedience, We the People have been willing to relinquish our lives, our children's lives, our values and the very survival of the earth in the name of national security. In 1942, the 3,000 residents of five rural Tennessee mountain communities were given just a few weeks' notice to vacate their homes and ancestral farms. Thus was the "secret city" of Oak Ridge established, and the 60,000 acres of Tennessee valleys and ridges expropriated for the war effort. The Manhattan Project was developed to enrich the uranium used for the Hiroshima bomb. In subsequent decades, and in the name of national security, officials knowingly subjected atomic industry workers, soldiers and nearby residents to deadly doses of radiation at nuclear sites throughout the country. "Some 300,000 people, or half of those who ever worked in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, are believed to have been affected by exposure to radiation," asserts Michael Renner, of the World Watch Institute writing in the 1997 book War and Public Health. Every step of the nuclear bomb-making process involves severe environmental contamination that lingers for generations. "Of all the different ways in which military operations have an impact on human health and the environment, nuclear weapons production and testing is the most severe and enduring," Renner says. As a result of naval accidents there are at least 50 nuclear warheads and 11 nuclear reactors littering the ocean floor. Some researchers estimate that the radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests have already caused as many as 86,000 birth defects and 150,000 premature deaths. Two million more cancer deaths may yet ensue from the now-banned above ground explosions. Despite the horrific consequences of nuclear energy, in Oak Ridge today, the Obama administration has approved an additional 7.5 billion dollars for refurbishing the next generation of thermonuclear weapons, assuring a stockpile of death for generations to come. The unprecedented atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, murdering hundreds of thousands, pales in comparison to the impact of modern weapons of mass destruction. Militarism in this atomic age has developed and used weapons so heinous as to extend the murderous reach to all future generations. After more than 60 years producing atomic weapons and nuclear energy, the Department of Defense and Department of Energy have accumulated over 500,000 tons of so-called depleted uranium, which it offers free of charge to weapons makers throughout the world. In Jonesborough, Tennessee, down a quiet country lane in the heart of the Southern Appalachian Mountains, Aerojet Ordnance employs a small workforce to produce weaponized uranium armaments. Bullets are coated with the radioactive waste from enriching U-235 to produce fuel for nuclear reactors and atomic bombs. According to investigative reporter Bob Nichols, writing in 2010 for the San Francisco Bay View, Iraq and virtually all the rest of the Middle East and Central Asia has been continually dosed for almost 20 years with thousands of tons of weaponized ceramic uranium oxide gas, also known as depleted uranium." These bullets, shells and bombs, when exploded, reach temperatures over 3,000 degrees centigrade and become a lethal uranium aerosol that "never stops indiscriminately maiming and killing." The contamination persists for billions of years, both on the battlefield and at US manufacturing and storage sites. Research has confirmed that uranium oxide (UO) particles, when inhaled, migrate up the olfactory nerve to the brain. They are so small they can even enter the body through the skindestroying cells in the brains, bones, and testicles or ovaries of anyone contaminated with the radioactive particles—friend, foe or noncombatant. In addition to the horrific crimes of authorizing, producing and deploying weaponized uranium, the U.S. military's lethal footprint around the globe includes toxins from heavy metals, dioxins, PCB's, asbestos, mustard, sarin and nerve gas, as well as other chemical and biological weapons. And scattered on battlefields throughout the world are as many as 100 million unexploded antipersonnel land mines. Eighty percent of landmine victims have been noncombatants. In Viet Nam, from 1962 to 1970, the US military engaged in chemical warfare dousing the country with 19 million gallons of herbicides, mostly Agent Orange produced by Monsanto, Dow Chemical and other U.S. manufacturers. The dioxin rich chemicals contaminated about five million acres of farmland, forest and waters. At least one million Vietnamese people and more than 100,000 Americans and allied troops were poisoned with deadly effects that have continued into the third generation. The human and environmental devastation in Central American during the US proxy wars of the 1980s is yet another horrific chapter in the tragedy of US militarism. In the United States alone, the Pentagon is responsible for at least 25,000 contaminated properties in all 50 states, according to a 2008 Washington Post report. Nine hundred abandoned military bases, weapons manufacturing and testing sites and other military-related industries are listed on the Environmental Protection Agency's list of 1,300 sites most hazardous to human and ecological health, and that is only a portion of the polluted sites. As many as 20 million Americans in 43 states drink water contaminated by cancer-causing perchlorate, a carcinogen found in missile and rocket fuel. According to a 1991 edition of Rachel's hazardous Waste news (#224), "… the military has exposed thousands (perhaps millions) of innocent Americans to deadly amounts of radioactivity and to a witch's brew of potent chemical toxins, has covered up these facts, has lied to the victims and their families, has lied to the press, has lied to Congress. It is a scandal and an outrage on such a scale that it takes your breath away." In 2011 it is still hard to catch one's breath in the face of this ongoing and intentional assault on the earth. And of course, it is not just the Pentagon with its lethal global reach, but the insidious corporate/government alliance that Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of over fifty years ago— a crime syndicate that colludes to profit from and deny responsibility for planetary ecocide. Gaia isn't bound by national borders, nor is this distressed planet protected by the false distinctions militarists make between combat zones and the lands they claim to defend. The militarists and the scientists in their employ have reached into the very heavens to harness the energies of the ionosphere in the service of war. Dr. Rosalie Bertell, a scientist and Roman Catholic nun confirms that "US military scientists are working on weather systems as a potential weapon. The methods include the enhancing of storms and the diverting of vapor rivers in the Earth's atmosphere to produce targeted droughts or floods." The US military practiced this so-called "geophysical warfare" in Viet Nam with Project Skyfire and Project Stormfury. Now the Pentagon is arrogantly pursuing what it calls "full spectrum" US military domination. Dr. Bertell has written of military experiments that may have played a part in earthquakes and unusual weather conditions and even accelerated global warming. Current military projects such as HAARP (High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program) are part of a "growing chain of astonishingly powerful, and potentially interactive, military installations, using varied types of electromagnetic fields or wavelengths, each with a different ability to affect the earth or its atmosphere," according to Dr. Bertell. Is there no end to the arrogance? We must intervene. We must put a stop to the militarism characterized by Academy of Natural Sciences writer Roland Wall as "a direct and relentless assault on human and natural ecosystems." The Department of Defense uses 360,000 barrels of oil each day. This amount makes the DoD the single largest oil consumer in the world. According to Sharon E. Burke, the Pentagon's director of operational energy plans and programs, the Defense Logistics Agency delivers more than 170,000 barrels of oil each day to the war theaters, at a cost of $9.6 billion in 2010. Climate change activists, rightly concerned about the continued use of fossil fuels to power our insatiable energy demands, have taken to the streets of Washington, DC to call for a halt to the tar sands oil pipeline, other resisters march in the hundreds to the sites of mountain top removal coal mining, or stand in resistance at the nuclear weapons and nuclear power complexes throughout the nation. Arrests, fines, jail and imprisonment is the lot of many who take a bold stand to call an end to the US military industrial choke hold on the planet. But a strategically disastrous divide persists between activists in the environmental sustainability movements and war resisters who challenge more directly the militarism that is the largest single cause of the Earth's imminent collapse. Have we blindly accepted the paradigm that war is inevitable, that violence is intrinsic to our nature, and that our security depends on a strong military? It is a lie—repeated again and again—but it is still a lie. "Challenging the destruction and damage to the environment and the massive exploitation of oil and metal resources for the military-industrial war machine must become paramount in the work for peace," scientist and author H. Patricia Hynes writes in a recent series of articles on the environmental impact of US militarism. Indeed, as the United Nations asserts, "there can be no durable peace if the natural resources that sustain livelihoods and ecosystems are destroyed." "We don't know how to extricate ourselves from our complicity very surely or very soon," Poet and social critic Wendell Berry asserts. "How could we live without the war economy and the holocaust of the fossil fuels?" We must find the answer to our deadly dilemma and put an end to our complicity in the desecration of the world and destruction of all creation. "To the offer of more abundant life," Berry writes, "we have chosen to respond with the economics of extinction." We cannot let this be the end.

