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#### Armed forces means humans not weapons

**Lorber, 13** - J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science (Eric, “Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?” 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, January, lexis)

As is evident from a textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization. n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as non-members constituting armed forces). n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.

An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.

The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.

This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in [\*992] harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the War Powers Resolution likely does not cover such activities. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. n192 Thus, individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. n193 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. n194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities - which is highly unlikely - such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### Voting issue –explode the topic, including weapons systems turns this into an arms control topic – nuclear weapons, space weaponization, or the CWC could all be topics, makes being negative impossible

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#### Obama PC makes the GOP blink on the debt ceiling

**Dovere, 10/1/13** (Edward, Politico, “Government shutdown: President Obama holds the line”

<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/government-shutdown-president-obama-holds-the-line-97646.html?hp=f3>)

President Barack Obama started September in an agonizing, extended display of how little sway he had in Congress. He ended the month with a display of resolve and strength that could redefine his presidency.¶ All it took was a government shutdown.¶ This was less a White House strategy than simply staying in the corner the House GOP had painted them into — to the White House’s surprise, Obama was forced to do what he so rarely has as president: he said no, and he didn’t stop saying no.¶ For two weeks ahead of Monday night’s deadline, Obama and aides rebuffed the efforts to kill Obamacare with the kind of firm, narrow sales pitch they struggled with in three years of trying to convince people the law should exist in the first place. There was no litany of doomsday scenarios that didn’t quite come true, like in the run-up to the fiscal cliff and the sequester. No leaked plans or musings in front of the cameras about Democratic priorities he might sacrifice to score a deal.¶ After five years of what’s often seen as Obama’s desperation to negotiate — to the fury of his liberal base and the frustration of party leaders who argue that he negotiates against himself. Even his signature health care law came with significant compromises in Congress.¶ Instead, over and over and over again, Obama delivered the simple line: Republicans want to repeal a law that was passed and upheld by the Supreme Court — to give people health insurance — or they’ll do something that everyone outside the GOP caucus meetings, including Wall Street bankers, seems to agree would be a ridiculous risk.¶ “If we lock these Americans out of affordable health care for one more year,” Obama said Monday afternoon as he listed examples of people who would enjoy better treatment under Obamacare, “if we sacrifice the health care of millions of Americans — then they’ll fund the government for a couple more months. Does anybody truly believe that we won’t have this fight again in a couple more months? Even at Christmas?”¶ The president and his advisers weren’t expecting this level of Republican melee, a White House official said. Only during Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 21-hour floor speech last week did the realization roll through the West Wing that they wouldn’t be negotiating because they couldn’t figure out anymore whom to negotiate with. And even then, they didn’t believe the shutdown was really going to happen until Saturday night, when the House voted again to strip Obamacare funding.¶ This wasn’t a credible position, Obama said again Monday afternoon, but rather, bowing to “extraneous and controversial demands” which are “all to save face after making some impossible promises to the extreme right wing of their political party.”¶ Obama and aides have said repeatedly that they’re not thinking about the shutdown in terms of political gain, but the situation’s is taking shape for them. Congress’s approval on dealing with the shutdown was at 10 percent even before the shutters started coming down on Monday according to a new CNN/ORC poll, with 69 percent of people saying the House Republicans are acting like “spoiled children.”¶ “The Republicans are making themselves so radioactive that the president and Democrats can win this debate in the court of public opinion” by waiting them out, said Jim Manley, a Democratic strategist and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who has previously been critical of Obama’s tactics.¶ Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said the Obama White House learned from the 2011 debt ceiling standoff, when it demoralized fellow Democrats, deflated Obama’s approval ratings and got nothing substantive from the negotiations.¶ “They didn’t gain anything from that approach,” Greenberg said. “I think that there’s a lot they learned from what happened the last time they ran up against the debt ceiling.”¶ While the Republicans have been at war with each other, the White House has proceeded calmly — a breakthrough phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Friday that showed him getting things done (with the conveniently implied juxtaposition that Tehran is easier to negotiate with than the GOP conference), his regular golf game Saturday and a cordial meeting Monday with his old sparring partner Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney said Monday that the shutdown wasn’t really affecting much of anything.¶ “It’s busy, but it’s always busy here,” Carney said. “It’s busy for most of you covering this White House, any White House. We’re very much focused on making sure that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act continues.”¶ Obama called all four congressional leaders Monday evening — including Boehner, whose staff spent Friday needling reporters to point out that the president hadn’t called for a week. According to both the White House and Boehner’s office, the call was an exchange of well-worn talking points, and changed nothing.¶ Manley advised Obama to make sure people continue to see Boehner and the House Republicans as the problem and not rush into any more negotiations until public outrage forces them to bend.¶ “He may want to do a little outreach, but not until the House drives the country over the cliff,” Manley said Monday, before the shutdown. “Once the House has driven the country over the cliff and failed to fund the government, then it might be time to make a move.”¶ The White House believes Obama will take less than half the blame for a shutdown – with the rest heaped on congressional Republicans.¶ The divide is clear in a Gallup poll also out Monday: over 70 percent of self-identifying Republicans and Democrats each say their guys are the ones acting responsibly, while just 9 percent for both say the other side is.¶ If Obama is able to turn public opinion against Republicans, the GOP won’t be able to turn the blame back on Obama, Greenberg said. “Things only get worse once things begin to move in a particular direction,” he said. “They don’t suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.”

#### **Plan costs PC**

Kriner 10 Douglas L. Kriner (assistant professor of political science at Boston University) “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69.

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61 When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### That’s key to the debt ceiling

**Lillis, 9/7/13** (Mike, The Hill, “Fears of wounding Obama weigh heavily on Democrats ahead of vote”

Read more: http://thehill.com/homenews/house/320829-fears-of-wounding-obama-weigh-heavily-on-democrats#ixzz2gWiT9H8u

The prospect of wounding President Obama is weighing heavily on Democratic lawmakers as they decide their votes on Syria.¶ Obama needs all the political capital he can muster heading into bruising battles with the GOP over fiscal spending and the debt ceiling.¶ Democrats want Obama to use his popularity to reverse automatic spending cuts already in effect and pay for new economic stimulus measures through higher taxes on the wealthy and on multinational companies.¶ But if the request for authorization for Syria military strikes is rebuffed, some fear it could limit Obama's power in those high-stakes fights. ¶ That has left Democrats with an agonizing decision: vote "no" on Syria and possibly encourage more chemical attacks while weakening their president, or vote "yes" and risk another war in the Middle East.¶ “I’m sure a lot of people are focused on the political ramifications,” a House Democratic aide said.¶ Rep. Jim Moran (D-Va.), a veteran appropriator, said the failure of the Syria resolution would diminish Obama's leverage in the fiscal battles.¶ "It doesn't help him," Moran said Friday by phone. "We need a maximally strong president to get us through this fiscal thicket. These are going to be very difficult votes."

#### Kills the global economy

**Davidson, 9/10/13** – co-founder of NPR’s Planet Money (Adam, “Our Debt to Society” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all>)

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.¶ Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.¶ Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

#### Nuclear war

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8**

[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

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#### the aff allows the government to deploy victimhood of 9/11 to wage wars and erases agency

**Faulkner, ‘8** professor at the University of New South Wales (Joanne Faulkner, Spring/Autumn 2008, “The Innocence of Victimhood Versus the “Innocence of Becoming”: Nietzsche, 9/11, and the “Falling Man,”” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Iss. 35/36)//CC

It would seem that there is very little about the events of the September 11, 2001, that has not already been said or imagined. Our understanding of these events, and especially the attacks on the Twin Towers, has been overdetermined by the seemingly endless repetition of (by now) iconic images: of planes perforating the clear, tranquil surface of those seemingly impenetrable buildings and thus opening a rupture in the Western consciousness, the reparation of which is not yet in sight. Other images also populate the post-9/11 memory: images of disbelief, of grief, and of bravery—especially with respect to the members of the New York Fire Department, who rose to the occasion of providing a sense of American resilience and fortitude, thus representing a possible future after the catastrophe. These images played a major role in enabling certain mainstream media groups in the United States to reconstruct a narrative concerning their particular place in the world and with respect to each other: a narrative about national character and identity, hope, fear, and desire. The images drawn on to illustrate this narrative were therefore of critical importance; what was needed was a strong and coherent picture of innocence: the innocence of those killed in the attacks, to be sure, but also of the American people more generally—who, after a brief period of tending to their wounds, would need to collect themselves and return to the everyday commerce of existence, secure in the belief that evil is radically external to their “way of life” and that their government will ultimately protect them.1 Such a narrative, however, also served to exclude images that could not support the specific requirements of its coherence: equivocal images that jar against our [End Page 67] sense of propriety, certainly now after the effects of repetition have etched within us a certain understanding of the experience of 9/11. But also, interestingly, just after the attacks and before the grooves of this understanding had been consolidated, spontaneous and diffuse acts of censorship regulated the kinds of experiences, fears, and decisions that the victims of the attacks could enact. This article addresses one such image, which proved to be disruptive of the limits of identity asserted immediately following 9/11: Richard Drew’s “Falling Man,” depicting an unknown victim of the attacks in midflight from the North Tower of the World Trade Center. This image complicates the very culturally specific notion of innocence that was invoked during the reconstruction of national identity following the terrorist attacks against America. In particular, it will be argued that the “falling man” compromised the vision of an innocence that solicits protection precisely because it is outside the sphere of action. The image represents a decision—a wild and hopeless decision but a decision nonetheless—that, from the perspective of a claim to innocence, conceived as passive and guiltless, is difficult to comprehend or acknowledge as a “proper” comportment of an innocent. The falling man reveals and embodies a traumatic horror, difficult to encounter: the horror of choosing the means of one’s own particular death in the face of a less certain but more protracted demise at the hands of another. This article argues for a reconsideration of “innocence” that might emphasize agency and creativity above morality and victimhood and in so doing hopes to promote an understanding of those who found themselves preferring to jump than to burn on that fateful morning. Conceptual development along these lines will also affect the concept of agency in accordance with Nietzsche’s critique of morality and metaphysics. The broader project to which this essay contributes is concerned with the manner in which the application of innocence to a group can serve to erode their political agency: governments thus soothe our civic conscience while also establishing a mandate of protection in relation to their citizens. The events of 9/11 precipitated a shift from innocence to victimhood and, finally, to a loss of civil liberties for populations across the “West,” not only in the United States. It is therefore imperative to disrupt this equation of innocence with helplessness and to restore agency to the victims of terrorism and citizens alike. In response to antidemocratic policies enacted by governments after 9/11, much political theory has orbited about the constellation of Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt, with Nietzsche lurking in the background as a conceptual precursor to Schmitt’s friend/enemy motif (Z:1 “Of the Friend”).2 We have therefore latterly seen an emphasis placed on the sovereign decision of the executive, the state of exception, and this in turn enlarges the sense that citizens of democracies are politically disempowered. In this context, the falling man is emblematic of the manner in which we might rework the concept of agency [End Page 68] to empower victims and those whose range of choices is limited. This kind of move is necessary, I contend, if the sense of hopelessness and futility that increasingly accompanies political subjectivity in Western democracies might be alleviated and a space for civil creativity might be opened. The essay will proceed by providing an account of the juridical or moral (Judeo-Christian) understanding of innocence and interrogating its conceptual relation to agency and belongingness to the political community. An alternative account of innocence—drawn from an interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the “innocence of becoming”—is then considered, through which the memory of the falling man might perhaps be redeemed. The article’s primary question thus concerns how this latter account might assist us in a revaluation of the falling man as innocent and of the “innocent” as capable of moral decision making and political participation.

#### the only way to achieve meaningful existence is to accept that violence and chaos are inevitable.

**Scott—90** (Charles E., professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University, “The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger,” Ed. John Sallis, p. 173-174)

One pathogenic aspect of our Western ethos that we have followed is the ascetic ideal. It is characterized by many types of refusal and denial regarding the manner in which human life occurs, and on Nietzsche's account the ascetic ideal reinforces this denial with a habitual insistence on the continuous presence of meaning in all dimensions of life and being. In our ascetic withdrawal from life we join forces with hopelessness, suffering, death, and helplessness by giving them meaning, in our appropriation of them, that far exceeds their occurrence and that subordinates them within a scheme of meaning and hope. The rule governing the ascetic ideal is found in its incorporation and blind expression of the hopelessness and meaninglessness that it is designed to overcome. This incorporation of what it is constitutes the ideal's nihilism for Nietzsche: the affirmations within the ascetic ideal project their opposites and produce a spiral of unwitting and inevitable violence in the spirituality that they create. The denial of life within the boundaries of the ascetic ideal continuously reestablishes the power of the ideal. But when this movement is broken by a self-overcoming like that in Nietzsche's genealogy of the ascetic ideal, the rule of the ascetic ideal is interrupted and a possibility is opened for life-affirmations that do not suppress the most fearful occurrences involved in being alive. The joyousness of life without the illusion of continuous meaning, the joyousness that Nietzsche found in early Greek culture, was lost, according to his reading, in the course of the increasing cultural dominance of those whose nerve has failed before the disheartening flow of life. The ascetic ideal expresses this failure in its insistence on meaning and in its persistent manufacture of hope out of illusions bred of the failure. Heidegger is perhaps at his most non-Nietzschean point when in his Rector's address he turns to the Greek division between the everyday and the question of being. This is an ironic moment in Heidegger's thought: he traces the origins of his own move to separate the future of the German university from the German Volkstum, (that is, from dominant popular culture) to the emergence of the separation of thought from everyday life in Greek culture. But this move is not associated with the joyousness that Nietzsche uses as his reference in delimiting the ascetic ideal. According to Nietzsche's genealogy we have lost an earthly affirmation of life in the midst of the specific suffering of everyday existence. Nietzsche countenances fully the brutality, the fateful shattering of hope, the disappointments that break people's lives, the individual and social tragedies. The debilitation of minds and bodies is juxtaposed to people's savoring food and drink, enjoying sexual pleasure. It is juxtaposed to friendship, the energy of ambition, the struggle between competitors, the mixture of desperation and exhilaration in efforts of accomplishment. Nietzsche's move is toward affirmation in the midst of chaotic living when he speaks of what is lost in the blind and self-deceived chaos of asceticism that is ordered by the illusion of continuous meaning. In this affirmation one has an awareness, presumably a full awareness, of the otherness to human interest that radically distresses us. People's attention is delimited by it. Rather than escape or turn away from it, people are delimited by it in their relations with things. Rather than appropriate the suffering of life in ascetic self-denial, human beings stand over against its otherness, its unthinkableness, its density. They need not attempt to embody it in forms that seem to shape it to human and thinkable dimensions. They live in the inappropriable, meaningless dark vacuity, with it and other to it, out of it and in it. They are angel and animal, Nietzsche said. Not to be lost, not to be redeemed, not to be overcome, it is juxtaposed to a will to live, an affirmation with, and not in spite of, the chaos.

#### choose death in the face of inevitability – your ballot allows you to reclaim agency

**Faulkner, ‘8** professor at the University of New South Wales (Joanne Faulkner, Spring/Autumn 2008, “The Innocence of Victimhood Versus the “Innocence of Becoming”: Nietzsche, 9/11, and the “Falling Man,”” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Iss. 35/36)//CC

Most significantly, for the purposes of this essay, we can perhaps see now how for Nietzsche agency is compatible with innocence. Indeed, innocence—regarded as what is unsullied by moral thinking—is integral to the skillful exercise of agency. Understood in these terms, innocence is neither a precious ideal to be protected from the forces of chance nor a moralistic instrument for the meting of punishment to those who threaten society. Rather, innocence is conceived as a style of existence that becomes active by claiming to itself what chance throws up before it. Innocence would here suggest a resistance to passivity and victimhood and a choice to take part in the inevitability of the moment—even if this agency ultimately extinguishes the subject through which it is performed. Perhaps at this point, then, we might attempt a return to the acts of the 9/11 jumpers, who in the light of the above can be understood as agents of their own demise but in a manner that nonetheless does not compromise their innocence.

The visions of falling bodies from the Twin Towers do not sit well with orthodox imagery surrounding 9/11 because they invoke an uncomfortable ambiguity with respect to their victim status. In their final moments of animation and on the precipice of death, these bodies occupy a middle space between life and death that renders us uncomfortable in our own mortality. But they also mark a cleavage between innocence and guilt: their decision to seize the opportunity to escape confinement within their smoky “tombs” signals a confusing complicity with the terrorists who had perpetrated the attacks. In the terms that Nietzsche (and Spinoza) set out above, the jumpers took an active part in the causes that led to their deaths—causes that originate in a terrorist plot against America. And in the eyes of some, this exposed them as irresolute, and even disloyal, in the face of what later emerged to be a monumental national threat.

In theological terms also—and keeping in mind the religious frame through which many in the United States view global politics—Drew’s photograph, especially, resonates with a near-godly defiance of death: the subject’s fall can be read as the taking of a liberty against God, who claims a privilege with respect to determining who lives or dies. The image may thus evoke to the viewing public humanity’s primal scene and the original sin that it demonstrates: the [End Page 80] taking of the fruit of knowledge that marks a new beginning for humanity. Even the photograph’s title would seem to suggest a proximity to the guilt through which humanity is engendered, by means of its irreparable separation from innocence. Likewise, its subject is separated from the other victims of the attacks who (more appropriately) awaited divine sanction on their lives and have thus continued to be redeemed (drawn back into the community’s fold) by means of the various ceremonies and purification rites since performed at Ground Zero. The resigned posture of the subject of “The Falling Man” surely gives the viewer pause: it looks like a suicide attempt, and the suicide cannot be connected to a redemptive innocence. Yet, according to Nietzsche’s refiguring of agency, the decision to die can be reconciled with innocence: and moreover, innocence comes to be the very condition of an agency—as opposed to (fictitious) free will—an agency that, rather, refuses the moralizing economy of guilt and punishment.

The decision to jump hundreds of meters to one’s death from a burning building might seem a limited, and somewhat undesirable, instance of agency. Clearly, it is a choice these people would not have made on any other morning and in any other circumstance. In the light of Nietzsche’s account of agency as conditioned by context and circumstance, however, it is possible to count the jumpers among the innocents lost to 9/11—and to do so in full recognition of their specific choice to take their lives into their own hands. In the context of Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming, we may understand innocence as a suspension of moral judgment rather than as prior to (and separate from) social existence. Nietzschean innocence emerges from within existence and gives rise to an agency that responds to the chance necessities life occasions. Likewise, the innocence of becoming is not grounded in opposition to guilt but, rather, undercuts the understanding of social relations in terms of guilt and debt. For this reason, Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming furnishes the jumpers’ decision with a sense that would be otherwise unavailable, at least within the narrow parameters according to which moral action and worth are conventionally adjudged.

