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#### Obama uses PC to delay an Iran deal now

**Gerstein, 11/12/13** (Josh, Politico, “Iran talks delay puts White House on defense”

http://www.politico.com//story/2013/11/iran-talks-delay-white-house-99707.html)

A ten-day delay in talks aimed at negotiating an interim halt to Iran’s nuclear program could allow opponents of such a deal to build momentum on Capitol Hill, analysts said Monday.

For a time last week, it seemed like the Obama administration was eager to complete such a pact in little more than 48 hours from the time officials disclosed that a serious short-term agreement was on the table. That would have allowed the administration to bring such a package to Congress as a done deal, with lawmakers in the position of having to upend an agreement that had the blessing of at least six major world powers.

However, a late snag in the talks — there was still some dispute Monday about who was responsible for the hitch — led the parties to recess, with plans to reconvene Nov. 20. And that delay is essentially forcing the administration into a more public and high-profile defense of more diplomacy with Iran, and the Senate to hold off on a vote on new sanctions against Tehran.

Vice President Joe Biden spoke to Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) Monday to encourage the Senate to avoid any moves that might scuttle the next round of talks, said a source familiar with the conversation, first reported by BuzzFeed.

And Secretary of State John Kerry is expected to brief members of the Senate Banking Committee at a closed-door session later this week, a congressional source said. Kerry spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters returning from the Mideast with the secretary that the briefing will take place Wednesday, Reuters reported.

As top Obama administration officials urged the Senate to hold off any new sanctions action, some supporters of a deal with Iran fretted that the administration had waited until now to make a strong push in Congress and with the public for a pact aimed at halting Tehran’s nuclear program.

“I understand the attractiveness of that strategy, but am still doubtful about the wisdom and effectiveness of it, because it essentially means the president wanted to present Congress with a fait accompli, and this Congress doesn’t react very well to that,” said Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council.

Parsi said it was clear that the U.S. administration and others wanted to get an interim deal signed before the debate heated up in Congress again on sanctions.

#### PC key – new sanctions wreck the deal

**Cockburn, 11/11**/13 **-** PATRICK COCKBURN is the author of Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq (“The Deal-Wreckers Why Iran’s Concessions Won’t Lead to a Nuclear Agreement”, Counterpunch, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/11/11/why-irans-concessions-wont-lead-to-a-nuclear-agreement/>

In Tehran President Hassan Rouhani has so far had a fairly easy ride because of his recent election and the support of the Supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. But if he is seen as offering too many concessions on the nuclear programme and not getting enough back in terms of a relaxation of economic sanctions then he and his supporters become politically vulnerable. There are some signs that this is already happening.

The Reformists in Iran will also be vulnerable to allegations that they have given the impression that they are negotiating from weakness because economic sanctions are putting unsustainable pressure on Iran. If this argument was true then Israel, France and Saudi Arabia can argue that more time and more sanctions will make the Iranians willing to concede even more.

There is no doubt that sanctions do have a serious impact on the Iranian economy, but it does not necessarily follow that it will sacrifice its nuclear programme. The confrontational policy advocated much of the US Congress may, on the contrary decide Iran to build a nuclear weapon on the grounds that the international campaign against Iranian nuclear development is only one front in an overall plan to overthrow the system of government installed in Iran since the fall of the Shah in 1979. In other words, Iranian concessions on nuclear issues are not going to lead to an agreement, because the real objective is regime change.

On the other hand, the decision by President Obama not to launch airstrikes against Syria, Iran’s crucial Arab ally, after the use of chemical weapons on 21 August, has to a degree demilitarised the political atmosphere. This could go into reverse if Congress adds even tougher sanctions and threats of military action by Israel resume. Much will depend on how much political capital President Obama is willing spend to prevent prospects for a deal being extinguished by those who believe that confrontation with Iran works better than diplomacy.

#### War powers stripping tanks pol cap

O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis)

a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by first-hand accounts of information battles and by the conclusions of experts who study them. Participants in such battles report that short-term political calculations consistently trump the constitutional interests at stake. One veteran of the first Bush White House, for example, has explained that rational-choice theory predicts what he in fact experienced: The rewards for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the office of the presidency would be largely abstract, since they would consist primarily of fidelity to a certain theory of the Constitution... . The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency, however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs would include the expenditure of political capital that might have been used for more pressing purposes, [and] the unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies. n182 Louis Fisher, one of the leading defenders of the political branches' competence and authority to interpret the Constitution independently of the courts, n183 acknowledges that politics and "practical considerations" typically override the legal and constitutional principles implicated in information disputes. n184 In his view, although debate about congressional access and executive privilege "usually proceeds in terms of constitutional doctrine, it is the messy political realities of the moment that usually decide the issue." n185 Indeed, Professor Peter Shane, who has extensively studied such conflicts, concludes that their successful resolution in fact depends upon the parties focusing only on short-term political [\*1123] considerations. n186 When the participants "get institutional," Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187

#### Deal stops prolif and iran strike

**Stephens, 11/14/13** – columnist for the Financial Times (Phillip, Financial Times, “The four big truths that are shaping the Iran talks” <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/af170df6-4d1c-11e3-bf32-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2kkvx15JT>

The first of these is that Tehran’s acquisition of a bomb would be more than dangerous for the Middle East and for wider international security. It would most likely set off a nuclear arms race that would see Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt signing up to the nuclear club. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty would be shattered. A future regional conflict could draw Israel into launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike. This is not a region obviously susceptible to cold war disciplines of deterrence.

The second ineluctable reality is that Iran has mastered the nuclear cycle. How far it is from building a bomb remains a subject of debate. Different intelligence agencies give different answers. These depend in part on what the spooks actually know and in part on what their political masters want others to hear. The progress of an Iranian warhead programme is one of the known unknowns that have often wreaked havoc in this part of the world.

Israel points to an imminent threat. European agencies are more relaxed, suggesting Tehran is still two years or so away from a weapon. Western diplomats broadly agree that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not taken a definitive decision to step over the line. What Iran has been seeking is what diplomats call a breakout capability – the capacity to dash to a bomb before the international community could effectively mobilise against it.

The third fact – and this one is hard for many to swallow – is that neither a negotiated settlement nor the air strikes long favoured by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, can offer the rest of the world a watertight insurance policy.

It should be possible to construct a deal that acts as a plausible restraint – and extends the timeframe for any breakout – but no amount of restrictions or intrusive monitoring can offer a certain guarantee against Tehran’s future intentions.

By the same token, bombing Iran’s nuclear sites could certainly delay the programme, perhaps for a couple of years. But, assuming that even the hawkish Mr Netanyahu is not proposing permanent war against Iran, air strikes would not end it.

You cannot bomb knowledge and technical expertise. To try would be to empower those in Tehran who say the regime will be safe only when, like North Korea, it has a weapon. So when Barack Obama says the US will never allow Iran to get the bomb he is indulging in, albeit understandable, wishful thinking.

The best the international community can hope for is that, in return for a relaxation of sanctions, Iran will make a judgment that it is better off sticking with a threshold capability. To put this another way, if Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink it will be because of its own calculation of the balance of advantage.

The fourth element in this dynamic is that Iran now has a leadership that, faced with the severe and growing pain inflicted by sanctions, is prepared to talk. There is nothing to say that Hassan Rouhani, the president, is any less hard-headed than previous Iranian leaders, but he does seem ready to weigh the options.

Seen from this vantage point – and in spite of the inconclusive outcome – Geneva can be counted a modest success. Iran and the US broke the habit of more than 30 years and sat down to talk to each other. Know your enemy is a first rule of diplomacy – and of intelligence. John Kerry has his detractors but, unlike his predecessor Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state understands that serious diplomacy demands a willingness to take risks.

The Geneva talks illuminated the shape of an interim agreement. Iran will not surrender the right it asserts to uranium enrichment, but will lower the level of enrichment from 20 per cent to 3 or 4 per cent. It will suspend work on its heavy water reactor in Arak – a potential source of plutonium – negotiate about the disposal of some of its existing stocks of enriched uranium, and accept intrusive international inspections. A debate between the six powers about the strength and credibility of such pledges is inevitable, as is an argument with Tehran about the speed and scope of a run down of sanctions.

#### An Israeli strike fails, but triggers World War 3, collapses heg and the global economy

**Reuveny, 10** – professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University (Rafael, “Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression” Gazette Xtra, 8/7, - See more at: <http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/#sthash.ec4zqu8o.dpuf>)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash.

For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force.

Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground.

All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well.

By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces.

Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond.

Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war.

During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. After years of futilely fighting Palestinian irregular armies, Israel has lost some of its perceived superiority—bolstering its enemies’ resolve.

Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat.

In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973.

An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe.

From there, things could deteriorate as they did in the 1930s. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops.

Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey—all of which essentially support Iran—could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.

Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.

Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted.

If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons but would probably not risk using force.

While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

### 2

#### The President of the United States should announce that he will restrict his war powers authority for targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities, publicly disclose all relevant legal rationales, evidence, and norms in this process, assert that Congress was an active participant in setting these terms of battle, and make any needed clarifications to inquiring parties.

#### Disclosure makes the counterplan credible and checks impulsive decisions

**Marguiles 2012** – Professor of Law, Roger Williams University (5/15, Peter, Pepperdine Law Review, Volume 39, Issue 4, Article 1, “Reforming Lawyers into Irrelevance?: Reconciling Crisis and Constraint at the Office of Legal Counsel”, http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1370&context=plr)

\*NOTE: Marguiles not to be confused with Margolis, who worked in the DOJ after John Yoo

1. Disclosure

Disclosure is an important deliberative safeguard. From an ex ante perspective, disclosure protects against fringe views, since the author of an opinion knows that outside audiences will “kick the tires” and quickly discover and critique views that distort the relevant law.242 Disclosure also helps ex post, by allowing Congress, professional peers, and the public to see distortions as they emerge and campaign to correct them.243 Disclosure also works hand in hand with efforts by the President to secure ratification of an unorthodox view that responds to exigent circumstances; disclosure, at least to Congress, is a necessary incident of ratification.244 Certain opinions may contain sensitive information that makes immediate disclosure inappropriate.245 However, Congress could well require as part of its oversight that OLC engage in a deliberative process, including making express findings that become part of an opinion, when such circumstances prevail.

#### Seen as the decisive voice of America, even if Congress hasn’t signed on

Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 12/3/12, Obama's Moment, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/03/obamas\_moment

In foreign affairs, the central challenge now facing President Barack Obama is how to regain some of the ground lost in recent years in shaping U.S. national security policy. Historically and politically, in America's system of separation of powers, it is the president who has the greatest leeway for decisive action in foreign affairs. He is viewed by the country as responsible for Americans' safety in an increasingly turbulent world. He is seen as the ultimate definer of the goals that the United States should pursue through its diplomacy, economic leverage, and, if need be, military compulsion. And the world at large sees him -- for better or for worse -- as the authentic voice of America. To be sure, he is not a dictator. Congress has a voice. So does the public. And so do vested interests and foreign-policy lobbies. The congressional role in declaring war is especially important not when the United States is the victim of an attack, but when the United States is planning to wage war abroad. Because America is a democracy, public support for presidential foreign-policy decisions is essential. But no one in the government or outside it can match the president's authoritative voice when he speaks and then decisively acts for America. This is true even in the face of determined opposition. Even when some lobbies succeed in gaining congressional support for their particular foreign clients in defiance of the president, for instance, many congressional signatories still quietly convey to the White House their readiness to support the president if he stands firm for "the national interest." And a president who is willing to do so publicly, while skillfully cultivating friends and allies on Capitol Hill, can then establish such intimidating credibility that it is politically unwise to confront him. This is exactly what Obama needs to do now.

### 3



#### the aff allows the government to deploy victimhood of 9/11 to wage wars and erases agency

**Faulkner, ‘8** professor at the University of New South Wales (Joanne Faulkner, Spring/Autumn 2008, “The Innocence of Victimhood Versus the “Innocence of Becoming”: Nietzsche, 9/11, and the “Falling Man,”” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Iss. 35/36)//CC

It would seem that there is very little about the events of the September 11, 2001, that has not already been said or imagined. Our understanding of these events, and especially the attacks on the Twin Towers, has been overdetermined by the seemingly endless repetition of (by now) iconic images: of planes perforating the clear, tranquil surface of those seemingly impenetrable buildings and thus opening a rupture in the Western consciousness, the reparation of which is not yet in sight. Other images also populate the post-9/11 memory: images of disbelief, of grief, and of bravery—especially with respect to the members of the New York Fire Department, who rose to the occasion of providing a sense of American resilience and fortitude, thus representing a possible future after the catastrophe. These images played a major role in enabling certain mainstream media groups in the United States to reconstruct a narrative concerning their particular place in the world and with respect to each other: a narrative about national character and identity, hope, fear, and desire. The images drawn on to illustrate this narrative were therefore of critical importance; what was needed was a strong and coherent picture of innocence: the innocence of those killed in the attacks, to be sure, but also of the American people more generally—who, after a brief period of tending to their wounds, would need to collect themselves and return to the everyday commerce of existence, secure in the belief that evil is radically external to their “way of life” and that their government will ultimately protect them.1 Such a narrative, however, also served to exclude images that could not support the specific requirements of its coherence: equivocal images that jar against our [End Page 67] sense of propriety, certainly now after the effects of repetition have etched within us a certain understanding of the experience of 9/11. But also, interestingly, just after the attacks and before the grooves of this understanding had been consolidated, spontaneous and diffuse acts of censorship regulated the kinds of experiences, fears, and decisions that the victims of the attacks could enact. This article addresses one such image, which proved to be disruptive of the limits of identity asserted immediately following 9/11: Richard Drew’s “Falling Man,” depicting an unknown victim of the attacks in midflight from the North Tower of the World Trade Center. This image complicates the very culturally specific notion of innocence that was invoked during the reconstruction of national identity following the terrorist attacks against America. In particular, it will be argued that the “falling man” compromised the vision of an innocence that solicits protection precisely because it is outside the sphere of action. The image represents a decision—a wild and hopeless decision but a decision nonetheless—that, from the perspective of a claim to innocence, conceived as passive and guiltless, is difficult to comprehend or acknowledge as a “proper” comportment of an innocent. The falling man reveals and embodies a traumatic horror, difficult to encounter: the horror of choosing the means of one’s own particular death in the face of a less certain but more protracted demise at the hands of another. This article argues for a reconsideration of “innocence” that might emphasize agency and creativity above morality and victimhood and in so doing hopes to promote an understanding of those who found themselves preferring to jump than to burn on that fateful morning. Conceptual development along these lines will also affect the concept of agency in accordance with Nietzsche’s critique of morality and metaphysics. The broader project to which this essay contributes is concerned with the manner in which the application of innocence to a group can serve to erode their political agency: governments thus soothe our civic conscience while also establishing a mandate of protection in relation to their citizens. The events of 9/11 precipitated a shift from innocence to victimhood and, finally, to a loss of civil liberties for populations across the “West,” not only in the United States. It is therefore imperative to disrupt this equation of innocence with helplessness and to restore agency to the victims of terrorism and citizens alike. In response to antidemocratic policies enacted by governments after 9/11, much political theory has orbited about the constellation of Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt, with Nietzsche lurking in the background as a conceptual precursor to Schmitt’s friend/enemy motif (Z:1 “Of the Friend”).2 We have therefore latterly seen an emphasis placed on the sovereign decision of the executive, the state of exception, and this in turn enlarges the sense that citizens of democracies are politically disempowered. In this context, the falling man is emblematic of the manner in which we might rework the concept of agency [End Page 68] to empower victims and those whose range of choices is limited. This kind of move is necessary, I contend, if the sense of hopelessness and futility that increasingly accompanies political subjectivity in Western democracies might be alleviated and a space for civil creativity might be opened. The essay will proceed by providing an account of the juridical or moral (Judeo-Christian) understanding of innocence and interrogating its conceptual relation to agency and belongingness to the political community. An alternative account of innocence—drawn from an interpretation of Nietzsche’s concept of the “innocence of becoming”—is then considered, through which the memory of the falling man might perhaps be redeemed. The article’s primary question thus concerns how this latter account might assist us in a revaluation of the falling man as innocent and of the “innocent” as capable of moral decision making and political participation.

#### 1ac cedes authority to the hands of the government to restrict itself – it uses that to create endless violence

**Duschinsky, ’11** Professor at University of Northumbria (Robbie Duschinsky, Spring 2011, “Nietzsche: Through the Lens of Purity,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies Iss. 41)//CC

By contrast, Joanne Faulkner demonstrates both the salience of the theme of purity in Nietzsche and the important contemporary stakes in co nducting such a reading.23 In the context of examining discourses of innocence in post–9/11 reconstructions of American identity, Faulkner proposes that at the core of social contract theory is an assumption that a state of personal and communal innocence has to be set aside to enter into the dirtying, compromised, fallen world of civil association. For Faulkner, it is this guilt that, as Nietzsche states, is the precondition of sovereign individuals who can make promises and who take responsibility for themselves and their actions. The implication is that the innocent can have no effective political agency and must be protected. The innocent victims of 9/11 have mandated war abroad and the curtailment of civil liberties at home, as "an eternally aggrieved icon of national identity: a perennially threatened and victimized creature of ressentiment who 'in order to exist first needs a hostile external world.'"24 Against this, Faulkner sets Nietzsche's notion of the innocence of becoming, which insists that there is no transcendent realm against which our lives can be judged. The innocence of becoming poses rather that creative activity and choices, based on the available options that chance presents to the individual, serve as their own justification.25 The metaphysical purity of innocent victim-hood has made certain bellicose actions on the part of state institutions appear as natural and seemingly neutral. Thus Faulkner's work indicates the stakes in using Nietzsche for considering alternative ways of seeing innocence and purity.

#### choose death in the face of inevitability – your ballot allows you to reclaim agency

**Faulkner, ‘8** professor at the University of New South Wales (Joanne Faulkner, Spring/Autumn 2008, “The Innocence of Victimhood Versus the “Innocence of Becoming”: Nietzsche, 9/11, and the “Falling Man,”” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Iss. 35/36)//CC

Most significantly, for the purposes of this essay, we can perhaps see now how for Nietzsche agency is compatible with innocence. Indeed, innocence—regarded as what is unsullied by moral thinking—is integral to the skillful exercise of agency. Understood in these terms, innocence is neither a precious ideal to be protected from the forces of chance nor a moralistic instrument for the meting of punishment to those who threaten society. Rather, innocence is conceived as a style of existence that becomes active by claiming to itself what chance throws up before it. Innocence would here suggest a resistance to passivity and victimhood and a choice to take part in the inevitability of the moment—even if this agency ultimately extinguishes the subject through which it is performed. Perhaps at this point, then, we might attempt a return to the acts of the 9/11 jumpers, who in the light of the above can be understood as agents of their own demise but in a manner that nonetheless does not compromise their innocence.

The visions of falling bodies from the Twin Towers do not sit well with orthodox imagery surrounding 9/11 because they invoke an uncomfortable ambiguity with respect to their victim status. In their final moments of animation and on the precipice of death, these bodies occupy a middle space between life and death that renders us uncomfortable in our own mortality. But they also mark a cleavage between innocence and guilt: their decision to seize the opportunity to escape confinement within their smoky “tombs” signals a confusing complicity with the terrorists who had perpetrated the attacks. In the terms that Nietzsche (and Spinoza) set out above, the jumpers took an active part in the causes that led to their deaths—causes that originate in a terrorist plot against America. And in the eyes of some, this exposed them as irresolute, and even disloyal, in the face of what later emerged to be a monumental national threat.

In theological terms also—and keeping in mind the religious frame through which many in the United States view global politics—Drew’s photograph, especially, resonates with a near-godly defiance of death: the subject’s fall can be read as the taking of a liberty against God, who claims a privilege with respect to determining who lives or dies. The image may thus evoke to the viewing public humanity’s primal scene and the original sin that it demonstrates: the [End Page 80] taking of the fruit of knowledge that marks a new beginning for humanity. Even the photograph’s title would seem to suggest a proximity to the guilt through which humanity is engendered, by means of its irreparable separation from innocence. Likewise, its subject is separated from the other victims of the attacks who (more appropriately) awaited divine sanction on their lives and have thus continued to be redeemed (drawn back into the community’s fold) by means of the various ceremonies and purification rites since performed at Ground Zero. The resigned posture of the subject of “The Falling Man” surely gives the viewer pause: it looks like a suicide attempt, and the suicide cannot be connected to a redemptive innocence. Yet, according to Nietzsche’s refiguring of agency, the decision to die can be reconciled with innocence: and moreover, innocence comes to be the very condition of an agency—as opposed to (fictitious) free will—an agency that, rather, refuses the moralizing economy of guilt and punishment.

