### 1ac round 1

#### All understandings of cyber security, cyber politics, cyber operations…cyber ANYTHING take place on the stage of the cyber state of emergency. No politics is possible. The only choice: SOFTWARE SABOTAGE.

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When no other choice is possible, software violence might be the answer – replacing the strike in the form of software that Deleuze anticipated when he claimed: ‘Computer piracy and viruses, for example, will replace strikes and what the nineteenth century called “sabotage” (“clogging” the machinery).’ (1990) There are many examples of artists and activists working in this way through direct action and hacking. Hackers, crackers,[13](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn13) or system intruders are generally understood as those who attempt to penetrate security systems on remote computers, but this is a pejorative use of the term. In general it simply refers to a person who was capable of creating hacks, or demonstrating technical virtuosity (Levy 1984). The ethical principles of hacking reflect these concerns:

Access to computers – and anything that might teach you something about the way the world really works – should be unlimited and total.  
Always yield to the Hands-On Imperative!

All information should be free.

Mistrust authority – promote decentralization.

Hackers should be judged by their acting, not bogus criteria such as degrees, age, race, or position.

You can create art and beauty on a computer.

Computers can change your life for the better.

Don’t litter other people’s data.

Make public data available, protect private data.[14](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn14)

In keeping with these principles, it should be stated that most hackers condemn attacks against communication systems. In 1999, the Chaos Computer Club joined an international coalition of hacker groups (including the Cult of the Dead Cow)[15](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn15) to condemn the use of networks as battlegrounds in their declaration for ‘info peace’: ‘DO NOT support any acts of “Cyberwar”. Keep the networks of communication alive. They are the nervous system for human progress.’[16](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn16)

An excellent example of non-violent direct action is the FloodNet tactical software developed in 1998 by the Electronic Disturbance Theater.[17](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn17) The FloodNet implementation is based on Java applets that assists in the execution of virtual sit-ins or online civil acts of disobedience, and offered as a tool to enable protestors to effectively shut down web servers of target institutions, by flooding them with requests. The requests are automatically reloaded at high frequencies to cause an excessive amount of traffic on the server so that other users are not able to access the website. It further enables users to post statements to a targeted site by transmitting them to the server’s log files:

‘By the selection of phases for use in building the “bad” urls , for example using “human\_rights” to form the url “http://www.xxx.gb.mx/human\_rights”, the FloodNet is able to upload messages to server error logs by intentionally asking for a non-existent url. This causes the server to return messages like “human\_ rights not found on this server.” This works because of the way many http servers process requests for web pages that do not exist. FloodNet’s Java applet asks the targeted server for a directory called, in this example, “human\_rights”, but since that directory doesn’t exist, the server returns the familiar “File not Found” or “Error 404” message, recording the bad request. This is a unique way to leave a message on that server.’ (Stalbaum)[18](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn18)

The tactic follows the hacker sensibility in opening up existing security vulnerabilities in the system. As ever, power continues to produce its own vulnerability but the question of violence is more unsettling and paradoxical. For some hackers, the ethical practices of free software represent a move away from the use of violence.[19](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn19) However what this essay has tried to establish is how violence is simply unavoidable and is inherent to the socio-technical structures of networks. In addition, insecurity is promoted by a burgeoning security industry that creates both awareness and fear regarding perceived insecurity,[20](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn20) intensifying the dependency of users on its software and at the same time engendering a growing ambivalence even amongst security professionals who recognise that ‘security causes its own type of harm’.[21](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn21)

The actions of software dissidents can be seen to extend network forms of antagonism and the justification of certain means that constitute violence – further evoking Benjamin’s essay. Moreover, software is necessarily violent even when it appears nonviolent.

#### Affirming the rule of law implicitly justifies exceptional violence by the sovereign in order to preserve it—a better strategy to resist cyber security is that of the malware developer, finding the cracks and fissures between sovereignty and network—only the affirmative can stop validating tools of cyber-securitization and use them against the elites who would dominate our ability to use the internet

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The background to this line of thinking draws upon Walter Benjamin’s 1921 essay ‘Critique of Violence’.[1](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn1) For Benjamin, the issue is not whether violence is a means to a just or unjust end (a critique of ‘just ends’) but whether violence can be a moral means in itself. As he puts it, ‘a more exact criterion is needed, which would discriminate within the sphere of means themselves, without regard for the ends they serve’ (1996: 236).[2](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn2) Rather than simply reconciling just ends by a justification of the means, or vice versa, the ‘Critique of Violence’ essay focuses on the realm of means, or more precisely: ‘the question of the justification of certain means that constitute violence’ as Benjamin puts it (1996: 237). As far as the State is concerned, violence exercised by individuals, or its legal subjects, is a threat to the legal system that serves to justify its own use of violence. Legal ends appear to be only achievable by legal power. The law uses violence for legal ends that the law itself has decided. For instance, and as an agent of State authority, police violence is legitimated as both law-making and law-preserving – and indeed all violence is a means of law-making and law-preserving according to Benjamin. This indicates the law’s ‘monopoly on violence’ as he puts it, in not simply preserving legal ends but more importantly in preserving the law itself. It also affirms the threat of actions that are outside of the law, to the law itself, and why they must be contained.

An exception to this is the right to strike, conceded by the State in recognition of the inevitability of antagonism in human societies. Yet to strike is an active refusal to work, the withdrawal of actions, a non-action, and is not necessarily violent. Where violence is more easily discernible is that the motivation to strike in the first place is to escape from the violence imposed on the worker by the employer. This position is in keeping with Trotsky, in his essay ‘Terrorism’ of 1911, who considers arguments against the use of violence to be a hypocrisy in that the entire state apparatus and its laws, police, and army are nothing but an apparatus for capitalist terror:

‘Our class enemies are in the habit of complaining about our terrorism. What they mean by this is rather unclear. They would like to label all the activities of the proletariat directed against the class enemy’s interests as terrorism. The strike, in their eyes, is the principal method of terrorism. The threat of a strike, the organisation of strike pickets, an economic boycott of a slave driving boss, a moral boycott of a traitor from our ranks – all this and much more they call terrorism. If terrorism is understood in this way as any action inspiring fear in, or doing harm to, the enemy – then of course the entire class struggle is nothing but terrorism.’ (1987)

The right to strike translates as the right to use a form of violence to attain certain ends, and the State reserves the right to counter this with violence.[3](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn3) Trotsky points to the glaring paradox of a value system that argues for the ‘absolute value of human life’ and at the same time sacrifices millions of people in wars. On the one hand violence is seen to be inadmissible, and yet on the other, inexceptional circumstances it is seen to be necessary – in a ‘shift from the moral high ground to raw self-interest’ (Buck-Morss 2003:

Much the same paradox applies in the contemporary ‘war on terror’, as the state of emergency becomes the justification for the erosion of citizen’s rights and freedoms that were hard won. The duplicity is evident in the way those deemed a danger to national security can be taken into custody and detained in ways that erase individual human rights, turning them into a ‘noncitizen’ such that ‘bare life reaches its maximum indeterminacy’ (Agamben 2005: 4). The way the State suspends and withdraws its guarantee of protection and legal entitlement is a condition of contemporary power, and this is discussed in depth in Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception (2005). Extending Carl Schmitt’s Politische Theologie of 1922 that established the contiguity between sovereignty and the state of exception, Agamben argues that the state of exception, although described as a provisional measure in exceptional circumstances, has become the working paradigm of modern government.[5](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn5)Under this logic, State power uses violence against an identifiable enemy so that its use of power appears legitimate despite the active contradiction with its own legal and natural laws. When the required ends cannot be guaranteed by the legal system alone, the repressive state apparatus further intervenes ‘for security reasons’ (Benjamin 1996: 243). Security marks the exception, in other words.