In the absence of an acknowledgment of the jumpers’ choice (and of the possibility of making a decision to die in one’s own way, where the choice to live is unavailable), we will continue to misunderstand their relationship to these events and thus to limit their political agency. In the context of the 9/11 attacks, the innocent—understood through the vista of Judeo-Christian moral tradition—has become an eternally aggrieved icon of national identity: a perennially threatened and victimized creature of ressentiment who “in order to exist first needs a hostile external world” (GM I:10).32 Although it is important to acknowledge the suffering of those affected, and this may indeed include the nation as a whole, what Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming reveals is that the relationship to one’s suffering is far from straightforward. If we subscribe too readily to the status of innocent-to-be-protected—thus recoiling from suffering and requiring that the [End Page 81] debts of enemies be paid in full—then we also deny the possibility of freedom opened by the affirmation of becoming. And such a predicament is all too well reflected in the erosion of civil liberties that is ongoing since the end of 2001 in the United States and elsewhere.

But were we to allow ourselves to imagine being trapped within those buildings and to contemplate the possibility that one might still make a choice, perhaps identification with the falling man might open the citizen to a new kind of agency in relation to government and nationhood. Remembering that the imagination furnishes us with knowledge of our situation—by means of the traces of interactions impressed upon memory—then we are able to develop a capacity for agency by using our imaginations to understand the decisions of those who have lived through what we have not. Through the rubric offered by the jumper’s predicament, we might then imagine a mode of resistance against attack, wherein strength is reappropriated from the enemy—even in death. Our reinterpretation of the falling man as innocent thus allows for a conception of freedom with respect to the chance events that constrain action. But moreover, it also allows us to develop a resistance to governments’ attempts to render us passive subjects by means of the moral mantle of innocence by which we are both idealized and contained. Such a modest and situated exercise of agency would involve attentiveness to the diffuse and unexpected opportunities that arise in one’s locality, to actively participate in the causes of change. For instance, one could organize a demonstration, write letters to political representatives and newspapers, meet with others who share one’s values, walk to work, or recycle.

Each of these activities, however humble or ambitious, contributes to the determination of life and prevents one being the mere passive object of external causes—disempowered and separated from agency. Such attunement to one’s situation, however, requires above all engaging one’s imagination: the site of ethical understanding—of what empowers the body and what the body should avoid. In this vein, we might reimagine the falling man as a figure of the active resistance that Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming teaches. And we can understand his final act of agency as such, without casting him out of the sanctum of human virtue. With respect to this reinterpretation of innocence, as a sensitivity to the specific opportunities that life grants, I will leave the last word to one who, mourning the loss of his wife, finds it within himself to understand her final decision: “Whether she jumped, I don’t know. I hoped that she had succumbed to the smoke but it doesn’t seem likely. In some ways it might just be the last element of control, that everything around you is happening and you can’t stop it, but this is something you can do. To be out of the smoke and the heat, to be out in the air … it must have felt like flying.”33 [End Page 82]

### 1nc

The President of the United States should issue a presidential directive announcing that the United States will not introduce nuclear weapons forces first into hostilities.

#### Solves the case

Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring 11-30-2012; Rebeccah Heinrichs is a Visiting Fellow and Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. “Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the 21st Century”

<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/11/deterrence-and-nuclear-targeting-in-the-21st-century>

Principles for Contemporary Targeting Policy Nuclear targeting policy is ultimately established through presidential guidance, which typically takes the form of a directive. Meeting the demands of this guidance, more than anything else, determines the overall size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force. According to a recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the current guidance was issued in 2002, although new presidential guidance may be issued as soon as later this year.[24 ] Following the application of more detailed guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Command produces the Nuclear Forces Employment Plan. Given the overall structure of this process, presidential guidance has the potential to do enormous damage to U.S. national security if it is conceptually flawed.

### 1nc

#### Deterrence credibility high

Donna Miles citing CR Kehler, 4-5-2013; head of US Strategic Command, “Nuclear Deterrence Remains Key Stratcom Mission, Commander Says” http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119703

American Forces Press Service

Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent -- and the ability to operate its nuclear capabilities effectively if directed by the president -- was a foundation of U.S. national security throughout the Cold War, said Air Force Gen. C. Robert Kehler, the Stratcom commander. Yet Stratcom’s **nuclear deterrence mission remains as critical as at any time in U.S. history**, Kehler said, injected with a **renewed focus and sense of urgency by the president’s 2010 Nuclear Posture** **Review** and the new national defense strategy. So even as the United States began withdrawing numerous weapons abroad, deactivated entire classes of weapons and reduced its nuclear stockpile by 75 percent since the height of the Cold War, **it has ensured that it maintains sufficient deterrent capability.** “As long as nuclear weapons exist, U.S. Strategic Command’s top priority must be to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure and effective strategic nuclear deterrent force,” Kehler told the House and Senate armed services committees earlier this month. Kehler’s job is to look across the entire nuclear enterprise to ensure it remains operationally viable, and to verify the safety and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. That includes the triad of ballistic missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable heavy bombers and associated aerial tankers, and the assured warning and command-and-control system that interconnects them. “I can assure you that today’s nuclear weapons and triad of delivery platforms are safe, secure and effective,” Kehler reported in testimony to the congressional panels.

#### Inflexibility kills deterrence and causes allied prolif

Keith B. Payne 2011; Keith B. Payne, PhD, is president of the National Institute for Public Policy and professor and head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (Washington campus). He served as a deputy assistant secretary of defense and as a member of the congressional commission on US strategic posture. “Maintaining Flexible and Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence” STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY ♦ SUMMER 2011 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:r-RNK7I75UsJ:www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/summer/payne.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

Will adequate flexibility and resilience ensure deterrence? Of course not; nothing can do that. But it should reduce the risk that deterrence will fail be- cause we do not have the threat options suitable for the occasion. Correspond- ingly, it can help to assure allies who rely on the US nuclear umbrella and may otherwise fear that the degradation of US deterrent capabilities endangers their own security. These fears could lead some allies and friends to reconsider their own need for nuclear weapons and thereby promote nuclear prolifera- tion. We already see this dynamic in play among some allies.49 It is useful to close with the observation that our preferred force numbers and types should follow the demands of strategy, not the reverse. This is no less true when that strategy is deterrence. Credible deterrence is a pre- cious product that defies easy or precise prediction. But, we do know that in the past, nuclear deterrence contributed to preventing conflict or esca- lation, and it may be necessary to do so again when we face severe risks. Consequently, the maintenance of credible nuclear deterrence should continue to be a national priority.

#### That causes extinction

Douglas J. Feith and Abram N. Shulsky8-3-2009; senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former undersecretary of defense for policy, and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former Defense Department official who dealt with arms control issues , WSJ, “Why Revive the Cold War? Russia and the U.S. were reducing their nuclear arsenals without ‘arms control’” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204313604574328430978849134.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj

There is an important connection between proliferation risks and modernization. But the Obama administration seems to have it backwards. If the U.S. fails to ensure the continuing safety and reliability of its arsenal, it could cause the **collapse of the U.S. nuclear umbrella**. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and others might decide that their security requires them to **acquire their own** nuclear arsenals, rather than rely indefinitely on the U.S. **The world could reach a tipping point, with cascading nuclear proliferation,** as the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission warned in its May 2009 report. The Obama administration’s nuclear weapons policies—including its treaty talks with Russia—affect the way America’s friends and potential adversaries view the integrity of the U.S. deterrent**.** The wrong policies can endanger the U.S. directly. They can also cause other states to **lose confidence in the American nuclear umbrella** **and to seek security in national nuclear capabilities.** If that happens, **the dangers of a nuclear war** somewhere in the worldwould go up substantially. It would not be the first time a U.S. government helped bring about the opposite of its intended result—but **it might be one of the costliest mistakes ever.**

#### Credibility collapse causes great power war

John P. Caves 2010; “Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent” Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University No. 252, January 2010 Strategic Forum <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=112063>

Perceptions of a compromised U.S. nuclear deterrent as described above would have profound policy implications, particu- larly if they emerge at a time when a nuclear- armed great power is pursuing a more aggressive strategy toward U.S. allies and partners in its region in a bid to enhance its regional and global clout. ■ A dangerous period of vulnerability would open for the United States and those nations that depend on U.S. protection while the United States attempted to rectify the problems with its nuclear forces. As it would take more than a decade for the United States to produce new nuclear weapons, ensuing events could preclude a return to anything like the status quo ante. ■ The assertive, nuclear-armed great power, and other major adversaries, could be willing to challenge U.S. interests more directly in the expectation that the United States would be less prepared to threaten or deliver a military response that could lead to direct conflict. They will want to keep the United States from reclaiming its earlier power position. ■ Allies and partners who have relied upon explicit or implicit assurances of U.S. nuclear protection as a foundation of their security could lose faith in those assur- ances. They could compensate by accom- modating U.S. rivals, especially in the short term, or acquiring their own nuclear deter- rents, which in most cases could be accom- plished only over the mid- to long term. A more nuclear world would likely ensue over a period of years. ■ Important U.S. interests could be com- promised or abandoned, **or a major war could occur as adversaries** and/or the United States **miscalculate new boundaries** of deterrence and provocation. At worst, war could lead to state-on-state employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on a scale far more **catastrophic** than what nuclear-armed terror- ists alone could inflict.

#### Primacy kt conflict containment – otherwise adversaries use it first

Lieber and Press 10 – Keir A. Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Political Science at Dartmouth College, March/April 2010, “Second Strike: Is the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Outmoded?,” Foreign Affairs

Nuclear weapons are a boon for vulnerable states. During the Cold War, the United States deployed them in Europe to defend NATO because Soviet conventional forces seemed overwhelming. Now, the tables are turned: the United States' potential adversaries see nuclear weapons as a vital tool to counter U.S. conventional military superiority. Facing defeat on the battlefield, adversaries would have powerful incentives to use nuclear forces coercively, just as NATO planned to do during the Cold War. The fates of Manuel Noriega, Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Saddam Hussein have taught a grim lesson: use every weapon at your disposal to prevent defeat. When Jan Lodal and James Acton call for the elimination or devaluation of nuclear weapons, they assume that U.S. adversaries can be convinced to accept perpetual vulnerability. The Soviet Union could not talk NATO into surrendering its nuclear arsenal during the Cold War, nor can the United States dupe its adversaries into disarming today. The challenge is to grapple with the problem of deterring nuclear escalation during conventional wars, when U.S. adversaries will have every incentive to use their nuclear arsenals to compel a cease-fire. Toward this end, Washington must retain a range of counterforce capabilities, including conventional and low-casualty nuclear weapons. Hans Kristensen, Matthew McKinzie, and Ivan Oelrich raise several technical objections concerning the United States' ability to launch a successful counterforce strike. They dispute whether 3,000 pounds per square inch (PSI) of overpressure produced by low-yield airbursts would be enough to wreck Chinese silos. The use of 3,000 PSI in our model, however, is conservative. Many analysts believe that U.S. Cold War estimates exaggerated the hardness of enemy silos, and analysts with considerable technical expertise on this matter believe that our estimated requirement of 3,000 PSI probably overstates the hardness of China's silos. Most important, our results are not sensitive to moderate changes in assumptions about silo hardness. The United States could conduct a low-casualty nuclear strike--producing fewer than 1,000 fatalities--against all 20 Chinese silos even if they were built to withstand 5,000 PSI. Kristensen, McKinzie, and Oelrich also contend that airbursts alone cannot destroy missile silos. This is incorrect. Airbursts can produce sufficient overpressure to crush the caps that protect missiles in the ground. In fact, the Pentagon assigns "vulnerability numbers" to silos on the basis of their resistance to overpressure. And McKinzie co-authored a 2001 Natural Resources Defense Council report that contradicts the claims that he, Kristensen, and Oelrich make here. The report listed the overpressures required to destroy various Russian missile silos, and it argued that even Russia's silos--which are probably much more robust than China's--are highly vulnerable to a U.S. airburst attack. Our critics further suggest that the existence of mobile missiles obviates our analysis. If the launchers can be located, the argument goes, conventional weapons are sufficient to destroy them; if the launchers cannot be found, even nuclear weapons are useless. But the greatest challenge of targeting mobile missiles is not locating them momentarily; it is continuously tracking them and identifying where they have stopped. Hitting mobile launchers with conventional weapons requires near-perfect real-time intelligence--locating them within a few dozen yards. Even low-yield nuclear warheads would significantly reduce the targeting problem; locating the launchers within about half a mile would suffice if a five-kiloton warhead were used. Kristensen, McKinzie, and Oelrich also note that the U.S. military's current delivery systems are not optimized for a counterforce mission: the most accurate systems (bombs and cruise missiles) are not prompt, and the most prompt systems (ballistic missiles) are not the most accurate. This is true. But current U.S. delivery systems are adequate given the weakness of the adversaries the United States now faces. If Washington wishes to retain effective low-casualty counterforce options, the next generation of nuclear delivery systems should further combine prompt delivery with high accuracy. Lodal tries to link our discussion of counterforce options with the views held by senior officials in the George W. Bush administration. The fact of the matter is that nuclear counterforce options have been a core element of U.S. deterrence doctrine during every administration since Harry Truman's. U.S. strategic planners have understood that for deterrence to be credible, the president needs retaliatory options that he might actually use. Especially today, low-yield nuclear counterforce strikes are a better retaliatory option than high-yield nuclear strikes that, regardless of their target, would kill millions of civilians. The latter would be a disproportionate response to many possible enemy uses of nuclear weapons. Critics of our policy prescriptions must confront two core issues. First, nuclear weapons have fundamentally changed since the Cold War. They once produced stalemate, and nuclear war once meant mass slaughter. For good or ill, that has changed. The revolution in accuracy means that enemy arsenals can be destroyed, and in ways that produce few civilian casualties. Theories of deterrence and beliefs about strategic stability and nuclear force requirements must be reevaluated accordingly.

#### Challengers inevitable – nukes kt stay ahead of China

Matthew Kroenig September 2013; associate professor and international relations field chair in Georgetown University's Department of Government “Think Again: American Nuclear Disarmament” Foreign Policy http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/03/think\_again\_american\_nuclear\_disarmament

But times are changing. Economists predict that China could overtake the United States as the world's largest economy in the coming years, and international relations theory tells us that transitions between reigning hegemons and rising challengers often produce conflict. Already, China has become more assertive in pursuing revisionist claims in East Asia, confronting America's allies, and building military capabilities -- including anti-ship ballistic missiles and submarines -- **tailored for a fight with the United States**. In September 2012, a dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands nearly caused a war that could have easily drawn in the United States. Beijing's contested claims to natural resources in the South China Sea and ever-present tensions with Taiwan could also lead to Sino-U.S. conflict. Even relations with Russia, America's partner in arms control, are becoming more competitive: The civil war in Syria bears every hallmark of a Cold War-style proxy battle. In short, great-power political competition is heating up once again, and as it does, **nuclear weapons will once again take center stage.** The writing is already on the wall. Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are modernizing or expanding their nuclear arsenals, and Iran is vigorously pursuing its own nuclear capability. As Yale University political scientist Paul Bracken notes, we are entering a "second nuclear age" in which "the whole complexion of global power politics is changing **because of the reemergence of nuclear weapons** as a vital element of statecraft and power politics." Nostalgia for simpler times can be seductive, but the United States needs a nuclear force that can protect it from the challenges that lie ahead.

#### Primacy prevents war over Taiwan and checks escalation

Lieber and Press 7 - Keir A. Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, Winter 2007, “U.S. Nuclear Primacy and the Future of the Chinese Deterrent,” China Security, Issue No. 5, online: http://www.wsichina.org/cs5\_5.pdf

Ironically, one of the clearest explanations for how the United States may use nuclear primacy in a crisis or war with China appears in an earlier article by Blair. His recent article with Chen labels our suggestion that the United States might use nuclear threats “the zenith of provocation” and “unthinkable.”23 However, in the autumn 2005 issue of China Security, Blair describes exactly the crisis dynamics we envision leading to U.S. nuclear threats and perhaps even a preemptive nuclear attack. He notes that if China were to alert its strategic nuclear forces during a war with the United States over Taiwan, “the United States would likely act to beat China to the punch.” He continues, “Given constant U.S. surveillance of Chinese nuclear launch sites, any major Chinese preparations to fire peremptorily would be detected and countered by a rapid U.S. preemptive strike against the sites by U.S. conventional or nuclear forces… The United States could easily detect and react inside of the lengthy launch cycle time of Chinese forces.”24 Blair’s words mirror our argument and suggest the two ways that nuclear primacy may benefit the United States. First, if the Chinese were to threaten nuclear escalation in the context of a Taiwan war, the U.S. could strike first and likely destroy the Chinese force on the ground – “beat China to the punch,” as Blair puts it. Second, China’s knowledge of its vulnerability to nuclear preemption might prevent China from alerting its nuclear force – or even attacking Taiwan – in the first place.

