## 1nc

### 1nc framework

#### Interpretation—the aff should defend topical change in USFG policy in accordance with the resolution

#### The text of the rez calls for debate on hypothetical government action – an alternate way to welcome veterans

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### You’ve gotta admit you could be wrong – voting aff entrenches opposition and choir-preaching

**Talisse 2005** – philosophy professor at Vanderbilt (Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”) \*note: gendered language in this article refers to arguments made by two specific individuals in an article by Iris Young

Nonetheless, the deliberativist conception of reasonableness differs from the activist’s in at least one crucial respect. On the deliberativist view, a necessary condition for reasonableness is the willingness not only to offer justifications for one’s own views and actions, but also to listen to criticisms, objections, and the justificatory reasons that can be given in favor of alternative proposals.

In light of this further stipulation, we may say that, on the deliberative democrat’s view, reasonable citizens are responsive to reasons, their views are ‘reason tracking’. Reasonableness, then, entails an acknowledgement on the part of the citizen that her current views are possibly mistaken, incomplete, and in need of revision. Reasonableness is hence a two-way street: the reasonable citizen is able and willing to offer justifications for her views and actions, but is also prepared to consider alternate views, respond to criticism, answer objections, and, if necessary, revise or abandon her views. In short, reasonable citizens do not only believe and act for reasons, they aspire to believe and act according to the best reasons; consequently, they recognize their own fallibility in weighing reasons and hence engage in public deliberation in part for the sake of improving their views.15 ‘Reasonableness’ as the deliberative democrat understands it is constituted by a willingness to participate in an ongoing public discussion that inevitably involves processes of self-examination by which one at various moments rethinks and revises one’s views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations offered by one’s fellow deliberators. Hence Gutmann and Thompson write:

Citizens who owe one another justifications for the laws that they seek to impose must take seriously the reasons their opponents give. Taking seriously the reasons one’s opponents give means that, at least for a certain range of views that one opposes, one must acknowledge the possibility that an opposing view may be shown to be correct in the future. This acknowledgement has implications not only for the way they regard their own views. It imposes an obligation to continue to test their own views, seeking forums in which the views can be challenged, and keeping open the possibility of their revision or even rejection.16 (2000: 172)

That Young’s activist is not reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’ (106); activist tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption that questions of justice are essentially settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its implementation requires. He also believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at enlisting other citizens in support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed.

The activist implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection to his views concerning justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse because he has judged on a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable.

According to the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The deliberativist recognizes that questions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter the activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of power wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve. That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of public deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue; reasonableness hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views, he is literally unable to be reasonable. Hence the deliberative democrat concludes that activism, as presented by Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement.

The dialogical conception of reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the activist’s reply to the charge that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist denied this charge on the grounds that activism is aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view, the problem with interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or deplorable) of the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory as fixed dispositions that are non-cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons. Insofar as the activist sees his view of justice as ‘given’ and not open to rational scrutiny, he is engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist rejects.

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational.

It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists.

Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17

The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

#### Protest is fruitless – focusing on the technical skills of consolidating power is best

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Few things can be as inspiring -- or misleading -- as the sight of millions of people gathered in protest. From Egypt (again) to Turkey to Brazil, we have recently seen stirring displays of people power, prompting commentators to suggest (again) that we are living in the new 1848 -- an era of discontent in which the world's emergent middle classes are finding their voices.

Putting aside the fact that many of those protesting in the Arab world and in other regions rattled recently by civil unrest are not yet middle class by any reasonable definition, the analogy holds in one particularly important respect: The revolutions of 1848 failed to produce real, immediate change. They upset the establishment to be sure, and they had longer-term consequences that should not be discounted. But they also frittered out or were quashed for an important reason: The revolutionaries were better at organizing protests than they were at institutionalizing their movements or creating, cultivating, and empowering leaders who could master existing institutions.

The genius of the American Revolution was that its leaders were good not only at promoting upheaval, but also at creating mechanisms to foster that upheaval over several years (a Continental Congress, a Continental Army). And then, once victory had been achieved, they created a constitutional government that protected itself while enshrining the principles they had fought for in a system that would both protect those principles and resist the efforts of counterforces to reassert themselves. The system allowed for pluralistic expression of views and smooth transitions among political groups within the society. In other words, the system preserved and was actually sustained by the energy of the revolution.

Look at some of the recent outpourings of public discontent that have captured our imaginations in the past couple of decades. Tiananmen Square. The uprisings that brought down the Soviet Union. Iran's Green Revolution. Tahrir Square. Revolutions in Libya, Tunisia, and elsewhere in the Arab world. Taksim Square. In each case, even where revolutions have brought seeming change, the protesters were hardly among the greatest beneficiaries of the outcomes.

There were really two kinds of outcomes. In the first, there was precious little change at all -- as in the case of China, Iran, or, to date, Turkey. In the second, the change shifted power from one entrenched elite to another: Russia may not be communist, but it is run by a former KGB officer in a very undemocratic way; in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to fill the void created when Hosni Mubarak was pushed out, and if the current protests there play out, expect the military to resume primary control of the state, reversing the "reforms" demanded by President Mohamed Morsy.

Certainly, there are exceptions. The wave of revolutions that swept through Central and Eastern Europe brought real change and democratic government to a swath of the continent. But for each such exception -- the Philippines' People Power Revolution might be another -- there are as many or more examples of protests going for naught or being exploited by the already-powerful to consolidate their grip on the countries. Ask Jennifer Lopez what kind of Soviet-style strongman she was singing "Happy Birthday" to the other day in Turkmenistan? Look elsewhere in the 'stans. Sometimes, where there is no effective organized political force behind the revolution -- as in Libya -- the result is years of festering unrest.

Brazil's Dilma Rousseff deserves real credit for seeking to listen to protesters in her country and for moving to change laws that had superempowered the political establishment and protected its members as they parlayed their jobs into illicit income and a place seemingly above the law. But, again, she was already president and had a history as a revolutionary and as a leader of a political party that was born of a protest movement. She sees change and listening to the people as part of her mandate. And she may well be able to turn that into another term in office if she follows through on the reforms she proposed last week.

But in places like the Arab world, the hopes of revolutionaries are more likely to turn into frustrations -- just as they did for the members of the Occupy movement, which, for all the soundness behind its campaign against inequality and the concentrated power of the 1 percent, now looks more like a worldwide tantrum than the beginning of a new era.

It is great that new technologies enable crowds to gather quickly, communicate among themselves, learn new slogans, and be briefed on the latest developments. They can help translate feelings into nationwide actions with unprecedented speed. But if the elites have the money, control the military, control the police, control the mechanisms of political expression, if they can use the means of the state to suppress upheaval or if they can exploit revolutions to advance their own agendas versus those of other elites, they become hard to dislodge -- especially for movements without real leaders, clear agendas, strong political organizations, or effective plans for enshrining their values were they ever to gain power.

Frustrated with the unreliable and sometimes menacing Morsy, the United States and other Western powers may welcome the return of the Egyptian military to power if it comes to that, just as they embraced the dubious Morsy and his counterparts in Libya. As great powers, they are more interested in stability than in empowering people who would upset the established actors they are used to working with -- which means those in the international system are complicit in preserving the status quo.

That underscores a point long understood by many students of power: The greatest force to be overcome in governments and societies everywhere is inertia. Demonstrations are easy. Lasting change is hard. Those who hope for it in the Arab world and elsewhere must focus more on training oppositions in the long game of getting and consolidating power and less on how today's chants are playing on CNN or in the Twitterverse.

#### That outweighs and turns the aff – their form of advocacy ensures that Daniel Boscarino doesn’t get the more that he needed

Christian O. **Lundberg 10** Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### 1nc kritik

#### Globalized capitalism is fueling inequality and destruction on a continually growing scale

**Harman 97** [Chris Harman 97, Editor of the Socialist Worker 1997 Economics of the madhouse, Pg 99-100]

‘A reprise in the early 21st century of the conditions in the early part of this century. Such is the danger that confronts the world if we cannot deal with the present crisis concludes Will Hutton in his book The State We’re In. Those conditions included two world wars, the rise of Nazism, the collapse o democracy across most of Europe, the victory of Stalinism, the death camps and the gulag. If they were to be repeated in a few years time there is no doubt it would be on a much more horrific scale that even Hitler could not imagine. We would indeed be facing a future of barbarism, if not the destruction of the whole of humanity. Warnings of such a future are not to be treated lightly. Already the crisis of the 1990’s has begun to unleash the same barbaric forces we saw in the 1930’s. In one country after another political adventurers who support the existing system are making careers for themselves by trying to scapegoat ethnic or religious minorities. In the Russia, the Hitler admirer, racist, and proponent of nuclear war, Zhirinovsky got 24 percent of the vote in the November 1993 poll. In Bombay, another Hitler admirer, Bal Thackercey, runs the state government, threatening to wage war against the Muslim minority. In turkey the government and the military wage a war against the Kurdish fifth of the population, while the fascists try to incite Sunni Muslims to murder Alawi Muslims. In Rwanda the former dictator unleashed a horrific slaughter of Tutsis by Hutus, while in neighboring Burundi there is the threat of slaughter of Hutus by Tutsis. All this horror has its origins in the failure of market capitalism to provide even minimally satisfactory lives for the mass of people. Instead is leaves a fifth of the worlds’ population under nourished and most of the rest doubting whether they will be able to enjoy tomorrow the small comforts that allowed to them today Both the out and out defenders of ruling class power and today’s timid cowed reformists tell us there is no alternative to this system. But if that is true then there is no hope for humanity. Politics becomes merely about having the deckchairs on the titanic while making sure no one disturbs the rich and privileged as they dine at the captains table. But there is an alternative. The whole crazy system of alienated labor is a product of what we do. Human beings have the power to seize control of the ways of creating wealth and to subordinate them to our decisions, to our values. We do not have to leave them to the blind caprice of the market to the mad rush of the rival owners of wealth in their race to keep ahead of each other. The new technologies that are available today, far from making out lives worse have the potential to make this control easier. Automated work processes could provide us with more leisure, with more time for creativity and more change to deliberate where the world is going. Computerism could provide us with the unparalleled information about the recourses available to satisfy our needs and how to deploy them effectivly But this alternative cannot come from working within the system, from accepting the insane logic of the market, of competitive accumulation, of working harder in order to force someone else to worker harder or lose their job. The alternative can only come from fighting against the system and the disastrous effect its logic has on the lives of the mass of people.