The decision to jump hundreds of meters to one’s death from a burning building might seem a limited, and somewhat undesirable, instance of agency. Clearly, it is a choice these people would not have made on any other morning and in any other circumstance. In the light of Nietzsche’s account of agency as conditioned by context and circumstance, however, it is possible to count the jumpers among the innocents lost to 9/11—and to do so in full recognition of their specific choice to take their lives into their own hands. In the context of Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming, we may understand innocence as a suspension of moral judgment rather than as prior to (and separate from) social existence. Nietzschean innocence emerges from within existence and gives rise to an agency that responds to the chance necessities life occasions. Likewise, the innocence of becoming is not grounded in opposition to guilt but, rather, undercuts the understanding of social relations in terms of guilt and debt. For this reason, Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming furnishes the jumpers’ decision with a sense that would be otherwise unavailable, at least within the narrow parameters according to which moral action and worth are conventionally adjudged.

In the absence of an acknowledgment of the jumpers’ choice (and of the possibility of making a decision to die in one’s own way, where the choice to live is unavailable), we will continue to misunderstand their relationship to these events and thus to limit their political agency. In the context of the 9/11 attacks, the innocent—understood through the vista of Judeo-Christian moral tradition—has become an eternally aggrieved icon of national identity: a perennially threatened and victimized creature of ressentiment who “in order to exist first needs a hostile external world” (GM I:10).32 Although it is important to acknowledge the suffering of those affected, and this may indeed include the nation as a whole, what Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming reveals is that the relationship to one’s suffering is far from straightforward. If we subscribe too readily to the status of innocent-to-be-protected—thus recoiling from suffering and requiring that the [End Page 81] debts of enemies be paid in full—then we also deny the possibility of freedom opened by the affirmation of becoming. And such a predicament is all too well reflected in the erosion of civil liberties that is ongoing since the end of 2001 in the United States and elsewhere.

But were we to allow ourselves to imagine being trapped within those buildings and to contemplate the possibility that one might still make a choice, perhaps identification with the falling man might open the citizen to a new kind of agency in relation to government and nationhood. Remembering that the imagination furnishes us with knowledge of our situation—by means of the traces of interactions impressed upon memory—then we are able to develop a capacity for agency by using our imaginations to understand the decisions of those who have lived through what we have not. Through the rubric offered by the jumper’s predicament, we might then imagine a mode of resistance against attack, wherein strength is reappropriated from the enemy—even in death. Our reinterpretation of the falling man as innocent thus allows for a conception of freedom with respect to the chance events that constrain action. But moreover, it also allows us to develop a resistance to governments’ attempts to render us passive subjects by means of the moral mantle of innocence by which we are both idealized and contained. Such a modest and situated exercise of agency would involve attentiveness to the diffuse and unexpected opportunities that arise in one’s locality, to actively participate in the causes of change. For instance, one could organize a demonstration, write letters to political representatives and newspapers, meet with others who share one’s values, walk to work, or recycle.

Each of these activities, however humble or ambitious, contributes to the determination of life and prevents one being the mere passive object of external causes—disempowered and separated from agency. Such attunement to one’s situation, however, requires above all engaging one’s imagination: the site of ethical understanding—of what empowers the body and what the body should avoid. In this vein, we might reimagine the falling man as a figure of the active resistance that Nietzsche’s innocence of becoming teaches. And we can understand his final act of agency as such, without casting him out of the sanctum of human virtue. With respect to this reinterpretation of innocence, as a sensitivity to the specific opportunities that life grants, I will leave the last word to one who, mourning the loss of his wife, finds it within himself to understand her final decision: “Whether she jumped, I don’t know. I hoped that she had succumbed to the smoke but it doesn’t seem likely. In some ways it might just be the last element of control, that everything around you is happening and you can’t stop it, but this is something you can do. To be out of the smoke and the heat, to be out in the air … it must have felt like flying.”33 [End Page 82]

### terror

#### Plan collapses counter-terror

Geoffrey Corn 13, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law, 5/16/13, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CQ Congressional Testimony, lexis

3. What is the geographic scope of the AUMF and under what circumstances may the United States attack belligerent targets in the territory of another country?

In my opinion, there is no need to amend the AUMF to define the geographic scope of military operations it authorizes. On the contrary, I believe doing so would fundamentally undermine the efficacy of U.S. counter-terror military operations by overtly signaling to the enemy exactly where to pursue safe-haven and de facto immunity from the reach of U.S. power. This concern is similar to that associated with explicitly defining co- belligerents subject to the AUMF, although I believe it is substantially more significant. It is an operational and tactical axiom that insurgent and non-state threats rarely seek the proverbial "toe to toe" confrontation with clearly superior military forces. Al Qaeda is no different. Indeed, their attempts to engage in such tactics in the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom proved disastrous, and ostensibly caused the dispersion of operational capabilities that then necessitated the co-belligerent assessment. Imposing an arbitrary geographic limitation of the scope of military operations against this threat would therefore be inconsistent with the strategic objective of preventing future terrorist attacks against the United States.

I believe much of the momentum for asserting some arbitrary geographic limitation on the scope of operations conducted to disrupt or disable al Qaeda belligerent capabilities is the result of the commonly used term "hot battlefield." This notion of a "hot" battlefield is, in my opinion, an operational and legal fiction. Nothing in the law of armed conflict or military doctrine defines the meaning of "battlefield." Contrary to the erroneous assertions that the use of combat power is restricted to defined geographic locations such as Afghanistan (and previously Iraq), the geographic scope of armed conflict must be dictated by a totality assessment of a variety of factors, ultimately driven by the strategic end state the nation seeks to achieve. The nature and dynamics of the threat -including key vulnerabilities - is a vital factor in this analysis. These threat dynamics properly influence the assessment of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, which in turn drive the formulation of national strategy, which includes determining when, where, and how to leverage national power (including military power) to achieve desired operational effects. Thus, threat dynamics, and not some geographic "box", have historically driven and must continue to drive the scope of armed hostilities. The logic of this premise is validated by (in my opinion) the inability to identify an armed conflict in modern history where the scope of operations was legally restricted by a conception of a "hot" battlefield. Instead, threat dynamics coupled with policy, diplomatic considerations and, in certain armed conflicts the international law of neutrality, dictate such scope. Ultimately, battlefields become "hot" when persons, places, or things assessed as lawful military objectives pursuant to the law of armed conflict are subjected to attack.

#### Specifically, special forces conduct first-resort targeted killings outside of armed conflict zones

Sascha-Dominik Bachmann 13, Reader in International Law (University of Lincoln), 2013, “Targeted Killings: Contemporary Challenges, Risks and Opportunities,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law, doi: 10.1093/jcsl/krt007

Targeted killing has also been used by the USA in theatres of actual combat operations, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as outside these theatres of war and as part of CIA and US military run covert operations in Pakistan. The USA is using drone strikes and Special Forces there to conduct pre-emptive as well as defensive targeted killing operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The argument is brought forward that such operations are necessary to protect US forces and its allies in Afghanistan and to disrupt the existent terrorist infrastructure. The focus of such operations is on the so-called ‘Tribal Areas’ of Pakistan, Waziristan, where the Taliban have effectively established an autonomous sphere of influence to the exclusion of the central government in Peshawar.32 Other such covert operations have seen CIA operated drone strikes in Yemen, Somalia as well Sudan, where a lack of cooperation and/or relative capabilities of the respective governments have created areas which are outside effective state control.33

#### That’s key to counter-prolif---solves nuclear war

Jim Thomas 13, Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Chris Dougherty is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013, “BEYOND THE RAMPARTS THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES,” http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SOF-Report-CSBA-Final.pdf

WMD do not represent new threats to U.S. security interests, but as nascent nuclear powers grow their arsenals and aspirants like Iran continue to pursue nuclear capabilities, the threat of nuclear proliferation, as well as the potential for the actual use of nuclear weapons, will increase. Upheaval in failing or outlaw states like Libya and Syria, which possess chemical weapons and a range of missiles, highlights the possibility that in future instances of state collapse or civil war, such weapons could be used by failing regimes in an act of desperation, fall into the hands of rebel forces, or be seized by parties hostile to the United States or its interests. SOF can contribute across the spectrum of counter-WMD efforts, from stopping the acquisition of WMD by hostile states or terrorist groups to preventing their use. The global CT network SOF have built over the last decade could be repurposed over the next decade to become a global counter-WMD network, applying the same logic that it takes a network to defeat a network. Increasing the reach and density of a global counter-WMD network will require expanding security cooperation activities focused on counter-proliferation. Finally, SOF may offer the most viable strategic option for deposing WMD-armed regimes through UW campaigns should the need arise.

#### No risk of backlash or litigation

Chesney 12

(Robert Chesney, professor at the University of Texas School of Law, nonresident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution, distinguished scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, and Cofounder of the Lawfare Blog, “Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism,” August 29, 2012, U Texas School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 227)

This multi-year pattern of cross-branch and cross-party consensus gives the impression that the legal architecture of detention has stabilized at last. But the settlement phenomenon is not limited to detention policy. The same thing has happened, albeit to a lesser extent, in other areas. The military commission prosecution system provides a good example. When the Obama administration came into office, it seemed quite possible, indeed likely, that it would shut down the commissions system. Indeed, the new president promptly ordered all commission proceedings suspended pending a policy review.48 In the end, however, the administration worked with the then Democratic-controlled Congress to pursue a **mend-it-don’t-end-it** approach culminating in passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2009, which addressed a number of key objections to the statutory framework Congress and the Bush administration had crafted in 2006. In his National Archives address in spring 2009, moreover, President Obama also made clear that he would make use of this system in appropriate cases.49 He has duly done so, notwithstanding his administration’s doomed attempt to prosecute the so-called “9/11 defendants” (especially Khalid Sheikh Mohamed) in civilian courts. Difficult questions continue to surround the commissions system as to particular issues—such as the propriety of charging “material support” offenses for pre-2006 conduct50—but the system as a whole is far more stable today than at any point in the past decade.51 There have been strong elements of cross-party continuity between the Bush and Obama administration on an array of other counterterrorism policy questions, including the propriety of using rendition in at least some circumstances and, perhaps most notably, the legality of using lethal force not just in contexts of overt combat deployments but also in areas physically remote from the “hot battlefield.” Indeed, the Obama administration quickly outstripped the Bush administration in terms of the quantity and location of its airstrikes outside of Afghanistan,52 and it also greatly surpassed the Bush administration in its efforts to marshal public defenses of the legality of these actions.53 What’s more, the Obama administration also succeeded in fending off a lawsuit challenging the legality of the drone strike program (in the specific context of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen and member of AQAP known to be on a list of approved targets for the use of deadly force in Yemen who was in fact killed in a drone strike some months later).54 The point of all this is not to claim that legal disputes surrounding these counterterrorism policies have effectively ended. Far from it; a steady drumbeat of criticism persists, especially in relation to the use of lethal force via drones. But by the end of the first post-9/11 decade, this criticism no longer seemed likely to spill over in the form of disruptive judicial rulings, newly restrictive legislation, or significant spikes in diplomatic or domestic political pressure, as had repeatedly occurred in earlier years. Years of law-conscious policy refinement—and quite possibly some degree of public fatigue or inurement when it comes to legal criticisms—had made possible an extended period of cross-branch and cross-party consensus, and this in turn left the impression that the underlying legal architecture had reached a stage of stability that was good enough for the time being.

#### Allied backlash empirically denied—their author

Dworkin, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, 13

(Anthony, “Drones And Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position,” http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84\_DRONES\_BRIEF.pdf, accessed 10-23-13, CMM)

The US use of drones for targeted killing away from any¶ battlefield has become the focus of increasing attention¶ and concern in Europe. In a recent opinion poll, people¶ in all European countries sampled were opposed to the¶ use of drones to kill extremists outside the battlefield and¶ a large majority of European legal scholars reject the legal¶ justification offered for these attacks.2 But European leaders¶ and officials have responded to the US campaign of drone¶ strikes in a muted and largely passive way. Although some¶ European officials have made their disagreement with¶ the legal claims underlying US policies clear in closeddoor¶ dialogues and bilateral meetings, EU member state¶ representatives have said almost nothing in public about¶ US drone strikes.3 The EU has so far failed to set out¶ any vision of its own about when the use of lethal force¶ against designated individuals is legitimate. Nor is there¶ any indication that European states have made a serious¶ effort to influence the development of US policy or to begin¶ discussions on formulating common standards for the kinds¶ of military operations that UAVs facilitate.

Torn between an evident reluctance to accuse Obama of¶ breaking international law and an unwillingness to endorse¶ his policies, divided in part among themselves and in some¶ cases bound by close intelligence relationships to the US,¶ European countries have remained essentially disengaged¶ as the era of drone warfare has dawned. Yet, as drones¶ proliferate, such a stance seems increasingly untenable.¶ Moreover, where in the past the difference between US¶ and European conceptions of the fight against al-Qaeda¶ seemed like an insurmountable obstacle to agreement on a¶ common framework on the use of lethal force, the evolution¶ of US policy means that there may now be a greater scope¶ for a productive dialogue with the Obama administration on¶ drones.

#### Alt cause—NSA

Kristin Archick, European affairs specialist @ CRS, 9-4-2013, “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism,” Congressional Research Service, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf>

Although the United States and the EU both recognize the importance of sharing information in an effort to track and disrupt terrorist activity, data privacy has been and continues to be a key U.S.-EU sticking point. As noted previously, the EU considers the privacy of personal data a basic right; EU data privacy regulations set out common rules for public and private entities in the EU that hold or transmit personal data, and prohibit the transfer of such data to countries where legal protections are not deemed “adequate.” In the negotiation of several U.S.-EU informationsharing agreements, from those related to Europol to SWIFT to airline passenger data, some EU officials have been concerned about whether the United States could guarantee a sufficient level of protection for European citizens’ personal data. In particular, some Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and many European civil liberty groups have long argued that elements of U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements violate the privacy rights of EU citizens. In light of the public revelations in June 2013 of U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs and news reports alleging that U.S. intelligence agencies have monitored EU diplomatic offices and computer networks, many analysts are worried about the future of U.S.-EU information-sharing arrangements. As discussed in this section, many of these U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements require the approval of the European Parliament, and many MEPs (as well as many officials from the European Commission and the national governments) have been deeply dismayed by the NSA programs and other spying allegations. In response, the Parliament passed a resolution expressing serious concerns about the U.S. surveillance operations and established a special working group to conduct an in-depth investigation into the reported programs.17 In addition, led by the European Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice, the United States and the EU have convened a joint expert group on the NSA’s surveillance operations, particularly the so-called PRISM program (in which the NSA reportedly collected data from leading U.S. Internet companies), to assess the “proportionality” of such programs and their implications for the privacy rights of EU citizens.18 U.S. officials have sought to reassure their EU counterparts that the PRISM program and other U.S. surveillance activities operate within U.S. law and are subject to oversight by all three branches of the U.S. government. Some observers note that the United States has been striving to demonstrate that it takes EU concerns seriously and is open to improving transparency, in part to maintain European support for existing information-sharing accords, such as SWIFT (which will be up for renewal in 2015), and the U.S.-EU Passenger Name Record agreement (up for renewal in 2019). Nevertheless, many experts predict that the revelations of programs such as PRISM will make the negotiation of future U.S.-EU information-sharing arrangements more difficult, and may make the European Parliament even more cautious and skeptical about granting its approval.

#### No nuke terror

**Schneidmiller 9** (Chris, Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism, 13 January 2009, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20090113\_7105.php, AMiles)

There is an "almost **vanishingly small" likelihood** that terrorists would ever be able to acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon, one expert said here yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 2, 2008). In even the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and a successful nuclear strike on a major city, said John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State University. The process itself is seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult -- buy or steal highly enriched uranium, manufacture a weapon, take the bomb to the target site and blow it up. Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the complexity of the effort, Mueller argued. Terrorists would have to bribe officials in a state nuclear program to acquire the material, while avoiding a sting by authorities or a scam by the sellers. The material itself could also turn out to be bad. "Once the purloined material is purloined, [police are] going to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration. Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The terrorists would then have to find scientists and engineers willing to give up their normal lives to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop. Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said. Every obstacle is "difficult but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller said, putting the chance of success at no less than one in three for each. The likelihood of successfully passing through each obstacle, in sequence, would be roughly one in 3 1/2 billion, he said, but for argument's sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million. "It's a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater length in an upcoming book, Atomic Obsession. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you're basically putting everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that's maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." Other scenarios are even less probable, Mueller said. A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group, he argued: "States just simply won't give it to somebody they can't control." Terrorists are also not likely to be able to steal a whole weapon, Mueller asserted, dismissing the idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said (see GSN, Jan. 12). Fear of an "extremely improbable event" such as nuclear terrorism produces support for a wide range of homeland security activities, Mueller said. He argued that there has been a major and costly overreaction to the terrorism threat -- noting that the Sept. 11 attacks helped to precipitate the invasion of Iraq, which has led to far more deaths than the original event. Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists' ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said. Friedman took issue with the finding late last year of an experts' report that an act of WMD terrorism would "more likely than not" occur in the next half decade unless the international community takes greater action. "I would say that the report, if you read it, actually offers no analysis to justify that claim, which seems to have been made to change policy by generating alarm in headlines." One panel speaker offered a partial rebuttal to Mueller's presentation. Jim Walsh, principal research scientist for the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said he agreed that nations would almost certainly not give a nuclear weapon to a nonstate group, that most terrorist organizations have no interest in seeking out the bomb, and that it would be difficult to build a weapon or use one that has been stolen.

#### No miscalc—accidents don’t cause all-out war

**Mueller** **10** – Woody Hayes chair of national security studies at Ohio State University (John, Atomic Obsession, p. 100-101)

It is a plausible argument that, all other things equal, if the number of nuclear weapons in existence increases, the likelihood one will go off by accident will also increase. In fact, all things haven't been equal. As nuclear weapons have increased in numbers and sophistication, so have safety devices and procedures. Precisely because the weapons are so dangerous, extraordinary efforts to keep them from going off by accident or by an unauthorized deliberate act have been instituted, and these measures have, so far, been effective: no one has been killed in a nuclear explosion since Nagasaki. Extrapolating further from disasters that have not occurred, many have been led to a concern that, triggered by a nuclear weapons accident, a war could somehow be started through an act of desperation or of consummate sloppiness. Before the invention of nuclear weapons, such possibilities were not perhaps of great concern, because no weapon or small set of weapons could do enough damage to be truly significant. Each nuclear weapon, however, is capable of destroying in an instant more people than have been killed in an average war, and the weapons continue to exist in the tens of thousands. However, **even if a bomb, or a few bombs, were to go off**, it does not necessarily follow that war would result. For that to happen, it is assumed, the accident would have to take place at a time of war-readiness, as during a crisis, when both sides are poised for action and when one side could perhaps be triggered – or panicked –into major action by an explosion mistakenly taken to be part of, or the prelude to, a full attack. This means that the unlikely happening –a nuclear accident – would have to coincide precisely with an event, a militarized international crisis, something that is rare to begin with, became more so as the cold war progressed, and has become even less likely since its demise. Furthermore, even if the accident takes place during a crisis, it does not follow that escalation or hasty response is inevitable, or even very likely. As Bernard Brodie points out, escalation scenarios essentially impute to both sides "a well-nigh limitless concern with saving face" and/or "a deal of ground-in automaticity of response and counterresponse." None of this was in evidence during the Cuban missile crisis when there were accidents galore. An American spy plane was shot down over Cuba, probably without authorization, and another accidentally went off course and flew threateningly over the Soviet Union. As if that weren’t enough, a Soviet military officer spying for the West sent a message, apparently on a whim, warning that the Soviets were about to attack.31 **None of these remarkable events triggered anything** in the way of precipitous response. They were duly evaluated and then ignored. Robert Jervis points out that "when critics talk of the impact of irrationality, they imply that all such deviations will be in the direction of emotional impulsiveness, of launching an attack, or of taking actions that are terribly risky. But irrationality could also lead a state to passive acquiescence." In moments of high stress and threat, people can be said to have three psychological alternatives: (1) to remain calm and rational, (2) to refuse to believe that the threat is imminent or significant, or to panic, lashing out frantically and incoherently at the threat. Generally, people react in one of the first two ways. In her classic study of disaster behavior, Martha Wolfenstein concludes, “The usual reaction is one of being unworried.” In addition, the historical record suggests that **wars simply do not begin by accident**. In his extensive survey of wars that have occurred since 1400, diplomat-historian Evan Luard concludes, "It is impossible to identify a single case in which it can be said that a war started accidentally; in which it was not, at the time the war broke out, the deliberate intention of at least one party that war should take place." Geoffrey Blainey, after similar study, very much agrees: although many have discussed "accidental" or "unintentional" wars, "it is difficult," he concludes, "to find a war which on investigation fits this description." Or, as Henry Kissinger has put it dryly, "Despite popular myths, large military units do not fight by accident."