#### Taiwan war inevitable – squo means China rolls back NFU and strikes

Zhang 8 - Baohui Zhang, Associate Professor of Political Science, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, March 2008, “The Taiwan Strait and the Future of China's No-First-Use Nuclear Policy,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 164-182

For the above reasons the no-first-use principle remained unchallenged until the 1990s, when a series of new issues began to force some in China to rethink its nuclear principles. These include the ascendance of the Taiwan issue as the central security challenge for China (and, as a result, the increased likelihood of American military intervention in the Taiwan Strait), and the revolution in military affairs (RMA) that has given the United States vast conventional advantage over China. According to John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, during the 1990s Taiwan's tendency to move toward de jure independence led to an increasingly pessimistic view inside China that the Taiwan issue could not be peacefully resolved. More and more Chinese analysts believed that, due to the internal political dynamics of a democratic Taiwan and the rise of Taiwanese identity among its people, peaceful reunification between Taiwan and the mainland has become increasingly hopeless.13 In fact, Jiang Zemin made the famous remark that “a war across the Taiwan Strait is unavoidable.”14 As a result, Taiwan has become the number-one security issue for China, and preparing for a war to prevent Taiwan's independence has become an obsession of the Chinese leadership and military. The problem for China is that it also increasingly believes that American military intervention can be expected in the event of war in the Taiwan Strait. Inside the Chinese military, due to “America's proclaimed geostrategic interests and recent military actions the prevailing opinion was that U.S. forces would undoubtedly intervene.”15 This scenario presents an extremely daunting challenge: how to defeat the world's most powerful military. This task is particularly daunting since the Chinese military recognizes that the revolution in military affairs has given the United States vast advantages over China. According to military observers, the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 NATO war against Serbia demonstrated the revolutionary change in warfare through the use of precision-guided weapons linked to information technologies in areas such as intelligence, command and control, and weapon guidance. The Chinese military was keenly aware of the new trend and organized systematic studies of how the American military conducted its operations in this new kind of war.16 In fact, the Chinese military was awed by the American dominance in conventional warfare. As observed by General Wang Baocun, a prominent strategist at the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, the U.S. revolution in military affairs has resulted in a new kind of gap with other countries. Previously, the gap was merely generational. This time, there is a “time gap” in that the U.S. military and others are fighting as if they were from different historical periods. According to Wang, “The time gap in military technologies allows the superior side to possess an absolute advantage while leaving the other side in a position of absolute disadvantage. … The time gap makes it impossible for developing countries to overcome their military disadvantage in confrontations with the United States.” Wang thus reaches a gloomy conclusion: “The military time gap results in serious threats to the national and military security of developing countries. In fact, they are almost in a defenseless situation.”17 Major General Xu Hezhen, who is the Commandant of PLA Army Command Academy in Shijiazhuang, suggests that the RMA allows the U.S. to conduct “no-contact combat” against other militaries through beyond visual range sensor technologies and precision-strike weapons. This revolution in combat “creates a battlefield situation where 'I can see you and hit you but you can't see me and hit back. The situation leaves the weaker side in a position of perpetual disadvantage until it loses the will of resistance.”18 The RMA thus presents a serious problem for China's military planners: how to defeat a technologically far superior enemy such as the United States. In fact, China is no longer confident it can defeat such an enemy due to the vast gap with the United States in conventional military technologies. As Lewis and Xue observe, “As senior PLA planners dissected the American strategy from the Gulf War of 1991 to the lightening war against Iraq in 2003, it was to become painfully evident that no war with the United States could be won or even brought to a reasonable draw.”19 This bleak assessment by Chinese officers of the U.S. conventional dominance in the Taiwan Strait is echoed by American analysis. In a research project for the U.S. Department of Defense, the Rand Corporation analyzed how China may choose to conduct a war against the American military. According to Rand, in the coming decades the U.S. will possess “even greater military advantages over Chinese forces than it currently enjoys.”20 Therefore, if the China intends to fight the U.S. through conventional military modernization, “this option, taken alone, potentially condemns the PLA to evolving relative obsolescence.”21 How to prevent a disastrous defeat in the Taiwan Strait led some in China to question the separation of conventional and nuclear doctrines in Chinese military thinking. While the no-first-use policy can prevent a nuclear attack against China, it cannot deter a large-scale conventional war by a technologically superior enemy. Some believe that the policy can no longer protect China's core national interests, such as preventing de jure independence of Taiwan. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, who was the first Western analyst to notice this trend in the 1990s, some Chinese strategists began to argue that China should develop a nuclear doctrine “suitable for economically and technologically weak states.”22

### heg

**Hegemony fails at resolving conflicts.**

**Maher 11—PhD candidate in Political Science @ Brown**

Richard, Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States Will Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, 11/12/2010 Orbis, ScienceDirect

And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America's growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America's closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil's growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America's vast power is **not translating into** America's preferred **outcomes**. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one's preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one's predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and **anxiety in others**, in one's friends just as much as in one's rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily *American* predominance that produces unease but rather American *predominance*. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country's economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America's own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one's role and purpose is acceptable and one's power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance **cannot last forever**. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America's position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the “post-unipolar” world.

#### No transition wars and heg isn’t key

Fordham 12—professor of political science at Binghamton University (Ben, International Economic Institutions and Great Power Peace, 8/12/12, http://gt2030.com/2012/08/15/international-economic-institutions-and-great-power-peace/)

I enjoyed Jack Levy’s comments on how the world would have looked to people writing in 1912. As part of my current research, I’ve been spending a lot of time thinking about the three decades before World War I. As Levy pointed out, this last period of great power peace has some interesting parallels with the present one. Like today, the international economy had become increasingly integrated. For good reason, some even refer to this period as the “first age of globalization.” The period also saw the emergence of several new great powers, including Japan, Germany, and the United States. Like emerging powers today, each of these states sought to carve out its own world role and to find, as the German Foreign Secretary put it, a “place in the sun.” Like Levy, I don’t think these parallels we are doomed to repeat the catastrophe of 1914. I want to highlight the different institutional rules governing the international economic system today. The dangers discussed in the NIC report are real, but there is reason for hope when it comes to avoiding great power war. The rules of the game governing the “first age of globalization” encouraged great powers to pursue foreign policies that made political and military conflict more likely. Declining transportation costs, not more liberal trade policies, drove economic integration. There was no web of international agreements discouraging states from pursuing protectionist trade policies. As Patrick McDonald‘s recent book, The Invisible Hand of Peace, explains nicely, protectionism went hand-in-hand with aggressive foreign policies. Many of the great powers, including the emerging United States, sought to shut foreign competitors out of their home markets even as they sought to expand their own overseas trade and investment. Even though markets and investment opportunities in less developed areas of the world were small, great power policy makers found these areas attractive because they would not export manufactured products. As one American policy maker put it in 1899, they preferred “trade with people who can send you things you ant and cannot produce, and take from you in return things they want and cannot produce; in other words, a trade largely between different zones, and largely with less advanced peoples….” Great powers scrambled to obtain privileged access to these areas through formal or informal imperial control. This zero-sum competition added a political and military component to economic rivalry. Increasing globalization made this dangerous situation worse, not better, in spite of the fact that it also increased the likely cost of a great power war. In large part because of the international economic institutions constructed after World War II, present day great powers do not face a world in which protectionism and political efforts to secure exclusive market access are the norm. Emerging as well as longstanding powers can now obtain greater benefits from peaceful participation

in the international economic system than they could through the predatory foreign policies that were common in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They do not need a large military force to secure their place in the sun. Economic competition among the great powers continues, but it is not tied to imperialism and military rivalry in the way it was in 1914. These international institutional differences are probably more important for continuing great power peace than is the military dominance of the United States. American military supremacy reduces uncertainty about the cost and outcome of a hegemonic war, making such a war less likely. However, as in the 19th Century, higher growth rates in emerging powers strongly suggest that the current American military edge will not last forever. Efforts to sustain it will be self-defeating if they threaten these emerging powers and set off a spiral of military competition. Similarly, major uses of American military power without the support (or at least the consent) of other great powers also risk leading these states to build up their military capabilities in order to limit American freedom of action. The United States will be better served by policies that enhance the benefits that emerging powers like China receive from upholding the status quo.

#### Relations will stabilize over time—resolution not key

**Bush, 10** [Richard C Bush III, Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, “China-Taiwan: Recent Economic, Political, and Military Developments Across the Strait, and Implications for the United States,” 3/18/10, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2010/0318\_china\_economy\_bush.aspx]

What is the trajectory of the current process? Conceptually, there are at least two possibilities. On the one hand, and more consequential, what we are watching might reflect movement toward the resolution of the fundamental dispute between the two sides. One type of resolution would be unification according to the PRC’s one-county, two-systems formula, but there are others. On the other hand, what we are seeing could be the stabilization of cross-Strait relations. That term implies several things: increasing two-way contact, reducing mutual fear, increasing mutual trust and predictability, expanding areas of cooperation, institutionalizing interaction, and so on. It constitutes a shift from the conflicted coexistence of the 1995-2008 period to a more relaxed coexistence. Examples of this process at work are the array of economic agreements that the two sides have concluded, removing obstacles to closer interchange; China’s approval for Taiwan to attend the 2009 meeting of the World Health Assembly; and the two sides’ tacit agreement that neither will steal the other’s diplomatic partners.¶ In and of itself, stabilization does not lead ineluctably to a resolution of the China-Taiwan dispute—however much Beijing prefers inevitability and however much some in Taiwan fear it. President Ma has been quite explicit that unification will not be discussed during his term of office, whether that is four or eight years. The Chinese leadership at least realizes that the current situation is better than the previous one and understands that resolution will be a long-term process.¶ Certainly, however, stabilization can create a better climate for resolution. It’s easier to address the tough conceptual issues that are at the heart of this dispute in an environment of greater mutual trust. But I don’t see that happening anytime soon. Stabilization can also evolve very incrementally toward resolution, either through better mutual understanding or because one side, knowingly or unknowingly, makes concessions to the other. How stabilization might migrate to resolution brings me to the Commission’s questions.¶ China’s Initiatives¶ Since 2005, and in contrast to past periods, China’s approach to Taiwan has been rather skillful. President Hu Jintao shifted the priority from achieving unification in the near or medium term to opposing Taiwan independence (unification remains the long-term goal). Although he speaks about the need for the two sides to “scrupulously abide by the one-China principle,” he has been prepared, for the sake of achieving substantive progress, to tolerate so far the Ma administration’s quite ambiguous approach to that issue. The Beijing leadership recognizes the importance of building mutual trust through dialogue and exchanges after a decade-plus of mutual fear. It is emphasizing what the two sides have in common—economic cooperation and Chinese culture—and agreed to reduce somewhat the zero-sum competition in the international arena. Through its policies and interactions, it is trying to build up support for a PRC-friendly public on Taiwan. It sees the value of institutionalizing a more stable cross-Strait relationship.¶ The exception to this trend is the continuation of the People’s Liberation Army’s acquisition of capabilities that are relevant to a Taiwan contingency. Why this build-up continues, in spite of the decline in tensions since President Ma took office, is puzzling. After all, Ma’s policies reduce significantly what Beijing regarded as a serious national security problem. China is more secure today than two years ago, yet it continues to make Taiwan more vulnerable. Possible explanations are rigid procurement schedules; the inability of civilian leaders to impose a change even when it makes policy sense; and a decision to fill out its capacity to coerce and intimidate Taiwan, in case a future Taiwan government challenges China’s fundamental interests. The answer is not clear. I am inclined to believe that it is a combination of the second and third reasons.¶ What is clear is that this trend is in no one's interests – Taiwan's, China's or the United States'. Taiwan's leaders are unlikely to negotiate seriously on the issues on Beijing's agenda under a darkening cloud of possible coercion and intimidation. The Taiwanese people will not continue to support pro-engagement leaders if they conclude that this policy has made Taiwan less secure. The U.S. will not benefit if mutual fear again pervades the Taiwan Strait.¶ Where do Current Trends Lead?¶ To be honest, I do not know. I cannot rule out the possibility that gradually and over time the Taiwan public and political leaders will abandon decades of opposition to one-country, two systems and choose to let Taiwan become a special administrative region of the PRC. But I doubt it. Despite the consciousness on the island of China’s growing power and leverage, there is still a broad consensus that the Republic of China (or Taiwan) is a sovereign state, a position that is inconsistent with China’s formula. Moreover, because of the provisions of the ROC constitution, fundamental change of the sort that Beijing wants would require constitutional amendments and therefore a broad and strong political consensus, which does not exist at this time.¶ So if political integration is to occur in the next couple of decades, it will occur not because of the cumulative impact of economic integration but because Beijing has decided to make Taiwan an offer that is better than one-country, two systems. So far, I see no sign it will do so.¶ The more likely future is the continued creation and consolidation of a stabilized order, one in which economic interdependence deepens, social and cultural interaction grows, competition in the international community is muted, and all these arrangements will be institutionalized to one degree or another. But none of this will be automatic. Issues relevant to the resolution of the dispute (e.g. whether Taiwan is a sovereign entity) may come up in the process of stabilization and dealt with in ways that do not hurt either side’s interests And the issue of China’s growing military power—and what it reflects about PLA intentions—remains.

#### NFU causes prolif – forces others to rely more on nukes to counter US superiority and conventional weapon usability

Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala 2013; Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “ADVANCED US CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT”, The Nonproliferation Review, 20:1, 107-122, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2012.761790

While the idea of increasing the role of advanced conventional weaponry as a component of US national security thinking and practice is not new, Obama is the first president to strongly link these plans with the goal of pursuing a world free from nuclear weapons.3 As a result, the administration’s domestic policy focus must also take into consideration the international impact of the disarmament agenda on the major military fault lines in key US nuclear relationships with Russia, China, and other nuclear weapon states. When the dynamics of these relationships are considered, the Obama plan to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons through\*at least in part\*a greater role for advanced conventional weaponry in order to foster larger nuclear reductions appears unlikely to succeed. The central problem is that US superiority in advanced conventional weaponry makes it very difficult for any US rival to agree to work toward a nuclear-free world when such a move\*already made difficult by existing conventional imbalances\* will magnify US power. More specifically, the close link between nuclear reductions and increases in conventional capabilities essentially works to decrease US vulnerability in a nuclear disarmed world, while at the same time increasing the vulnerability of its current or future rivals and adversaries. As the former US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has written, ‘‘U.S. conventional power-projection capability and the concern that it may be used to intimidate, attack, or overthrow regimes’’ is far more important in terms of driving proliferation and increasing Russian and Chinese reliance on nuclear weapons than ‘‘fear of U.S. nuclear capability or the content of U.S. nuclear policy.’’4As such, a growing role for advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking\*even if it helps to facilitate US nuclear reductions\*appears likely to make Obama’s quest for global zero far more difficult, and perhaps impossible.5’

#### NFU can’t solve prolif – NPT cred does nothing and it collapses extended deterrence

Pierre Hassner 2007, Emeritus Research Director and Research Associate at The Centre for International Studies and Research, Sciences Po, Paris, France; Who killed nuclear enlightenment? International Affairs 83: 3 (2007) 427–430)

I shall dwell a little more on the strategic and moral dimensions of the ‘nuclear bargain’. The first concerns the promise of extended deterrence and its role in limiting proliferation. This involves a series of dilemmas and a debate which predates the Non-Proliferation Treaty and may well be re-emerging today in connection with the Middle East. Advocates of the NPT are normally also advocates of minimum deterrence as a step towards nuclear disarmament, and of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons as a step towards their marginalization and as a way to emphasize that their only use is to deter their use by others, or even that this deterrence should operate by their existence alone. The result in terms of a nuclear order should then be based on ‘mutual assured destruction’. This posture has the virtue of avoiding the ‘mad momentum’ of a nuclear arms race and the illusion of victory in a nuclear war. However, both its credibility and its morality if deterrence fails have been strongly criticized. Its real weakness, I think, is in terms of extended deterrence. It may be the least bad solution if states have only to deter an attack against themselves, but what is its credibility if they have to deter an attack upon their allies, let alone upon other non-nuclear states party to the NPT? Would they not need what Herman Kahn used to call a ‘not too uncredible threat of a first strike’, and does that not mean a strike which would not be suicidal? Would this kind of strike not require a counterforce capability and would it not be enhanced by missile defense? Hence the anti-MAD, pro-counterforce school has argued that the best strategy against the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one that maintains the flexibility and, if possible, the superiority made impossible by ‘minimum’ or, even more, by ‘existential’ mutual deterrence. But if one adopts this argument, does it not set us on the road to what Walker calls ‘counter-enlightenment’—that is, the refusal of universality and reciprocity in favour of war-fighting postures, the mutual search for superiority, the likelihood of an intensified arms race and an increased risk of nuclear war? The only possible way of avoiding both the pitfalls of mutual vulnerability and the dangers of the search for unilateral invulnerability may be essentially political, involving a tightening of alliances and a strategy of engagement materialized by visible physical presence on the territory of one’s non-nuclear allies. But this would look more like NATO than like collective security, and it would leave the unattached without a credible security guarantee unless the alliance were extended to the whole world, which would give it all the characteristics of an empire. These dilemmas are insoluble; I mention them not as an argument for inaction, but to indicate that, like enlightenment in general according to Adorno and Horkheimer, nuclear enlightenment may lead to dialectical reversals and unwanted results. Above all, they indicate that while universal treaties (like the convention against genocide) and declarations of intention are inspiring and legitimizing documents or institutions, their application can never be detached from political interests and priorities, from relations of power and of alliance, of dependence or of rivalry. The question is whether their value as inspirations, as guides or, in Kantian terms, as ‘regulatory ideas’ is morally useful or can lead to hypocrisies and disaffections when confronted with reality. Here lies my main political and moral objection to the idealized picture presented by William Walker of nuclear enlightenment in general and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in particular. It is contained in one word: hypocrisy. Walker directs all his attacks against the cynicism or scepticism of counter-enlightenment, represented by the Bush administration, and its abandonment of the goal of denuclearization. It has certainly made matters much worse, in particular by de-emphasizing the distinction between deterrence and war-fighting, and between nuclear and conventional weapons. But what Walker tends to forget or to downplay is the hypocrisy which prevailed almost without exception among nuclear powers, and to a large extent also among non-nuclear states, about getting rid of their own nuclear weapons and reaching universal nuclear disarmament. I think it is fair to say that none of the leaders of the nuclear powers, with the possible exceptions of Gorbachev and Reagan, ever seriously contemplated following the South African example and abandoning nuclear weapons. At any rate I have no hesitation whatsoever in stating that the thought never crossed the mind of any French political or military authority. Nor can I blame them for their skepticism in this respect, even though I emphatically do not share their belief in the automatic stabilizing, equalizing and, above all, moderating effect of nuclear weapons. I remain convinced that you cannot eliminate knowledge, that nuclear weapons cannot be dis-invented, and that the calculations of the most serious of arms controllers, such as Thomas Schelling in the 1960s, according to which a situation of minimal deterrence, with a few tens of nuclear missiles instead of thousands, would be more stable than the abolition of nuclear weapons, which could not be verified and would give rise to permanent suspicion of surprise attack, remain valid. Nor do I believe that the non-fulfilment by the great powers of their pledge to work towards total nuclear disarmament is a basic cause of proliferation. I think that if they were to keep their word, the power of their example would not be sufficient, in most cases, to prevail against the motivations in terms of status, domination or security that may push some of the non-nuclear states to seek nuclear status. The non-compliance of the nuclear powers with article VI of the treaty simply provides these other states with a ready-made alibi for continuing their quest, and some of them might even be encouraged or reinforced in their decision to go nuclear by the removal of the threat of nuclear retaliation by one of the existing nuclear powers.