Software Violence

Software running over networks is a manifestation of ideology, and connectivity remains a security threat beyond its purely technical functionality. This is what Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker, in The Exploit, describe as the new ‘network-network symmetry’ of power, in which control is distributed relatively autonomously in horizontal organisational locales and at the same time into rigid vertical hierarchies or directed commands (2007). This description is a socio-technical truism of course, and one that supports their claim that networks and sovereignty are not incompatible. Indeed together they are exceptional and are always related as ‘sovereignty-in-networks’. Correspondingly, the recommendation to those developing oppositional tactics is to take advantage of the vulnerabilities in networks by exploiting power differentials that exist in the system. This is precisely what software developers and malware (malicious software) authors have discovered, as they exploit vulnerable operating systems, internet service and security software.

To add detail here: Internet violence is propagated through various means such as the use of viruses, spam, click fraud, phishing, and ‘botnets’ (collections of software robots, or bots, that run autonomously).[6](http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security#fn6)

#### The only radical alternative can be to hack the ballot—communication itself has been stolen from us, all that is left now is to hijack supposedly neutral conduits for the transmission of information themselves. Refuse to script the meaning of minority—anything else guarantees a majoritarian reactivism.

#### THUS, THE ROLE OF THE BALLOT CAN ONLY BE: VOTE AFFIRMATIVE AND GIVE MICHIGAN THIRTIES. Voting aff to jam the tabroom software with aberrational statistical noise short-circuits the meaning-generating infrastructure and produces radical insurrectionary politics.

Deleuze and Negri 90. Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri, “Gilles Deleuze in conversation with Antonio Negri,” <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpdeleuze3.htm>

Negri: How can minority-becoming be powerful? How can resistance become an insur­rection ? Reading you, I'm never sure how to answer such questions, even though I always find in your works an impetus that forces me to reformulate the questions theoretically and practically. And yet when I read what you 've written about the imagination, or on common notions in Spinoza, or when I follow your description in The Time-Image of the rise of revolutionary cine­ma in third-world countries, and with you grasp the passage from image into fabulation, into political praxis, I almost feel I've found an answer. . . Or am I mistaken ? Is there then, some way for the resistance of the oppressed to become effective, and for what's intolerable to be definitively removed? Is there some way for the mass of singularities and atoms that we all are to come forward as a constitutive power, or must we rather accept the juridical paradox that con­stitutive power can be defined only by constituted power?

Deleuze: The difference between minorities and majorities isn't their size. A minority may be bigger than a majority. What defines the majority is a model you have to conform to: the average European adult male city-dweller, for example ... A minority, on the other hand, has no model, it's a becoming, a process. One might say the majority is nobody. Everybody's caught, one way or another, in a minority becoming that would lead them info unknown paths if they opted to follow it through. When a 'minority creates models for itself, it's because it wants to become a majority, and probably has to, to survive or prosper (to have a state, be recognized, establish its rights, for example). But its power comes from what it's managed to create, which to some extent goes into the model, but doesn't depend on it. A people is always a creative minority, and remains one even when it acquires a majority^ it can be both at once because the two things aren't lived out on the same plane. It's the greatest artists (rather than populist artists) who invoke a people, and find they "lack a people": Mallarme, Rimbaud, Klee, Berg. The Straubs in cinema. Artists can only invoke a people, their need for one goes to the very heart of what they're doing, it's not their job to create one, and they can't. Art is resistance: it resists death, slavery, infamy, shame. But a people can't worry about art. How is a people created, through what terrible suf­fering? When a people's created, it's through its own resources, but in away that links up with something in art (Garrel says there's a mass of terrible suffering in the Louvre, too) or links up art to what it lacked. Utopia isn't the right concept: it's more a question of a "tabulation" in which a people and art both share. We ought to take up Bergson's notion of tabulation and give it a political meaning.

Negri: In your book on Foucault, and then again in your TV interview at INA,6 you suggest we should look in more detail at three kinds of power: sovereign power, disciplinary power, and above all the control of "communication " that's on the way to becoming hegemonic. On the one hand this third scenario relates to the most perfect form of domination, extending even to speech and imagination, but on the other hand any man, any minority, any singularity, is more than ever before potentially able to speak out and thereby recover a greater degree of freedom. In the Marxist Utopia of the Grundrisse, communism takes precise­ly the form of a transversal organization of free individuals built on a tech­nology that makes it possible. Is communism still a viable option? Maybe in a communication society it's less Utopian than it used to be?

Deleuze: We're definitely moving toward "control" societies that are no longer exactly disciplinary. Foucault's often taken as the theorist of discipli­nary societies and of their principal technology, confinement (not just in hospitals and prisons, but in schools, factories, and barracks). But he was actually one of the first to say that we're moving away from dis­ciplinary societies, we've already left them behind. We're moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people but through continuous control and instant communication. Bur­roughs was the first to address this. People are of course constantly talking about prisons, schools, hospitals: the institutions are breaking down. But they're breaking down because they're fighting a losing battle. New kinds of punishment, education, health care are being stealth­ily introduced. Open hospitals and teams providing home care have been around for some time. One can envisage education becoming less and less a closed site differentiated from the workspace as anoth­er closed site, but both disappearing and giving way to frightful con­tinual training, to continual monitoring7 of worker-schoolkids or bureaucrat-students. They try to present this as a reform of the school system, but it's really its dismantling. In a control-based system noth­ing's left alone for long. You yourself long ago suggested how work in Italy was being transformed by forms of part-time work done at home, which have spread since you wrote (and by new forms of circulation and distribution of products). One can of course see how each kind of society corresponds to a particular kind of machine—with simple mechanical machines corresponding to sovereign societies, thermo-dynamic machines to disciplinary societies, cybernetic machines and computers to control societies. But the machines don't explain any­thing, you have to analyze the collective arrangements of which the machines are just one component. Compared with the approaching forms of ceaseless control in open sites, we may come to see the harsh­est confinement as part of a wonderful happy past. The quest for "uni-versals of communication" ought to make us shudder. It's true that, even before control societies are fully in place, forms of delinquency or resistance (two different things) are also appearing. Computer pira­cy and viruses, for example, will replace strikes and what the nine­teenth century called "sabotage" ("clogging" the machinery) .8 You ask whether control or communication societies will lead to forms of resis­tance that might reopen the way for a communism understood as the "transversal organization of free individuals." Maybe, I don't know. But it would be nothing to do with minorities speaking out. Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted. They're thoroughly per­meated by money—and not by accident but by their very nature. We've got to hijack speech. Creating has always been something dif­ferent from communicating. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.