#### No Pakistan collapse and it doesn't escalate

Dasgupta 13

Sunil Dasgupta is Director of the University of Maryland Baltimore County Political Science Program at the Universities at Shady Grove and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, East Asia Forum, February 25, 2013, "How will India respond to civil war in Pakistan?", http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/

As it is, India and Pakistan have gone down to the nuclear edge four times — in 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2001–02. In each case, India responded in a manner that did not escalate the conflict. Any incursion into Pakistan was extremely limited. An Indian intervention in a civil war in Pakistan would be subject to the same limitations — at least so long as the Pakistani army maintains its integrity.¶ Given the new US–India ties, the most important factor in determining the possibility and nature of Indian intervention in a possible Pakistani civil war is Washington. If the United States is able to get Kabul and Islamabad to work together against the Taliban, as it is trying to do now, then India is likely to continue its current policy or try to preserve some influence in Afghanistan, especially working with elements of the Northern Alliance.¶ India and Afghanistan already have a strategic partnership agreement in place that creates the framework for their bilateral relationship to grow, but the degree of actual cooperation will depend on how Pakistan and the Taliban react. If Indian interests in Afghanistan come under attack, New Delhi might have to pull back. The Indian government has been quite clear about not sending troops to Afghanistan.¶ If the United States shifts its policy to where it has to choose Kabul over Islamabad, in effect reviving the demand for an independent Pashtunistan, India is likely to be much more supportive of US and Afghan goals. The policy shift, however, carries the risk of a full-fledged proxy war with Pakistan in Afghanistan, but should not involve the prospect of a direct Indian intervention in Pakistan itself.¶ India is not likely to initiate an intervention that causes the Pakistani state to fail. Bill Keller of the New York Times has described Pakistani president Asif Ail Zardari as overseeing ‘a ruinous kleptocracy that is spiraling deeper into economic crisis’. But in contrast to predictions of an unravelling nation, British journalist-scholar Anatol Lieven argues that the Pakistani state is likely to continue muddling through its many problems, unable to resolve them but equally predisposed against civil war and consequent state collapse. Lieven finds that the strong bonds of family, clan, tribe and the nature of South Asian Islam prevent modernist movements — propounded by the government or by the radicals — from taking control of the entire country.¶ Lieven’s analysis is more persuasive than the widespread view that Pakistan is about to fail as a state. The formal institutions of the Pakistani state are surprisingly robust given the structural conditions in which they operate. Indian political leaders recognise Pakistan’s resilience. Given the bad choices in Pakistan, they would rather not have anything to do with it. If there is going to be a civil war, why not wait for the two sides to exhaust themselves before thinking about intervening? The 1971 war demonstrated India’s willingness to exploit conditions inside Pakistan, but to break from tradition requires strong, countervailing logic, and those elements do not yet exist. Given the current conditions and those in the foreseeable future, India is likely to sit out a Pakistani civil war while covertly coordinating policy with the United States.

### norms

#### Turkish influence won’t convince Iran to give up nukes but does trade off with Saudi power – now is the key time

**Ennis and Momani, 13** – Crystal A., PhD candidate, Global Governance and International Political Economy, at the University of Waterloo and Bessma, Associate Professor at the University of Waterloo’s Balsillie School of International Affairs and a Fellow at Brookings Institution (“Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi foreign policy strategies,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 34, is. 6, 2013 //Red)

While the Middle East and North Africa ( mena ) are undergoing rapid change, many domestic, regional and international **actors are vying for** space and **influence** as systems and customs evolve and adopt new forms. This paper characterises and compares the evolving foreign policy strategies of two such regional actors, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It further assesses the motivations and activities of and challenges to Turkish and Saudi involvement throughout the region since the Arab uprisings. Ultimately these cases provide intriguing insight into the foreign policy purpose and methods of emerging states under conditions of uncertainty. The Middle East is in a delicate period of political transition, given the momentous changes sweeping the region since the onset of the 2011 Arab uprisings. The present is a critical period in modern Middle East history, where the region is **especially vulnerable to competing ideas and interests.** This paper seeks to assess and compare the foreign policy strategies of two influential regional actors, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Both states have, to various degrees over the years, held leadership roles in the region. While holding divergent preferences on the region’s direction and revolutionary outcomes, the current regional climate provides a **renewed impetus for each to exert influence.** Neither state expects to use hard power to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Instead, both Turkey and Saudi Arabia use a mixture of public diplomacy, media, economic incentives, convening power and the mobilisation of Islam. While both countries share similar foreign policy instruments, they vary greatly in how they utilise these instruments and justify their involvement in the region. Turkey has prided itself on being viewed as a modern role model. Its rapidly growing economy, built on modern industrialisation, along with its successful Islamist government, are offered as examples to be emulated. Where Saudi Arabia has been predominately counter-revolutionary, motivated by **geopolitical security fears** and driven by sectarianism, Turkey has been able to walk a clearer line in support of democratic, albeit Islamist, transitions. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has long considered its role as custodian of the holy Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina as its de facto guarantee of regional significance, while promulgating its prominent role in the G20, the Organization of Islamic States and the Arab League as examples of regional leadership.

#### Saudi model key to regime stability, countering Iran heg

**Ennis and Momani, 13** – Crystal A., PhD candidate, Global Governance and International Political Economy, at the University of Waterloo and Bessma, Associate Professor at the University of Waterloo’s Balsillie School of International Affairs and a Fellow at Brookings Institution (“Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi foreign policy strategies,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 34, is. 6, 2013 //Red)

In order to understand Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy over the past few years, it is important to take a long view. Saudi foreign policy, even if fragmented, has historically been depicted as cautious, pragmatic and characterised by interpersonal relations. From the outset **it has been primarily concerned with regime and state survival.** It is in this vein that Saudi Arabia has retooled its foreign policy since 2011. Containment of the Arab uprisings has become a defining feature. 18 Containment has proven difficult, however, resulting in much international floundering through attempts to shape outcomes in ways that maintain the regional balance of power. Indeed, the Saudi focus on containment can best be understood by recognising the conventional determinants that shape Saudi Arabia’s foreign affairs. A concern with domestic security has long structured how external security is approached, prioritising the endurance of the ruling House of Saud and the geographic integrity of what has become the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In this regard foreign policy in Saudi Arabia is largely determined by domestic concerns. 19 This occurs through the cross-utilisation of resources, traditional legitimacy and control. Natural resources have played a significant role in structuring Saudi Arabia’s relationships both internationally and within the state. As one of the top two countries in the world with the highest proven oil reserves, Saudi Arabia’s 267 billion barrels in oil reserves unsurprisingly shape its international and domestic affairs. 20 The availability of such vast financial means with which to support its foreign policy and security objectives is central to how it wields its policy tools. Not only does oil generate great wealth, it fashions relations between the ruling family, business interests and international capital, expertise and energy. 21 It also bestows on Saudi Arabia the ability to moderate international oil prices by functioning as a swing producer. This in turn serves as a significant bargaining chip and policy tool. 22Resources and access to resources dominate much international engagement, give Saudi Arabia geo-strategic significance, propel its friendly relationship with the US and help secure its role in OPEC and the G20, along with a dominant position in the MENA region more broadly and the Arabian peninsula in particular. One must be mindful that, first and foremost, Saudi international relations are defined by an odd alliance with the US that started with the early days of oil exploration and extends to the present. Their current relationship is best ‘characterized as transactional, each side seeking specific benefits from the other through cooperation on various issues’. 23 Saudi security has been undergirded by many US military agreements since the 1940s. 24 The emphasis on the Saudi–US relationship has drawn international attention since the Arab uprisings, especially where they diverge on support for or opposition to the various revolutions. Despite this, accusations that relations are in **crisis are exaggerated.** All evidence points to the US–Saudi relationship weathering this test to its relationship much like it weathered arguably more serious ones like the 1973 oil embargo and 9/11. 25 Normative concerns with the US’s continued implicit support for authoritarian governments in the Gulf is another debate. Pointing to human rights and political reform concerns, scholars and activists are known to decry the US complicity in torture and human rights abuses, and note its impact on local activists. 26 These same people advocate a rethinking of the US–Saudi alliance, and look to Obama’s second term as a possible moment of opportunity. Although Saudi and Western resource and security interests do not always converge, common ground can often be found, even if the rationale diverges. Saudi Arabia tends to craft its foreign policy moves based on economic, primarily oil, interests and domestic stability concerns, both of which reinforce each other. For instance, where the US portrays Iran as a significant security threat and regional rival, the Saudis tend to emphasise an assumed more insidious ideological and political challenge domestically, while pursuing competitive energy and political manoeuvring abroad. 27 This demonstrates the nexus of domestic security and foreign policy in Saudi politics. It also points to the significance of the second tool mentioned above—legitimacy. Saudi foreign policy must take into account concerns from various segments within society. Even in the absence of formal policy input mechanisms, the legitimacy and consequently the security of the Saudi state partially rest upon various social groups. Gerd Nonneman calls this ‘omnibalancing’, in that it involves a fragile multilevel balancing of resources and risks. 28 In order to maintain its domestic legitimacy, Saudi Arabia leverages oil rent, its family leadership tradition, the ‘manipulation of a cultural ideal related to leadership’, its importance as the custodian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina with a concomitant association of religious guardianship, and its championing of Islamic and Arab causes. 29 It also uses the divisive politics of sectarianism alongside the summoning of the Wahhabi religious tradition. This is especially evident in its relationship with the Arab uprisings. 30 The utilisation of oil rent to both secure legitimacy and promote political quiescence to rule is well documented in literature on the rentier state. 31 A growing population and widening fiscal constraints on the state are limiting its ability to wield rent resources as effectively as in the past. With rising expenditure since 2011, some estimates put Saudi’s breakeven oil price at US$90 per barrel in 2012—quite a leap from $35 per barrel in 2005. 32 Legitimacy resources, given a decreased capacity to manage welfare and patronage distribution as effectively, must be sought from other sources. 33 These include religion and control. Conventional interpretations of domestic legitimacy and foreign policy see these resting on a foundation of religion in general, and the Wahhabi Sunni tradition in particular. The early alliance of Abdulaziz ibn Saud with Muhammad Al-Wahhab and his followers has extended into the present with a peculiar religo-political alliance. Whatever security this does provide, however, has also resulted in something of a catch-22 for the House of Saud. Legitimating their rule in these terms has been complicated by the transnational identity of Islam and other domestic and regional religious movements. As such, ‘because of the importance of Arabist and Islamist feelings among the Saudi population, encouraged to some extent by the government itself, Riyadh risks domestic reactions if it is seen as deviating too far from the Arab-nationalist and/or Islamist consensus on issues concerning Israel and relations with the United States’.34 The same logic applies to domestic reforms as well, which has seen conservative patriarchal elements of society protest at government legislative moves deemed ‘un-Islamic’. 35 Religion provides the Saudi leadership with a sharp legitimacy tool that, like any sharp tools, has the potential to cut its handler. Therefore control plays an important role. Like many authoritarian states, Saudi Arabia uses the promise of economic well-being and the provision of national security. This is combined with the use of a strong security apparatus, fear and control over official discourse ranging from religion to political and social issues. Oil revenues have allowed the Saudis to develop a robust security apparatus. Its military expenditure as a share of GDP was 10.1% in 2010, the highest in the world for that year. 36 In addition to this, it consolidates its control by distributing a division of royal labour across key security and foreign policy roles. The late crown prince Sultan, for example, was both minister of defence and responsible for the Special Office for Yemeni Affairs until his death in 2011. 37 The current crown prince, Salman bin Abdulaziz, is the current minister of defence. Various members of the Saudi royal family, particularly the remaining members of the so-called Sudairi Seven and more recently their sons, maintain these posts. The House of Saud must constantly maintain this balance of internal and external security and legitimacy, appeasing various segments of society and maintaining a strong, principled image. It must balance local perceptions of danger emanating from the forces of globalisation and the presence of foreign culture through the heavy presence of expatriate workers, as well as pressure from Europe and the USA in particular. Its control and authoritarianism have long been rooted in the struggle of ordering natural resources and society. As Toby Jones argues, this struggle can be seen as constructing and entrenching authoritarianism more than early alliances between religious actors and the Al Saud. 38 Regionally and internationally Saudi Arabia has tried to flex its diplomatic muscles through multilateral organisations for some time. Its founding role in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Arab League, for instance, are suggestive of its self-proclaimed interest in playing an ‘effective role’ in international and regional organisations and leveraging soft power toward its aims. 39 Its long-standing role in OPECalready cast it as an economic force, which it happily continued to embrace with its inclusion in the G20. Saudi Arabia is, in fact, the only Arab and the only OPEC member in the G20. Its increasing exposure to international economic vicissitudes with its expanding financialisation, given its sovereign wealth funds and transition from a debtor to a creditor country, have made it a natural peer to other emerging economies in the G20. One should not underestimate its economic considerations in its international foreign policy moves. Since the global financial crisis of 2008 the Saudis have been affected by finance, oil and food commodity markets. 40 In the same vein Saudi Arabia has also been diversifying its international economic and political partners. After joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), following over a decade of negotiations and the accession of King Abdullah to the throne, both in 2005, Saudi Arabia appears to have jump-started its integration into the global community. 41 Visits to China and the Pope, and mushrooming relations with both India and China all indicate a ‘more pragmatic, rational and economy-oriented foreign policy’. 42 Nonetheless, alongside its participation in regional and international organisations, one can also trace a history of Saudi Arabia **serving in a mediating role** since the early 1970s and arguably earlier. Indeed, Saudi Arabia considers ‘**mediation as an integral tool in its foreign policy goals of maintaining an active involvement in regional issues, enhancing and deepening its influence**’. 43 Saudi foreign policy under King Abdullah may be seen as more reformist or pragmatic, but it continues to pursue its chief goals of domestic and regional security and stability. This has long included the support of regional actors aligned with Saudi and Western interests, along with countering Iranian influence in its neighbourhood, especially in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. It is only since 2011 that it found itself also pursuing a new foreign policy objective, namely ‘containment’ of the revolutions sweeping the Arab world. 44 This new behaviour, however, **can be viewed in the same context of protecting regime security and domestic and regional stability.** Saudi Arabia is a peculiar middle power. Its foreign policy is not designed simply to balance neighbouring interests or yield to US pressure, but rather **walks a fine line between managing domestic and external pressure so as to guarantee regime survival and regional authority.** Understanding the determinants of Saudi foreign policy can help us understand its seemingly schizophrenic reaction to the Arab revolutions. The notion of containment fits well within this narrative. Not only does Saudi Arabia want to maintain its role as a soft power mediator and be seen as advancing and even leading Arab causes, it wants to be the dominant religio-regional figurehead, opposite Iran. Along with acceptance and complicity in consigning unfriendly Arab states to casualties of the Arab Spring, it has sought to aid its regional friends and, when that failed, tried to forge new friendships. This was particularly evident in the case of Egypt, where Saudi Arabia tried to help Hosni Mubarak stave off unrest and now finds itself in the awkward position of trying to mend relations with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Simultaneously it has tried to buttress monarchy in the region, while leveraging sectarianism to marginalise and discredit dissent in its eastern province and Bahrain.

#### Saudi stability solves oil shocks and Iran

**Riedel, 13** – Bruce, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy (“Revolution in Riyadh,” Brookings, 1/17/13, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/revolution-in-riyadh> //Red)

So far, they have helped ensure that revolution has not unseated any Arab monarch. However, Bahrain and Jordan have become the weakest links in the royal chain. The King of Bahrain is failing to suppress a prolonged rebellion against his rule; the King of Jordan could be next. Unrest in Jordan would threaten the peace with Israel. But the United States – **and Israel** – can cope with instability in both small states. **Not so in Saudi Arabia.** If an Awakening takes place in Saudi Arabia it will probably look a lot like the revolutions in the other Arab states. Already demonstrations, peaceful and violent, have wracked the oil-rich Eastern Province for over a year. These are Shia protests and thus atypical of the rest of the Kingdom because Shias represent only 10 percent of the population. Shia dissidents in ARAMCO, the Saudi oil company, have also used cyber warfare to attack its computer systems, crashing over 30,000 work-stations this past August. They probably received Iranian help. Much more disturbing to the royals would be protests in Sunni parts of the Kingdom. These might start in the so-called Koran belt north of the capital where dissent is endemic or in the neglected Asir province on the Yemeni border. Once they start they could snowball and reach the major cities of the Hejaz, including Jidda, Mecca, Taif, and Medina. The Saudi opposition is well-armed with mobile phone technology, which could ensure rapid communication of dissent within the Kingdom and to the outside world. The critical defender of the regime would be the National Guard. King Abdallah has spent his life building this Praetorian elite force. The United States has trained and equipped it with tens of billions of dollars’ worth of helicopters and armored vehicles. But the key unknown is whether the Guard will shoot on its brothers and sisters in the street. It may fragment or it may simply refuse to suppress dissent if it is largely peaceful, especially at the start. The succession issue adds another layer of complication. Every succession in the Kingdom since its founder Abdel Aziz bin Saud died in 1953 has been among his brothers. King Abdallah and Crown Prince Salman are, literally, the end of that breed and both are in frail health; after them there are only two remaining half brothers that might suit and then there is no clear line of succession in the next generation. If Abdallah and/or Salman die as unrest unfolds, and a succession crisis ensues, then the Kingdom could be even more vulnerable to revolution. Like in other Arab revolutions, the opposition revolutionaries will not be united on anything except ousting the monarchy. There will be secular democrats but also al Qaeda and Wahhabi elements in the opposition. Trying to pick and choose will be very difficult. The unity of the kingdom could collapse as the Hejaz separates from the rest, the east falls to Iranbacked Shia and the center **becomes a jihadist stronghold.** For the United States, revolution in Saudi Arabia would be a game-changer. While the United States can live without Saudi oil, China, India, Japan and Europe cannot. **Any disruption** in Saudi oil exports either due to unrest, cyber attacks or a new regime’s decision to reduce exports substantially **will have major impacts on the global economy.** The CIA war against al Qaeda is heavily dependent on the Kingdom; Saudi intelligence operations **foiled the last two a**l **Q**aeda in the **A**rabian **P**eninsula **attacks** on the American homeland. The U.S. military training mission in the Kingdom, founded in 1953, is the largest such mission in the world. **The Saudis have also been a key player in containing Iran for decades.** King Abdallah was the author of the Arab peace plan that bears his name.

#### Oil shocks cause multiple scenarios for nuclear war

**King 8** [Neil King, Jr. “Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns” CNAS Energy Security Visionaries Series. July 2008. http://www.aspousa.org/aspousa4/proceedings/\_CNAS\_King\_Peak\_Oil\_WorkingPaper.pdf]

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whethersoaring oil pricesand market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University. 6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “isone of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.” 7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.” 8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energychallenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.” 9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’sIslamic partiesthe leverage they have long needed to take power. It is not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military-size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put injeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent-sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty.

#### No escalation

Womack 11**—**Professor of Foreign Affairs @ University of Virginia [Dr. Brantly Womack (PhD in Poli Sci from University of Chicago), “The Spratlys: From Dangerous Ground to Apple of Discord,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 33, Number 3, December 2011, pp. 370-387

It is difficult to imagine a Spratly scenario in which a crisis would go beyond a specific incident and threaten the current overall pattern of mixed occupation. Accidents happen, so incidents cannot be ruled out, though the sustained confrontation of two or more militaries are increasingly unlikely. Accidental incidents are likely to lead to a blamestorm, but not to prolonged conflict or to escalation. A premeditated fait accompli against other claimants, as argued earlier, would not accomplish much. The victor (let us assume China) would have alienated the entire region and it would have alarmed the rest of its neighbours and international partners. International cooperation in resource development would be unlikely, and the logistics of transportation, supply and defence would be formidable. If China’s overall foreign policy made a radical change towards aggressive regional hegemony perhaps the Spratlys could become a battleground. But the ramp-up in aggressiveness would take time to develop, Spratly controversies would be derivative rather than the leading element, and there would no longer be a need for a synecdoche of anxiety. The currently foreseeable future is based on a quarter century of broad and peaceful development in which the Spratlys have been a grain of sand.

A militarized incident in the South China Sea between China and the United States is more likely, but it is not likely to originate in the Spratlys nor is it likely to escalate. The direct confrontation has been over the definition of innocent passage in the context of freedom of navigation in EEZs, and an incident in the Spratlys is unlikely to generate a restriction of general freedom of navigation since traffic goes around the islands rather than through them. Incidents such as those involving the EP-3 surveillance aircraft incident of April 2001 or the USNS Impeccable hydrographic ship in March 2009 are possible, but these do not relate specifically to the Spratlys and are only indirectly related to Southeast Asia. It would be surprising if Southeast Asian states would be happy with an American solution that would consider intelligence operations (by China as well as by the United States) legitimate up to a twelve mile limit. The reverberations from such incidents are likely to be restricted to tit-for-tat responses rather than general escalation. The days of the War of Jenkins’s Ear are long past.35 pg. 381-383

#### No Chinese drone aggression

**Erickson and Strange 13** [Andrew Erickson, associate professor at the Naval War College and Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, and Austin Strange, researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute and graduate student at Zhejiang University, 5-29-13 China has drones. Now how will it use them? Foreign Affairs, McClatchy-Tribune, 29 May 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html, da 8-3-13]

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.