#### Prolif is inevitable, there’s no modeling, and the plan can’t save the NPT or US nonprolif leadership

Pierre Hassner 2007, Emeritus Research Director and Research Associate at The Centre for International Studies and Research, Sciences Po, Paris, France; Who killed nuclear enlightenment? International Affairs 83: 3 (2007) 427–430)

Probably the most important reason for the crisis of the nuclear order, and for my rather pessimistic assessment of its chances of being solved any time soon, is the sharp decline of the international political order on which the NPT was based. The two elements on which any such order has to rely—power and legitimacy—have been profoundly modified in a direction unfavourable to the West. As a result, inequality is seen by the have-nots as less inevitable and acceptable, and belief in reciprocity is in short supply, both among the nuclear powers and among the nonnuclear states aspiring either to join the club or to fight it. The authority of the West, in particular of the United States, and that of the international institutions it has created but within which its control is increasingly challenged, have been considerably weakened in the last few years. Conversely, the rise of new centres of powers outside the West (whether potential challengers like China and India, a Russia newly powerful thanks to the energy crisis, violent and fanatical but wealthy and technologically able subnational or transnational groups, or armed militias resisting conventional armies) has given rise to a general feeling in ‘the rest’ that they no longer have to accept and follow rules which they have not created and which they feel are intended to perpetuate a domination which belongs to the past. As Bruno Tertrais has pointed out, to the regional reasons which are usually predominant in the decision to acquire nuclear weapons is added a global one: the feeling that the old international order is no longer legitimate, that the world is entering a period of uncertainty where new rules have to be written, and that these rules should be written less by a declining ‘West’ than by an ascending ‘Rest’.10 This feeling has, of course, been enormously strengthened and accelerated by the Iraq disaster. The loss in American prestige and influence since 2003 is quite unprecedented. Some of the reasons for this are profoundly debatable: practically all Muslim countries and most countries of the South see not only the Iraq war but also the Afghan war as basically anti-Islamic, or neo-colonial, or both, and most of us now accept this lumping together of the two interventions. Other reasons are shared even by those of America’s allies that believe in the necessity of fighting terrorism, genocide and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The way the Iraq war has been conducted projects an image of recklessness, of mendacity, of resort to immoral practices like torture and, on top of all this, of ineffectiveness and incoherence. All this has eroded whatever trust previously existed in America’s promises and protection, and in its wisdom and predictability, and this loss of trust obviously has deeply damaging consequences for the NPT bargain. Other actions or omissions by the Bush administration are more directly linked to the nuclear issue. The tolerance of the nuclearization of Israel, India and Pakistan that preceded it has been more wholehearted under its tenure. It may have justified the agreement to help India in nuclear matters, in violation at least of the spirit of the NPT, by appealing to political circumstances. But in any case such decisions show a clear choice of political alliances over general collective security and the general doctrine of non-proliferation. The legalistic argument that these countries had not signed the treaty, as if that made their possession of the bomb any less dangerous, is not very convincing. Similarly, the Bush administration’s commitment to regime change, coupled with the contrast between the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the lack of military action against the no less evil but nuclear-armed North Korea, creates a clear incentive for any ‘rogue state’ or member of the ‘axis of evil’ to acquire nuclear arms as quickly as possible.11 Of course, the United States and the West more generally are not alone in wishing the failure of such attempts. They are joined in this wish by China and Russia, who play the role of balancers or arbiters, and by the regional neighbours and rivals of countries like North Korea or Iran, who fear their domination or their aggressiveness and would not mind being spared agonizing decisions by the success of western sanctions. But even these regional adversaries of the would-be proliferators are not immune to the powerful and ubiquitous wave of anti-American and, by extension, anti-western resentment and accusations of hypocrisy. As Kishore Mahbubani has put it, ‘All across the world, from street bazaars to university corridors, from corporate boardrooms to government offices, in daily conversations there is disbelief that America is “threatening” Iran with UN Security Council sanctions when America itself has demonstrated—most clearly in the case of Iraq—that it will not accept the authority of the council.’ Similarly, ‘while the treaty remains alive on paper, it has become spiritually dead. Many middle powers have quietly decided that it is a question of when, and not if, they will go nuclear.’12 None of these countries would find it acceptable to be branded as criminal or punished by nuclear powers for trying to follow in their footsteps. Only ‘country-neutral’ measures which apply equally to all have a chance of being accepted. Even a proposal such as that formulated by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn in January 2007,13 aiming at a world free of nuclear weapons and calling for intermediate measures that run counter to current American policies (such as the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), is likely to be greeted by the non-nuclear states with irony and distrust. They are bound to ask why respected American statesmen who for decades made the case for nuclear deterrence are suddenly in favour of banning the bomb. They are bound to think that the American strategic establishment saw nothing wrong with nuclear weapons as long as they were confined to the developed world and has discovered their madness when they have become accessible to newcomers. Their response is bound to be: ‘Start by abandoning your own nuclear weapons, or wait until we join the club and abandon them together.’ The situation, then, is every bit as dire as Walker sees it; but its roots are deeper than he implies and the remedies he suggests are not very likely to succeed. Sticking to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and relying on the IAEA and the UN Security Council to enforce it, while permitting and encouraging civilian nuclear energy, looks more and more like a losing proposition. Governments are not seriously intending to commit themselves to the revolutionary step of the universal renunciation of nuclear weapons; and while this goal is making new converts, its chances of adoption are rather decreasing than increasing, for reasons both technical (easier access to the weapons, even, probably, by non-state groups) and political (lack of mutual trust).

### prolif

**Double Bind – Either:**

a.) Prolif will never happen

**Alagappa 08** (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa , p. 521-522)

It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventive action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On the domino effect, India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapon programs have not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that country's security concerns about the United States and Tehran's regional aspirations. The North Korean test has evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S. Japan security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought reaffirmation of the American extended deterrence commitment, but has firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dramatic change in its political, economic, and security circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not spurred Taiwan or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability. The point is that each country's decision to embark on and sustain nuclear weapon programs is contingent on its particular security and other circumstances. Though appealing, the domino theory is not predictive; often it is employed to justify policy on the basis of alarmist predictions. The loss of South Vietnam, for example, did not lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia. In fact the so-called dominos became drivers of a vibrant Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that subregion (Lord 1993, 1996). In the nuclear arena, the nuclear programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part of a security chain reaction, not mechanically falling dominos. However, as observed earlier the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests have thus far not had the domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy makers. Great caution should be exercised in accepting at face value the sensational predictions of individuals who have a vested interest in accentuating the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Such analysts are now focused on the dangers of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the basis of an objective reading of the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.

**OR**

**b.) They cant solve the reasons it would happen**

**Cha 01 –** Associate Prof. Gov. and School of Foreign Service – Georgetown U., Journal of Strategic Studies (Victor, “The second nuclear age: Proliferation pessimism versus sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia”, 24:4, InformaWorld)

This contribution makes two arguments with regard to the causes and consequences of the second nuclear age in Asia. Regarding causes of proliferation, I argue that these are overdetermined in Asia. As was the case in the first nuclear age, proliferation derives largely from the intersection of security-scarcity and resource constraints. However, in addition to these basic security drivers, there are a plethora of secondary drivers ranging from domestic forces, political currency (insurance and bargaining), prestige, and a healthy dose of skepticism regarding first world hypocrisy that explain the region's proliferation. The combination of these primary and secondary drivers not only ensures that proliferation is overdetermined in Asia, but also means that rollback of these capabilities, though desirable, is not likely.

#### Combined probability approaches zero

**Schneidmiller 9** (Chris, Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism, 13 January 2009, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20090113\_7105.php, AMiles)

There is an "almost **vanishingly small" likelihood** that terrorists would ever be able to acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon, one expert said here yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 2, 2008). In even the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and a successful nuclear strike on a major city, said John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State University. The process itself is seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult -- buy or steal highly enriched uranium, manufacture a weapon, take the bomb to the target site and blow it up. Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the complexity of the effort, Mueller argued. Terrorists would have to bribe officials in a state nuclear program to acquire the material, while avoiding a sting by authorities or a scam by the sellers. The material itself could also turn out to be bad. "Once the purloined material is purloined, [police are] going to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration. Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The terrorists would then have to find scientists and engineers willing to give up their normal lives to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop. Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said. Every obstacle is "difficult but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller said, putting the chance of success at no less than one in three for each. The likelihood of successfully passing through each obstacle, in sequence, would be roughly one in 3 1/2 billion, he said, but for argument's sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million. "It's a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater length in an upcoming book, Atomic Obsession. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you're basically putting everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that's maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." Other scenarios are even less probable, Mueller said. A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group, he argued: "States just simply won't give it to somebody they can't control." Terrorists are also not likely to be able to steal a whole weapon, Mueller asserted, dismissing the idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said (see GSN, Jan. 12). Fear of an "extremely improbable event" such as nuclear terrorism produces support for a wide range of homeland security activities, Mueller said. He argued that there has been a major and costly overreaction to the terrorism threat -- noting that the Sept. 11 attacks helped to precipitate the invasion of Iraq, which has led to far more deaths than the original event. Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said. Friedman took issue with the finding late last year of an experts' report that an act of WMD terrorism would "more likely than not" occur in the next half decade unless the international community takes greater action. "I would say that the report, if you read it, actually offers no analysis to justify that claim, which seems to have been made to change policy by generating alarm in headlines." One panel speaker offered a partial rebuttal to Mueller's presentation. Jim Walsh, principal research scientist for the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said he agreed that nations would almost certainly not give a nuclear weapon to a nonstate group, that most terrorist organizations have no interest in seeking out the bomb, and that it would be difficult to build a weapon or use one that has been stolen.

**No miscalc or accidents—their examples are weak**

**Trachtenberg 2k** – History Professor, Pennsylvania (Marc, The "Accidental War" Question, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/inadv(1).pdf)

There are two points to be made on this issue. First of all, as long as states choose courses of action with their eyes open--if they decide to engage in a test of will, knowing full well that this is what they are doing, and deliberately adopt tactics limiting their own freedom of action (and in particular their ability to avoid ending up in an armed conflict) as a way of prevailing in the crisis--then it can scarcely be said that the outcome of that confrontation is to be viewed as essentially an "accident." And the basic point here is that states, by and large, do know what they are doing; to a certain extent, they burn their bridges in the course of a crisis, but they do this with important political objectives in mind. They know that if their prestige is engaged, their adversary will know that it is hard for them to draw back, and so their adversary will be under more pressure to accommodate them on the issue at hand.

The second point has to do with how much risk there really is in situations of this sort. It should not be assumed too readily that states underestimate the degree to which they lose control of the situation when they engage in a crisis. States can generally pull back from the brink if they really want to; prestige will be sacrificed, but often states are willing to pay that price. The history of international politics in the century that just ended is full of crises that were liquidated by one side accepting what amounted to defeat, sometimes even humiliating defeat; and in the July Crisis in 1914, the German government chose at the most critical moment to let the war come rather than press for a compromise solution.9

The key thing here is that in 1914 and 1939 political leaders had not totally lost control, but had chosen to accept war rather than back off in a crisis. Their aversion to war was not overwhelming. But when both sides very much want to avoid a full-scale armed conflict, the story is very different. This was the case during the Cold War. People sometimes seem to assume that peace was hanging by a thread during that conflict, and that we were lucky to make our way through it without a thermonuclear holocaust. But I don't think this is true at all: and in general I think it is very unlikely that a great war would break out if both sides are determined to avoid it.

These arguments about how war could break out almost by accident were frequently made during the Cold War itself--and indeed were made by responsible and experie nced officials. A British document from March 1946, for example, argued that the Soviets did not want war, but the kind of tactics they used with the West might lead to a war that neither side wanted: "although the intention may be defensive, the tactics will be offensive, and the danger always exists that Russian leaders may misjudge how far they can go without provoking war with American or ourselves."10 A year later, a British Foreign Office official warned that the fact that the Soviets had military superiority in Europe might make them careless, and that they might "misjudge what measures can safely be taken without producing a serious crisis." Events might get out of control and a situation might develop that could "lead to disaster."11

What is wrong with this point of view? It assumes that the Soviets would not be cautious, that they would not frame their actions very carefully with an eye to the American reaction, that in deciding how far to go they would not gauge very closely how the Americans reacted to the measures they had taken up to that point. This point of view assumes also that the Soviets would find it very hard to draw back if it became clear that they had overstepped the bounds and had thought the American reaction would not be as vigorous as it in fact was--or indeed that they had not made the mental reservation that they could draw back, in necessary, when they decided to embark on a provocative course of action. Basically the assumption is that the Soviets did not care enough about what a war would entail to take these rather elementary and normal precautions. This point of view also assumes that the American response would be very rigid and "spring-loaded": a slight Soviet infringement, and the Americans immediately take the plunge into general war--as though there are no intermediate measures of a political or military nature that would be taken, no process that would unfold within which the two sides would test each other out before resorting to extreme measures. To my mind, anyone with any sense should know that things would never move directly and mechanically from initial provocation to full-scale war, that things would unfold almost inevitably in a more complex way--or, in short, that enough "cushioning" exists in the system to keep relatively minor provocations from leading directly to general war.

#### US conventional strength is resilient and miles ahead – and improving it won’t solve the problems it can’t solve already

Barry Blechman and Russell Rumbaugh 2012; Co-Founder/Distinguished Fellow and Director of the Stimson Center “A New US Defense Strategy for a New Era: Military Superiority, Agility, and Efficiency http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/a-new-us-defense-strategy-for-a-new-era-military-superiority-agility-and-efficiency/

Operational US military involvement since the end of the Cold War has highlighted the nation's comparative military strengths and weaknesses. The US is unrivaled in its global flexibility and reach. Its intelligence and reconnaissance assets as well as air, naval, and ground forces can reach anywhere in the world with unparalleled speed and power. At the same time, US capabilities to fight unconventional wars on the ground, to defeat insurgencies, to stabilize governance, and to ensure security for societies in distant regions are limited, at best. This is not because of any deficiencies in, nor malpractices by, the US armed forces. The task of imposing order, providing good governance, and inculcating democratic values in foreign, undeveloped societies riven by internal conflicts is simply too hard a task, and not one for which military forces are particularly well-suited.

#### Nuclear deterrence is key to effective warfighting and global leadership

Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring 11-30-2012; Rebeccah Heinrichs is a Visiting Fellow and Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. “Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the 21st Century”

<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/11/deterrence-and-nuclear-targeting-in-the-21st-century>

In addition to their physical qualities, nuclear weapons have unique psychological effects. This is because deterrence has everything to do with creating a calculus in the minds of U.S. enemies that attacking the U.S. is not worth the cost. The extreme destructive power of nuclear weapons make their possible employment a more persuasive deterrent. In 2010, General Kevin P. Chilton, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, warned, “We have to be careful when we start talking about one-for-one substitutions of conventional weapons for nuclear weapons,” because “the nuclear weapon has a deterrent factor that far exceeds a conventional threat."[22] Since the goal motivating the use of military force is to achieve political objectives and to terminate war on terms favorable to the U.S., it is not necessarily the case that simply because a conventional weapon can reach a target that it would be the optimal weapon for the U.S. to employ. The threat of the U.S. employing a nuclear weapon may actually better

achieve deterrence aims, and in the event deterrence fails, the employment of a nuclear weapon with its unique physical and psychological attributes may help to end the war on terms more favorable to the U.S.

#### Deeply buried hardened targets ruin conventional weapon viability

Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring 11-30-2012; Rebeccah Heinrichs is a Visiting Fellow and Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. “Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the 21st Century”

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Policy for Counterforce Strategic Targeting In the context of the protect and defend strategy, the U.S. would have an overall strategic posture consisting of a mix of complementary nuclear, conventional, and defensive forces. It is essential to recognize that nuclear weapons are unique. This is due, in part, to their physical qualities, which enable them not only to hit their targets, but to destroy them with a higher level of confidence. In February of this year, U.S. Strategic Command’s Deputy Director for Plans and Policy Greg Weaver said, “You can’t replace nuclear weapons today with conventional capability” because “they don’t have the same effects on targets."[20] Dr. Mark Schneider puts it this way, “Ultimately, an attempt to counter a nuclear attack with conventional weapons would be fighting a yield of up to one million to one.” Although analysts arguing for significant cuts to the nuclear force often make the case that conventional weapons can hold at risk critical targets, it is highly unlikely that conventional weapons can reach deeply buried, hardened targets. One can deduce that an enemy would keep its most valuable assets in such places. Accordingly, the U.S. needs a credible means of holding them at risk. The National Academy of Sciences has reported that there are 10,000 such targets, mostly controlled by foes of the U.S.[21 ]

#### Shift to conventional deterrence blurs the firebreak – they can’t solve conflict and it increases the risk of nuclear escalation

Andrew Krepinevich and Steven Kosiak 1998 – Executive Director and Director of Budget Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Andrew Krepinevich and Steven Kosiak, Winter 1998/99, “The Military Revolution And The Case For Deep Cuts In Nuclear Forces,” http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/A.19981100.The\_Military\_Revol/A.19981100.The\_Military\_Revol.php, JMP)

In the absence of a “sanctuary” regime, there is a danger that transitioning to a highly effective nonnuclear strategic strike capability could actually **make nuclear war more likely**, by blurring the distinction, or “firebreak,” between nonnuclear and nuclear capabilities. In other words, there is a danger that the United States will feel freer than it has in the past to conduct strategic strikes — because it will be able to do so without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, the country on the receiving end may not view such a distinction as particularly meaningful and may well feel compelled to **retaliate with nuclear weapons.**

# 2nc

## deterrence

### 2nc overview

#### Nuclear primacy’s key to hegemony

Craig 9 – Campbell Craig, Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton, 2009, “American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, p. 35-36

As Keir Lieber and Daryl Press have suggested, the US may be on the verge of acquiring a first-strike nuclear capability, which, combined with an effective system of anti-ballistic missile defence, could allow the US to destroy a rival’s nuclear capabilities and intercept any remaining retaliatory missiles before they hit American cities. While this possibility clearly reduces the likelihood of other states seeking to match American power with the aim of fighting and winning a nuclear war, and, if their argument becomes widely accepted, could lead American policy-makers to reject the logic of the nuclear revolution and consider pre-emptive nuclear strikes against large nuclear rivals, it clearly is less germane to the question of small-state deterrence.33 Lieber and Press contend that the US may have the capability to destroy the entire nuclear arsenal of another large nuclear state lest that state use it on America first for the purposes of winning a great war. That, as they say, would mean the end of Mutual Assured Destruction as it existed during the Cold War. However, Washington would have much less reason to use its new first-strike capability against a nation that cannot threaten to destroy the US, and has no ambition to defeat America in a war, but only possesses a second-strike minimum deterrent. Such an attack would turn much of the world against a US willing to use nuclear weapons and kill hundreds of thousands or millions in order to defeat a nation that did not threaten its survival. Perhaps more to the point, an attack like this would be tremendously risky. Even after a perfect first strike some retaliation might get through, which could mean the nuclear destruction of an American city or perhaps the city of an American ally. At the very least, survivors of the attacked state and their allies would seek to unleash destruction upon the US in other ways, including an unconventional delivery of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. An imperfect first strike, or, even worse, a failure of the US anti-missile system, would constitute a total disaster for the US: not only would it incur the world’s wrath and suffer the destruction of one or more of its cities, but such a failure would also expose America as both a brutal and vulnerable state, surely encouraging other states to acquire nuclear weapons or otherwise defy it. The US might have reason to launch a first strike against a large rival that deployed a major arsenal and appeared ready to attack America, as implausible as this scenario is. It would have little reason to do so against a small nation with a second-strike minimum deterrent arsenal. The nuclear revolution delivers a clear message to any large state considering major war with a powerful nuclear rival. The message is that such a war is likely to escalate to total nuclear exchange, and that in this event a large percentage of its citizenry will be killed or injured, its ability to govern what remains of the nation will be weakened or destroyed, and its power relative to other states that stayed out of the war will be radically diminished. It also delivers a message to any advanced small state eager to obtain security from the possible predation of large ones. The message is that if the small state possesses, or can quickly get its hands on, a few invulnerable and deliverable nuclear weapons, any large state contemplating invading it will have to weigh the benefits of invasion against a new kind of cost – not just a difficult or stalemated conventional war, such as the US faced in Vietnam and faces in Iraq, but the destruction of perhaps one, three, or five of its cities, and the death and injury of millions of its citizens. Unless it is able to obtain an absolutely fool-proof defence against any kind of nuclear retaliation, the choice that any large state is going to make when faced with this new circumstance is so likely to be peace that the small nuclear state can feel confident that it will be safe from conquest.34 The general relevance of these messages to American unipolar preponderance is clear. At the ‘great power’ level, rising states are unlikely to regard major war as a suitable means for overturning the international system and overthrowing American preponderance. The classic means of systemic change – hegemonic war – will not be an attractive option to any state hoping to survive, and the very existence of nuclear arsenals will make all states cautious about provoking conflict with nuclear rivals, especially the heavily armed US.35 Moreover, advanced smaller states know that they can provide for their own security, if they come to believe that it is endangered, not by embarking on large military build-ups or forming alliances with larger states, but by developing a small and invulnerable nuclear arsenal, or at least preparing the way to obtain such an arsenal quickly. This means that small states have a far greater ability to defend themselves from, and therefore be less afraid of, American predation today than comparable states facing dominant powers in previous eras.36 The main effects of the nuclear revolution, then, bolster the general claim of Power Preponderance that unipolarity is enduring. To support their claim, Brooks and Wohlforth specify three factors that dissuade would-be rivals to the US from balancing against it in traditional military terms: the effect of America’s relative geographical isolation from these potential rivals; the fact that American preponderance happened as a fait accompli about which no other nation could do anything; and the vast and growing ‘power gap’ between the US and all other rivals. The next section will describe each factor, and show how the nuclear revolution specifically reinforces each of them.