#### The aff makes it harder to understand and resist that system—we’ll isolate a couple links:

#### 1. Experience: emphasizing lived experience obscures the conditions of possibility for that experience. Their pedagogy robs class of explanatory power—that's key to sustainable challenges to the relations of production

Mas'ud **Zavarzadeh** retired professor of English at Syracuse University jac 23.1 (**2003**) journal of Advanced Composition Theory

The pedagogy of appearance focuses on cultural representation and the role of representation in constructing the represented. By centering teaching in the machinery of "representation," it **obliterates the objective**. Reducing pedagogy to lessons in cultural semiotics, it makes "experience" of the pleasures of "depth less" surfaces the measure of reality and thus **obscures the social relations of production that are the material conditions of that experience.** However, "This 'lived' experience is not a given, given by a pure 'reality,' but the spontaneous 'lived experience' of ideology in its peculiar relationship to the real" (Althusser 223). The ideological value of the concept of "experience" in de-conceptualizing pedagogy will perhaps become more clear in examining the way bourgeois radical pedagogues, such as Giroux, **deploy experience** as an instance of spontaneity to **eviscerate class** as an explanatory concept by which the social relations of property are critiqued. In his Impure Actsa book devoted to marginalizing explanatory concepts and popularizing "hybrids" and that, in effect, justifies political opportunism in pedagogy-Giroux repeats the claims of such other cultural phenomenologists as Stuart Hall, Judith Butler, and Robin Kelley that "class" is "lived through race" (28). Class, in other words, is an affect. He represents this affective view of class as epistemological resistance against class which, he claims, is a universal category that takes the "difference" of race out of class. As I have already argued, epistemology is used in mainstream pedagogy as a cover for a reactionary class politics that does several things, as Giroux demonstrates. First, **it segregates the "black" proletariat from the "white" proletariat and isolates both :from other "racial" proletariats**. In doing so, Giroux's pedagogy **carries out the political agenda of capital**-to pit one segment of the proletariat against the other and to turn the unity of the working class into contesting (race) "differences." Second, it rewrites the system of wage labor itself into a hybrid. Giroux's experience-ism obscures the **systematicity of wage labor** and argues that there is no capitalism operating with a single logic of exploitation. Instead, there are many, aleatory, ad hoc, local arrangements between employees and employers depending on the color of the worker not the laws of motion of capital. Third, it converts capitalism from an economic system based on the "exploitation" of humans by humans (wage labor)through the ownership of the means of production-into an institution of cultural "oppression" based on "power." Fourth, since class is lived through race, it is not an objective fact (the relation of the worker to ownership ofthe means of production) but a subjective experience. The experience of ("living") class through race, like all experiences, is contingent, aleatory, and indeterminate. Class (lived through the experience of race) is thus reconstituted as contingent-an accident not a necessity of wage labor. Fifth, since capitalism is not a system but a series of ad hoc arrangements of exchange with various workers of diverse colors, it does not produce an objective binary class system but only cultural differences. One cannot, therefore, obtain objective knowledge of capitalism. There are, in short, no laws of motion of capital; there are only "experiences" of work influenced by one's color. Consequently, to say-as I have said-that capitalism is a regime of exploitation is simply a totalitarian closure. We cannot know what capitalism is because, according to Giroux's logic, it is fraught with differences (of race) not the singularity of "surplus labor." In Giroux's pedagogy, there is no capitalism ("totality"), only cultural effects of capitals without capitalism ("differences"). Giroux represents his gutting of class as a radical and groundbreaking notion that will lead to liberation of the oppressed. However, he never completes the logic of his argument because in the end it will deground his position and turn it into epistemological nonsense and **political pantomime.** If class is a universal category that obliterates the difference of race, there is (on the basis of such a claim) no reason not to say that race is also a universal category because it obliterates the difference of sexuality (and other differences), which is, by the same logic, itself a universal category since it obliterates the difference of age (and other differences), which is itself a universal category because it obliterates the difference of (dis )ability (and other differences), which is itself a universal category because it obliterates the difference of class (and other differences). In short, the social, in Giroux's pedagogy is a circle of oppressions, **none of whose components can explain any structural relations**; each simply absorbs the other ("class is actually lived through race," paraphrasing Giroux) and thus points back to itself as a local knowledge of the affective, difference, and contingency. Class explains race; it does not absorb it as an experience (see Butler, "Merely"), nor does it reduce it to the contingencies of ethnicities (Hall, "New") or urban performativities (Kelley, Yo '). To put it differently**, since in this pluralism of oppressions each element cancels out the explanatory capacity of all others, the existing social relations are reaffirmed in a pragmatic balancing of differences.** Nothing changes, everything is resignified. The classroom of experience reduces all concepts (which it marks as "grand narratives") to affects ("little stories") and, instead of explaining the social in order to change it**,** only "interprets" it as a profusion of differences. Teaching becomes an affirmation of the singular-as-is; its lessons "save the honor of the name" (see Lyotard, Postmodern 82). Giroux's program is a mimesis of the logic of the ruling ideology: as in all pedagogies of affect, it redescribes the relation of the subject of knowledge with the world but **leaves the world itself intact by reifying the signs of "difference**" (see Rorty, Contingency 53, 73). The subject, as I will discuss later in my analysis of Cary Nelson's radical pedagogy, feels differently about itself in a world that remains what it was Giroux is putting forth a class-cleansing pedagogy: he erases class from teaching in the name of epistemology ("totalization"). But as I have already argued, epistemology is not an issue for Giroux; it **is an alibi for hollowing out from class its economic explanatory power.** Epistemology in bourgeois pedagogy is class politics represented as "theory"-whose aim is to turn class into a cultural aleatory experience. In Giroux's phenomenological experientialism, **lived experience is an excuse for advancing the cause of capital in a populist logic** (respect for the ineluctable "experience" of the student) so that the student, the future worker, is trained as one who understands the world only through the sense-able-his own "unique" experience as black, white, or brown; man or woman; gay or straight-but never as a proletariat: a person who, regardless of race, sexuality, gender, age, or (dis )ability has to sell his or her labor power to capital in order to obtain subsistence wages in exchange. Experience, in Giroux's pedagogy, becomes a self-protecting "inside" that resists world-historical knowledge as an intrusion from "outside"; it thus valorizes ignorance as a mark of the authenticity and sovereignty of the subject-as independence and free choice.

#### Independently turns case—they create attachment to categorical oppression—focus on exclusion from white liberal subjectivity perversely recreates those ideals

Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)

2 The Reification of Identity We wish to turn now to a related problem within identity politicsthat can be best described as the problem of the reiﬁcation of politicised identities. Brown (1995) positions herself within thedebate about identity politics by seeking to elaborate on “the wounded character of politicised identity’s desire” (ibid: 55); that is, the problem of “wounded attachments” whereby a claim to identity becomes over-invested in its own historical suffering and perpetuates its injury through its refusal to give up its identity claim. Brown’s argument is that where politicised identity is founded upon an experience of exclusion, for example, exclusion itself becomes perversely valorised in the continuance of that identity. In such cases, group activity operates to maintain and reproduce the identity created by injury (exclusion) rather than– and indeed, often in opposition to – resolving the injurious social relations that generated claims around that identity in the ﬁrst place. If things have to have a history in order to have af uture, then the problem becomes that of how history is con-structed in order to make the future. To the extent that, for Brown, identity is associated primarily with (historical) injury, the future for that identity is then already determined by the injury “as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present which embodies that history” (ibid 1995: 73). Brown’s sug-gestion that as it is not possible to undo the past, the focus back- wards entraps the identity in reactionary practices, is, we believe, too stark and we will pursue this later in the article. Politicised identity, Brown maintains, “emerges and obtains its unifying coherence through the politicisation of exclusion from an ostensible universal, as a protest against exclusion” (ibid: 65). Its continuing existence requires both a belief in the legitimacy of the universal ideal (for example, ideals of opportunity, and re- ward in proportion to effort) and enduring exclusion from those ideals. Brown draws upon Nietzsche in arguing that such identities, produced in reaction to conditions of disempowerment andinequality, then become invested in their own impotence through practices of, for example, reproach, complaint, and revenge. These are “reactions” in the Nietzschean sense since they are substitutes for actions or can be seen as negative forms of action. Rather than acting to remove the cause(s) of suffering, that suffering is instead ameliorated (to some extent) through “the estab-lishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue” (ibid 1995:70), and is compensated for by the vengeful pleasures of recrimnation. Such practices, she argues, stand in sharp distinction to –in fact, provide obstacles to – practices that would seek to dispel the conditions of exclusion. Brown casts the dilemma discussed above in terms of a choicebetween past and future, and adapting Nietzsche, exhorts theadoption of a (collective) will that would become the “redeemer of history” (ibid: 72) through its focus on the possibilities of creat-ing different futures. As Brown reads Nietzsche, the one thingthat the will cannot exert its power over is the past, the “it was”.Confronted with its impotence with respect to the events of thepast, the will is threatened with becoming simply an “angry spec-tator” mired in bitter recognition of its own helplessness. The onehope for the will is that it may, instead, achieve a kind of mastery over that past such that, although “what has happened” cannotbe altered, the past can be denied the power of continuing to de-termine the present and future. It is only this focus on the future, Brown continues, and the capacity to make a future in the face of human frailties and injustices that spares us from a rancorous decline into despair. Identity politics structured by ressentiment – that is, by suffering caused by past events – can only break outof the cycle of “slave morality” by remaking the present againstthe terms of the past, a remaking that requires a “forgetting” of that past. An act of liberation, of self-afﬁrmation, this “forgettingof the past” requires an “overcoming” of the past that offers iden-tity in relationship to suffering, in favour of a future in whichidentity is to be deﬁned differently. In arguing thus, Brown’s work becomes aligned with a posi-tion that sees the way forward for emancipatory politics as re-siding in a movement away from a “politics of memory” (Kilby 2002: 203) that is committed to articulating past injustices andsuffering. While we agree that investment in identities prem-ised upon suffering can function as an obstacle to alleviating the causes of that suffering, we believe that Brown’s argument as outlined is problematic. First, following Kilby (2002), we share a concern about any turn to the future that is ﬁgured as a complete abandonment of the past. This is because for those who have suffered oppression and exclusion, the injunction to give up articulating a pain that is still felt may seem cruel and impossible to meet. We would argue instead that the “turn to the future” that theorists such as Brown and Grosz callfor, to revitalise feminism and other emancipatory politics, need not be conceived of as a brute rejection of the past. Indeed, Brown herself recognises the problems involved here, stating that [since] erased histories and historical invisibility are themselves suchintegral elements of the pain inscribed in most subjugated identities[then] the counsel of forgetting, at least in its unreconstructedNietzschean form, seems inappropriate if not cruel (1995: 74). She implies, in fact, that the demand exerted by those in painmay be no more than the demand to exorcise that pain throughrecognition: “all that such pain may long for – more than revenge– is the chance to be heard into a certain release, recognised intoself-overcoming, incited into possibilities for triumphing over, and hence, losing itself” (1995: 74-75). Brown wishes to establish the political importance of remembering “painful” historical events but with a crucial caveat: that the purpose of remembering pain is to enable its release . The challenge then, according to her,is to create a political culture in which this project does not mutate into one of remembering pain for its own sake. Indeed, if Brown feels that this may be “a pass where we ought to part with Nietzsche” (1995: 74), then Freud may be a more suit-able companion. Since his early work with Breuer, Freud’s writ-ings have suggested the (only apparent) paradox that remember-ing is often a condition of forgetting. The hysterical patient, who is doomed to repeat in symptoms and compulsive actions a past she cannot adequately recall, is helped to remember that trau-matic past in order then to move beyond it: she must remember in order to forget and to forget in order to be able to live in the present. 7 This model seems to us to be particularly helpful for thedilemma articulated by both Brown (1995) and Kilby (2002),insisting as it does that “forgetting” (at least, loosening the holdof the past, in order to enable the future) cannot be achieved without ﬁrst remembering the traumatic past. Indeed, this wouldseem to be similar to the message of Beloved , whose central motif of haunting (is the adult woman, “Beloved”, Sethe’s murderedchild returned in spectral form?) dramatises the tendency of theunanalysed traumatic past to keep on returning, constraining, asit does so, the present to be like the past, and thereby, disallow-ing the possibility of a future different from that past. As Sarah Ahmed argues in her response to Brown, “in order to break the seal of the past, in order to move away from attach-ments that are hurtful, we must ﬁrst bring them into the realm of political action” (2004: 33). We would add that the task of analys-ing the traumatic past, and thus opening up the possibility of political action, is unlikely to be achievable by individuals on their own, but that this, instead, requires a “community” of participants dedicated to the serious epistemic work of rememberingand interpreting the objective social conditions that made up thatpast and continue in the present. The “pain” of historical injury is not simply an individual psychological issue, but stems from objective social conditions which perpetuate, for the most part, forms of injustice and inequality into the present. In sum, Brown presents too stark a choice between past andfuture. In the example of Beloved with which we began thisarticle, Paul D’s acceptance of Sethe’s experiences of slavery asdistinct from his own, enable them both to arrive at new under-standings of their experience. Such understanding is a way of partially “undoing” the (effects of) the past and coming to terms with the locatedness of one’s being in the world (Mohanty 1995). As this example shows, opening up a future, and attending to theongoing effects of a traumatic past, are only incorrectly under-stood as alternatives. A second set of problems with Brown’s critique of identity poli-tics emerge from what we regard as her tendency to individualise social problems as problems that are the possession and theresponsibility of the “wounded” group. Brown suggests that the problems associated with identity politics can be overcome through a “shift in the character of political expression and politi-cal claims common to much politicised identity” (1995: 75). She deﬁnes this shift as one in which identity would be expressed in terms of desire rather than of ontology by supplanting the language of “I am” with the language of “I want this for us” (1995:75). Such a reconﬁguration, she argues, would create an opportu-nity to “rehabilitate the memory of desire within identiﬁcatory processes…prior to [their] wounding” (1995: 75). It would fur-ther refocus attention on the future possibilities present in the identity as opposed to the identity being foreclosed through its attention to past-based grievances.

