## 1nc

#### The roll of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question “whether topical action is better then the status quo or competitive option”

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

**Army Officer School 2005**

(“# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, 5-12, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

**Ericson, California Polytechnic dean emeritus, 2003**

(Jon, The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, pg 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

**Steinberg and Freeley, Miami communication studies lecturer and Boston based attorney, 2008**

(David and Austin, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, pg 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Deliberation is the best model-continual testing bolsters advocacy and inclusion-this means we create better methods of engagement to resolve the AFF but they don’t resolve this offense-only switching sides on a limited point of stasis maximizes this potential

**Talisse, Vanderbilt philosophy professor, 2005**

(Robert, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, project muse)

Nonetheless, the deliberativist conception of reasonableness differs from the activist’s in at least one crucial respect. On the deliberativist view, a necessary condition for reasonableness is the willingness not only to offer justifications for one’s own views and actions, but also to listen to criticisms, objections, and the justificatory reasons that can be given in favor of alternative proposals. In light of this further stipulation, we may say that, on the deliberative democrat’s view, reasonable citizens are responsive to reasons, their views are ‘reason tracking’. Reasonableness, then, entails an acknowledgement on the part of the citizen that her current views are possibly mistaken, incomplete, and in need of revision. Reasonableness is hence a two-way street: the reasonable citizen is able and willing to offer justifications for her views and actions, but is also prepared to consider alternate views, respond to criticism, answer objections, and, if necessary, revise or abandon her views. In short, reasonable citizens do not only believe and act for reasons, they aspire to believe and act according to the best reasons; consequently, they recognize their own fallibility in weighing reasons and hence engage in public deliberation in part for the sake of improving their views.15 ‘Reasonableness’ as the deliberative democrat understands it is constituted by a willingness to participate in an ongoing public discussion that inevitably involves processes of self-examination by which one at various moments rethinks and revises one’s views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations offered by one’s fellow deliberators. Hence Gutmann and Thompson write: Citizens who owe one another justifications for the laws that they seek to impose must take seriously the reasons their opponents give. Taking seriously the reasons one’s opponents give means that, at least for a certain range of views that one opposes, one must acknowledge the possibility that an opposing view may be shown to be correct in the future. This acknowledgement has implications not only for the way they regard their own views. It imposes an obligation to continue to test their own views, seeking forums in which the views can be challenged, and keeping open the possibility of their revision or even rejection.16 (2000: 172) That Young’s activist is not reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’ (106); activist tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption that questions of justice are essentially settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its implementation requires. He also believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at enlisting other citizens in support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed. The activist implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection to his views concerning justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse because he has judged on a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable. According to the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The deliberativist recognizes that questions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter the activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of power wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve. That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of public deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue; reasonableness hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views, he is literally unable to be reasonable. Hence the deliberative democrat concludes that activism, as presented by Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement. The dialogical conception of reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the activist’s reply to the charge that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist denied this charge on the grounds that activism is aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view, the problem with interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or deplorable) of the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory as fixed dispositions that are non-cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons. Insofar as the activist sees his view of justice as ‘given’ and not open to rational scrutiny, he is engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist rejects. The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

#### Effective deliberative discourse is the lynchpin to solving existential social and political problems

**Lundberg, UNC Chapel Hill communications professor, 2010**

(Christian, Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century, pg 311-3)

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical •outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by •debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change out pacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to re-articulation, it is open to re-articulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Dewey in The Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63,154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, 140) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multi-mediated information environment (ibid.), Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instruction/no instruction and debate topic ... that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned... students in the Instructional [debate] group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so.... These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in [debate] These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthen and Gaylen Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthen and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical-thinking skills, research and information-skills, oral-communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded, and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens who can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive and to deal with systemic threats that risk our collective extinction. Democratic societies face a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention, and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization, including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in an increasingly complex world. Given the challenge of perfecting our collective political skill, and in drawing on the best of our collective creative intelligence, it is incumbent on us to both make the case for and, more important, to do the concrete work to realize an expanded commitment to debate at colleges and universities.

#### Maintaining even division of ground and contestability is key to maintain debate’s unique potential for educational dialogue-alternative interpretations-guarantee uneducational monologues.

**Hanghoj, Aarhus education assistant professor, 2008**

(Thorkild, “Playful Knowledge An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming”, <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf>)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Dialogue is the biggest impact—the process of discussion precedes any truth claim by magnifying the benefits of any discussion

**Morson, Northwestern professor, 2004**

(Gary, Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language, Literacy, and Learning (Learning in Doing: Social, Cognitive and Computational Perspectives), pg 330-2)

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

#### Debating the intricacies of the topic is key reverse excessive presidential authority-impact is constant and unlimited military actions

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

#### Switching sides is key

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Bridging Competitive Debate and Public Deliberation on Presidential War Powers

http://public.cedadebate.org/node/14

The second major function concerns the specific nature of deliberation over war powers. Given the connectedness between presidential war powers and the preservation of national security, deliberation is often difficult. Mark Neocleous describes that when political issues become securitized; it “helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms.” (2008, p. 71). Collegiate debaters, through research and competitive debate, serve as a bulwark against this “short-circuiting” and help preserve democratic deliberation. This is especially true when considering national security issues. Eric English contends, “The success … in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security politics points to efficacy of academic debate as a training ground.” Part of this training requires a “robust understanding of the switch-side technique” which “helps prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies” (English et. al, 2007, p. 224). Hence, competitive debate training provides foundation for interrogating these policies in public. Alarmism on the issues of war powers is easily demonstrated by Obama’s repeated attempts to transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay. Republicans were able to launch a campaign featuring the slogan, “not in my backyard” (Schor, 2009). By locating the nexus of insecurity as close as geographically possible, the GOP were able to instill a fear of national insecurity that made deliberation in the public sphere not possible. When collegiate debaters translate their knowledge of the policy wonkery on such issues into public deliberation, it serves to cut against the alarmist rhetoric purported by opponents. In addition to combating misperceptions concerning detainee transfers, the investigative capacity of collegiate debate provides a constant check on governmental policies. A new trend concerning national security policies has been for the government to provide “status updates” to the public. On March 28, 2011, Obama gave a speech concerning Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya and the purpose of the bombings. Jeremy Engels and William Saas describe this “post facto discourse” as a “new norm” where “Americans are called to acquiesce to decisions already made” (2013, p. 230). Contra to the alarmist strategy that made policy deliberation impossible, this rhetorical strategy posits that deliberation is not necessary. Collegiate debaters researching war powers are able to interrogate whether deliberation is actually needed. Given the technical knowledge base needed to comprehend the mechanism of how war powers operate, debate programs serve as a constant investigation into whether deliberation is necessary not only for prior action but also future action. By raising public awareness, there is a greater potential that “the public’s inquiry into potential illegal action abroad” could “create real incentives to enforce the WPR” (Druck, 2010, p. 236). While this line of interrogation could be fulfilled by another organization, collegiate debaters who translate their competitive knowledge into public awareness create a “space for talk” where the public has “previously been content to remain silent” (Engels & Saas, 2013, p. 231). Given the importance of presidential war powers and the strategies used by both sides of the aisle to stifle deliberation, the import of competitive debate research into the public realm should provide an additional check of being subdued by alarmism or acquiescent rhetorics. After creating that space for deliberation, debaters are apt to influence the policies themselves. Mitchell furthers, “Intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process” (2010, p. 107). With the timeliness of the war powers controversy and the need for competitive debate to reorient publicly, the CEDA/Miller Center series represents a symbiotic relationship that ought to continue into the future. Not only will collegiate debaters become better public advocates by shifting from competition to collaboration, the public becomes more informed on a technical issue where deliberation was being stifled. As a result, debaters reinvigorate debate.

#### Generalities are not enough; Debating specific policies on both sides is critical to make us better advocates against government violence—criticizing war without being willing to discuss actual policy details is a bankrupt strategy for social resistance.

--we can use these categories to critique them; simulation does not undercut our potential for critique

--have to roll-play the enemy to know their language and learn their strategies

Mellor 13 (Ewan E. Mellor – European University Institute, Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 2013, accessed: http://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Drones\_Targeted\_Killing\_Ethics\_of\_War)

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms. Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 Conclusion This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

#### The 1AC is founded on negation rather than prefigurativity ---the politics of the possible has occluded the politics of the actual to the point where there is no beyond the monological affirmation of their ontological “difference” in a possible “world to come.”

Nail 10 (Thomas, is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Denver“Constructivism and the Future Anterior of Radical Politics,” http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/thomas-nail-constructivism-and-the-future-anterior-of-radical-politics)

Radical politics today faces a two-fold challenge: to show the problems and undesirability of the current structures of exclusion and power, and to show the desirability and coherency of various alternatives that may take their place. This paper argues that over the last 15 years, in particular, radical politics have been vastly more attentive to the former than to the latter and that what is now required is an appropriate shift in practical and theoretical efforts toward more constructive and prefigurative activities. In particular, the politics of difference, often associated with post-structuralist political theory and contemporary radical politics would do well to attend more closely to some of the more productive and promising political experiments emerging today. Not merely by exemplifying them as instances of a general potential for political transformation, as is more often the case, but to concretely clarify their field of struggle, the types of political subjects they create, what makes them desirable as alternatives, and the dangers these experiments confront. That is, radical political theory can no longer be satisfied with the mere critique of various forms of representation and essentialism in favour of difference and the affirmation that “another world is possible.” It has been ten years since this admittedly important slogan was adopted by the World Social Forum, but it is time that radical theory and practice begin to create a new praxis adequate to the world that will have been emerging: our political future anterior. To be clear, I am not arguing that radical political theory does not engage contemporary political events. I am arguing that it has disproportionally favoured the practice of critiquing of them, and insufficiently engaged political events that propose inspiring alternatives to the present. For the most part it has merely exemplified them in name: the No Borders Movement, Zapatismo, the Landless Peasants Movement, etc. These events are understood as parts of a new revolutionary sequence demonstrating the possibility of another world. A shift in radical political theory toward a clarification, valorization, and prefiguration of these events that are currently drawing an outline of the future would thus have the following advantages: (1) It would prove, against its critics, that post-structuralism (in particular) is not merely an abstract theoretical discourse, but has analytical tools adequate to contemporary struggles; (2) It would help clarify the structure and importance of radical political events, not only for those subject to the event, but for those who do not yet understand its consequences; (3) Finally, it would show the intelligibility and desirability of promising alternatives to present authoritarian phenomena. But since the analytical category of “radical political theory” is perhaps too broad to address in this paper, I would like to focus my argument on what I think is one of the more prominent efforts to connect radical theory to contemporary political struggles: post-anarchism. Post-anarchism is the explicit conjunction between post-structuralist political philosophy and anti-authoritarian politics. Here one might expect to see a relatively high degree of theoretical analysis of concrete political struggles with an attention to their prefigurative capacity to create a new future in the present. But for the most part this has not been the case, although there are some recent notable exceptions.[1] Post-anarchism has often been criticized for being either a purely scholastic critique of humanist essentialism in classical anarchism (Kropotkin, Bakunin, Proudhon) or being a purely theoretical effort with only speculative relation to the political field. But while I too remain so far unconvinced by articulations of post-anarchism’s applicability to the political field, I also believe that it does have the ability to offer a host of constructive analytical tools that other political theories lack. In this paper, I aim to vindicate this capacity. Post-anarchism is perhaps too large of an analytical category to digest. Todd May has drawn on the work of Deleuze, Foucault, and Rancière, while Saul Newman has focused his own on that of Lacan, Derrida, and Badiou. These are all very different thinkers and it would be a mistake to conflate them into a single post-anarchist position. But distinguishing them all or attempting to re-synthesize their “anarchist” inclinations is perhaps equally indigestible. Thus, I would like to make a more modest intervention into this discussion in a way that not only provides support for my thesis, that the political philosophy of difference (adopted by post-anarchism) is insufficient for understanding the positive contributions of anti-authoritarian struggles, but also motivates a turn to a more constructive analysis of contemporary events. By constructive analysis, I mean a theoretical focus on the degree to which political struggles offer or inspire alternative modes of social organization. To do this I will draw on two figures associated with post-anarchism who I believe articulate an overlooked potential for a more constructive theoretical contribution: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari are particularly useful for three reasons: (1) they are post-structuralist philosophers who explicitly reject the representational politics of the state, party, and vanguard and (2) who, according to Todd May, supposedly affirm a political philosophy of difference. But more importantly, (3) Deleuze and Guattari also propose three positive political strategies often expressed in anti-authoritarian experiments that I think have been overlooked in post-anarchist readings of these philosophers. I think these strategies are able to show the unique analytical strength of post-anarchism’s contribution to concrete struggles. Additionally, and following my own imperative to examine more closely positive political experiments offering alternatives to the present, I want to look at the often touted, post-anarchist political event of Zapatismo.[2] Zapatismo has achieved a relatively high degree of success, or stability over the past 15 years, and I believe it corroborates at least three of the transferable political strategies found in the post-anarchism of Deleuze and Guattari: (1) a multi-centered strategy of political diagnosis, (2) a prefigurative strategy of political transformation, and (3) a participatory strategy of organizing institutions. These strategies are both inventions specific to Zapatismo but also consonant with several political-theoretical structures in Deleuze and Guattari’s work. I. Post-structuralist Anarchism’s Before I begin with an analysis of these three post-structuralist or post-anarchist strategic insights located in Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas, I want to be clear of precisely what I find so insufficient in post-anarchist political theory and why I think it would benefit from engaging in more prefigurative political analyses. My criticisms are by no means meant to capture all of post-anarchism, but only a specific formulation of it I find particularly insufficient. While there are of course many anarchists writing under the proper name of post-anarchism, there are, I think, two distinguishing features that unite the particular formulation I want to focus on: (1) the critique of all forms of authoritarianism and representation (statism, capitalism, vanguardism, essentialism, identity politics, etc.) and (2) more positively, the affirmation of difference. Unlike classical anarchism, Newman and May claim, post-anarchism does not rely on naturalism or humanist essentialism, but rather affirms difference as the radical horizon of politics as such. According to Newman, it is “the infinite demand that will remain unfulfilled and never grounded in any concrete normative social order” (Newman, 2007: 11). Todd May accordingly defines post-anarchism by two central commitments: the “anti-representationalist principle” and the “principle of promoting differences” (May, 1994: 135). This is the formulation of post-anarchism that I find most inadequate and ill-equipped for theorizing constructive alternatives to contemporary forms of political domination and exclusion. Given this commitment to anti-authoritarianism and the promotion of difference, understood positively as the radical possibility “to create new, non-statist forms of communal association and direct democracy that would make the state irrelevant,” how are we to understand the relationship between, on the one hand, this radical possibility freed from the constraints of authoritarianism, and on the other the concrete practices of direct democracy that may or may not come to realize the “infinite demands” of post-anarchism (Newman, 2007: 8)? Not only does post-anarchism reject any concrete practices that would seek to centralize power but, according to May and Newman, it also rejects institutions themselves as forms of coercion and authority (Newman, 2007: 4).[3] How then are we to understand, positively, the kinds of organizations post-anarchism is proposing as alternatives to the coercive ones currently in place? In an anarchist society how will decisions be made on global issues like climate change, border issues, and pollution? How will the fair exchange of goods and services take place and how will we negotiate conflicts among community groups without centralized authority, either socialist or market? Or is Frederic Engels correct in his common criticism that anarchists have no idea how an anarchist society would function? “[H]ow these people [the anarchists] propose to run a factory, operate a railway, or steer a ship without having in the last resort one deciding will, without single management, they of course do not tell us” (Engles, 1978: 728–9). Insofar as post-anarchism and contemporary radical politics share a similar commitment to “political contingency” and “radical possibility” they also share a similar uncertainty regarding the true alternatives they are proposing. But why is this? The post-anarchist position, that all of politics emerges from the inconsistent void of being, (from Greek: αναρχία, anarchía, “without ruler” or “without origin”) unfortunately does not seem to tell us anything about the kinds of political distributions that seem to emerge from this void and how they should be reorganized. With no certain ground (it is after all, an-archic) for determining the revolutionary object (seizer of state power, etc.), the revolutionary subject (the proletariat, etc.), the just society, or its future organizations, there is really no way to tell whether or not a particular group or organization has really articulated the “difference” post-anarchism aims to be promoting. Political action must be understood instead as “aporetic” or “preformativley contradictory” because “difference” is nothing other than the unconditioned and inconsistent unground for the emergence of radical politics as such, not any particular actual difference we may encounter. But if this is the case and “the only ontological ground is the void,” according to Newman’s paraphrase of Alain Badiou, on what condition or criteria do we say that a given political experiment is radical, reformist, authoritarian, capitalist, etc. (Newman, 2007: 14)? And what is the structure or order particular to actual radical organizations (not just possible ones) that distinguishes them from authoritarian ones? As political phenomena they have always already fallen from their radical possibility into the realm of concrete effectuation and are no longer purely possible. This does not mean, of course, that post-anarchism is unable to define radicalism as such, but merely that it has difficulty defining radicalism outside the affirmation of difference, in this account. Post-anarchist radicalism is, strictly speaking, the degree to which the phenomena defends its “possibility of becoming-other,” or “difference.” Thus, direct action groups like Peoples Global Action (PGA), the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), or even the anti-globalization movement may be considered radical political groups because they are defenders of a “political potentiality” foreclosed by global capitalism, but not because of the particular way in which they are positively ordered or distributed in themselves. The politics of the possible, in this case, has occluded a politics of the actual. The “multitude,” according to Hardt and Negri, or the “counter-hegemony,” according to Laclau, are the potensia or “constituent power” of the people to rise up and defend their capacity to create a new world in the shell of the old. The slogan, “another world is possible” thus seems to articulate post-structuralist and radical politics well insofar as both valorize the possibility of the people to come and criticize the authoritarianism of the present. But what is to be said of the actually existing infrastructure of worker cooperatives, free schools, local exchange trading systems, equalitarian kinship models, consensus community councils, land trusts, etc. beyond the monological affirmation of their ontological “difference” in a possible “world to come?” What kinds of concrete practices are they effectuating in their decision-making, self-management, exchange, and conflict resolution and how do such practices work? What are the new conditions, elements, and agencies that are emerging and how are they viable alternatives to parliamentary capitalism? Richard J.F. Day, in his essay, “From Hegemony to Affinity: The Political Logic of the Newest Social Movements” has advanced a similar concern. While Hardt and Negri’s concept of “constituent power,” he says “thus appears to be strongly identified with constructing concrete alternatives to globalizing capital here and now, rather than appealing to state power or waiting for/bringing on the revolution,” “ultimately it is not at all clear how they perceive the practical political logic of the project of counter-Empire” (Day, 2004: 735; 736). Thus despite Hardt and Negri’s claim that, “[o]nly the multitude through its practical experimentation will offer the models and determine when and how the possible becomes real,” the question of how these real political effectuations function as actual existing alternatives to Empire is left completely unanswered (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 411). So while it may be true that the when of a singular political emergence is in some sense contingent and nomadic, the concept of the multitude ultimately says nothing about the how of alternative political organizations as they are ordered and distributed in reality. Thus it says nothing of actually existing radical politics. Day’s response to this problem is a move in the right direction but in his essay he offers only a glimpse of the post-anarchist alternatives. Instead of being satisfied with Hardt and Negri’s account of the vaguely creative power of the multitude, or Gramsci’s logic of hegemony that would centralize these heterogeneous and anarchistic social movements, Day argues instead that several of these newest social movements like Food Not Bombs, Independent Media Centers, and Reclaim the Streets offer new post-anarchist strategies of affinity and direct action: (1) grassroots organization; (2) autonomy from state centralization and instrumentalist accumulation, and; (3) a move away from strategies of demand and representation to strategies of direct action and participation. Instead of demonstrating at NBC’s news headquarters to demand that they more accurately represent race relations in the area, for instance, activists are instead creating their own independent media networks as an alternative to mainstream media. While I agree with the three characteristics Day mentions, as well as his support for a general strategy of disengagement and reconstruction (drawn from Gustav Landauer), I would like to suggest the additional importance of a few uniquely post-anarchist strategies I think can be found in Deleuze, Guattari, and the Zapatistas. My motivation in this analysis is to supplement what I believe is an insufficient vision of post-anarchism based on the political philosophy of difference with an analysis that focuses instead on the more constructive alternatives offered by contemporary political struggles. The problem of radical politics today is thus not that it lacks resistance to all of the many forms of hierarchy and oppression (sexism, racism, ecological destruction, etc.), but that such resistance groups form no organizational consistency or cohesion by which to put in place a viable alternative network to replace the present systems of power. The problem of the anti-globalization movement is not a new one. Resistance movements faced a similar difficulty in the 19th century in their struggle against industrial capitalism. How to organize, whom to organized with, to what degree such decisions were binding, the positive demands that would be made politically, and the specific practices that worked in the interest of the struggle and those that didn’t. These were central questions debated then, just as they are now among movements at the World Social Forum, for example. What can post-anarchism, in particular, contribute to these questions?