#### Nuclear deterrence prevents and de-escalates all conflicts

C. PaulRobinson**,** 3-22-2001; President and Director of Sandia National Laboratories

“A White Paper: Pursuing a New Nuclear Weapons Policy for the 21st Century,” http://www.nukewatch.org/importantdocs/resources/pursuing\_a\_new\_nuclear\_weapons\_p.html

I served as an arms negotiator on the last two agreements before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and have spent most of my career enmeshed in the complexity of nuclear weapons issues on the government side of the table. It is abundantly clear (to me) that formulating a new nuclear weapons policy for the start of the 21st Century will be a most difficult undertaking. While the often over-simplified picture of deterrence during the Cold War—two behemoths armed to the teeth, staring each other down—has thankfully retreated into history, there are nevertheless huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, all in quite usable states, that could be brought back quickly to their Cold War postures. Additionally, throughout the Cold War and ever since, there has been a steady proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by other nations around the globe. The vast majority of these newly armed states are not U.S. allies, and some already are exhibiting hostile behaviors, while others have the potential to become aggressors toward the U.S., our allies, and our international interests. Russia has already begun to emphasize the importance of its arsenal of nuclear weapons to compensate for its limited conventional capabilities to deal with hostilities that appear to be increasing along its borders. It seems inescapable that the U.S. must carefully think through how we should be preparing to deal with new threats from other corners of the world, including the role that nuclear weapons might serve in deterring these threats from ever reaching actual aggressions. I personally see the abolition of nuclear weapons as an impractical dream in any foreseeable future. I came to this view from several directions. The first is the impossibility of ever “uninventing” or erasing from the human mind the knowledge of how to build such weapons. While the sudden appearance of a few tens of nuclear weapons causes only a small stir in a world where several thousands of such weapons already exist, their appearance in a world without nuclear weapons would produce huge effects. (The impact of the first two weapons in ending World War II should be a sufficient example.) I believe that the words of Winston Churchill, as quoted by Margaret Thatcher to a special joint session of the U.S. Congress on February 20, 1985, remain convincing on this point: “Be careful above all things not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure, and more sure than sure, that other means of preserving the peace are in your hands.” Similarly, it is my sincere view that the majority of the nations who have now acquired arsenals of nuclear weapons believe them to be such potent tools for deterring conflicts that they would never surrender them. Against this backdrop, I recently began to worry that because there were few public statements by U.S. officials in reaffirming the unique role which nuclear weapons play in ensuring U.S. and world security, far too many people (including many in our own armed forces) were beginning to believe that perhaps nuclear weapons no longer had value. It seemed to me that it was time for someone to step forward and articulate the other side of these issues for the public: first, that nuclear weapons remain of vital importance to the security of the U.S. and to our allies and friends (today and for the near future); and second, that nuclear weapons will likely have an enduring role in preserving the peace and **preventing world wars for the foreseeable future.** These are my purposes in writing this paper. For the past eight years, I have served several Commanders-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command by chairing the Policy Subcommittee of the Strategic Advisory Group (SAG). This group was asked to help develop a new terms of reference for nuclear strategy in the post-Cold War world. This paper draws on many of the discussions with my SAG colleagues (although one must not assume their endorsement of all of the ideas presented here). We addressed how nuclear deterrence might be extended—not just to deter Russia—but how it might serve a continuing role in deterring wider acts of aggression from any corner of the world, including deterring the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. [Taken together, these are normally referred to as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).] My approach here will be to: (1) examine what might be the appropriate roles for nuclear weapons for the future, (2) propose some new approaches to developing nuclear strategies and policies that are more appropriate for the post-Cold War world, and (3) consider the kinds of military systems and nuclear weapons that would be needed to match those policies. The Role(s) of Nuclear Weapons The Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Command, Admiral Rich Mies, succinctly reflected the current U.S. deterrent policy last year in testimony to the U.S. Senate: “Deterrence of aggression is a cornerstone of our national security strategy, and **strategic nuclear forces serve as the most visible and most important element** of our commitment Š (further) deterrence of major military attack on the United States and its allies, particularly attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, remains our highest defense priority.” While the application of this policy seemed clear, perhaps we could have said even “straightforward,” during the Cold War; application of that policy becomes even more complicated if we consider applying it to any nation other than Russia. Let me first stress that nuclear arms must never be thought of as a single “cure-all” for security concerns. For the past 20 years, only 10 percent of the U.S. defense budget has been spent on nuclear forces. The other 90 percent is for “war fighting” capabilities. Indeed, conflicts have continued to break out every few years in various regions of the globe, and these nonnuclear capabilities have been regularly employed. By contrast, we have not used nuclear weapons in conflict since World War II. This is an important distinction for us to emphasize as an element of U.S. defense policy, and one not well understood by the public at large. Nuclear weapons must never be considered as war fighting tools. Rather we should rely on the catastrophic nature of nuclear weapons to **achieve war prevention**, to **prevent a conflict from escalating** (e.g., to the use of weapons of mass destruction), or to help **achieve war termination** when it cannot be achieved by other means, e.g., if the enemy has already escalated the conflict through the use of weapons of mass destruction. Conventional armaments and forces will remain the backbone of U.S. defense forces, but **the inherent threat to escalate to nuclear use can help to prevent conflicts from ever starting, can prevent their escalation, as well as bring these conflicts to a swift and certain end.** In contrast to the situation facing Russia, I believe we cannot place an over-reliance on nuclear weapons, but that we must maintain adequate conventional capabilities to manage regional conflicts in any part of the world. Noting that the U.S. has always considered nuclear weapons as “weapons of last resort,” we need to give constant attention to improving conventional munitions in order to raise the threshold for which we would ever consider nuclear use. It is just as important for our policy makers to understand these interfaces as it is for our commanders. Defenses Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to strictly consider “defensive” tactics and armaments, I believe it is important for the United States to consider a continuum of defensive capabilities, from boost phase intercept to terminal defenses. Defenses have always been an important element of war fighting, and are likely to be so when defending against missiles. Defenses will also provide value in deterring conflicts or limiting escalations. Moreover, the existence of a credible defense to blunt attacks by armaments emanating from a rogue state could well eliminate that rogue nation’s ability to dissuade the U.S. from taking military actions. If any attack against the U.S., its allies, or its forces should be undertaken with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, there should be no doubt in the attacker’s mind that the United States might retaliate for such an attack with nuclear weapons; but the choice would be in our hands. If high effectiveness defenses can be achieved, they will enhance deterrence by eliminating an aggressor’s confidence in attacking the U.S. homeland with long-range missiles, and thus make our use of nuclear weapons more credible (if the conflict could not be terminated otherwise.) Whereas, nuclear weapons should always remain weapons of last resort, defensive systems would likely be our weapons of first resort. Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Strategic Tool? Throughout my career, I have had the opportunity to participate in a number of “war games” in which the roles and uses of nuclear weapons had to be faced in scenarios that imagined military conflicts developing between the U.S. and other potential adversaries. The totality of those games brought new realizations as to the role and purpose of nuclear weapons, in particular, how essential it is that deterrence be tailored in a different way for each potential aggressor nation. It also seemed abundantly clear that any use of nuclear weapons is, and always will be, strategic. Thus, I would propose we ban the term “nonstrategic nuclear weapons” as a non sequitur. The intensity of the environment of any war game also demonstrates just how critical it is for the U.S. to have thought through in advance exactly what messages we would want to send to other nations (combatants and noncombatants) and to “history,” should there be any future use of nuclear weapons—including threatened use—in conflicts. Similarly, it is obvious that we must have policies that are well thought through in advance as to the role of nuclear weapons in deterring the use of, or retaliating for the use of, all weapons of mass destruction. Let me then state my most important conclusion directly: I believe nuclear weapons must have an abiding place in the international scene for the foreseeable future. I believe that the world, in fact, would become more dangerous, not less dangerous, were U.S. nuclear weapons to be absent. The most important role for our nuclear weapons is to serve as a “sobering force,” one that can **cap the level of destruction of military conflicts and thus force all sides to come to their senses.** This is the enduring purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. I regret that we have not yet captured such thinking in our public statements as to why the U.S. will retain nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone of our defense policy, and urge that we do so in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. Nuclear deterrence becomes in my view a “countervailing” force and, in fact, a potent antidote to military aggression on the part of nations. But to succeed in harnessing this power, effective nuclear weapons strategies and policies are necessary ingredients to help shape and maintain a stable and peaceful world.

#### And it solves inadvertent war through miscalculation

RobertSpulak**,** 19**99**; Senior Analyst at the Strategic Studies Center, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Opposing Viewpoints, p. 53-4

The need for nuclear deterrence will not disappear. There are still powerful nations in the world which are potential adversaries, both immediate and future. The interests of these other nations will, at times, be in conflict with the interests of the United States. It is inevitable that another great power or a coalition of powers will arise to oppose the hegemony of the United States. Although the Cold War is over, Russia still has the capability to destroy the United States; the strong showing of the nationalists and communists in the Russian elections, the obvious failure of reforms, the desire of Russia to be recognized as a great power, and replacement of the reformers in the Russian government with officials from the communist era have refocused our concerns on this point. In a few years Japan, a Western European state, or China could pose a strategic threat to our broad security interests; China is rapidly modernizing its arsenal and could soon be a strategic nuclear threat. Since we will be cautious about attacking any nuclear power with conventional forces, it will be difficult to deter even smaller nuclear powers such as North Korea, Iran, or Iraq if our nuclear threat to them is not credible. Credibility is important for deterrence because the conditions under which the United States would actually use nuclear weapons, and therefore the conditions under which nuclear deterrence even exists, depend on limitations we place on ourselves. Credibility has been one of the most important aspects of nuclear policy from the beginning. For example, the lack of credibility of the U.S. policy of massive retaliation led to the more limited U.S. doctrines that were then developed. The development of warfighting capabilities as a contribution to deterrence was based on the need to demonstrate that there was a likelihood that nuclear weapons would actually be used. Minimizing and stigmatizing our nuclear weapons can create a self-imposed taboo with respect to even nuclear adversaries, thereby delegitimizing deterrence and inviting threats to our interests. This self-injury to our nuclear deterrence is not the delegitimization of all nuclear weapons that the proponents of nuclear stigma hope for. It is neither reciprocal with our potential enemies nor permanent, even for ourselves. Credible nuclear deterrence is robust, not delicate. Policies and actions that establish credibility couple with our nuclear arsenal to create the possibility that in a war with the United States an enemy may face a risk of annihilation. A potential enemy need not even be very rational to be deterred from actions that ensure his own destruction. (This is not to argue for belligerence; we can keep the threshold for nuclear use high without undermining credibility.) This creates extreme caution in the behavior of other states if they wish to threaten vital U.S. security interests, and it **substantially reduces the likelihood of miscalculation**.

### Link – NFU/Sole Purpose

#### Sole purpose and NFU declarations crush credibility – they eliminate a valuable strike option and make counterforce strikes impossible

Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring 11-30-2012; Rebeccah Heinrichs is a Visiting Fellow and Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. “Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the 21st Century”

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There are two major problems with this goal. First, it requires the U.S. to return to a countervalue strategy because under a minimal deterrence strategy the U.S. would be unable to hold at risk the spectrum of military and political targets that foes need to attack the U.S. or its allies with strategic weapons. Rather, minimal deterrence necessitates the U.S. maintain a small nuclear force and establish a targeting policy and targeting requirements that would inflict enough pain so as to deter first use. The only target sets that fit this description with minimal numbers of nuclear weapons are large population centers. As already discussed, indiscriminately targeting population centers to cause as many fatalities and economic damage as possible is immoral and contrary to American values. It is also ineffective due to the lack of credibility that a U.S. President would ever order such an attack. Second, if the “sole purpose”—as opposed to the chief purpose—of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter, one would deduce that this means that the U.S. is effectively barring itself from launching the first nuclear strike and therefore can only be the recipient of a first strike if deterrence fails. More importantly, the logic of this policy dictates that if the U.S. is attacked with nuclear weapons—meaning deterrence has failed—its nuclear weapons would no longer serve any purpose because the policy would not permit the U.S. to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Moreover, if the U.S. maintains a minimal force, it would lack survivability and likely would be completely destroyed by the enemy’s first strike in the event deterrence does fail.

### Link – Declaratory Policy

#### Declaratory policy is perceived – and crucial to the value of the nuclear deterrent

William J. Perry 2009; Chairman of the Congressional Commission(William J. Perry, James R. Schlesinger – Vice Chairman, Other members include: Harry Cartland, Fred Ikle, John Foster, Keith Payne, John Glenn, Bruce Tarter, Morton Halperin, Ellen Williams, Lee Hamilton, and James Woolsey, America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, http://media.usip.org/reports/strat\_posture\_report.pdf

It is important to underscore that deterrence is in the eye of the beholder (as is assurance). Whether potential adversaries are deterred (and U.S. allies are assured) is a **function of their understanding of U.S. capabilities and intentions.** Those capabilities must be **sufficiently visible** and **sufficiently impressive**. But deterrence is more than a summary calculation of cumulative target kill probabilities. And it is not simply a function of technical characteristics of the nuclear force. It derives also from perceptions of U.S. intent and credibility, and the declaratory policy that embodies these factors. // pg. 22

#### It’s key to the overall perception of strategic posture

William J. Perry 2009; Chairman of the Congressional Commission(William J. Perry, James R. Schlesinger – Vice Chairman, Other members include: Harry Cartland, Fred Ikle, John Foster, Keith Payne, John Glenn, Bruce Tarter, Morton Halperin, Ellen Williams, Lee Hamilton, and James Woolsey, America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, http://media.usip.org/reports/strat\_posture\_report.pdf

On declaratory policy: Declaratory policy is a signal of U.S. intent to both friends and prospective enemies and thus an important aspect of the overall strategic posture. To be effective, it must be understood to reflect the intentions of national leadership. While an element of calculated ambiguity remains essential, there should be enough clarity that potential foes will be deterred. The United States should underscore that it conceives of and prepares for the use of nuclear weapons only for the protection of itself and its allies in extreme circumstances. // pg. xvii

### Link – Primacy

#### NFU undermines nuclear warfighting and counterforce capabilities

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press 2006; Keir A. Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, March-April 2006, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs

During the Cold War, Washington relied on its nuclear arsenal not only to deter nuclear strikes by its enemies but also to deter the Warsaw Pact from exploiting its conventional military superiority to attack Western Europe. It was primarily this latter mission that made Washington rule out promises of "no first use" of nuclear weapons. Now that such a mission is obsolete and the United States is beginning to regain nuclear primacy, however, Washington's continued refusal to eschew a first strike and the country's development of a limited missile-defense capability take on a new, and possibly more menacing, look. The most logical conclusions to make are that a **nuclear-war-fighting** capability remains a key component of the United States' military doctrine and that nuclear primacy remains a goal of the United States.

### 2NC Link Framing

#### Offensive strike capabilities are key

Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring 11-30-2012; Rebeccah Heinrichs is a Visiting Fellow and Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. “Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the 21st Century”

<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/11/deterrence-and-nuclear-targeting-in-the-21st-century>

Conclusion It is a misguided notion that the world is safer when America is weaker. All national security policy should strive first and foremost to protect the American people and U.S. allies. To do this, policymakers should increase and maintain U.S. military strength, thereby protecting the ability of the U.S. to shape events, rather than be controlled by the wills of other nations. Arms control and diplomacy can be means to this end, but confusing them for ends in themselves is folly. American nuclear weapons deter aggression and protect America and its allies. Nuclear weapons themselves are not a threat to peace. Rather, the actors who would seek to harm peaceful nations pose the threat. Accordingly, the U.S. must conceive of a deterrence posture that is convincing to both the allies and current and potential enemies of the U.S. and that reflects the values of the American people and the federal government’s solemn commitment to protect and defend them to the best of its ability. In order to convince foes that attacking the U.S. or U.S. allies with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons would result in an outcome far worse than the current situation, the U.S. must possess a credible ability to target the enemy’s political and military assets **in a strategic attack.** Such a force preserves peace. Failing to maintain such a force due to an ideological opposition to nuclear weapons themselves would only invite aggression and increase the likelihood of nuclear holocaust.

#### And, ambiguity – wide range of responses maximizes deterrent power

Timothy P. Fischer 2012; Lieutenant Colonel United States Army “Post Cold War Nuclear Weapons Policy” United States Army War College Strategy Research Report

There is no need for the U.S. to unnecessarily limit its options and remove a deterrent that may prevent a chemical or biological attack. Although the U.S. currently maintains a sufficient conventional force to respond to any attack without nuclear weapons, it makes sense to maintain the ambiguity that only nuclear deterrence can deliver. The possibility of a nuclear response causes greater fear for the enemy leadership and populace than conventional forces do. As Clausewitz points out there are three areas one must consider when determining scale and effort to be employed: the opponent‟s strength of will, character, and abilities.59 Before a state or a non-stare actor decides on an attack, it will consider the size and scope of the response. A state or non-state actor is more likely to risk a response from a conventional force, even though it is capable of inflicting an equal or greater amount of pain, than it is from a nuclear force because they do not fear a conventional response as much as they do a nuclear response. Thus, maintaining an intentionally ambiguous policy will caution any adversary against deciding to employ WMD knowing the decision to employ could have consequences that may include the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons also remove any question about a direct threat to a State or actor‟s leadership.