#### No solvency—they’ll use other weapons or cheat

**Etzioni 13** [Amitai, professor of international relations at George Washington University, “The Great Drone Debate,” March-April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>]

Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries into making and using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK and author of a book about drones argues that, “The proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the precedent that the United States is setting by killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can be little doubt that the fact that drones have served the United States well has helped to popularize them. However, it does not follow that United States should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First of all, this would have meant that either the United States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. Further, the record shows that even when the United States did not develop a particular weapon, others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind that the international environment is a hostile one. Countries—and especially non-state actors— most of the time do not play by some set of self constraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further their interests. The United States correctly does not assume that it can rely on some non-existent implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the avoidance of new military technology by nation X or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains from employing that technology. I am not arguing that there are no natural norms that restrain behavior. There are certainly some that exist, particularly in situations where all parties beneﬁt from the norms (e.g., the granting of diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of mass destruction). However drones are but one step—following bombers and missiles—in the development of distant battleﬁeld technologies. (Robotic soldiers—or future ﬁghting machines— are next in line). In such circumstances, the role of norms is much more limited.

#### No impact to drone spread or US norms

Singh 12 (Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security. “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones. As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings. Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use. In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.” Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey. Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory. States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement. This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active. What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy. In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region. Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones: – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue. – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose. – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face. – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts. In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology. Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team. Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones. What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use. Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best. Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations. Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Drone prolif solve Asia war – deterrence – and no solvency for surveillance drones LOL

Gettinger, 11/8/ 13 [Dan, Bard College, “An Act of War”: Drones Are Testing China-Japan Relations,http://dronecenter.bard.edu/act-war-drones-testing-china-japan-relations/]

The proliferation of unmanned surveillance aircraft and an agreement similar to President Eisenhower’s 1955 “Open Skies” proposal could help deter conflict by giving each side better knowledge of movements by the other. However, these measures would do little to calm the flaring nationalistic feeling in both countries or solve the question of ownership of undersea resources. The region is seeing a significant escalation in military preparedness in reaction to the tensions over the Senkaku Islands. The investments in drones by both sides could result in one of these aircraft acting as a catalyst for broader conventional military action. This possibility was made clear by China’s reaction to Japan’s revised rules of engagement concerning intrusive drones. The Senkaku Islands dispute is becoming the first case study of the role that drones play in escalating geopolitical tensions to the point of war.

#### Unfettered drone prolif key to stable china rise

Basu, 13 [China: The Dawn of the Drones [Narayani Basu] Narayani Basu Research Intern, CRP, IPCS http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/china-the-dawn-of-the-drones-3948.html]

An Aerial Geo-Strategy The primary role of China’s growing drone programme is to help Beijing control and monitor disputed territories in the Asia-Pacific region. Put simply, drones help China deter countries from intervening in the area by helping to detect and target potential violators of the areas they are trying to deny. Indeed, Beijing’s deployment of drones near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands impacted Sino-Japanese relations recently, prompting Tokyo to place its own defence programme under review, with the aim of introducing its own drones to patrol the disputed waters by 2015. For China then, drones could act as the ideal surveillance tool in the event of a crisis - a proxy weapon to deter assertive behaviour over territories China considers its own - such as the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands. China’s move into large-scale drone deployment is a significant indication of its military’s growing sophistication. It could not only challenge American dominance in the Asia-Pacific, but could also elevate the threat to any neighbours with which China has territorial disputes, such as Vietnam, Japan, India or the Philippines. Within China, drones are already patrolling the borders, and a navy drone was deployed to the western province of Sichuan to provide aerial surveillance, in the aftermath of last month’s deadly earthquake. However, on a wider geopolitical canvas, Chinese drones could be the tipping point for giving the Chinese an edge in possible future disputes in Asia with the US, as American foreign policy continues its rebalancing trends within the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, China has already made it clear that the drones are capable of carrying bombs and missiles as well as conducting reconnaissance missions, potentially turning them into offensive weapons in the event of a border conflict. The thought of armed UAVs patrolling the skies over disputed territories like the Paracel and the Spratly Islands is enough to cause anxiety among ASEAN members, besides greatly enhancing China’s ocean surveillance. On the other hand, it is equally important to remember that Chinese drones are not yet as sophisticated as their US counterparts in terms of range, hardware, and engines. Official makers COSIC admit that **progress is needed** in half a dozen major areas, from airframe designs to digital linkups. Secondly, the Chinese drones on display at the Zhuhai Airshow are prototypes and not finished products. Nor have Chinese drones ever been put to military use.

#### The impact is overpopulation, Indian economic growth and global war

Hutchison, 13 [Martin Hutchinson is the author of Great Conservatives (Academica Press, 2005) - details can be found on the website www.greatconservatives.com - and co-author with Professor Kevin Dowd of Alchemists of Loss (Wiley, 2010). Both are now available on Amazon.com, Great Conservatives only in a Kindle edition, Alchemists of Loss in both Kindle and print editions. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/GECON-01-250613.html>]

U economic, military and foreign policy blunders make China's global dominance appear entirely realistic, and for many observers inevitable. Last week, the Nicaraguan congress approved a US$40 billion project for a Chinese company to build an Isthmian canal parallel to Panama's. For those of us prone to peering anxiously into the future, this gave a disquieting advance picture of the new world of Chinese hegemony into which we are probably entering, whether we like it or not. As president Ronald Reagan famously remarked, Nicaragua is only two days' drive from Harlingen, Texas. And presumably we can rely on China to cut that down a bit by improving the road! Historically we must remember that the natural position of China is hegemony, though for several hundred years it only achieved that position by being deliberately geographically obtuse. Nevertheless, like ancient Egypt, for all but about 200 years of her history China has been militarily dominant over all powers it felt it had to deal with. We should also remember that the high point of Chinese civilization was not the early Ming period of exploration by Admiral Zheng He under the Yongle emperor, but the apogee of the Song dynasty some three centuries earlier. The Zheng He voyages, while gigantic in scale, were strategically very unambitious - they followed an entirely coastal route, not striking out away from the known world as Columbus was to do. Moreover, they were diplomatic efforts, rather than attempts to establish permanent trading routes, as the Portuguese were to do in the East Indies, or colonize new areas, as the Spanish were to do in Mexico. If Zheng He had discovered California, it's likely he would have done little with it; if he'd stretched his voyage to almost twice its length and sailed into Lisbon harbor, he would have been a spectacular sight for the Portuguese. However, his arrival would not have been psychologically daunting for the contemporaneous exploration efforts of Portugal's Henry the Navigator, who knew of China's existence and nature through the travels of Marco Polo a century earlier. Song dynasty civilization, on the other hand, was in terms of technology and lifestyle superior to anything that had preceded it, or anything that followed it until the Western Enlightenment 500 years later. Confucianism also is a very benign religion/philosophy compared with its Christian, Moslem, Hindu or even Buddhist approximate contemporaries. We should not judge China solely by the current regime, the remnants of a dictatorship of unparalleled brutality, but instead by its overall record, the peaks of which were very enlightened indeed. There is no question that China's enormous economic success in the last 40 years has brought forth a desire, both among the regime and among China's people as a whole, to resume the position of global dominance it enjoyed for two millennia. Ten years ago, this ambition would have seemed quixotic, except over the time-frame of half a century or more. Today, both because of China's economic successes and because of US economic, military and foreign policy blunders, it appears entirely realistic, and for many observers inevitable. Whether China's advance is something to be welcomed depends entirely on what kind of regime China has as a hegemon. Two possibilities exist. First, China may continue its current growth on its current trajectory with its current regime, with its GDP per capita increasing from about 15% of the US figure to about 50%. At that point, the inefficiencies and corruption of China's current government system would prevent further progress towards the "frontier" affluence of the United States and the better-run European and Asian free-market economies. However, to a Chinese regime concerned about its power position rather than the welfare of its citizens, this wouldn't matter. With a gross domestic product per capita half that of the United States, China would have a GDP in absolute terms about twice that of the US, since its population is four times that of the US. Indeed, China's GDP would be as great as that of the US and the EU combined, although smaller free-market countries like Canada, Australia and the free-market East Asian economies of Japan, South Korea and the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations would still give the West a modest preponderance (and no, Vladimir Vladimirovich, by allying with China you would not bring the position back into balance; with only 130 million people by then and a GDP per capita constrained like China's by corruption and inefficiency you would still not be a serious economic competitor, however impressive your missile count). In this case, you can imagine the Chinese playing the game of international power politics rather like the old Soviet Union, at least in its less malign days after Stalin's death. The Nicaraguan canal, a $40 billion investment that is hopelessly economically unviable (as Panama's adjacent canal has annual revenues of only $2.4 billion) would be followed by a naval base. China would enjoy the enthusiastic cooperation of the anti-American Ortega government, which would have been propped up by Chinese money and when necessary information about its opponents. Daniel Ortega, in spite of having been around seemingly almost as long as Fidel Castro, is only 67 and in good health. Another 20 years of his rule would cement China's position in the Western Hemisphere. China's economic extreme helpfulness to anti-Western regimes like Rafael Correa's Ecuador would also cement itself into long-lasting dictatorships under Chinese dominance. Countries like Venezuela and Argentina, with anti-Western regimes that got into economic trouble, would find China very helpful, although not all of these interventions would be successful. Africa would also be dotted with Chinese satrapies, not all of them entirely under its control, any more than all the Comecon bloc countries were entirely under the control of the Soviet Union. Economically, free markets would dominate only in trade between the Western powers themselves and those few wealthy nations in East Asia who feared Chinese domination. Natural resources would be locked up by China in long-term contracts, backed by the threat of force. Of course, this world would be thoroughly economically suboptimal, especially in terms of innovation, which would take place only in the Western economies. In particular, the peoples of countries dominated by China would find their existence a miserable one. Nevertheless, China itself would benefit from its advantageous resources and cheap-labor manufacturing operations overseas. Since China would remain semi-capitalist and generally more efficient than the old Soviet Union, the Chinese hegemony would not run into the contradictions faced by the Soviet empire in the 1970s and 1980s. Certainly its wealth would prove ample to fund a massive military machine, which would engage in few overt acts of aggression but would exert Chinese dominance whenever the opportunity arose. If this sounds like a resumption of the 1945-91 Cold War, it is. China would not be economically communist (whatever its theoretical pretensions), and it's unlikely it to be ruled by an irrational monster like Stalin. Nevertheless, its economic autarky would impoverish much of the world, and its military might would be used to seize advantages from those Western countries foolish enough to elect a Jimmy Carter, Willy Brandt or Harold Wilson. And because of its size and relative economic efficiency, it would be a far more dangerous strategic opponent than the Soviet Union ever was. There is however an alternative. The continuation of China's current government is not inevitable, and nor is the gradual progress of its economy to a hegemonic level. There are already signs of severe funds shortage in the Chinese banking system - the domestic interbank rate is up to 8%, a T-bill auction recently was only two-thirds subscribed and the People's Bank is trying to rein back credit hard, since bank loan volumes are already 23% above last year. Since in 2006 there was reckoned to be $910 billion of bad debts in the Chinese banking system, and the anecdotes of entirely empty luxury office buildings are legion, there must be a chance that the country's financial system will collapse, revealing "malinvestment" - to use the Austrian economic term - not seen since the Tower of Babel proved the folly of over-investing in ziggurats. In that event, the Chinese economy will enter a deep recession, with unemployment, bankruptcies and the other attributes of misery. That won't end the Chinese prospects for growth, but it will very likely destabilize the Chinese political system, causing unrest similar to that of Tiananmen Square in 1989, but with a much larger middle class and infinitely better communications. There is no certainty whatever that such an event will produce a benign outcome; in general, street unrest doesn't, as was demonstrated two years ago in Cairo. However, if it produces a reshuffled authoritarian regime, we are simply back to Option 1 after a few extra years, while if it produces a socialist outcome Chinese economic emergence will be aborted and hegemony will be unaffordable, as it was for Mao Zedong. If on the other hand, China reaches back into the mists of its history and produces a Confucian democracy, a kind of Song dynasty with elected emperors, then Chinese economic and political emergence will take a very different form. Like the Song dynasty itself, which relied on barbarians for its military muscle and pursued a generally defensive international strategy (before being overwhelmed by the infinitely more aggressive but less agreeable Mongols), a neo-Song regime would regard the Nicaragua canal as simply a canal, abandoning it as hopelessly uneconomic or finishing it if it had by then become economic to do so. Unlike the current Chinese regime, it would be a thoroughly benign and cooperative member of the global order, like Germany or Singapore. A neo-Song China would allow the free market to flourish, but without the crony capitalism and protectionism of the current regime. Thereby it would raise the incomes of its people far beyond the 50% of US incomes that would be the maximum for the current China, but towards and even beyond the "frontier" of the highest incomes possible with the current technological capability. It would be a pioneer in several areas of research, notably biotech, in which its Confucian heritage would allow it to experiment in areas taboo to Judeo-Christians. A world with such a China would be close to its optimum. It would have lower military spending than today, because rogue states would be unable to destabilize a world dominated by the immensely wealthy neo-Song China and its equally wealthy but smaller friends in the US, Europe and East Asia. India would develop rapidly, with a wealthy free-trading China as its neighbor, and the poor countries of Africa and Latin America would also be brought up towards "frontier" levels. Global population would peak and begin to decline as the world became wealthier, with neo-Song China representing about 20% of the world's population, but a rather larger percentage of its wealth, intellectual capability and civilizational potential. Just as modern Germany is a highly prosperous and civilized member of the world community and a force for much good, so too a neo-Song China could play a huge role in making this a happier and richer planet. But whether we arrive at such a Nirvana, or whether we descend into a Manichean Cold War with the existing Chinese regime grown rich and arrogant is entirely in the lap of the gods, to be driven by political and economic developments that are currently unknowable.

#### Extinction

**Brown 2006** – professor of physiology at West Virginia University (Paul, Notes from a Dying Planet, p. 3-4)

The threats we face stem from overpopulation and environmental degradation. The resulting climate change and mass extinctions are leading to ecological collapse, in which the once-robust tapestry of interrelationships among living creatures, climate, and our physical environment has been weakened and is starting to unravel. Clinical indicators of our planet’s serious illness are illustrated in the graph. I’ve adjusted the vertical scales for population, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, temperature, and extinction of species per year so they all have a common minimum and maximum.   All the minima occurred tens of thousands of years BC, and all the maxima are now.  The state of the Earth today is unique. We’re consuming the world’s resources faster than they can be restored. The world’s population is now doubling in less than fifty years. Around mid-century the world’s population is expected to level off at eight to twelve billion people. The lower number is far too high: population must start to decline before 2050 if we are to survive. The upper limit, to put it simply, will never be reached because **we would all die first.** Because of population growth and increasing consumption, concentrations of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane in our atmosphere are the highest in human history, as are global temperatures. This is not normal climatic fluctuation, as fossil-fuel industry shills would have you believe. The rate of species extinctions is comparable to mass extinctions that have occurred only five times before, and is likely to exceed those. The total decline of species since the Industrial Revolution will soon be worse than the mass extinction caused by the asteroid impact sixty-five million years ago off the Yucatan peninsula, which wiped out 83% of species including the dinosaurs.  Before we came along, species evolved and went extinct for billions of years, creating and filling a diversity of ecological niches. Organisms used energy from the sun to grow and reproduce, recycling the materials needed for life through an interdependent worldwide ecosystem. Mechanisms existed to maintain ecological stability, ensuring that the environment didn’t change too fast for evolution to keep up. Our biosphere recovered from calamitous events like asteroid collisions, even though only a minority of species made it through some of those catastrophes. Today’s ongoing catastrophe may eliminate all but the smallest and simplest of life forms.  Our species has flourished, but without realizing it we’ve changed our environment **too fast for other species to adapt**. A system’s stability can only be eroded so far, after which it becomes unstable. We’re approaching a point where the world’s ecosystem will change too fast even for us to adapt. We will become extinct.  It’s already too late for us to return to the world as we found it or even as it was ten years ago. We’ve wiped out too many species. But we can protect the remaining fragile stability. In a word, we must seek sustainability, which means consuming resources only as fast as they’re replenished. All the trends on our graph have to be reversed, until they’re all back to pre-industrial levels or lower. This doesn’t mean returning to a pre-industrial quality of life – in fact, we should all be able to live much better once there are fewer of us. But we have to take effective action very soon, before it’s too late.

#### Indian economic growth solves asia war

**Garten 95** (Jeffrey, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, FDCH, 3-7, Lexis)

Paramount among those interests are the commercial opportunities that are increasingly at the heart of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy. But it is impossible to separate those commercial interests from our broader interests. Economic reforms enable our companies to take advantage of the opportunities within the Indian market and enable Indian companies to better enter the global marketplace. Economic growth in India is a **powerful stabilizing force** in a region of the world where stability is of Supreme importance. Stability and growth in India are of enormous importance through southern Asia, from the Middle East to Indochina. Peace and prosperity in that part of the world are **essential** to the peace and prosperity of the world.

## 2nc terror

### --2nc no domestic backlash

#### Criticism over lack of judicial review won’t collapse the program

Benjamin Wittes 13, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, 2/27/13, “In Defense of the Administration on Targeted Killing of Americans,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/in-defense-of-the-administration-on-targeted-killing-of-americans/>

This view has currency among European allies, among advocacy groups, and in the legal academy. Unfortunately for its proponents, it has no currency among the three branches of government of the United States. The courts and the executive branch have both taken the opposite view, and the Congress passed a broad authorization for the use of force and despite many opportunities, has never revisited that document to impose limitations by geography or to preclude force on the basis of co-belligerency—much less to clarify that the AUMF does not, any longer, authorize the use of military force at all. Congress has been repeatedly briefed on U.S. targeting decisions, including those involving U.S. persons.[5] It was therefore surely empowered to either use the power of the purse to prohibit such action or to modify the AUMF in a way that undermined the President’s legal reasoning. Not only has it taken neither of these steps, but Congress has also funded the relevant programs. Moreover, as I noted above, Congress’s recent reaffirmation of the AUMF in the 2012 NDAA with respect to detention, once again contains no geographical limitation.

There is, in other words, a consensus among the branches of government on the point that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict that involves co-belligerent forces and follows the enemy to the new territorial ground it stakes out. It is a consensus that rejects the particular view of the law advanced by numerous critics. And it is a consensus on which the executive branch is entitled to rely in formulating its legal views.

Second, a mounting chorus of critics has insisted that judicial review must be a feature of the legal framework that authorizes the targeting of any American nationals. The New York Times, for example, has editorialized that “[g]oing forward, [President Obama] should submit decisions like [the Al-Aulaqi] one to review by Congress and the courts. If necessary, Congress could create a special court to handle this sort of sensitive discussion, like the one it created to review wiretapping.”

The question of whether targeting judgments might benefit from some form of judicial review—either prospectively or after-the-fact—is an enormously complicated one. Scholars have put together several thoughtful proposals for review mechanisms,[6] and I don’t rule out the idea of some form of judicial review—though I tend to disfavor it. But critically, none of these or other proposals to change the rules to include judicial review undermines the integrity of the administration’s view of current law, which simply does not provide for judicial involvement in targeting decisions. Whether some as-yet-unwritten statutory framework might usefully provide for judicial involvement presents a difficult question. But it’s hard to fault Attorney General Holder for failing to bring the Anwar Al-Aulaqi case for prospective review before a court that does not exist.

#### The scale of backlash is laughable

Stephen Holmes 13, the Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, July 2013, “What’s in it for Obama?,” The London Review of Books, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n14/stephen-holmes/whats-in-it-for-obama>

This is the crux of the problem. We stand at the beginning of the Drone Age and the genie is not going to climb back into the bottle. The chances that this way of war will, over time, reduce the amount of random violence in the world are essentially nil. Obama’s drone policy has set an ominous precedent, and not only for future residents of the White House. It promises, over the long term, to engender more violence than it prevents because it excites no public backlash. That, for the permanent national security apparatus that has deftly moulded the worldview of a novice president, is its irresistible allure. It doesn’t provoke significant protest even on the part of people who condemn hit-jobs done with sticky bombs, radioactive isotopes or a bullet between the eyes – in the style of Mossad or Putin’s FSB. That America appears to be laidback about drones has made it possible for the CIA to resume the assassination programme it was compelled to shut down in the 1970s without, this time, awakening any politically significant outrage. It has also allowed the Pentagon to wage a war against which antiwar forces are apparently unable to rally even modest public support.

#### Experts agree

Masters, deputy editor – CFR, 10/3/2011 (Jonathan, “US acquires targeted killing as an essential tactic,” The Nation)

Since assuming office in 2009, Barack Obama's administration has escalated targeted killings, primarily through an increase in unmanned drone strikes on Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership, but also through an expansion of US Special Operations kill/capture missions. The successful killing of Osama bin Laden in a US Navy SEAL raid in May 2011 and the drone strike on Al-Qaeda's number two, Atiyah Abd Rahman, in August 2011 are prime examples of this trend. The White House points to these outcomes as victories, but critics continue to condemn the lethal tactic on moral, legal, and political grounds. Despite the opposition, most experts expect the United States to boost targeted killings in the coming years as military technology improves and the public appetite for large-scale, conventional armed intervention erodes.