#### 2. Individualism: Activism without advocacy is worse than no activism at all—it’s a politics of symbolism that dodges engagement with collective struggles

Chandler 7 – Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Democracy, Chandler. 2007. Centre for the Study of Democracy, Westminster, Area, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 118-119

This disjunction between the human/ethical/global causes of post-territorial political activism and the capacity to 'make a difference' is what makes these individuated claims immediately abstract and metaphysical – there is no specific demand or programme or attempt to build a collective project. This is the politics of symbolism. The rise of symbolic activism is highlighted in the increasingly popular framework of 'raising awareness'– here there is no longer even a formal connection between ethical activity and intended outcomes (Pupavac 2006). Raising awareness about issues has replaced even the pretense of taking responsibility for engaging with the world – the act is ethical in-itself. Probably the most high profile example of awareness raising is the shift from Live Aid, which at least attempted to measure its consequences in fund-raising terms, to Live 8 whose goal was solely that of raising an 'awareness of poverty'. The struggle for 'awareness' makes it clear that the focus of symbolic politics is the individual and their desire to elaborate upon their identity – to make us aware of their 'awareness', rather than to engage us in an instrumental project of changing or engaging with the outside world. It would appear that in freeing politics from the constraints of territorial political community there is a danger that political activity is freed from any constraints of social mediation(see further, Chandler 2004a). Without being forced to test and hone our arguments, or even to clearly articulate them, we can rest on the radical 'incommunicability' of our personal identities and claims – you are 'either with us or against us'; engaging with those who disagree is no longer possible or even desirable. It is this lack of desire to engage which most distinguishes the unmediated activism of post-territorial political actors from the old politics of territorial communities, founded on struggles of collective interests (Chandler 2004b). The clearest example is old representational politics – this forced engagement in order to win the votes of people necessary for political parties to assume political power. Individuals with a belief in a collective programme knocked on strangers' doors and were willing to engage with them, not on the basis of personal feelings but on what they understood were their potential shared interests. Few people would engage in this type of campaigning today; engaging with people who do not share our views, in an attempt to change their minds, is increasingly anathema and most people would rather share their individual vulnerabilities or express their identities in protest than attempt to argue with a peer. This paper is not intended to be a nostalgic paean to the old world of collective subjects and national interests or a call for a revival of territorial state-based politics or even to reject global aspirations: quite the reverse. Today, politics has been 'freed' from the constraints of territorial political community – governments without coherent policy programmes do not face the constraints of failure or the constraints of the electorate in any meaningful way; activists, without any collective opposition to relate to, are free to choose their causes and ethical identities; protest, from Al Qaeda, to anti-war demonstrations, to the riots in France, is inchoate and atomized. When attempts are made to formally organize opposition, the ephemeral and incoherent character of protest is immediately apparent.

#### Short term profit-focus necessitated by globalized capitalism corrupts decisionmaking and makes extinction inevitable

**Marko 03** (Anarchism and Human Survival: Russell’s problem., May 14, 2003, <https://www2.indymedia.org.uk/en/2003/05/68173.html>)