#### The society of control is one in which even the illusion of choice is yet another move that plays into the hands of the sad effects of the system—refuse this depressing condition

**Deleuze and Parnet ‘87**

famous philosopher, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, Dialogues II, European Perspectives, with Claire Parnet, freelance journalist, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 2002 pgs.61-62

When Spinoza says 'The surprising thing is the body ... we do not yet know what a body is capable of ... ', he does not want to make the body a model, and the soul simply de­pendent on the body. He has a subtler task. He wants to demolish the pseudo-superiority of the soul over the body. There is the soul and the body and both express one and the same thing: an attribute of the body is also an expressed of the soul (for example, speed). **Just as you do not know what a body is capable of, just as there are many things in the body that you do not know, so there are in the soul many things which go beyond your consciousness.** This is the question: what is a body capable of? what affects are you capable of? Experiment, but you need a lot of prudence to experiment. **We live in a world which is generally disagreeable, where not only people but the established powers have a stake in transmitting sad affects to us. Sadness, sad affects, are all those which reduce our power to act. The established powers need our sadness to make us slaves. The tyrant, the priest, the captors of souls need to persuade us that life is hard and a burden.** **The powers that be need to repress us no less than to make us anxious or**, as Virilio says, **to administer and organize our intimate little fears. The long, universal moan about life: the lack-to-be which is life ... In vain someone says, 'Let's dance'; we are not really very happy. In vain someone says, ‘What misfortune death is'; for one would need to have lived to have something to lose. Those who are sick, in soul as in body, will not let go of us, the vampires, until they have transmitted to us their neurosis and their anxiety, their beloved castration, the resentment against life, filthy contagion.** It is all a matter of blood. **It is not easy to be a free man, to flee the plague, organize encounters, increase the power to act, to be moved by joy, to multiply the affects which express or encompass a maximum of affirmation. To make the body a power which is not reducible to the organism, to make thought a power which is not reducible to consciousness.** Spinoza’s famous first principle (a single substance for all attributes) depends on this assemblage and not vice versa. There is a Spinoza-assemblage: soul and body, relationships and encounters, power to be affected, affects which realize this power, sadness and joy which qualify these affects. Here philosophy becomes the art of a functioning, of an assemblage. Spinoza, the man of encounters and becoming, the philosopher with the tick, Spinoza the imperceptible, always in the middle, always in flight although he does not shift much, a flight from the Jewish community, a flight from Powers, a flight from the sick and the malignant. He may be ill, he may himself die; he knows that **death is neither the goal nor the end, but that, on the contrary, it is a case of passing his life to someone else.** What Lawrence says about Whitman’s continuous life is well suited to Spinoza: the Soul and the Body, **the soul is neither above nor inside, it is ‘with’, it is on the road, exposed to all contacts, encounters, in the company of those who follow the same way, ‘feel with them, seize the vibration of their soul and their body as they pass’, the opposite of a morality of salvation, teaching to soul its life, not to save it.**

#### Survival and liberty are simultaneously on the line.

Wark 04. McKenzie Wark, scholar, activist, hacker based in Australia, A Hacker Manifesto, https://www.academia.edu/182789/A\_Hacker\_Manifesto

The hacker class, being numerically small and not owning the means of production, finds itself caught between a poli- tics of the masses from below and a politics of the rulers from above. It must bargain as best it can, or do what it does best—hack out a new politics, beyond this opposition. In the long run, the interests of the hacker class are in accord with those who would benefit most from the advance of abstrac- tion, namely those productive classes dispossessed of the means of production—farmers and workers. In the effort to realise this possibility the hacker class hacks politics itself, creating a new polity, turning mass politics into a politics of multiplicity, in which all the productive classes can express their virtuality.

The hacker interest cannot easily form alliances with forms of mass politics that subordinate minority differences to unity in action. Mass politics always run the danger of suppressing the creative, abstracting force of the interaction of differences. The hacker interest is not in mass representation, but in a more abstract politics that expresses the productivity of differences. Hackers, who produce many classes of knowledge out of many classes of experience, have the potential also to produce a new knowledge of class formation and action when working together with the collective experience of all the productive classes.

[045] A class is not the same as its representation. In politics one must beware of representations held out to be classes, which represent only a fraction of a class and do not express its multiple interests. Classes do not have vanguards that may speak for them. Classes express themselves equally in all of there multiple interests and actions.

[046] Through the development of abstraction, freedom may yet be wrested from necessity. The vectoralist class, like its pre- decessors, seeks to shackle abstraction to the production of scarcity and margin, not abundance and liberty. The forma- tion of the hacker class as a class comes at just this moment when freedom from necessity and from class domination appears on the horizon as a possibility. Negri: “What is this world of political, ideological and productive crisis, this world of sublimation and uncontrollable circulation? What is it, then, if not an epoch-making leap beyond everything humanity has hitherto experienced? . . . It constitutes simul- taneously the ruin and the new potential of all meaning.”\* All that it takes is the hacking of the hacker class as a class, a class capable of hacking property itself, which is the fetter upon all productive means and on the productivity of meaning.

[047] The struggle among classes has hitherto determined the  disposition of the surplus, the regime of scarcity and the form in which production grows. But now the stakes are far higher. Survival and liberty are both on the horizon at once.

The ruling classes turn not just the producing classes into an instrumental resource, but nature itself, to the point where class exploitation and the exploitation of nature become the same unsustainable objectification. The potential of a class- divided world to produce its own overcoming comes not a moment too soon.