Identity politics as practiced by the 1AC acts as an emergency measure rather than a preventative political practice; valorization of identity as created by colonialism participates in a binary economy that cannot challenge the illegitimate terms of the of the definition in the first place, erasing “being-such” as an ontological category, a process Agamben refers to as resubjetification. This precisely defines biopower*.* A politics defined by lingering and rushing is key to orient demands towards material changes without forgetting the injuries of the past.

Enns 7 (Diane Enns is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University, Hamilton, “Political Life Before Identity,” Project Muse)

The underlying assumption of her discussion appears to be that if color is considered not to matter, then there is no way for a black person to comprehend his or her own experience as a victim of racism. While she claims to embrace color-blindness as a legitimate hope for the future (EC 4), Williams believes we have to ponder our differences before "we can ever agree on the terms of our sameness" (EC 6). If race, however, is treated as a "social infirmity," a "disfigurement," "a genetic leprosy or a biological train wreck" as Williams suggests (EC 8-9), we are left to wonder what in the end the designation of whites as a race would accomplish except as an expression of grievance -- however understandable -- against privilege. How would inscribing white people with this designation lead us towards the future Williams claims to embrace? Is the declaration, politicization or institutionalization of whiteness as a race a better solution than the de-politicization, de-institutionalization or "unnaming" of blackness as a race? My argument is premised on a disagreement with Alcoff, who worries that the focus on such places as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in discussions on identity, misses the "obviously different nature" of problems in the United States, a country not constituted by multiple ethnic groups with long histories of border disputes, but rather by forced immigrants and a history of slavery.21 Certainly there are social, political and historical contingencies that must not be overlooked in discussions of the politics of identity occurring in various locations, within a nation or state as well as without, but there is a similar underlying logic -- a binary economy of victim vs. perpetrator that essentializes identity categories into one camp or the other -- that should make us pause. We don't have to argue that what happened in the former Yugoslavia could happen in the United States or Canada (although this of course could be argued) to find reasons to critique the politicization of identity. We need only ask what are the effects of such a politics? What kind of political future is created when we operate within the same binary that functioned in the selection, segregation, and victimization of individuals and groups to begin with? How should we define violence in this instance? Thus, I would argue that while forceful arguments continue to be made for the necessity of identifying with this or that politicized category -- even if temporarily -- in the face of global sites of violence perpetuated in the name of identity it is becoming harder to justify even the most strategic of strategic essentialisms. While Williams presents us with a passionate and eloquent account of what it means to see racism, I am uneasy about the requirement to see race, and unconvinced by the argument that the latter is necessary for the former; in effect, that difference is prior to "sameness" or commonality. It may be time to reevaluate the reification of difference in feminist and anti-racist discourses of recent decades; to take stock of its effects -- intended or unintended -- on politics and ethics.22 One of these effects is the potential to imprison the victim of racism in his or her own victimhood. We find such an outcome in Kelly Oliver's claim that color-blindness is the culprit of white guilt, a "covert" racism whose effects are "in some ways more insidious" than the violent racism of early 20th century colonization, for its denial of difference in the name of equality.23 It is a stunning claim that demonstrates a remarkable shift in attitudes towards the condition and status of the victim found in contemporary discussions of oppression in the West. Despite Oliver's nod towards the community and agency that results from political resistance to subordination, by way of Fanon she relentlessly stresses the "suffering, pain, depression, shame, anger, or alienation" constitutive of the psychic effects of oppression, rendering the victim impotent in spite of Oliver's expressed intentions. "Without the social space to create meaning for oneself from the culturally available symbols," she explains with reference to racist alienation in the U.S., "it is impossible to gain a sense of individuality and of belonging to the community. ... A positive sense of self is unavailable within the values of oppression."24 Oliver's suggestion that the desire to work towards a raceless society and the practices such a work would entail, could be considered to have worse effects than the violent racism of colonization highlights the cost of valuing difference above all else, and betrays a blindness not to color, but to the violence -- of any degree -- carried out in the name of artificial and arbitrary boundaries. (By this definition, ironically, Fanon would stand accused of the worst racism). It also fails to point out the potential for victims of racism, like their perpetrators, to become locked into the identity categories that inscribe them. Like Williams and Alcoff, Oliver does not inquire into the desires and attachments of the racialized subject, and therefore fails to account in any sustained way for the agency of the victimized, and for the effects of anti-racist theories and practices (which are not always emancipatory). In fact, the moral authority that has consequently been ascribed to the victim frequently prohibits critiques such as the one I am making, as Alcoff clearly illustrates when she states that critics of identity politics have sabotaged feminist and anti-racist work, or when Oliver complains of the insidious racism of a desire for a color-blind society. The emphasis on recognizing difference thus appears to have led to an increasing focus on the injury of the victim in contemporary Western academic discussions of oppression. Such a perspective fails to acknowledge that victims can become perpetrators -- that skin color provides no immunity to racist behavior, for example -- and that the victim is not wholly bereft of responsibility for the creation of political community.25 We must ask with Anne Anlin Cheng, "How is a racial identity secured? How does it continue to generate its seduction for both the dominant and the marginalized?" Why is it that so little attention has been given "to the ways in which individuals and communities remain invested in maintaining such categories, even when such identities prove to be prohibitive or debilitating?"26 I have ventured into this discussion of racial discourse and attachment to identity in order to point out the urgency of interrogating some tenacious assumptions regarding the relationship between politics and identity. Is there no way to recognize ourselves as "un-raced," to maintain that race should not matter -- here, today, even without equality -- and still acknowledge the violence and pain of racism? Could we turn our attention to life before the politicized mark of identity -- as Fanon appears to do -- to illuminate an alternative way of thinking about politics and community that is not wholly preoccupied with belonging to this or that identity category and does not consequently perpetuate an absolutist division between victim and perpetrator? What does the association of identity with politics leave out -- that is to say, what kind of politics could we imagine that does not have as its foundation this association? In the remainder of this paper, I would like to explore these questions, looking to Arendt and Agamben for direction. It is the juxtaposition of the political and the non-political, assumed in the discourses on identity that we need to interrogate anew. I want to ask if it is possible to arrest this making-political of identity in the full acknowledgement that identity, community, and belonging are all necessary requirements for the common life of living beings. This is not, therefore, a matter of denying that we seek out like-minded companions, establish political communities in which we feel at home, and exercise our political agency in the name of these communities. Rather, my interest is in questioning how we can re-conceive politics in such a way that what we consider the stuff of human life that becomes politicized is always-already political in an entirely different sense from what we normally mean by this -- that there is difference already in the merely human. To put it another way, I want to investigate this realm of the being-such, or the being that is considered unmarked as of yet by the boundaries of a particular identity, to assist us in asking questions about the meaning of politics. Much has been made of late of Agamben's notion of "bare life" which is indebted to Arendt's conceptualization of "mere existence" in her famous essay "The Decline of the Nation State and the End of the Rights of Man." Recalling Arendt's statement, "a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-man,"27 we need to ask how to understand this category of the human being who is nothing but human. For Arendt, it designates those who are beyond the pale of the law: the predicament is not that these individuals or groups are not equal before the law but that no law exists for them; it is not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them (OT 295-6). They constitute a group which does not have the right to have rights because they have no political community to which they belong, through which their needs will be met, their rights protected and their voices made to count. Arendt writes: "The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective" (OT 296). How this relates to power is clear enough in her reference to the Nazis who began their extermination of Jews by first reducing them to this condition of rightlessness, removing them beyond the pale of the law. It is therefore a condition of naked humanity that is created specifically with the end of political domination in sight; a process of selection for elimination. We must not forget this crucial and terrible fact: that it is through the mark of identity that an individual or a people is selected, segregated, and subordinated. If one reads about the torture being exercised on the prisoners of Guantanamo Bay -- torture with the specific aim of unrelenting humiliation and degradation at the most human, biological level -- one witnesses quite viscerally this marking, this selection. While this mere existence does not constitute an enviable condition for Arendt, she betrays some ambivalence towards it. She protests that inalienable human rights and the dignity that they confer, must be independent of human plurality and remain valid even for those expelled from the human community (OT 298). Whether it is possible, Arendt states, to articulate a sphere of human rights that is above the nation, guaranteed by humanity itself, is open to question. She argues that some kind of organized political community is necessary for all human individuals, yet nevertheless commits herself to thinking about the possibility of rights guaranteed by this naked condition of life beyond law, rights and polities -- for human rights must remain valid for mere existence, she states, the right to have rights must be guaranteed by humanity itself (OT 298). Thus while she considers naked life to pose a great danger to the common, political world -- it perhaps threatens our political life in an even more terrifying way than the wildness of nature once threatened man-made cities -- and even asserts that the production of such mere existence forces people into conditions of savagery and barbarism (OT 302), she alludes to the potentially affirmative conditions of this status when she relates it to love and friendship: This mere existence, that is, all that which is mysteriously given us by birth and which includes the shape of our bodies and the talents of our minds, can be adequately dealt with only by the unpredictable hazards of friendship and sympathy, or by the great and incalculable grace of love, which says with Augustine, "Volo ut sis (I want you to be)," without being able to give any particular reason for such supreme and unsurpassable affirmation. (OT 301) In Agamben's notion of bare life, we again find a certain ambivalence; one that I will argue can only be understood in the context of a revised understanding of the meaning of politics. Like Arendt in the above passage, Agamben opens his series of texts on political life, community and sovereign power, by referring to a singular relationship between mere existence and love. He writes that "love is never directed toward this or that property of the loved one (being blond, being small, being tender, being lame), but neither does it neglect the properties in favor of an insipid generality (universal love): The lover wants the loved one with all of its predicates, its being such as it is."28 It is this "being-such" that is always hidden when we consider relations of belonging to this or that property or class. In other words, when we think of an individual as defined by this particular identity or that, as black or white, male or female, Muslim or Christian, what is denied or hidden is this being-such with all of its predicates. What happens in friendship and love that alters the tendency (and sometimes the imperative) to simplify and essentialize the identity categories to which we belong? In friendship we cease to see the other as white or as black, as gay or straight, able or disabled, female or male. At least, we are aware of these particular identifying categories of a companion, but exist in relation with him or her in a state of "forgetfulness" of, or "indifference" to, this reduction to one singular category. It is when pushing a wheelchair-bound friend into an airport and noting with annoyance the infantilizing treatment to which one's intelligent and dignified friend is subjected by well-intentioned airport employees, that she becomes disabled. This is not to deny the unique obstacles her disability places before her on a daily basis, but to acknowledge how devastating this lack of the state of forgetfulness can be, as the loved one with all of her predicates becomes reduced to one identifiable category. In using such terms as forgetfulness or indifference, I am attempting to find a language to describe this effect of loving or seeing the other with all of her predicates, her being such as it is -- an "I want you to be" without reason. It isn't blindness to disability, color, or gender, but recognition of and appreciation for the bare existence or life of the other, against which the skin color, genitalia or degree of muscle coordination responsible for designating us as this or that identity become relatively insignificant. Insignificant for the love we bear him or her, which is not the same as saying insignificant in the sense that another's struggle to live with dignity in the face of discrimination is ignored. To consider further William's anecdote of the little girl at her son's school who calls attention to his blackness, one could argue that the white girl was indifferent to the boy's skin color even while drawing attention to it. We might assume that she did not mean by her declaration that the boy was somehow a lesser being. Would this not demonstrate a way of being that is indifferent to politics -- at least politics as we know it, what Agamben would call the juridico-political -- that is called up not in order to reduce, abuse, discriminate or select for the purposes of elimination, but as fact, as simple, phenomenological observation? Could we not turn our attention to this life before the mark of identity to illuminate another way of thinking about politics or political community that is not wholly preoccupied with belonging to this or that identity category? potential politics These examples have something in common with Agamben's evocation of "bare life -- "the simple fact of living common to all living beings" that the Greeks separated from the life of politics, philosophy, and law -- in that they expose life which is considered pre-political. Yet Agamben demonstrates, building on the work of Foucault, that bare life is increasingly the object of sovereign power; increasingly produced by sovereign power in a global political context that operates more and more under the rubric of a state of exception or state of emergency. This is fairly convincing if we simply note the incursions on civil rights due to the post-9/11 paradigm of security; the ever-increasing encroachment of surveillance techniques instituted by the U.S. Patriot Act; the torture and human rights abuses perpetuated against prisoners at Guantanamo Bay who live in limbo outside the law and political community; the current colonization of Iraq;29 or simply the everyday production of the biopolitical body through the institutions of medicine, education, government or the pharmaceutical industry. Agamben shows that bare life is included in political life only by way of its exclusion; it is the "original -- if concealed -- nucleus of sovereign power."30 At times Agamben appears to betray nostalgia for a private sphere unfettered by public interference. His famous analysis of the figure of homo sacer, or sacred man, in Roman antiquity, who could be killed without reprisal yet whose life could not be sacrificed since it was already meaningless, is rife with ambiguity regarding this public/private split and the function of bare life as it moves between these. Homo sacer becomes a paradigm for Agamben, designating the body of the comatose patient who exists on the border between life and death as well as the camp inmate of Auschwitz, who "moved in a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit, in which the very concepts of subjective right and juridical protection no longer made any sense" (HS 170). These are extreme examples which Agamben uses to show that the body is always-already a biopolitical body and always-already both inside and outside the realm of the political. This is the starting point for any reconceptualization of the political space of the West, he states; we must begin "with the clear awareness that we no longer know anything of the classical distinction between zoe and bios, between private life and political existence, between man as a simple living being at home in the house and man's political existence in the city" (HS 187). Less ambivalently than Arendt, Agamben writes of the promise for a coming politics -- meaning a politics we cannot yet know -- found in the figure embodying bare life. Here one could argue he pushes his claims too far and unnecessarily so, with his focus on the abject Musselmann of Auschwitz, the comatose body or the refugee. Most would immediately object to his suggestion that it is only when "the citizen has been able to recognize the refugee that he or she is" that political survival for humankind is today thinkable.31 He writes this as an elaboration of Arendt's statement that refugees are the vanguard of their peoples -- they break the identity between the human and the citizen, bringing the fiction of sovereignty into crisis. We protest that no one wants to be a refugee; that it is human to desire a homeland, a community to which one belongs. Agamben, however, is insistent in his use of the refugee as a "paradigm": The refugee must be considered for what he is: nothing less than a limit concept that radically calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation-state, from the birth-nation to the man-citizen link, and that thereby makes it possible to clear the way for a long-overdue renewal of categories in the service of a politics in which bare life is no longer separated and excepted, either in the state order or in the figure of human rights. (HS 134) In this passage we could be perplexed by what seems to be a contradictory wish to bring zoe and bios together; that is, private, natural or biological life together with public, political life -- the very suturing he appears to critique in his discussion of the concentration camp as biopolitical nomos of the planet, "the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space" (HS 123); "the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule" (HS 168-9); where "power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation" (HS 171). If bare life is already produced and regulated by sovereign power, the object of surveillance and technological intervention, why would Agamben conclude from his discussion of the refugee that bare life must no longer be separated and excepted in the state or with respect to human rights? To make sense of this claim requires that we reorient ourselves to an understanding of politics that is preoccupied with potentiality; and with "the prevention of catastrophe," rather than the instituting of emergency measures.32 If we think of politics as potentiality, or in Agamben's formulation, as means without end, we would not alter the inability to conceptualize solutions in advance for the dilemmas of an unpredictable future, but we might be able to imagine another way of relating to one another within and without particular political communities. If for Aristotle potentiality precedes actuality and conditions it, while remaining subordinate, for Agamben, the existence of potentiality must be thought without any relation to Being in the form of actuality, not even of actuality as the fulfillment and manifestation of potentiality (HS 47). Only with this break with relation can the cyclical collapsing of constituting power into constituted power be disrupted, and "the knot that binds sovereignty to constituting power" be cut (HS 44). What can this mean for identity and community? Both must remain as possibilities rather than actualities for any kind of communication to occur: Among beings who would always already be enacted, who would always already be this or that thing, this or that identity, and who would have entirely exhausted their power in these things and identities -- among such beings there could not be any community but only coincidences and factual partitions. We can communicate with others only through what in us -- as much as in others -- has remained potential, and any communication. . . is first of all communication not of something in common but of communicability itself. (HS 10) It is a passage that flies in the face of what we have come to believe constitutes a community, and of the assumption of a logic that Etienne Balibar states is only a logic: the long companionship of the idea of the common and the community with the logic of unity and of the gathering of particularities in unity. Is there a generic notion of the common? Must the logical schema of this be the reduction of multiplicity to unity? "Can difference and sharing, conflict and the general interest be thought together?"33 This is one of the most important questions to ask today, as we assess the effects of the contemporary philosophical and political discourses on difference. It requires that we engage in political thought and action constantly in two registers -- what Derrida refers to as "lingering and rushing" -- acting in the crisis of the moment, with judgment and decision, and at the same time deliberating, slowly and patiently, with an unknown, imprevisible future in mind. When thinking of the dilemma Du Bois presented us with a century ago, whether to stress one's difference or points of commonality, we could conclude that choosing one or the other restricts us to a very narrow scope for politics, one that either dwells on remedying the past or dreaming of a better future. As we wait for equality, our focus on difference perpetuates the process of selection, discrimination, and silence on the separate ethical universe of the other;34 yet we must account for the inequalities that make difference matter in the present. It seems that identity politics as we currently know it acts as an emergency measure rather than a preventative political practice. Like the communication in potentiality, for Agamben the life that is not exhausted "in this or that identity," always retains the character of a possibility. He uses the term "form-of-life" to describe a life than can never be separated from its form; a life in which it is never possible to isolate something like naked life; a life that is only its own bare existence, the bios of zoe. This is a life "in which the single ways, acts, and process of living are never simply facts but always and above all possibilities of life, always above all power."35 The consequences of such a conceptualization need to be explored. Is it necessary for Agamben to ask for such a complete break between potentiality and actuality? Can we maintain the central idea of "form-of-life" -- that a life is only its own bare existence -- without denying that a life is a fact as well as possibility? Agamben's work is characterized by an element of the negative, exemplified by the abject figures he focuses on, that is often disappointing for those interested in the implications of his thought for political resistance. While he offers some vague examples of "what could be" a politics of whatever singularity in The Coming Community -- the Tiananmen Square demonstrations for one, where he argues there was a "relative absence of determinate contents" in the protestors' demands -- he remains cautious in describing the coming politics, no longer "a struggle for the control of the State but a struggle between the State and the non-State (humanity)."36 Agamben's worry is over the risk of reidentification -- as revealed to us by Foucault -- "that one invest this situation with a new identity, that one produce a new subject, if you like, but one subjected to the State; the risk that one from then on carry out again, despite oneself, this infinite process of subjectivation and subjection that precisely defines biopower."37 Significantly, he adds, "I don't believe there is any escape from this problem."38 And certainly, his conclusion to the Tiananmen essay -- that "sooner or later, the tanks will appear" when these whatever singularities demonstrate their being in common without identity or belonging -- attests to this. While Antonio Negri argues that there is also a life-affirming element in Agamben's work -- "a seizing of the biopolitical horizon" occurs39 -- it seems that Agamben does not push his own ideas on potentiality and a politics of a "form-of-life" far enough in this direction. The figure of bare life -- even the Muselmann of Auschwitz -- is not without its own strange power, a "silent resistance" which renders the guard powerless before the Muselmann, who remains indifferent to the distinction between law and fact, politics and nature (HS 185). We may do well to listen to Arendt, however, who cautions against romanticizing the "humanity of the insulted and injured" which she states "has never yet survived the hours of liberation by so much as a minute" and therefore remains politically irrelevant.40 Perhaps we find in Agamben this very romanticization of the victim, and of a "silent resistance" that is poignant in theory, but utterly useless historically.