There exist three threats to survival namely nuclear war, ecological change and north-south conflict. All three I would argue can be traced to a single source that being the pathological nature of state capitalism. What is frightening is that eventual self induced extinction is a rational consequence of our system of world order much like the destruction of the system of world order prior to 1914 was a rational consequence of its internal nature. I shall focus in this essay on nuclear war, the most immediate threat. In doing so we will come to appreciate the nexus between this threat, globalisation and north-south conflict. Currently we are witnessing a major expansion in the US global military system. One facet of this expansion is the globalisation of US nuclear war planning known as "adaptive planning". The idea here is that the US would be able to execute a nuclear strike against any target on Earth at very short notice. For strategic planners the world's population is what they refer to as a "target rich environment". The Clinton era commander of US nuclear forces, Admiral Mies, stated that nuclear ballistic missile submarines would be able to "move undetected to any launch point" threatening "any spot on Earth". What lies at the heart of such a policy is the desire to maintain global strategic superiority what is known as "full spectrum dominance" previously referred to as "escalation dominance". Full spectrum dominance means that the US would be able to wage and win any type of war ranging from a small scale contingency to general nuclear war. Strategic nuclear superiority is to be used to threaten other states so that they toe the party line. The Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review stipulated that nuclear weapons are needed in case of "surprising military developments" not necessarily limited to chemical or biological weapons. The Clinton administration was more explicit stating in its 2001 Pentagon report to Congress that US nuclear forces are to "hedge against defeat of conventional forces in defense of vital interests". The passage makes clear that this statement is not limited to chemical or biological weapons. We have just seen in Iraq what is meant by the phrase "defense of vital interests". Washington is asserting that if any nation were to have the temerity to successfully defend itself against US invasion, armed with conventional weapons only, then instant annihilation awaits. "What we say goes" or you go is the message being conveyed. Hitler no doubt would have had a similar conception of "deterrence". It should be stressed that this is a message offered to the whole world after all it is now a target rich environment. During the cold war the US twice contemplated using nuclear weapons in such a fashion both in Vietnam, the first at Dien Bien Phu and during Nixon administration planning for "operation duck hook". In both cases the main impediments to US action were the notion that nuclear weapons were not politically "useable" in such a context and because of the Soviet deterrent. The Soviet deterrent is no more and the US currently is hotly pursuing the development of nuclear weapons that its designers believe will be "useable" what the Clinton administration referred to as low yield earth penetrating nuclear weapons and what the Bush administration refers to as the Rapid Nuclear Earth Penetrator. Such strategic reforms are meant to make nuclear war a more viable policy option, on the basis that lower yields will not immediately kill as many innocent people as higher yield weapons. This is known as the lowering of the threshold of nuclear war. The development of the RNEP draws us closer to the prospect of nuclear war, including accidental nuclear war, because lower yields will lower the barrier between conventional and nuclear war. There will exist no real escalatory firewall between these two forms of warfare which means that in any conventional crisis involving nuclear powers, there will exist a strong incentive to strike first. A relationship very similar to the interaction between the mobilisation schedules of the great powers prior to 1914. There exist strong parallels between US nuclear planning and the German Imperial Staff’s Schlieffen plan. Lowering the threshold of nuclear war will also enhance pressures for global nuclear proliferation. If the US is making its arsenal more useable by working towards achieving a first strike capability, then others such as Russia and China must react in order to ensure the viability of their deterrents. Moreover, the potential third world targets of US attack would also have greater incentive to ensure that they also have a nuclear deterrent. It is also understood that the development of these nuclear weapons may require the resumption of nuclear testing, a key reason for the Administration's lack of readiness to abide by the CTBT treaty, which is meant to ban nuclear testing. The CTBT is a key feature of contemporary global nuclear non proliferation regimes for the US signed the CTBT in order to extend the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT) indefinitely. Abandoning the CTBT treaty, in order to develop a new generation of more "useable" nuclear weapons that will lower the threshold of nuclear war, will place the NPT regime under further strain and greatly increase the chances of further nuclear proliferation. There exists a "deadly connection" between global weapons of mass destruction proliferation and US foreign policy. One may well ask what has all this to do with state capitalism? Consider the thinking behind the militarisation of space, outlined for us by Space Command; “historically military forces have evolved to **protect national interests and investments** – both military and economic. During the rise of sea commerce, nations built navies to protect and enhance their commercial interests. During the westward expansion of the continental United States, military outposts and the cavalry emerged to protect our wagon trains, settlements and roads”. The document goes on, “the emergence of space power follows both of these models”. Moreover, “the globalization of the world economy will continue, with a widening between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. The demands of unilateral strategic superiority, long standing US policy known as "escalation" or "full spectrum" dominance, compel Washington to pursue “space control". This means that, according to a report written under the chairmanship of Donald Rumsfeld, "in the coming period the US will conduct operations to, from, in and through space" which includes "power projection in, from and through space". Toward this end, Washington has resisted efforts in the UN to create an arms control regime for space. As a result there will inevitably arise an arms race in space. The importance of this simply cannot be over-emphasised. Throughout the nuclear age there have been a number of close calls, due to both human and technical error, that almost lead to a full scale nuclear exchange between Washington and Moscow. These glitches in command and control systems were ultimately benign because both sides had early warning satellites placed in specialised orbits which could be relied upon to provide real time imagery of nuclear missile launch sites. However the militarisation of space now means that these satellites will become open game; the benign environment in space will disappear if the militarisation of space continues. Thus if the US were to "conduct operations to, from in and through space" it will do see remotely. Technical failure may result in the system attacking Russian early warning satellites. Without question this would be perceived by the Russian's as the first shot in a US nuclear first strike. Consider for instance a curious event that occurred in 1995. A NASA research rocket, part of a study of the northern lights, was fired over Norway. The rocket was perceived by the Russian early warning system as the spear of a US first strike. The Russian system then began a countdown to full scale nuclear response; it takes only a single rocket to achieve this effect because it was no doubt perceived by Russian planners that this single rocket was meant to disable their command and control system as a result of electromagnetic pulse effects. To prevent the loss of all nuclear forces in a subsequent follow on strike the Russian's would need to launch a full scale response as soon as possible. Because the US itself has a hair trigger launch on warning posture a Russian attack would be followed by a full scale US attack; the US has a number of "reserve options" in its war plans, thus such an accidental launch could trigger a global chain of nuclear release around the globe. Calamity was averted in 1995 because Russia's early warning satellites would have demonstrated that there was no launch of US nuclear forces. If these satellites were to be taken out then this ultimate guarantee disappears; the Russian ground based radar system has a number of key holes that prevent it from warning of an attack through two key corridors, one from the Atlantic the other from the Pacific. In the future if an event such as 1995 were to occur in space the Russians no longer would have the level of comfort provided by its space based assets. The militarisation of space greatly increases the chances of a full scale accidental nuclear war. The militarisation of space is intimately linked with US strategic nuclear forces, for the previous command covering space, known as Space Command, has merged with the command responsible for nuclear forces, Strategic Command. Upon merger, the commander of Strategic Command stated, "United States Strategic Command provides a single war fighting combatant command with a global perspective, focused on exploiting the strong and growing synergy between the domain of space and strategic capabilities." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff added, "this new command is going to have all the responsibilities of its predecessors, but an entirely new mission focus, greatly expanded forces and you might even say several infinite areas of responsibility." In other words, we are witnessing the integration of strategic conventional, nuclear and space planning into the command responsible for overseeing US nuclear forces. In turn these forces become an ordinary facet of US strategic planning, severing the break between conventional and nuclear war. The link between the increase in threats to survival and state capitalism (as well as globalisation) was provided for us by the old Space Command as noted above. We may justly also conclude that US nuclear weapons provide a shield, or “shadow”, enabling the deployment of offensive military firepower in what Kennedy era commander General Maxwell Taylor referred to as the key theatre of war, namely "under-developed areas". This shield was made effective by "escalation dominance", as noted above, now known as "full spectrum dominance". It is this facet of US strategic policy that compels Washington place such a premium on nuclear superiority and nuclear war fighting. The link between US nuclear strategy and the global political economy is intimate. US nuclear weapons, both during and after the cold war, have acted as the ultimate guarantors of US policy, which is concerned with managing the world capitalist system in the interests of dominant domestic elites. Nuclear weapons provide the umbrella of power under which the system is able to function in much the same way that Karl Polanyi in his classic work, The Great Transformation, argued that the balance of power functioned in the service of the world capitalist system in the 19th century. The “great restoration” of the world capitalist system, under the rubric of “liberal internationalism”, and the onset of the nuclear age in the wake of the second world war, are not merely coincidental. To understand the contours of contemporary world order is to appreciate the deep nexus between the two. Military superiority is necessary because of threats to "stability". It is to be expected that a system of world order constructed for the benefit of an elite core of corporate interests in the US will not go down well with the world's population, especially in key regions singled out for capital extraction such as the Middle East and Latin America. Planners recognise that the pursuit of capital globalisation and the consequent widening of the gap between rich and poor would be opposed by the globe's population. Absolute strategic superiority is meant to keep the world's population quite and **obedient out of sheer terror**, as Bush administration aligned neo-conservative thinkers have argued it is better that Washington be feared rather than loved. As they have asserted, after world war two US hegemony had to be "obtained", now it must be "maintained" (Robert Kagan and William Kristol). It is only natural that this "maintenance operation" should be a militaristic one given that the US has a comparative advantage in the use of force; a nuclear global first strike capability would give Washington an absolute advantage. Should anyone get out of line, possibly threatening to spread the "virus" of popular social and economic development, force is to be used to restore "credibility" to beat down the threat of a better example. The US pursues a dangerous nuclear strategy because such a strategy in its terms is "credible". Anarchists are well aware of this important aspect of international relations given the events of the Spanish Civil War. Such a situation is no joke, for this was precisely the fear of Kennedy era planners that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington sought to return Cuba to the "Latin American mode" fearing that Cuba would set an example to the population of Latin America in independent social and economic planning conducted in the interests of the population rather than US capital. In response to the Castro takeover the US engaged in one of the most serious terrorist campaigns of recent times, meant as a prelude to invasion in order to ensure "regime change" thereby teaching the people of the region the lesson that "what we say goes". One of the key reasons why Khrushchev sought to place nuclear missiles in Cuba was to deter a US invasion and to achieve strategic parity with Washington. Throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis many potential flashpoints almost lead to a full-scale nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the US, how close we came to annihilation is only now being fully realised. These are not matters for idle speculation: destruction almost occurred in the past and may very well occur in the future; even cats have only nine lives. This is a matter of great contemporary significance because of the current geographical expansion of the US military system. One of the most significant results of the invasion of Afghanistan was the expansion of the US military system into Central Asia, including into some former Soviet republics. The Russians have traditionally considered this to be their version of the Western hemisphere. If a "great game" were to develop in the region between Russia and the US (perhaps also Pakistan, China and India all nuclear powers, Turkey which sits under US "extended deterrence" and Iran, a potential nuclear power) then such a "great game" may become a nuclearised great game. Indeed the standoff in Kashmir may have global consequences if a system of alliance politics were to develop in the region between the globe's nuclear powers, especially as the threshold of nuclear war is being lowered. In this sense Central Asia may develop into a global version of the link between the Balkans and central alliance systems prior to 1914. Of even greater concern is the further expansion of the US military system into the Middle East following the invasion of Iraq. Washington has already foreshadowed a desire to construct permanent military bases in Iraq in order to facilitate intervention into the region. Both Iran and Syria are potential targets of US attack. Iran may decide upon the nuclear option in order to deter the globe’s leading rogue state. This could be potentially explosive because it is well known that Israel posses a significant nuclear force. Israel has always feared that its paymaster would ultimately abandon it. In response Israel has reportedly developed a "samson option" nuclear targeting strategy. The idea is that Israel would target Russia with its nuclear weapons (Israel has developed delivery systems with an excessive range capability), which would lead to a full-scale nuclear exchange between Moscow and Washington. In essence Israel is saying: we should be allowed to continue repressing the Palestinians if not we have the "samson option". Furthermore, in order to facilitate intervention into these regions the US has began a programme to shift the basing of its military forces into "new Europe" that is Eastern Europe. Washington for instance pushed Romania into NATO for this very reason. Placing military forces in Eastern Europe no doubt would give the Russians some cause for concern. After Kosovo Russia conducted large-scale war games assuming an invasion through "new Europe". The game ended with the release of nuclear weapons. Indeed, expanding the US military system up to the border of Belarus may be dangerous for it is quite possible that Russia extends nuclear deterrence to Minsk; for instance Russia is building a new ground based strategic early warning radar in Belarus. This may all become a series problem in the future because of what the US Geological Survey refers to as "the big rollover": the time at which the world oil market changes from a buyers market into a sellers market (which may occur in the next 15-20 years). Washington has always regarded the oil resources of the Middle East as "the most stupendous material prize in world history" which is a key lever of US global dominance. The big rollover will ensure that Middle Eastern oil reserves will become an even more significant lever of world control placing greater premium on US control over the political development of the Arab world. In 1967, 1970 and 1973 strategic developments in the Middle East were overshadowed by nuclear weapons. In fact the events of 1970 and 1973 convinced many, such as Henry Kissinger, that the US needed to strive to retain nuclear superiority and reverse the condition of strategic parity with Moscow. This ultimately lead to the Carter-Reagan build-up of the late 1970s and early 1980s; a build-up which easily could have been disastrous. The militarisation of space, the development of so called "useable" nuclear weapons, the globalisation of the US nuclear planning system, the hair trigger alert status of the globe's nuclear forces and the expansion of the US military system into Central Asia and the Middle East possibly triggering a "great game" in these regions between nuclear powers, not to mention military expansion into "new Europe", all seriously increase the threats to our long term (indeed short term) survival. Washington's aggressive nuclear strategy is not only meant to deter democracy abroad; it is also meant to deter democracy at home. In 1956 the author of NSC 68 and one of the chief ideologues behind the Carter-Reagan nuclear build-up, Paul Nitze, made a distinction between what he referred to as "declaratory" nuclear weapons policy and "actual" nuclear weapons policy. For anybody interested in unravelling truth from fiction the distinction is critical. In Nitze's words, "the word 'policy' is used in two related but different senses. In one sense, the action sense, it refers to the general guidelines, which we believe should and will govern our actions in various contingencies. In the other sense, the declaratory sense, it refers to policy statements which have as their aim political and psychological effects". The most important target audience of declaratory policy is the American population, the so-called "internal deterrent". Consider for instance the key nuclear proliferation planning document of the cold war era, the Gilpatric report delivered to President Johnson. In it Gilpatric spelt out the threat that nuclear proliferation poses to US security: "as additional nations obtained nuclear weapons our diplomatic and military influence would wane, and strong pressures would arise to retreat to isolation to avoid the risk of involvement in nuclear war". So if it were seen by the population that the pursuit of foreign policy, conducted in the interests of domestic elites, would increase the threat of nuclear war then the internal deterrent may become dangerously aroused possibly calling off the show. In the strategic literature this is referred to as “self-deterrence”. In other words US non proliferation policy was meant to “lock in” US strategic dominance so that the domestic population would not become dangerously aroused whilst providing Washington the freedom of action necessary to brandish its nuclear superiority over others. This sentiment was reflected in the Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, “nuclear capabilities also assure the US public that the United States will not be subject to coercion based on a false perception of U.S. weakness among potential adversaries.” Many strategic thinkers have argued that the greatest threat to US hegemony or "unipolarity" is the internal "welfare role" and the populations lack of understanding for the burdens of Empire, in other words popular democracy. One of the reasons that the Reagan administration pursued "Star Wars" a programme to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" was to outflank the domestic and global peace movements that were gathering pace as a result of the administration's pursuit of potentially apocalyptic nuclear policies (the very same people have their fingers on the button again). It was well recognised that the Star Wars programme would have increased the chances of a nuclear exchange between Moscow and Washington, just as today the pursuit of short term interests is known to have potentially serious international consequences, such as increase in conflict and global weapons of mass destruction proliferation. The ruling class is well aware of the adverse impact the pursuit of its own sectional interests will have on international order. It pursues those interests with renewed zeal anyway. As far as the ruling class is concerned the greatest threat we face is not nuclear war, it is popular democracy. As Adam Smith observed of a previous mercantile system, applicable to today's system of state-corporate mercantilism, "it cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose interest has been entirely neglected; but the producers, whose interest has been so carefully attended to; and among this latter class our merchants and manufacturers have been by far the principal architects." Policy Smith observed, "comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it." This raises an interesting issue, namely that the pursuit of Armageddon is quite rational. The dominant institutions of capitalism **place a premium on short-term greed**. Rational participatory planning incorporating long-term concerns such as human survival are of no interest to these pathological institutions. What matters is short-term profit maximisation. One can see this most clearly in the case of such “externalities” as ecological change where the desire to pursue short-term profit undermines the long-term viability of the system itself (also us as a species; indeed many have surmised that we are in the era of the sixth great extinction of life on Earth this time human induced). The fact that the institutional structures of society compel the ruling classes to pursue highly dangerous “security” policies that are another “externality” of the system of state capitalism compels the population to constrain and eventually overthrow these institutions because apocalypse is institutionally rational.

#### We think debate should be a site for contingent struggles beyond the irrefutable Truth of their identity—foregrounding that subjectivity foregrounds an excessively local strategy that hinders collectivist challenges; solves and turns the case, allows us to engage veterans differently

Brown 95—prof at UC Berkeley (Wendy, States of Injury, 47-51)