#### Won’t collapse the drone program

Masters, deputy editor – CFR, 10/3/2011 (Jonathan, “US acquires targeted killing as an essential tactic,” The Nation)

Blowback from civil liberties and human rights groups is likely to grow in direct proportion to any increase in targeted killings. Organisations such as the ACLU and Human Rights Watch have raised pointed questions regarding the perceived lack of accountability and transparency. Others question if the United States is setting a negative precedent that will be invoked by other nations (WashPost) acquiring similar technology, such as China and Russia. CFR's Bellinger expects targeted killings to become much more politically provocative given the Obama administration's current posture, and asks if drones will "become Obama's Guantanamo?" Nevertheless, analysts point to several factors indicating that an expansion of US targeted killings in the near term is likely. Drone strikes and special operations raids put fewer Americans in harm's way and provide a low-cost alternative to expensive and cumbersome conventional forces. This alternative is further enhanced given the probability of future cuts in the defence budget and a waning public appetite for long, expensive wars. The rise of the so-called "non-state actor," operating in loose transnational networks, as the principal threat to US national security also lends itself to an expansion of US targeted killings. Other experts say technological advances, including precision-guided munitions and enhanced surveillance, have given the United States a greater ability to target these particular individuals while reducing collateral damage. In July 2011, Obama's chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, provided a portent of things to come: "Going forward, we will be mindful that if our nation is threatened, our best offence won't always be deploying large armies abroad but delivering targeted, surgical pressure to the groups that threaten us."

#### Backlash is inevitable--critics want to shut the entire program down, but Obama’s not budging

Steven Groves 13, the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, 1/25/13, “The U.S. Should Ignore U.N. Inquiry Into Drone Strikes,” http://blog.heritage.org/2013/01/25/the-u-s-should-ignore-u-n-inquiry-into-drone-strikes/

Various international legal academics and human rights activists have regularly made these and other similar allegations ever since the Obama Administration stepped up the drone program in 2009. While drone strikes cannot be viewed alone as an effective counterterrorism strategy, the Administration has repeatedly defended the legality of the program.

Emmerson and his fellow U.N. special rapporteurs Philip Alston and Christof Heyns have repeatedly demanded that the U.S. provide more information on drone strikes—and the U.S. has repeatedly complied, issuing public statement after public statement defending every aspect of the drone program.

Public statements detailing the legality and propriety of the drone program have been made by top Administration officials, including State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh, Attorney General Eric Holder, Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan, General Counsel for the Department of Defense Jeh Johnson, and CIA General Counsel Stephen Preston.

Increased transparency will, of course, be deemed by human rights activists as insufficient where their true goal is to stop the U.S. drone program in its entirety. Unless and until the U.S. can somehow promise that no civilian casualties will result from drone strikes, such strikes will be considered violations of international law.

Ignoring the U.N. probe will not make it go away, but the Obama Administration should not be so naive as to expect that its cooperation will substantively alter the investigation’s findings and conclusions.

### --2nc no allied backlash

#### Empirics are decisive

Aldrich 09

Richard J. Aldrich is a Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, February 2009, "US–European Intelligence Co-operation on Counter-Terrorism: Low Politics and Compulsion", Vol. 11, Issue 1, pgs. 122-139

Since 9/11, intelligence has been viewed as an integral part of a controversial ‘war on terror’. The acrimonious public arguments over subjects such as Iraqi WMD assessments, secret prisons and the interrogation of detainees suggest intense transatlantic discord. Yet improbably, some of those countries that have expressed strident disagreement in public are privately the closest intelligence partners. It is argued here that we can explain this seeming paradox by viewing intelligence co-operation as a rather specialist kind of ‘low politics’ that is focused on practical arrangements. Intelligence is also a fissiparous activity, allowing countries to work together in one area even while they disagree about something else. Meanwhile, the pressing need to deal with a range of increasingly elusive transnational opponents—including organised crime—compels intelligence agencies to work more closely together, despite their instinctive dislike of multilateral sharing. Therefore, transatlantic intelligence co-operation will continue to deepen, despite the complex problems that it entails.

#### Even if we lose this, overlapping organizations preserve CT

**Boyle & Schmid 9** – assistant professor of political science at La Salle University & Chair in Internaitonal Relations at St. Andrews University and Director of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews (Michael and Alex, “A Global Compact for Counter-Terrorism: Towards a Robust Multilateral Counter-Terrorism Regime” The New Ideas Fund, <http://www.newideasfund.org/proposals/NIF_Global%20Compact.pdf>)

Multilateral arrangements, whether in the form of sub-regional and regional arrangements or functional arrangements that reach across regions have become more frequent in recent years also in the field of counter-terrorism. There are nowadays at least twenty Security Communities or Communities of Interest – regional or issue-specific organizations - which are trying to coordinate their counter-terrorism efforts, although their main business, historically, might have been different or larger, e.g. fighting crime in general (like with Interpol) or oriented towards economic development (like OECD). More often than not one country is a member of several such security communities or communities of interest. In fact many countries which concluded counter-terrorist agreements are part of more than one cooperative arrangement. There are regional bodies like the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Organisation of American States (OAS) and its Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation ( SAARC) ,the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the (British) Commonwealth Secretariat , the Commonwealth of Independent States (formerly USSR) , the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which have all assumed some counterterrorist roles as part of a broader package of services to their member states. In addition, there are functional groups that fulfil one or more anti-terrorist tasks. They include the International Monetary Fund (IMF) , the World Bank (WB), the World Customs Organisation (WCO) the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), The International Police Organizations (Interpol), the European Police Office ( Europol), the European Union‟s Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust), the Council of Europe, the Group of 8 (G8) , the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) , the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Some of these bodies are part of the wider UN family (e.g. IAEA) while others are not. Last but not least there is the United Nations. Together they form the mosaic of current multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation

### xt nuclear no ability

#### Too many obstacles—look at aggregate probability

**Pinker, 11** [Steven, professor of psychology at Harvard University, The Better Angels of our Nature Why Violence Has Declined, ISBN: 067002295, for online access email alexanderdpappas@gmail.com and I will forward you the full book]

Though conventional terrorism, as John Kerry gaffed, is a nuisance to be policed rather than a threat to the fabric of life, terrorism with weapons of mass destruction would be something else entirely. The prospect of an attack that would kill millions of people is not just theoretically possible but consistent with the statistics of terrorism. The computer scientists Aaron Clauset and Maxwell Young and the political scientist Kristian Gleditsch plotted the death tolls of eleven thousand terrorist attacks on log-log paper and saw them fall into a neat straight line.261 Terrorist attacks obey a power-law distribution, which means they are generated by mechanisms that make extreme events unlikely, but not astronomically unlikely. The trio suggested a simple model that is a bit like the one that Jean-Baptiste Michel and I proposed for wars, invoking nothing fancier than a combination of exponentials. As terrorists invest more time into plotting their attack, the death toll can go up exponentially: a plot that takes twice as long to plan can kill, say, four times as many people. To be concrete, an attack by a single suicide bomber, which usually kills in the single digits, can be planned in a few days or weeks. The 2004 Madrid train bombings, which killed around two hundred, took six months to plan, and 9/11, which killed three thousand, took two years.262 But terrorists live on borrowed time: every day that a plot drags on brings the possibility that it will be disrupted, aborted, or executed prematurely. If the probability is constant, the plot durations will be distributed exponentially. (Cronin, recall, showed that terrorist organizations drop like flies over time, falling into an exponential curve.) Combine exponentially growing damage with an exponentially shrinking chance of success, and you get a power law, with its disconcertingly thick tail. Given the presence of weapons of mass destruction in the real world, and religious fanatics willing to wreak untold damage for a higher cause, a lengthy conspiracy producing a horrendous death toll is within the realm of thinkable probabilities. A statistical model, of course, is not a crystal ball. Even if we could extrapolate the line of existing data points, the massive terrorist attacks in the tail are still extremely (albeit not astronomically) unlikely. More to the point, we *can’t* extrapolate it. In practice, as you get to the tail of a power-law distribution, the data points start to misbehave, scattering around the line or warping it downward to very low probabilities. The statistical spectrum of terrorist damage reminds us not to dismiss the worst-case scenarios, but it doesn’t tell us how likely they are. So how likely are they? What do you think the chances are that within the next five years each of the following scenarios will take place? (1) One of the heads of state of a major developed country will be assassinated. (2) A nuclear weapon will be set off in a war or act of terrorism. (3) Venezuela and Cuba will join forces and sponsor Marxist insurrection movements in one or more Latin American countries. (4) Iran will provide nuclear weapons to a terrorist group that will use one of them against Israel or the United States. (5) France will give up its nuclear arsenal. I gave fifteen of these scenarios to 177 Internet users on a single Web page and asked them to estimate the probability of each. The median estimate that a nuclear bomb would be set off (scenario 2) was 0.20; the median estimate that a nuclear bomb would be set off in the United States or Israel by a terrorist group that obtained it from Iran (scenario 4) was 0.25. About half the respondents judged that the second scenario was more likely than the first. And in doing so, they committed an elementary blunder in the mathematics of probability. The probability of a conjunction of events (A and B both occurring) cannot be greater than the probability of either of them occurring alone. The probability that you will draw a red jack has to be lower than the probability that you will draw a jack, because some jacks you might draw are not red. Yet Tversky and Kahneman have shown that most people, including statisticians and medical researchers, commonly make the error.263 Consider the case of Bill, a thirty-four-year-old man who is intelligent but also unimaginative, compulsive, and rather dull. In school he was strong in mathematics but undistinguished in the arts and humanities. What are the chances that Bill plays jazz saxophone? What are the chances that he is an accountant who plays jazz saxophone? Many people give higher odds to the second possibility, but the choice is nonsensical, because there are fewer saxophone-playing accountants than there are saxophone players. In judging probabilities, people rely on the vividness of their imaginations rather than thinking through the laws. Bill fits the stereotype of an accountant but not of a saxophonist, and our intuitions go with the stereotype. The conjunction fallacy, as psychologists call it, infects many kinds of reasoning. Juries are more likely to believe that a man with shady business dealings killed an employee to prevent him from talking to the police than to believe that he killed the employee. (Trial lawyers thrive on this fallacy, adding conjectural details to a scenario to make it more vivid to a jury, even though every additional detail, mathematically speaking, ought to make it *less* probable.) Professional forecasters give higher odds to an unlikely outcome that is presented with a plausible cause (oil prices will rise, causing oil consumption to fall) than to the same outcome presented naked (oil consumption will fall).264 And people are willing to pay more for flight insurance against terrorism than for flight insurance against all causes.265 You can see where I’m going. The mental movie of an Islamist terrorist group buying a bomb on the black market or obtaining it from a rogue state and then detonating it in a populated area is all too easy to play in our mind’s eye. Even if it weren’t, the entertainment industry has played it for us in nuclear terrorist dramas like *True Lies, The Sum of All Fears,* and *24*. The narrative is so riveting that we are apt to give it a higher probability than we would if we thought through all the steps that would have to go right for the disaster to happen and multiplied their probabilities. That’s why so many of my survey respondents judged an Iran-sponsored nuclear terrorist attack to be more probable than a nuclear attack. The point is not that nuclear terrorism is impossible or even astronomically unlikely. It is just that the probability assigned to it by anyone but a methodical risk analyst is likely to be too high. What do I mean by “too high”? “With certainty” and “more probable than not” strike me as too high. The physicist Theodore Taylor declared in 1974 that by 1990 it would be too late to prevent terrorists from carrying out a nuclear attack.266 In 1995 the world’s foremost activist on the risks of nuclear terrorism, Graham Allison, wrote that under prevailing circumstances, a nuclear attack on American targets was likely before the decade was out.267 In 1998 the counterterrorism expert Richard Falkenrath wrote that “it is certain that more and more non-state actors will become capable of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons acquisition and use.”268 In 2003 UN ambassador John Negroponte judged that there was a “high probability” of an attack with a weapon of mass destruction within two years. And in 2007 the physicist Richard Garwin estimated that the chance of a nuclear terrorist attack was 20 percent per year, or about 50 percent by 2010 and almost 90 percent within a decade.269 Like television weather forecasters, the pundits, politicians, and terrorism specialists have every incentive to emphasize the worst-case scenario. It is undoubtedly wise to scare governments into taking extra measures to lock down weapons and fissile material and to monitor and infiltrate groups that might be tempted to acquire them. Overestimating the risk, then, is safer than underestimating it—though only up to a point, as the costly invasion of Iraq in search of nonexistent weapons of mass destruction proves. The professional reputations of experts have proven to be immune to predictions of disasters that never happen, while almost no one wants to take a chance at giving the all-clear and ending up with radioactive egg on his face.270 A few **brave analysts, such as Mueller,** John Parachini, and Michael Levi, have taken the chance by examining the disaster scenarios component by component.271 For starters, of the four so-called weapons of mass destruction, three are far less massively destructive than good old-fashioned explosives.272 Radiological or “dirty” bombs, which are conventional explosives wrapped in radioactive material (obtained, for example, from medical waste), would yield only minor and short-lived elevations of radiation, comparable to moving to a city at a higher altitude. Chemical weapons, unless they are released in an enclosed space like a subway (where they would still not do as much damage as conventional explosives), dissipate quickly, drift in the wind, and are broken down by sunlight. (Recall that poison gas was responsible for a tiny fraction of the casualties in World War I.) Biological weapons capable of causing epidemics would be prohibitively expensive to develop and deploy, as well as dangerous to the typically bungling amateur labs that would develop them. It’s no wonder that biological and chemical weapons, though far more accessible than nuclear ones, have been used in only three terrorist attacks in thirty years.273 In 1984 the Rajneeshee religious cult contaminated salad in the restaurants of an Oregon town with salmonella, sickening 751 people and killing none. In 1990 the Tamil Tigers were running low on ammunition while attacking a fort and opened up some chlorine cylinders they found in a nearby paper mill, injuring 60 and killing none before the gas wafted back over them and convinced them never to try it again. The Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo failed in ten attempts to use biological weapons before releasing sarin gas in the Tokyo subways, killing 12. A fourth attack, the 2001 anthrax mailings that killed 5 Americans in media and government offices, turned out to be a spree killing rather than an act of terrorism. It’s really only nuclear weapons that deserve the WMD acronym. Mueller and Parachini have fact-checked the various reports that terrorists got “just this close” to obtaining a nuclear bomb and found that all were apocryphal. Reports of “interest” in procuring weapons on a black market grew into accounts of actual negotiations, generic sketches morphed into detailed blueprints, and flimsy clues (like the aluminum tubes purchased in 2001 by Iraq) were overinterpreted as signs of a development program. **Each of the pathways** to nuclear terrorism, when examined carefully, turns out to have gantlets of improbabilities. There may have been a window of vulnerability in the safekeeping of nuclear weapons in Russia, but today most experts agree it has been closed, and that no loose nukes are being peddled in a nuclear bazaar. Stephen Younger, the former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos National Laboratory, has said, “Regardless of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.”274 Russia has an intense interest in keeping its weapons out of the hands of Chechen and other ethnic separatist groups, and Pakistan is just as worried about its archenemy Al Qaeda. And contrary to rumor, security experts consider the chance that Pakistan’s government and military command will fall under the control of Islamist extremists to be essentially nil.275 Nuclear weapons have complex interlocks designed to prevent unauthorized deployment, and most of them become “radioactive scrap metal” if they are not maintained.276 For these reasons, the forty-seven-nation Nuclear Security Summit convened by Barack Obama in 2010 to prevent nuclear terrorism concentrated on the security of fissile material, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, rather than on finished weapons. The dangers of filched fissile material are real, and the measures recommended at the summit are patently wise, responsible, and overdue. Still, one shouldn’t get so carried away by the image of garage nukes as to think they are inevitable or even extremely probable. The safeguards that are in place or will be soon will make fissile materials hard to steal or smuggle, and if they went missing, it would trigger an international manhunt. Fashioning a workable nuclear weapon requires precision engineering and fabrication techniques well beyond the capabilities of amateurs. The Gilmore commission, which advises the president and Congress on WMD terrorism, called the challenge “Herculean,” and Allison has described the weapons as “large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient.”277 Moreover, the path to getting the materials, experts, and facilities in place is mined with hazards of detection, betrayal, stings, blunders, and bad luck. In his book *On Nuclear Terrorism*, Levi laid out all the things that would have to go right for a terrorist nuclear attack to succeed, noting, “Murphy’s Law of Nuclear Terrorism: What can go wrong might go wrong.”278 Mueller counts twenty obstacles on the path and notes that even if a terrorist group had a fifty-fifty chance of clearing every one, the aggregate odds of its success would be one in a million. Levi brackets the range from the other end by estimating that even if the path were strewn with only ten obstacles, and the probability that each would be cleared was 80 percent, the aggregate odds of success facing a nuclear terrorist group would be one in ten. **Those are not our odds of becoming victims**. A terrorist group weighing its options, even with these overly optimistic guesstimates, might well conclude from the long odds that it would better off devoting its resources to projects with a higher chance of success. None of this, to repeat, means that nuclear terrorism is impossible, only that it is not, as so many people insist, imminent, inevitable, or highly probable.

### --xt no impact to pakistan

#### No loose nukes

Tepperman, 9/7/2009 (John - journalist based in New York City, Why obama should learn to love the bomb, Newsweek, p.lexis)

As for Pakistan, it has taken numerous precautions to ensure that its own weapons are insulated from the country's chaos, installing **complicated firing mechanisms** to prevent a launch by lone radicals, for example, and instituting special training and screening for its nuclear personnel to ensure they're not infiltrated by extremists. Even if the Pakistani state did **collapse** entirely--the nightmare scenario--the chance of a Taliban bomb would still be **remote**. Desch argues that the idea that terrorists "could use these weapons radically underestimates the difficulty of actually operating a modern nuclear arsenal. These things **need constant maintenance and they're very easy to disable**. So the idea that these things could be stuffed into a gunnysack and smuggled across the Rio Grande is preposterous."

## 2nc norms

### at: turkey model

#### Turkey model fails

**Cagaptay 11** (Soner, Senior Fellow and Director of the Turkish Reseaerch Program – Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Turkey's Future Role in the 'Arab Spring',” inFocus Quarterly, 5(4), Winter, http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2814/turkey-arab-spring)

Turkey ruled the Arab Middle East until World War I, and it must now be careful about how its messages are perceived there. Arabs might be drawn to fellow Muslims; the Turks are also former imperial masters. Arabs are pressing for democracy, and if Turkey behaves like a new imperial power, this approach will backfire. Arab liberals and Islamists alike regularly suggest that Turkey is welcome in the Middle East but should not dominate it. Then, there is the problem of transferring the "Turkish model" to Arab countries. In September 2011, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan landed at Cairo's new airport terminal (built by Turkish companies), he was warmly met by joyous millions, mobilized by the Muslim Brotherhood. However, he soon upset his pious hosts by preaching about the importance of a secular government that provides freedom of religion, using the Turkish word "laiklik"—derived from the French word for secularism. In Arabic, this term translates as "irreligious." Mr. Erdogan's message may have been partly lost in translation, yet the incident illustrates the limits of Turkey's influence in countries that are far more socially conservative than it is. What is more, Ankara also faces domestic challenges that could hamper its influence in the "Arab Spring." At the moment, Turkey is debating chartering its first civilian-made constitution. If Turkey wants to become a true beacon of democracy in the Middle East, its new constitution must provide broader individual rights for the country's citizens, as well as lifting limits on freedoms, such as curbs on the media. Turkey will also need to fulfill Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's vision of a "no problems" foreign policy. This means moving past the 2010 flotilla episode to rebuild strong ties with Israel and getting along with the Greek Cypriots who live on the southern part of the divided island of Cyprus (Turkish Cypriots control the north).