## 2nc

### AT: Impact Calc

#### 2 external impacts with no defense---deliberation is critical to solving global problems like climate, structural violence and war, that’s Lunberg

#### A public both involved and knowledgeable about war powers checks adventurism, that’s Young and Kurr, switch sides is a key method, forces you to know your opponets arguments, Mellor says technical discussion is key

#### Solvency is a prerequisite to impact calc—all begs the question of the larger debate about their method, if its ineffective and they cant solve their impacts vote neg.

#### Proximate cause outweighs root cause, we have a relatively larger IL to solving our impact vis a vis theres, they also have NO impact defense, util bad only makes sense as a framing arg when you can contest the validity of the existential threat.

#### moral tunnel vision is bad, don’t ignore other forms of violence

**Isaac 2**—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness **undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of **complicity in injustice**. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that **politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions**; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Appeal to consequences is inevitable

**Epstein, Chicago law professor, 1996**

(Richard, “SYMPOSIUM: THE TORT/CRIME DISTINCTION: A GENERATION LATER”, Februrary/April, 76 B.U.L. Rev. 1, lexis, ldg)

Similarly, on questions of method, I believe that the deontological approach is wrong insofar as it claims that its normative conclusions can be denied only on pain of self-contradiction. Today many writers believe that the protection of individual autonomy is not a primary goal of legal rules, but that, to the contrary, any "natural" distribution of talents is determined largely by luck and hence morally arbitrary. n5 Given this perspective, it follows that legal rules should introduce certain measures of sharing across individuals, if not by forced labor, then by systems of taxation and regulation that redistribute the fruits of individual labor. n6 One can argue against these views, but hardly on the ground that they are self-contradictory, or even that they are morally suspect in their effort to raise [\*3] the level of the least fortunate closer to the level enjoyed by those who have a greater share of natural abilities and endowments. A defense of the older regime of individual liberties and properties cannot rest on a simple assertion that people have rights and that other individuals are not allowed to do actions that violate those rights. n7 One has to show why any given configuration of rights is superior to its rival conceptions, an undertaking that typically requires an appeal to consequences, less for particular cases, and more for some overall assessment of how alternative legal regimes play out in the long run. In a word, one has to become a utilitarian of some stripe to justify rules in terms of the consequences they bring about. n8

### AT: Oppressed Can’t Appeal to Oppressor

#### Having opinions about courses of government action is good

#### Framework doesn’t mean you are asking the government for liberation, either their argument magnifies the link to the topic education disad because it has a huge disavowl for the government because we totally avoid or you have to discount their claim because there are policies that can be undertaken that can improve the material well being of the black body.

#### Trying to reach your goals in our delib democracy process is better

#### Debates about state-policy don’t flatten or exclude difference---they help foster political advocacy and critical habits necessary for navigating inevitable differences in democracy---the affirmative’s emphasis on flux makes negotiating plurality impossible

David McIvor 10, research associate at the Kettering Foundation, The Politics of Speed: Connolly, Wolin, and the Prospects for Democratic Citizenship in an Accelerated Polity, Polity (2011) 43, 58–83

In some ways Wolin's description of revolution seems to converge with Connolly's emphasis on speed as a means of creating a pluralistic ethos and ultimately political change. Yet Connolly, as I have argued above, has elided the intense requirements of slow time practice that support the possibility of successful, “rapid” change. Furthermore, Wolin finds that the tempos of frenetic agitation have “not vanished … [but] simply switched location.” The rise of corporate-driven capitalism has appropriated the revolutionary tempo through the “troika effect,” which unites capital, technology and science:

By enlisting technological innovation and scientific discovery and joining them with its own impulses, capital has produced an unprecedented form of power. The combination has quickened the rate of change throughout the world … . Globalized capital … may be said to monopolize agitation … thus corporate capital is the agitator, the exemplar of permanent revolution, of normalized agitation.85

Speedy agitation has been co-opted by corporate capital, which in turn “encourages change, elevates fashion to a norm, and … instructs an agitated populace that virtually every job and habitat are temporary.”86 This emphasis on flux and change disrupts the attachments that normally develop over time, including those related to vocation or community (and, by extension, those which lead to agitation). For Wolin, a hopeful politics today depends on whether or not “agitation … can find its bearings.”86 In order for this to occur the “appropriate tempo” of democratization must be identified. Since Wolin identifies this tempo as the slower one found at the local level of state, county, and municipality, we must wonder if he has not fallen into the nostalgic shackles that Connolly has already fit for him. Far from it. While recognizing the difficulty of frenetic agitation in a hurrying, racing world, Wolin thinks that such agitation can emerge from and alter the slower tempos of small-scale deliberation and debate occurring in local politics. Agitation can “educate … and energize” particularism, leading it to “challenge the center” in changed times. Democratic agitation “takes time” in that it must be nursed by patient deliberation, but it also “takes time” when, energized by such micro-political activities, it alters the status quo in powerful, lasting ways.

Again, Wolin does not look to slow time practices and local sites of action in order to flatten or exclude difference. According to Wolin, a leisurely pace and deliberation are “conditioned by the presence of differences and the attempt to negotiate them.”87 Democratic theory that emphasizes speed and dislocation, on the other hand, mimics the temporal rhythms of contemporary culture and economy at the expense of the tempos of deliberation and reflection that are important in themselves and insofar as they make possible the politics of a quicker pace. Some habits and practices are fundamental to the honoring and negotiating of plurality.

In order to develop these habits, Wolin wants to direct attention away from the state and towards localities with their particularities, peculiarities, and irregularities. On Wolin's reading, national politics is little more than a spectacle, and the citizen's role within that spectacle is often only as “a rooter limited to choosing sides.”88 Localities, on the other hand, remain venues that promise robust participation. As individuals slowly develop the habits related to participation—interpreting and coming to know one's environment and its other inhabitants, its multiple histories and overlapping concerns—their very being changes. “Politicalness” marks our capacity “to develop … into beings who know and value what it means to participate in and be responsible for the care and improvement of our common and collective life.”89 By nurturing this politicalness we begin to feel a tug of loyalty towards a common reality that had not heretofore existed. Wolin, in describing the early stages of the Free Speech Movement, referred to this experience as the “revival of a sense of shared destiny, of some common fate which can bind us into a people we have never been.”90 Of course, these assemblages are subject to the same “thousand natural shocks” to which all flesh is heir. Publics rise and fall; democratic moments remain momentary. Yet those who are honed by these experiences and who are dedicated to their recovery become what Wolin calls a “multiple civic self … one who is required to act the citizen in diverse settings: national, state, city or town, neighborhood, and voluntary association.”91 This is “perhaps the most complex conception of citizenship ever devised” yet “we have no coherent conception of it.”91 The multiple civic self is not modeled along republican or representative lines, which reduce participation to occasional ratification or refusal, and which filter popular power through elite-managed institutions. Nor, however, is it based on the radical democratic conception of citizenship as direct sharing in power. The complexities of what Wolin calls “the megastate” and the sheer size of the United States exceed what an Athens-styled radical democracy could manage. The multiple civic self is one capable of participating not simply in his/her locality but “intellectually and passionately in the controversies surrounding the megastate” in order to “reclaim” public space and insist upon “widened debate.”92 Wolin is not (only) a localist. Rather, he thinks that the skills and habits best acquired by consistent participation in our particular localities lay the groundwork for a form of citizenship attuned to the plural layers of political action and struggle in late-modern America. Moreover, the multiple civic self promotes the dispersal of power between local, state, and national bodies.93 Such diffusion re-establishes a separation of powers that forces slow-time negotiations upon the impatient megastate.94 The slowly developed habits of participation make possible a more robust form of democratic citizenship and, perhaps, fugitive democratic moments. These moments, in turn, can help to slow the world down.

Political theorists and social actors inspired by Wolin's example and worried about the inegalitarian consequences of social acceleration should look to start from his (so far underdeveloped) idea of the multiple civic self. Instead of refurbishing federal institutions or romanticizing the consequences of speed, we ought to attend primarily to what Wolin calls the “recurrent aspiration” of democracy: “to find room in which people can join freely with others to take responsibility for solving their common problems and thereby sharing the modest fate that is the lot of all mortals.”95 By pursuing solutions to mutual problems through concerted action, we as citizens can hone the craft of democratic participation—broadening our notions of self and learning to honor the differences we encounter within a shared space.96

The differences drawn above between Wolin and Connolly—and the choice that they seem to offer, Connolly or Wolin—may seem exaggerated, given the broad convergence between their normative interests and political concerns.97 Perhaps, then, a critical synthesis can be located between Wolin's efforts at nurturing democratic identity and Connolly's recent emphasis on generating a positive political resonance machine capable of promoting the use of inclusive goods while remaining attentive to difference and dissonance. For Connolly, the success of such movements will depend on cultivating the democratic virtues of what he calls “agonistic respect” and “critical responsiveness.” In fact, it is the latter two qualities, first articulated together in Neuropolitics, that form Connolly's recent conception of “bicameral citizenship,” which might be seen as a response or friendly rejoinder to Wolin's idea of the multiple civic self.98 Bicameralism comes from a “decent respect for the persistent diversity of the human condition” and results in a tolerance of ambiguity in our relationships and contestability in our creeds.99 The stubborn opacity of the world and the agonistic nature of political life can both become, on Connolly's reading, the basis for a generous acceptance of disagreement and difference. But the acceptance of such opacity would not necessarily come at the expense of a search for spaces of convergence or commonality—what Wolin calls the “sense of shared destiny.”

The dispositions of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness can clearly resonate with and reinforce the care and concern for the common that Wolin puts at the center of fugitive democracy. Yet these efforts, I would argue, need to be situated within a praxis whereby (seemingly anachronistic) habits of participation and engagement are nurtured in spite of the pressures of an accelerated society. For outside of these practices, what will inspire a commitment to the virtues relevant to democratic flourishing? What will make Connolly's virtues more compelling than resentment about the “illegible” social relations in “liquid” modernity? Connolly's under-theorization of the bonds of democratic identification and commitment seems a symptom of his sanguinity about the connection between speed and pluralism (“the acceleration of speed, though it contains counterpressures, amplifies trends towards diversity among multiple dimensions of being”).100 We ought to remain slightly skeptical, therefore, when Connolly writes, “acceleration prepares us for bicameralism” or asserts “it takes massive energy to turn us against pluralism.”101 We ought to ask whether this sanguine attitude is really justified by our understanding of the world around us. After all, since the fifteenth century, nearly 4,000 human languages have died out, and there have been similar crashes in biodiversity and methods of agricultural production since the rise of the steam engine. It seems that diversity of political, cultural, and ecological life is far from a given; one might say rather that it requires “massive energy” in order to persist.

#### Government isn’t totally irredeemable; Lunberg, delib has issues but is the only means nonetheless to solve global problems

### AT: Exclusion

#### The premise of their response to framework is that issues of identity/race/culture should be protected from exposure to reason-giving debate---this impedes the culture of democratic debate that’s key to effective decisionmaking in a pluralistic society---it’s also simply wrong to claim that framework oppresses identity or alternate styles---our argument is style-neutral---it simply asks that narrative/experience/etc be used to support a policy conclusion which solves their offense as well as ours

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

MY RECENT BOOK, The Way We Argue Now, has in a sense two theses. In the first place, the book makes the case for the importance of debate and argument to any vital democratic or pluralistic intellectual culture. This is in many ways an unexceptional position, but the premise of the book is that the claims of reasoned argument are often trumped, within the current intellectual terrain, by appeals to cultural identity and what I gather more broadly under the rubric of ethos, which includes cultural identity but also forms of ethical piety and charismatic authority. In promoting argument as a universal practice keyed to a human capacity for communicative reason, my book is a critique of relativism and identity politics, or the notion that forms of cultural authenticity or group identity have a certain unquestioned legitimacy, one that cannot or should not be subjected to the challenges of reason or principle, precisely because reason and what is often called "false universalism" are, according to this pattern of thinking, always involved in forms of exclusion, power, or domination. My book insists, by contrast, that argument is a form of respect, that the ideals of democracy, whether conceived from a nationalist or an internationalist perspective, rely fundamentally upon procedures of argumentation and debate in order to legitimate themselves and to keep their central institutions vital. And the idea that one should be protected from debate, that argument is somehow injurious to persons if it does not honor their desire to have their basic beliefs and claims and solidarities accepted without challenge, is strenuously opposed. As is the notion that any attempt to ask people to agree upon processes of reason-giving argument is somehow necessarily to impose a coercive norm, one that will disable the free expression and performance of identities, feelings, or solidarities. Disagreement is, by the terms of my book, a form of respect, not a form of disrespect. And by disagreement, I don't mean simply to say that we should expect disagreement rather than agreement, which is a frequently voiced-if misconceived-criticism of Habermas. Of course we should expect disagreement. My point is that we should focus on the moment of dissatisfaction in the face of disagreement-the internal dynamic in argument that imagines argument might be the beginning of a process of persuasion and exchange that could end in agreement (or partial agreement). For those who advocate reconciling ourselves to disagreements rather than arguing them out, by contrast, there is a complacent-and in some versions, even celebratory-attitude toward fixed disagreement. Refusing these options, I make the case for dissatisfied disagreement in the final chapter of the book and argue that people should be willing to justify their positions in dialogue with one another, especially if they hope to live together in a post-traditional pluralist society.

One example of the trumping of argument by ethos is the form that was taken by the late stage of the Foucault/Habermas debate, where an appeal to ethos-specifically, an appeal to Foucault's style of ironic or negative critique, often seen as most in evidence in the interviews, where he would playfully refuse labels or evade direct answers-was used to exemplify an alternative to the forms of argument employed by Habermas and like-minded critics. (I should pause to say that I provide this example, and the framing summary of the book that surrounds it, not to take up airtime through expansive self-reference, but because neither of my respondents provided any contextualizing summary of the book's central arguments, though one certainly gets an incremental sense of the book's claims from Bruce Robbins. Because I don't assume that readers of this forum have necessarily read the book, and because I believe that it is the obligation of forum participants to provide sufficient context for their remarks, I will perform this task as economically as I can, with the recognition that it might have carried more weight if provided by a respondent rather than the author.)

The Foucauldian counter-critique importantly emphasizes a relation between style and position, but it obscures (1) the importance or value of the Habermasian critique and (2) the possibility that the other side of the debate might have its own ethos to advocate, one that has precisely to do with an ethos of argument, an ideal of reciprocal debate that involves taking distance on one's pre-given forms of identity or the norms of one's community, both so as to talk across differences and to articulate one's claims in relation to shared and even universal ideals. And this leads to the second thesis of the book, the insistence that an emphasis on ethos and character is interestingly present if not widely recognized in contemporary theory, and one of the ways its vitality and existential pertinence makes itself felt (even despite the occurrence of the kinds of unfair trumping moves I have mentioned). We often fail to notice this, because identity has so uniformly come to mean sociological, ascribed, or group identity-race, gender, class, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and so forth. Instances of the move toward character and ethos include the later Foucault (for whom ethos is a central concept), cosmopolitanism (whose aspiration it is to turn universalism into an ethos), and, more controversially, proceduralist ethics and politics (with its emphasis on sincerity and civility). Another version of this attentiveness to ethos and character appears in contemporary pragmatism, with its insistence on casualness of attitude, or insouciance in the face of contingency-recommendations that get elevated into full-fledged exemplary personae in Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" or Barbara Herrnstein Smiths portrait of the "postmodern skeptic." These examples-and the larger claim they support-are meant to defend theory as still living, despite the many reports of its demise, and in fact still interestingly and incessantly re-elaborating its relation to practice. This second aspect of the project is at once descriptive, motivated by the notion that characterology within theory is intrinsically interesting, and critical, in its attempt to identify how characterology can itself be used to cover or evade the claims of rational argument, as in appeals to charismatic authority or in what I identify as narrow personifications of theory (pragmatism, in its insistence on insouciance in the face of contingency, is a prime example of this second form). And as a complement to the critical agenda, there is a reconstructive agenda as well, an attempt to recuperate liberalism and proceduralism, in part by advocating the possibility, as I have suggested, of an ethos of argument.