### 2NC A2 Conventional Superiority

#### Sole reliance on conventional superiority encourages other countries to nuclearize and modernize – only nuclear flexibility maintains balance

Keith Payne, et. al, Oct 2009; President and Co-Founder of the National Institute for Public Policy and Head of Missouri State University's Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Planning the Future U.S. Nuclear Force, Volume I: Executive Report, October 2009, http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/Planning%20the%20Future%20US%20Nuclear%20Force%20I\_txt.pdf

U.S. Conventional Superiority Creates Nuclear Incentives for Others Conventional superiority, according to advocates of nuclear zero, enables the United States to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and move toward their eventual abolition. Proponents of zero argue that the manifest air, land, and maritime predominance of U.S. general-purpose forces makes resort to nuclear threats or use unnecessary. Those same powerful conventional forces, however, make adversaries seek nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction to counter the same U.S. advantage, which works against the prospect of general nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, allies threatened by those WMD-armed countries depend on the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, making it more difficult for the United States to forgo nuclear weapons. Where that protection is absent or ineffective, allies may develop indigenous nuclear arsenals to defend themselves. The same U.S. conventional superiority that supposedly facilitates the U.S. embrace of zero will likely preclude Russian cooperation on nuclear elimination, which would be essential to the success of the endeavor. This point has been emphasized by Russian sources. The United States would be hard-pressed to make deep nuclear reductions if these were not done in conjunction with Russia. Yet Moscow depends on nuclear forces, particularly theater-range nuclear weapons, to compensate for deficiencies in the conventional capabilities that defend its borders. Indeed, Russia maintains a 10:1 advantage over the United States in non-strategic nuclear weapons.47 With chronic tensions along its periphery and insecurity over its conventional weaknesses, Russia is unlikely to be a reliable partner on the path toward nuclear zero.

#### Conventional reliance crushes credibility in a crisis – makes us look unwilling to escalate

Matthew Kroenig 8-27-2009, Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University, August 27, 2009, “Nuclear Superiority or the Balance of Resolve? Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1452250

I also include a number of control variables. We may expect states that enjoy conventional military superiority over opponents to be more likely to prevail in nuclear crises. Perhaps states fear the prospect of conventional military invasion more than the threat of nuclear attack and are more likely to back down in the face of greater conventional military capabilities regardless of the nuclear balance. On the other hand, we may expect that conventional military superiority may not be particularly relevant in a crisis among nuclear powers and that conventional superiority may even serve as a handicap in nuclear crises to the degree that it makes **conventionally-dominant states reluctant to escalate to the nuclear level.** To control for this factor, I generate Capabilities. I employ a standard power ratio variable which assesses the ratio of the capabilities of State A to the capabilities of State B.14 Capability is a composite index containing information on total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military manpower, and military expenditures. Data on capabilities are drawn from the Corelates of War composite capabilities index, version 3.01 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) and extracted using EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000).

### 2NC Deterrence Strong

#### The nuclear umbrella is active and the US is committed to alliance security guarantees

Ashton B. Carter 3-18-2013; Deputy Secretary of Defense, Seoul, Republic of Korea, Monday, March 18, 2013 “Statement by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter at U.S. Embassy Seoul” <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1760>

The key topic of our discussions today was North Korea and its continued pattern of provocative actions that pose a serious threat to the United States and Republic of Korea as well as to regional and global stability. The United States is working with friends and allies around the world and is employing an integrated response to these unacceptable provocations: the United Nations Security Council resolutions with unprecedentedly strong sanctions, additional unilateral sanctions of great effect, and all together the progressive isolation of North Korea. In the military sphere, the United States remains steadfast in its defense commitments to the Republic of Korea. Together, we are taking important steps to advance the alliance’s military capabilities. In particular, we’ve remained steadfast to our commitment to extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and will ensure that all of its capabilities remain available to the alliance. For example, I should note the presence of strategic bombers taking place in flight training in the Korea peninsula area in particular, for example, but this is routine, there will be a B-52 flight tomorrow.

### Counterforce Solves War

#### Nuclear counterforce strikes controls conflict escalation – all crises are worse without U.S. nuclear threats

Lieber and Press, November-December 2009 - Keir A. Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, November-December 2009, “The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, p. 50-51

A second criticism of the argument for retaining and improving certain counterforce capabilities is that the cure could be worse than the disease. Counterforce capabilities may mitigate escalation during a conflict—for example, by dissuading adversaries from nuclear saber rattling, by reassuring allies that the United States can defend them, and, if necessary, by giving the United States the ability to pursue regime change if adversaries brandish or use nuclear weapons. But they may also exacerbate the problem of controlling escalation if an adversary feels so threatened that it adopts a hair-trigger nuclear doctrine. Specifically, the United States’ ability to launch a disarming strike without killing millions of civilians might increase the escalatory pressures that already exist because of the nature of the U.S. military’s standard wartime strategy. Conventional air strikes on radar systems, communication links, and leadership bunkers may look even more like the precursors of a preemptive disarming strike if adversaries know that the United States possesses a well-honed nuclear counterforce capability. This second criticism has merit. Nevertheless, the benefits of maintaining effective counterforce capabilities trump the costs. Strong counterforce capabilities should make adversaries expect that escalating a conventional war will lead to a disarming attack, not a cease-fire. Beyond deterrence, these capabilities will provide a more humane means of protecting allies who are threatened by nuclear attack and give U.S. leaders the ability to pursue regime change if an adversary acts in a truly egregious fashion. Moreover, some danger of escalation is unavoidable because the style of U.S. conventional operations will inevitably blind, rattle, and confuse U.S. adversaries. If the United States has powerful counterforce tools, these may dissuade its enemies from escalating in desperate times, and U.S. leaders would have a much more acceptable option if deterrence fails. The nuclear forces the United States builds today must be able to act as a reliable deterrent, even in much darker times. Many of those who recommend a much smaller U.S. nuclear arsenal—and assign little importance to a nuclear counterforce option—fail to consider the great difficulties of maintaining deterrence during conventional wars. The U.S. nuclear arsenal should retain sufficient counterforce capabilities to make adversaries think very carefully before threatening to use, putting on alert, or actually using a nuclear weapon. Any nuclear arsenal should also give U.S. leaders options they can stomach employing in these high-risk crises. Without credible and effective options for responding to attacks on allies or U.S. forces, the United States will have difficulty deterring such attacks. Unless the United States maintains potent counterforce capabilities, U.S. adversaries may conclude—perhaps correctly—that the United States’ strategic position abroad rests largely on a bluff.

## heg

### 2nc heg

#### Deeply buried hardened targets ruin conventional weapon viability

Rebeccah Heinrichs and Baker Spring 11-30-2012; Rebeccah Heinrichs is a Visiting Fellow and Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. “Deterrence and Nuclear Targeting in the 21st Century”

<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/11/deterrence-and-nuclear-targeting-in-the-21st-century>

Policy for Counterforce Strategic Targeting In the context of the protect and defend strategy, the U.S. would have an overall strategic posture consisting of a mix of complementary nuclear, conventional, and defensive forces. It is essential to recognize that nuclear weapons are unique. This is due, in part, to their physical qualities, which enable them not only to hit their targets, but to destroy them with a higher level of confidence. In February of this year, U.S. Strategic Command’s Deputy Director for Plans and Policy Greg Weaver said, “You can’t replace nuclear weapons today with conventional capability” because “they don’t have the same effects on targets."[20] Dr. Mark Schneider puts it this way, “Ultimately, an attempt to counter a nuclear attack with conventional weapons would be fighting a yield of up to one million to one.” Although analysts arguing for significant cuts to the nuclear force often make the case that conventional weapons can hold at risk critical targets, it is highly unlikely that conventional weapons can reach deeply buried, hardened targets. One can deduce that an enemy would keep its most valuable assets in such places. Accordingly, the U.S. needs a credible means of holding them at risk. The National Academy of Sciences has reported that there are 10,000 such targets, mostly controlled by foes of the U.S.[21 ]

#### Shift to conventional deterrence blurs the firebreak – they can’t solve conflict and it increases the risk of nuclear escalation

Andrew Krepinevich and Steven Kosiak 1998 – Executive Director and Director of Budget Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Andrew Krepinevich and Steven Kosiak, Winter 1998/99, “The Military Revolution And The Case For Deep Cuts In Nuclear Forces,” http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/A.19981100.The\_Military\_Revol/A.19981100.The\_Military\_Revol.php, JMP)

In the absence of a “sanctuary” regime, there is a danger that transitioning to a highly effective nonnuclear strategic strike capability could actually **make nuclear war more likely**, by blurring the distinction, or “firebreak,” between nonnuclear and nuclear capabilities. In other words, there is a danger that the United States will feel freer than it has in the past to conduct strategic strikes — because it will be able to do so without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, the country on the receiving end may not view such a distinction as particularly meaningful and may well feel compelled to **retaliate with nuclear weapons.**

### XT Conventional Reliance = Prolif

#### Forgoing nuclear strike capabilities crushes prolif credibility effectiveness – adversaries need a great equalizer

Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala 2013; Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “ADVANCED US CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT”, The Nonproliferation Review, 20:1, 107-122, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2012.761790

In this respect, it is arguable that a growing US reliance upon advanced conventional weaponry to dissuade new nuclear challengers will further undermine the possibility for nuclear reductions**.** It is difficult to see how such states could feel secure without building and developing at least a rudimentary nuclear weapons capability to act as a ‘‘great equalizer’’ to US conventional superiority. This has been very publicly demonstrated in diplomatic engagements with both North Korea and Iran, whereby neither state has felt inclined to trade away its actual or potential nuclear programs for a US-backed security guarantee. Nevertheless, it is at least conceivable that a move away from nuclear weapons by the United States will reinforce the norm of nonproliferation and theoretically make it harder for these countries to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Moreover, the deployment of these capabilities in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East may provide a more credible US commitment to the region, assuring other nations of US support, and thus making them less inclined to pursue their own weapons programs. In this regard, it may be that the major positive impact of a move towards US conventional superiority is that it reinforces international non-nuclear norms and thereby makes it both politically and militarily harder for these states to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. While advanced conventional weaponry is arguably a necessary and prudent response to the challenges posed by new nuclear aspirants (and even terrorist groups), in particular by protecting against a surprise missile launch, it is unclear that such developments will assist the abolition agenda. More specifically, advanced US conventional weaponry appears to be one of the drivers of rogue state nuclear proliferation (amongst other factors), and it would seem that both North Korea and Iran fear the combination of missile defense and global strike programs in much the same way that China does. This is arguably why nuclear weapons appear to have such utility for these regimes. When these dynamics are taken into consideration it is hard to see how the Obama plan can lead to a situation where either current or future ‘‘rogue states’’ are less likely to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The same requirement to accept some degree of vulnerability applies to trust building, no matter how limited\*even with nuclear aspirants\*and therefore the invulnerability provided by BMD and PGS works against future progress.38

### XT Nukes Key

#### Perception is key – nuclear weapons ensure credibility and leadership

Keith Payne**,** 2009; professor in the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University and president of the National Institute for Public Policy (Spring, Dr. Keith B., Strategic Studies Quarterly, “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf

The Nuclear Disarmament Vision Throughout the Cold War and post–Cold War years, various groups and individuals have put forth initiatives for the long-term elimination of nuclear weapons or their near-term reduction to small numbers. With the end of the Cold War, many thoughtful people understandably question why the United States should continue to maintain nuclear weapons, particularly if most plausible adversaries can be defeated militarily with conventional forces alone. The point here is that, on some occasions, deterrence and assurance will be the priority goals. Numerous countries— including contemporary opponents and allies—give every indication that they perceive unique value in nuclear weapons for those purposes, whether or not US domestic commentators believe it or want it to be true. Those **perceptions alone create the potential value of nuclear weapons for deterring opponents and assuring allies.**

#### Iraq proves – there’s a difference in crises

Keith Payne**,** 2009; professor in the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University and president of the National Institute for Public Policy (Spring, Dr. Keith B., Strategic Studies Quarterly, “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf

Of course, the explanations of apparent Iraqi restraint offered by Tariq Aziz, Wafic Al Sammarai, and Hussein Kamal do not close the issue; they do, however, suggest that nuclear deterrence was at least part of the answer as to why **Saddam Hussein did not use WMD in 1991** when he apparently had the option to do so. These explanations also suggest the profound error of those prominent commentators who asserted with such certainty immediately after the 1991 war that **nuclear weapons were “incredible as a deterrent** andtherefore irrelevant**,**”28 and the fragility of similar contemporary claims that US nuclear threats are incredible and thus useless for contemporary regional deterrence purposes.29

### 2NC Evidence Comparison/Impact Calc

#### Give us the benefit of the doubt – their authors’ predictions are unproven and nuclear deterrence has worked so far

Keith Payne**,** 2009; professor in the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University and president of the National Institute for Public Policy (Spring, Dr. Keith B., Strategic Studies Quarterly, “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf

There should be no presumption that nuclear threats always will make the difference between effective deterrence or its failure. The capability, however, to threaten an adversary’s valued assets with great lethality and from afar—including well-protected targets—may be critical for some US deterrence purposes. Unless future leadership decision making is different from that of the past, in some cases nuclear threat options will contribute to deterrence. **Given literally decades of experience, the burden of proof lies with those who now contend that nuclear weapons are unnecessary for deterrence**; considerable available evidence contradicts such a contention.

The decisions of Britain and France also suggest the continuing value of nuclear weapons for deterrence. Both have reaffirmed their long-term commitments to maintaining their nuclear capabilities for deterrence purposes, including deterrence of rogue states and other possible future unexpected contingencies.40

Also indicative of the continuing deterrence value of nuclear weapons are Russia’s and China’s decisions to modernize and expand their nuclear arsenals41 and the apparent desire of North Korea, Iran, and possibly Syria to possess nuclear weapons.42 North Korean officials have pointed to the value of nuclear weapons for deterrence:

Today’s reality verifies that the [North Korean] nuclear deterrent constitutes the one and only means that can prevent war on the Korean peninsula and defend peace in this region. . . . We will strengthen our nuclear deterrent in every way to prevent war and defend peace on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia and will take a decisive self-defensive countermeasure at the necessary time.43

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is “an all-purpose cost effective instrument of foreign policy . . . the single most important lever in its asymmetric conflicts and negotiations with South Korea, the United States, and Japan.”44 So too, Iranian officials reportedly attribute great deterrence value to nuclear weapons. Following Iran’s costly war with Iraq in the 1980s, and the subsequent 1991 Gulf War,

Iranian leaders believed that nuclear weapons were the ultimate instrument of asymmetric warfare. They held that if Iraq had had nuclear weapons [in 1991], the United States would never have attacked it. Hence, in January 1995, Iran signed a contract with Russia for the completion of a nuclear power plant in the city of Bushehr, which . . . provided Iran with a pretext to begin building a complete fuel cycle, with the aim of producing enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.45

The material question is not whether commentators believe nuclear weapons “ought” to have value for deterrence in a normative sense; they have demonstrated that value. The question is whether we are willing to accept the risk of deterrence failure on those occasions in which the United States could not threaten nuclear escalation, possibly including threats to some adversaries’ highly valued/protected targets. The added risk of deterrence failure flowing from such an inability surely cannot be calculated a priori with precision. It may be nonexistent or high, depending on the specific circumstances of the contingency. **Even if the risk of deterrence failure for this reason is low**, however, the possibility would **still deserve serious consideration** because the consequences of a single failure to deter WMD attack could be measured in thousands to millions of US and allied casualties. And, of course, that risk may not be low.

## prolif

### 2nc prolif internal

#### Also – changes in US policy are irrelevant to political proliferation decisions

Bruce M. Sugden 2008; defense analyst in the Washington, DC area. He does consulting for the Department of Defense and commercial clients on combating weapons of mass destruction, future global strike force structure alternatives, nuclear policy and strategy, and emerging deterrence requirements and technology issues. He earned master's degrees in international relations and public policy studies at the University of Chicago and served for six years in the U.S. Air Force as a missile launch officer; ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC HORIZON; Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, November 2008

While U.S. nuclear policy is certainly a major consideration in Russian and Chinese nuclear strategic thought, there is mixed evidence regarding it as a strong causal factor across cases of nuclear proliferation over the past twenty years. First, Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests were based heavily on its perception of India as a threat.14 Second, in 2004, the Central Intelligence Agency’s special advisor report on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program assessed that ‘‘Iran was the pre-eminent motivator’’ underlying Iraq’s latent WMD program.15 Subordinate reasons for Iraq’s program were to balance against Israel and wield influence throughout the Arab world. Third, although the case of India shows some evidence that states might link their proliferation efforts to the connection between U.S. nuclear policy\*and the policies of other nuclear states recognized by the NPT\*and the status and international prestige of being a great power, some analysts disagree on the relative causal weight of factors behind India’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. For example, in the 1970s Paul Power showed that the leadership of India viewed the NPT as a discriminatory treaty that produced a monopoly of power and failed to prevent the growth of existing nuclear arsenals.16 Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai said that India would sign the NPT only if the other nuclear weapon states destroyed their arsenals.17 In 1998, following India’s detonation of nuclear devices, T.V. Paul assigned primary causal weight to India’s perception of NPT-recognized nuclear states as a privileged class in international politics. Their unwillingness to recognize India as an equal exacerbated the perception.18 In 1999, Sumit Ganguly argued that three factors were behind India’s 1998 nuclear tests: scientific advances in India’s nuclear research and development program; ideological and domestic political influences that were constrained by national security considerations; and perceived security threats in the absence of security assurances from the NPT recognized nuclear states.19 Rodney Jones, however, disagrees with Ganguly’s analysis. Jones argues that India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which directed the nuclear tests, sought to raise India’s global status through the tests to improve the BJP’s political popularity.20 Furthermore, nuclear reversals have occurred despite the largely static nature of U.S. nuclear policy at the time of the reversals. Several states\*Argentina, Brazil, and Egypt, for example\*tried to develop nuclear weapons programs but then gave up.

### prolif—no prolif

#### Proliferation is not going to happen

**Alison 10** (Graham, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Foreign Affairs volume 89, issue 1, pages 74-85, "Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats", <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19819/nuclear_disorder.html>,)

After listening to a compelling briefing for a proposal or even in summarizing an argument presented by himself, Secretary of State George Marshall was known to pause and ask, "But how could we be wrong?" In that spirit, it is important to examine the reasons why the nonproliferation regime might actually be more robust than it appears. Start with the bottom line. There are no more nuclear weapons states now than there were at the end of the Cold War. Since then, one undeclared and largely unrecognized nuclear weapons state, South Africa, eliminated its arsenal, and one new state, North Korea, emerged as the sole self-declared but unrecognized nuclear weapons state.  One hundred and eighty-four nations have forsworn the acquisition of nuclear weapons and signed the NPT. At least 13 countries began down the path to developing nuclear weapons with serious intent, and were technologically capable of completing the journey, but stopped short of the finish line: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Iraq, Italy, Libya, Romania, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia. Four countries had nuclear weapons but eliminated them: South Africa completed six nuclear weapons in the 1980s and then, prior to the transfer of power to the postapartheid government, dismantled them. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine together inherited more than 4,000 strategic nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991. As a result of negotiated agreements among Russia, the United States, and each of these states, all of these weapons were returned to Russia for dismantlement. Ukraine's 1,640 strategic nuclear warheads were dismantled, and the highly enriched uranium was blended down to produce low-enriched uranium, which was sold to the United States to fuel its nuclear power plants. Few Americans are aware that, thanks to the Megatons to Megawatts Program, half of all the electricity produced by nuclear power plants in the United States over the past decade has been fueled by enriched uranium blended down from the cores of nuclear warheads originally designed to destroy American cities. Although they do not minimize the consequences of North Korea's or Iran's becoming a nuclear weapons state, those confident in the stability of the nuclear order are dubious about the prospects of a cascade of proliferation occurring in Asia, the Middle East, or elsewhere. In Japan, nuclear neuralgia has deep roots. The Japanese people suffered the consequences of the only two nuclear weapons ever exploded in war. Despite their differences, successive Japanese governments have remained confident in the U.S. nuclear umbrella and in the cornerstone of the United States' national security strategy in Asia, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance. The South Koreans fear a nuclear-armed North Korea, but they are even more fearful of life without the U.S. nuclear umbrella and U.S. troops on the peninsula. Taiwan is so penetrated and seduced by China that the terror of getting caught cheating makes it a poor candidate to go nuclear. And although rumors of the purchase by Myanmar (also called Burma) of a Yongbyon-style nuclear reactor from North Korea cannot be ignored, questions have arisen about whether the country would be able to successfully operate it.  In the Middle East, it is important to separate abstract aspirations from realistic plans. Few countries in the region have the scientific and technical infrastructure to support a nuclear weapons program. Saudi Arabia is a plausible buyer, although the United States would certainly make a vigorous effort to persuade it that it would be more secure under a U.S. nuclear umbrella than with its own arsenal. Egypt's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, meanwhile, is limited by its weak scientific and technical infrastructure, unless it were able to rent foreign expertise. And a Turkish nuclear bomb would not only jeopardize Turkey's role in NATO but also undercut whatever chances the country has for acceding to the EU.  Looking elsewhere, Brazil is now operating an enrichment facility but has signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which outlaws nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and has accepted robust legal constraints, including those of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Other than South Africa, which retains the stockpile of 30 bombs' worth of highly enriched uranium that was once part of its nuclear program, it is difficult to identify other countries that might realistically become nuclear weapons states in the foreseeable future.