#### The impact is a perpetual state of war

Dabashi 2007

Hamid, Thinking beyond the US invasion of Iran, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/831/focus.htm

More than being at war, what works best for the US/Israeli warlords is being in "a state of war" -- for the fear of war is the best condition in which they want to keep the world. Come March, April, May or whenever, US/Israel may or may not, invade Iran. If the war indeed happens, no one will count the Iranian dead, for counting them will amount to no moral outrage loud enough to match what is happening to the world. CNN will count the US soldiers' casualties, but even this, too, will dissipate into a vacuous pomposity that could not care less about the poor and disenfranchised Americans who are grabbed by the throat of their poverty, and catapulted half way around the globe to maim, murder, torture, and rape their own brothers and sisters. For every one US casualty (which is one too many) there will be anywhere between one to two hundred Iranian casualties, if we were to take the Iraqi case as our measure. No one will hold anyone responsible. The Iranian neo-con contingency will have made their career and lucrative contracts, and still appear on television. Just like Fouad Ajami, they will tell Americans that these Iranians, just like Iraqis, did not deserve the gift of freedom and democracy that the Americans were offering them (as he proposes in his new book The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq ). The rest of the world will have gotten even more used to the state of war that US/Israel is imposing on the globe. The invasion of Iran will add yet another front to the US/Israeli global flexing of its military prowess. And if they -- the US government and Jewish state (the two most violent states on planet Earth) -- don't invade Iran, it still makes no difference. All it takes is a comment here by President Bush, or a suggestion there by Vice President Cheney, or yet another confession that Israel makes that it indeed has massive nuclear capacities -- or else planting of a news story that Israel may attack Iran. The actual context of these news, that the US/Israel may or may not attack Iran, is entirely irrelevant to the reality of positing these threats. It is this that keeps the world on the edge of its seat, making fear and warmongering the paramount condition of our lives. In his groundbreaking work on the "state of exception", the distinguished Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has begun the uncanny task of theorising what has hitherto been delegated to the realm of necessities legem non habet ("necessity has no law"). Defying this dictum, Agamben has taken Karl Schmitt's famous pronouncement in his Political Theology (that the sovereign is "he who decides on the state of exception") quite seriously and sought to theorise that state of exception. In Agamben's own project, what he calls the "no- man's land between public law and political fact, and between the juridical order and life" remains paramount. But adjacent to that effectively juridical project, there remains a widespread culture of catastrophe that must systematically generate and sustain that state of exception, which here and now in the United States, and the world it ruthlessly rules, amounts to a perpetual state of war. It is to that state, and not merely its potential and actual evidence, that we must learn how to respond.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should abolish the authority to engage in targeted killing.

### Contention Two-Moving Past Just War

#### Just war theory is an obstacle to new ways of understanding and relating to the world-The focus on asking WHICH WARS, forecloses the possibility of asking IF WAR? The 1AC encourages us to move beyond the narrow debates over morality and legality and onto a broader focus that can start to challenge structural violence.

CMSM 13 (CMSM is an association of the leadership of men in religious and apostolic institutes in the United States, Armed Drones: Do They Make us Better People?, May 30, http://www.cmsm.org/documents/05-30-13\_CMSM\_Statement\_Armed\_Drones.pdf)

Focusing on the “just war” theory as the key frame of moral analysis for armed drones also fails to adequately engage our imagination for practices of nonviolent peacemaking. This focus also lowers our capacity to sustain peacemaking practices, and offers little insight into envisioning the justpeace which “just war” theory purports to intend. “Just war” theory also depends on, but doesn't develop the "just people" needed to interpret, apply, and revise the criteria. But even more significant, “just war” theory doesn't prioritize or illuminate a more important moral question about human habits. Therefore, by taking a longer-term view of building a justpeace, we recommend we shift the primary analysis of armed drones from law, “just war” theory, and rights to the question, "what kind of people are we becoming by using armed drones?" The following discussion provides an example of where this ethical approach, i.e. virtue ethics, might draw us. Increasing fear in communities With drones killing people, we become the kind of people who cultivate fear in communities as they wonder when a drone is hovering and if they may be attacked just by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Drones provoke high anxiety in communities and children become especially afraid. Parents often fear sending their children to school or going to the market. This anxiety and fear is incredibly destructive to trust in communities, and as many have pointed out, drone killing also leads increasing numbers of people to turn to other fearbased strategies, which includes acts we often describe as "terrorism." Increasing impersonal ways of engaging conflict Armed drones are an impersonal means of engaging conflicts. By increasingly relying on the latest destructive machine to settle conflict and destroy the other, we become increasingly less capable and willing to engage various conflicts in humanizing ways that are in accord with our human dignity. For instance, we become less likely to create conditions to defuse the hostility, such as using development programs, restorative justice practices, nonviolent civilian resistance training, or unarmed civilian peacekeeping. Further, we also become less likely to speak face-to-face with our opponents, less empathetic for the other, less prone to healing and more apt to ignoring, excluding, de-faming, and even destroying in our various relationships. The capacity for empathy is a core virtue of human flourishing as President Obama has even promoted in the past. But armed drones significantly damage this capacity in ourselves as well as lowering the empathy that others may have for us. This impersonal way of engaging conflict is also manifested in the video-game mentality of the drone controllers and thus exacerbates the objectification of others. Such objectification contributes to the habits in our culture of relating to others primarily as instruments for economic gain, political power, sexual gratification, etc. One of the more direct manifestations of this habit is the development of higher rates of post-traumatic stress syndrome in military drone operators compared to soldiers in combat zones. Avoiding the roots of conflicts Using armed drones also lowers our engagement and effectiveness in addressing the roots of conflicts. Hence, although they may appear to be immediate or short-term resolutions, i.e. “x” leader is killed, we soon end up facing the same conflict re-surfacing in new ways. Then we wonder why we seem to lurch from hostility to hostility. We must develop practices and habits that get closer to the roots of conflict to transform them into opportunities for growth and human flourishing. President Obama is wise to raise the issue of addressing “underlying grievances,” but when coupled with ongoing armed drone attacks, we will largely obstruct any social gains and create more "grievances." In our culture, this habit of avoiding root causes shows up too often in our criminal justice system with its high recidivism rates; school disciplinary systems that too often focuses on exclusion; immigration debate that overemphasizes border security without attention to the drivers of migration; and even friends who too often are unwilling to offer constructive critique to each other. Using armed drones will likely exacerbate this habit and some cultural problems that arise from it. Diminishing key virtues Using armed drones diminishes other key virtues besides empathy. For instance, the virtue of hope in others, particularly regarding the capacity to change will falter. We see this showing up in the ways we too often disconnect, avoid, or give up on people who think differently than us in our families, in the criminal justice system, and in our political wrangling. The virtue of solidarity with all people, especially the poor and marginalized will become less active. We damage solidarity not only by increasing fear and cultivating fear-based strategies of violence in poor and marginalized communities, but also by instigating an arms race in drones, which diverts funds away from those in urgent need. The virtue of courage that risks one's life to lift up the dignity of all people will also be diminished. This is incredibly damaging to our capacity to imagine, enact, and sustain the practices of nonviolent civilian resistance, which has driven our greatest social movements and overthrown dictators across the globe in much more sustainable ways than any violent approach. The virtue of justice also suffers in our culture as we ramp up armed drones. A preoccupation with technical legal issues regarding the use of lethal force, risks diverting attention from the deeper and more significant form of justice that focuses on the harms done to relationships and how to heal them in ways that address human needs, i.e., restorative justice. Using armed drones damages our capacity to see the harm done to relationships and to imagine how to heal that harm in a sustainable way. Perpetuating this destructive habit will likely increase patterns in our culture such as our high recidivism, divorce and suicide rates, etc. The virtue of nonviolent peacemaking which realizes the good of conciliatory love that draws enemies toward friendship, and the good of our ultimate unity and equal dignity of all people is also diminished by continued reliance on armed drones. To recognize this virtue is not to deny that violence is presently part of our experience, but to acknowledge that the habit of nonviolent peacemaking is an expression or basic component of human flourishing. For those professing Christianity, which many of our leaders do, Jesus’ example clarifies that nonviolent peacemaking is a central virtue. The strategies and tactics we engage become practices, which cultivate the character habits of human persons and societiess. Although President Obama asserts that his “high threshold” for the “lethal action” of drones respects the “inherent dignity of every human life,” and John Brennan claims that armed drones satisfy the "principle of humanity," the analysis above indicates some deeper concerns and a fuller vision of "humanity" we should attend to.