Robbins, in his extraordinarily rich and challenging response, zeroes in immediately on a crucial issue: who is to say exactly when argument is occurring or not, and what do we do when there is disagreement over the fundamentals (the primary one being over what counts as proper reasoning)? Interestingly, Robbins approaches this issue after first observing a certain tension in the book: on the one hand, The Way We Argue Now calls for dialogue, debate, argument; on the other, its project is "potentially something a bit stricter, or pushier: getting us all to agree on what should and should not count as true argument." What this point of entry into the larger issue reveals is a kind of blur that the book, I am now aware, invites. On the one hand, the book anatomizes academic debates, and in doing so is quite "debaterly" This can give the impression that what I mean by argument is a very specific form unique to disciplinary methodologies in higher education. But the book is not generally advocating a narrow practice of formal and philosophical argumentation in the culture at large, however much its author may relish adherence to the principle of non-contradiction in scholarly argument. I take pains to elaborate an ethos of argument that is linked to democratic debate and the forms of dissent that constitutional patriotism allows and even promotes. In this sense, while argument here is necessarily contextualized sociohistorically, the concept is not merely academic. It is a practice seen as integral to specific political forms and institutions in modern democracies, and to the more general activity of critique within modern societies-to the tradition of the public sphere, to speak in broad terms. Additionally, insofar as argument impels one to take distance on embedded customs, norms, and senses of given identity, it is a practice that at once acknowledges identity, the need to understand the perspectives of others, and the shared commitment to commonality and generality, to finding a way to live together under conditions of difference.

More than this: the book also discusses at great length and from several different angles the issue that Robbins inexplicably claims I entirely ignore: the question of disagreement about what counts as argument. In the opening essay, "Debatable Performances," I fault the proponents of communicative ethics for not having a broader understanding of public expression, one that would include the disruptions of spectacle and performance. I return to and underscore this point in my final chapter, where I espouse a democratic politics that can embrace and accommodate a wide variety of expressions and modes. This is certainly a discussion of what counts as dialogue and hence argument in the broad sense in which I mean it, and in fact I fully acknowledge that taking distance from cultural norms and given identities can be advanced not only through critical reflection, but through ironic critique and defamiliarizing performance as well. But I do insist-and this is where I take a position on the fundamental disagreements that have arisen with respect to communicative ethics-that when they have an effect, these other dimensions of experience do not remain unreflective, and insofar as they do become reflective, they are contributing to the very form of reasoned analysis that their champions sometimes imagine they must refuse in order to liberate other modes of being (the affective, the narrative, the performative, the nonrational). If a narrative of human rights violation is persuasive in court, or in the broader cultural public sphere, it is because it draws attention to a violation of humanity that is condemned on principle; if a performance jolts people out of their normative understandings of sexuality and gender, it prompts forms of understanding that can be affirmed and communicated and also can be used to justify political positions and legislative agendas.

#### Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process outweighs the content of the aff

Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8)

25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any substantive normative guidance is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. Attempting to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of both the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the powerful instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life.” The potential he refers to is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language.” 7 Habermas acknowledges the dominance and reach of instrumental reason—his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the historical conditions and social effects of that dominance—yet at the same time he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative¶ ¶ 26¶ reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible; he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of the ideal speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. Benhabib, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by promoting a “historically self-conscious universalism” that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). Benhabib’s work thus constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of specific potentialities of modernity. She differs from him in two key respects, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that Habermas’s emphasis on consensus seriously distorts his account of communicative ethics. Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus, Benhabib champions instead a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going:¶ When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, we begin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the moral conversation among us. The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for Benhabib undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly opposes any ethics or politics that privileges the unencumbered or detached self over the concrete, embodied, situated self. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:¶ Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans, without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid. While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are constituents, that is, necessary conditions of the moral standpoint, interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection and action. In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied and embedded identity, but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all. Universality is not the ideal consensus of fictitiously defined selves, but the concrete process in politics and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of Benhabib’s position, which attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism as traditionally understood. On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm, enabling crucial distinctions between those notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and embedded” and promotes encounters with otherness so as to nurture the development of a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have, according to universalism’s own principles, forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical¶ ¶ 28¶ community. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion, but not in the sense that many poststructuralist and postmodernist cultural critics do, as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality. Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness and plurality, which ultimately prove self-undermining in their toleration of communities, individuals, and practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices.

#### Establishing constraints on the topics for discussion in debate does not cause internal exclusion and breaking down those constraints doesn’t solve it because the absence of clash and the refusal of the burden of rejoinder only flips external exclusion---the way to resolve internal exclusion is to broaden the scope of what counts as a persuasive argument within a given topic---for example, our model of debate would welcome the use of narrative and personal experience on behalf of a topical argument---this middle ground most effectively resolves their exclusion arguments

Gert Biesta et al 9, professor of Education and Director of Research at the School of Education, University of Stirling, Susan Verducci , Assistant Professor at the Humanities Department at San José State University, and Michael S. Katz, professor of philosophy and education at San Jose State, Education, Democracy and the Moral Life, 2009, p. 105-107

This example not only shows why the issue of inclusion is so prominent in the deliberative model. It also explains why the deliberative turn has generated a whole new set of issues around inclusion. The reason for this is that deliberation is not simply a form of political decision-making but first and foremost a form of political communication. The inclusion question in deliberative democracy is therefore not so much a question about who should be included - although this question should be asked always as well. It is first and foremost a question about who is able to participate effectively in deliberation. As Dryzek aptly summarises, the suspicion about deliberative democracy is "that its focus on a particular kind of reasonable political interaction is not in fact neutral, but systematically excludes a variety of voices from effective participation in democratic politics" (Dryzek, 2000, p.58). In this regard Young makes a helpful distinction between two forms of exclusion: external exclusion, which is about "how people arc [actually] kept outside the process of discussion and decision-making", and internal exclusion where people are formally included in decision-making processes but where they may find, for example, "that their claims are not taken seriously and may believe that they are not treated with equal respect" (Young, 2000, p.55). Internal exclusion, in other words, refers to those situations in which people "lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-making" (ibid.) which can particularly be the outcome of the emphasis of some proponents of deliberative democracy on "dispassionate, unsituatcd, neutral reason" (ibid. p.63). To counteract the internal exclusion that is the product of a too narrow focus on argument, Young has suggested several other modes of political communication which should be added to the deliberative process not only to remedy "exclusionary tendencies in deliberative practices" but also to promote "respect and trust" and to make possible "understanding across structural and cultural difference" (ibid. p.57). The first of these is greeting or public acknowledgement. This is about "communicative political gestures through which those who have conflicts . .. recognize others as included in the discussion, especially those with whom they differ in opinion, interest, or social location" (ibid., p.61; emphasis in original). Young emphasises that greeting should be thought of as a starting-point for political interaction. It "precedes the giving and evaluating of reasons" (ibid., p.79) and does so through the recognition of the other parties in the deliberation. The second mode of political communication is rhetoric and more specifically the affirmative use of rhetoric (ibid., p.63). Although one could say that rhetoric only concerns the form of political communication and not its content, the point Young makes is that inclusive political communication should pay attention to and be inclusive about the different forms of expression and should not try to purify rational argument from rhetoric. Rhetoric is not only important because it can help to get particular issues on the agenda for deliberation. Rhetoric can also help to articulate claims and arguments "in ways appropriate to a particular public in a particular situation' (ibid., p.67; emphasis in original). Rhetoric always accompanies an argument by situating it "for a particular audience and giving it embodied style and tone" (ibid., p.79). Young's third mode of political communication is narrative or storytelling. The main function of narrative in democratic communication lies in its potential "to foster understanding among members of a polity with very different experience or assumptions about what is important" (ibid., p.71). Young emphasises the role of narrative in the teaching and learning dimension of political communication. "Inclusive democratic communication", so she argues, "assumes that all participants have something to teach the public about the society in which they dwell together" and also assumes "that all participants are ignorant of some aspects of the social or natural world, and that everyone comes to a political conflict with some biases, prejudices, blind spots, or sterco-types" (ibid., p.77). It is important to emphasise that greeting, rhetoric and narrative are not meant to replace argumentation. Young stresses again and again that deliberative democracy entails "that participants require reasons of one another and critically evaluate them" (ibid., p.79). Other proponents of the deliberative model take a much more narrow approach and see deliberation exclusively as a form of rational argumentation (e.g. Bcnhabib, 1996) where the only legitimate force should be the "forceless force of the better argument" (Habermas). Similarly, Dryzck, after a discussion of Young's ideas,1 concludes that argument always has to be "central to deliberative democracy" (Dryzek, 2000, p.7l). Although he acknowledges that other modes of communication can be present and that there are good reasons to welcome them, their status is different "because they do not have to be present" (ibid., emphasis added). For Dryzek, at the end of the day, all modes of political communication must live up to the standards of rationality. This does not mean that they must be subordinated to rational argument “but their deployment only makes sense in a context where argument about what is to be done remains central” (ibid., p.168).

#### Exclusion in this sense isn’t political or violent-in the context of game spaces some exclusion is necessary to maintain the goal oriented focus of answering the resolutional question; their arguments are in the context of a hard right interpretation of Habermas that forces consensus, not what framework does.

### AT: Neutrality

#### Universal skills, public opinion polls all count for the same, they don’t have an indite of the sampling methodology in the young card. An informed on war power issues stops the president from unilateral intervention because it raises the perceived political costs.

#### Mellor---language of policy making is effective, when you can own a politician in their own language they are more likely to listen and change because they cant be dismissive

#### Micro political starting points are bad---we don’t assume neutrality when we say deliberation is the best argumentative method, just because deliberation is unequal doesn’t mean it isn’t the most optimal Advocating the debate space as a site for change degenerates into academic self-congratulation that locks in the SQ

Bryant 13—philosophy prof at Collin College (Levi, The Paradox of Emancipatory Political Theory, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/05/31/the-paradox-of-emancipatory-political-theory/>)

There’s a sort of Hegelian contradiction at the heart of all academic political theory that has pretensions of being emancipatory. In a nutshell, the question is that of how this theory can avoid being a sort of commodity. Using Hegel as a model, this contradiction goes something like this: emancipatory political theory says it’s undertaken for the sake of emancipation from x. Yet with rare exceptions, it is only published in academicjournals that few have access to, in a jargon that only other academics or the highly literate can understand, and presented only at conferencesthat only other academics generally attend. Thus, academic emancipatory political theory reveals itself in its truth as something that isn’t aimed at political change or intervention at all, but rather only as a move or moment in the ongoing autopoiesis of academia. That is, itfunctions as another line on the CVand is one strategy through which the university system carries outits autopoiesis or self-reproduction across time. It thus functions– the issue isn’t here one of the beliefs or intentions of academics, but how things function –as something like a commodity within the academic system. The function is not to intervene in the broader political system– despite what all of us doing political theory say and how we think about our work –but rather to carry out yet another iteration of the academic discourse (there are other ways that this is done, this has just been a particularly effective rhetorical strategy for the autopoiesis of academia in the humanities).

Were the aim political change, then the discourse would have to find a way to reach outside the academy, but this is precisely what academic politicaltheory cannot do due to the publication and presentation structure, publish or perish logic, the CV, and so on. To produce political change, the academic political theorist would have to sacrifice his or her erudition or scholarship, because they would have to presume an audience that doesn’t have a high falutin intellectual background in Hegel, Adorno, Badiou, set theory, Deleuze, Lacan, Zizek, Foucault (who is one of the few that was a breakaway figure), etc. They would also have to adopt a different platform of communication. Why? Because they would have to address an audience beyond the confines of the academy, which means something other than academic presses, conferences, journals, etc. (And here I would say that us Marxists are often the worst of the worst. We engage in a discourse bordering on medieval scholasticism that only schoolmen can appreciate, which presents a fundamental contradiction between the form of their discourse– only other experts can understand it –and the content; they want to produce change). But the academic emancipatory political theorist can’t do either of these things. If they surrender their erudition and the baroque nature of their discourse, they surrender their place in the academy (notice the way in which Naomi Klein is sneered at in political theory circles despite the appreciable impact of her work). If they adopt other platforms of communication– and this touches on my last post and the way philosophers sneer at the idea that there’s a necessity to investigating extra-philosophical conditions of their discourse –then they surrender their labor requirements as people working within academia. Both options are foreclosed by the sociological conditions of their discourse.

The paradox of emancipatory academic political discourse is thus that it is formally and functionally apolitical. At the level of its intention or what it says it aims to effect political change and intervention, but at the level of what it does, it simply reproduces its own discourse and labor conditions without intervening in broader social fields (and no, the classroom doesn’t count). Unconscious recognition of this paradox might be why, in some corners, we’re seeing the execrable call to re-stablish “the party”. The party is the academic fantasy of a philosopher-king or an academic avant gard that simultaneously gets to be an academic and produce political change for all those “dopes and illiterate” that characterize the people (somehow the issue of how the party eventually becomes an end in itself, aimed solely at perpetuating itself, thereby divorcing itself from the people never gets addressed by these neo-totalitarians). The idea of the party and of the intellectual avant gard is a symptom of unconscious recognition of the paradox I’ve recognized here and of the political theorist that genuinely wants to produce change while also recognizing that the sociological structure of the academy can’t meet those requirements. Given these reflections, one wishes that the academic that’s learned the rhetoric of politics as an autopoieticstrategy for reproducing the university discourse would be a little less pompous and self-righteous, but everyone has to feel important and like their the best thing since sliced bread, I guess.

#### Change won’t trickle up

**Jensen, PhD student in Philosophy, 2009**

(Tim, “Bridging Micro and Macro :: Setting the Stage”, 4-6, <http://candidcandidacy.wordpress.com/2009/04/06/bridging-micro-and-macro-setting-the-stage/>, ldg)

Oliver Marchart asks the same question in his essay, “Bridging the Micro-Macro Gap: Is There Such a Thing as a Post-subcultural Politics?“ “What criteria,” he asks, have to be met by micro-practices in order to ‘go macro’? Do we need a new concept of ‘organization’? Can there be a subcultural politics of pure particularism or does it take a dimension of universalism?’ Marchart begins by debunking what he sees as a heroism myth that dominates subcultures and those who study them academically. While others have certainly critiqued the narrative of “co-optation,” it’s still necessary to do so, and Marchart does it swiftly and with eloquence. I say that it’s still necessary because there are still plenty of folks (punks, activists, liberals) who believe they can “drop-out” of capitalism in many ways and narratives of “selling out” continue to proliferate. In this set-up, a subculture is designated as “authentic” to the degree that it remains unappropriated by the mainstream. The group or set of practices remains heroic in relation to how much it resists commodification and recuperation. Marchart notes that this narrative of the process of subculture’s incorporation into the mainstream construes “subcultures as some sort of substance–noise from the viewpoint of the dominant system, and the precedes any cooptation by the latter” (author’s emphasis 87). This myth is used to show how the “defending of micro-political practices eo ipso” obviates any move to the macro-political, since those micro-practices are always already political, “simply by virtue of resisting cooptation” (88). Some theorists laud this indirect, style-driven form of dissent and its oblique challenge to exploitative powers. Not Marchart, for sure. And I have some pretty serious reservations about it, too. Who has time to take direct action when one is busy looking like they’re constantly dissenting? (This also becomes an issue, as we shall see in later posts, when dealing with internet cultures of protest.) Much of postmodernism and cultural studies in particular has done excellent–and needed–work in revealing the political nature of our everd ay acts. The cultural and the political have been blurred for some time now. But you can see where this may stunt the move to macro action: if we’re always already political, how do we judge a scale of action? I agree with Marchart that, “What is needed today is an analysis of the passage between culture and macro-politics, that is, an analysis of the process of ‘becoming macro’” (90). We’re missing an understanding of the links between ever day life and organized, collective action, especially with regard to the communicative process. So we must ask, is an answer to be found in the micro-politics of everyday life or in the marco-political movements of collective will and deep structural and cultural reorganization? Where do we start in attempting to make sense of this line between micro and macro; and what role do information communication technologies play in the communication process of this movement between micro and macro? Marchart lists four preconditions for the passage of micro going macro: 1) A situation of explicit antagonization; 2) The emergence of a collectivity; 3) The function of organization; 4) A movement towards universalization. So, for Marchart, what is necessary is a swing towards the macro, a recognition that as long as resistance to hegemony remains at the level of symbolic rituals of the micro-political, we’re in trouble. Only when these tactics form a collective will they become politicized. Despite using a term like micro-political, Marchart argues there is no politics of the individual; politics is collective. And that is why he argues for theorization to begin at macro-levels

#### Framing around institutional action creates the space for effective localism-but not the other way around

**Monbiot, M.A. in zoology and guardian columnist, 2004**

(George, Manifesto for a New World Order, pg. 11-13, ldg)

The quest for global solutions is difficult and divisive. Some members of this movement are deeply suspicious of all institutional power at the global level, fearing that it could never be held to account by the world’s people. Others are concerned that a single set of universal prescriptions would threaten the diversity of dissent. A smaller faction has argued that all political programmes are oppressive**:** our task should not be to replace one form of power with another, but to replace all power with a magical essence called ‘anti-power’. But most of the members of this movement are coming to recognize that if we propose solutions which can be effected only at the localor the nationallevel, we remove ourselves from any meaningful role in solving precisely those problems which most concern us. Issues such as cli­mate change, international debt, nuclear proliferation, war, peace and the balance of trade between nations can be addressed only globally or internationally. Without global measures and global institutions, it is impossible to see how we might distribute wealth from rich nations to poor ones, tax the mobile rich and their even more mobile money, control the shipment of toxic waste, sustain the ban on landmines, prevent the use of nuclear weapons, broker peace between nations or prevent powerful states from forcing weaker ones to trade on their terms. If we were to work only at the local level, we would leave these, the most critical of issues, for other people to tackle. Global governance will take place **whether we participate** in it **or not**. Indeed, it must take place if the issues which concern us are not to be resolved by the brute force of the powerful**.** That the international institutions have been designed or captured by the dictatorship of vested interests is not an argument against the existence of international institutions, but a reason for overthrowing them and re­placing them with our own. It is an argument for a global political system which holds power to account. In the absence of an effective global politics, moreover, local solutions will always be undermined by communities of interest which do not share our vision. We might, for example, manage to persuade the people of the street in which we live to give up their cars in the hope of preventing climate change, but unless **everyone**, in all communities, either shares our politics or is bound by the same rules, we simply open new road space into which the neighbouring communities can expand. We might declare our neighbour­hood nuclear-free, but unless we are simultaneously work­ing, at the international level, for the abandonment of nuclear weapons, we can do **nothing** to prevent ourselves and everyone else from being threatened by people who are not as nice as we are**.** We would deprive ourselves, in other words, of the power of restraint. By first rebuilding the global politics, we establish the **political space** in which our local alternatives can **flourish**. If, by contrast,we were to leave the governance of the necessary global institutions to others, then those institutions will pick off our local, even our national, solutions one by one. There is little point in devising an alternative economic policy for your nation, asLuis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva,now president of Brazil, once advocated, if the International Monetary Fund and the financial speculators have not first been overthrown**.** There is little point in fighting to protect a coral reef from local pollution, if nothing has been done to prevent climate change from destroying the conditions it requires for its survival.