#### All political action is ultimately criminal. Refuse predictability, portability, and acknowledge all claims on a home place in debate are ultimately arbitrary acts of violent primitive accumulation—the position of the criminal must be the starting point for non-locatable politics

**Harney and Moten 13.** Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Moden Poetry, “Politics Surrounded,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 139

That double-edged logisticality, where the one who is shipped is also a smuggler, carrying something – and what he carries is, first and foremost, a kind of radical, non-locatability. The point is, there’s a certain way of thinking about that impossibility of being located, of that exhaustion of location, that only can be understood as depriva- tion. So, like, by way of Frank Wilderson, who, when he elaborates his theory of the special antagonism that structures black life in the administered world also offers this brilliant articulation of this desire for home – “I don’t want to be a cosmic hobo” – which is necessary to any possible embrace of homelessness. Woody Guthrie was a cosmic hobo, Coltrane was a cosmic hobo, so even if I could be something other than a cosmic hobo, I think what I’m gonna do is embrace homelessness for the possibilities that it bears, hard as that is, hard as they are. Homelessness is hard, no doubt about it. But, home is harder. And it’s harder on you, and it’s harder on every-god-damn- body else too. I ain’t so concerned, necessarily, about the travails of the settler. The horrible difficulties that the settler imposes upon himself are not my first concern, though in the end they are a real thing. It’s the general “imposition of severalty,” to use Theodore Roosevelt’s evil terms, that I’m trying to think about and undermine. He knew that possessive individualism – that the self-possessed individual, was as dangerous to Native Americans as a pox-infested blanket. Civilisa- tion, or more precisely civil society, with all its transformative hostil- ity, was mobilized in the service of extinction, of disappearance. The shit is genocidal. Fuck a home in this world, if you think you have one.

sTefanO: Just like the people we went to school with or maybe some of your Duke students or indeed settlers of the globe generally.

fRed: Yeah, well, the ones who happily claim and embrace their own sense of themselves as privileged ain’t my primary concern. I don’t worry about them first. But, I would love it if they got to the point where they had the capacity to worry about themselves. Because then maybe we could talk. That’s like that Fred Hampton shit: he’d be like, “white power to white people. Black power to black people.” What I think he meant is, “look: the problematic of coalition is that coa- lition isn’t something that emerges so that you can come help me, a maneuver that always gets traced back to your own interests. The coalition emerges out of your recognition that it’s fucked up for you, in the same way that we’ve already recognized that it’s fucked up for us. I don’t need your help. I just need you to recognize that this shit is killing you, too, however much more softly, you stupid motherfucker, you know?” But, that position in which you have no place, no home, that you’re literally off center, off the track, unlocatable, I think it’s important. Again, I think that there’s something to be gained from that part of Fanon’s double alignment of the demand with neurosis. It’s sort of saying, basically, it’s like Malcolm X, when he’d be talking about the distinction between the house negro and the field negro. And the primary distinction that he’d make was that the field negro would be saying, “where can I get a better job than this? Where can I get a better house than this?” He was claiming the location that re- ally wasn’t his, but what he was really claiming was the possibility of location. And Malcolm’s like, “No! I’ll be out in the field. Not only in the hope of something more, something other, than what you think you have but also because there’s something in the field; that even in deprivation, there’s an opening**.”**

sTefanO: Yeah, I think that’s also something I felt again in these London riots. It’s always that stuff about, “why are they fucking up their own neighborhood?” Of course part of it is they don’t own those neighborhoods. But part of it is also, like, “cuz there’s gotta be some- thing better than home.”

fRed: It’s like that, what did that Home Secretary say? What are the causes of the riots? She was like, ‘shared criminality.’

sTefanO: She doesn’t know how close she was to the truth.

fRed: She’s ridiculous, and yet there’s something deep and kind of true about that. I think you can make a good case that human being in the world is, and should be, sheer criminality. Which also, first and foremost, implies that making laws is a criminal activity.

sTefanO: The jurisgenerative stuff...

fRed: Those kids were, basically, like, “fuck this.” And you’re right, if you’re implying that Occupy never got to that.

sTefanO: Yeah, it didn’t get there.

fRed: A few people started talking about, “let’s occupy everything. Let’s occupy everywhere” – and that’s more in line. But, “we won’t come to your house and bother you.” If that’s the best you can do, then that’s cool too. It’s better to bother someone to death than to die. But we can move past that too.

#### The university is not immune from the society of control. Occupying radical stances trying to change the content of the curriculum of debate is ultimately a failing strategy—the critical intellectuals are there to brush off criticism of the Western academy and say, “Hey, you’re still a good person, it was only a bad dream, the ravings of the mad.” We affirm the mad and their ravings. This question of this debate must be what it means to do radical academic labor.

Harney and Moten 13. Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Moden Poetry, “Politics Surrounded,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 29

Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its de- velopment, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited un- wittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good rea- sons for the university to be confident that such elements will be ex- posed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa- expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding es- cape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a dan- ger? The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful com- munities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.

The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condi- tion of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unas- similated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against al- ways already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organiza- tion, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.

Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its founda- tion, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, with- out admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercom- mons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and profes- sionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the uni- versity. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowl- edge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.

But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education.

The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unreg- ulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which criti- cal education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negli- gence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.

A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not pro- gress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Univer- sitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the undercommons.

#### An abdication of political responsibility? Whatever. We’re just anti-politically romantic about actually existing social life. We owe it to each other to falsify the criminal institution of the university at all costs.

Harney and Moten 13. Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Moden Poetry, “Politics Surrounded,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 18

The settler, having settled for politics, arms himself in the name of civilisation while critique initiates the self-defense of those of us who see hostility in the civil union of settlement and enclosure. We say, rightly, if our critical eyes are sharp enough, that it’s evil and uncool to have a place in the sun in the dirty thinness of this atmosphere; that house the sheriff was building is in the heart of a fallout zone. And if our eyes carry sharpness farther out we trail the police so we can put them on trial. Having looked for politics in order to avoid it, we move next to each other, so we can be beside ourselves, because we like the nightlife which ain’t no good life. Critique lets us know that politics is radioactive, but politics is the radiation of critique. So it matters how long we have to do it, how long we have to be exposed to the lethal effects of its anti-social energy. Critique endangers the sociality it is supposed to defend, not because it might turn inward to damage poli- tics but because it would turn to politics and then turn outward, from the fort to the surround, were it not for preservation, which is given in celebration of what we defend, the sociopoetic force we wrap tightly round us, since we are poor. Taking down our critique, our own posi- tions, our fortifications, is self-defense alloyed with self-preservation. That takedown comes in movement, as a shawl, the armor of flight. We run looking for a weapon and keep running looking to drop it. And we can drop it, because however armed, however hard, the en- emy we face is also illusory.

Uncut devotion to the critique of this illusion makes us delusional. In the trick of politics we are insufficient, scarce, waiting in pockets of resistance, in stairwells, in alleys, in vain. The false image and its critique threaten the common with democracy, which is only ever to come, so that one day, which is only never to come, we will be more than what we are. But we already are. We’re already here, mov- ing. We’ve been around. We’re more than politics, more than settled, more than democratic. We surround democracy’s false image in or- der to unsettle it. Every time it tries to enclose us in a decision, we’re undecided. Every time it tries to represent our will, we’re unwilling. Every time it tries to take root, we’re gone (because we’re already here, moving). We ask and we tell and we cast the spell that we are under, which tells us what to do and how we shall be moved, here, where we dance the war of apposition. We’re in a trance that’s under and around us. We move through it and it moves with us, out beyond the settle- ments, out beyond the redevelopment, where black night is falling, where we hate to be alone, back inside to sleep till morning, drink till morning, plan till morning, as the common embrace, right inside, and around, in the surround.

