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#### Facts are meaningless. Their internal link chains are factoids, which are worse. 1ac was detrimental to the cause of their position. This is not a critique of the law.

Schlag ’13 Pierre Schlag, “Facts (The),” his blog, 1/28/2013, http://brazenandtenured.com/2013/01/28/facts-the/

But let me explain about the facts. First, notice, that the most factish of facts (apologies to Latour) are actually factoids—trivial data bits shorn of any actual narrative. CNN had it down cold: “America has had five presidents who ate fish for breakfast.” What, I ask you, could you possibly do with that qua fact? Still, Americans like facts. It was Joe Friday on Dragnet who first said, “all we want are the facts, ma’am.” Really? That’s all? I don’t think so. He was on a mission. He wanted facts on a mission. And we, the viewers, did too. So I have to say, as a preliminary matter, things already don’t look too good for the facts. Indeed, the possibility that in their most prototypical factishisness, facts are nearly useless while in their most desirable state they are on a mission—well, that’s not an auspicious start. Things get worse. In law and social science (that’s my domain limit here—I feel really cramped) facts generally function as poseurs. The facts, are nearly always posing as the truth about “what-is-actually-going-on.” Facts are frequently presented as “the-real-story” or “the bottom line.” One is no doubt supposed to conclude from this that “facts are facts”—that they are the veritable bedrock of truth. But notice that this doesn’t make any sense. Notice that the “bottom line” is an accounting metaphor. Consider that, “the real story” is an oxymoron deliberately composed of both truth and fiction. Note that “what-is-actually-going-on” is a problematic state hanging precariously on the ungrounded and notoriously unreliable reality/appearance pair. All of this is to say, that the appeal of “getting down to the facts,” (or some such thing) often rests on situating the facts in some initially alluring rhetorical space (e.g. “the real story” “the bottom line”) that turns out, upon further inspection, to be constructed of images, metaphors or fictions of questionable philosophical countenance. (See, Nietzsche, On Lies and Truth in a Non-Moral Sense) Now, it’s not that these metaphors, images or fictions turn facts into non-facts. But still, I ask you: what could be more humbling to a fact then to learn that its appeal rests upon a fiction? Not only do facts frequently function as poseurs, but, when they are at their most factish, they’re often not all that interesting. Factish facts don’t really tell you much of anything you want to know. Imagine a party. Here are some exemplary factish facts: There were 19 people at the party. 9 were women. 10 were men. While the party was happening, gravity exercised a constant force of 32 feet per second/per second. Everyone standing stayed connected to the ground. Not the greatest narrative is it? And notice here that if you stick strictly to the facts (if you admit only of truly factish facts) adding more of these little items will not markedly improve your story line. (For you editors of university press books and law review articles, please pay special attention here.) The only time facts are really interesting (remember law and social science is the domain limit) is when they’re something more than just the facts. Go back to the party. Here’s another fact: Jill left the party with Tom. This fact is more interesting. Well, mildly so. With this sort of fact, you can start imagining possible implications (amorous, murderous, whathaveyou). But note that now we’re no longer talking about “just the facts.” We’re talking about facts with implications, facts with attitude. Why then are facts ever interesting? Well, ironically it’s because they’re not functioning as “just facts,” but something more.

#### Information is uniquely dissuasive—presumption is neg

Baudrillard, ’92 (Jean, *Pataphysics of Year 2000*, [online])