#### Militarism is process; exposing its hidden circuits of imperial violence is critical to demystifying its hegemony; the affirmatives moment of interruption is a breakaway from the paranoia that current governs national security policy.

McClintock 9 (Anne, is a Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Wisconsin, “Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib,” Project Muse)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5 Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6 Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8 Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.” 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal. Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty? A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body, the methods by which schools, the military, training camps— not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence. 10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11 The Enemy Deficit: Making the “Barbarians” Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution. —C. P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians” The barbarians have declared war. —President George W. Bush C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians” a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that an imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution.

## \*\*\*2AC

### 2AC Top Level

#### The utilization of Just War theory to justify targeted killing continues cycles of militarism that manifests itself in systemic conflict, racialization of bodies, and environmental destruction that leads us along a path to extinction – that’s Dabashi and Hanrahan

#### And the affirmative is a prerequisite to broader critiques of the fluid status of whiteness permute do the plan and the United Snakes of Amerikkka should stop watchin an snipin dem bodies– this is the only way to resolve the inevitable oppressive and violent practices of militarism – there’s a couple of turns to utilizing only their performance that outweigh –

#### First DA is Virtuous Violence – the manipulation of just war theory facilitates the mass murder of racialized bodies at home and abroad – it becomes easier to justify killing others when it is supposedly in the name of self-defense and within an ethical framework. Calling for restrictions on targeted killing is important because it is seen as a technological innovation that sanitizes the killing and creates hierarchies of who gets to live or die– that’s Nobel – this also turns their ethics arguments more than they can solve. Virtuous violence will cement the hierarchies that they are attempting to dismantle

Campos 07 (Joseph H. Campos, The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power, google books pg 101)

Later it was discovered that the U.S.' strikes against terrorist facilities in Sudanwere in fact attacks on pharmaceutical facilities. As long as the state maintains and successfully promotes its virtuous violence, it is able to name any action as justified in defense of the state and the security of its citizenry. Terrorist violence, not statist violence, is portrayed as the outlaw component of the international world order. Everything within the control of the state - from vast bodies of water, to borders, and ultimately to the complex working of the individual body - becomes a national security site that must be secured against the violence of terrorism. The state frames terrorists as inhumane individuals who corrupt the battlefields of statist control as it turns the "war" from actual fields of battle with physical space to fields of battle that are indeterminate, unstructured, and malleable. "The enemies of peace cannot defeat us with traditional military means" (Clinton, 1999: 86) and thus they warp time and space "realities" of the state in their production of fear and terror. The "civilized" order is then solidified and enacted by the state in the face of terrorism's "uncivilized" nature.

#### Second DA is Presidential Preemption – as long as the executive has the authority to kill whoever they want at their will, it becomes impossible for the 1NC performance to mount an effective revolutionary understanding of the current state of affairs. The war against non-white communities doesn’t just stop abroad, it can be contextualized to a war against oppressed communities at home – the 1NC performance will always be in the cross-hairs and their ignorance of the war abroad means the 1NC advocacy always fails

Bloice et al 13 (Carl Bloice is a BlackCommentator.com Editorial Board member, writer and senior activist in San Francisco, a member of the National Coordinating Committee of the Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism, a moderator at portside.org and formerly worked for a healthcare union. Bill Fletcher, Jr. is a long-time racial justice, labor and international activist and writer. He is a Senior Scholar with the Institute for Policy Studies and the immediate past president of TransAfrica Forum. He is the co-author of Solidarity Divided. Jamala is a long-time organizer and writer. She is a 2011 Alston-Bannerman Fellow and author of The Best of The Way I See It & Other Political Writings. She is the co-founder of the Organization for Black Struggle. “Black America and Obama’s Foreign Policy,” http://www.zcommunications.org/black-america-and-obama-s-foreign-policy-by-bill-fletcher-jr.html)

Well, this is a partial list, but the point here is that there is something very wrong in Obama’s foreign policy, yet you would not know that from Black America’s response. Foreign policy is not being debated on most African American talk radio programs and very rarely do we hear African American commentators in the mainstream media address the limitations of US foreign policy under Obama. While the Congressional Black Caucus has increasingly criticized the President around domestic policies, particularly the need by the administration to address the economic depression-like conditions of Black America, there is relative silence on foreign policy. This relative silence appears to be rooted in the same general problem that has afflicted Black America since the election of Obama: a belief that criticism and pressure is somehow destructive and disloyal. One can only conclude this in light of the fact that on most foreign policy matters Black America has shown an historic identification with the struggles for liberation and independence, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America. African Americans were the most critical demographic segment of the USA when it came to the US invasion of Iraq, for instance, and we regularly criticize and openly oppose interventionist activities by the USA…except when they are carried out by the Obama Administration. We are not waving our fingers at anyone. Rather we are suggesting that this is a dangerous course of action because it represents a failure to recognize that the Obama administration is not about one individual named Barack Obama. It is an administration overseeing policies, many historically rooted, in the objective of building and sustaining global domination. In other words, this goes way beyond a question of Obama’s personal views and beliefs and speaks to the sort of administration that he constructed, including who were named top officials and who were excluded. By remaining silent in the face of US aggression (and law violations, such as the murder of Awlaki and drone attacks that take the lives of many civilian noncombatants) we are making several mistakes. For one, we are ignoring the precedent that is being set. Kill one US citizen without even an indictment (let alone a trial) and where does it end? Wave our swords at Iran and promote destabilization, and does this result in an all-out war? Send troops to Uganda, and does this become another Vietnam? Cajole military forces in one African country to invade another? None of this benefits Black America—not to mention the rest of the world—in the slightest and under other circumstances many African Americans would be protesting. Paradoxically, it is probably time for us to rethink Obama’s remarks at the Congressional Black Caucus banquet in September. When he said African Americans needed to stop complaining and put on our marching boots, many people became upset and felt insulted. But let’s think about this for a moment. Too many of us have been content to complain—sometimes bitterly—in private about what we fail to see from the Obama administration. So, maybe it is time to put on those marching boots, indeed, and march in protest not only against the demonic activities of the Republicans but as well against US aggression carried out by the first African American President of the United States of America? If not now, when? If not you (us), who?

#### And tracing the history of just war in relationship to targeted killing and the rest of militarism has to be the starting point – it’s the primary way militarism justifies itself, otherwise we cede academia to the military – our approach isn’t just singular but

Moore 01 (Thomas, An Australian Approach to ethic warfare?, War, Ethics and Justice: New Perspectives on a Post-9/11 World, google books, pg39)

The revival of just war theory in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks in the United States reveals the contradictory and contested nature of moral claims about violence within International Relations. If political scientists are often criticised for "fiddling while Rome burns' (Strauss 1962: 327) then the extensive revival of just war theory in public debates about armed intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates the importance of moral reasoning in public deliberation about warfare and violence in International Relations. The extensive deployment of just war theory in the global war on terror raises signi- ficant questions about the contradictory relationship between political practice and political theory within the just war tradition. The strength of the just war tra-dition lies in its capacity to generate an understanding of the communitarian basis of modem militaries and how decisions about warfare are questions for deliberation within political community. Nonetheless, this instrumental view of just war theory thinks of just war as a rational body of conditions that must be satisfied in order to go to war (jus ad bellum) and in the fighting of war (jus in bello) This chapter examines the way in which parliamentary debate about the Iraqi intervention highlights the limitations of the just war theory as a public dis- course of warfare. A failure to examine the 'difficult questions' of just war theory within the official discourse of Australian foreign policy have revealed how the vocabulary of the just war tradition has become a 'permission slip’ for states in justifying the global war on terror. The 'difficult questions' of the just war tradition have been overlooked in the need to provide a moral justification for an intervention that was contrary to international law.