#### Only takes out the portable skills impact---they conceded dialogue is the best method of inquiry, this can only occur when there are limits on topics of discussion where both sides have time to research a question and formulate sophisticated arguments; that’s Hanjoh, monologue stifles knowledge production, its impossible to validate their truth claims unless they are engaging with a well prepared opponent, this means framework is a prior question to their case offence, the most optimal epistemology turns the case.

### AT: UQ

#### 1. No wrong forum takes out your aff

#### 2. Reasons why debate is racist is NI to debating the topic, that means they cant solve the worst forms of structural exclusion, if we win link defense to their exclusion offence it proves their political strategy is not escaping the problems of the skwo.

#### 3. ID politics don’t resolve the uq---presumption should go neg—**if we win their politics are ineffective---don’t vote for them even if we do not have a better method---if we win a link argument we don’t need to win uniqueness---the act of voting negative to unmask the 1ACs nothingness is more productive because it prevents placebo activism and forces us to find better strategies for activism**

### AT: Whiteness

#### Your strategy in particular relies on a hermeneutics of suspicion that totalizes whiteness, forces a confession of privilege, and insists that the game is being rigged – destroys ability to accurately conceptualize identity construction as well as ignoring other modes of oppression and causing backlash

Niemonen ‘10 (Jack, Department of Anthropology & Sociology, University of South Dakota, “Public Sociology or Partisan Sociology? The Curious Case of Whiteness Studies” Am Soc 41, pp. 68-69)

A hermeneutics of suspicion is predicated on revealing societal dynamics as a white plot by tying together seemingly unrelated events into a set of cause and effect relationships. This explanatory schema creates order out of chaos (Chubbuck 2004; Parker 2001; Pratt 2003; Waters 1997). By invoking whiteness, proponents explain what was not understood previously. They find purpose where others find coincidence, offer the clarity of simple explanations to the ambiguity of contradictory facts, and assign blame, responsibility, and agency (Hewitt and Hall 1973; Knight 1997; McArthur 1995). Histories, biographies, stories, anecdotes, recollections, and ruminations reveal other manifestations of whiteness, adding to the conviction that proponents have made a theoretical breakthrough (Hewitt and Hall 1973). The fact that whites don’t recognize whiteness is a function of its power, which secures itself by refusing to identify itself as the primary organizing principle of contemporary life (Asumah 2004; Blanchett 2006; Cashmore 1979; Donskis 1998; Howard 2004; Hyland 2005; Jay 2005; Jeffery 2005; Martin and Davis 2001; McArthur 1995; Pratt 2003; Purnell 1982; Tate 2003). History is thus the “undisturbed realization of intentions,” largely white (Waters 1997). “To disrupt the insidious power of white culture, then, [proponents of whiteness studies] most expose and define it” (Perry 2001:85). A hermeneutics of suspicion is a self-confirming belief system (Birchall 2001; Parker 2001). For example, to deny that whiteness is omnipresent is proof that whiteness is omnipresent. To protest that sociological knowledge is not used to manipulate nonwhites is evidence that it is used for such a purpose (Aanerud 2007; Applebaum 2006; Catron and Harmon 1981; Haddad and Lieberman 2002; Hartigan 2000b; Hays and Chang 2003; Sleeter 1993). To claim “I just see people” is “color evasiveness” (Solomon et al. 2005), which circumvents the need to interrogate whiteness (Denevi 2001; Flagg 1993; Gallagher 2003; Gillespie 2003; Gordon 2005; Jay 2005; Lewis 2001; Mahoney 1995). To observe that some whites are materially worse off than nonwhites is a rhetorical move that dissociates them as beneficiaries of a white privileged system (Aanerud 2007; Eichstedt 2001). A hermeneutics of suspicion is skeptical of dominant discourse, which is characterized as a “totalizing narrative” (Birchall 2001) that is expressed in the phrase “well, minorities would say that, wouldn’t they?” The white elite manipulates discursive resources—that is, the language and rules of the game—to reframe the race relations problematic in such a way as to preserve the status quo (Marvasti and McKinney 2007; Spark 2001; cf. Abercrombie and Turner 1978). For example, “master scripting” is employed in nonwhite schools to prevent “counter-voices” from challenging white supremacy and affirming an alternative humanity (Blanchett 2006). Master scripting requires that nonwhites dance the “performance of subjugation” (Gillman 2007), which is sustained through institutional practices such as tracking (Blanchett 2006; Chubbuck 2004; Hunter and Nettles 1999). When confronted with their complicity, whites make the classic moves, such as de-racializing events and accusing nonwhites of playing the race card. These moves are the means by which to sustain an illusory state of equality (Aanerud 2007; Denevi 2001; Gordon 2005; Hunter and Nettles 1999; Jay 2005; Lea 2006; Levine-Rasky 2000; Lewis 2001; Marvasti and McKinney 2007). Instructors versed in whiteness studies have both the authority and the responsibility to “reclaim” social justice (Baez 2000). White students are to explain in ontological terms the oppressive basis of their being, which means that in practice they are to identify themselves as white and catalog the unearned benefits that they accrue because they are white. Then, they are to accept responsibility for the atrocities of the past, acknowledge their complicity in perpetuating injustice, and undergo “corrective socialization” such that they may love themselves and others more authentically (Thompson 2003b; Vasquez 2006). Developing “race cognizance” is a necessary tool in this process (O’Brien 2007). Race cognizance is a pedagogical device that enhances students’ ability to understand how history was racialized, identify the major distortions of Western epistemology, recognize the practices that normalize whiteness, and disown whiteness and its concomitant privileges. Students are expected to reject social scientific frameworks that focus on the alleged cultural deficiencies of nonwhites, embrace the epistemologies that challenge Eurocentrism, and become more effective anti-racist practitioners by developing, mastering, and implementing anti-racist strategies and practices (Hatchell 2004; Hytten and Warren 2003; Jeffery 2005; Kimmel 2002; LadsonBillings 1996; Lawrence 1998; Leonardo 2002; Levine-Rasky 2000; Manglitz 2003; Manglitz et al. 2005; Martin and Davis 2001; Marx 2004; Marx and Pennington 2003; McCarthy 2003; McIntyre 1997a, b; Niehuis 2005; Pearce 2003; Samuels et al. 2003; Sanders 1999; Schacht 2001; Scheurich and Young 1997; Schick 2000; Sleeter 1993; cf. Srivastava 1996). Through the use of experiential approaches, such as autobiographies, storytelling, and parables, the pedagogy of whiteness studies critiques the accepted canon and prevailing order and presents an alternative view of reality. It “unpacks” white privilege (McIntosh 1988, 1990), brings to the forefront the impact of racism on the lives of nonwhites, “liberates students from the logic of the present system” (Sanders 1999:175), and creates a communal understanding that builds consensus and encourages social change (Cooper et al. 2006; Green 2003; Kanpol and Yeo 1995; Manglitz et al. 2005; Mueller et al. 2007; Tate 1997; Taylor 1998). The pedagogy of whiteness studies claims to be a model for education that recognizes the “multiplicity of situated knowers” (Kanpol and Yeo 1995) vis-à-vis imposing a Eurocentric worldview as the standard against which others will be judged. Its operative assumption is that for some to have good lives, the others must have lives that are truncated and brutalized (Green 2003). Moral Vision, Democratic Dialogue, and Corrective Socialization Throughout the whiteness studies literature on pedagogy, moral vision and democratic dialogue are mantras. White students understand neither because they are the dupes of colorblindness. Allegedly, white students resist teaching strategies that disrupt their sense of entitlement. Some students express embarrassment, shame, guilt, anxiety, discomfort, defensiveness, anger, denial, or resistance in order to avoid appearing racist. They trivialize racism and exonerate themselves from culpability by citing parallels to nonwhites in an attempt to show that their experiences are comparable. They affirm their goodness by dissociating themselves from their racist families or friends. In the classroom, other students impede “authentic” discussions of whiteness and its associated privileges by refusing to recognize the right of nonwhites to speak (Denevi 2004; Diangelo 2006; Gillespie et al. 2002; Green 2003; Griffin 1998; Haddad and Lieberman 2002; Hays and Chang 2003; Hunter and Nettles 1999; Hytten and Warren 2003; Kiselica 1999; Leonardo 2004; Samuels et al. 2003). Through the use of counter-claims that devalue alternative epistemologies, they reassert the dominant discourse and reproduce the myths that sustain the status quo. Pedagogues who are versed in whiteness studies state categorically that students who do not admit that they are racist are in denial. Nonwhite students who adopt the Western epistemological standpoint do so because that is easier than developing an oppositional standpoint in the face of white resistance. Courses that students view as less controversial or non-biased are the embodiment of whiteness—that is, they are “unmarked and unnamed” (Hunter and Nettles 1999; also Hytten and Warren 2003; Marx and Pennington 2003). Pedagogues who are versed in whiteness studies claim that nonwhite students bring richer perspectives and experiences to the classroom than do most white students, who have almost no “race literacy” (Aanerud 2007)—that is, the ability to understand, discuss, and challenge white privilege. They are trapped within a Western worldview, and they have not mastered the skills that most nonwhites have to negotiate their way through different epistemologies. Thus, white instructors and students alike must be racialized in order to enable them to see how whiteness in the classroom has impeded their ability to learn (Aanerud 2007; Blanchett 2006; Diangelo 2006). The point is not to prove that students are racist—that is a given— but to bring to conscious awareness their “uncritical and limited ways of thinking” (Applebaum 2006), decenter whiteness as the favored epistemological standpoint, and undercut the authority with which they speak and act in the world, revealing this authority as a particular perspective that is imbued with the unjustifiable claim to truth (Allen 2004; Fishman and McCarthy 2005; Henze et al. 1998; Perry 2001; Reitman 2006). Unlike victims, perpetrators are masters of self-deception and do not take responsibility for their actions; therefore, they must be held accountable (Doolin 2001; Johnson et al. 2000; Rodriguez 1999). White students are to move from a position of anger and denial toward an antiracist white identity, which requires self-examination—that is, learning how being white affects their values, attitudes, and behaviors (Martin and Davis 2001). Bafflement, shame, and guilt are expected and necessary stages in the process (Marx and Pennington 2003; Norton and Baker 2007). White students will “work through whiteness” by engaging in “memory work,” defined as am emerging outrage at the history of racial oppression and a growing desire for justice in the present (Giroux 1997). Instructors are not prepared to take on this mandate. Indeed, they describe themselves as ignorant, inept, and vulnerable when discussing whiteness and its associated privileges. To paraphrase a common question, how was I, as a white instructor, prepared to acknowledge the privileges that whiteness affords me? Pedagogues who are versed in whiteness studies claim that the answer is not found through intellectual inquiry; rather, the answer lies in a developmental leap sparked by a deep call to the soul (Blum 1998; Denevi 2004; Johnson et al. 2000; Ryan 2002; Smith 1998; Thompson and Disch 1992; Warren and Hytten 2004). For true racial reconciliation to occur, white students must admit that they are necessarily racist as a consequence of their epistemological standing. Then, along with their non-student counterparts, they must confess (Allen 2004; Croteau 1999; D’Andrea 1999; Gustafson 2007): I believed that racist attitudes and behaviors were an aberration. I contributed to racial oppression even though I was not a blatant racist. I thought that the underprivileged simply needed to work harder to achieve success in life. I understand for the first time how I had benefited from the privileged position that I had been granted because I am white. I realize that I cannot escape from racism so long as we live in a racist society (Croteau 1999; Hays and Chang 2003; Kiselica 1999; Schacht 2001; Schick 2000). In short, this process requires that white students disavow white supremacy and commit to the public good (D’Andrea 1999; Ferber et al. 2007; Hays and Chang 2003; Jay 2005; Levine-Rasky 2000; McDermott and Sampson 2005). White confessionals are helpful insofar as they bring to light the “insidiousness” of white privilege and result in a critique of selves rather than the others (Leonardo 2004). However, confessing is not enough; confession merely releases white students from their complicity. It fails to make visible the negative consequences that the “power of whiteness” has had on the lives of nonwhites (McDonald 2005).18 The claim that “I am not a racist” is little more than an American liberal fantasy that maintains the belief that one is a good white who protects the underdog (Grimes 2002; Jeffery 2005; Schick 2000). The need to be known as a good white results from the recognition that whiteness is problematic. Thus, cherished notions of rationality, objectivity, universality, fairness, and goodness must be relinquished, for they are the main obstacles to racial change (Thompson 2003a). Confessions may be painful and demoralizing, as a more realistic self emerges from the process of “piercing falsely inflated notions of the self” (Thompson 2003b:431; also Alcoff 1998; Leonardo 2004; Thompson 2003b). Although white students cannot be “cured” of racism in a short period, given their lifelong submersion in whiteness, they can develop healthy white identities that reflect on, and then take responsibility for, their roles in perpetuating racial inequality (Alcoff 1998; Masko 2005; McIntyre 1997a, 1997b; O’Brien 2007; Vasquez 2006). Until whiteness is a “felt experience,” it will be impossible to “bring Whites on board to fight racism” (Denevi and Pastan 2006:71). The Problematic Nature of Whiteness Studies: Propounding Public Sociology Without Professional Sociology Whiteness studies are constructed on a foundation that consists of broad generalizations, ontological and epistemological claims, normative and evaluative statements, prescriptive advice, political goals, and critique—supported by histories, biographies, stories, anecdotes, recollections, and ruminations (Kolchin 2002; Scott 2000; cf. Zack 1999). If proponents prove that Western epistemology “incubated” whiteness and then predicated it on the racial ruling, cultural denigration, and physical decimation of nonwhites, then they could lay claim to both a new sociology of race relations and the moral high ground (Featherstone 2001; Leonardo 2002; Rabaka 2007). However, their defense rests on a caricature of professional sociology. Allegedly, mired in assimilationist and multicultural concerns, its approach to the study of race relations today explains racism primarily as a problem of distorted personality dynamics. Professional sociology characterizes the United States as a meritocratic society that is “afflicted by the disease of racism,” and it invokes the culture of poverty to explain the plight of nonwhites, who typically are described as “natives with deficient cultures” (Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi 2003, 2007, 2008). Professional sociology employs social surveys, dubious statistics, and “rhetorical writing” as means to support the thesis of the declining significance of race (Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi 2003, 2007, 2008).19 It does not conceptualize racism as an institutional phenomenon because it is grounded on a weak theory that defines racial disparities as a problem of individual failings (Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi 2008:139). Worse, professional sociology encourages nonwhites to adopt white—that is, Western European—values as a divide and conquer strategy (Baez 2000; Castagno 2006; Chubbuck 2004; Garcia 1999; Garner 2006; Goldberg et al. 2006; Guess 2006; Hendrix 2001; Moreton-Robinson 2006; Reitman 2006; Welcome 2004). For example, “... assimilation is a one-way adaptation to existing white hegemony, which inevitably means it’s symbolically violent and self-oppressive” (Feagin and Cobas 2008:52). Latinos, especially, formulate their views on racial matters from the perspective of the white racial frame . . . . By buying heavily into the racial-status continuum and its supportive framing, they pay a substantial price in self-oppression and in symbolic violence to themselves, their families, and their communities (Feagin and Cobas 2008:40, 52). Latinos’ willingness to work for the “wages of whiteness” vis-à-vis the political, economic, and moral advantages of allying with blacks has undermined the possibilities for inter-group cooperation among minorities (Feagin and Cobas 2008; Rochmes and Griffin 2006): . . . so long as Latinos think they are white, there is no hope for them. The search for a meaningful Latino identity and real political inclusion in the United States must be predicated on the dismantling of whiteness (Rochmes and Griffin 2006:89).20 The fact that these dynamics were not examined until recently reflects the power of paradigmatic thinking. Professional sociology promotes the theories and methods that keep whiteness invisible (Rochmes and Griffin 2006). It grounds race, not in exploitive relations, “but in the realm of visibility as apparently locatable in the body” (McDonald 2005:248; also Guess 2006; Hartigan 1997; McCarthy 2003). In other words, sociologists conclude that nonwhites have pathological tendencies. This conclusion finds its way into popular culture as fact, thus encouraging the policies and practices that force assimilation (Masko 2005; Scheurich and Young 1997; Solomon et al. 2005; Sue 2004; Tate 2003). Such “deceitful narratives” (Welcome 2004) are nothing less than “epistemological racism” (Hendrix 2001). Reification, Reductionism, and Conceptual Inflation Despite recognition that racial classification systems are not constant, proponents of whiteness studies treat whites as if they were an immutable, bounded, and cohesive category (Bonnett 2003; Eichstedt 2001; Gabriel 2000; Giroux 1997; Hartigan 1997; Keating 1995; Kincheloe 1999; Kolchin 2002; Levine-Rasky 2000; McCarthy 2003; Pugliese 2002; Sidorkin 1999; Yans 2006). They posit a generic white subject, both privileged and unaware of the extent of that privilege. However, even if whites coalesce at certain historical junctures, we cannot conclude that the category “white” is an entity that will continue indefinitely in the absence of antiracist initiatives (McDermott and Sampson 2005; Yans 2006; cf. Niemonen 2007). Reification has the unintended consequence of neglecting how the construction of racial identities is a negotiated, indeed manipulative, process (Bonnett 1998; Rockquemore 2002). In doing so, proponents of whiteness studies understate the contradictions, inconsistencies, and ambivalences within white and nonwhite identities. They assume before the fact that whites regard whiteness rather than nationality, ethnicity, religion, or class as the main factor that separates the civilized from the uncivilized. And, they oversimplify the challenges that nonwhites face by implying that their problems are largely race-related and hence attributable to racism (Croteau et al. 2002; Hartigan 2002; Kolchin 2002; Mansfield and Kehoe 1994; Warren and Twine 1997). Emphasizing the unifying interest in, and reproduction of, dominance minimizes how the boundaries of racial categories are negotiated, reinforced, or challenged in daily life (Alcoff 1998; Bash 2006; Perera 1999). Largely ignored are the complicated interactions between race, class, and sex, and the struggles of many whites to acquire privileges in a class-stratified society, especially economic security and some degree of self-autonomy (Bonnett 1997; Eichstedt 2001; Hartigan 1997, 2000b; Hubbard 2005; Kolchin 2002; Lee 1999; Winders 2003). Reifying the concept of race fails to capture the processes through which it acquires meaning, confers status, or exerts a “structuring effect” (Bash 2006; Lewis 2004). By suppressing intra-group divisions and contradictions, whiteness studies ignore how multiple statuses work together in people’s lives (cf. Brekhus 1998; Merton 1972) and perpetuate an “us-them” view of difference—the binary perspective that is at the core of racist discourses. The reification of racial categories endows them with causal potential and predictive ability, implying that all persons classified as white will exhibit the undesirable traits associated with whiteness, since being white is a condition with distinct, identifiable, but largely negative attributes that are in need of corrective attention (Alcoff 1998; Bash 2006; Hartigan 2000b; Keating 1995; Santas 2000; Scott 2000). In a reversal of the historical equation, “white” has become reprehensible whereas “nonwhite” has become virtuous (Gillborn 1996; Keating 1995). Whiteness studies posit racism as a mono-causal explanation for almost everything. All other forces, including the class struggle, are relegated to the margins. William Julius Wilson’s work is dismissed out-of-hand as a defense of the culture of poverty thesis (e.g., Harrison 1998; Ladson-Billings 1996; Welcome 2004). Racism is the problem. Therefore, whites either actively resist its reproduction or they perpetuate existing inequalities (Hartigan 2000b; Kolchin 2002; Moon and Flores 2000; Troyna 1994). This premise allows for the subsequent argument that whiteness is the source of oppression. If it is eradicated, then social justice will emerge (Moon and Flores 2000; Trainor 2002). Once whiteness is demonized, whites have no choice but to view their selves—ironically—in the context of a deficit model that identifies their failings, after which they may redeem themselves by becoming race traitors. Whites are required to renounce their whiteness but at the same time celebrate the alternatives. Such arguments inevitably result in anger and bafflement (Gillborn 1996; Kolchin 2002).