Outside of this gravitational pull which keeps bodies in orbit, all the atoms of meaning lose themselves or self-absolve in space. Every single atom follows its own trajectory towards infinity and dissolves in space. This is precisely what we are living in our present societies occupied with the **acceleration of all** bodies, all **messages, all processes** in all possible senses and wherein, via modern media, each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory. Every political, historical, cultural fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they **lose all meaning** by way of an inability to attain their meaning. It is useless to turn to science-fiction: from this point on, from the here and now, through our computer science, our circuits and our channels, this particle accelerator has definitively disrupted and broken the referential orbit of things. With respect to history, the narrative has become impossible since by definition it is the **potential re-narrativization of a sequence of meaning**. Through the impulse of total diffusion and circulation **each event is liberated for itself only** — each event becomes atomized and nuclear as it follows its trajectory into the void. In order to diffuse itself *ad infinitum,* it has to be fragmented like a particle. This is the way it attains a speed of no-return, distancing it from history once and for all. Every cultural, eventual group needs to be fragmented, disarticulated to allow for its entry into the circuits, each language must be absolved into a binary mechanism or device to allow for its circulation to take place — not in our memory, but in the electronic and luminous memory of the computers. There is no human language or speech (*langage*) that could compete with the speed of light. There is no event that could withstand its own diffusion across the planet. No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration. There is no history that will resist the centrifugal pull of facts or its short-circuiting in real time (in the same order of ideas: no sexuality will resist its own liberation, not a single culture will foreclose its own advancement, no truth will defy its own verification, etc.). Even theory is no longer in the state of "reflecting" on anything anymore. All it can do is to snatch concepts from their critical zone of reference and transpose them to the point of no return, in the process of which theory itself too, passes into the hyperspace of simulation as it loses all "objective" validity, while it makes significant gains by acquiring real affinity with the current system. The second hypothesis, with respect to the vanishing of history, is the opposite of the first, i.e., it pertains not to the acceleration but to the slowing down of processes. This too is derived directly from physics. Matter slows the passage of time. More precisely, time seems to pass very slowly upon the surface of a very dense body of matter. The phenomenon increases in proportion to growth in density. The effect of this slowing down (*ralentissement*) will raise the wavelength of light emitted by this body in a way that will allow the observer to record this phenomenon. Beyond a certain limit, time stops, the length of the wave becomes infinite. The wave no longer exists. Light extinguishes itself. The analogy is apparent in the way history slows down as it brushes up against the astral body of the "silent majorities". Our societies are governed by this process of the mass, and not only in the sociological or demographical sense of the word, but also in the sense of a "critical mass", of going beyond a certain point of no-return. That is where the crucially significant event of these societies is to be found: the advent of their revolutionary process along the lines of their mobility, (they are all revolutionary with respect to the centuries gone by), of their equivalent force of inertia, of an immense indifference, and of the silent power of this indifference. This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, of information or of communication; on the contrary, it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges. It is borne of the hyperdensity of cities, of merchandise, messages and circuits. It is the cold star of the social, a mass at the peripheries of which history cools out. Successive events attain their annihilation in indifference. **Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information**, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption. They themselves have no history, no meaning, no conscience, no desire. They are potential residues of all history, of all meaning, of all desire. By **inserting themselves into modernity**, all these wonderful things managed to invoke **a mysterious counterpart**, the misappreciation of which has unleashed all current political and social strategies. This time, it's the opposite: history, meaning, progress are no longer able to find their speed or tempo of liberation. They can no longer pull themselves out of this much too dense body which slows down their trajectory, slows down