#### Turkish leadership is ineffective – their goals for the region are nonsensical and overstated

**Cook, 11** Steven, Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (“Arab Spring, Turkish Fall,” Foreign Policy, 5/5/11, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/05/arab_spring_turkish_fall?page=0,1&wp_login_redirect=0> //Red)

The Arab uprisings seemed tailor-made for the "new Turkey" to exert its much-vaunted influence in the Middle East. Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power almost nine years ago, Ankara has actively courted the region, cultivating warm relations with certain Arab countries, winning plaudits from Rabat to Ramadi for its principled stand on Gaza, and using its prestige to solve problems in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. A central focus of Turkey's so-called "zero problems" foreign policy has been a concerted effort to improve and expand relations with the countries to its south and east. Now, with millions of Arabs standing up and demanding their freedom, Turks are not the only ones to have held up the "Turkish model" -- the democratic development of a predominantly Muslim society in an officially secular political system -- as a possible way forward for the rest of the Middle East. Yet five months into the turmoil buffeting the Arab world, **it is hard to discern exactly if Turkey has a policy to deal with the change** going on around it. Indeed, **rather than a regional leader with a clear sense of purpose, Ankara has been downright clumsy** in dealing with the Arab upheavals. It didn't have to be this way. The Arab revolutions actually started out pretty well for Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was way ahead of other world leaders in demanding that Egypt's Hosni Mubarak heed the desires of his people and resign. Whether or not Ankara saw the writing on the wall quicker than most, the position was entirely in keeping with the Justice and Development Party's worldview -- and the role Erdogan and other principle party figures fashioned for themselves -- as promoters of democratic change at home and abroad. Of course, the difficult personal relationship between Erdogan and Mubarak made it easier for the Turkish leader to dump his counterpart in favor of the multitudes camped out in Tahrir Square. And there was a regional rivalry at play here, too: Ankara sensed that Cairo's influence was waning and wanted to fashion itself as a new Middle East powerbroker. It seemed that once again Erdogan and his team had insights into the politics of the region that seemed beyond the grasp of others -- most notably the Obama administration, which, hamstrung by Washington's strategic relationship with Mubarak, was far more cautious and circumspect than Ankara. Then came Libya. Despite the brutality and chaos instigated by Muammar al-Qaddafi, Erdogan found it difficult to decisively cut ties with the Libyan leader: Not only was the Turkish prime minister a personal recipient of the al-Qaddafi International Prize for Human Rights, but with 30,000 Turks working on $1.5 billion worth of construction projects for the Libyan government, there was a clear economic imperative to maintaining good relations. Indeed, when NATO members began discussing in late February the prospect of a no-fly zone, Turkey -- an early member of the alliance -- objected. On Feb. 28, Erdogan pointedly told the Turkish-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, "NATO's intervention in Libya is out of the question. We are against such a thing." A few days later, the Turkish Foreign Ministry declared that foreign intervention on behalf of the Libyan opposition would rob the rebels of the satisfaction of bringing Qaddafi down on their own -- this at a time when the Interim Libyan National Council was practically begging for foreign support. Once the Arab League approved a no-fly zone, the Turkish position became truly strange. Erdogan expressed "heartfelt support" for prohibiting Qaddafi's use of airpower while simultaneously rejecting the "foreign intervention in friend and brother Libya." Even as NATO airstrikes took out loyalist air defenses, Ankara remained ambivalent toward Qaddafi's use of force against his own people, curiously committed to the Libyan leader. And though the Turks positioned themselves as the leading provider of humanitarian aid to Libya, they consistently rejected the use of force to protect rebel fighters, arguing instead for a Turkish-brokered cease-fire after which Qaddafi could begin the process of political reform. To the Benghazi rebel leadership, the Turks were, in fact, the culprits behind the noticeable downshift in the NATO air campaign in the previous few weeks. In time, as Turkish diplomatic efforts -- primarily through direct communication between the two leaders -- to persuade Qaddafi to stand down bore **little in the way of positive results**, Ankara ultimately came to the conclusion that almost everyone but Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and a group of motley African countries arrived at months ago: Qaddafi must go. On May 3, Erdogan declared to a gathering of journalists in Istanbul, "We wish to see Libya's leader step down immediately and leave Libya immediately for his own sake and for the sake of his country's future." Turkey seems to be engaged in a similar diplomatic dance with regard to Syria. At one time, Ankara and Damascus were hostile neighbors in conflict over the downstream flow of the Euphrates river and Syrian support for the terrorists of the Kurdistan Workers Party, which targeted the Turkish state in a quixotic campaign of Kurdish independence. During AKP's tenure, however, relations between the two countries warmed considerably. Syrians and Turks no longer require visas for travel between each country and Turkey has become Syria's largest trading partner. Although there has been precious little talk of foreign intervention in Syria, just to be sure, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu warned that "internationalization" of the unrest there could lead to "undesired outcomes." Chief among them, from the Turkish perspective, would be the downfall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime. The Turks have much to be worried about when it comes to a destabilized Syria -- in particular a restive Kurdish region just to Turkey's south. It would also be a setback for Ankara's Middle East strategy, of which warm relations with Damascus have been central. Given those interests, it is unlikely that the Turks will break with Assad in the way they have now abandoned Qaddafi. Instead, **the Turks have indulged in cynical posturing. As Assad deploys troops** and tanks against peaceful protestors, the Turkish foreign ministry counseled the Syrian leader to "implement [reforms] without further delay" and subsequently expressed satisfaction with Assad's efforts. To which the only reasonable reply is, "What democratic reforms?" The Turkish position on Syria has not yet placed Ankara at odds with Washington or Brussels. But should the United States or Europe shift on Assad -- a distinct possibility -- then Turkey would find itself supporting a dictator against the will of its two most important allies, as well as the will of the Syrian people. Among the many myths that the Arab spring has shattered is the legend of Turkish foreign policy in the era of the AKP. If officials in Ankara are to be believed, Turkey's diplomacy has, over the course of the last decade -- and very often over the objections of Washington -- had a decisively positive effect on conflicts and problems from the Balkans and the Caucuses to Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. **But Turkey's prideful rhetoric only masked the contradictions and weaknesses at the heart of its foreign policy.** Erdogan, Davutoglu, and their advisors have to come to grips with how hard it is to master the Middle East. There was always a lot less to Ankara's influence in the Arab world than met the eye. Turkish leaders love the anecdotes about Arabs watching Turkish soap operas, the posters of Erdogan in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, and the comparison between the Turkish prime minister and Gamal Abdel Nasser -- but the new Ottomans have found it as difficult to manage the politics of the region as the Sultans before them. At base, the Turks managed a measure of influence during a period of Arab decay. It was easy to be influential when the Arab world was politically dead and devoid of authentic leadership. Like it or not, Ankara's interests are wrapped up in the old regional order. As a result, at a moment of unprecedented regional change, when people power and democracy is sweeping the Middle East, the Turks look timorous, maladroit, and diminished -- not at all the regional leader to which Ankara has aspired.

#### No solvency – Turkey’s entire policy in the region is broke

**Kirisci and Keane, 13** – Kemal, TUSIAD Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution and **their author**, and Rob research assistant with the Managing Global Order project at Brookings (“Turkey's Israel-Palestine Opportunity,” National Interest, 8/1/13, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkeys-israel-palestine-opportunity-8809?page=1> //Red)

For several years now, Turkey has been a major player in the rapidly changing politics of the Middle East. Recent crises in Egypt, Syria and Iraq have made Turkey a key pillar of stability in a region of constantly shifting ground. While its role in the region was once praised as both positive and constructive, in the course of the last year or so, Turkey’s reputation has suffered.Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s grandly touted and formerly praised “zero problems with neighbors” policy has become a source of black humor and has now come to be known as the “zero neighbors without problems” policy. With a new round of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians commencing in Washington, Turkey’s next step remains unclear. Will Turkey live up to the legacy of past policies and play a constructive role in the process, or will it continue with policies that undermine the legacy and spirit of the “zero problems” policy? The latter course of action risks Turkey being seen as a spoiler, left out in the cold at what could be a historic juncture in the politics of the Middle East. The Legacy of Turgut Özal Turkey has historically had a precarious and nuanced role in the Middle East. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey’s own desire to pursue Westernization and Europeanization kept Turkey from being a major player in the region until relatively recently. Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel in 1949 but was also a consistent supporter of Palestinian rights, frequently withdrawing its diplomatic representatives from Tel Aviv in protest and becoming one of the first countries to recognize the declaration of the State of Palestine. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, under prime minister and later president Turgut Özal, Turkey aspired to play an active role in efforts to seek peace in the Middle East. In the mid-1980s Özal proposed the building of a pipeline to carry fresh water from Turkey to the Middle East, including Israel and the Palestinian territories, in the hopes that functional interdependence would help to foster peace. More ambitiously, Özal aspired to have the first Middle East peace conference following the first Gulf War held in Istanbul. Instead, Turkey settled for a more modest but constructive role in both the Madrid and Oslo processes until their collapse at the end of the decade. Erdoğan and Davutoğlu Pick Up the Baton Years later, with Davutoğlu’s “zero problems” policy, Turkey once again embarked upon an effort to reshape the region through constructive diplomatic action, this one even more ambitious. In the Middle East, the cornerstone of this policy was Turkey’s ability to talk to all parties involved in the region’s disputes. In Lebanon, Turkey was able to engage with Hezbollah as well as with the Christian and Sunni leadership. The same was true of Iraq where Turkey maintained close contacts with Sunni, Shia, Kurdish and Turkmen parties during much of the 2000s. Longstanding tensions with Syria over territorial disputes, water rights and the Kurdish issue were replaced by much closer and warmer relations. Furthermore, Davutoğlu, in the spirit of Özal’s legacy, embarked upon a regional economic-integration project. But the true political prize was the beginning of Turkish-sponsored indirect talks between Syria and Israel. Turkish efforts reached their peak in December 2008, when prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert in Ankara for an hours-long dinner that ultimately produced a blueprint for direct talks with the Assad regime in Syria. “Zero Problems” No More **But within weeks of the meeting, Turkish-Israeli relations were nearing an all-time low.** Following Operation Cast Lead, Israel’s December 2008-January 2009 military strike against Hamas in Gaza and the January 2009 incident at Davos in which Erdoğan chastised and wagged his finger at Israeli president and longtime peace seeker Shimon Peres, Turkey’s **relations** with Israel **entered a tailspin.** Tensions were only exacerbated by the Mavi Marmara incident, in which nine Turks were killed trying to run an Israeli blockade of Gaza. While Erdoğan’s increasing truculence toward Israel made him a hero to the Arab street, it **undermined his relations with many Arab governments** who felt they were being shown up by the Turkish prime minister, and virtually **destroyed any notion that Israel might be able to trust Turkey as an** “**honest broker**” in future peace negotiations. While the break with Israel may have been the first crack in the “zero problems with neighbors” façade, events in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Iran soon seemed to leave Turkey with “zero neighbors without problems.” At the outset of the Arab Awakening, Turkey looked poised to benefit the most of any regional power from the expected democratic transformation, and was even touted as a model for Muslim democrats across the Middle East. But as the promise of the region’s democratic movement has waned and peaceful revolutions have been replaced by civil war, sectarian strife and unpredictable, often violent changes of government, **Turkey has become a party to the regional conflicts rather than an arbiter of them.** Turkey’s relationship with Syria, once presented as a resounding success and the crown jewel of the “zero-problems” policy, **have deteriorated into virtual undeclared warfare** even as hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees flood southeastern Turkey. Turkey’s influence in Lebanon and Iraq has declined precipitously as it entered the partisan fray in both countries on the side of predominantly Sunni groups. By casting its lot with Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar, Turkey has positioned itself firmly, even if by default, in the camp of those confronting the alleged rise of the “Shia Crescent,” **further aggravating the sectarian polarization that is tearing the Middle East apart.** The ouster of Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi is only the latest in a series of major blows to Turkey’s regional influence—a blow that was exacerbated by the Turkish government’s decision to categorically declare the new interim government illegitimate and demand Morsi’s reinstatement. Given Turkey’s own history with military interventions and the long repression of the country’s conservative religious movement, of which Erdoğan’s AKP is a part, the reaction is understandable and principled. But even so, **unless Turkey adopts a more realistic, conciliatory and constructive approach to the ongoing instability** resulting from the Arab Awakening, **Turkey is in danger of being sidelined** during what may be the most decisive moment of political change for the region in nearly a century.

### AT: SCS conflict advantage

#### No impact to miscalc

**Sevastopulo, 10/28/13** (Demetri, “China-Japan relations take turn for worse” Financial Times, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/db42ec8e-3fab-11e3-8882-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2kkvx15JT>)

Sino-Japanese ties have been very tense since Tokyo last year bought three of the Senkaku Islands – a chain in the East China Sea that Japan controls but China claims – from their private owners. At the weekend, tensions flared again as Japan scrambled fighter jets to shadow Chinese jets in the area.

Last month, China flew a drone near the Senkaku, leading Japan to say it would consider shooting down unmanned aircraft that violate its airspace. China said that would be an “act of war” and that it would take “decisive action to strike back”.

Mike Green, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the chance of an accidental confrontation near the Senkaku, which China calls the Diaoyu, was “higher than it has ever been, but it is not August 1914”.

“The Senkaku are not Sarajevo, the fuse waiting to light a highly combustible military confrontation across northeast Asia. Even an accidental military collision would be quickly contained, but it would also be very bad for business.”

The tensions over the weekend coincided with China unveiling its first nuclear submarine force for a detailed full show for the first time, in the latest sign of its growing military confidence.

Last December, a Chinese surveillance aircraft flew over the Senkaku in what Japan described as the first official Chinese breach of its airspace since 1958. Chinese ships and aircraft have since routinely tested Japanese control of the group, prompting concern about deliberate or accidental conflict.

On the surface, the Senkaku situation had cooled somewhat before this weekend. The Japanese coast guard says Chinese vessels have entered its territorial waters or the surrounding “contiguous zone” on five separate days this month, compared with 20 to 24 days in each of the previous four months.

And while Japan scrambled fighters 149 times in the April to September period, the high number was still 88 fewer than it did in the preceding six months. Trade relations between the countries have also improved from last year.

#### China won’t model – drones are key to its great power interests

**King, 11/4/13 -** managing editor of Outstanding Investments and Energy & Scarcity Investor. He is a Harvard-trained geologist who has traveled to every U.S. state and territory and six of the seven continents. He has conducted site visits to mineral deposits in 26 countries and deep-water oil fields in five oceans.(Byron, “A Drone of Their Own: US Eyes China’s Drone Program” <http://dailyreckoning.com/a-drone-of-their-own-us-eyes-chinas-drone-program/>)

Today, Chinese leadership is on a crash program to catch up with the rest of the world in terms of military capability. They want the best, and they’ll go to any ends to get it and figure out how to make it work.

The move toward drone warfare is part of China’s larger strategy to project power over the international waters to its east and south and over its small, weaker neighbors to the north and west. (Of course, one very underpopulated area north of China is Siberia — part of Russia.)

### --xt no china drone threat

#### No Asian drone wars

**Zhou 12** (Dillon Zhou, graduate of the International Relations Program at the University of Massachusetts Boston, “China Drones Prompts Fears of a Drone Race With the US,” Policymic, December 2012, http://www.policymic.com/articles/19753/china-drones-prompt-fears-of-a-drone-race-with-the-us)

There are several facts that provide some solace to the U.S. as China's drones are far from being a real challenge to the American drone program. First, the Chinese drones are nowhere as sophisticated as U.S. drones in their range and proper hardware for optic systems and motors to power the "dragons." The DSB report notes that the U.S. technical systems are almost unrivaled at present. Second, China lacks the manpower to properly support their new fleet of drones. Whereas the U.S. has been training and honing a large force of UAV pilots, technicians and operation managers for 15 years. Finally, the U.S. drone program is about 20 years ahead of the Chinese program. The current models on show are considered to be prototypes and not finished products. The Chinese also have not had a chance to gain real experience with their drones during real operation.

#### Chinese drones are inelegant prototypes—no risk of application

**Axe 11** (David Axe, “Where are China’s Killer Drones?” Wired, February 8, 2011, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/02/where-are-chinas-killer-drones/)

Against this fast-expanding fleet of killer drones, China has just a handful of inelegant UAV prototypes. There were two dozen different aerial bots on display at the Zhuhai Airshow in southern China last year, but almost all of them were small, flimsy models that John Pike, from Globalsecurity.org, called “easy to do.” China does possess prototypes for at least four medium-size drones similar in dimension to the Predator and Reaper. These include the propeller-driven Yilong and BZK-005 and the jet-poweredTianchi and WJ-600. The BZK-005 is the only one of these four drones to show up in a photo depicting a seemingly operational environment. That photo, seen above, was leaked onto the Internet in October 2009 and showed just two BZK-005s at what appeared to be an active PLAAF airstrip. Otherwise, China’s four medium drones appear to be mere prototypes. And only the WJ-600 is said to be capable of carrying weapons. What’s holding China back? Engines, for one. Chinese industry has not proved capable of developing reliable military-grade motors. That’s been the biggest thing holding back China’s new fighters and choppers — and now apparently drones, too. “Another obstacle probably is real-time, on-time delivery of precision photo imagery,” observed Arthur Ding, an analyst based in Taiwan. The Pentagon possesses scores of communications satellites for linking drones, ground troops and imagery analysts; China has just a handful of similar spacecraft. The same communication problem could also inhibit the PLA’s ability to control its UAVs.

### --xt no china escalation

#### Economics and diplomacy

Fravel 12—Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT. Taylor is a graduate of Middlebury College and Stanford University, where he received his PhD. He has been a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, a Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, a Fellow with the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program and a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences(M. Taylor, “All Quiet in the South China Sea,” March 22nd, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137346/m-taylor-fravel/all-quiet-in-the-south-china-sea>)

Little noticed, however, has been China's recent adoption of a new -- and much more moderate -- approach. The primary goals of the friendlier policy are to restore China's tarnished image in East Asia and to reduce the rationale for a more active U.S. role there.

Beijing is also unlikely to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the United States.

The first sign of China's new approach came last June, when Hanoi dispatched a special envoy to Beijing for talks about the countries' various maritime disputes. The visit paved the way for an agreement in July 2011 between China and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to finally implement a declaration of a code of conduct they had originally drafted in 2002 after a series of incidents in the South China Sea. In that declaration, they agreed to "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes."

Since the summer, senior Chinese officials, especially top political leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, have repeatedly reaffirmed the late Deng Xiaoping's guidelines for dealing with China's maritime conflicts to focus on economic cooperation while delaying the final resolution of the underlying claims. In August 2011, for example, Hu echoed Deng's approach by stating that "the countries concerned may put aside the disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas."

Authoritative Chinese-language media, too, has begun to underscore the importance of cooperation. Since August, the international department of People's Daily (under the pen name Zhong Sheng) has published several columns stressing the need to be less confrontational in the South China Sea. In January 2012, for example, Zhong Sheng discussed the importance of "pragmatic cooperation" to achieve "concrete results." Since the People's Daily is the official paper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, such articles should be interpreted as the party's attempts to explain its new policy to domestic readers, especially those working lower down in party and state bureaucracies.

In terms of actually setting aside disputes, China has made progress. In addition to the July consensus with ASEAN, in October China reached an agreement with Vietnam on "basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues." The accord stressed following international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, China and Vietnam have begun to implement the agreement by establishing a working group to demarcate and develop the southern portion of the Gulf of Tonkin near the disputed Paracel Islands.

China has also initiated or participated in several working-level meetings to address regional concerns about Beijing's assertiveness. Just before the East Asian Summit last November, China announced that it would establish a three billion yuan ($476 million) fund for China-ASEAN maritime cooperation on scientific research, environmental protection, freedom of navigation, search and rescue, and combating transnational crimes at sea. The following month, China convened several workshops on oceanography and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and in January it hosted a meeting with senior ASEAN officials to discuss implementing the 2002 code of conduct declaration. The breadth of proposed cooperative activities indicates that China's new approach is probably more than just a mere stalling tactic.

Beyond China's new efforts to demonstrate that it is ready to pursue a more cooperative approach, the country has also halted many of the more assertive behaviors that had attracted attention between 2009 and 2011. For example, patrol ships from the Bureau of Fisheries Administration have rarely detained and held any Vietnamese fishermen since 2010. (Between 2005 and 2010, China detained 63 fishing boats and their crews, many of which were not released until a hefty fine was paid.) And Vietnamese and Philippine vessels have been able to conduct hydrocarbon exploration without interference from China. (Just last May, Chinese patrol ships cut the towed sonar cable of a Vietnamese ship to prevent it from completing a seismic survey.) More generally, China has not obstructed any recent exploration-related activities, such as Exxon's drilling in October of an exploratory well in waters claimed by both Vietnam and China. Given that China retains the capability to interfere with such activities, its failure to do so suggests a conscious choice to be a friendlier neighbor.

The question, of course, is why did the Chinese shift to a more moderate approach? More than anything, Beijing has come to realize that its assertiveness was harming its broader foreign policy interests. One principle of China's current grand strategy is to maintain good ties with great powers, its immediate neighbors, and the developing world. Through its actions in the South China Sea, China had undermined this principle and tarnished the cordial image in Southeast Asia that it had worked to cultivate in the preceding decade. It had created a shared interest among countries there in countering China -- and an incentive for them to seek support from Washington. In so doing, China's actions provided a strong rationale for greater U.S. involvement in the region and inserted the South China Sea disputes into the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

By last summer, China had simply recognized that it had overreached. Now, Beijing wants to project a more benign image in the region to prevent the formation of a group of Asian states allied against China, reduce Southeast Asian states' desire to further improve ties with the United States, and weaken the rationale for a greater U.S. role in these disputes and in the region.

So far, Beijing's new approach seems to be working, especially with Vietnam. China and Vietnam have deepened their political relationship through frequent high-level exchanges. Visits by the Vietnamese Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, to Beijing in October 2011 and by the Chinese heir apparent, Xi Jinping, to Hanoi in December 2011 were designed to soothe spirits and protect the broader bilateral relationship from the unresolved disputes over territory in the South China Sea. In October, the two also agreed to a five-year plan to increase their bilateral trade to $60 billion by 2015. And just last month, foreign ministers from both countries agreed to set up working groups on functional issues such as maritime search and rescue and establish a hotline between the two foreign ministries, in addition to starting talks over the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.