## 1NR

### 1NR Overview

#### Prefer a politics of prefigurativity over their politics of negation – utilizing identity as the starting point is flawed and instead there should be an advocacy for transformative political proscriptions –

#### First, is the Ontological Occlusion DA – their focus on a static ontological difference that separates them from the oppressor prevents the clarification of their struggle in tandem with a reflexive approach that produces viable alternatives to the current state of affairs – their inability to abdicate themselves from a static state prevents proscription that can resolve violence within oppressed communities – that’s Nail

#### Second, is the Biopolitical Binary DA – our Enns evidence indicates that their identity politics is an emergency measure meant to reinscribe oppressive biopolitical structures that allow for a continual violence against their performance and oppressed groups. By valorizing static identities as a starting point it produces a binary economy that allow for an externalizing practice against their performance at the hands of the state which flips the entire 1AC – only through accepting a politics of lingering and rushing through proscription can one produce an ethical frame that promotes agonism in the face of oppression, otherwise, it continues to reify itself

#### And a topological proscriptive politics is key to solve – only through an intersectional understanding of all oppression in tandem with political proscription can we create an ethical, actualizing politics that seeks not to forget oppression identified with particular groups while promoting an emancipatory politics

#### Beginning with commonality of a shared world as the basis for ethical intersubjective relationships is a better starting point than the affs pure antagonistic difference---we are not saying the affirmative should abandon recognition of their identity, nor are we saying that their identity is illusory or unimportant---rather, our claim is that we should being with recognizing that there is a shared element of humanity and use that as the basis for our politics---and then we should articulate how we are different. Only this can avoid absolutist essentialism

Enns 7 (Dr. Diane Enns is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Associate Director of the Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition, at McMaster University, Canada. “Identity and Victimhood,” http://www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/documents/publications/boc28e.pdf)

If the politicization and institutionalization of identity categories are responsible for violent conflict, then most promising for an alternative political future—one in which vulnerability to the other and a “dialogue-based dispute culture” are fundamental—are those visions and practices that struggle to create a community and politics founded on other relationships besides those tied to absolutist notions of identity. Mamdani’s articulation of a justice as survival is one such approach. Suggesting that groups be allowed to come to the negotiating table with only one criterion, that they lay down their arms, may seem utopian, but it quite concretely calls for another kind of disarmament: namely, the “laying down” of ideologies associated with this particular identity or that. The fact that many observers and scholars of violent conflict follow Mamdani’s lead reveals the extent to which identity politics has harmed the globe, which is why I find it important to bring this discussion to bear on academic debates in North America regarding an emancipatory politics that is considered necessary and unrelated to violent struggles elsewhere. These identity politics have also led to divisiveness, and in the context of feminism, what Ranjana Khanna calls “separate ethical universes,” produced by the reification of difference and effectively silencing any comment on another context.90 In the name of “cultural sensitivity” and the incommensurability of the other, the divide between identity groups widens, and understanding diminishes. In a discussion of the “instabilities” of truth and reconciliation within the sites of theater and public culture, Rustom Bharucha notes that, the politics of identity can catalyze, metabolize, and disrupt the hierarchies of any given society, but there is no guarantee that in this process new hierarchies are unlikely to emerge, or that reconciliation across older divides is likely to be stabilized. To seek reconciliation beyond the constraints of specific identity constructions, we need to do more than posit the multiple or hybrid identities that have become postmodern tropes. Perhaps we need to counter the very concept of ‘identity’ with the enigmas of the ‘self’…91 This is where conflict management practices don’t appear to reach far enough, assuming, as they often do, that identity is natural and fundamental to human experience. But conflict management is caught up in the crisis of the day, in emergency measures, and unable to indulge in the luxury of theoretical creations of enigmatic selves. When faced with two hostile parties, each rooted staunchly in a historical and ideological understanding of who they are, who can speak of enigmatic selves that counter the very concept of identity?92 The gap between theory and practice must always be negotiated. We need both emergency measures and preventative measures, which explains my own ambivalence towards the “dialogue industry.” Here we seem to glimpse a different future through the discovery of commonalities among human beings who have been taught to hate each other. What better way to prevent future antagonism? It seems in keeping with the kind of sentiments Boris Buden shares when he states unequivocally that truth commissions and organized reconciliation processes are not what the people of the former Yugoslavia need. Rather, what they need is to “invent a new form of political solidarity, one that goes beyond their national, ethnic, cultural, and religious identities, if they really want to build new bridges toward each other over the mass graves and ruins.93 For conflict management practice to effectively deal with what we might call a new terrain—not only due to the increase in ethnopolitical violence but also because of increasing claims to the status of victimhood—it must work to arrest the transition from a mere cultural identity to a politicized identity, as well as stall the transition from the empowerment of the victim to the victim’s call for violent retribution. A tall order to be sure, but recent attention to multi-track diplomacy, to both psychological and political approaches, and above all to the historical and socio-political conditions of every site of conflict, seem to point in the right direction. The most difficult challenge is to know at what point the victim must let go of victimhood, sacrifice the tremendous need for recognition and reparation, even when it is known that victimization robs individuals and communities of something that will never be returned or repaid, and never fully repaired. Frantz Fanon, who gave us probably the best description of what it means to be victimized by colonization and who witnessed its festering wounds as a psychiatrist in French colonized Algeria, refused victimhood. In Black Skin, White Masks (1962) he outlines the task of the native to “disalienate” himself. It is accomplished neither in the celebration of a black identity, nor in the attempt to be white, for both of these are projects defined within the framework of white colonialism. In other words, Fanon refuses the world view of the cat or the rat, for both are products of an oppressive regime. As a man of colour he does not claim the right to hope the white man will feel guilt, the right to destroy white pride, to claim reparations, or to “cry out [his] hatred at the white man.”94 The only right Fanon does claim is “that of demanding human behavior from the other.”95 It is a profound statement about the bare bones of political community; the responsibility one has to the other, both to demand and to bestow human consideration—compassion and political judgment—to the other on the basis of a shared life and world, rather than on recognition for the other’s identity. He refuses to accept the “amputation” of victimhood.96 Coming from one who knew intimately the traumas of the colonized, Fanon’s words are a provocative and inspiring call to rethink both politics and community.

#### Politics must be beyond both pessimism and depoliticizing statements – defined ends and means with specific proposals is critical to effectively dismantling oppressive structures – Zapatistas prove

Nail 10 (Thomas, is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Denver“Constructivism and the Future Anterior of Radical Politics,” http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/thomas-nail-constructivism-and-the-future-anterior-of-radical-politics)

The new revolutionary present thus emerges from strategic sites of struggle that draw it “in negative outline,” Deleuze and Guattari say. “But for it to be realized there must be a whole integral of decoded flows, a whole generalized conjunction that overspills and over-turns the preceding apparatuses” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 452). That is, it must “cause the other elements to cross a threshold enabling a conjunction of their respective deterritorializations, a shared acceleration. This is [...] absolute, positive deterritorialization.” It is not only an escape but the creation of new weapons, “the creation of great machines of struggle” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 142; Deleuze,1987: 136; Guattari, 2008: 210). However, less we risk arguing in favor of a purely subterranean and imperceptible form of revolutionary transformation, we should highlight, because some often forget to, that the purpose of absolute positive deterritorialization, for Deleuze and Guattari, is not simply to become-imperceptible in relation to the plane of organization for the sake of doing so. This has too much fascist potential. The purpose of prefigurative revolutionary interventions are to render everything “fragment by fragment” imperceptible from the plane of organization to create “the plane of consistency, which is nevertheless precisely where the imperceptible is seen and heard (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 252). The task is not to relish the theory of an impossible and invisible revolution, but rather to “bring the imperceptible to perception” by changing the dominant conditions for visibility (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 267). It is neither by oppositional destruction or by ex nihilo creation but “by conjugating, by continuing with other lines, other pieces, that one makes a world that can overlay the first one, like a transparency (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 280). The Zapatistas have also deployed a prefigurative revolutionary intervention in two ways. First, the only way one could possibly say that the Zapatistas “burst onto the scene of Mexican politics out of nowhere” is if they had not been aware of the ten years of prefigurative revolutionary activity, training, and indigenous mobilizations sustained in the jungles of the Lacandon since 1983. Marcos and three others began as Che-inspired military vanguardists living outside indigenous communities and slowly earning the trust of, and radicalizing the indigenous population. Far from appearing out of nowhere, there was a long and ultimately collective decision by the assembly of indigenous campasin@s to go to war. During this time the event of Zapatismo certainly existed as a new present connected to a specific historical legacy (emerging from Emiliano Zapata’s peasant revolution) with a determinate future (leading to the democratic transformation of Mexican politics). During these ten years Zapatismo existed as a form of invisibility that will have been visible. Not only retroactively visible but visible as a real historical sequence resurrected from Zapata and drawn into a future overthrow of the Mexican government. The second example, and perhaps the most original one, is the scale on which the Zapatistas have refused to “take power” and have instead continued their revolution by creating in the present the world they want to see in their own autonomous municipalities. They began in August of 2003 to create the Juntas de Buen Gobierno: directly democratic institutional frameworks for collective and autonomous decision making. One JBG was created in each of the Caracoles (regional communities, or snails) to promote and approve the participation of compañeros and compañeras [...] to mediate conflicts which might arise between Autonomous Municipalities [...] to monitor the implementation of projects and community work in the Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities [...] to serve and guide national and international civil society so that they can visit communities, carry out productive projects, set up peace camps, carry out research, etc (Marcos, 2004: 619). Currently over 2,200 communities (over 100,000 people) are federated into 32 autonomous municipalities each grouped into five local self-governments (JBGs). Today the Zapatistas remain committed to, among other things, autonomy, participatory self-government, consensus decisions making, respect for nature and life without the use of pesticides, dams, or unnecessary logging, and the inclusion of “everybody without distinctions of party, religion, sex, or color.”[7] By forming a specific block of becoming through rotational self-government, the federation of their communes, and ultimately their solidarity with an international network of shared social struggle, the Zapatistas continue to make political interventions and alternative institutions that prefigure the kind of democratic and equalitarian world they and their allies want to live in. Opposed to directly declaring war on the Mexican government and instituting a regime change in the state, or simply affirming the radical possibility that “another world is possible,” the Zapatistas are building, to what degree they can, another world from inside the old: “one that can overlay the first one, like a transparency,” as Guattari says.

### 1NR A2: Erotic Performance

#### We don’t seek to exclude your performance or use of poetry as a means for politics, our Enns and Nail evidence show that you can use it to actualize politics and it requires proscription that doesn’t just put identity as the starting point

### 1NR A2: No Moral Authority

#### This links back to our identity arguments – by indicating that no one can attempt to understand another person means that oppressive structures will reify themselves because the oppressor won’t seek to empathize and will continue to engage in colonial, sexist, and racist violence against their performance

#### The notion that policy must be relevant to you in order to discuss it is narcissistic and shuts down progressive politics

Fred Clark 13, ethicist, journalist, former managing editor of Prism Magazine, 3/21/13, “For Sen. Portman, Sen. Kirk and the rest of us: The next big step is the important one,” <http://www.patheos.com/blogs/slacktivist/2013/03/21/for-sen-portman-sen-kirk-and-the-rest-of-us-the-next-big-step-is-the-important-one/>

Earlier this year, Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., returned to Washington after a long, arduous recovery from the stroke he suffered in early 2012. In an interview with Natasha Korecki of the Chicago Sun-Times, Kirk said he:

[Plans] to take a closer look at funding of the Illinois Medicaid program for those with have no income who suffer a stroke, he said. In general, a person on Medicaid in Illinois would be allowed 11 rehab visits, he said.

“Had I been limited to that, I would have had no chance to recover like I did,” Kirk said. “So unlike before suffering the stroke, I’m much more focused on Medicaid and what my fellow citizens face.”

Kirk has the same federal health-care coverage available to other federal employees. He has incurred major out-of-pocket expenses, which have affected his savings and retirement, sources familiar with Kirk’s situation said.

Harold Pollack commended Kirk for those “wise words, sadly earned,” writing: “Such a profound physical ordeal – and one’s accompanying sense of profound privilege in securing more help than so many other people routinely receive — this changes a person.”Steve Benen was also impressed with Kirk’s hard-won change of heart, but noted:I do wish, however, that we might see similarly changed perspectives without the need for direct personal relevance. Many policymakers are skeptical about federal disaster relief until it’s their community that sees devastation. They have no interest in gay rights until they learn someone close to them is gay. And they’re unsure of the value of Medicaid until they see its worth up close.Which brings us to this week, and the news that conservative Republican Sen. Rob Portman of Ohio now supports marriage equality for same-sex couples. The Cleveland Plain-Dealer’s headline for Sabrina Eaton’s report tells the story, “Sen. Rob Portman comes out in favor of gay marriage after son comes out as gay“:Republican U.S. Sen. Rob Portman on Thursday announced he has reversed his longtime opposition to same-sex marriage after reconsidering the issue because his 21-year-old son, Will, is gay.Portman said his son, a junior at Yale University, told him and his wife, Jane, that he’s gay and “it was not a choice, it was who he is and that he had been that way since he could remember.”“It allowed me to think of this issue from a new perspective, and that’s of a Dad who loves his son a lot and wants him to have the same opportunities that his brother and sister would have — to have a relationship like Jane and I have had for over 26 years,” Portman told reporters in an interview at his office.The conversation the Portmans had with their son two years ago led to him to evolve on the issue after he consulted clergy members, friends — including former Vice President Dick Cheney, whose daughter is gay — and the Bible.This is a big deal. Portman is the first Republican senator to endorse marriage equality. And he wasn’t previously someone who seemed on the fence — he was adamantly, religiously opposed before.So the first thing I want to say is congratulations, kudos, and thank you to Portman. I heartily second the commendations and praise he’s receiving from groups like the Human Rights Campaign, Freedom to Marry Ohio, and PFLAG.For Portman, as for Kirk, an unbidden circumstance expanded his perspective of the world. That new, larger appreciation in turn expanded his understanding of what justice requires — of what justice requires for people who aren’t necessarily just like him.This is one way we all learn — one way we all become bigger, better people. It is, for almost all of us, a necessary first step toward a more expansive empathy and a more inclusive understanding of justice. Even if it is only a first step, it is an unavoidable one, and we should celebrate the epiphany that challenging circumstance has allowed these senators.What Steve Benen said about Kirk is still true for Portman. It is good to see his perspective change due to “direct personal relevance,” but it would be better if he could learn to expand his perspective even without it. That’s the next necessary step, the next epiphany awaiting these senators.Kirk’s long recovery provided his “Aha!” moment when it comes to other people who are also recovering from a stroke. And Portman’s coming to grips with his son’s identity provided him with an “Aha!” moment when it comes to other LGBT people and their families. But it’s not yet clear that either senator has yet taken the next logical step — the next “Aha!” moment. The next step is the big one. It’s the realization that because I didn’t understand others’ situation or others’ perspective until I myself faced the same thing, I should then strive to listen and to learn and to see the world through others’ eyes so that I can better understand the world without having to experience every situation, every injustice, every ordeal personally.This next step is necessary for justice, which can only come “When those who are not injured feel as indignant as those who are.”That next step may seem obvious, but epiphanies always seem obvious in retrospect.Until that next step occurs, though, the slightly expanded empathy of people like Kirk and Portman seems self-serving, like the “cowardice and hypocrisy” of the privileged, as Morf Morford describes it. They still seem to cling to a cramped, self-centered understanding of justice — one that can only grow when their own, personal interests require it to do so. It still lacks the ability to be “indignant” except when one is personally among the “injured.”“Moral and political positions aren’t supposed to be something you only take when they’ll benefit you,” Mark Evanier wrote. Empathy becomes suspect when it coincides so closely with personal benefit. It begins to look like what Mark Schmitt calls “Miss America compassion“:Their compassion seems so narrowly and literally focused on the specific misfortune that their family encountered. Having a child who suffers from mental illness would indeed make one particularly passionate about funding for mental health, sure. But shouldn’t it also lead to a deeper understanding that there are a lot of families, in all kinds of situations beyond their control, who need help from government? Shouldn’t having a son whose illness leads to suicide open your eyes to something more than a belief that we need more money for suicide help-lines? Shouldn’t it call into question the entire winners-win/losers-lose ideology of the current Republican Party?

If we take the first step without ever taking the next step — changing our perspective only when “direct personal relevance” demands it and not otherwise — we can fall into what Matthew Yglesias describes as “The Politics of Narcissism“:Remember when Sarah Palin was running for vice president on a platform of tax cuts and reduced spending? But there was one form of domestic social spending she liked to champion? Spending on disabled children? Because she had a disabled child personally? Yet somehow her personal experience with disability didn’t lead her to any conclusions about the millions of mothers simply struggling to raise children in conditions of general poorness. Rob Portman doesn’t have a son with a pre-existing medical condition who’s locked out of the health insurance market. Rob Portman doesn’t have a son engaged in peasant agriculture whose livelihood is likely to be wiped out by climate change. Rob Portman doesn’t have a son who’ll be malnourished if SNAP benefits are cut. So Rob Portman doesn’t care.

… But if Portman can turn around on one issue once he realizes how it touches his family personally, shouldn’t he take some time to think about how he might feel about other issues that don’t happen to touch him personally? Obviously the answers to complicated public policy questions don’t just directly fall out of the emotion of compassion. But what Portman is telling us here is that on this one issue, his previous position was driven by a lack of compassion and empathy. Once he looked at the issue through his son’s eyes, he realized he was wrong. Shouldn’t that lead to some broader soul-searching? Is it just a coincidence that his son is gay, and also gay rights is the one issue on which a lack of empathy was leading him astray? That, it seems to me, would be a pretty remarkable coincidence. The great challenge for a senator isn’t to go to Washington and represent the problems of his own family. It’s to try to obtain the intellectual and moral perspective necessary to represent the problems of the people who don’t have direct access to the corridors of power. Senators basically never have poor kids. That’s something members of Congress should think about. Will Femia notes that this widely shared observation prompted an insightful — and darkly funny — meme about “hypothetical Republican empathy.”“If empathy only extends to your flesh and blood, we gotta start shoving people into those families,” Rachel Maddow said. “Now all we need is 59 more gay Republican kids,” Dave Lartigue wrote.“Perhaps if we could get the Republican caucus to adopt gay, black Hispanic illegal-immigrant children, who will grow up to be denied insurance due to pre-existing conditions, we’d make some more social progress,” mistermix wrote.