their time to the point from whereon perception and imagination of the future escapes us. All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence. Already, political events no longer conduct sufficient autonomous energy to rouse us and can only run their course as a silent movie in front of which we all sit collectively irresponsible. That is where history reaches its end, not because of the lack of actors or participants, not due to a lack of violence (with respect to violence, there is always an increasing amount), not due to a lack of events (as for events, there will always be more of them thanks to the role of the media and information!) — but because of a slowing down or deceleration, because of indifference and stupefaction. History can no longer go beyond itself, it can no longer envisage its own finality or dream of its own end, it shrouds or buries itself in its immediate effect, it self-exhausts in special effects, it implodes in current events. Essentially, one can no longer speak of the end of history since it has no time to rejoin its own end. **As its effects accelerate, its meaning inexorably decelerates**. It will end up stopping and extinguishing itself like light and time at the peripheries of an infinitely dense mass... Humanity too, had its big-bang: a certain critical density, a certain concentration of people and exchanges that compel this explosion we call *history* and which is none other than the dispersal of dense and hieratic cores of earlier civilizations. Today, we are living an effect of reversal: we have overstepped the threshold of critical mass with respect to populations, events, information, control of the inverse process of inertia of history and politics. At the cosmic level of things, we don't know anymore whether we have reached this speed of liberation wherein we would be partaking of a permanent or final expansion (this, no doubt, will remain forever uncertain). At the human level, where prospects are more limited, it is possible that the energy itself employed for the liberation of the species (acceleration of birthrates, of techniques and exchanges in the course of the centuries) have contributed to an excess of mass and resistance that bear on the initial energy as it drags us along a ruthless movement of contraction and inertia. Whether the universe infinitely expands or retracts to an infinitely dense and infinitely small core will hinge upon its critical mass (with respect to which speculation itself is infinite in view of the discovery of newer particles). Following the analogy, whether our human history will be evolutionary or involuted will presumably depend upon the critical mass of humanity. Are we to see ourselves, like the galaxies, on a definitive orbit that distances us from each other under the impact of a tremendous speed, or is this dispersal to infinity itself destined to reach an end, and the human molecules bound to draw closer to each other by way of an inverse effect of gravitation? The question is whether a human mass that grows day by day is able to control a pulsation of this genre? Third hypothesis, third analogy. But we are still dealing with a point of disappearance, a point of evanescence, a *vanishing-point,* this time however along the lines of music. This is what I call the stereophonic effect. We are all obsessed with high fidelity, with the quality of musical "transmission" (*rendu*). On the console of our channels, equipped with our tuners, our amplifiers and our baffles, we mix, regulate and multiply soundtracks in search of an infallible or unerring music. Is this, though, still music? Where is the threshold of high fidelity beyond the point of which music as such would disappear? Disappearance would not be due to the lack of music, it would disappear for having stepped beyond this boundary, it would disappear into the perfection of its materiality, into its own special effect. Beyond this point, neither judgement nor aesthetic pleasure could be found anymore. Ecstasy of musicality procures its own end. The disappearance of history is of the same order: there too, we have gone beyond this limit or boundary where, subjected to *factual* and *information-al* sophistication, history as such ceases to exist. Large doses of immediate diffusion, of special effects, of secondary effects, of fading — and this famous Larsen effect produced in acoustics by an excessive proximity between source and receiver, in history via an excessive proximity, and therefore the disastrous interference of an event with its diffusion — create a short-circuit between cause and effect, similarly to what takes place between the object and the experimenting subject in microphysics (and in the human sciences!). All things entailing a certain radical uncertainty of the event, like excessive high fidelity, lead to a radical uncertainty with respect to music. Elias Canetti says it well: "as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore. This is also why the soft music of history escapes us, it disappears under the microscope or into the stereophony of information.