#### Won’t happen – too expensive and controversial

**Tepperman 09** - former Deputy Managing Ed. Foreig Affairs and Assistant Managing Ed. Newsweek (Jonathon, Newsweek, “Why Obama should Learn to Love the Bomb”, 44:154, 9-7)

The risk of an arms race--with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one--is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; **that's spread at glacial pace**." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors--Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say--might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

# 1nr

## nietzsche

### 2nc overview

#### 9/11 tore a rift in the nation’s identity which the government inscribed with a narrative of victimhood – the aff reasserts this innocent helplessness by placing the responsibility of protection squarely in the hands of the law – that erodes agency while assuaging our civil consciousness allowing the government to wage endless wars, in order to vote aff you have to determine that the govt should have your agency to choose your means of death, they have no defense of that – use the ballot to jump from the twin towers in the face of the 1ac’s catastrophe – that disruption of sovereign control through willful demise is a prerequisite to any productive action

**Duschinsky, ’11** Professor at University of Northumbria (Robbie Duschinsky, Spring 2011, “Nietzsche: Through the Lens of Purity,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies Iss. 41)//CC

By contrast, Joanne Faulkner demonstrates both the salience of the theme of purity in Nietzsche and the important contemporary stakes in conducting such a reading.23 In the context of examining discourses of innocence in post–9/11 reconstructions of American identity, Faulkner proposes that at the core of social contract theory is an assumption that a state of personal and communal innocence has to be set aside to enter into the dirtying, compromised, fallen world of civil association. For Faulkner, it is this guilt that, as Nietzsche states, is the precondition of sovereign individuals who can make promises and who take responsibility for themselves and their actions. The implication is that the innocent can have no effective political agency and must be protected. The innocent victims of 9/11 have mandated war abroad and the curtailment of civil liberties at home, as "an eternally aggrieved icon of national identity: a perennially threatened and victimized creature of ressentiment who 'in order to exist first needs a hostile external world.'"24 Against this, Faulkner sets Nietzsche's notion of the innocence of becoming, which insists that there is no transcendent realm against which our lives can be judged. The innocence of becoming poses rather that creative activity and choices, based on the available options that chance presents to the individual, serve as their own justification.25 The metaphysical purity of innocent victim-hood has made certain bellicose actions on the part of state institutions appear as natural and seemingly neutral. Thus Faulkner's work indicates the stakes in using Nietzsche for considering alternative ways of seeing innocence and purity.

#### the 1ac is the will to will – when power reaches its peak it turns back on itself – now the government must fight itself – that’s the death-knell of civilization

**Kroker 2k11.** Arther Kroker, professor of political science at Victoria University, director of the Pacific Centre for Technology and Culture, “The Arab Spring: The Contradictions of Obama’s Charismatic Liberalism,” CT Theory, <http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=679>, January 27th, 2011

Delivered on June 4, 2009 at Cairo University, this speech provided Obama with an opportunity to address the world community of Muslims. The setting of the speech was politically volatile, with Egyptian faculty and students in attendance taking careful note of the American occupation of Iraq as well as the American invasion of Afghanistan. In the United States, powerful media voices demanded a new crusade against Islam while in the Muslim world the most violent forms of political resistance against American soldiers were widely viewed as morally justified. To the highly selective targeting of Muslims by all the policing strategies involved in the War on Terror, the Islamic counter-response was as sudden as it was terminal -- the destruction by suicide bombs, by IEDs, by the sword, of American targets of opportunity. To the American military's documented acquiescence in war crimes by the Shia-dominated security forces against Sunni Muslims, young Arab resistance fighters sought out opportunities for revenge killings that would have maximum media impact. In all this, Obama was no innocent. His endorsement of the concept of a "Just War" motivated his strong and persistent support for the invasion of Afghanistan. While he may have decried the use of extra-judicial procedures such as the rendition of political suspects to torture chambers in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Eastern and Central Europe, his concern with American security led him to support draconian surveillance and policing tactics in America, including bunkering North America in a Perimeter Defence. For all his protestations against Bush's Guantanamo, the prison has still not been closed, and Obama has proved reluctant to provide the full measure of judicial protections for CIA nominated terrorist suspects. All this to say, the Obama that rose tospeak in that sun drenched Cairo day was a fully contradictory figure, compromised by a war raging not only in America itself but in his own liberal heart--ideals versus realities, reason versus passion. As the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre might have said, Obama was entangled in the "practico-inert" of the War on Terror with all its political nomenclature concerning bodies that needed to be secured by the power of government and bodies that don't matter and, hence, could be **disavowed, excluded, marginalized**. At the same time, by force of political conviction Obama was driven to transcend the limitations of his political predicament. In this sense, his speech in Cairo was a way of throwing his general political project into the future, breaking with the past in order to negotiate new pathways through a fully uncertain future. This is evident in the first measures of the speech that began with a political confession of responsibility: We meet at this time of great tension between the United States and Muslims around the world -- tension rooted in historical forces that go **beyond any current policy debate**. The relationship between Islam and the West includes centuries of coexistence and cooperation, but also conflict and religious wars. More recently, tension has been **fed by colonialism** that denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims, and a Cold War in which Muslim-majority countries were often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations. Moreover, the sweeping change brought by modernity and globalization led many Muslims to view the West as hostile to the traditions of Islam. There we have it: colonialism as the source of political disenfranchisement of Muslims and a Cold War that resulted in many "Muslim-majority countries" being treated as pawns in the larger games involved in the clash of imperial powers. Political history of this order surely sows the seeds of distrust and suspicion among subject populations, providing fertile ground for the growth of resistance networks among those who refuse to bend to the will to colonial domination. For Obama, the results are as self-evident as they are dangerous. Violent extremists have exploited these tensions in a small but potent minority of Muslims. The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the continued efforts of these extremists toengage in violence against civilians has led many in my country to view Islam as inevitably hostile not only to America and Western countries, but also to human rights.All this has bred **more fear and more mistrust**. If the aim of **effective political rhetoric** is to **frame the interpretation of events in advance**, implicitly def**ining what is considered to be intelligible and consequently within the boundaries of moral acceptability and what is considered to be unintelligible and thus to be disavowed**, marginalized, and excluded, Obama's opening statement is noteworthy. Rather than side with majoritarian American opinion that continues to hold that the events of 9/11 had no historical context, representing an irrational act of extremist violence against an unsuspecting nation, Obama does something different. He brings into intelligibility the events of 9/11, noting that the story of domination and power that was implicit to the history of colonialism and the Cold War finds its inevitable result in what the historian, Chalmers Johnson, once described as "**blowback**." [[1]](http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=679#_edn1) Of course, Chalmers went to his death noting that America was caught up in a fatal mythological spiral associated with the rise and fall of empires. From Chalmers' perspective, the migration of the United States from Republic to Empire has **inevitably fatal consequences**, committing American future to the classic rhythms of political mythology whereby the project of grasping for power, particularly the power of global domination, creates in its wake unpredictable historical consequences: **melancholic subjectivity as the keynote of American subjectivity, gathering hints of nemesis abroad, followed by spectacular acts of revenge-taking by subjected populations**. Perhaps it was with something like this in mind that led Obama to break with the harsh policies of the Bush regime, encapsulated in all its bitterness and sense of American exceptionalism in the phrase -- "You're either with us or against us." Presiding in the bleak aftermath of the Bush administration with poll after poll confirming profound mistrust of American intentions in Muslim countries, Obama chose not to evade issues of mistrust, fear and skepticism but to do the opposite, namely to turn directly into the wind of Islamic discontent. In doing so, **Obama's Cairo speech is a lesson in the metaphysics of power**. While the Bush administration implicitly operated on the basis of a theory of power that held that power must always expand, must always seek out new opportunities for control, that the world must be subjected to military policies aimed at "full spectrum dominance," Obama's theory of power is different. Perhaps at some point he might have reflected on Nietzsche'sThe Will to Power wherein Nietzsche argued that power **always seeks external resistances in order to thrive**, that power establishes boundaries and limits in order both to test its strength as well as to mobilize its energies. In the most mature stages of the development of power, a period that Nietzsche described as "**completed nihilism**," the will to power, **finding itself without external enemies of merit**, turns back on itself, **making of itself its own opposition**. Considered in terms of political theory, while the Bush administration represented the highpoint of American will to power before its political fortunes stalled in the face of gathering global opposition, the Obama administration may be **the quintessential expression of power as the will to will**, that point where power, **having tested its outer limits, turns back upon itself**. In retrospect, the Bush political administration probably represented the last bacchanalian feast of power in its purest form. Here, the power of American empire having no manifest enemy was finally liberated to be power in its final stage -- **power as a pure sign**. Globally hegemonic in its military claims to "full spectrum dominance" of time and space as well as "metabolic domination" of the world population, the feast of American power expanded with **implosive energies** -- a financial sector that transformed the machinery of capitalist transactions into an economic landscape where money in the form of credit finally **floated free of any solvency requirements**; a housing sector that increasingly operated on the basis of purely virtual value standards, with the value of homes measured by aesthetic standards; and **a consumer sector where the delusional economy of zero credit requirements** made individual over-indebtedness a structural requirement of **the operation of the system as a whole**.

#### extinction inevitable – only thing that matters is how we face it

Nietzsche 1886 [fredrich, “beyond good and evil”, aph # 225, pg. 342]

Whether hedonism, or pessimism, or utilitarianism, or eudaimonianism (6)—all these ways of thinking, which measure the value of things according to pleasure and pain, that is, according to contingent circumstances and secondary issues, are ways of thinking in the foreground and naïveté, which everyone who knows about creative forces and an artistic conscience will look down on, not without ridicule and not without compassion. Compassion for yourself—that is, of course, not compassion the way you mean the term: it's not pity for social "needs," for "society" and its sick and unlucky people, with those depraved and broken down from the start, and with the way they lie on the ground all around us—even less is it compassion for the grumbling oppressed, the rebellious slave classes, who strive for mastery—they call it "Freedom." Our compassion is a higher compassion which sees further—we see how man is making himself smaller, how you make him smaller—and there are moments when we look at your compassion with an indescribable anxiety, where we defend ourselves against this compassion—where we find your seriousness more dangerous than any carelessness. You want, if possible—and there is no wilder "if possible"—to do away with suffering. What about us? It does seem that we would prefer it to be higher and worse than it ever was! Well being, the way you understand it, that's no goal. To us that looks like an end, a condition which immediately makes human beings laughable and contemptible, something which makes their destruction desirable! The culture of suffering, of great suffering, don't you realize that up to this point it is only this suffering which has created all the things which raise man up?

#### Their framework makes them extratopical—resolved means to personally think about things—fiat is extratopical and allows them to claim absurd solvency arguments that we can’t predict, which is a reason to reject the team.

**AHD 2k6.** American Heritage Dictionary

resolved v. To cause (a person) to reach a decision.

#### Their framework skips the important parts of policymaking – internal link turns their offense

**Carpentier 2011** (Nico, asst prof comm @  Vrije Universiteit Brussel “Policy’s Hubris: Power, Fantasy, and the Limits of (Global) Media Policy Interventions” The Handbook of Global Media and Communication Policy, First Edition.)

This discussion on the nature of policy brings us to an encounter with a set of key assumptions which will be theorized here as fantasies, using a Lacanian framework.4 The reason for using this framework is that there are implicit claims embedded within policy debates that are partially (discursive) power strategies but, partially also, fantasies about control and harmony. And within a Lacanian framework, fantasy beholds the promise of the unachievable wholeness and the harmonious resolution of social antagonism. Although this access to the Real is impossible, the fantasy, as such, and the desire for wholeness and harmony that lies behind it remain crucial driving forces and feed into the strategies that the diversity of (policy) actors develop. This also implies that these fantasies become part of our social realities in many different ways, for instance, as utopian driving forces for political activity and as discursive strategies for legitimating policies. A first fantasy has already been mentioned in the discussion about the classic perspective on policy. In the introductory part of his discussion of media policy, which carries the title “Is policy political?,” Freedman (2008: 2) refers to the mechanical perspective of policy-making, which marginalizes “political agency in favour of administrative technique and scientific principles” and becomes “the domain of small thoughts, bureaucratic tidiness and administrative effectiveness.” This fantasy of isolating policy from politics (and from the political) is a protective strategy to generate a harmonious and consensual zone within the social, out side political conflicts and antagonisms, which is believed to be governed by bureaucratic principles and/or legalistic mechanisms. This way of thinking is very much related to the ideology of “endism,” which proclaimed the end of ideology and claimed that this would lead to the replacement of politics by a managerial culture (see, for instance, Burnham (1941) and Bell (1960) ). More contemporary critical frameworks refer to (and critique) the post-political and the post-democratic, where the latter is defined by Rancière (2007: 88) as “the rule of the principle of unification of the multitude under the common law of the One.” Not only does this lead to the conflation of the “pays légal” and the “pays reél” (to use the two marvellous French concepts that allow us to distinguish between legislation and social practice), but it also becomes a form of strategic power that allows for the mobilization of actors (and their minds and bodies), discourses, and objects to legitimize the hegemonization of specific political projects by reverting to the claim that these projects are outside the political. However important this fantasy may be, it is structurally frustrated by the permanent reemergence of antagonisms and conflicts. This brings us to Mouffe’s (2005: 9) argument that the political is structurally defined by “power, conflict and antagonism.” Her work challenges the post-political status quo, which assumes that a societal consensus is reached or reachable. Not surprisingly, the last sentence of her 2005 book On the Political is a plea for “abandoning the dream of a reconciled world that would have overcome power, sovereignty and hegemony” (Mouffe 2005: 130; my emphasis). Through the contingency of the social, any hegemony and social imaginary, however phantasmagorically comforting it may be, remains vulnerable to contestation, and even the most sedimented and takenfor-granted certainties can become unfixed and fluid, as they are permanently vulnerable to rearticulation. In Mouffe’s (2005: 18) words: “What is at a given moment considered as the ‘natural’ order – jointly with the ‘common sense’ which accompanies it – is the result of sedimented practices; it is never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into being.”

#### the 1nc was an interpretation of the world through art – that’s the only way – voter issue

**Strong, ‘3** distinguished professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego (Tracy B. Strong, “Where are we when we are beyond good and evil,” 24 Cardozo L Rev.)//CC

The spirit that would become a free spirit at now a midway point, where he flies about the world in a kind of “curiosity mingled with tender contempt,” unattached to anything even by love or hatred. One step more and the distance of the midpoint fades in the astonishment of that which is at hand. He is besides himself, literally in ecstasy. This is still not the final stage; it is instead a stage in which the spirit realizes suddenly that the very distance it had from the world—its “tender contempt”—was itself generative of “for and against” and was, in that way, an injustice against the world. The astonishment of the close at hand is a consequence of the realization that one must not rest in the position that one’s critical distance provides. “You shall become master (Herr) over yourself; master also over your own virtues. Before they were your masters.”46 (Thus, to recall, he writes to Lou Salom6: “The old word once again: become who you are. First you must be liberated from your fetters; then you must be liberated from your liberation.”). The realization here is that the one becomes the perspective that one takes. But it is clear that perspectivalism is not a recommendation for a moderate and tolerant pluralism, nor even an agonistic one. Nietzsche clearly, as Babich notes, “does not claim the same value or right for every perspective.”47 In relation to morality, what does this mean? What kind of understanding is present here? What does he know? In the 1886 preface he added to the new edition of the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche notes that what he had hit upon in that book was the question of “the problem of knowledge—das Problem der Wissenschaft” a problem that cannot be understood on knowledge grounds alone. Nietzsche sees himself as having wanted to argue that the preconditions for the possibility of knowledge lies not in knowledge itself, but in art; and art cannot be understood except in the optic of “life.” He calls attention to how bad the book is in his present judgment and then indicates that it “settled accounts more with the profanum vulgus of the so-called educated than with the ‘people’.” His word for the operation that produces this knowledge (the knowledge, that is, that absolute truth is an illusion and that this illusion is the source of nihilism) is “what is Dionysian.” This means, in the end, to look at morality from the perspective, the optic, of life. What does this mean? Life, he tells us, “rests on appearance (Schein), art, deception, optics, the necessity of the perspectival and of error.” If you believe in a better life— Nietzsche’s next sentence starts “Christianity was from the beginning.. ..”—then you believe in a life that is not appearance. Yet a perspectival understanding of the world must always experience itself as inadequate, as refusing the last word. It means, in other words, that one knows that the world is always more than one makes of it, and yet that our knowledge of the world is what knowledge is. This means, however, that any claim of finality of knowledge is necessarily wrong. What difference does it then make to say that by virtue of what one is one does injustice to the world, that any structure of the world must acknowledge its own contingency, that is that one’s understanding of the world must always be defeasible? It means a number of things: This world must ultimately find itself condemned by virtue of the fact that it is only what one makes of it. This means that we must live in injustice to the world. What difference does it make to say that by virtue of what one is, one does injustice to the world, that is, that one must always understand the world in a manner that is principally and foundationally defeasible? It means at least that this world (the only world) must be seen as wanting when viewed from a moral and epistemological framework. In turn, this implies that the privileging of morality and epistemology—any structure of knowledge—will always be self-defeating.\*8 Yet this is not simply the recognition of the epistemological claim that one can never make final sense of the world. I can go now to a fuller text of a passage cited at the beginning of this essay. At the beginning of the fourth book of The Gay Science, Nietzsche finds himself making a New Year’s resolution. The recognition of the coterminousness of the sum and the cogito (“Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum. Today each permits himself to express his desire, his most precious thought”)49 leads to this wish: “I want to learn more and more how to understand necessity in things as the beautiful in itself.” As noted above in the drafts of this version, Nietzsche had followed these words with, “[m]ay I weigh more and more with the pans of an aesthetic scale and less and less with those of a moral one.” Hence, in the 1886 preface to the Birth, we find a sentence that revises the most famous claim of the Birth. In that passage, he writes: “It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that the existence of the world (Dasein der Welt) is justified.”50 Slight but important variations have come about. This sentence had appeared twice in the Birth and reads the first time: “It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence (Dasein) and the world is eternally justified.” The second time it reads: “It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world appear justified.”51 Noteworthy is Nietzsche’s hesitation in the body of the text between “is eternally” and “appear.” The final formulation of this matter as “is” justifies the understanding that appearance, eternality, and being have finally come together in Nietzsche’s thought. Furthermore, in the 1872 text, existence and the world were separated, as he was still responding to an apparent Schopenhauerism that there is something behind the world of appearance. Now he writes of the Dasein of the world. As he himself notes, he had reasons to engage in a “self-critique.” He had finally come to the full understanding that there was no beyond. It is in this context that we can understand precisely what Nietzsche meant by a “lawgiver.” It is worth noting in this context that his admiration for the “Pre-Platonic” philosophers, as he noteworthily calls them, is for them as Wissenschaftlicher and as political men. Empedocles, who for Nietzsche might have provided a political alternative to Socrates, was a poet, religious teacher, statesman, physiologist (i.e., one of the physiologoi, those who understood physis) and, one supposes, a philosopher.