Even if it is smooth sailing now, there could be choppy waters ahead. Months of poor weather have held back fishermen and oil companies throughout the South China Sea. But when fishing and hydrocarbon exploration activities resume in the spring, incidents could increase. In addition, China's new approach has raised expectations that it must now meet -- for example, by negotiating a binding code of conduct to replace the 2002 declaration and continuing to refrain from unilateral actions.

Nevertheless, because the new approach reflects a strategic logic, it might endure, signaling a more significant Chinese foreign policy shift. As the 18th Party Congress draws near, Chinese leaders want a stable external environment, lest an international crisis upset the arrangements for this year's leadership turnover. And even after new party heads are selected, they will likely try to avoid international crises while consolidating their power and focusing on China's domestic challenges.

China's more moderate approach in the South China Sea provides further evidence that China will seek to avoid the type of confrontational policies that it had adopted toward the United States in 2010. When coupled with Xi's visit to Washington last month, it also suggests that the United States need not fear Beijing's reaction to its strategic pivot to Asia, which entails enhancing U.S. security relationships throughout the region. Instead, China is more likely to rely on conventional diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft than attempt a direct military response. Beijing is also unlikely to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the United States. Whether the new approach sticks in the long run, it at least demonstrates that China, when it wants to, can recalibrate its foreign policy. That is good news for stability in the region.

#### Most recent and qualified impact d

Allison & Blackwill 13 -- \*director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government AND \*\*Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert D., 2013, "Interview: Lee Kuan Yew on the Future of U.S.- China Relations," http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/)

Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore, one of Asia's most prominent public intellectuals, a member of the Fondation Chirac's honour committee

Competition between the United States and China is inevitable, but conflict is not. This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world. There will be a struggle for influence. I think it will be subdued because the Chinese need the United States, need U.S. markets, U.S. technology, need to have students going to the United States to study the ways and means of doing business so they can improve their lot. It will take them 10, 20, 30 years. If you quarrel with the United States and become bitter enemies, all that information and those technological capabilities will be cut off. The struggle between the two countries will be maintained at the level that allows them to still tap the United States. Unlike U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between the United States and a China that has enthusiastically embraced the market. Sino-American relations are both cooperative and competitive. Competition between them is inevitable, but conflict is not. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive. A stabilizing factor in their relationship is that each nation requires cooperation from and healthy competition with the other. The danger of a military conflict between China and the United States is low. Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so for the next few decades. They will modernize their forces not to challenge America but to be able, if necessary, to pressure Taiwan by a blockade or otherwise to destabilize the economy. China's military buildup delivers a strong message to the United States that China is serious about Taiwan. However, the Chinese do not want to clash with anyone -- at least not for the next 15 to 20 years. The Chinese are confident that in 30 years their military will essentially match in sophistication the U.S. military. In the long term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight.

### --2nc no impact to drones

#### Basic countermeasures solve—drones are only usable in permissive environments, creating a built in check to aggressive use

Michael W. Lewis 12, Associate Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Spring 2012, “ARTICLE: SYMPOSIUM: THE 2009 AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS: Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield,” Texas International Law Journal, p. lexis

Like any weapons system drones have significant limitations in what they can achieve. Drones are extremely vulnerable to any type of sophisticated air defense system. They are slow. Even the jet-powered Avenger recently purchased by the Air Force only has a top speed of around 460 miles per hour, n20 meaning that it cannot escape from any manned fighter aircraft, not even the outmoded 1970s-era fighters that are still used by a number of nations. n21 Not only are drones unable to escape manned fighter aircraft, they also cannot hope to successfully fight them. Their air-to-air weapons systems are not as sophisticated as those of manned fighter aircraft, n22 and in the dynamic environment of an air-to-air engagement, the drone operator could not hope to match the situational awareness n23 of the pilot of manned fighter aircraft. As a result, the outcome of any air-to-air engagement between drones and manned fighters is a foregone conclusion. Further, drones are not only vulnerable to manned fighter aircraft, they are also vulnerable to jamming. Remotely piloted aircraft are dependent upon a continuous signal from their operators to keep them flying, and this signal is vulnerable to disruption and jamming. n24 If drones were [\*299] perceived to be a serious threat to an advanced military, a serious investment in signal jamming or disruption technology could severely degrade drone operations if it did not defeat them entirely. n25

These twin vulnerabilities to manned aircraft and signal disruption could be mitigated with massive expenditures on drone development and signal delivery and encryption technology, n26 but these vulnerabilities could never be completely eliminated. Meanwhile, one of the principal advantages that drones provide - their low cost compared with manned aircraft n27 - would be swallowed up by any attempt to make these aircraft survivable against a sophisticated air defense system. As a result, drones will be limited, for the foreseeable future, n28 to use in "permissive" environments in which air defense systems are primitive n29 or non-existent. While it is possible to find (or create) such a permissive environment in an inter-state conflict, n30 permissive environments that will allow for drone use will most often be found in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations.

### --2nc norms fail

#### Even moderate norms fail—circumvention and prestige—subsumes “pressure”

McGinnis, senior professor – Northwestern Law, ‘10

(John O. 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 366)

It is hard to overstate the extent to which advances in robotics, which are driven by AI, are transforming the United States military. During the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, more and more Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) of different kinds were used. For example, in 2001, there were ten unmanned "Predators" in use, and at the end of 2007, there were 180. n42 Unmanned aircraft, which depend on substantial computational capacity, are an increasingly important part of our military and may prove to be the [\*374] majority of aircraft by 2020. n43 Even below the skies, robots perform im-portant tasks such as mine removal. n44 Already in development are robots that would wield lasers as a kind of special infantryman focused on killing snipers. n45 Others will act as paramedics. n46 It is not an exaggeration to predict that war twenty or twenty-five years from now may be fought predominantly by robots. The AI-driven battlefield gives rise to a different set of fears than those raised by the potential autonomy of AI. Here, the concern is that human malevolence will lead to these ever more capable machines wreaking ever more havoc and destruction. III. THE FUTILITY OF THE RELINQUISHMENT OF AI AND THE PROHIBITION OF BATTLEFIELD RO-BOTS Joy argues for "relinquishment"--i.e., the abandonment of technologies that can lead to strong AI. Those who are concerned about the use of AI technology on the battlefield would focus more specifically on weapons powered by AI. But whether the objective is relinquishment or the constraint of new weaponry, any such program must be translated into a specific set of legal prohibitions. These prohibitions, at least under current technology and current geopolitics, are certain to be ineffective. Thus, nations are unlikely to unilaterally relinquish the technology behind accelerating compu-tational power or the research to further accelerate that technology. Indeed, were the United States to relinquish such technology, the whole world would be the loser. The United States is both a flourishing commercial republic that benefits from global peace and prosperity, and the world's hegemon, capable of supplying the public goods of global peace and security. Because it gains a greater share of the prosperity that is afforded by peace than do other nations, it has incentives to shoulder the burdens to maintain a global peace that benefits not only the United States but the rest of the world. n47 By relinquishing the power of AI, the United States would in fact be giving greater incentives to rogue nations to develop it. Thus, the only realistic alternative to unilateral relinquishment would be a global agreement for relinquishment or regulation of AI-driven weaponry. But such an agreement would face the same insuperable obstacles nuclear disarma-ment has faced. As recent events with Iran and North Korea demonstrate, n48 it seems difficult if not impossible to per-suade rogue nations [\*375] to relinquish nuclear arms. Not only are these weapons a source of geopolitical strength and prestige for such nations, but verifying any prohibition on the preparation and production of these weapons is a task beyond the capability of international institutions. The verification problems are far greater with respect to the technologies relating to artificial intelligence. Relative-ly few technologies are involved in building a nuclear bomb, but arriving at strong artificial intelligence has many routes and still more that are likely to be discovered. Moreover, building a nuclear bomb requires substantial infrastruc-ture. n49 Artificial intelligence research can be done in a garage. Constructing a nuclear bomb requires very substantial resources beyond that of most groups other than nation-states. n50 Researching artificial intelligence is done by institu-tions no richer than colleges and perhaps would require even less substantial resources.

#### States construe justifications because they want drones

Alejandro Sueldo 12, J.D. candidate and Dean’s Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London of the University of London, 4/11/12, “The coming drone arms race,” <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=70B6B991-ECA7-4E5F-BE80-FD8F8A1B5E90>

Of particular concern are the legal and policy challenges posed if other states imitate the U.S. targeted killing program. For Washington is setting a precedent whereby states can send drones, often over sovereign borders, to kill foreigners or their own citizens, who are deemed threats.

Other states may also follow Washington’s example and develop their own criteria to define imminent threats and use drones to counter them.

Washington will find it increasingly difficult to protest other nations’ targeted killing programs — particularly when the United States has helped define this lethal practice. U.S. opposition will prove especially difficult when other states justify targeted killings as a matter of domestic affairs.

Should enough states follow the U.S. example, the practice of preemptively targeting and killing suspected threats may develop into customary international law.

Such a norm, however, which requires consistent state practice arising out of a sense of legal obligation, now looks unlikely. While targeted killing policies are arguably executed by states citing a legal obligation to protect themselves from imminent threats, widespread state practice is still uncommon.

But international law does not forbid drones. And given the lack of an international regime to control drones, state and non-state actors are free to determine their future use.

This lack of international consensus about how to control drones stems from a serious contradiction in incentives. Though drones pose grave challenges, they also offer states lethal and non-lethal capabilities that are of great appeal. Because the potential for drone technology is virtually limitless, states are now unwilling to control how drones evolve.

## 1nr

### Iran Sanctions Impacts

#### Impacts - Sanctions destroy Iran negotiations kills US cred and alliances – leads to US-Iran war and prolif

Nader, The Hill, ‘13

(Alirez “ Pause on additional Iran sanctions crucial to negotiations” 11-5-13 <http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/189371-pause-on-additional-iran-sanctions-crucial-to-negotiations> accessed: 11-15-13 mlb)

Iran has demonstrated a different tone and approach to nuclear negotiations since the June 14 election of Hassan Rouhani as president. Nothing concrete has emerged yet, but the U.S. negotiating team, headed by Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman, has described the last round of negotiations as positive and different from previous sessions with the Iranian team under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. ADVERTISEMENT Rouhani’s election and, more importantly, Iran’s dire economic condition are the reasons for Tehran’s new approach. Some have taken this to mean that more sanctions are needed. However, just because Tehran is seeking to ease the pressure brought on by the sanctions that exist today does not mean that it will yield to new sanctions tomorrow. Rouhani has a limited mandate to solve the nuclear crisis and lift sanctions. However, more radical elements of the Iranian political system, marginalized for now, are waiting for him to fail. They believe that the American government is either duplicitous or will be unable to deliver a deal. New sanctions would confirm their view and further their goals of ending negotiations and sidelining Rouhani. New sanctions passed before a true test of Iran’s intentions could result in a bleak future: a risky and costly war with Iran with no guarantee of success, or the acceptance of an increasingly embittered, isolated, repressive and nuclear capable Islamic Republic. The Iranian people have borne the brunt of sanctions, but it would be hard to argue that the Iranian regime has not felt the pressure as well. And it is this crucial portfolio that could determine his fate. He has the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard, without which he would not be able to negotiate or even run his government. But Khamenei and the Guard are under no illusion that negotiations are sure to succeed; nor are they willing to continue negotiations under humiliating conditions. Sanctions are a danger to their rule, but weakness in the face of pressure might be no less a threat. They must give Rouhani a chance because the Iranian people and key political constituents support negotiations. The viability of Rouhani’s platform of moderation and engagement with the West hangs in balance. Khamenei and hard-line Guard are willing to “test” America as much as the Obama administration is willing to “test” Tehran. New sanctions under consideration by Congress could lead to a weakening of the overall U.S. position. First, Rouhani could lose his mandate to continue negotiations. Second, Iran could begin to undermine the international coalition that has created the harshest peacetime sanctions in history. Rouhani, weakened at home but still respected abroad, could persuade major Iranian oil buyers such as China, India, Japan and even European that Iran attempted to negotiate in good faith but was rebuffed by the United States. Third, Iran could successfully cause a split between the group. China and Russia might believe that Congress wants regime change in Iran instead of a diplomatic solution. Germany, which has close business ties with Iran, could become unhappy about its economic sacrifices. And even the U.K. and France could begin to doubt U.S. intentions. Congress deserves credit for pressuring the Iranian regime, but it should pause the march toward new sanctions to give the negotiations a chance. Current sanctions against Iran are effective, and new sanctions can always be imposed if Iran does not budge. A smart approach toward Iran does not only entail creating pressure but using it correctly, and for the right goals.

#### Turns heg and cred

**Daremblum, Hudson Institute senior fellow, 11**

(Jaime, 10/25/11, “Iran Dangerous Now, Imagine it Nuclear,” Real Clear World, accessed 10/3/13, <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=8439>, kns)

What would it mean if such a regime went nuclear? Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that a nuclear-armed Iran would never use its atomic weapons or give them to terrorists. Even under that optimistic scenario, Tehran's acquisition of nukes would make the world an infinitely more dangerous place. For one thing, it would surely spark a wave of proliferation throughout the Greater Middle East, with the likes of Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia - all Sunni-majority Muslim countries - going nuclear to counter the threat posed by Shiite Persian Iran. For another, it would gravely weaken the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. After all, Washington has repeatedly said that the Islamic Republic will not be permitted to get nukes. If Tehran demonstrated that these warnings were utterly hollow, rival governments and rogue regimes would conclude that America is a paper tiger. Once Tehran obtained nuclear weapons, it would have the ultimate trump card, the ultimate protection against outside attack. Feeling secure behind their nuclear shield, the Iranians would almost certainly increase their support for global terrorism and anti-American dictatorships. They would no longer have to fear a U.S. or Israeli military strike. Much like nuclear-armed North Korea today, Iran would be able to flout international law with virtual impunity. If America sought to curb Iranian misbehavior through economic sanctions, Tehran might well respond by flexing its muscles in the Strait of Hormuz. As political scientist Caitlin Talmadge explained in a 2008 analysis, "Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz tops the list of global energy security nightmares. Roughly 90 percent of all Persian Gulf oil leaves the region on tankers that must pass through this narrow waterway opposite the Iranian coast, and land pipelines do not provide sufficient alternative export routes. Extended closure of the strait would remove roughly a quarter of the world's oil from the market, causing a supply shock of the type not seen since the glory days of OPEC." Think about that: The world's leading state sponsor of terrorism has the ability to paralyze destabilize the global economy, and, if not stopped, it may soon have nuclear weapons. As a nuclear-armed Iran steadily expanded its international terror network, the Western Hemisphere would likely witness a significant jump in terrorist activity. Tehran has established a strategic alliance with Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez, and it has also developed warm relations with Chávez acolytes in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua while pursuing new arrangements with Argentina as an additional beachhead in Latin America Three years ago, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Venezuelan government of "employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers." More recently, in July 2011, Peru's former military chief of staff, Gen. Francisco Contreras, told the Jerusalem Post that "Iranian organizations" are aiding and cooperating with other terrorist groups in South America. According to Israeli intelligence, the Islamic Republic has been getting uranium from both Venezuela and Bolivia. Remember: Tehran has engaged in this provocative behavior without nuclear weapons. Imagine how much more aggressive the Iranian dictatorship might be after crossing the nuclear Rubicon. It is an ideologically driven theocracy intent on spreading a radical Islamist revolution across the globe. As the Saudi plot demonstrates, no amount of conciliatory Western diplomacy can change the fundamental nature of a regime that is defined by anti-Western hatred and religious fanaticism.

#### Turns terror

Brookes, National security affairs senior fellow, 07

(Peter, 4-2-07, “Iran Emboldened: Tehran Seeks to Dominate Middle East Politics”, DOA: 10-10-13, <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2007/04/iran-emboldened-tehran-seeks-to-dominate-middle-east-politics>, llc)

According to the U.S. State Department, Iran continues to be the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. At the request of senior Iranian leadership, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command with funding, training and weapons. Hezbollah - a Lebanese Shiite terrorist group - is a particular favorite. In fact, Iran established Hezbollah to parry Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Tehran may fund Hezbollah to the tune of $100 million per year. Last summer, Tehran's military support for Hezbollah was evident. Iran likely gave Hezbollah the green light to ambush an Israeli patrol and kidnap soldiers, which ultimately kicked off the monthlong conflict. In the ensuing days, Hezbollah indiscriminately fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles into Israel. In addition, many were stunned when a C-802 cruise missile struck an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Lebanon. While the shooter was never identified, the Chinese C-802 is in Iran's inventory. It could have been fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC. Today, Hezbollah, with Iranian and Syrian support, is threatening to topple Lebanon's democratically elected government unless it is given additional cabinet seats - potentially giving it veto power over Beirut's decisions. Iran would love to add Lebanon to Syria as a client state in its effort to form an arc of Iranian influence across the region. Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S. and American interests, if necessary. This is likely not an idle threat. American blood is already on the hands of Iran and its terrorist proxies as a result of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks attack and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq today. It is almost without question that Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe - including in the U.S. - as leverage against American military action over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq. Perhaps the most frightening scenario is that Iran might transfer weapons of mass destruction capability to a terrorist ally. While this is risky behavior, it is a possibility. Iran could transfer nuclear capability to a Hezbollah-dominated government in Lebanon, or a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, significantly increasing the threat to Israeli security. Osama bin Laden has not been shy about his desire for WMD or al-Qaida's readiness to use them. The insurgency's recent use of chlorine gas in Iraq is evidence of a terrorist group's willingness to employ WMD.

#### Now is key - Lack of a deal ensures further Iranian proliferation, Israeli strikes, a Middle East war, and more sanctions won’t solve

**Davenport and Kimball,** Arms Control Association, **11-10**-13

(Kelsey and Daryl, “Closing in on a Deal with Iran: Assessing the Nov. 7-9 Talks,” accessed 11-12-13, <http://armscontrolnow.org/>)

**In the absence of a meaningful, realistic deal to limit Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will continue to increase its capacity to enrich uranium and expand its other sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle project. That**, in turn, **will increase the risk of Israeli military strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites. Such an attack would only delay, not stop, Iran’s nuclear pursuits, lead to a wider Middle East war, and likely push Iran’s leaders to openly seek the bomb.** In the absence of a negotiated “first phase” agreement to pause Iran’s nuclear program, **further sanctions against Iran** would surely be legislated, but they **would not halt or eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons potential**. **Now is the time to finally secure a meaningful agreement on the basis of realistic and achievable goals.**

**exinction**

**James Forest, 9/1/07**, Director of Terrorism Studies – U.S. Military Academy-West Point, “War is a No-Win Scenario,” The Futurist

A regional war in the Middle East would bring a variety of negative consequences for the United States. First, and most obvious, the global security environment would shift in a most unfavorable direction. The death and destruction would transcend geopolitical boundaries and possibly spill over into neighboring regions. The humanitarian crisis would overwhelm the unprepared regimes throughout the Middle East. Calls for intervention and relief could result in allies of the United States becoming involved. Meanwhile, the asymmetric nature of much of the fighting will offer new opportunities for many young, motivated men and women to acquire the skills of guerrilla warfare, making them attractive recruits for al-Qaeda and affiliate terrorist organizations. Wars bring an enabling environment for arms trafficking and other sorts of criminal activity, as well as human rights abuses--in some cases, even atrocities like genocide. It is also highly doubtful that, should such a war take place, the victors of the bloodshed will be inclined to establish the sort of liberal, open democratic societies that were fostered and nurtured in Europe and Asia following World War II. The impact of a regional war on the world's increasingly interdependent economy would go beyond the price we pay to heat our homes and fuel our cars, which will increase dramatically. (Of course, this could force more serious private and personal investment in alternative energy sources, which is not a bad thing.) Key shipping lanes, like the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Suez, will become hazardous for all types of commercial vessels. We have already witnessed how instability in the Middle East--punctuated by brief skirmishes like the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006--negatively affects global commodity prices, foreign exchange rates, and other facets of the global economy. A full-blown regional war would naturally exacerbate this.

### 2nc – PC key

#### Political capital is key – Obama’s mounting a full-court press on the Senate to forestall sanctions pressure from the Israel lobby

**Warner, 11/14/13** – chief foreign affairs correspondent for PBS (Margaret, “As negotiators ready for Iran talks, Obama asks Congress not to step up pressure” PBS News Hour,

<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec13/iran_11-14.html>)

GWEN IFILL: The behind-the-scenes struggle between the White House and Congress could drive the outcome of the Geneva talks.

Chief foreign affairs correspondent Margaret Warner says it's been quite a vigorous one.

Margaret, behind the scenes, it seem like what is the president is trying to do, as he was with health care today, is mollify the Democrats.

MARGARET WARNER: That is one of his main problems, Gwen. There's strong sentiment on the Hill to step up pressure on Iran during these talks.

And it's coming not just from Republicans, but from some leading Democrats, like Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Bob Menendez. The two scenarios are, they would either impose new sanctions, or, as Senator Bob Corker, Republican, wants to do, strip the president of his ability to waive even existing sanctions under existing law.