The postmodern exposure of the imposed and created rather than dis- covered character of all knowledges—of the power-surtuscd, struggle-¶48¶produced quality of all truths, including reigning political and scientific ones—simultaneously exposes the groundlessness of discovered norms or visions. It also reveals the exclusionary and regulatory function of these norms: white women who cannot locate themselves in Nancy Hartsock’s account of women’s experience or women s desires, African American women who do not identify with Patricia Hill Collinss account of black women’s ways of knowing, are once again excluded from the Party of Humanism—this time in its feminist variant. ¶Our alternative to reliance upon such normative claims would seem to be engagement in political struggles in which there are no trump cards such as “morality” or “truth."Our alternative, in other words, is to struggle within an amoral political habitat for temporally bound and fully contestable visions of who we are and how we ought to live. Put still another way, postmodernity unnerves feminist theory not merely because it deprives us of uncomplicated subject standing, as Christine Di Stefano suggests, or of settled ground for knowledge and norms, as Nancy Hartsock argues, or of "centered selves and “emancipatory knowledge," as Seyla Bcnhabib avers. Postmodernity unsettles feminism because it erodes the moral ground that the subject, truth, and nor- mativity coproduce in modernity. When contemporary feminist political theorists or analysts complain about the antipolitical or unpolitical nature of postmodern thought—thought that apprehends and responds to this erosion—they arc protesting, inter' aha, a Nictzschcan analysis of truth and morality as fully implicated in and by power, and thereby dplegiti- mated qua Truth and Morality Politics, including politics with passion- ate purpose and vision, can thrive without a strong theory of the subject, without Truth, and without scientifically derived norms—one only need reread Machiavelli, Gramsci, or Emma Goldman to see such a politics flourish without these things. The question is whether fnninist politics can prosper without a moral apparatus, whether feminist theorists and activists will give up substituting Truth and Morality for politics. Are we willing to engage in struggle rather than recrimination, to develop our faculties rather than avenge our subordination with moral and epistemological gestures, to fight for a world rather than conduct process on the existing one? Nictzschc insisted that extraordinary strengths of character and mind would be necessary to operate in thce domain of epistemological and religious nakedness he heralded. But in this heexcessively individualized a challenge that more importantly requires the deliberate development of postmoral and antirelativist political spaces, practices of deliberation, and modes of adjudication.¶49¶The only way through a crisis of space is to invent a new space —Fredric Jameson. “Postmodernism"¶Precisely because of its incessant revelation of settled practices and identi- ties as contingent, its acceleration of the tendency to melt all that is solid into air. what is called postmodernity poses the opportunity to radically sever the problem of the good from the problem of the true, to decide “what we want” rather than derive it from assumptions or arguments about “who we are.” Our capacity to exploit this opportunity positively will be hinged to our success in developing new modes and criteria for political judgment. It will also depend upon our willingness to break certain modernist radical attachments, particularly to Marxism’s promise (however failed) of meticulously articulated connections betwreen a com- prehensive critique of the present and norms for a transformed future—a science of revolution rather than a politics of oneResistance, the practice most widely associated with postmodern polit- ical discourse, responds to without fully meeting the normativity chal- lenge of postmodernity. A vital tactic in much political w’ork as wrcll as for mere survival, resistance by itself does not contain a critique, a vision, or grounds for organized collective efforts to enact either. Contemporary affection for the politics of resistance issues from postmodern criticism’s perennial authority problem: our heightened consciousncss of the will to power in all political “positions” and our wrariness about totalizing an- alyses and visions. Insofar as it eschew’s rather than revises these problematic practices, resistance-as-politics does not raise the dilemmas of responsibility and justification entailed in “affirming” political projects and norms. In this respect, like identity politics, and indeed sharing with identity politics an excessively local viewpoint and tendency toward positioning without mapping, the contemporary vogue of resistance is more a symptom of postmodernity’s crisis of political space than a coherent response to it. Resistance goes nowhere in particular, has no inherent attachments, and hails no particular vision; as Foucault makes clear, resistance is an effect of and reaction to power, not an arrogation of it.¶What postmodernity disperses and postmodern feminist politics requires are cultivated political spaces for posing and questioning feminist political norms, for discussing the nature of “the good” for women. Democratic political space is quite undcrtheonzed in contemporary femi- nist thinking, as it is everywhere in latc-twentieth-ccntury political the- ory, primarily bccausc it is so little in evidence. Dissipated by the increasing tcchnologizing of would-be political conversations and pro- cesses, by the erosion of boundaries around specifically political domains¶50¶and activities, and by the decline of movement politics, political spaces are scarcer and thinner today than even in most immediately prior epochs of Western history. In this regard, their condition mirrors the splayed and centrifuged characteristics of postmodern political power. Yet precisely because of postmodernity’s disarming tendencies toward political disori- entation, fragmentation, and technologizing, the creation of spaces where political analyses and norms can be proffered and contested is su- premely important.¶Political space is an old theme in Western political theory, incarnated by the polis practices of Socrates, harshly opposed by Plato in the Repub- lic, redeemed and elaborated as metaphysics by Aristotle, resuscitated as salvation for modernity by Hannah Arendt. jnd given contemporary spin in Jurgen Habermas's theories of ideal speech situations and com- municative rationality. The project of developing feminist postmodern political spaces, while enriched by pieces of this tradition, necessarily also departs from it. In contrast with Aristotle’s formulation, feminist politi- cal spaces cannot define themselves against the private sphere, bodies, reproduction and production, mortality, and all the populations and is- sues implicated in these categories. Unlike Arendt’s, these spaces cannot be pristine, ratified, and policed at their boundaries but are necessarily cluttered, attuned to earthly concerns and visions, incessantly disrupted, invaded, and reconfigured. Unlike Habermas, wc can harbor no dreams of nondistorted communication unsullied by power, or even of a ‘com- mon language,’\* but wc recognize as a permanent political condition par- tiality of understanding and expression, cultural chasms whose nature may be vigilantly identified but rarely “resolved,” and the powers of words and images that evoke, suggest, and connote rather than transmit meanings.42 Our spaces, while requiring some definition and protection, cannot be clean, sharply bounded, disembodied, or permanent: to engage postmodern modes of power and honor specifically feminist knowledges, they must be heterogenous, roving, relatively noninstitutionalized, and democratic to the point of exhaustion.¶Such spaces are crucial for developing the skills and practices of post- modern judgment, addressing the problem of “how to produce a discourse on justicc . . . when one no longer relies on ontology or epistemology.”43 Postmodemity’s dismantling of metaphysical foundations for justice renders us quite vulnerable to domination by technical reason ¶51¶unless we seize the opportunity this erosion also creates to develop democratic processes for formulating postepistemelogical and postontological judgments. Such judgements require learning how to have public conversations with each other, arguing from a vision about the common (“what I want for us") rather than from identity (“who I am”), and from explicitly postulated norms and potential common values rather than false essentialism or unreconstructed private interest.44 Paradoxically, such public and comparatively impersonal arguments carry potential for greater accountability than arguments from identity or interest. While the former may be interrogated to the ground by others, the latter are insulated from such inquiry with the mantle of truth worn by identity-based speech. Moreover, post identity political positions and conversations potentially replace a politics of difference with a politics of diversity—differences grasped from a perspective larger than simply one point in an ensemble. Postidentity public positioning requires an outlook that discerns structures of dominance within diffused and disorienting orders of power, thereby stretching toward a more politically potent analysis than that which our individuated and fragmented existences can generate. In contrast to Di Stefano's claim that 'shared identity” may constitute a more psychologically and politically reliable basis for “attachment and motivation on the part of potential activists,” I am suggesting that political conversation oriented toward diversity and the common, toward world rather than self, and involving a conversion of ones knowledge of the world from a situated (subject) position into a public idiom, offers us the greatest possibility of countering postmodern social fragmentations and political disintegrations.¶Feminists have learned well to identify and articulate our "subject positions —we have become experts at politicizing the “I” that is produced through multiple sites ofpower and subordination. But the very practice so crucial to making these elements of power visible and subjectivity political may be partly at odds with the requisites for developing political conversation among a complex and diverse “we.” We may need to learn public speaking and the pleasures of public argument not to overcome our situatedness, but in order to assume responsibility for our situations and to mobilize a collective discourse that will expand them. For the political making of a feminist future that does not reproach the history on which it is borne, we may need to loosen our attachments to subjectivity, identity, and morality and to redress our underdeveloped taste for political argument.

#### Identity arguments are just implicit explanations of social power relations. Identity is never formed by experience alone or some metaphysical status—it’s produced and interpreted in concert with others. Instead of privileging their singular experience, our alt uses collective political commitment as the basis for neogitating differences.

Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)

We suggest that alternative models of identity and community are required from those put forward by essentialist theories, and that these are offered by the work of two theorists, Satya Mohanty and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Mohanty’s ([1993] 2000) post-positivist, realist theorisation of identity suggests a way through the impasses of essentialism, while avoiding the excesses of the postmodernism that Bramen, among others, derides as a proposed alternative to identity politics. For Mohanty ([1993] 2000), identities must be understood as theoretical that enable subjects to read the world in particular ways; as such, substantial claims about identity are, in fact, implicit explanations of the social world and its constitutive relations of power. Experience – that from which identity is usually thought to derive– is not something that simply occurs, or announces its meaning and signiﬁcance in a self-evident fashion: rather, experience is always a work of interpretation that is collectively produced (Scott 1991). Mohanty’s work resonates with that of Nelson (1993), who similarly insists upon the communal nature of meaning of knowledge-making. Rejecting both foundationalist views of knowledge and the postmodern alternative which announces the “death of the subject” and the impossibility of epistemology, Nelson argues instead that, it is not individuals who are the agents of epistemology, but communities. Since it is not possible for an individual to know something that another individual could not also (possibly) know, it must be that the ability to make sense of the world proceeds from shared conceptual frameworks and practices. Thus, it is the community that is the generator and repository of knowledge. Bringing Mohanty’s work on identity as theoretical construction together with Nelson’s work on epistemological communities therefore suggests that, “identity” is one of the knowledges that is produced and enabled for and by individuals in the context of the communities within which they exist. The post-positivist reformulation of “experience” is necessary here as it privileges understandings that emerge through the processing of experience in the context of negotiated premises about the world, over experience itself producing self-evident knowledge (self-evident, however, only to the one who has “had” the experience). This distinction is crucial for, if it is not the experience of, for example, sexual discrimination that “makes” one a feminist, but rather, the paradigm through which one attempts to understand acts of sexual discrimination, then it is not necessary to have actually had the experience oneself in order to make the identiﬁcation “feminist”. If being a “feminist” is not a given fact of a particular social (and/or biological) location – that is, being designated “female” – but is, in Mohanty’s terms, an “achievement” – that is, something worked towards through a process of analysis and interpretation – then two implications follow. First, that not all women are feminists. Second, that feminism is something that is “achievable” by men. 3 While it is accepted that experiences are not merely theoretical or conceptual constructs which can be transferred from one person to another with transparency, we think that there is something politically self-defeating about insisting that one can only understand an experience (or then comment upon it) if one has actually had the experience oneself. As Rege (1998) argues, to privilege knowledge claims on the basis of direct experience, or then on claims of authenticity, can lead to a narrow identity politics that limits the emancipatory potential of the movements or organisations making such claims. Further, if it is not possible to understand an experience one has not had, then what point is there in listening to each other? Following Said, such a view seems to authorise privileged groups to ignore the discourses of disadvantaged ones, or, we would add, to place exclusive responsibility for addressing injustice with the oppressed themselves. Indeed, as Rege suggests, reluctance to speak about the experience of others has led to an assumption on the part of some white feminists that “confronting racism is the sole responsibility of black feminists”, just as today “issues of caste become the sole responsibility of the dalit women’s organisations” (Rege 1998). Her argument for a dalit feminist standpoint, then, is not made in terms solely of the experiences of dalit women, but rather a call for others to “educate themselves about the histories, the preferred social relations and utopias and the struggles of the marginalised” (Rege 1998). This, she argues, allows “their cause” to become “our cause”, not as a form of appropriation of “their” struggle, but through the transformation of subjectivities that enables a recognition that “their” struggle is also “our” struggle. Following Rege, we suggest that social processes can facilitate the understanding of experiences, thus making those experiences the possible object of analysis and action for all, while recognising that they are not equally available or powerful for all subjects. 4 Understandings of identity as given and essential, then, we suggest, need to give way to understandings which accept them as socially constructed and contingent on the work of particular, overlapping, epistemological communities that agree that this or that is a viable and recognised identity. Such an understanding avoids what Bramen identiﬁes as the postmodern excesses of “post-racial” theory, where in this “world without borders (“racism is real, but race is not”) one can be anything one wants to be: a black kid in Harlem can be Croatian-American, if that is what he chooses, and a white kid from Iowa can be Korean-American”(2002: 6). Unconstrained choice is not possible to the extent that, as Nelson (1993) argues, the concept of the epistemological community requires any individual knowledge claim to sustain itself in relation to standards of evaluation that already exist and that are social. Any claim to identity, then, would have to be recognised by particular communities as valid in order to be successful. This further shifts the discussion beyond the limitations of essentialist accounts of identity by recognising that the communities that confer identity are constituted through their shared epistemological frameworks and not necessarily by shared characteristics of their members conceived of as irreducible. 5 Hence, the epistemological community that enables us to identify our-selves as feminists is one that is built up out of a broadly agreed upon paradigm for interpreting the world and the relations between the sexes: it is not one that is premised upon possessing the physical attribute of being a woman or upon sharing the same experiences. Since at least the 1970s, a key aspect of black and/or postcolonial feminism has been to identify the problems associated with such assumptions (see, for discussion, Rege 1998, 2000). We believe that it is the identiﬁcation of injustice which calls forth action and thus allows for the construction of healthy solidarities. 6 While it is accepted that there may be important differences between those who recognise the injustice of disadvantage while being, in some respects, its beneﬁciary (for example, men, white people, brahmins), and those who recognise the injustice from the position of being at its effect (women, ethnic minorities, dalits), we would privilege the importance of a shared political commitment to equality as the basis for negotiating such differences. Our argument here is that thinking through identity claims from the basis of understanding them as epistemological communities militates against exclusionary politics (and its associated problems) since the emphasis comes to be on participation in a shared epistemological and political project as opposed to notions of ﬁxed characteristics – the focus is on the activities individuals participate in rather than the characteristics they are deemed to possess. Identity is thus deﬁned further as a function of activity located in particular social locations (understood as the complex of objective forces that inﬂuence the conditions in which one lives) rather than of nature or origin (Mohanty 1995:109-10). As such, the communities that enable identity should not be conceived of as “imagined” since they are produced by very real actions, practices and projects.