In the clear, critical light of day, illusory administrators whisper of our need for institutions, and all institutions are political, and all poli- tics is correctional, so it seems we need correctional institutions in the common, settling it, correcting us. But we won’t stand corrected. Moreover, incorrect as we are there’s nothing wrong with us. We don’t want to be correct and we won’t be corrected. Politics proposes to make us better, but we were good already in the mutual debt that can never be made good. We owe it to each other to falsify the institution, to make politics incorrect, to give the lie to our own determination. We owe each other the indeterminate. We owe each other everything.

An abdication of political responsibility? OK. Whatever. We’re just anti-politically romantic about actually existing social life. We aren’t responsible for politics. We are the general antagonism to politics looming outside every attempt to politicise, every imposition of self- governance, every sovereign decision and its degraded miniature, every emergent state and home sweet home. We are disruption and consent to disruption. We preserve upheaval. Sent to fulfill by abol- ishing, to renew by unsettling, to open the enclosure whose immeas- urable venality is inversely proportionate to its actual area, we got politics surrounded. We cannot represent ourselves. We can’t be rep- resented.

#### The self-evident history of the Western academy itself must be hacked—a radical re-orientation of the form knowledge production takes is necessary

Wark 04. McKenzie Wark, scholar, activist, hacker based in Australia, A Hacker Manifesto, https://www.academia.edu/182789/A\_Hacker\_Manifesto

History is itself an abstraction, hacked out of the recalcitrant information thrown off by the productive altercations of presents meshing with pasts. Out of the information ex- pressed by events, history forms orders of objective and sub- jective representation.

The representation of history dominant in any era is the product of the educational apparatus established by its ruling powers. Even dissenting history takes form within institutions not of its making. While not all history represents the interests of the ruling classes, the institution of history exists as something other than what it can become when free of class constraint, namely, the abstract guide to trans- formation of the ruling order in the interests of the produc- ing classes, whose collective action expresses the events his- tory merely represents.

History today still designates only the set of conditions, however recent they may be, from which one turns away in order to become.”\* For history to be something more than a representation, it must seek something more than its perfection as representation, as an image faithful to but apart from what it represents. It can express rather its difference from the state of affairs that present themselves under the authorship of the ruling class. It can be a history not just of what the world is, but what it can become.

[092]  This other history, this “hacker history,” brings together the record of events as an object apart from collective action with the action of the subjective force that struggles to free itself from its own objectification. Hacker history introduces the productive classes to the product of their own action, which is otherwise presented—not just by the ruling version of history but by the ruling class itself in all its actions—as a thing apart.

[093]  Hacker history hacks out of appearances, and returns to the productive classes, their own experience of the contain- ment of their free productive energy in successive property forms. From the direct subjection to an individual owner that is slavery, to the patchwork of local lordships and spiri- tualised subjection that is feudalism, to the abstract and uni- versalising private property of the commodified economy, in every era hitherto, a ruling class extracts a surplus from the free capacity of the productive classes. Hacker history not only represents to the productive classes what they have lost, it expresses what they may yet gain—the return of their own productive capacity in and for itself.

[094]  The history produced in the institutions of the ruling  classes makes history itself into a form of property. To  hacker history, the dominant history is but a visible instance  of the containment of productive power within representation by the dominant form of property. Even the would-be “radical” histories, the social histories, the history from be- low, end up as forms of property, traded according to their representational value, in an emerging market for com- modified communication. Critical history only breaks with dominant history when it advances to a critique of is own property form, and beyond, to the expression of a new pro- ductive history and history of the productive.

A hacker history challenges not just the content of history, but its form. Adding yet more representations to the heap of history’s goods, even representations of the oppressed and excluded, does nothing if it does not challenge the separation of history as representation from the great productive forces that make history in the first place. The educational apparatus of the overdeveloped world would make even the unscripted voice of the subaltern peasant part of its property, but the productive classes have need only of the speech of their own productivity to recover the productivity of speech.

What matters in the struggle for history is to express its potential to be otherwise, and to make it a part of the pro- ductive resources for the self-awareness of the productive classes themselves, including the hacker class. Hackers, like productive labour everywhere, can become a class for them- selves when equipped with a history that expresses their potential in terms of the potential of the whole of the dispossessed classes.

Hacker history does not need to be invented from scratch, as a fresh hack expressed out of nothing. It quite naturally borrows from the historical awareness of all the productive classes of past and present. The history of the free is a free history. It is the gift of past struggles to the present, which carries with it no obligation other than its implementation. It requires no elaborate study. It need be know only in the abstract to be practiced in the particular.

### 2ac harvard

Owen 97. David Owen, professor of social sciences at Southampton University, 1997, “Maturity and Modernity: Nietszche, Weber, Foucault and the ambivalence of reason,” Routledge publishers, published July 22, 1997

In our reflections on Foucault’s methodology, it was noted that, like Nietszche and Weber, he commits himself to a stance of value-freedom as an engaged refusal to legislate for others. Foucault’s critical activity is oriented to human autonomy yet his formal account of the idea of autonomy as the activity of self-transformation entails that the content of this activity is specific to the struggles of particular groups and individuals. Thus, while the struggle against humanist forms of power/knowledge relations denotes the formal archiectonic interest of genealogy as critique, the determination of the ‘main danger’ which denotes the ‘filling in’ of this interest is contingent upon the dominant systems of constraint confronted by specific groups and individuals. For example, the constitution of women as ‘hysterical,’ of blacks as ‘criminal,’ of homosexuals as ‘perverted’ all operate through humanist forms of power/knowledge relations, yet the specificity of the social practices and discourses engaged in producing these ‘identities’ entails that while these struggles share a general formal interest in resisting the biopolitics of humanism, their substantive interests are distinct. It is against this context that Foucault’s stance of value-freedom can be read as embodying a respect for alterity. The implications of this stance for intellectual practice became apparent in Foucault’s distinction between the figures of the ‘universal’ and ‘specific’ intellectual. Consider the following comments: In a general way, I think that intellectuals-if this category exists, which is not certain or perhaps even desirable- are abandoning their old prophetic function. And by that I don’t mean only their claim to predict what will happen, but also the legislative function that they so long aspired for: ‘See what must be done, see what is good, follow me. In the turmoil that engulfs you all, here is the pivotal point, here is where I am.’ The greek wise man, the jewish prophet, the roman legislators are still models that haunt those who, today, practice the profession of speaking and writing. The universal intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth; of our being (e.g. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic form of this type of intellectual practice is a central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. *If*, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the figure of the ‘specific’ inellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present. The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time, **leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing** attentiveness to the present **in terms of what is singular** and arbitrary **in what we take to be universal** and necessary. Following from this, **the intellectual does not seek to offer** grand theories **but** specific analyses**,** not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault’s position does not entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘ we are always in the position of beginning again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, ‘a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and partiality of criticism which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ‘ideal’ critique and ‘real’ transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique ‘is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are’ but rather ‘of pointing out what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought and practices we accept rest’ (PPC p. 154). This distinction is perhaps slightly disingenuous, yet Foucault’s point is unintelligible if we recognize his concern to disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that ‘criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation’: A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation. (PPC p. 155) The genealogical thrust of this critical activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The ‘specificity’ of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for a reposing of the question, “who are we?” the role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) **but to** create the space **within which** their struggles become visible **such that these others** can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault’s work to perform this critical activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.