“Eventually one of these Republican congressmen is going to find out his daughter is a woman, and then we’re all set,” Anil Dash tweeted.

And Andy Borowitz chimed in with “Portman Inspires Other Republicans to Stop Speaking to Their Children.”

Endless variations of that joke circulated this week because that joke offers limitless possibilities — as limitless as the stunted “hypothetical empathy” of “Miss America compassion” is limited.

That joke and Yglesias’ argument are correct. An empathy that never moves beyond that first step and that first epiphany is morally indistinct from selfishness. To take that first step without the next one is only to move from “me first” to “me and mine first.” (David Badash and Jonathan Chait also have insightful posts making this argument.)

But no one can take that next big step until they take the first one. So I’m less interested in criticizing Portman or Kirk or anyone else in their position than I am in figuring out how we can urge and encourage them to take that next big step. How can we facilitate the next epiphany?

That’s the bigger issue, the more important challenge. Ari Kohen tackles this challenge in a bookish post building on Richard Rorty’s thoughts. Kohen is interested most of all in how “to accomplish this progress of sentiments, this expanding of our sense of solidarity”:

The best way to convince the powerful that their way of thinking about others needs to evolve is to show them the ways in which individuals they consider to be “Other” are, in fact, much more closely akin to them than they ever realized. It is, in short, to create a greater solidarity between the powerful and the weak based on personal identification.

Rob Portman’s change of heart is a good example of the way in which we ultimately achieve a progress of sentiments that leads to the equal treatment of more and more people. Viewed in this way, it’s really not something people on the Left ought to be criticizing; it’s something we should be working to encourage for those without the sort of immediate personal connection that Portman fortunately had.

(Note that we are, yet again, confronted with the idea of ethics as a trajectory.)

The vital question, then, is how? How can we encourage “a progress of sentiments” along a trajectory “that leads to the equal treatment of more and more people”?

Part of the answer, I think, is to remember how we ourselves were encouraged along — how we ourselves each came to take that next step, how we ourselves came to have that second epiphany.

That’s the approach that Grace at Are Women Human? takes in a firm-but-generous post titled “Changes of heart and our better selves.” Grace highlights Portman’s case as an example of “the tensions between celebrating progress and recognizing that there’s still work to be done.” She draws on her own story and history for humility and perspective, and as a guide to helping others see and take the next steps in their journey:

How easy it is to say Portman … should have done better and forget that I wasn’t so different, not so long ago.

The honest truth: it was getting to know and love queer people that, more than anything else, led me away from the bigotry I’d been taught as faith. … It’s important for me not to forget this, or that it took the thought that my not-yet-born child might be transgender for me to realize that I needed to educate myself about gender identity. It would be dangerous to indulge the fiction that I’ve always held the moral “high ground.” …

That history — her own and that of others who have come to a more inclusive, expansive understanding of justice — informs the advice, and the warning, that follows:

Portman isn’t an exception in having, and indulging, the luxury of ignoring the consequences of politics that don’t affect him personally.

This is a feature, not a bug, of our culture and political system. Power is concentrated in the hands of people who routinely make policy on matters they have little experience or real stakes in. You don’t need any conscious malice in this setup to produce policy that has devastating effects on the communities these issues touch most directly (though there’s plenty of malice, too). All you need is a system run by people who can afford not to care that much about policies that mostly impact other people’s lives.

Which, I suppose, is why civil rights activism often depends on cultivating these very moments of identification with the “other,” on spontaneous and planned appeals to emotion and basic decency. Systemic lack of incentive to care has to be confronted with stories that get politicians or the public to care.

Emmitt Till’s open casket. Rosa Parks’ carefully planned protest of bus segregation – as a more “respectable” face of black resistance than Claudette Colvin. Hydeia Broadbent and Ryan White as the faces of children with HIV. DREAMers taking over public spaces, stories about families torn apart by racist, classist, unjust immigration policies.

… Rob Portman is not an exception. He’s the rule. I don’t say this to suggest that we cut him slack for finally arriving at a basic (and still incomplete) recognition of the humanity of queer people. Nor am I arguing that we shouldn’t critique the circumstances around his change of heart.

What I hope is that we don’t forget ourselves in these calls to do better. That we don’t fall into the deceptive confidence that because we know or do better, we’ve arrived…or forget how many of us had to change and grow to get to where we are now. We’re all capable of fooling ourselves into thinking our standpoints are clearly “rational” or “moral” when it comes to issues that don’t affect us.

#### Identity of the self shouldn’t come first – knowledge of experience isn’t the province of the individual but rather shared practices that make communities the locus of knowledge production

Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)

We suggest that alternative models of identity and community are required from those put forward by essentialist theories, and that these are offered by the work of two theorists, Satya Mohanty and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Mohanty’s ([1993] 2000) post-positivist, realist theorisation of identity suggests a way through the impasses of essentialism, while avoiding the excesses of the postmodernism that Bramen, among others, derides as a proposed alternative to identity politics. For Mohanty ([1993] 2000), identities must be understood as theoretical that enable subjects to read the world in particular ways; as such, substantial claims about identity are, in fact, implicit explanations of the social world and its constitutive relations of power. Experience – that from which identity is usually thought to derive– is not something that simply occurs, or announces its meaning and signiﬁcance in a self-evident fashion: rather, experience is always a work of interpretation that is collectively produced (Scott 1991). Mohanty’s work resonates with that of Nelson (1993), who similarly insists upon the communal nature of meaning of knowledge-making. Rejecting both foundationalist views of knowledge and the postmodern alternative which announces the “death of the subject” and the impossibility of epistemology, Nelson argues instead that, it is not individuals who are the agents of epistemology, but communities. Since it is not possible for an individual to know something that another individual could not also (possibly) know, it must be that the ability to make sense of the world proceeds from shared conceptual frameworks and practices. Thus, it is the community that is the generator and repository of knowledge. Bringing Mohanty’s work on identity as theoretical construction together with Nelson’s work on epistemological communities therefore suggests that, “identity” is one of the knowledges that is produced and enabled for and by individuals in the context of the communities within which they exist. The post-positivist reformulation of “experience” is necessary here as it privileges understandings that emerge through the processing of experience in the context of negotiated premises about the world, over experience itself producing self-evident knowledge (self-evident, however, only to the one who has “had” the experience). This distinction is crucial for, if it is not the experience of, for example, sexual discrimination that “makes” one a feminist, but rather, the paradigm through which one attempts to understand acts of sexual discrimination, then it is not necessary to have actually had the experience oneself in order to make the identiﬁcation “feminist”. If being a “feminist” is not a given fact of a particular social (and/or biological) location – that is, being designated “female” – but is, in Mohanty’s terms, an “achievement” – that is, something worked towards through a process of analysis and interpretation – then two implications follow. First, that not all women are feminists. Second, that feminism is something that is “achievable” by men. 3 While it is accepted that experiences are not merely theoretical or conceptual constructs which can be transferred from one person to another with transparency, we think that there is something politically self-defeating about insisting that one can only understand an experience (or then comment upon it) if one has actually had the experience oneself. As Rege (1998) argues, to privilege knowledge claims on the basis of direct experience, or then on claims of authenticity, can lead to a narrow identity politics that limits the emancipatory potential of the movements or organisations making such claims. Further, if it is not possible to understand an experience one has not had, then what point is there in listening to each other? Following Said, such a view seems to authorise privileged groups to ignore the discourses of disadvantaged ones, or, we would add, to place exclusive responsibility for addressing injustice with the oppressed themselves. Indeed, as Rege suggests, reluctance to speak about the experience of others has led to an assumption on the part of some white feminists that “confronting racism is the sole responsibility of black feminists”, just as today “issues of caste become the sole responsibility of the dalit women’s organisations” (Rege 1998). Her argument for a dalit feminist standpoint, then, is not made in terms solely of the experiences of dalit women, but rather a call for others to “educate themselves about the histories, the preferred social relations and utopias and the struggles of the marginalised” (Rege 1998). This, she argues, allows “their cause” to become “our cause”, not as a form of appropriation of “their” struggle, but through the transformation of subjectivities that enables a recognition that “their” struggle is also “our” struggle. Following Rege, we suggest that social processes can facilitate the understanding of experiences, thus making those experiences the possible object of analysis and action for all, while recognising that they are not equally available or powerful for all subjects. 4 Understandings of identity as given and essential, then, we suggest, need to give way to understandings which accept them as socially constructed and contingent on the work of particular, overlapping, epistemological communities that agree that this or that is a viable and recognised identity. Such an understanding avoids what Bramen identiﬁes as the postmodern excesses of “post-racial” theory, where in this “world without borders (“racism is real, but race is not”) one can be anything one wants to be: a black kid in Harlem can be Croatian-American, if that is what he chooses, and a white kid from Iowa can be Korean-American”(2002: 6). Unconstrained choice is not possible to the extent that, as Nelson (1993) argues, the concept of the epistemological community requires any individual knowledge claim to sustain itself in relation to standards of evaluation that already exist and that are social. Any claim to identity, then, would have to be recognised by particular communities as valid in order to be successful. This further shifts the discussion beyond the limitations of essentialist accounts of identity by recognising that the communities that confer identity are constituted through their shared epistemological frameworks and not necessarily by shared characteristics of their members conceived of as irreducible. 5 Hence, the epistemological community that enables us to identify our-selves as feminists is one that is built up out of a broadly agreed upon paradigm for interpreting the world and the relations between the sexes: it is not one that is premised upon possessing the physical attribute of being a woman or upon sharing the same experiences. Since at least the 1970s, a key aspect of black and/or postcolonial feminism has been to identify the problems associated with such assumptions (see, for discussion, Rege 1998, 2000). We believe that it is the identiﬁcation of injustice which calls forth action and thus allows for the construction of healthy solidarities. 6 While it is accepted that there may be important differences between those who recognise the injustice of disadvantage while being, in some respects, its beneﬁciary (for example, men, white people, brahmins), and those who recognise the injustice from the position of being at its effect (women, ethnic minorities, dalits), we would privilege the importance of a shared political commitment to equality as the basis for negotiating such differences. Our argument here is that thinking through identity claims from the basis of understanding them as epistemological communities militates against exclusionary politics (and its associated problems) since the emphasis comes to be on participation in a shared epistemological and political project as opposed to notions of ﬁxed characteristics – the focus is on the activities individuals participate in rather than the characteristics they are deemed to possess. Identity is thus deﬁned further as a function of activity located in particular social locations (understood as the complex of objective forces that inﬂuence the conditions in which one lives) rather than of nature or origin (Mohanty 1995:109-10). As such, the communities that enable identity should not be conceived of as “imagined” since they are produced by very real actions, practices and projects.

### 1NR A2: You Are the Problem

#### By indicating that Donnie and I are the problem and are engaging in an abusive relationship within the debate space reinforces our case arguments – to essentialize who we are in the name of identity politics reproduces the binary economy that maintains a static state of oppression that the 1AC seeks to extricate themselves from – that’s Nail and Enns

Their attempts at strategic essentialism guarantees repeated cycles of conflicts which reifies the very same war they seek to undermine against their performance

Enns 7 (Diane Enns is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University, Hamilton, “Political Life Before Identity,” Project Muse)

Giorgio Agamben's work is increasingly invoked in the task of articulating a politics and ethics of "whatever singularity" or bare life, concepts that have sparked a flurry of attention, especially on the part of those concerned with what these terms imply for political resistance. Drawing out the practical implications of what are often highly abstract formulations is proving to be a challenge.3 I will attempt to meet this challenge by bringing Arendt and Agamben into a discussion concerning race, racism, and victimhood; a particularly salient site for investigating questions of identity and its relation to politics, as well as a timely one, given the new global forms of racism we are currently witnessing.4 It is my contention that the proliferation of violent conflicts around the world, whatever their origins -- perpetuated by the fear and hatred of an enemy whose identity is never in question -- has rendered even the most strategic of strategic essentialisms problematic. I will argue that a focus on what is variously described by Arendt and Agamben as bare life, the pure fact of being human, biological life, or the human-as-such, holds promise for a political thought and practice attempting to extricate itself from the determinations of politicized identities. This is not the promotion of a universal category or community of the human -- not therefore, an abstract universal subject -- but an appeal to the significance of the singularity of life; the bare life or "mere existence" that is included in the realm of politics, power, and rights, only by way of its exclusion. More specifically, I would like to demonstrate that the appeal to naked life could assist us in avoiding the dangers of an identification with victimhood -- what Paul Gilroy calls an "exaltation of victimage" -- in ways that sabotage political agency in its grasping for a just future, or simply survival. To this end, I will return to the rich, phenomenological descriptions that W.E.B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon provide of the condition of victimhood -- the double consciousness of the racialized or colonized subject -- and of the process of "disalienation" in Fanon that refuses the "amputation" of victimization. I argue that subsequent raciology, occurring in the context of a contemporary focus on difference and on the fundamental significance of identity for political practice, has the tendency to forget this refusal. The critique of "color-blindness" -- a perspective that refuses the terms and divisions of race even for emancipatory politics -- reflects the tenacious link between identity and politics that many argue will only lead to repeat cycles of grievance at best and violence at worst. That we need to extricate ourselves not only from the worldview of the perpetrator, but also that of the victim, is the claim I turn to in the remainder of the paper. I will argue, as Mahmood Mamdani does, that once an economy of violence has evolved out of a binary logic of victim and perpetrator, political transformation cannot occur on the basis of identity.5 It is crucial then, that we engage with those thinkers who attempt to refuse the politicization of identities to begin with -- who articulate a sense of political life before it becomes named or names itself by identifying with this or that category. Arendt, Agamben and Fanon give us some clues as to how to reconceive politics and community in radical ways that disrupt the association between politics and identity, community and the common, sovereign power and mere existence. Several noteworthy points of resonance can be found especially between Agamben and Fanon; both of whom express an affirmation of life lived in an altered relation to politics and to other living beings. In his formidable analysis of the Rwandan genocide, Mahmood Mamdani concludes that political identities are artifacts. This does not mean there are not real victims or real perpetrators, but that continuing to act in the name of an identity once an economy of violence has sprung out of the binary logic of victim and perpetrator, or friend and enemy, does not enable political transformation, but prevents it. The great crime of colonialism, from this perspective, went beyond the expropriation of the native; "the greater crime was to politicize indigeneity in the first place."6 Mamdani includes in this politicization both the negative libeling of the native by the settler, as well as the positive self-assertion of the native response to this libel, a perspective remarkably similar, as we shall see, to Fanon's position in Black Skin White Masks. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda -- unprecedented for its massive civilian participation in the massacre of the Tutsi population -- occurred in the context of a political world set in motion by Belgian colonialism: a world divided into natives and settlers. The genocide was a natives' genocide, Mamdani argues, a struggle by the majority, the Hutu, to cleanse the country of a threatening "alien" presence, the minority Tutsi, a group with a privileged relation to power before colonialism. This was a violence not of neighbors against neighbors then, as it is generally portrayed, he contends, but against a population viewed as a foreigner; a violence therefore that sought to eliminate a foreign presence from home soil. Rather than focusing on the origin of a racial or ethnic difference, the crucial task, according to Mamdani, is to ask when and how Hutu was made into a native identity and Tutsi into a settler identity, and to understand how violence is the key to sustaining the relationship between them.7 It is not merely the settler's or perpetrator's worldview we need to break out of, but that of the victim as well, for they stand or fall together. Such a position appears to contradict Arendt's vehement claim that to respond in the name of humanity to an attack against one's identity -- rejecting an identification with the very identity subject to persecution and defamation -- is "nothing but a grotesque and dangerous evasion of reality." Indeed, she adds, those who reject such a "necessary identification" may feel "wonderfully superior to the world" but it is a superiority of "a more or less well-equipped cloud-cuckoo-land."8 A few decades later, we begin to hear this criticism in a different guise, typified by Robert Bernasconi when he points out in a discussion of these very passages, "Arendt's argument is a strong one. To accept someone for their humanity by 'overlooking' their social identity, is not to respect difference. One can be respected as a human being and still be hated as a Jew."9 The confidence with which Bernasconi makes this moral claim should give us pause. Which is the "greater crime" -- to emphasize difference or sameness, identity or humanity? This is the persistent, aporetic question bequeathed by late twentieth-century debates on difference and equality, here foreclosed Bernasconi. If we are to respect difference (it is assumed both that we know what this means and that we accept it as a moral imperative) it is not enough to respect a person's or group's humanity alone, we must acknowledge the identity category to which they are ascribed. A significant distinction is being made here: that one can be respected as simply human and hated for being a Jew (or presumably, by extension, black, female, Arab, etc.) presupposes that we can only experience these identities as attributes, laid over an amorphous, common humanity. Thus human life itself -- before the inscription of political qualifiers -- is not considered to be characterized by difference.