## 2nc

### 2nc impact

#### Ethical decisions require accounting for consequences

**Gvosdev 5** – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest (Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse, AG)

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

#### Util good – equality

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor, AG)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

### 2nr kritik

**The illusion of biopower is just an abstraction of the fundamental basis of social relations, which is labor**

Hardt & Negro 2k (Professors, Michael & Antonia “Empire” <http://textz.gnutenberg.net/text.php?id=1034709069754> )

The danger of the discourse of general intellect is that it risks remaining entirely on the plane of thought, as if the new powers of labor were only intellectual and not also corporeal (Section 3.4). As we saw earlier, new forces and new positions of affective laborcharacterize labor power as much as intellectual labor does. Biopower names these productive capacities of life that are equally intellectual and corporeal. The powers of production are in fact today entirely biopolitical; in other words, they run throughout and constitute directly not only production but also the entire realm of reproduction. Biopower becomes an agent of production when the entire context of reproduction is subsumed under capitalist rule, that is, when reproduction and the vital relationships that constitute it themselves become directly productive. Biopower is another name for the real subsumption of society under capital, and both are synonymous with the globalized productive order. Production fills the surfaces of Empire; it is a machine that is full of life, an intelligent life that by expressing itself in production and reproduction as well as in circulation (of labor, affects, and languages) stamps society with a new collective meaning and recognizes virtue and civilization in cooperation.

### 2nc perm block

#### Now even if they win the theoretical stuff – the perm lets them reformulate commitments to avoid directly challenging capital—that type of “principle harmonization” is a hallmark of neoliberal ideology

Adolph **Reed**, Jr., University of Pennsylvania http://nonsite.org/editorial/django-unchained-or-the-help-how-cultural-politics-is-worse-than-no-politics-at-all-and-why 2-25-**13**

Thus star Maggie Gyllenhaal and director Daniel Barnz defended themselves against complaints about their complicity in the hideously anti-union propaganda film Won’t Back Down **by adducing their identities as progressives**. Gyllenhaal insisted that the movie couldn’t be anti-union because “There’s no world in which I would ever, EVER make an anti-union movie. My parents are left of Trotsky.”15 Barnz took a similar tack: “I’m a liberal Democrat, very pro-union, a member of two unions. I marched with my union a couple of years ago when we were on strike.”16 And Kathryn Bigelow similarly has countered criticism that her Zero Dark Thirty justifies torture and American militarism more broadly by invoking her identity as “a lifelong pacifist.”**17 Being a progressive is now more a matter of how one thinks about oneself than what one stands for or does in the world**. The best that can be said for that perspective is that it registers acquiescence in defeat. It amounts to an effort to salvage an idea of a left by **reformulating it as a sensibility within neoliberalism rather than a challenge to it**. Gyllenhaal, Barnz, and Bigelow exemplify the power of ideology as a mechanism that **harmonizes the principles one likes to believe one holds with what advances one’s material interests;** they also attest to the fact that the transmutation of leftism into pure self-image exponentially increases the potential power of that function of ideology. Upton Sinclair’s quip—“It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it”—takes on all the more force when applied not merely to actions or interpretations of an external world but to devoutly savored self-perception as well. That left political imagination now operates unself-consciously within the practical ontology of neoliberalism is also the most important lesson to be drawn from progressives’ discussion of Django Unchained and, especially, the move to compare it with Lincoln. Jon Wiener, writing in The Nation, renders the following comparisons: “In Spielberg’s film, the leading black female character is a humble seamstress in the White House whose eyes fill with tears of gratitude when Congress votes to abolish slavery. In Tarantino’s film, the leading female character (Kerry Washington) is a defiant slave who has been branded on the face as a punishment for running away, and is forced—by Leonardo DiCaprio—to work as a prostitute. In Spielberg’s film, old white men make history, and black people thank them for giving them their freedom. In Tarantino’s, a black gunslinger goes after the white slavemaster with homicidal vengeance.”18 Never mind that, for what it’s worth, Kerry Washington’s character, as she actually appears in the film, is mainly a cipher, a simpering damsel in distress more reminiscent of Fay Wray in the original King Kong than heroines of the blaxploitation era’s eponymous vehicles Coffy or Foxy Brown. More problematically, Wiener’s juxtapositions reproduce the elevation of private, voluntarist action as a politics—somehow more truly true or authentic, or at least more appealing emotionally—**over the machinations of government and institutional actors. That is a default presumption of the identitarian/culturalist left and is also a cornerstone of neoliberalism’s practical ontology.**

#### We don’t have to win everyone suffers from or experiences capitalism equally—rather, oppression is fundamentally mediated by relations to means of production—history of colonial rule proves our offense and applies directly to their anti-US stance

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In contrast to both Critical Race Theorists and revisionist socialists/left liberals/equivalence theorists, and those who see caste as the primary form of oppression, Marxists would agree that objectively- whatever our “race” or gender or sexuality or current level of academic attainment or religious identity, whatever the individual and group history and fear of oppression and attack- **the fundamental objective and material form of oppression in capitalism is class oppression**. Black and Women capitalists, or Jewish and Arab capitalists, or Dalit capitalists in India, exploit the labour power of their multi-ethnic men and women workers, essentially (in terms of the exploitation of labour power and the appropriation of surplus value) in just the same way as do white male capitalists, or upper-caste capitalists. But the subjective consciousness of identity, this subjective affirmation of one particular identity, while seared into the souls of its victims, **should not mask the objective nature of contemporary oppression under capitalism** – class oppression that, of course, hits some “raced” and gendered and caste and occupational sections of the working class harder than others. Martha Gimenez (2001:24) succinctly explains that “class is **not simply another ideology** legitimating oppression.” Rather, class denotes “exploitative relations between people **mediated by their relations to the means of production**.” Apple’s “parallellist,” or equivalence model of exploitation (equivalence of exploitation based on “race,” class and gender, his “tryptarchic” model of inequality) produces valuable data and insights into aspects of and the extent and manifestations of gender oppression and “race” oppression in capitalist USA. However, such analyses serve to **occlude the class-capital relation**, the class struggle, **to obscure an essential and defining nature of capitalism,** class conflict. Objectively, whatever our “race” or gender or caste or sexual orientation or scholastic attainment, whatever the individual and group history and fear of oppression and attack, the **fundamental form of oppression in capitalism is class oppression**. While the capitalist class is predominantly white and male, capital in theory and in practice can be blind to colour and gender and caste – even if that does not happen very often. African Marxist-Leninists such as Ngugi wa Thiong’o (e.g., Ngugi wa Thiong’o and Ngugi wa Mirii, 1985) know very well that **when the white colonialist oppressors were ejected** from direct rule over African states in the 1950s and 60s, the white bourgeoisie in some African states such as Kenya was **replaced by a black bourgeoisie**, acting in concert with transnational capital and/or capital(ists) of the former colonial power. Similarly in India, capitalism is no longer exclusively white. It is Indian, not white British alone. As Bellamy observes, the diminution of class analysis “**denies immanent critique of any critical bite,” effectively disarming a meaningful opposition to the capitalist thesis** (Bellamy, 1997:25). And as Harvey notes, neoliberal rhetoric, with its foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms, has the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of justice through the conquest of state power. (Harvey, 2005:41) To return to the broader relationship between “race,” gender, and social class, and to turn to the USA, are there many who would deny that Condoleeza Rice and Colin Powell have more in common with the Bushes and the rest of the Unites States capitalist class, be it white, black or Latina/o, than they do with the workers whose individual ownership of wealth and power is an infinetismal fraction of those individual members of the ruling and capitalist class? The various oppressions, of caste, gender, “race,” religion, for example, are functional in dividing the working class and securing the reproduction of capital; constructing social conflict between men and women, or black and white, or different castes, or tribes, or religious groups, or skilled and unskilled, thereby tending to dissolve the conflict between capital and labor, thus occluding the class-capital relation, the class struggle, and to obscure the essential and defining nature of capitalism, the labor-capital relation and its attendant class conflict.

#### The perm nullifies class as a useful means of inquiry—makes the alt superfluous through methodological individualism which echoes the failures of multiculturalism

E. San Juan, Jr. , PhD harvard Marxism and the Race/Class Problematic: A Re-Articulation , Cultural Logic Vol 6 2003

The implacably zombifying domination of the Cold War for almost half a century has made almost everyone allergic to the Marxian notion of class as a social category that can explain inequalities of power and wealth in the "free world." One symptom is the mantra of "class reductionism" or "economism" as **a weapon to silence** anyone who calls attention to the value of one's labor power, or one's capacity to work in order to survive, if not to become human. Another way of nullifying the concept of **class as an epistemological tool for understanding** the dynamics of capitalist society is to equate it with status, life-style, even an entire "habitus" or pattern of behavior removed from the totality of the social relations of production in any given historical formation. Often, class is reduced to income, or to voting preference within the strict limits of the bourgeois (that is, capitalist) electoral order. Some sociologists even play at being agnostic or nominalist by claiming that class displays countless meanings and designations relative to the ideological persuasion of the theorist/researcher, hence its general uselessness as an analytic tool. This has become the orthodox view of "class" in mainstream academic discourse. 2. Meanwhile, with the victory of the Civil Rights struggles in the sixties (now virtually neutralized in the last two decades), progressive forces relearned the value of the strategy of alliances and coalitions of various groups. These coalitions have demonstrated the power of demanding the recognition of group rights, the efficacy of the politics of identity. Invariably, ethnic or cultural identity became the primordial point of departure for political dialogue and action. Activists learned the lesson that Stuart Hall, among others, discovered in the eighties: the presumably Gramscian view that "there is no automatic identity or correspondence between economic, political and ideological processes" (1996, 437). This has led to the gradual burgeoning of a "politics of ethnicity predicated on difference and diversity." Nonetheless, Hall insisted that for people of color, class is often lived or experienced in the modality of race; in short, racism (racialized relations) often function as one of the factors that "overdetermine" (to use the Althusserian term) the formation of class consciousness. While this trend (still fashionable today in its version of cosmopolitanism, post-national or postcolonial criticism, eclectic transnationalism of all sorts) did not completely reject the concept of class, it **rendered it superfluous** by the formula of subsuming it within the putative **"intersectionality**" of race, gender, and class as a matrix of identity and agency. 3. One of the systematic ideological rationalizations of this approach is David Theo Goldberg's Racist Culture. Goldberg argues that class cannot be equated with race, or race collapsed into class; in short, culture cannot be dissolved into economics. That move "leaves unexplained those cultural relations race so often expresses, or it wrongly reduces these cultural relations to more or less veiled instantiations of class formation" (1993, 70). Race then becomes primarily an affair of race relations. It acquires **an almost fetishistic valorization** in this framework of elucidating social reality. A less one-sided angle may be illustrated by Amy Gutman's belief that class and race interact so intimately that we need a more nuanced calibration of the specific moments in which the racial determinant operates over and above the class determinant: "What we can say with near certainty is that if blacks who live in concentrated poverty, go to bad schools, or live in single-parent homes are also stigmatized by racial prejudice as whites are not, then even the most complex calculus of class is an imperfect substitute for also taking color explicitly into account" (2000, 96). What is clear in both Goldberg's and Gutman's analysis is that class (taken as a rigid phenomenal feature of identity) is only one aspect or factor in explaining any dynamic social situation, not the salient or fundamental relation. Unlike the Marxian concept of class as a relation of group antagonisms (more precisely, class conflict) that is the distinctive characteristic of the social totality in capitalism, class in current usage signifies an **element of identity**, a phenomenon whose meaning and value is **incomplete without taking into account other factors** like race, gender, locality, and so on. **Neoliberal pluralism** and the discourse of **methodological individualism** reign supreme in these legitimations of a reified world-system, what Henri Lefebvre (1971) calls "the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption."