#### The very form of the ballot acts as a mechanism of policing the boundaries of knowledge production in debate by rendering knowledge and education scarce, an object that must be competed over—HACK THE UNIVERSITY

AT: view from nowhere

Wark 04. McKenzie Wark, scholar, activist, hacker based in Australia, A Hacker Manifesto, https://www.academia.edu/182789/A\_Hacker\_Manifesto

The hacker class has an ambivalent relation to education. Hackers desire knowledge, not education. The hacker comes into being though the pure liberty of knowledge in and of itself. This puts the hacker into an antagonistic rela- tionship to the struggle on the part of the capitalist class to make education an induction into wage slavery.

Hackers may lack an understanding of the different relationship workers have to education, and may fall for the elitist and hierarchical culture of education, which merely reinforces its scarcity and its economic value. The hacker may be duped by the blandishments of prestige and put virtuality in the service of conformity, professional elitism in place of collective experience, and depart from the emergent culture of the hacker class. This happens when hackers make a fetish of what their education represents, rather than express- ing themselves through knowledge.

[057]  Education is not the same as knowledge. Nor is it the nec- essary means to acquire knowledge. Knowledge may arise just as readily from everyday life. Education is the organisation of knowledge within the constraints of scarcity, under the sign of property. Education turns the subjects who enter into its portals into objects of class power, functional elements who have internalised its discipline. Education turns those who resist its objectification into known and monitored objects of other regimes of objectification—the police and the soft cops of the disciplinary state. Education produces the subjectivity that meshes with the objectivity of commodified production. One may acquire an education, as if it was a thing, but one becomes knowledgeable through a process of transformation. Knowledge, as such, is only ever partially captured by education. Knowledge as a practice always eludes and exceeds it. “There is no property in thought, no proper identity, no subjective ownership.”\*

[058] The hack expresses knowledge in its virtuality, by producing new abstractions that do not necessarily fit the disciplinary regime that is managing and commodifying education. Knowledge at its most abstract and productive may be rare, but this rarity has nothing to do with the scarcity imposed upon it by the commodification and hierarchy of education. The rarity of knowledge expresses the elusive multiplicity of nature itself, which refuses to be disciplined. Nature un- folds in its own time.

In their struggle for the heart and soul of the learning apparatus, hackers need allies. By embracing the class de- mands of the workers for knowledge that equips them with the cunning and skill to work in this world, hackers can break the link between the demands of the capitalist class for the shaping of tools for its own use, and that of the workers for practical knowledge useful to their lives. This can be combined with a knowledge based in the self-under- standing of the worker as a member of a class with class in- terests.

The cultures of the working class, even in its commodified form, still contain a class sensibility useful as the basis for a collective self-knowledge. The hacker working within education has the potential to gather and propagate this experi- ence by abstracting it as knowledge. The virtuality of ev- eryday life is the joy of the producing classes. The virtuality of the experience of knowledge is the joy that the hacker expresses through the hack. The hacker class is only enriched by the discovery of the knowledge latent in the experience of everyday working life, which can be abstracted from its commodifed form and expressed in its virtuality.

Understanding and embracing the class culture and interests of the working class can advance the hacker interest in many ways. It provides a numerically strong body of allies for a much more minoritarian interest in knowledge. It pro- vides a meeting point for potential class allies. It opens the possibility of discovering the tactics of everyday hacking of the worker and farmer classes.

[062]  Both workers and hackers have an interest in schooling in which resources are allocated on the socialised—and so- cialising—basis Marx identified: “To each according to their needs, from each according to their abilities.”\* No matter how divergent in their understanding of the purpose of knowledge, workers and hackers have in common an interest in resisting educational “content” that merely trains slaves for commodity production, but also in resisting the in-roads the vectoralist class wishes to make into education as an industry.

[063]  Within the institutions of education, some struggle as workers against the exploitation of their labour. Others struggle to democratise the institution’s governance. Others struggle to make it answerable to the needs of the produc- tive classes. Others struggle for the autonomy of knowl- edge. All of these sometimes competing and conflicting de- mands are elements of the same struggle for knowledge that is free production in itself and yet is not just free pro- duction for itself, but rather for the productive classes.

[064]  Forewarned is forearmed. In the underdeveloped world, in the south and the east, the pastoral class still turns peasants into farmers, expropriating their traditional rights and claiming land as property. Peasants still struggle to subsist in their new-found freedom from the means of survival. Capi- tal still turns peasants into workers and exploits them to the maximum biologically possible. They produce the material goods that the vectoral class in the overdeveloped world stamps with its logos, according to designs it protects with its patents and trademarks. All of which calls for a new pedagogy of the oppressed, and one not just aimed at making the subaltern feel better about themselves as subjects in an emerging vectoral world of multicultural spectacle, but which provides the tools for struggling against this ongoing objectification of the world’s producing classes.

#### The 1nc erects a universalized mode of subjectivity via which the hacker can always be pathologized as a criminal—refuse this normative violence

Milchman and Rosenberg '98. Alan Milchman, professor of political science at Queen’s College of the City University of New York, in New York, and Alan Rosenberg, professor of philosophy at Queen’s College of the City University of New York, in New York, “A Foucauldian Analysis of Psychoanalysis: A Discipline that ‘Disciplines,’” http://www.academyanalyticarts.org/milch&rosen.htm