### 2nc at perm

#### The perm bankrupts the alt – there is no middle ground for their motivations

**Wrisley No Date** (George, Prof of Philosophy @ U Iowa, “What Should Our Attitude Towards Suffering Be,” Nietzsche and Suffeirng- A Choice of Attitudes and Ideals, <http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=site%3Ageorgewrisley.com+What+Should+Our+Attitude+Towards+Suffering+Be&aq=f&oq=&aqi>=) Zanezor

How should we comport ourselves to the suffering we find in our lives? When touching a hot stove or confronted with danger, our natural reactions are to pull back, to flee, to find safety. In general it seems that we naturally shy away from discomfort and pain—suffering of all types. The child laments his boring afternoon and the adult fears the impending death of a parent and the subsequent anguish the loss will bring, hoping and wishing they will never come. Suffering, it seems, is quite rightly seen as undesirable. However: When a misfortune strikes us, we can overcome it either by removing its cause or else by changing the effect it has on our feelings, that is, by reinterpreting the misfortune as a good, whose benefit may only later become clear. So, should we seek to abolish suffering as far as we can by removing its cause, or should we attempt to change our attitude toward suffering such that it is no longer seen as (always) undesirable? Taking Nietzsche seriously when he says that it is the meaning of our suffering that has been the problem, I will attempt to indirectly answer this question by looking at two possibilities found in Nietzsche for giving meaning to our suffering. The first possibility concerns a religious ethic that, according to Nietzsche, views suffering as undesirable, but which ultimately uses mendacious and deleterious means to provide a meaning for human suffering. The second possibility concerns the extent to which we can say Nietzsche endorsed the idea of giving meaning to suffering through acknowledging its necessary role in human enhancement and greatness. Since the religious ethic sees suffering as undesirable and thus something ultimately to be avoided (being itself the paradigmatic means for easing suffering), and the means it uses to give suffering meaning are ultimately mendacious, I will argue that if Nietzsche is significantly correct in both his attack on religious morality and his alternative ideal, we can take this as evidence that the avoidance of suffering is not the proper attitude. Unfortunately, I will not be able to address the question of whether Nietzsche is significantly correct in this paper. Secondly, given Nietzsche’s positive alternative—one that embraces the necessary role suffering has for the enhancement of human life—I will argue that we can take this as evidence that it is our attitude toward suffering that needs to be modified, i.e., we should modify so that we no longer see suffering as something to be avoided. Because of this, the middle position of avoiding suffering when possible and then seeing its positive attributes when it does occur does not recommend itself. That is, since it will be argued that suffering has a positive and necessary role to play, to seek to avoid it as far as possible and then to acknowledge its positive aspects when it does occur, is not really to acknowledge and accept suffering’s positive and necessary role. However, as we will see, all of this is complicated by the issue of the order of rank as found in Nietzsche’s writings.

### at vtl inev

#### They make death desirable.

Kaufman 74. Walter Kaufman, professor of philosophy at Princeton University, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*. Princeton Press, 1974, pg. 394-395

In fact, Nietzsche asks explicitly: “Perhaps art is even a necessary corollary and supplement of science?” (GT 14). In the next sentence, he replies: “…it must now be said how the influence of Socrates…again and again prompts a regeneration of art” (15). Far from merely presaging a solution, Nietzsche then tries systematically to show how the “sublime metaphysical delusion” of Socrates is that very instinct which leads science ever again to its own limits—at which it must necessarily give way to art. Socratism—i.e., the rationalistic tendency—was not arbitrarily injected into the Greek mind by Socrates; it was “already effective before Socrates” and “only gained in him an indescribably magnificent expression” (14). What—Nietzsche asks in the end—would have happened to mankind without Socrates? He finds in Socrates the only turning point…of world history. For if one were to think of this whole incalculable sum of energy…as not employed in the service of knowledge, …then the instinctive lust for life would probably have been so weakened in general wars of annihilation…that suicide would have become a general custom, and individuals might have experienced the final remnant of a sense of duty when…strangling their parents and friends:…[15]. This is the final vision of the *Birth of Tragedy*—except for the appended application to Wagnerian opera. Unrestrained pessimism would not only fail to produce a great art, but it would lead to race suicide. The Socratic heritage, the elemental passion for knowledge, must “by virtue of its own infinity guarantee the infinity” and continuation of art (15). In the picture of the “theoretical man” who dedicates his life to the pursuit of truth, Nietzsche pays homage to the “dignity” of Socrates. At the same time his own features mingle with those of his ideal (15). Socratism is the antithesis of tragedy, but Nietzsche asks “whether the birth of an artistic Socrates is altogether a contradiction in terms” (14), and nobody has ever found a better characterization of Nietzsche himself. At the end of section 15, we must find another self-portrait: “the *Socrates who practices music*.” In Nietzsche’s first book as in his last, Socrates is criticized but still *aufgehoben* in—still part of­­­­—the type Nietzsche most admires. Here is Nietzsche’s own estimate of *The Birth of Tragedy*: It smells offensively Hegelian, and the cadaverous perfume of Schopenhauer sticks out to a few formulas. An “idea”—the antithesis of the Dionysian and the Apollinian—translated into the realm of metaphysics; history itself as the deployment of this “idea”; in tragedy this antithesis is *aufgehoben* [still part of] into a unity; and in this perspective, things that had never before faced each other are suddenly juxtaposed, used to illuminate each other, and comprehended [begriffen] [EH-GT 1].

### at may

#### May is silly – there are no objective values one can struggle against – their card supports Hitler’s struggle to eradicate the Jews as much as it does the plan

**Curmudgeon 11** [September 14, 2011, The Curmudgeon's Attic, Pseudonymn of anonymous philosopher, J.D., University of Texas School of Law, “The Thing As It Is A Reply to Todd May’s “The Meaningfulness of Lives” in the New York Times”]

Todd May, a professor of philosophy at Clemson University, wrote this article as part of a philosophy series, The Stone, in something called The Opinionater (online content only) in the New York Times. Because I’ve had lunch and need something meaningful to do with my life until my next meal (you’ll understand the reference if you read to the end of the post), allow me to parse Mr. May’s observations, in the process, hopefully providing some clarity: *Who among us has not asked whether his or her life is a meaningful one? Who has not wondered — on a sleepless night, during a long stretch of dull or taxing work, or when a troubled child seems a greater burden than one can bear — whether in the end it all adds up to anything? On this day, too, when many are steeped in painful reminders of personal loss, it is natural to wonder about the answers.* Indeed, I have wondered these very things myself. Does it all add up to anything? The fact of one’s existence is unalterable. Descartes told us we know we exist because we can think about whether or not we do. But what does it mean for the fact of one’s existence to add up to anything? Nothing that we do will be remembered for long after we’re gone. Even the extravagant pains Egyptian pharaohs took to preserve their existence only haltingly succeeded, and they go back only about four or five thousand years. So **if “adding up to anything” means that we will be eternally remembered by other humans,** then **no, our lives don’t add up to anything**. But if it instead means that we are a tiny link in an eternal chain of events in space-time, specks in a vast universe to be sure, but still, specks, then the fact that we exist or existed adds up to as much as it possibly can. *A meaningful life is distinct from a happy life or a morally good one.* I just love philosophers that offer platitudes like this without offering any supporting reasoning. How do we know a meaningful life is distinct from a happy life or a morally good one? Perhaps just because the words have different meanings? Can a happy life be meaningful? How about a morally good one? Is meaningfulness decided by others, or by the one who is actually living the life? Happiness, we know, is subjective. Hitler may have been happy, and his life had great meaning, if meaning is determined by the effect one’s life has on others, and several million German citizens apparently thought it to be a morally good one at some point or another. So is this philosophical exegesis pointing us to meaningful, happy and moral life modeled after Hitler’s? *The philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre thought that, without God, our lives are bereft of meaning. He tells us in his essay “Existentialism,” “if God does not exist, we find no values or commands to turn to which legitimize our conduct. So, in the bright realm of values, we have no excuse behind us, nor justification before us.” On this view, God gives our lives the values upon which meaning rests. And if God does not exist, as Sartre claims, our lives can have only the meaning we confer upon them.* For Sartre, meaningfulness is more or less completely subjective. God’s existence can not be proved or disproved. God is a matter of belief, which is, of course, subjective. So if meaningfulness is subjective and God is also, then God can provide meaningfulness to one’s life. *This seems wrong on two counts. First, why would the existence of God guarantee the meaningfulness of each of our lives? Is a life of unremitting drudgery or unrequited struggle really redeemed if there’s a larger plan, one to which we have no access, into which it fits? That would be small compensation for a life that would otherwise feel like a waste — a point not lost on thinkers like Karl Marx, who called religion the “opium of the people.” Moreover, does God actually ground the values by which we live? Do we not, as Plato recognized 2500 years ago, already have to think of those values as good in order to ascribe them to God?* This paragraph screams for some clarification as to what one means when discussing God. Is God a beneficent, if also irascible and churlish, old man, looking over us, concerned with our personal welfare, much as God is described in the Old Testament story of the Exodus? Or is it an omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent being not amenable to anthropomorphizing? Or, is God just generally, as Plato observed, a coalescence of our ideas of what is good as opposed to that which is evil? Without understanding the nature of the God referred to here, there is no way to know whether or not God’s existence matters. *Second, and more pointedly, must the meaningfulness of our lives depend on the existence of God? Must meaning rely upon articles of faith? Basing life’s meaningfulness on the existence of a deity not only leaves all atheists out of the picture; it leaves different believers out of one another’s picture. What seems called for is an approach to thinking about meaning that can draw us together, one that exists alongside or instead of religious views.* Again, we need to understand whether meaningfulness is subjectively determined by the individual, or is a quality decreed upon a life by others. If meaningfulness is subjectively determined, then belief in God is good enough to impart subjective meaningfulness (and possibly happiness, and maybe even allow one to live a morally good life). It doesn’t mean belief in God is necessary to achieve meaningfulness, it just means that it could be a path to meaningfulness. *A promising and more inclusive approach is offered by Susan Wolf in her recent and compelling book, “Meaning in Life and Why It Matters.” A meaningful life, she claims, is distinct from a happy life or a morally good one. In her view, “meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness.” A meaningful life must, in some sense then, feel worthwhile. The person living the life must be engaged by it. A life of commitment to causes that are generally defined as worthy — like feeding and clothing the poor or ministering to the ill — but that do not move the person participating in them will lack meaningfulness in this sense. However, for a life to be meaningful, it must also be worthwhile. Engagement in a life of tiddlywinks does not rise to the level of a meaningful life, no matter how gripped one might be by the game.* So Ms. Wolf apparently believes meaningfulness has an objective standard to which one seeking a meaningful life would be attracted. From whence does this objective standard arise? If tiddlywinks doesn’t cut the mustard, what about other games? Is being subjectively attracted to the game of football such that one spends one’s life engaged in it objectively attractive enough to qualify as meaningful? See what a mess to which all this pontificating resolves? *Often one defends an idea by giving reasons for it. However, sometimes the best defense is not to give reasons at the outset but instead to pursue the idea in order to see where it leads. Does it capture something important if we utilize it to understand ourselves? It’s this latter tack that I would like to try here. The pursuit of this core idea — that a meaningful life is both valued and valuable — allows us to understand several important aspects of our attitudes toward ourselves and others.* Valued by whom? Valuable on the basis of what metric? *In this pursuit, the first step we might take beyond what Wolf tells us is to recognize that lives unfold over time. A life is not an unrelated series of actions or projects or states of being. A life has, we might say, a trajectory. It is lived in a temporal thickness. Even if my life’s trajectory seems disjointed or to lack continuity, it is my life that is disconnected in its unfolding, not elements of several different lives. If a life has a trajectory, then it can be conceived narratively. A human life can be seen as a story, or as a series of stories that are more or less related. This does not mean that the person whose life it is must conceive it or live it narratively. I needn’t say to myself, “Here’s the story I want construct,” or, “This is the story so far.” What it means rather is that, if one reflected on one’s life, one could reasonably see it in terms of various story lines, whether parallel or intersecting or distinct. This idea can be traced back to Aristotle’s “Ethics,” but has made a reappearance with some recent narrative conceptions of what a self is. What makes a trajectory a meaningful one? If Wolf is right, it has to feel worthwhile and, beyond that, has to be engaged in projects that are objectively worthwhile. There is not much difficulty in knowing what feels worthwhile. Most of us are good at sensing when we’re onto something and when we’re not. Objective worthiness is more elusive. We don’t want to reduce it simply to a morally good life, as though a meaningful life were simply an unalienated moral life. Meaningful lives are not so limited and, as we shall see, are sometimes more vexed. So we must ask what lends objective worthiness to a life outside the moral realm. Here is where the narrative character of a life comes into play.* Now I’m really confused. A meaningful life has a trajectory that feels worthwhile and is engaged in projects that are objectively worthwhile? Writing this blog feels worthwhile to me, but is it objectively worthwhile? By what metric might it be judged? I write because I like writing. I have found writing to be the only way for me to learn what I am really thinking; writing is subjectively valuable to me, as I place great value on understanding how I think and feel, if only because failing to do so is detrimental to my own welfare. Is it objectively valuable? My wife might say I waste far too much time at this that I could otherwise spend in fruitful endeavors, i.e., at things that make money. But that’s just her subjective opinion of my subjective view towards its value. Is there some other authority to consult that could determine whether this is objectively valuable? Society at large would probably agree with my wife, but what if they and my wife are wrong, even by their own valuation metrics? What if I one day become rich and famous as The Curmudgeon? Will it then have objective value? ***What is the point of understanding what makes lives meaningful? Why not just live them?*** Indeed. Mr. May could have started and ended his exegesis on meaningfulness there. *There are values we associate with a good narrative and its characters that are distinct from those we associate with good morals. A fictional character can be intense, adventurous, steadfast or subtle. Think here of the adventurousness of Ishmael in “Moby-Dick,” the quiet intensity of Kip in “The English Patient,” the steadfastness of Dilsey in “The Sound and the Fury” or the subtlety of Marco Polo in “Invisible Cities.” As with these fictional characters, so with our lives. When a life embodies one or more of these values (or others), and feels engaging to the one who lives it, it is to that extent meaningful. There are narrative values expressed by human lives that are not reducible to moral values. Nor are they reducible to happiness; they are not simply matters of subjective feeling. Narrative values are not felt, they are lived. And they constitute their own arena of value, one that has not been generally recognized by philosophers who reflect on life’s meaningfulness. An intense life, for instance, can be lived with abandon. One might move from engagement to engagement, or stick with a single engagement, but always (well, often) by diving into it, holding nothing back. One throws oneself into swimming or poetry or community organizing or fundraising, or perhaps all of them at one time or another. Such a life is likely a meaningful one. And this is true even where it might not be an entirely moral one.* What in the world is a “narrative value”? Is it something that makes a story, or a life, interesting to others, or to the one who lives it? If so, I think rather highly of the narrative value of my life, as I suspect most others would feel of theirs. Like a microcosm of all lives lived in all times and all places, my life has been both tragedy and comedy, depending on whether feeling or thinking reigned paramount in my mind during the particular events comprising it. *We know of people like this, people whose intensity leads them to behavior that we might call morally compromised. Intense lovers can leave bodies in their wake when the embers of love begin to cool. Intense athletes may not be the best of teammates. Our attitudes toward people like this are conflicted. There is a sense in which we might admire them and another sense in which we don’t. This is because meaningful lives don’t always coincide with good ones. Meaningful lives can be morally compromised, just as morally good lives can feel meaningless to those who live them.* So meaningfulness must be grounded in subjectivity. Just because I might not admire someone who is famous just for being famous, or perhaps who is famous for doing others harm (instead of using the amorphous “morally bad”), they still might have led meaningful lives. I’m sure Britney Spears and Bernie Madoff believe their lives to be meaningful, no matter what is the opinion of others. For Britney, perhaps the essence of meaning in her life is that others have an opinion of her, whether good or bad. *We should not take this to imply that there is no relationship between meaningfulness and morality. They meet at certain moral limits. An evil life, no matter how intense or steadfast, is not one we would want to call meaningful. But within the parameters of those moral limits, the relationship between a meaningful life and a moral one is complicated. They do not map directly onto each other.* Who decides whether one’s life is evil? Going back to Hitler, who seems to be the essence of evil, imagine all the good that came of his life. Would Western Europe have enjoyed over a half century of unparalleled prosperity and freedom and peace had Hitler not coalesced and compelled the forces of freedom to defeat him? Would the nation state of Israel (regardless of whatever one thinks about the Israeli state at present) been revivified in Palestine had not the Holocaust happened? Good and evil are extraordinarily subjective matters. Germans thought victory over France, twenty years after the insult of the Treaty of Versailles, was good; the French, presumably, not so much. Meaningfulness is apparently, like good and evil, also a subjective matter. *Why might all this matter? What is the point of understanding what makes lives meaningful? Why not just live them? On one level, the answer is obvious. If we want to live meaningful lives, we might want to know something about what makes a life so. Otherwise, we’re just taking stabs in the dark. And in any event, for most of us it’s just part of who we are. It’s one of the causes of our lying awake at night.* I have never lain awake at night wondering whether life was meaningful in any overarching way. I have lain awake at night wondering whether the things I was doing were capable of meaningfully helping me achieve what I hoped to achieve. But **the hardest question in that regard is determining what is desired**, not whether actions taken to that end are meaningful or not.