The administration says, if that happens, President Obama will have nothing left to deal on Geneva next week. His negotiators won't, because even the modest easing they're proposing, that they proposed last week, say, unblocking some funds that is Iranian money held in foreign accounts, he can't do if his hands are tied on the waivers. So that's why you saw a full-court press this week, Vice President Biden, Secretary Kerry up on the Hill in private briefings.

GWEN IFILL: And they were saying -- and they were saying we weren't -- sorry -- that we weren't lifting oil sanctions, we aren't lifting banking sanctions.

So what is driving the objections to even the potential of a deal?

MARGARET WARNER: I would say distrust on two fronts, distrust of Iran, given its long record of deception -- and there is such a record in negotiations -- and distrust of the administration, or a mistrust, that this administration is so eager for a deal, that it is ready to give away leverage.

And the final factor is definite pressure from Israel, from Prime Minister Netanyahu, from Israel's friends on the Hill and outside of the Hill to not head down the slippery slope of easing any sanctions until you get a deal that ends all, all Iranian enrichment.

#### Obama is pushing to delay new Iranian sanctions, but it will be a huge fight and Congress could scuttle a deal

**CBS News, 11/13/13** (“Obama administration seeks time from Congress for Iran diplomacy”

<http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57612230/obama-administration-seeks-time-from-congress-for-iran-diplomacy/>

The Obama administration is pleading with Congress to allow more time for diplomacy with Iran, but faces sharp resistance from Republican and Democratic lawmakers determined to further squeeze the Iranian economy and wary of yielding any ground in nuclear negotiations.

Back from a week of nuclear talks in Geneva and tense consultations with nervous Middle East allies, Secretary of State John Kerry arrived Wednesday on Capitol Hill to join Vice President Joe Biden in presenting the administration's case to their ex-colleagues in the Senate on Wednesday and ask them to hold off on a package of new, tougher Iran sanctions under consideration.

Kerry told reporters as he arrived for the briefing that new sanctions "could be viewed as bad faith by the people we are negotiating with. It could destroy the ability to be able to get an agreement. And it could actually wind up setting us back in dialogue that has taken 30 years to be able to achieve."

Still, Kerry added, "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed here."

"The fact is, you know, we didn't put sanctions in place for the sake of sanctions; we did it to be able to negotiate, and to negotiate a final agreement," he said. "What we have negotiated, we believe, is a very strong protocol which will restrict Iran's ability to be able to grow its program."

A House committee, meanwhile, held a hearing to vent its frustration with Kerry and an Obama administration they believe should adopt a far tougher line with Tehran.

"The Iranian regime hasn't paused its nuclear program," said Rep. Ed Royce, a Republican and the House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman. "Why should we pause our sanctions efforts as the administration is pressuring Congress to do?"

President Obama's disagreement with many if not most members of Congress concerns tactics, not substance: Each wants to stop Iran from reaching the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, and even hard-line hawks say they'd prefer diplomacy to U.S. military intervention. Almost everyone recognizes that Washington and its partners will have to offer some relief from the punitive measures that have crippled Iran's economy in exchange for concrete Iranian actions to roll back and dismantle elements of the nuclear program.

But the road map for achieving what has been a central U.S. foreign policy goal for more than a decade is hotly politicized, with fierce debate over the parameters and sequencing of any deal. The Obama administration has offered Iran an initial opportunity to recoup some of the billions of dollars in frozen overseas assets if it begins the process, while insisting that the most severe restrictions would remain in place until Tehran conclusively eliminates fears that it is trying to assemble an atomic arsenal. Some legislators worry Obama is moving too quickly.

Iran maintains that its uranium enrichment is for energy production and medical research, not for any covert military objective. But until the recent election of President Hassan Rouhani, it refused to compromise in talks with world powers.

Responding to Rouhani's promise of flexibility, Obama has staked significant international credibility on securing a diplomatic agreement. His telephone chat with Rouhani in September was the first direct conversation between U.S. and Iranian leaders in more than three decades. The unprecedented outreach has angered U.S. allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. And lawmakers are deeply skeptical.

"This is a decision to support diplomacy and a possible peaceful resolution to this issue," White House press secretary Jay Carney told reporters Tuesday. "The American people justifiably and understandably prefer a peaceful solution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and this agreement, if it's achieved, has the potential to do that. The American people do not want a march to war."

The administration sees itself on the cusp of a historic breakthrough, so much so that Obama hastily dispatched Kerry to Switzerland last week for the highest-level nuclear negotiations to date. The talks broke down as Iran demanded formal recognition of what it says is its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, and as France sought stricter limits on Iran's ability to make nuclear fuel and on its heavy water reactor to produce plutonium, according to diplomats.

Still, officials said significant progress was made. The U.S., Britain, China, France, Germany, Iran and Russia will send top nuclear negotiators back to Geneva next week to see whether they can push the ball forward.

And on Wednesday, Obama spoke by telephone with French President Francois Hollande. The two countries "are in full agreement" on Iran, the White House said in a statement.

However, the administration is worried Congress could make an agreement more difficult.

### 2nc – will pass wall

#### We control issue specific uniqueness and that distinction is relevant –

1. It’s a foreign policy agenda item – their evidence says Obama lacks PC for his domestic agenda.
2. Senate Democrats are the ones that PC matters for. Their evidence describes the reaction of House Democrats to the failed rollout of Obamacare.

#### Obama’s winning on Iran now – 1nc Gerstein says Obama is making a strong push in Congress and it will be sufficient to delay a Senate sanctions vote.

#### Effective use of political capital is key – Cockburn says success or failure depends on whether Obama invests all of his capital on the sanctions issue

#### That effort is successful in convincing Senate Democrats now – Obama’s personal credibility is reducing the influence of the lobby

**Dreyfus, 11/13/13** (Bob, The Nation, “Did the Israel Lobby Agree to Hold Off on New Iran Sanctions?”

<http://www.thenation.com/blog/177144/did-israel-lobby-agree-hold-new-iran-sanctions>

Today the leaders of the US negotiating team are on Capitol Hill, trying to dissuade senators from that sort of outright sabotage. Secretary of State John Kerry, along with Wendy Sherman, are meeting with members of the Senate Banking Committee and others to beg, plead and cajole the Capitol Hill busybodies, many of whom are strongly influenced by the Israel lobby and its chief arm, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. So far, it appears that the Democratic-controlled Senate, despite its AIPAC ties, is willing to go along with White House requests to avoid interfering in the talks. Reports The Wall Street Journal:

Proponents of tougher sanctions could seek avenues beside the Banking Committee to move a measure.… Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D., Nev.) is likely to oppose such a move, however. Mr. Reid on Tuesday warned against attempts to force “extraneous issues” into the debate over the defense bill.

Obama administration officials have been reaching out to a number of lawmakers in recent days to tamp down any momentum for new sanctions. Mr. Kerry has personally spoken with key senators while traveling in recent days, and was to speak to top Senate Democrats on Wednesday.

As for AIPAC itself, it issued a statement saying that it won’t accept any delays in sending a wrecking ball aimed at the talks. “AIPAC continues to support congressional action to adopt legislation to further strengthen sanctions, and there will absolutely be no pause, delay or moratorium in our efforts.”

The comment on “pause, delay or moratorium” follows an effort by the White House, which recently met with American Jewish organizations, to seek exactly that: a moratorium on new anti-Iran sanctions while the talks are underway. As the AP reported on October 29:

The White House has updated Jewish and pro-Israel groups about its talks with Iran amid concerns by some of the groups about the U.S. easing sanctions pressure on Iran over its nuclear program.

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the powerful pro-Israel lobbying group, attended the meeting along with the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

The White House’s National Security Council says senior officials told Jewish leaders that the U.S. will not let Iran obtain a nuclear weapon but wants to resolve the nuclear issue through diplomacy.

The Obama administration is asking Congress to hold off on new sanctions while it pursues diplomacy. But Israel and AIPAC are pressing the administration to retain harsh economic sanctions.

That’s tricky for AIPAC, and for Israel. Because if they defy the White House and push aggressively for new sanctions and fail, it will be a major, even unprecedented defeat for AIPAC—plus, it makes outright enemies of the Obama administration and the president himself. Scuttlebutt after the White House meeting suggested that the Jewish groups (AIPAC, the ADL and the AJC) had quietly agreed to allow the negotiations to unfold without the added interference of new sanctions.

Laura Rozen, reporting for Al-Monitor, penned a detailed report on the talks between the White House and the Jewish groups, at which Sherman was joined by Susan Rice, Obama’s national security adviser, and two top White House aides, Antony Blinken and Ben Rhodes.

Following the talks, there was conflicting information about whether or not the Jewish groups (which, collectively, make up the bosses of the Israel lobby) had agreed to a “pause” in their lobbying efforts. According to Haaretz, the liberal Israeli daily, the four groups did indeed agree to a moratorium:

Though they refrained from describing it as “a deal” or a quid pro quo, sources familiar with the meeting said they had agreed to a limited “grace period” only after hearing assurances from the Administration that it had no intention of easing sanctions or of releasing Iranian funds that have been “frozen” in banks around the world.

That was later denied by the same groups, according to The Jerusalem Post:

A report published in Haaretz on Friday claiming that US Jewish leaders have agreed to halt their lobbying efforts in support of a new sanctions bill against Iran has been roundly denied by their organizations.

“No one has given any commitment to make some public moratorium,” said sources with an organization represented at the meeting, “categorically denying” that any such commitment was given.

However, in an on-the-record interview with Haaretz, the ADL’s Abraham Foxman (who attended the White House gathering on October 29) confirmed the cease-fire:

ADL National Director Abe Foxman has confirmed that leaders of major Jewish organizations have agreed on a limited “time out” during which they will not push for stronger sanctions on Iran.

“That means that we are not lobbying for additional sanctions and we are not lobbying for less sanctions,” Foxman told Haaretz, as well as US media outlets.

Foxman was responding to a report in Haaretz on Friday that cited understandings reached among the leaders of four major Jewish organizations who participated in a Monday meeting at the White House with a group of senior White House officials led by National Security Adviser Susan Rice.

Foxman was specific, too:

Foxman made clear, however, that the hiatus is only tactical in nature. “We still believe that sanctions have worked and that additional sanctions would also work,” Foxman said, “but the Administration feels otherwise. They believe that further sanctions at this time would harm prospects for a diplomatic solution.”

“We didn’t change our positions and they didn’t change their positions. But we’re not going to be out there before the end of the next two meetings of the P5+1 with Iran.”

The risk for the Israel lobby is enormous. If it tries to wreck the talks and fails, because members of Congress—especially Democrats in the Senate—sanely agree to postpone a new round of sanctions, it will look powerless and ineffective. So it has to tread carefully, all while being pushed, hard, by Netanyahu and Co. in Israel.

According to Politico, Senate Democrats are willing to give the White House room to negotiate:

Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson (D-S.D.) said his panel will not draft new economic penalties toward Iran until the Senate has fully digested that briefing. Even then, Johnson said he will defer to his leadership and the White House to give him the green light. …

Two members of Democratic leadership, Sens. Patty Murray of Washington and Chuck Schumer of New York, both said they remain undecided on pursuing new sanctions and will continue to talk to top administration brass.

#### And Dreyfus creates an important framing issue – the Senate leadership is key, not the rank and file. If there were an actual vote, Obama would probably lose it. But pressure on the leadership in the Banking Committee is working so there won’t be a vote.

### AT: No PC / Health care thumper

#### The number of Democratic defections was extremely limited and won’t pressure Senate Democrats

**Sargent, 11/15/13** – writes the Plum Line blog for the Washington Post (Greg, “Dems leaders struggle to contain the damage”

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/11/15/dems-leaders-struggle-to-contain-the-damage/>

So the House of Representatives just passed GOP Rep. Fred Upton’s bill to fix Obamacare by gutting it, with 39 Democrats voting for the measure. That will lead to many stories claiming “dozens” of Dems defected, which is true. More Democrats voted for the Upton bill today than I would have liked.

However, the outcome actually appears to be somewhat better than Dem leaders expected. A senior House Democratic leadership aide tells me that leaders had calculated earlier today that as many as 70 House Dems could defect. That is supported by reports from last night claiming leaders feared “over 100″ Dems could support the measure.

The 39 votes is being widely portrayed as a big defection. But aides note that a similar number of House Dems — 35 — voted back in July with Republicans to delay the employer mandate. So today’s high stakes vote — right in the midst of a crush of bad Obamacare press that could not possibly have been worse — only got a few more Dems than a less consequential vote taken well before the serious problems started. Still, as noted above, the total of 39 Dems is significant, more than I would have liked to see.

Today, Dem leaders faced a problem: Because House Dems might think anything that passes the House would be DOA in the Senate, there would be no harm in a vote for the Upton bill. But leaders hoped to keep the vote down well below 50, and hopefully below 40, which would still be too high but might ensure less pressure on Senate Democratic leaders to hold a vote on something else, like the Mary Landrieu fix, the senior aide tells me.

“They know Reid is going to block it, so it’s a free vote for them,” the aide says of House Dems. “But if there were too many it would have put more pressure on Reid to act.”

#### Democrats are still mostly unified around Obama – tensions over health care are shallow

**Beutler, 11/15**/13 - Brian Beutler is Salon's political writer (“The right’s clueless gloating: Democratic civil war is only in their dreams” Salon, <http://www.salon.com/2013/11/15/the_rights_clueless_gloating_democratic_civil_war_is_only_in_their_dreams/>

That’s not to say everything’s fine now. But they’re off the ledge. The clarion calls from politically vulnerable Dems to do something, and do it fast, have subsided for the moment. And the hope is that in this window of relative repose the administration can get the website working, increase enrollment, and calm the public outcry.

At the same time it exposed the unctuousness of the right’s concern for people whose plans have been canceled. Republicans who have been demanding a comparable legislative fix are suddenly skeptical that this plan will work, and conservatives are torn between hoping Obama’s plan fails — that nobody gets their plans reinstated and continue to blame him for it — or that it works too well and damages the law in the longer run.

But the fix hasn’t taken the shine off the right’s schadenfreude party. If you were expecting conservatives to react to the Democrats’ mad scramble with anything less than unrestrained glee you … well, I guess you don’t understand the politics of Obamacare.

Everyone’s entitled to a little gloating, I guess. But I do think conservatives — who just last month spilled gallons of ink explaining why conservatism wasn’t in collapse — are engaging in a bit of premature celebration.

Obamacare has a real problem — an enrollment bottleneck created by Healthcare.gov’s failure — and the truth is the wave of cancellations wouldn’t have been easily brushed off even if the website had been working perfectly. Together they’ve driven some Democrats into conflict with one another.

But the conflict isn’t especially deep. Ask congressional Democrats whether they support Sen. Mary Landrieu’s bill to require insurance carriers to reinstate canceled policies, some will say no, some will say yes, some will have a different plan that they like better. Deep down they know that a ham-fisted solution shouldn’t become law, but they don’t feel like they can be caught supporting nothing either.

Ask them, by contrast, if they support the Affordable Care Act, or think it should be repealed, or regret their votes for it, or believe it can be fixed, or anything like that, and they’re unanimous.

You don’t have to squint very hard to notice that these divisions are about equal to but opposite the divisions within the Republican Party that resulted in a government shutdown last month. Every one of them agrees Obamacare is an excrescence that should be wiped off the books. But they had different ideas about how to respond to its imminent launch.

The difference is they chose the maximally self-destructive option. Maybe they wouldn’t have if they knew how badly the rollout would go. But that’s what they did. Conservative and moderate members openly attacked each other; grass-roots and establishment groups continue to do battle. Democrats, by contrast, haven’t followed their desperation into a burning furnace.

Not yet, anyhow.

We’ll know Democrats are warring with each other, or in full retreat from the law, when Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi can’t restrain rank-and-file members from forcing legislative sabotage on Obama. That hasn’t happened yet. Obama’s administrative fix staved it off for the time being. But the scenario’s not outside the realm of possibility if the relaunch isn’t smooth, and enrollments fail to reach escape velocity.

### 2nc war powers spillover link

#### Fiating a hostile Congress by unilaterally restricting war powers spills over to Iran negotiations

**Alterman, 9/4/13 –** holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and directs the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS in 2002, he served as a member of the Policy Planning staff at the US Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs. In addition to his policy work, he teaches Middle Eastern studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and George Washington University (Jon, “US-Iran Nuclear Deal Hinges On Syria Vote” http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/us-iran-nuclear-deal-hinges-on-syria-vote.html)

To start, it is worth noting the extent to which foreign governments are sophisticated consumers of American political information. Decades of international cable news broadcasts and newspaper websites have brought intimate details of US politics into global capitals. Foreign ministers in the Middle East and beyond are US news junkies, and they seem increasingly distrustful of their embassies. For key US allies, the foreign minister often seems to have made him- or herself the US desk officer. Most can have a quite sophisticated discussion on congressional politics and their impact on US foreign relations.

The Iranian government is no exception. While former president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad was emotional and shrill in his opposition to the United States, there remains in Iran a cadre of Western-trained technocrats, fluent in English and nuanced in their understanding of the world. President Hassan Rouhani has surrounded himself with such people, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has charged them with investigating a different relationship between Iran and the United States.

As they do so, they cannot help but be aware that on the eve of Rouhani’s inauguration, the US House of Representatives voted 400–20 to impose stiff additional sanctions on Iran. The House saw Rouhani’s electoral victory as a call for toughness, not potential compromise.

If Iran were to make concessions in a negotiation with the United States, they would surely seek sanctions relief and other actions requiring congressional approval. To make such concessions to Obama, they would need some confidence that he can deliver. A president who cannot bring around a hostile Congress is not a president with whom it is worth negotiating.

#### The plan sets a precedent against Obama’s independent war powers authority. The lack of a Syria vote created uncertainty over the scope – the plan sets clear limits on the boundaries of his authority, which would weaken his overall foreign policy stance

**Mataconis, 9/6/13** – DC attorney (Doug, “What Would Obama Do If Congress Says No On Syria?” <http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/what-would-obama-do-if-congress-says-no-on-syria/>)

To answer this question, we must examine what the President could do, what we think he would do, and, of course, what he should do, in the event he loses the vote.

The President is walking a tightrope here, obviously. If he were to come right out and say that he was inclined to strike regardless of what Congress said, then he would likely guarantee that he would end up losing the vote in the end simply because he annoyed Congress. At the same time, he can’t necessarily say that he would absolutely comply with Congress’s will, then he risks weakening his position on the foreign policy front and creating a precedent that could unduly bind future Presidents. Even Blinken’s statement is far more nuanced than most of the reports about it would have you believe. What Blinkin said was that it was not the President’s intention to act in defiance of Congressional will. That’s a far cry from saying that he would comply with that will. So, we’re left, somewhat intentionally, in an ambiguous world where we’re forced to speculate about how the President would react to the loss, and what that would mean for domestic politics and his relationship with Congress.

Legally, the situation here is also ambiguous. While many will be quick to draw an analogy between this Congressional vote and the vote in Parliament last week, after which British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that he would abide by the vote and that Britain would not be participating in an attack on Syria, that analogy fails. Unlike the American President, the powers when it comes to warmaking and the use of military force are far more constrained. By the terms of the Constitution, the President is Commander in Chief of America’s armed forces. The British Prime Minister does not hold a similar position. Instead, the C-in-C of British armed forces is, technically at least, Queen Elizabeth II. That authority, of course, has been vested in Parliament along with most other Royal powers, and Parliament further vests it in the Prime Minister and various other defense officials. If Parliament says that certain action cannot be taken, then the Prime Minister has to be consider him or herself bound by that decision or otherwise risk a vote of no confidence that results in their removal from office. The President’s authority, however, is far broader and over 200+ years of American history has been interpreted to permit him to commit American forces in a wide variety of circumstances. Whether those interpretations are correct is, of course, debatable, but the precedents do exist and Congress has done little to restrain such actions by previous Presidents (or, in the case of Libya, by this President.) Given all of this, a statement by President Obama that he would absolutely follow Congressional will in this matter would arguably constitute an historical rewriting of the relationship between the branches of government.

The fact that President Obama may be able to make a credible legal/historical case for acting without Congressional authority, though, is only half the equation. The other thing to consider if Congress votes down a Syria AUMF is what the political consequences would be if the President acted notwithstanding that result. Without question, it would further damage the relationship between the White House and the House and Senate GOP at a time when the Federal Government still has to deal with several immediate issues beyond Syria, such as the Fiscal Year 2014 Budget, and the impending Debt Ceiling vote. It would likely reinvigorate the Tea Party and other groups opposed to the President’s agenda. And, it would bring closer the point in his Second Term when President Obama would become a “lame duck.” It’s also likely that many House and Senate Democrats who opposed the AUMF would be upset at such a direct Presidential snub of Congressional prerogative. We might even see impeachment or censure proceedings in Congress. Candidates for 2014 and 2016 would be required to take a position on what the President did, and Washington would generally become even more of a mess than it already is. Given all of this, the political factors would seem to argue strongly that, if he loses the vote, the President should state that he will respect the vote while doing so in a manner that preserves traditional Presidential powers and reserving the right to return to the Syria issue if circumstances warrant. Any other option would seem to be political suicide.