#### AND – any indication that our methodology should be excluded in the context of just war and non-violent anti-militaristic practices makes our methodologies diametrically opposed to one another. This is a reproduction of violence in the creation of knowledge that only voting for the perm and aff can prevent – our form of scholarship by kritiking just war and the concept of virtuous violence is a prerequisite to resolving the harms of the K and an independent reason to vote affirmative

Allen 7 (Douglas Allen Department of Philosophy, University of Maine “Mahatma Gandhi on Violence and Peace Education,” Project Muse)

Gandhi, of course, is very concerned with violence in the more usual sense of overt physical violence. He devotes considerable attention to identifying such violence, trying diverse approaches to conflict resolution, and providing nonviolent alternatives. This is evident in his many writings and struggles directed at war, overt terrorism, outbreaks of class and caste violence, and Hindu-Muslim communal violence. 6 However, for Gandhi, such serious overt violence constitutes only a small part of the violence that must be addressed by peace education. Gandhi’s approach to education emphasizes both the multidimensional nature of violence and the structural violence of the status quo. Educational violence cannot be separated from linguistic, economic, psychological, cultural, political, religious, and other forms of violence. These many dimensions of violence interact, mutually reinforce each other, and provide the subject matter and challenge for peace education. For example, language, inside or outside the classroom, can serve as a violent weapon used to control, manipulate, humiliate, intimidate, terrorize, oppress, exploit, and dominate other human beings. ‘‘Peaceful’’ situations, free from overt violent conflict, may be defined by deep psychological violence. If I am filled with ego-driven hatred, manifested as self-hatred and hatred for others, I am a very violent person. This will be manifested in how I relate to myself and to others, even if I repress or control my desire to strike out violently at the targets of my hatred. In his analysis of ‘‘normal’’ British colonial education in India, Gandhi frequently analyzes how the structures, values, and goals of such educational models inflicted great psychological and cultural violence on colonized Indians. Unlike most philosophers and others who adopt ethical and spiritual approaches, Gandhi places a primary emphasis on basic material needs and the ‘‘normal’’ state of economic violence. Repeatedly, he uses ‘‘violence’’ as synonymous with exploitation. He is attentive to unequal, asymmetrical, violent power relations in which some, who possess wealth, capital, and other material resources, are able to exploit and dominate those lacking such economic power. Gandhi identifies with the plight of starving and impoverished human beings and with the plight of peasants, workers, and others who are disempowered and dominated. He emphasizes that such economic violence is not the result of supernatural design or an immutable law of nature. It involves human-caused oppression, exploitation, domination, injustice, and suffering, and, hence, we as human beings are responsible. If I could change conditions and alleviate suffering, but I choose either to profit from such structural violence or not to get involved, I perpetuate, am complicit in, and am responsible for the economic violence of the status quo. Obviously, incorporating such concerns of economic violence broadens and radically changes the nature of peace education. In pointing to Gandhi’s radical challenges and to his value as a catalyst, we may touch briefly on a few aspects of educational violence in typical modern university settings. While focusing on universities, we must keep in mind that Gandhi submits that peace education must emphasize the formative training and socialization of young children. Most people do not think of universities and classroom teaching as violent, but Gandhi argues that ‘‘normal’’ university education is very violent, in terms of both multidimensional violence and the violence of the status quo. From Gandhi’s perspective, the ‘‘peaceful,’’ seemingly nonviolent classroom can be a very violent place, even when there are no actual outbursts of violence. A professor may use the grade as a weapon to threaten, intimidate, terrorize, and control students, including those who raise legitimate concerns questioning the analysis of the teacher who has institutional power over their futures. A teacher may use language, or even facial expressions and other body-language communication, in a violent way as when ignoring, humiliating, or ridiculing students who ask questions. Most often, these students will become silenced and will not subject themselves to the dangers of any further such terrifying humiliation. In more general terms, Gandhi would emphasize that universities educate students and do research in violent ways. Modern universities have increasingly become commodified and corporatized. Education is a good investment. Commodified students, as a means to some corporate end, are our most important ‘‘product.’’ Through education we increase their market-driven exchange value. Central Gandhian ethical, cultural, spiritual, social, and humanistic priorities regarding peace and nonviolence are usually ignored, occasionally attacked as unrealistic, and sometimes acknowledged but then unfunded and marginalized. Gandhi views many courses, departments, and colleges as violent even if this is taken as the status quo in no need of justification. Economic and business courses assume a framework and orientation in which students are educated to calculate how to maximize their narrow, ego-defined self-interests and how to defeat opponents and win economically in a world of adversarial, win-lose relations. For Gandhi, we are ‘‘educating’’ our students to such dominant economic models, models in which economic success is synonymous with maximizing economic exploitation, and exploitation is always violent. Similarly, Gandhi’s peace education would analyze most political science or government courses as inherently violent since they claim to be value-free but actually assume, as an immutable given, a status quo framework in which we live in a violent world of antagonistic adversarial relations. The goal is to win by amassing greater power and dominating those challenging one’s power interests. Similarly, public relations and communications courses usually adopt a violent framework in which the goal is to use language, images, and media to manipulate and control others, to get one’s way, and to maximize one’s narrow interests in winning in a world of violent relations. In terms of his own professional background, Gandhi was a barrister, and he makes the same kinds of criticisms of the violent adversarial legal system in which the goal is not cooperation, reconciliation, and peaceful relations, but exacerbating and exploiting multidimensional violence and winning at any cost by defeating the other. To provide one other, disciplinary illustration, Gandhi’s peace education points to the normal violence of the status quo reflected in most disciplines of the sciences, engineering, and technology. Scholars uncritically adopt models of instrumental rationality in which they provide the means allowing for the ends of control, domination, and exploitation of other human beings and of nature. Gandhi is not focusing on individual professors or students who are rewarded for acquiring and applying such scientific and technological means. His more fundamental and radical critique is of the unacknowledged structural violence that defines such disciplines and has devastating violent economic, military, political, and environmental effects on most of humanity and on nature. One of the most valuable contributions of Gandhi’s approach to violence is to broaden our focus so that we are able to situate our peace-education concerns in terms of the larger dominant, multidimensional structures of the violence of the status quo. For example, we uncritically accept the existence of a permanent war economy as just the way things are. We do not critique how the permanent war economy was created, is maintained, and flourishes best under conditions of insecurity, terror, violence, and war. We do not critique how it removes resources that could be provided to meet vital human needs and to provide alternative nonviolent ways of relating. Instead we accept a view of jobs and economic security dependent on a permanent war economy of insecurity, and we train students to become functionaries and contributors to a more effective war economy based on the perpetuation and domination of structural violence. Similarly, Gandhian peace education raises an awareness of how universities have increasingly become integral parts of what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex and what Senator J. William Fulbright reformulated as the military-industrial-academic complex.7 Universities increasingly approach transnational corporations, the military, the government, and other funding sources and promote themselves as valuable places to invest. Universities, as institutions of educational violence, provide the means, in terms of applied research and the education of students, to further the ends of the structural violence of the military-industrial complex based on the hierarchical, multidimensional, and violent relations of control, exploitation, and domination.

#### And our activism against just war and violent militarism doesn’t omit the agency of black women or other oppressed groups – it can be utilized as a starting point for understanding and resolving violence against those identified at intersectional sites of oppression

Heaney and Rojas-prof organizational studies and sociology, Indiana-12 (Antiwar Politics and Paths of Activist Participation on the Left, <http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/papers/rojas_working%20paper.pdf>)

Charles Tilly (1985) famously argued that war making facilitated state building because wars allow states to expand their tax collecting capacity, which resulted in an expansion of the state itself. The US Social Forum data shows that Tilly's observation can be further developed. In modern America, wars increase movement capacity. Wars touch many sectors of society and are highly emotional events. They disproportionately attract people who are interested in movement activism. Thus, antiwar politics is often the starting point for many activism careers. The aggregate result is that other movements of the left are populated with activists who began as antiwar demonstrators. If the US Social Forum is an indicator of broader trends among progressives, American wars have successfully shifted the left. The lives of activists are now intertwined with antiwar activism.