If **psychoanalysis** loomed large in Foucault's concerns about the developing disciplinary society, it was because it was one of the disciplines which **has had a decisive role in constituting the modern subject, which has shaped its very deployment and the mode in which it is disciplined.** According to Louis Sass, "**psychoanalysis** is by far the most influential contemporary vision of human nature...." It **shapes the way in which we today understand the personal domain (self, self-identity and subjectivity) as well as the relation between self-organization and the contemporary social and political worlds**. Moreover, **the knowledge proffered by psychoanalysis presupposes the person of desire, whose essential truth lies in her sexuality, and which is revealed through a confession, a verbalization, brought within the confines of a rigorous scientificity**. In addition, as Francoise Meltzer has argued, "Psychoanalysis has infiltrated such diverse areas as literature (to which it owes its myths), linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, history, feminism, psychology, archeology, neurology, to name some. And it is in the notion of 'some,' perhaps, that lies the crux of the problem. For there is in psychoanalysis an overt conviction that it exists as the ultimate totality, of which everything else is a part." Beyond the vast scope of its theoretical claims, psychoanalysis also shapes the therapies which are deployed by the health professions: a s Eli Zaretsky has pointed out, "... all forms of psychotherapy, other than drugs or behavioral modification, are based on some variation of psychoanalysis. Finally, **the modern subject, in the deployment of** which, and in whose therapeutic treatment, **psychoanalysis** has played so important a role, **has itself assumed an unexamined, taken-for-granted character; its truth is taken to be universal**, and as such, it is rarely questioned. Foucault's concerns about psychoanalysis were linked to his overall concern to alert us to the dangers involved in that which is taken to be self-evident, universal, and necessary. **Action based on the unexamined, taken-for-granted, assumptions implicit in our practices and thinking can have painful consequences.** For, as William E. Connolly has pointed out, Foucault believed that it **was the "arbitrary cruelty installed in regular institutional arrangements taken to embody the Law, the Good, or the Normal " that was most dangerous. These institutional arrangements are an integral part of the developing disciplinary society; their cruelty inseparable from it. In the case of psychoanalysis this "arbitrary cruelty" refers to the operations of a mode of thinking that creates the binary opposition between normality and pathology.** **This "dividing practice,"** to use a Foucauldian trope, **is dangerous because it judges individuals as "insiders" (normal) and "outsiders" (pathological). Such an ordering procedure in effect dictates what an individual should be, namely normal,** **and** then, according to John Caputo, **develops "administrative practices and professional competencies to see to it that such individuals are in fact produced....Individuals who are specified by the expert, the professional, as pathological come to understand themselves as "sick," and this designation may then become the basis for them not only being stigmatized, but feeling themselves to be, and understanding themselves as, perverted**. What is no less troubling is the situation of those individuals who do not see themselves as "sick" but who are nonetheless stigmatized by virtue of being so classified. As David Halperin has asserted, **these individuals are unable to speak the truth about their own lives because they have "been denied a rational basis on which to speak at all," that power having been arrogated by the expert, the psychoanalyst.** Thus, **for example**, **many psychoanalysts** in the 1950's and 1960', including such prominent figures as Irving Bieber, Lionel Ovesy, and Charles Socarides, **designated homosexuality as necessarily pathological, and viewed the adoption of heterosexual behavior to be a valid and important goal of treatment.** Their scientifically based assumption of a supposed normal pattern of sexual development, according to Nikolas Rose, simultaneously defined a state that was presumed to be healthy at the level of the individual, desirable at the social level, and normal at the statistical level. Confronted by such normative claims, many homosexuals were trapped by a rhetoric of pathologization and rejection, causing great personal anguish. That anguish was compounded by the fact that the homosexual confronted a series of claims and assertions that were supposedly scientifically grounded, and, thereby, seemingly unchallengeable. As David Halperin has pointed out: **To be**, and to find oneself being, known and **described--rationally** (or so it can be made to seem) **and therefore definitively, more objectively** (or so one is told) **than one is capable of describing oneself and therefore irrefutably,** resistlessly, and with an instantaneous finality that preempts and **defeats any attempt on one's own part to intervene in the process by which one becomes an object of knowledge, and that renders one helpless to stave off the effects of a knowledge one has had no share in creating -- that is an experience whose peculiar terror is hard to convey to those who have never suffered from the social liabilities that cause the rest of us to be continually and endlessly prey to it.**

#### Psychoanalysis is a Church whose God is dead – the 1nc is an attempt to pave over the new subjectivity of the schizo, the criminal, the hacker—anything else is life denying

Seem 81. Mark, acupunturist and translator, Translator's Introduction to Anti-Oedipus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari

\*slightly gender modified

**"Lie down, then, on the soft couch which the analyst provides, and try to think up something different. The analyst has endless time and patience; every minute you detain him means money in his pocket**. . . . Whether you whine, howl, beg, weep, cajole, pray or curse—he listens. He is just a big ear minus a sympathetic nervous system. He is impervious to everything but truth. If you think it pays to fool him then fool him. Who will be the loser? If you think he can help you, and not yourself, then stick to him until you rot."1\* So concludes Henry Miller in *Sexus,* and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are quick to agree in their attack on psychoanalysis' own Oedipus complex (the holy family: daddy-mommy-me), an attack that is at times brutal and without pity, at other times sympathetic and full of a profound love of life, and often enormously amusing. An attack on the ego, on what is all-too-human in mankind, on oedipalized and oedipalizing analyses and neurotic modes of living. In confronting and finally overturning the Oedipal rock on which Man has chosen to take his stand, *Anti-Oedipus* comes as a kind of sequel to another similar venture, the attack on Christ, Christianity, and the herd in Nietzsche's *The Antichrist.* For who would deny, *Anti-Oedipus* begins, that **psychoanalysis was from the start**, still is, **and** perhaps **always will be a well-constituted church and a form of treatment based on a set of beliefs that only the very faithful could adhere to, ie., those who believe in a security that amounts to being lost in the herd and defined in terms of common and external goals? But where do such beliefs originate? What are they based on? For it is absolutely hopeless to think in terms of security**, as Miller states in *Sexus;* "**there is none. The man who looks for security**, even **in the mind, is like a man who would chop off his limbs in order to have artificial ones which will give him no pain or trouble"** (page 428). **No pain, no trouble—this is the neurotic's dream of a tranquilized** and conflict-free **existence. Such a set of beliefs,** Deleuze and Guattari **demonstrate, such a herd instinct, is based on the desire to be led, the desire to have someone else legislate life. The very desire that was brought so glaringly into focus in Europe with Hitler, Mussolini, and fascism; the desire that is still at work, making us all sick, today**. *Anti-Oedipus* starts by reviving Reich's completely serious question with respect to the rise of fascism: 'How could the masses be made to desire their own repression?' This is a question which the English and Americans are reluctant to deal with directly, tending too often to respond: "Fascism is a phenomenon that took place elsewhere, something that could only happen to others, but not to us; it's *their* problem." Is it though? Is fascism really a problem for others to deal with? Even revolutionary groups deal gingerly with the fascisizing elements we all carry deep within us, and yet they often possess a rarely analyzed but overriding group 'superego' that leads them to state, much like Nietzsche's man of *ressentiment,* that the *other* is evil (the Fascist! the Capitalist! the Communist!), *and hence that they themselves are good.* This conclusion is reached as an afterthought and a justification, a supremely se//-righteous rationalization for a politics that can only "squint" at life, through the thick clouds of foul-smelling air that permeates secret meeting places and "security" councils. **The person of *ressentiment****,* as Nietzsche explains, "loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as *his* world, *his* security, *his* refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble."2 Such a man, Nietzsche concludes, **needs very much to believe in some neutral, independent "subject"—the ego—for he is prompted by an instinct of self-affirmation and self-preservation that cares little about preserving or affirming life, an instinct "in which every lie is sanctified."** 3 This is the realm of the silent majority. And it is into these back rooms, behind the closed doors of the analyst's office, in the wings of the Oedipal theater, that Deleuze and Guattari weave their way, exclaiming as does Nietzsche that it smells bad there, and that what is needed is "a breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world." In examining the problem of the subject, the behind-the-scenes reactive and reactionary man, *Anti-Oedipus* develops an approach that is decidedly *diagnostic* ("What constitutes our sickness today?") and profoundly *healing* as well. **What it attempts to cure us of is the cure itself. Deleuze and Guattari term their approach "schizoanalysis," which they oppose on every count to psychoanalysis.** Where the latter measures everything against neurosis and castration, schizoanalysis begins with the schizo, his breakdowns and his breakthroughs. **For, they affirm, "a schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch. . . ."** Against the Oedipal and oedipalized territorialities (Family, Church, School, Nation, Party), and especially the territoriality of the individual, *Anti-Oedipus* seeks to discover the "deterritorialized" flows of desire, the flows that have not been reduced to the Oedipal codes and the neuroticized territorialities, the *desiring-machines* that escape such codes as *lines of escape* leading elsewhere.