### 2nc root cause

**Capitalism is the root cause of war**

Dr. David Adams, 2002, former UNESCO Director of the Unit for the International Year for the Culture of Peace, former Professor of Psychology (for 23 years) at Wesleyan University, specialist on the brain mechanisms of aggressive behavior and the evolution of war, “Chapter 8: The Root Causes of War,” The American Peace Movements, p. 22-28, <http://www.culture-of-peace.info/apm/chapter8-22.html>

To take a scientific attitude about war and peace, we must carry the causal analysis a step further. If peace movements are caused by wars and war threats, then we must ask, what are the causes of these wars, both in the short term and in the long term? Before analyzing the causes of wars, it is necessary to dismiss a false analysis that has been popularized in recent years, the myth that war is caused by a "war instinct." The best biological and anthropological data indicate that there is no such thing as a war instinct despite the attempt of the mass media and educational systems to perpetuate this myth. Instead, "the same species that invented war is capable of inventing peace" (note 15). Since there are several kinds of war, it is likely that there are several different kinds of causes for war. There are two kinds of war in which the United States has not been engaged for over two centuries. The first are wars of national liberation such as the American Revolution or today's revolutions in Nicaragua and South Africa being waged by the Sandinistas and the African National Congress. The second are wars of revolution in which the previous ruling class is thrown out and replaced by another. In the British and French Revolutions of earlier eras the feudal land-owners were overthrown by the newly rising capitalist class. In the revolutions of this century in Russia, China, Cuba, etc. the capitalists, in turn, were overthrown by forces representing the working class and landless farmers. The six wars and threats of war that have caused American peace movements in this century have been wars of imperial conquest, inter-imperialist rivalry, and capitalist-socialist rivalry. What are the root causes of these wars in the short term? For the following analysis, I will rely upon some of America's best economic historians (note 16). The Spanish-American and Philippine Wars of 1898, according to historian Walter LaFeber, were inevitable military results of a new foreign policy devoted to obtaining markets overseas for American products. The new foreign policy was the response to a profound depression that began in 1893 with unemployment soaring to almost 20 percent. Farm and industrial output piled up without a market because American workers, being unemployed, had no money to buy them. Secretary of State Gresham "concluded that foreign markets would provide in large measure the cure for the depression." To obtain such markets, the U.S. went into competition with the other imperialist empires such as Britain and Spain. The U.S. intervened with a naval force to help overthrow the government of Hawaii in 1893, intervened diplomatically in Nicaragua in 1894, threatened war with England over Venezuela in 1895, and eventually went to war with Spain in 1898 and invaded the Philippines in 1898. To quote from the title of LaFeber's book, the U.S. established a "new empire." American intervention in World War I again rescued the economy from a depression. In 1914 and 1915, as war between the European imperialist powers broke out, American unemployment was rising towards ten percent and industrial goods were piling up without a market. One industrial market was expanding, however, the market for weapons in Europe. The historian Charles Tansill concludes that "it was the rapid growth of the munitions trade which rescued America from this serious economic situation." And since the sales went to Britain and France, it committed the U.S. to their side in the war. Finance capital was equally involved: "the large banking interests were deeply interested in the World War because of wide opportunities for large profits." When bank loans to Britain and France of half a billion dollars went through in 1915, "the business depression, that had so worried the Administration in the spring of 1915, suddenly vanished, and 'boom times' prevailed." Of course, German imperialism did not stand idly by while the U.S. profited from arms shipments and loans to their enemies in the war. German submarine warfare against these shipments finally provoked American involvement in the War. The rise of fascism in Europe was the direct result of still another cyclical depression, the Great Depression that gripped the entire capitalist world in the Thirties. In his recent book on the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of fascism, David Abraham has documented how major capitalists turned to Hitler to fill the vacuum of political leadership when the economy collapsed. In part, the absence of political leadership "with the collapse of the export economy at the end of 1931...drove German industry to foster or accept a Bonapartist solution to the political crisis and an imperialist solution to the economic crisis. The "Bonapartist solution", as Abraham calls it, was found in Hitler's Nazi Party. As he says, "By mid-1932, the vast majority of industrialists wanted to see Nazi participation in the government." For these industrialists, "an anti-Marxist, imperialist program was the least common denominator on which they could all agree, and the Nazis seemed capable of providing the mass base for such a program." The appeasement of Hitler's promise to smash the communists and socialists at home and to destroy the Soviet Union abroad expressed a new cause of capitalist war. Up until that time, inter-imperialist wars were simply the response to economic contradictions at home and capitalist competition abroad. In part, World War II was yet another inter-imperialist war. But now a new cause of war was emerging alongside of the old. The rise of socialism was a direct threat to the entire capitalist world. In addition to glutted domestic markets and competition for foreign markets, the capitalists now had to face the additional problem that the overall foreign market itself was shrinking. Thus, they tended to support each other in the face of a common enemy. After World War II, there was a particularly sharp shrinkage in the "free world" for capitalist exploitation as socialism and national liberation triumphed through much of the world. The U.S. and its allies responded by demanding that the socialist countries open their doors to investment by capitalism. According to historian William Appleman Williams, "It was the decision of the United States to employ its new and awesome power in keeping with the traditional Open Door Policy which crystallized the cold war." As Williams explains, "the policy of the open door, like all imperial policies, created and spurred onward a dynamic opposition." Diplomatic and military confrontation between the U.S. and USSR were used to justify the Cold War and establishment of NATO, but the underlying issues were economic. As pointed out by historians Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, "The question of foreign economic policy was not the containment of Communism, but rather more directly the extension and expansion of American capitalism according to its new economic power and needs." In addition to the new problem of shrinking world markets, there remained the problem of cyclical depressions. Although unemployment was not bad in 1946 because industry was producing to meet the accumulated needs of the war-deprived American people, the specter of another depression was very much a factor in the Cold War. As the Kolkos point out, "The deeply etched memory of the decade-long depression of 1929 hung over all American plans for the postwar era....In extending its power throughout the globe the United States hoped to save itself as well from a return of the misery of prewar experience." The Vietnam War was a continuation of the Cold War, as the United States tried to prevent further shrinkage of the world capitalist economic system. The U.S. had already fought a similar war in Korea. In his chapter, "The U.S. in Vietnam, 1944-66: Origins and Objectives," Gabriel Kolko calls the intervention of the United States in Vietnam, "the most important single embodiment of the power and purposes of American foreign policy since the Second World War." Elsewhere in his book, Kolko goes into detail about the economic basis of American imperialism: access to raw materials, access to markets for American products, and investment opportunities for American capital. The Vietnam War, he explains, was not a conspiracy or simply a military decision. It was the natural result of "American power and interest in the modern world." Finally we come to the question of what has caused the massive escalation of the arms buildup under Presidents Carter and Reagan (and more recently under Bush, father and son). To some extent, it is a response to the old problem of cyclical depressions. Since World War II, each recession has been deeper than the last, until by 1981 unemployment reached double digits for the first time since