We do not argue non-peace issues are no longer an important element of the American left. Rather, war making has resulted in a fundamental re-articulation of the relationship between the different social movements that are found in American society. Early in the 20th century, activism was often dominated by "old left" issues, such as labor. In the mid-20th century, the 31 new and old left developed a complex relationship, which at time was competitive and at other times supportive. One strand of civil rights movement scholarship, for example, argues that labor and civil rights were in conflict (Foner 1981; Quadagno 1992). Other scholars have argued that the civil rights movement had a rejuvenating effect on labor unions (Isaac and Chistiansen 2002; Isaac, McDonald and Lukasik 2006). Taken together, this scholarship suggests that old and new social movements co-existed on the same political stage. Major American wars and the post-WWII defense build-up have brought antiwar activism to the forefront of activism. Major wars and other national security issues, such as the deployment of nuclear weapons in the 1980s, created a consistent point of contention, which commanded substantial resources from activists. The persistent effort to combat war has resulted in a situation where the peace movement is ubiquitous and highly connected to other movements. The relationship is asymmetric. The antiwar movement is much more likely to send it recruits to other movements.

#### A general social structural analysis isn’t enough; Debating specific instances of militarism is critical to make us better advocates against government violence—criticizing war without being willing to discuss actual policy details is a bankrupt strategy for social resistance.

Mellor 13 (Ewan E. Mellor – European University Institute, Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 2013, accessed: http://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Drones\_Targeted\_Killing\_Ethics\_of\_War)

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms. Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 Conclusion This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

### 2AC Narrative

#### Politics shouldn’t be extrinsically located from governmental prescription – to do so is defeatist and reifies states of oppression

Minow 96 (Martha Prof of Law and Dean @ Harvard University, “SPEECH: Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics, and Law,” Oregon Law Review 75 Or. L. Rev. 647 Lexis)

To identify fluidity, change, border-crossing, and unstable categories is not to deny the real force and power that some people have accorded group labels and categories, to the clear detriment of others. 59 What else could explain a regime that, in historian Barbara Fields's words, "considers a white woman capable of giving birth to a black child but denies that a black woman can give birth to a white child"? 60 As another historian, David Hollinger, puts it in his recent book, Post-Ethnic America, "Racism is real, but races are not." 61 The power to create groups and oppress them is real, but the rationale for those groups or for the assignment of members is not. Benedict Anderson's book Imagined Communities artfully traces the creation of nations as official eff- [\*663] orts by dynastic regimes to control workers and peasants; in the process, colonial powers created census categories that in turn stamped racial categories to replace previous religious, status, and anonymous identities. 62 Thomas Scheff argues that these cognitive maps of difference join with emotions of pride and shame to fuel prejudice and oppression. 63 In this view, group-based differences need not have a foundation in biology, or anything but historic oppressions, to make them real enough to warrant recognition and mobilization. 64 We do not need refined understandings of identities to acknowledge how much people in power have hurt others along lines producing the harsh reality of identities. The Nazis resolved the question of who is a Jew in the most definitive way. 65 Similarly, "black means being identified by a white racist society as black." 66 Thus, Catharine MacKinnon locates gender difference not in biology but historic oppression when she asks, "Can you imagine elevating one half of a population and denigrating the other half [\*664] and producing a population in which everyone is the same?" 67 Judith Butler argues that the meaning of anyone's gender is troubled and unfixed except by exercises of convention and authority. 68 Marilyn Frye and Peggy MacIntosh, among others, have detailed the ways in which part of the comforts enjoyed by those with more power is the distance from other people's pain and the seeming invisibility of their own privileges. 69 Empirical studies of individuals' self-understandings highlight the impact of societal views about groups and discrimination by more powerful groups. 70 Regardless of the theoretical arguments against essentialism and for intersectionality, many people believe and perceive that their identities are bound up with experiences of subordination along simplistic group lines. 71 Experiences of mistreatment along group lines influence how individuals view people from their own groups, and people in other groups. Todd Gitlin's book, which is chiefly an attack - from the progressive left - on identity politics as a distraction from deeper issues of poverty and economic dislocation, nonetheless asserts confidently that "blacks are more likely than whites to doubt the promise of America; women more likely than men to care about children and fear rape; Jews more likely than Buddhists to study the Holocaust." 72 The racial divide in public responses to the verdict in the murder trial of O.J. Simpson is only one recent confirmation [\*665] of this perception. 73 Focusing on historical and ongoing oppression cannot, however, fully rehabilitate identity politics. 74 The problem here is less incoherence than the personal, psychological, and political costs of engaging in politics around group identifications. Individuals' experiences of membership in more than one group may produce complicated responses to discrimination. For example, a study suggests that some young African-American males develop an exaggerated conception of male power and devaluation of females, apparently as a coping response to racial and economic disadvantage. 75 Privilege and oppression both can mark a person's experience, even simultaneously. Simply validating experience affords no guarantee of ending a person's own role in dominating others. Mobilizing African-American males is a current development in identity politics, as in the Million Man March, but that strategy risks splintering men and women who could be working together. 76 That strategy also could seem to condone sexist attitudes that undermine the vision of equality and human liberation behind identity politics. Here, then, is a place where the errors of essentialism, the insights of intersectionality, and the basic incoherence of group identities run up against the case of adopting categories that were never designed to help those assigned to them. Mobilizing in resistance to oppression based on a group trait may strengthen that oppression and the conceptions that it unleashes. As one observer recently put it: This politics of being, essentializing or fixing who we are, is in actuality often an inversion or continuation of ascribed colonial identities, though stated as "difference." The stereotypi- [\*666] cal contents of Africanness or Indianness, for example, are in the end colonial constructs, harbouring the colonizer's gaze. We look at ourselves with his eyes and find ourselves both adorned and wanting. 77 The internalized sense of inferiority and the assumption that human relationships must be marked by hierarchy and domination are legacies of oppression. A piece of the oppressor, then, lies within each person, as Franz Fanon, Albert Memmi, George W. Hegel, and so many observers recount. 78 Paulo Freire has argued that the true focus of revolutionary change is never merely the oppressive situation, but also the piece of the oppressor which is implanted within each person and which knows only the oppressor's tactics and relationships. 79 This insight undergirds Jacques Ranciere's observation that emancipation is never the simple assertion of an identity;it is always, at the same time, the denial of an identity given by the ruling order. 80 Efforts to reclaim identities produced by oppression can express creative resistance, 81 but it is not clear they can extirpate either the specific category's origins or the reductionism of categorical thinking. Besides strengthening the categories and methods of oppression, identity politics may freeze people in pain and also fuel their dependence on their own victim status as a source of meaning. Wendy Brown has written powerfully about these dangers; she argues that identity-based claims re-enact subordination along the lines of historical subjugation. 82 This danger arises, in her view, not only because of the ready acceptance of those very [\*667] lines of distinction and oppression in a society that has used them, but also because people become invested in their pain and suffering, or in her terms, their "wounded attachments." 83 She writes: Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impotence in the context of a discourse of sovereign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political paralysis, to feast on generalized political impotence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation through empowerment. Indeed, it is more likely to punish and reproach ... than to find venues of self-affirming action. 84 Brown urges efforts to shape a democratic political culture that would actually hear the stories of victimization while inciting victims to triumph over their experiences through political action. 85 Toward this end, she proposes shifting the focus from identity toward a focus on desires and wants, from the language of "I am" to the language of "I want." 86 In this way, perhaps politics could move beyond the artificially fixed and frozen identity positions and blame games toward expressive and engaged political action, but Brown has yet to sketch a language of solidarity rather than individual self-interest. Therapeutic understandings of trauma and recovery support this call to shift from what an individual lacks to what an individual, with others, can envision and seek. Judith Herman's work on child abuse, incest, rape, and war-time trauma emphasizes the crucial importance to individual psychological health of recovering memories and learning to speak about atrocity. 87 She also stresses the significance of moving on through mourning, acting [\*668] and fighting back, and reconnecting with others. 88 Identity politics risks directing all energy and time to pain without moving through recovery, action, and reconnection with larger communities. There remains a crucial place for anger and recrimination, as well as forgiveness and reconciliation. 89 But when identity politics takes the form of claiming excuses due to past victimization, it even makes it difficult for others to remember and acknowledge past wrongdoings and harms. 90

#### Our criticism alone of the federal government is empowering – that actualizes politics that checks presidential unilateralism