### 1NR A2: Yancy

#### Fluidity cannot be whiteness because fluidity is an ontological condition of humanity, , race, identity, and gender is a HUGE part of the mosaic that is our identity but it is not the only important one. Aspects of identity change over time and some of them are more important to some people than others

Cummings 11 (“Essence Precedes Existence? The Problem of Identity Politics in Hurewitz’s Bohemian LA,” http://tropicsofmeta.wordpress.com/2011/09/15/essence-precedes-existence-the-problem-of-identity-politics-in-hurewitzs-bohemian-la/)

What does it mean to “be” white, or black, or gay, or working-class? How might a Jewish Ethiopian-American who grew up in poverty but now has a big bank account define himself? Which identity matters most – the current status of wealth and privilege, the experience of coming from a hardscrabble background, or Jewishness or Africanness or national identity (native or adopted)? Does one dimension of identity actually have to subordinate the others? Our current president is almost always described as being black, despite having one white parent and growing up almost entirely with a white family. His own experience is far more complex than our contemporary framework of race and identity allows, a fact he explored in Dreams from My Father to much praise but little apparent understanding. When it comes to identity politics, as Ani Difranco once said, “Their eyes are all asking are you in or are you out – and I’m like, what is this about?” Daniel Hurewitz’s impressive first book, Bohemian Los Angeles, attempts to provide a historical account of why we even ask these questions today. It shows how identity, particularly sexual identity, became a rigid and essentialized category as it became political over the course of the twentieth century. One’s political Identity has come to be associated with what Hurewitz calls one’s “essence.” Beginning in Los Angeles’s burgeoning Edendale community at the turn of the twentieth century, Hurewitz explores a world where manhood and womanhood were considered certain, consistent, even immutable; given this underlying certainty about gender, men like Julian Eltinge could “impersonate” women with thrilling exactness without compromising their identity as men. A reader is right to question this schema, given Eltinge’s own clearly exaggerated self-presentation as a virile “manly man” when he was not (technically) performing. Hurewitz suggests that the star female impersonator’s PR spectacle of strength and manliness off-stage served to reinforce the remarkable quality of his transformation as a prim, demure, completely believable woman – which is no doubt true. Yet evidence suggests that Eltinge did have sex with men, a fact he was no doubt eager to keep secret, and his self conscious display of masculinity can also be read as an effort to dispel any doubts about his personal character (or what later generations would think of as “sexuality”). Other female impersonators had more feminine off-stage personalities, and they may have been suspected as being less manly (or straight) by the public. Hurewitz understandably focuses the most on Eltinge, due to his greater popularity and accessibility as a public figure, but one wonders if his dual identity as macho man and master female impersonator is really typical of or representative of men who performed in such a way (and who may have been more “queeny” than Eltinge). In short, Eltinge’s example may not adequately capture the experience of men who dressed as women or had sex with other men in this period. In any case, Hurewitz’s argument is that gender identity was more fixed in the early twentieth century, or at least undisturbed by the possibility of alternative conceptions of sexuality, such that people were more comfortable with a flexible approach to performing gender and sexuality then than in later years. Men could imitate women or have homosexual encounters in clubs and public parks without thinking of themselves as gay, bi, or transgender. Hurewitz is trying to tell a story both about how gay identity itself became conceivable and how such identity (along with others, such as race, ethnicity, and gender) became perceived as political constituencies. It’s an ambitious project, and as a result it has many moving parts. Hurewitz attempts to link the emergence of a boho urban hipster milieu (Edendale and the broader Silver Lake area of LA) with the development of Communism as an essential identity, first for the party faithful in their tight-knit communities and then with the onset of post-World War II repression that made “being” Communist an irrevocable condition, an unwashable stain that disqualified one as a legitimate participant in political life or even the workforce. Along the way he discusses the idea of interracialism, the political fortunes of Japanese and Mexican Americans in Depression and wartime LA, and, most importantly, the influential project of the first gay rights movement in the US, the Mattachine Society. This epic skein of interrelated political events does not always hold together. Showing how female impersonators in the 1910s relate to the political status of Mexican Americans and the zoot suit riots of the 1940s, for example, is not easy, but Hurewitz has still accomplished a significant historiographical feat. The Mattachine Society proposed “homophile” as a public identity, not merely a furtive secret or subterranean practice, confined to fleeting encounters in bathrooms and bars. Through the vision of Harry Hay, Mattachine imagined gayness as equivalent to blackness, Mexicanness, or Jewishness – a critical and ultimately persuasive point in Hurewitz’s overall argument. But is being gay or Communist really the same as being black, Jewish, or Mexican? Perhaps they are not exactly the same, but are they even of the same order of difference? A Communist could relocate (many did) to a different state and not necessarily be marked as Red, but it was much harder for a black person to stop being black. (Hard, but not impossible for some.) This comes to the greatest weakness in Hurewitz’s provocative and thoughtful book – his concept of essence or “inner life.” He aims to show with Bohemian LA how people’s interior worlds came to have political meaning akin to one’s outward identity as a worker or farmer or businessperson, or any other economic or political status. In other words, he seeks to answer the question of why Americans’ cultural, racial or sexual identities came to surpass class as a prime political consideration in the late twentieth century, which is, of course, a widely remarked upon phenomenon. Liberals in particular have bemoaned this shift, exemplified by exit polls that showed “moral values” to be the top concern of voters in the 2004 presidential election. Surely moral values reflect one’s “inner life” more than the economy as a political issue. (Many Evangelical Christians likely view their faith as the most salient fact about their political identity, not unlike the passionate, one might say obsessed, Communists of 1930s Los Angeles.) Yet this argument runs into some trouble. In what is otherwise a lucid and deftly written book, Hurewitz’s language gets notably fuzzier when he starts talking about essence and the inner life. The passive voice creeps in, and the author seems to be on less sure footing. Rightly so. Skin color and race are simply not internal essences in the way being Muslim, or gay, or a postmodernist might be – though blackness or Asianness may have come to be seen as essential, unchanging identities by many Americans in the years since WWII (and not just in the generalizing and universalizing minds of racists, but in the way African or Asian Americans view themselves). Moreover, one can reasonably question whether essence or an interior life became important for American politics only in the twentieth century. Certainly, identities such as white, Irish, black, Northern, Southern, Transcendentalist, abolitionist, woman (think of republican motherhood, the domestic sphere, the suffrage movement), Democrat, Republican, or any number of ethnic self-identifications played a major role in the passionate and participatory politics of the nineteenth century. Ultimately, the link between a gay or homophile identity and political or racial identity – the idea that one’s identity as a man with a feminine persona, or a man who has sex with other men is an essence of the same order as being Communist, or Jewish, or Mexican – still feels tenuous and hypothetical. The Mattachine Society sought to articulate such a vision of a common minority political project, but it remains unclear whether they affected the way other groups thought of themselves or were thought of by others. No doubt the author would echo the words of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri: Race is just as much a political concept as economic class… Neither ethnicity nor skin color determine race; race is determined politically by collective struggle. Some maintain that race is created by racial oppression, as Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, claims that anti-Semitism produces the Jew. This logic should be taken one step further: race arises through the collective resistance to racial oppression. (Multitude, 104) In other words, race is not a fact in and of itself – it is created by racism, or, better still, in the struggle against racism that generates a self-concept shared by members of the repressed group. In this sense, it was the struggle of gays, blacks, Mexicans, Jews and Communists against exclusion and injustice that created their identities, and led to their recognition as political interests based on identity. That this struggle created a world in which racial and sexual identity is more rigid and essentialized than before is one of the great ironies of this book. People who identify as bisexual, for instance, often feel marginalized by both straight and gay communities, thanks to the widespread belief (reinforced by the debatable view that people are “born gay”) that a person who sleeps with both men and women is simply a gay or straight person who went off the reservation. Similarly, contemporary discussions of race seem to fall into clichés of whiteness, blackness, Mexicanness and so forth – a comic goldmine that has been exploited by the brilliant (Dave Chappelle) as well as the decidedly un-brilliant (Carlos Mencia). The blog Stuff White People takes a pre-existing assumption of white racial identity and jumbles it with class and subcultural stereotypes, proposing (only half-kiddingly) that all white people are bourgeois urban hipsters who love Animal Collective and complicated sandwiches. The idea of blackness has at least received a more nuanced and intelligent discussion in recent years, though an observer like Randall Kennedy – who has been on the wrong side of accusations of selling out and racial betrayal before – still feels compelled to argue that the boundaries of blackness ought to be policed for African Americans to retain a distinct and coherent identity. Rich Harvard law professors apparently make the cut; African Americans who do not meet his definition of blackness need not apply. Studies estimate that fully a fifth of the so-called Millennial Generation(Americans born since 1982) have one foreign-born parent. I do not have statistics close at hand for how many young Americans come from mixed-race families. Whatever the numbers may be, a new generation of multiracial, ambisexual Americans may have to find a voice to awaken themselves and the rest of society to the apparent truth that identity is, in fact, fluid, and essences are not always so essential.

### 1NR A2: Train

#### The indication that I myself, a Latino male is constitutive of the train that seeks to run them over is violent to myself – the insistence we know where the view from nowhere lies is a position of whiteness, because it presumes an outside of lived experience that determines who is or is not performing identity correctly

Gines ’13 (Kathryn, Founding Director of the Collegium of Black Women Philosophers, Assist. Prof. of Philosophy @ Penn State. U., “introduction: Critical Philosophy of Race Beyond the Black/White Binary” critical philosophy of race, vol. 1, no. 1, 2013, p. 30)

In addition to indicating what is absent from the BwB, Linda Martín Alcoff approaches this binary from the perspective of coalition building in *Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self*, where she argues, “The black-white paradigm that dominates racial discourse in the United States inhibits our comprehension of the variety of racisms and racial identities and thus proves more of an obstacle to coalition building than an aid.”7 She, too, points out that Latinos and Asian Americans have been victims of nativist arguments and have been perceived as ineradicably foreign. For Martín Alcoff, theorizing race in the United States strictly through what she calls the “black/white paradigm” is “actually disadvantageous for all people of color, and in many respects for whites as well” (249). She considers how this paradigm operates both *descriptively* (describing racialization and racism in black and/or white terms) and *prescriptively* (enforcing the paradigm to control how race operates)—but neither its descriptive nor prescriptive reach addresses the complexity and plurality of racial identities adequately (249). This point is emphasized again when Martín Alcoff asserts that “the hegemony of the black/white paradigm has stymied the development of an adequate account of the diverse racial realities in the United States and weakened the general accounts of racism that attempt to be truly inclusive” (253). Martín Alcoff summarizes five key arguments against the Black/white paradigm: (1) it has disempowered various racial groups from being able to define their own identity (having had descriptions foisted from the outside); (2) it historically ignores and/or marginalizes Asian Americans and Latinos (among others) in the public discourse on race and racism, resulting in a weakened analysis within the discourse; (3) it undermines development of effective legal and political solutions to variable forms of racial oppression by eliminating the specificities of the “black” or nonwhite group; (4) it proposes that all conflicts between communities of color can be understood through anti-black racism and white supremacy; and (5) for these reasons, it undermines possibilities for coalition building (255). To these five, Martín Alcoff adds the following two: (6) the BwB has resulted in an imaginary of race in which there is large white majority confronting a small black minority, reinforcing a sense of the inevitability to white domination and a sense of fatalism; and (7) the BwB mistakenly configures race as exclusively having to do with color, as if color alone determines racial identity and is the sole object of racism (255–56).

#### **This silence smooths over different forms of racism and either discards them as irrelevant or integrates them within the logic of antiblackness. This recreates the uncritical universalism of whiteness and makes alleviating certain racial harms impossible.**

Alcoff 3 (Linda Alcoff, professor of philosophy at CUNY, “LATINO/AS, ASIAN AMERICANS, AND THE BLACK-WHITE BINARY”, The Journal of Ethics 7: 5–27, 2003

In fact, in Texas not only were Mexicans subject to Jim Crow in public facilities from restaurants to bathrooms, they were also excluded from business and community groups, and children of Mexican descent were required to attend a segregated school for the first four grades, whether they spoke fluent English or not. Thus, when they were classified as nonwhite, Latino/as were overtly denied certain civil rights; when they were classified as white, the de facto denial of their civil rights could not be appealed. Although the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Supreme Court of the State of Texas decision in the Hernandez case, its final decision indicated a perplexity regarding Mexican American identity. The U.S. Supreme Court did not want to classify Mexicans as black, nor did they want to alter the legal classification of Mexicans as white; since these were the only racial terms they thought were available, they ended up explaining the discrimination Mexicans faced as based on “other differences,” left undefined. Thus, oddly, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld that there was racial discrimination against Mexicans, but denied that Mexicans constituted a race.15 One clear lesson to be learned from this legal history is that race is a construction that is variable enough to be stretched opportunistically as the need arises to maintain and expand discrimination. The fact that Latino/as and Asians had to be put into either one of two categories black and white has not been of benefit to them. Nonetheless, one might take these legal cases to indicate that discrimination against African Americans was the paradigm case which U.S. courts stretched when they could to justify discrimination against other nonwhites, and thus to provide support for the black/white paradigm of race. The distinguished historian John Hope Franklin argued in this way at the first official meeting of the Race Relations Commission which was convened by former U.S. President Bill Clinton to advance his initiative for a national dialogue on race. Franklin maintained that “racism in the black/white sphere” developed first in North America when slavery was introduced in the Jamestown colony in 1619 and has served as a model for the treatment of race in the U.S. Attorney Angela Oh, also serving on the commission, argued against Franklin on this point, using the example of the uprising of April 29, 1992 in Los Angeles to show that the specific history and racist treatment of Asian Americans needs to be accounted for in order to understand what occurred during that event. “I just want to make sure we go beyond the black-white paradigm. We need to go beyond that because the world is about much more than that ...,” she said.16 Frank Wu, commenting on this exchange, tries diplomatically to unite both sides, affirming that “African Americans bear the greatest burden of racial discrimination” and that the Los Angeles uprising needs to be understood in relation both to African American history as well as Korean American history (and, I would add, Latino/a history, since Latino/as were the largest number of arrested). Wu advocates the following: Whatever any of us concludes about race relations, we should start by including all of us ... Our leaders should speak to all individuals, about every group, and for the country as a whole. A unified theory of race, race relations, and racial tensions must have whites, African Americans, and all the rest, and even within groups must include Arab Americans, Jewish Americans, white ethnicities, and so forth. Our theory is an inadequate account otherwise.17 The question Wu does not address directly is whether the continued acceptance of the black/white paradigm will allow such a comprehensive account. The reality of race in the U.S. has always been more complicated than black/white. The initial exclusionary laws concerning testimony in court, as mentioned earlier, grouped “blacks, mulattoes, and Native Americans.” The Chinese laborers brought to the West in the 1800’s had specific rulings and ideological justifications used against them, restricting their right not only to vote or own property but even to marry other Chinese. This latter ruling outlasted slavery and was justified by invoking images of Asian overpopulation. To avoid reproduction, Chinese women were allowed to come as prostitutes but not as wives, a restriction no other group faced. The Mexicans defeated in the Mexican-American War were portrayed as cruel and cowardly barbarians, and although the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo ratified in 1848 guaranteed the Mexicans who stayed in the U.S. full rights of citizenship, like the treaties with Native Americans neither local governments nor the federal courts upheld the Mexicans right to vote or respected the land deeds they held before the Treaty.18 By the time of the Spanish-American War of 1898 the image of barbarism used against Mexicans was consistently attributed to a Latin-Catholic heritage and expanded for use throughout Latin American and the Caribbean, thus subsequently affecting the immigrant populations coming from these countries as well as justifying U.S. claims of hegemony in the region.19 The so-called Zoot Suit riots in Los Angeles in 1943 targeted Mexicans and their ethnically specific style of dress. The attempts made to geographically sequester and also to forcibly and totally assimilate Native American groups were not experienced by any other group, and had their own ideological justifications that combined contradictory images of the Great Chain of Being with the romanticized Noble Savage. Native peoples were represented as vanquished, disappearing, and thus of no account. The paradigm of an antiblack racism intertwined with slavery does not help to illuminate these and other specific experiences of other nonwhite groups, where ideologies often relied on charges of evil, religious backwardness, horde mentalities, being a disappearing people, and other projections not used in regard to African Americans. The hegemony of the black/white paradigm has stymied the development of an adequate account of the diverse racial realities in the U.S., and weakened the general theories of racism which attempt to be truly inclusive. This has had a negative effect on our ability to develop effective solutions to the various forms racism can take, to make common cause against ethnic and race based forms of oppression and to create lasting coalitions, and has recently played a significant role in the demise of affirmative action. I will support these claims further in what follows. Critics of the black/white paradigm have argued that, although all communities of color have shared the experience of political and economic disenfranchisement in the U.S., there are significant differences between the causes and the forms of this disenfranchisement. Bong Hwan Kim, a Korean American community leader who has worked both as the Director of the Korean Community Center of East Bay in Oakland, CA, and as Director of the Korean Youth and Community Center in Los Angeles, blames the black/white binary for disabling relationships among people of color and even for creating the conditions leading to the Los Angeles civil disaster of April 1992, in which 2,300 small Korean owned businesses were destroyed by mostly Latino/a and African American looters. Kim cites the xenophobia marshaled by African American leader Danny Bakewell before the looting occurred, and argues that the Korean American community had been and continues to be systematically rendered incapable of responding to such rhetoric because they are not recognized in the media as a player in racial politics.20 Elaine Kim explains: It is difficult to describe how disempowered and frustrated many Korean Americans felt during and after the sa-i-ku p’ok-dong (the April 29 “riots”). Korean Americans across the country shared the anguish and despair of the Los Angeles tongp’o (community), which everyone seemed to have abandoned the police and fire departments, black and white political leaders, the Asian and Pacific American advocates who tried to dissociate themselves from us because our tragedy disputed their narrow and risk-free focus on white violence against Asians ... the Korean Americans at the center of the storm were mostly voiceless and all but invisible (except when stereotyped as hysterically inarticulate, and mostly female, ruined shopkeepers .. .).21 Similar to the Mexicans in Texas, the Koreans have been denied the legal or socially recognized category of being a politicized group at the same time that they are made subject to group based scapegoating. Moreover, as this event demonstrates, the black/white paradigm of race is incapable of theoretically or politically addressing racism among communities of color, or racism, in other words, which is not all about white people. A response to this line of reasoning might be that it is white supremacy which is at the root of the conflictual relations among communities of color, and responsible for their acceptance of stereotypes manufactured by a white dominant power structure. Thus, on this reading, what occurred in Los Angeles can be reductively analyzed as caused by white supremacy. Although I do find explanatory arguments that focus on political economy often compelling, it is far too simplistic, as I think Karl Marx himself knew, to imagine cultural conflict as the mere epiphenomenon of economic forces with no life or grounding of their own. To blame only white supremacy for what occurred in Los Angeles would also deny power and agency to any groups but the dominant, which is increasingly untrue. We must all accept our rightful share of the blame, whatever that turns out to be in particular instances, and resist explanations that would a priori reduce that blame to zero for communities of color. Supporting the arguments of both Elaine Kim and Bong Hwan Kim, Juan Perea argues that because of the wide acceptance of the black/white paradigm, “other racialized groups like Latino/as, Asian Americans, and Native Americans are often marginalized or ignored altogether.”22 He points out that the concerns of Asian Americans and Latino/as cannot be addressed through immigration legislation because all are not immigrants, which is one of the reasons to reject the claim of some ethnic theorists that these groups will follow the path of European immigrants in gradual assimilation and economic success (the other reason to reject this claim is their racialization).23 Roberto Suro argues that the black/white binary disadvantages Latino/as and other people of color who are not African Americans by forcing them to adopt the strategies of civil rights litigation even though it was “not particularly well-suited to Latino/as” who are a much more diverse group.24 For example, any meaningful redress of economic discrimination affecting Latino/as and Asian Americans will need to disaggregate these groups, as some “target of opportunity” programs today in fact do, since the gap between median incomes in Filipino and Japanese households, or between Puerto Rican and Cuban households, makes averaging these incomes useless as an indicator of economic success. Richard Delgado argues that “If one’s paradigm identifies only one group as deserving of protection, everyone else is likely to suffer.” Current civil rights legislation, in Delgado’s view, has provided legal advantages for African Americans, unwittingly perhaps, over other people of color. I do not take Delgado to be implying that the legislation has effectively benefited the African American population and been applied forcefully and universally, but that the language of the law, however much it has yet to be applied, identifies only one group and this is a problem. Just as the protection of the right of property advantages the propertied, and the protection of free speech increases the influence of those who are articulate and can afford microphones, TV air time, and so on ... the Equal Protection Clause produces a social good, namely equality, for those falling under its coverage blacks and whites. These it genuinely helps at least on occasion. But it leaves everyone else unprotected.25