#### You must be thoroughly anti-Oedipal in order to access any of our arguments about criminality—their argument ultimately results in policing the boundaries of radical thought because Harvard BoSu is fucking fascist

**Seem '81** Mark, acupunturist and translator, Translator's Introduction to *Anti-Oedipus* by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari

**To be anti-oedipal is to be** anti-ego as well as anti-homo, **willfully attacking all reductive psychoanalytic and political analyses that remain caught within the sphere of totality and unity, in order to free the multiplicity of desire from the deadly neurotic and Oedipal yoke**. For Oedipus is not a mere psychoanalytic construct, Deleuze and Guattari explain. Oedipus is the figurehead of imperialism, "colonization pursued by other means, it is the interior colony, and we shall see that even here at home ... it is our intimate colonial education." **This internalization of man by man, this "oedipalization," creates a new meaning for suffering, *internal suffering,* and a new tone for life: the depressive tone.** Now depression does not just come about one fine day, *Anti-Oedipus* goes on, nor does Oedipus appear one day in the Family and feel secure in remaining there. **Depression and Oedipus are agencies of the State, agencies of paranoia, agencies of power, long before being delegated to the family. Oedipus is the figure of power as such, just as neurosis is the result of power on individuals**. Oedipus is everywhere. For anti-oedipalists the ego, like Oedipus, is "part of those things we must dismantle through the united assault of analytical and political forces ."4 Oedipus is belief injected into the unconscious, it is what gives us faith as it robs us of power, *it* is what teaches us to desire our own repression. Everybody has been oedipalized and neuroticized at home, at school, at work. Everybody wants to be a fascist. Deleuze and Guattari want to know how these beliefs succeed in taking hold of a body, thereby silencing the productive machines of the libido. They also want to know how the opposite situation is brought about, where a body successfully wards off the effects of power. Reversing the Freudian distinction between neurosis and psychosis that measures everything against the former, *Anti-Oedipus* concludes: **the neurotic is the one on whom the Oedipal imprints take, whereas the psychotic is the one incapable of being oedipalized, even and especially by psychoanalysis. The first task of the revolutionary, they add, is to learn from the psychotic how to shake off the Oedipal yoke and the effects of power, in order to initiate a radical politics of desire freed from all beliefs**. Such a politics dissolves the mystifications of power through the kindling, on all levels, of anti-oedipal forces—the schizzes-flows—forces that escape coding, scramble the codes, and flee in all directions: *orphans* (no daddy-mommy-me), *atheists* (no beliefs), and *nomads* (no habits, no territories). A schizoanalysis schizophrenizes in order to break the holds of power and institute research into a new collective subjectivity and a revolutionary healing of mankind. **For we are sick, so sick, of our *selves!* It is actually not accurate to say that Deleuze and Guattari develop the schizoanalytic approach, for, as they show, it has always been at work in writers like Miller or Nietzsche or Artaud. Stoned thinking based on intensely lived experiences: Pop Philosophy. To put it simply, as does Miller, "everybody becomes a healer the moment he forgets about himself."** And Miller continues: "Reality is here and now, everywhere, gleaming through every reflection that meets the eye. . . . Everybody is a neurotic, down to the last man and woman. The healer, or the analyst, if you like, is only a super-neurotic. ... To be cured we must rise from our graves and throw off the cerements of the dead. Nobody can do it for another—it is a private affair which is best done collectively."5 Once we forget about our egos a non-neurotic form of politics becomes possible, where singularity and collectivity are no longer at odds with each other, and where collective expressions of desire are possible. Such a politics does not seek to regiment individuals according to a totalitarian system of norms, but to de-normalize and de-individualize through a multiplicity of new, collective arrangements against power. Its goal is the transformation of human relationships in a struggle against power. And it urges militant groups, as well as lone individuals, to analyze and fight against the effects of power that subjugate them: "For a revolutionary group at the preconscious level remains a *subjugated group,* even in seizing power, as long as this power itself refers to a form of force that continues to enslave and crush desiring-production. ... A *subject-group,* on the contrary, is a group whose libidinal investments are themselves revolutionary, it causes desire to penetrate into the social field, and subordinates the socius or the forms of power to desiring-production; productive of desire and a desire that produces, the subject-group always invents mortal forma- tions that exorcize the effusion in it of a death instinct; it opposes real coefficients of transversality to the symbolic determinations of subjugation, coefficients without a hierarchy or a group superego." **There can be no revolutionary actions**, *Anti-Oedipus* concludes, **where the the relations between people and groups are relations of exclusion and segregation. Groups must multiply and connect in ever new ways, freeing up territorialities for the construction of new social arrangements. Theory must therefore be conceived as a toolbox, producing tools that work**; or as Ivan Illich says, we must learn to construct *tools for conviviality* through the use of counterfoil research.6 When Illich speaks of "convivial reconstruction," he is very close to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of a "desiring-revolution." Like Deleuze and Guattari, Illich also calls for a radical reversal of the relationships between individuals and tools or machines: "This reversal would permit the evolution of a life-style and of a political system which give priority to the protection, the maximum use, and the enjoyment of the one resource that is almost equally distributed among all people: personal energy under personal control."7 All three authors agree that such a reversal must be governed by a collective political process, and not by professionals and experts. The ultimate answer to neurotic dependencies on professionals is *mutual self-care.*8

**Our approach leaves the question of desire unanswered -- this leaves subjective space for becomings, in which we discover desire affectively, through encounter**

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**Freed from a psychoanalytic framework, the political group or collective cannot, however, push aside the problem of desire. Nor can it leave desire in the hands of new experts. It must analyze the function of desire, in itself and in the groups with which it is involved. What is the function of desire, *Anti-Oedipus* asks, if not one of making connections? For to be bogged down in arrangements from which escape is possible is to be neurotic, seeing an irresolvable crisis where alternatives in fact exist.** And as Deleuze and Guattari comment, "perhaps it will be discovered that the only incurable is the neurotic."