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

### 2AC A2: Nommo

#### Any attempt to put linguistic analysis as a voting issue through a process of decision-making paralyzes politics and allows militarism to continue unfettered oppressive practices against the marginalized

**Schram, Bryn Mawr College social theory and policy professor, 1995**

(Sanford F. The Poverty of Social Science and the Social Science of Poverty, pg 20-26, ldg)

Renaming points to the profoundly political character of labels. Labels operate as sources of power that serve to frame identities and interests. They predispose actors to treat the subjects in question in certain ways, whether they are street people or social policies. This increasingly common strategy, however, overlooks at least three major pitfalls to the politics of renaming." Each reflects a failure to appreciate language's inability to say all that is meant by any act of signification. First, many renamings are part of a politics of euphemisms that conspires to legitimate things in ways consonant with hegemonic discourse. This is done by stressing what is consistent and de-emphasizing what is inconsistent with prevailing discourse. When welfare advocates urge the nation to invest in its most important economic resource, its children, they are seeking to recharacterize efforts on behalf of poor families as critical for the country's international economic success in a way that is entirely consonant with the economistic biases of the dominant order. They are also distracting the economic-minded from the social democratic politics that such policy changes represent." This is a slippery politics best pursued with attention to how such renamings may reinforce entrenched institutional practices." Yet Walter Truett Anderson's characterization of what happened to the "cultural revolution" of the 1960s has relevance here: One reason it is so hard to tell when true cultural revolutions have occurred is that societies are terribly good at co-opting their opponents; something that starts out to destroy the prevailing social construction of reality ends up being a part of it. Culture and counterculture overlap and merge in countless ways. And the hostility, toward established social constructions of reality that produced strikingly new movements and behaviors in the early decades of this century, and peaked in the 1960s, is now a familiar part of the cultural scene. Destruction itself becomes institutionalized." According to Jeffrey Goldfarb, cynicism has lost its critical edge and has become the common denominator of the very society that cynical criticism sought to debunk .21 **If this is the case, politically crafted characterizations can easily get co-opted by a cynical society that already anticipates the political character of such selective renamings**. **The politics of renaming itself gets interpreted as a form of cynicism that uses renamings in a disingenuous fashion in order to achieve political ends**. Renaming not only loses credibility but also corrupts the terms used. This danger is ever present, given the limits of language. Because all terms are partial and incomplete characterizations, every new term can be invalidated as not capturing all that needs to be said about any topic. With time, the odds increase that a new term will lose its potency as it fails to emphasize neglected dimensions of a problem. As newer concerns replace the ones that helped inspire the terminological shift, newer terms will be introduced to ad- dress what has been neglected. Where disabled was once an improvement over handicapped, other terms are now deployed to make society inclusive of all people, however differentially situated. The "disabled" are now "physically challenged" or "mentally challenged?' The politics of renaming promotes higher and higher levels of neutralizing language." Yet a neutralized language is itself already a partial reading even if it is only implicitly biased in favor of some attributes over others. Neutrality is always relative to the prevailing context As the context changes, what was once neutral becomes seen as biased. Implicit moves of emphasis and de-emphasis become more visible in a new light. "Physically" and "mentally challenged" already begin to look insufficiently affirmative as efforts intensify to include people with such attributes in all avenues of contemporary life.24 Not just terms risk being corrupted by a politics of renaming. Proponents of a politics of renaming risk their personal credibility as well. Proponents of a politics of renaming often pose a double bind for their audiences. The politics of renaming often seeks to highlight sameness and difference si-multaneously.25 It calls for stressing the special needs of the group while at the same time denying that the group has needs different from those of anyone else. Whether it is women, people of color, gays and lesbians, the disabled, or even "the homeless:' renaming seeks to both affirm and deny difference. This can be legitimate, but it is surely almost always bound to be difficult. Women can have special needs, such as during pregnancy, that make it unfair to hold them to male standards; however, once those different circumstances are taken into account, it becomes inappropriate to assume that men and women are fundamentally different in socially significant ways .21 Yet emphasizing special work arrangements for women, such as paid maternity leave, may reinforce sexist stereotyping that dooms women to inferior positions in the labor force. Under these circumstances, advocates of particular renamings can easily be accused of paralyzing their audience and immobilizing potential sup- porters. Insisting that people use terms that imply sameness and difference simultaneously is a good way to ensure such terms do not get used. This encourages the complaint that proponents of new terms are less interested in meeting people's needs than in demonstrating who is more sophisticated and sensitive. Others turn away, asking why they cannot still be involved in trying to right wrongs even if they cannot correct their use of terminology," Right-minded, if wrong-worded, people fear being labeled as the enemy; important allies are lost on the high ground of linguistic purity. **Euphemisms also encourage self-censorship. The politics of renaming discourages its proponents from being able to respond to inconvenient information inconsistent with the operative euphemism. Yet those who oppose it are free to dominate interpretations of the inconvenient facts. This is bad politics**. Rather than suppressing stories about the poor, for instance, it would be much better to promote actively as many intelligent interpretations as possible. The politics of renaming overlooks that life may be more complicated than attempts to regulate the categories of analysis. Take, for instance, the curious negative example of "culture?' Some scholars have been quite insistent that it is almost always incorrect to speak about culture as a factor in explaining poverty, especially among African Americans .211 Whereas some might suggest that attempts to discourage examining cultural differences, say in family structure, are a form of self-censorship, others might want to argue that it is just clearheaded, informed analysis that deemphasizes culture's relationship to poverty.29 Still others suggest that the question of what should or should not be discussed cannot be divorced from the fact that when blacks talk publicly in this country it is always in a racist society that uses their words to reinforce their subordination. Open disagreement among African Americans will be exploited by whites to delegitimate any challenges to racism and to affirm the idea that black marginalization is self-generated.3° Emphasizing cultural differences between blacks and whites and exposing internal "problems" in the black community minimize how "problems" across races and structural political-economic factors, including especially the racist and sexist practices of institutionalized society, are the primary causes of poverty. Yet it is distinctly possible that although theories proclaiming a "culture of poverty" are incorrect, cultural variation itself may be an important issue in need of examination." For instance, there is much to be gained from contrasting the extended-family tradition among African Americans with the welfare system of white society, which is dedicated to reinforcing the nuclear two-parent family.32 A result of self-censorship, however, is that an important subject is left to be studied by the wrong people. Although analyzing cultural differences may not tell us much about poverty and may be dangerous in a racist society, leaving it to others to study culture and poverty can be a real mistake as well. Culture in their hands almost always becomes "culture of poverty."" A politics of renaming risks reducing the discussants to only those who help reinforce existing prejudices.

#### And the permutation is able to confront white privilege – it allows us to enter black semiotic spaces but without corrupting it to serve the ends of racism – our form may be different but it isn’t exclusionary if we accept yours

Shannon Sullivan**,** Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African and African American Studies—Penn State University, 2004

“White World-Traveling,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18.4 (2004) 300-304

In his captivating essay in this issue of Journal of Speculative Philosophy, on Geneva Smitherman, African American Language, and Black resistance to white domination, George **Yancy issues an invitation to white philosophers, and by extension white people in general. "Regarding white philosophers**," he claims, "**I believe that it is the job of knowledgeable and responsible Black philosophers ... to invite them to enter African American semiotic spaces of discursive difference and overlap**" (Yancy 2004, 275). **Given the constitutive relationship of word and world, the existence of African American semiotic spaces is crucial to the representation, power, and survival of Black experiences. White people's recognition of the importance of African American Language thus can be a sign that they value those experiences and wish to combat the racism that attempts to eliminate, assimilate, and "forget" them. For white people to enter African American semiotic spaces can be a way for them to fight white privilege by helping "make 'inroads against the established power-lines of speech'**" (Yancy 2004, 274).