the Thirties. Government spending was needed to put people back to work. Would the government spend the money for military weapons or for civilian needs? A long line of Presidential candidates, standing for the military solution, have been supported in their campaigns by the military-industrial complex against other candidates who were unable to wage a serious campaign for civilian spending instead of military spending. The growing power of the military-industrial complex is a new and especially dangerous addition to the economic causes of war. It reflects an economic crisis that goes even deeper than those of the past. In addition to the cyclical depressions and the shrinkage of foreign markets, there is a new imbalance in the entire structure of capitalism. There is an enormous increase in financial speculation and short-term profit schemes. The military-industrial complex has risen to become the dominant sector of the American economy because through the aid of state subsidies it generates the greatest short-term profits. Never mind if the U.S. government goes into debt to banks and other financial institutions in order to pay for military spending. The world of financial speculation does not worry about tomorrow. Not only does this "military spending solution" endanger the security of the planet, but it also increases the risk of a major financial collapse and subsequent depression. To summarize, we may point to the following causes of American wars over the past century: 1) cyclical crises of overproduction and unemployment, 2) exploitation of poor colonial and neo-colonial countries by rich imperialist countries, 3) economic rivalry for foreign markets and investment areas by imperialist powers, 4) the attempt to stop the shrinkage of the "free world" - i.e. the part of the world that is free for capitalist investment and exploitation, and 5) financial speculation and short-term profit making of the military-industrial complex. In the 1985 edition of this book the argument was made that the socialist countries were escaping from the economic causation of war. In comparison to the capitalist countries, they did not have the same dynamic of over-production and cyclical depression, with periods of enhanced structural unemployment. As for exploitation and imperialism, despite the frequent reference in the American media to "Soviet imperialism," the direction of the flow of wealth was the opposite of what holds true under capitalist imperialism. Instead of the rich nations extracting wealth from the poor ones, which is the case, for example between the U.S. and Latin America, the net flow of wealth proceeded from the Soviet Union towards the other socialist countries in order to bring them towards an eventually even level of development. According to an authoritative source associated with the U.S. military-industrial complex, the net outflow from the Soviet Union amounted to over forty billion dollars a year in the mid-1980's. In one crucial respect, however, the 1985 analysis was incorrect. It failed to take account of the military-industrial complex that had grown to be the most powerful force of the Soviet economy, a mirror image of its equivalent in the West. The importance of this was brought home to those of us who attended a briefing on economic conversion from military to civilian production that was held at the United Nations on November 1, 1990, a critical time for Gorbachev's program of Perestroika in the Soviet Union. The speaker, Ednan Ageev, was the head of the Division of International Security Issues at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was asked by the Gorbachev administration to find out the extent to which the Soviet economy was being used for military production. Naturally, he went to the Minister of Defense, where he was told that this information was secret. Secret even to Gorbachev. In conversation, Ageev estimated that 85-90% of Soviet scientific researchers were in the military sector. That seems high until you realize that the Soviet's were matching U.S. military research, development and production on the basis of a Gross National Product only half as large. Since about 40% of U.S. research and development was tied to the military at that time, it would make sense that the Soviets would have had to double the U.S. percentage in order to keep pace. How could the Gorbachev administration convert their economy from military to civilian production if they could not even get a list of defense industries? Keeping this in mind, along with the enormous militarization of the Soviet economy, it is not so surprising that the Soviet economy collapsed, and with it the entire political superstructure. The origins of the Soviet military-industrial complex can be traced back to the Russian revolution which instituted what Lenin, at one point, called "war communism". He warned that war communism could not succeed in the long run and that instead of a top-down militarized economy, a socialist economy needed to be structured as a "cooperative of cooperatives." But war communism was entrenched during the Stalin years, carried out of necessity to an extreme during the Second World War, and then perpetuated by the Cold War. The economic causation of the war system is not new. It originated long before capitalism and socialism. From its beginnings in ancient Mesopotamia, the state was always associated with war, both to capture slaves abroad and to keep them under control at home. As states grew more powerful, war became the means to build empires and to acquire and rule colonies. In fact, the economic causation of war probably extends back even further into ancient prehistory. From the best analysis I know, that of Mel and Carol Ember, using the methods of cross-cultural anthropology, it would seem that war functioned as a means to survive periodic but unpredictable food shortages caused by natural disasters. Apparently, tribes that could make war most effectively could survive natural disasters better than others by successfully raiding the food supplies of their neighbors. While particular wars can be analyzed, as we have done above, in terms of immediate, short-term causes, there is a need to understand the war system itself, which is as old as human history. Particular wars are the tip of a much deeper iceberg. Beneath war, there has developed a culture of war that is entwined with it in a complex web of causation. On the one hand, the culture of war is produced and reinforced by each war, and, on the other hand, the culture of war provides the basis on which succeeding wars are prepared and carried out. The culture of war is a set of beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that consists of enemy images, authoritarian social structure, training and arming for violence, exploitation of man and nature, secrecy and male domination. Without an enemy, without a social structure where people will follow orders, without the preparation of soldiers and weapons, without the control of information, both propaganda and secrecy, no war can be carried out. The culture of war has been so prevalent in history that we take it for granted, as if it were human nature. However, anthropologists point to cultures that are nowhere near as immersed in the culture of war, and it is the opinion of the best scientists that a culture of peace is possible. Peace movements have not given enough attention to the internal use of the culture of war. The culture of war has two faces, one facing outward and the other inward. Foreign wars are accompanied by authoritarian rule inside the warring countries. Even when there is no war threat, armies (or national guards) are kept ready not just for use against foreign enemies, but also against those defined as the enemy within: striking workers, movements of the unemployed, prisoners, indigenous peoples, just as in an earlier time they were used against slave rebellions. As documented in my 1995 article in the Journal of Peace Research (Internal Military Interventions in the United States) the U.S. Army and National Guard have been used an average of 18 times a year, involving an average of 12,000 troops for the past 120 years, mostly against actions and revolts by workers and the unemployed. During periods of external war, the internal wars are usually intensified and accompanied by large scale spying, deportations and witch hunts. It would appear that we have once again entered such a period in the U.S. We are hardly alone in this matter. Needless to say, the culture of war was highly developed to stifle dissent in the Soviet Union by Stalin and his successors of "war communism." The internal culture of war needs to be analyzed and resisted everywhere. For example, readers living in France should question the role of the CRS. The internal use of the culture of war is no less economically motivated than external wars. The socialists at the beginning of the 20th Century recognized it as "class war," carried out in order to maintain the domination of the rich and powerful over the poor and exploited. Not by accident, it has often been socialists and communists who are the first to be targeted by the internal culture of war in capitalist countries. And they, in turn, have often made the most powerful critique of the culture of war and have played a leading role in peace movements for that reason. Their historical role for peace was considerably compromised, however, by the "war communism" of the Soviet Union. With its demise, however, there is now an opportunity for socialists and communists to return to their earlier leadership against war, both internal and external, and to insist that a true socialism can only flourish on the basis of a culture of peace. In considering future prospects for the American Peace Movements, I shall begin with trends from the past and then consider different factors for the future? First, let us look back over the economic factors and movements of the previous century to see if the trends are likely to continue. 1. Wars are likely to continue because, for the most part, their economic causes remain as strong as ever: 1) cyclical crises of overproduction and unemployment, 2) exploitation of poor colonial and neo-colonial countries by rich imperialist countries, 3) economic rivalry for foreign markets and investment areas by imperialist powers, 4) the attempt to stop the shrinkage of the "free world" - i.e. the part of the world that is free for capitalist investment and exploitation, and 5) financial speculation and short-term profit making of the military-industrial complex. The fourth factor is not as prominent since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but there is still evidence of this factor at work: for example, the attempted overthrow of the government of Venezuela in spring, 2002, was apparently linked to its developing ties with socialist Cuba, especially in terms of its oil resources. Although the coup d'etat failed, there was a risk of plunging Venezuela into warfare, especially considering the increasingly internationalized war next door in Colombia. Although the "war against terrorism" in Afghanistan, Philippines, etc. and the associated military buildup is usually justified as revenge for the attacks of September 11, there seems little doubt that there are economic motives involved as well, including the control of oil resources from Central Asia as a supplement to those of the Middle East. At the same time, the massive expansion of the military-industrial complex in the U.S. appears at some level to be intended as an increase in government spending to hedge against declining non-military production, unemployment and financial crises in the stock markets. 2. The American peace movements have been reactive in the past, developing in response to specific wars or threats of war, and then disappearing when the war is over or the threat is perceived to have decreased. In fact, this observation at the macro level is mirrored by an observation that I have made previously at a micro level: participants in peace movements have been motivated to an important degree by anger against the injustice of war. This dynamic seems likely to continue. Governments, worried about the reactive potential of peace movements may attempt to engage in very brief wars, just as the U.S. government cut short the 1991 Gulf War after several weeks to avoid an escalating peace movement. In the future, peace movements need to be broadened by linkages to other issues and by international solidarity and unity; otherwise they risk being only temporary influences on the course of history, growing in response to particular wars and then disappearing again afterwards. The world needs a sustained opposition to the entire culture of war, not just to particular wars. To be fully successful, the future peace movement needs to be positive as well as negative. It needs to be for a culture of peace at the same time as it is against the culture of war. This requires that activists in the future peace movement develop a shared vision of the future towards which the movement can aspire. I have found evidence, presented in the recent revision of my book Psychology for Peace Activists (note 17), that such a shared, positive vision is now becoming possible, and, as a result, human consciousness can take on a new and powerful dimension in this particular moment of history.

### 2nc liberalism turns case

#### Refusing the permanence of the ballot is the only way to maintain the singularity of the aff’s performance—voting aff quantifies the value of their performance which can only result in its fetishization by external forces

Phelan 96—chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies (Peggy, Unmarked: the politics of performance, ed published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, 19)

I am speaking here of an **active vanishing,** a deliberate and conscious refusal to take the payoff of visibility. For the moment, active disappearance usually requires at least some recognition of what and who is not there to be effective. (In short, this has largely been apossibility for white middle- and upper-class women.)

A group of women artists and feminist theorists in New York callthemselves the Guerrilla Girls. They make posters and signs underliningthe everyday racist and sexist practices which constitute business asusual in the mainstream art market. They take the real facts of exhibitionspace, art market prices, and the sexist and racist policies which have influenced the collections of most galleries and museums, as the ground of their representational strategies. Much of this work is witty and wry. In their poster straightforwardly listing the ten advantages of being awoman artist, for example, one benefit is the relief of never having toworry about being labeled a genius. While their work has become increasingly lauded by both establishment and anti-establishment criticsand art world commentators, the Guerrilla Girls continue to remain anonymous. When they do make appearances, they wear gorilla masks and mini-skirts. By refusing to participate in the **visibility-is-currency economy** which determines value in “the art world,” the members of the group **resist the fetishization of their argument** that many are, at themoment, quite ready to undertake. By resisting visible identities, the Guerrilla Girls mark the failure of the gaze to possess, and arrest, their work. Their posters go up with glue on temporary construction sites, onthe sides of buildings, on the doors of closed galleries. They remain thereuntil other messages, often advertisements, overtake them. Underneaththe new representations, the racist and sexist “facts” of the Guerrilla Girls’ real continue to “exist,” while remaining obscured. Always failing to keep the real in view, representation papers it over and reproduces other representations.

## 1nr

### at: alienation

#### Arguments don’t injure people, but policies do—voting aff on this is much closer to censorship because it says we can’t even introduce ideas without harming them—that's a tactical move to shut down debates

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

Probyns piece is a mixture of affective fallacy, argument by authority, and bald ad hominem. There's a pattern here: precisely the tendency to personalize argument and to foreground what Wendy Brown has called "states of injury." Probyn says, for example, that she "felt ostracized by the books content and style." Ostracized? Argument here is seen as directly harming persons, and this is precisely the state of affairs to which I object. Argument is not injurious to persons. Policies are injurious to persons and institutionalized practices can alienate and exclude. But argument itself is not directly harmful; once one says it is, one is very close to a logic of censorship. The most productive thing to do in an open academic culture (and in societies that aspire to freedom and democracy) when you encounter a book or an argument that you disagree with is to produce a response or a book that states your disagreement. But to assert that the book itself directly harms you is tantamount to saying that you do not believe in argument or in the free exchange of ideas, that your claim to injury somehow damns your opponent's ideas.

When Probyn isn't symptomatic, she's just downright sloppy. One could work to build up the substance of points that she throws out the car window as she screeches on to her next destination, but life is short, and those with considered objections to liberalism and proceduralism would not be particularly well served by the exercise. As far as I can tell, Probyn thinks my discussion of universalism is of limited relevance (though far more appealing when put, by others, in more comfortingly equivocating terms), but she's certain my critique of appeals to identity is simply not able to accommodate the importance of identity in social and political life. As I make clear throughout the book, and particularly in my discussion of the headscarf debate in France, identity is likely to be at the center of key arguments about life in plural democracies; my point is not that identity is not relevant, but simply that it should not be used to trump or stifle argument.

In closing, I'd like to speak briefly to the question of proceduralism's relevance to democratic vitality. One important way of extending the proceduralist arguments put forth by Habeimas is to work on how institutions and practices might better promote participation in democratic life. The apathy and nonparticipation plaguing democratic institutions in the United States is a serious problem, and can be separated from the more romantic theoretical investments in a refusal to accept the terms of what counts as argument, or in assertions of inassimilable difference. With respect to the latter, which is often glorified precisely as the moment when politics or democracy is truly occurring, I would say, on the contrary democracy is not happening then-rather, the limits or deficiencies of an actually existing democracy are making themselves felt. Acknowledging struggle, conflict, and exclusion is vital to democracy, but insisting that exclusion is not so much a persistent challenge for modern liberal democracies but rather inherent to the modern liberal-democratic political form as such seems to me precisely to remain stalled in a romantic critique of Enlightenment. It all comes down to a question of whether one wants to work with the ideals of democracy or see them as essentially normative in a negative sense: this has been the legacy of a certain critique of Enlightenment, and it is astonishingly persistent in the left quarters in the academy. One hears it clearly when Robbins makes confident reference to liberalisms tendency to ignore "the founding acts of violence on which a social order is based." One encounters it in the current vogue for the work of Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt. Saying that a state of exception defines modernity or is internal to the law itself may help to sharpen your diagnoses of certain historical conditions, but if absolutized as it is in these accounts, it gives you nothing but a negative diagnostic and a compensatory flight to a realm entirely other-the kind of mystical, Utopian impulse that flees from these conditions rather than confronts and fights them on terms that derive from the settled-if constantly evolving-normative basis of democratic modernity. If one is outraged by the flagrant disregard of democratic procedures in the current U.S. political regime, then one needs to be able to coherently say why democratic procedures matter, what principles underwrite them, and what historical movements and institutions have helped us to secure and support them. Argument as a critical practice and as a key component of democratic institutions and public debate has a vital role to play in such a task.

### 2nc at: topic relevance

#### “Topic relevance” doesn’t solve—only a precise and limited rez creates deliberation on a point of mutual difference

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education withoutfinding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a **precise question** is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### It’s a prior question—otherwise there's nothing to require structured disagreement

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POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2000, p. 104-5. (DRGNS/E625)

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separation. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that **precedes the actual** taking and **implementation** of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators **require something to deliberate about and that** deliberation **presumes certain institutional structures** and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting partisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.