#### The permutation is the only hope to incorporate Nommo into a process of intersubjective communication that allows it to be used as means to an end to resolve oppression, not the other way around

Clarke, Communication Professor @ Vanderbilt, 2004

[Lynn, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol 18, No 4, p. 323-324]

Despite the risks that accompany the concept of Nommo as creative power, and those that attend a linguistic theory of AAL framed within it, the promises of invention offer an important opportunity to rethink Nommo and the linguistic theory of AAL in ways that reduce the risks. In this effort, the paradox of creativity may be a resource insofar as it facilitates thinking Nommo in relation to what it appears to exclude: the argumentative dimensions of public speech. Appealing, with some unease, to Benjamin’s (1986) linguistic theory, language speaks its potential to speak. With Agamben (1999), the potential may begin to avail itself of accountability when figured not as an occasion for choice. If so, a choice appears between defining Nommo as creative power unhinged from communicative reason or as creative power linked to intersubjective speech by a “middle” that holds the two accountable to one another, keeping them in mutually responsible play. Prematurely excluded by the law of noncontradiction, the choice of linking Nommo to a middle deserves serious consideration. Figured as an attitude, or “ethos,” the “middle” is a name that speaks to the generative, relational, and practical rational potentials of logos (Doxtader 2000).6 In this speaking, the power to define reality and identity is both enacted and deferred. The middle opens up a space for individuals, groups, and communities to represent and debate competing definitions and identities, in the name of collective choice and action. On this account of public speech, advocates of particular definitions of self and world are expected to justify their terms by way of argument, and dissenting audience members are invited to provide reasons to back their disagreement and the interpretive frame(s) of reference in which the disagreement appears. Viewed from this perspective on Nommo, speakers and (individual) members of audiences within an AAL community would have a conceptual and practical opportunity to define and debate the warrants of definitions and identities offered in their name(s). Additionally, they may come to mutual agreement. In the concluding pages of Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon wrote of several wishes, one of which expressed hope “That the tool never possess the man” (Fanon 1967, 371). Critically indebted to Hegel, who saw that language may be used practically in ways akin to a tool, Fanon expressed longing for a world in which humans are emancipated from the forms of domination they create, forms that, as Hegel (1979) also saw, can pit humans against each other as if in absolutely opposed relation. Fanon also named the danger of living according to a language in which humankind appears to exist for the power of speech, and not the other way around (Fanon 1967, 191–92). Significantly, Yancy recognizes this danger and wants to survive it by talking about AAL in a way that illumines the capacity of speech to resist power’s terms. As crucial as this attempt is to the lives and political possibilities of a socially disrespected people, accounting for it through a concept of Nommo that removes itself from accountability to communicative reason creates a tool that may thwart its own potential. An approach to conceptualizing AAL from the middle of public speech provides one possible way out of the dig. Where the path may lead remains a question for talk and debate among those in whose name it is proposed.

## \*\*\*1AR

### Solvency

#### Specific demands are critical to nonviolent struggle- we must patiently fight every instance of militarism

Nagler 11 (Michael, co-founded the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at Berkeley, also the founder of the Metta Center for Nonviolence Love In Action: Their weapons don’t scare us, Nov 1, http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/their-weapons-dont-scare-us/)

I have long argued that nonviolence works best when it deals not with mere symbols but with real things that have symbolic power. Gandhi’s Salt March was an outstanding example; another is the ongoing actions of Palestinian farmers, oftentimes organized and supported by the Palestine Solidarity Project, to plant and replant olive trees that are uprooted, poisoned, and otherwise destroyed by Israeli settlers or the military. There is something primordial, and even beautiful about a direct confrontation of something real and true — and especially a living thing — with the destructive power of human delusions. The olive tree is both a symbol and an actual source of Palestinian well-being, and hence of Palestinian hopes and dignity. To uproot them, which is contrary to Jewish law, is to enact one’s own violence in a way that even the perpetrator is forced to understand the evil that person is perpetrating. This “forcing reason to be free,” as Gandhi called it, is an important part of nonviolent dynamics. Not long ago, a courageous woman who ran a shelter for destitute mothers with children in Delhi was told by city authorities that she would have to pay taxes that up until then had been waived. She explained that they were a shoestring operation and if the taxes were imposed at least three of her women would have to be turned out on the street. “We can’t help that,” said the men. “All right,” she replied, but then took them through the door to the large dorm where her charges were housed, and said, “You choose which ones to turn out.” The men left and the tax waiver remained in place. In the important film Bringing Down a Dictator that chronicles the 2000 Otpor (‘Resist!’) uprising, which in one dramatic day turned Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic out of office (after eleven weeks of NATO bombings that only consolidated his hold on power), student leader Srdja Popovic explained, “we won because we were on the side of life.” This symbolic valence might be said to be missing from the present occupation movement. Fun, music, and face paint may say “life” to some people more than business suits and portfolios, but they don’t quite evoke the reality and urgency that enabled the oppressed Serbian population to rise up against harsh police brutality and is enabling the Palestinians and their international supporters to face even fatal resistance in Beit Omar, Surif, and other West Bank villages. Proudly declaring that “their weapons don’t scare us,” the message of the Palestinian Solidarity Project, which is coordinating not only the olive-tree planting but roadblock removal, and apartheid wall demonstrations, is quite accurate: Peace and security are rights not just for some of us, but for all the people of the world. Controlling another person’s life, possessions, future, and thoughts is a crime and a humiliation. We have dreams and hopes of freedom, so we are inviting all the people of the world to stand with us and share in our struggle for freedom. For any such struggle to succeed — be it that of the Palestinians or of Occupy Wall Street or even a larger movement for peace — it must be able to counter the power of the Apocalyptic myths that have driven the post-9/11 wars and brought the U.S. to a point of near ruin financially and morally. These prevailing narratives of militarism revolve around the powerful archetype of good and evil, order vs. chaos; but they can be overcome by an even more powerful myth, if you will (I taught mythology for many years at U.C. Berkeley), which is the struggle for life itself against death. The answer is to take back not just our incomes and some civic spaces, but the “spaces” in our minds and our public discourse. In practice, this would mean making common cause with the Palestinian struggle and looking for other ways to show, patiently but insistently, that in opposing greed and militarism we are on the side of life — which would have the added advantage of being true.

#### The crisis of politics can only be solved by using politics

**Katwala, General Secretary of the Fabian Society, 2009**

(Sunder, A Future For Politics, pg. 31)

The answer to the political legitimacy crisis is politics. There can be no magic bullet solution to what is primarily a question of political cultural and political education. But the overriding priority should be to pursue political reform in a way that is engaging and educative of the nature of politics itself and that brings about practical results.

### Perm do both

\*Framing issue\* we should deliberate about future politics while also focusing on past injusttices that have shaped our identities, the alternative alone is reactionary because it grabs on to identity as men have constructed it, but doesn’t contest the terms of identity.

Enns 7 (Diane Enns is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University, Hamilton, “Political Life Before Identity,” Project Muse)

This is one of the most important questions to ask today, as we assess the effects of the contemporary philosophical and political discourses on difference. It requires that we engage in political thought and action constantly in two registers -- what Derrida refers to as "lingering and rushing" -- acting in the crisis of the moment, with judgment and decision, and at the same time deliberating, slowly and patiently, with an unknown, imprevisible future in mind. When thinking of the dilemma Du Bois presented us with a century ago, whether to stress one's difference or points of commonality, we could conclude that choosing one or the other restricts us to a very narrow scope for politics, one that either dwells on remedying the past or dreaming of a better future. As we wait for equality, our focus on difference perpetuates the process of selection, discrimination, and silence on the separate ethical universe of the other;34 yet we must account for the inequalities that make difference matter in the present. It seems that identity politics as we currently know it acts as an emergency measure rather than a preventative political practice.

it is always, at the same time, the denial of an identity given by the ruling order. 80 Efforts to reclaim identities produced by oppression can express creative resistance, 81 but it is not clear they can extirpate either the specific category's origins or the reductionism of categorical thinking. Besides strengthening the categories and methods of oppression, identity politics may freeze people in pain and also fuel their dependence on their own victim status as a source of meaning. Wendy Brown has written powerfully about these dangers; she argues that identity-based claims re-enact subordination along the lines of historical subjugation. 82 This danger arises, in her view, not only because of the ready acceptance of those very [\*667] lines of distinction and oppression in a society that has used them, but also because people become invested in their pain and suffering, or in her terms, their "wounded attachments." 83 She writes: Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impotence in the context of a discourse of sovereign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political paralysis, to feast on generalized political impotence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation through empowerment. Indeed, it is more likely to punish and reproach ... than to find venues of self-affirming action. 84 Brown urges efforts to shape a democratic political culture that would actually hear the stories of victimization while inciting victims to triumph over their experiences through political action. 85 Toward this end, she proposes shifting the focus from identity toward a focus on desires and wants, from the language of "I am" to the language of "I want." 86 In this way, perhaps politics could move beyond the artificially fixed and frozen identity positions and blame games toward expressive and engaged political action, but Brown has yet to sketch a language of solidarity rather than individual self-interest. Therapeutic understandings of trauma and recovery support this call to shift from what an individual lacks to what an individual, with others, can envision and seek. Judith Herman's work on child abuse, incest, rape, and war-time trauma emphasizes the crucial importance to individual psychological health of recovering memories and learning to speak about atrocity. 87 She also stresses the significance of moving on through mourning, acting [\*668] and fighting back, and reconnecting with others. 88 Identity politics risks directing all energy and time to pain without moving through recovery, action, and reconnection with larger communities. There remains a crucial place for anger and recrimination, as well as forgiveness and reconciliation. 89 But when identity politics takes the form of claiming excuses due to past victimization, it even makes it difficult for others to remember and acknowledge past wrongdoings and harms. 90

#### Indicating that we are engaging in a process of omission undermines criticism and reinforces oppressive structures that allow militarism to continue its unfettered drive

Dean 13 (Jodi, is a professor of political science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “Comrades,” http://www.thenorthstar.info/?p=11319)

In the contemporary US, capitalist ideology pushes non-stop on the throttle of individuality. “Individuality,” in the present context, is not the same as rugged individualism or personality, although it shares with these earlier formations an emphasis on the singularity of a self against others. Unlike rugged individualism, contemporary individuality doesn’t emphasize strength as much as it does suffering. Unlike personality (appearing in a new form in the 19th century and well-described by Richard Sennett), contemporary individuality doesn’t rely on an interiority that is both authentic and to be cultivated, expressed only with care and attention. Instead, individuality is uniqueness for its own sake, uniqueness as moment, quip, fashion statement, flare, comeback, quirk–the difference that registers as different before it is swept into communicative capitalism’s flows. Two elements that factor into the particularly US fetish for individuality are law and economics. Our legal system emphasizes individual rights. The peculiarity of US libertarianism is its inability to acknowledge that a right is only as a good as the force that backs it up, whether that force comes from the state or the community. Rather than part of a broader cultural appreciation for the imbrication of rights and responsibilities, duties, and obligations (part of the continental tradition), in the popular understanding of rights in the US, rights are individual claims to freedom. Rights are imagined in terms of the specific injury of a plaintiff, not the larger, structural, condition of a collectivity. Winning rights (ending segregation, workplace discrimination, marriage restrictions) has required not just legislative victories but judicial ones as well, which means finding individual plaintiffs. The US capitalist economic system likewise insists on individuality. Particularly in the wake of the attack on unions, work is more and more figured as an individual matter. It’s a choice, an option, a matter of one’s own unique ability to work hard, play the game, think outside the box, be a team player, demonstrate leadership skills, give a 110 percent, seize the opportunity, and take risks. One has to be be unique, different from all the rest, so that one stands out from the crowd, shows that one has what it takes — no wonder it’s hard for some people to think of themselves as part of the 99%. The demands of so-called flexible employment (flexible for whom?) make the process of differentiation constant and inescapable: one is perpetually trying to show that one is the best for whatever job comes around. The best are hard to find. They are unique. This is the lesson of Wall Street, whose finance wizards are ostensibly rare and valuable enough to justify massive bonuses every year. It’s the lesson of Silicon Valley: not everyone is Steve Jobs. It’s the lesson of professional sports (one MVP), of Hollywood, of all of communicative capitalism’s intensified networks as they activate the many in order to generate the one. How, then, does the left respond? There is the rejection of leaders. Already part of the legacy of ’68, the current rejection of leaders rightly tries to immunize itself from celebrity seekers attempting to use radical politics for their own advancement. Some of the best versions of this have been the common names Zapatista (including Subcommandante Marcos) and Anonymous. They replace individual leaders with a common name and image. Occupy went far in this direction of a name in common as well. Yet it’s also the case that people sometimes interpret the need to provide an alternative to capitalist individuality as an injunction to destroy any individual who emerges out of the left as someone exciting, someone to hear and read. Need passes through demand to the plane of unconditionality, to put it in the ever-popular Lacanian idiom. In this urge to destroy, we find the intensity, the excess, of desire. It’s desire that is absolute, unconditioned, out of proportion, desire that abolishes the dimension of the other. We learn from Lacan that this desire is incommensurate to any specific object. So, we would be wrong to think of it in terms of its object. I admit, this is a drag. It would be much easier to be able to point out that someone desires their own fame, their own power, their own glory, and then demolish them by demonstrating how this desire makes them hypocrites, failed and false leftists, even betrayers of the people or the revolution. This sort of cheap shot relies on a shift into the economy of the drive, into the loop of momentary satisfaction where one repeats the same gestures over and over, getting off a little bit, enjoying, but completely effacing the dimension of desire. To think within desire we have to think of it in terms of its effects, its abolition of the dimension of the other. The question, then, would be who is the other who is abolished? Who is the other for us? For communists, the other is the capitalist other. In the demand to abolish private property (ownership and waged labor), basic needs pass “over to a state of being unconditioned, not because it is a question of something borrowed from a particular need, but of an absolute condition out of all proportion to the need for any object whatsoever, and in so far as this condition is perhaps called for precisely in this, that it abolishes here the dimension of the other, that it is a requirement in which the other does not have to reply yes or no.” The capitalist cannot meet the demand. It cannot even reply “yes or no.” Morphed through demands, basic needs are not enough. Their satisfaction is just a vehicle for a more profound, unconditional, restructuring of society. An effect of communist desire, then, is the abolition of capitalist other, and hence an abolition of class itself, the very relation on which capitalism depends. It’s no wonder that capitalism works incessantly at blocking this dimension of desire, at attempting to push it into the more present and frequent momentary satisfactions of drive. Capitalism wants to channel this desire into different languages and images, the ones that it provides — that of individuality, specificity, uniqueness. For a left that has struggled for a voice in a place contorted by forty years of unfettered capitalism, this channeling is apparent in efforts to suppress emerging class solidarity. Even as a global proletariat — textile workers in Bangladesh, technology workers in China, transport workers of multiple backgrounds, indeed, a mobile proletariat visible less in terms of national location, race, or sex than of interdependence along multiple vectors — presses to build its collective power, the left finds itself attached to practices that undermine solidarity. Perpetually suspicious and mistrustful, it eats its own. There are multiple versions of this mistrust. Sometimes it manifests as a preoccupation with process. Sometimes it manifests as critique and “problematization” before anything has even been carried out. For those who engage in social media, the left-liberal press, and left academia, it appears as a set of predictable responses and snarky one-liners, which then devolve into debates over tone, and various accusations, most of which are mean-spirited, many of which demolish rather than build. In the course of the demolition, the capitalist is displaced as the other. He is safe, protected, no longer the target. The only way to move through this is via an ethos of comradeship, a solidarity. We can’t fight class war one person at a time. We have to be connected, solidary, and strong. Mark Fisher’s recent essay in The North Star is a major contribution to such an ethos as it describes the practices that have prevented it from emerging as well as their destructive effects. Mark writes: We need to learn, or re-learn, how to build comradeship and solidarity instead of doing capital’s work for it by condemning and abusing each other. This doesn’t mean, of course, that we must always agree – on the contrary, we must create conditions where disagreement can take place without fear of exclusion and excommunication. We need to think very strategically about how to use social media – always remembering that, despite the egalitarianism claimed for social media by capital’s libidinal engineers, that this is currently an enemy territory, dedicated to the reproduction of capital. As I see it, examples of destructive projects are criticisms that attack someone for sins of omission, as if one person could do, think, and write everything, as if one person had the capacity of a party to encompass a wide array of positions. Criticisms of blog posts as if they were academic articles or even books are similarly misplaced as are attacks that proceed as if one article were all that a person had ever written.