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#### Catastrophe is upon us—militarized geographies lock in violent patterns of engagement in the mid east. Rejection in academic settings sets a precedent—accepting expertist militarized discourse recreates the problems with CIA intell

Morrissey 11. John Morrissey, professor of geography at the National University of Ireland, Antipode Vol. 43 No. 2 2011 ISSN 0066-4812, pg. 435–470

Collusion between “knowledge” and “power” must be forcefully exposed, as must the purposes to which bureaucracy bends knowledge’s specialization. When institutional (academic) knowledge sets itself up **above** lived experience...catastrophe is in the offing. Catastrophe is indeed **already upon us** (Lefebvre 1991:415). Henri Lefebvre may have been writing in 1974 but his perceptive thoughts are perhaps as vital today as ever. The “specialized knowledges” of the “military–strategic studies complex” have long been patronized, prioritized and actioned by the US military. The cosy “collusion” between the Pentagon and military–strategic studies has been instrumental in the contemporary “production of military space”. Reductive scriptings of national security, abstracted geopolitical visions and dreams of empire have collectively served to **occlude geographies of the “lived experience**” (Chandrasekaran 2006; Packer 2005). As Bradley Klein (1994:3) reminds us, “questions of war and peace are too important to leave to students [and practitioners] of Strategic Studies”. Strategic studies knowledges have long been “above lived experience”, yet their power has been instrumental in unleashing catastrophe, terror and abject misery for the very people whose lives they are “above”. But clearly there is “catastrophe” for “us” too: the catastrophe of being overwhelmed by the collusion of power and knowledge, the catastrophe of the militant and deeply unequal world in which we live and the catastrophe of inaction—politically, discursively and otherwise. But of course there has been action, with some of the most significant resistance taking place outside the academy, such as that seen in the unprecedented global protests against the Iraq War in February and March 2003, and continued anti-war activism worldwide since then. Geographers and other academics have of course been variously actively involved. Within the academy, geographers have illuminated key aspects of the US-led war against “militant Islam”, including its place-making strategies, its territorial responses to terrorist attacks and its exceptional legal and biopolitical geographies (Coleman 2003; Elden 2007; Morrissey 2011; Reid-Henry 2007). Others have revealed the imperial historical geographies of contemporary geopolitics, and signalled its geoeconomic underpinnings (Cowen and Smith 2009; Harvey 2003; Kearns 2006; Smith 2003a). In addition, geographers have depicted the violent geographies of recent western military interventions (Dalby 2006; Flint 2005; Graham 2005; Gregory and Pred 2007). And focus has been placed too on the state discourses of military power and broader imaginative and affective geographies **legitimating that violence** (Bialasiewicz et al 2007; Hannah 2006; O ́ Tuathail 2003; Woodward 2005). Such counter-geographies are important, yet their disruptive power, as Matthew Sparke notes (2007:347), is perhaps ultimately “practically limited”. In spite of the above work, and after a cultural turn in the US military that has produced a “powerful rhetorical effect” that justifies “more killing to stop the killing” (Gregory 2008a:21), reductive vernaculars, reifying essentialist tropes of terror, threat, correction and security still prevail and discursively underpin the war in Iraq and broader war on terrorism. The military–strategic studies complex plays a central role in advancing such discourses, and possesses vital forums through which to enunciate their endgame: legitimized state violence. I want to conclude more positively, however, by suggesting ways to effectively oppose them. As an academic working in political geography, a key starting point of resistance for me is the careful detailing of the largely unseen **inner workings of empire** in our contemporary world, ultimately in order **to be better able to resist it** (which is what this paper has been about). That resistance can manifest itself in counter-scriptings in **a variety of contexts**, from lecture halls to town halls, from academic journals to online blogs. And in a variety of public forums, many geographers have played, and continue to play, important roles in **critiquing the war on terror** and advancing more nuanced, reasoned and **humane geographies** and histories of **Islam and the Middle East** (Gregory 2005). Such academic and public intellectual work can also crucially liaise with, learn from, and be **transformed by grassroots activists** in peace and social justice movements **throughout the world**.44 And linking to their work in our teaching especially has more power than perhaps we sometimes realise; especially given the multimedia teaching and learning tools available today.45

#### The juridical matrix is a racist project to force the entire earth under the aegis of liberal control or else—wars are waged not in the name of a sovereign’s juridical power, but on behalf of the global liberal body itself

Evans 10. Brad Evans, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations, “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424, sage

Imposing liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war. While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, the more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order to achieve it: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonethe-­ less committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, espe-­ cially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least pro-­ vided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defin-­ ing enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how liberalism gains its mastery by posing fundamental questions of life and death – that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be for the unification of the species. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counter-­ insurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counter-­ insurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global spe-­ cies necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. With enmity instead depending upon the complex, adaptive, dynamic account of life itself, what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those newly appointed enemies of humanity – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival. Vital in other words to all human existence, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity requires a new moral assay of life that, pitting the universal against the particular, willingly commits vio-­ lence against any ontological commitment to political difference, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters. Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degener-­ ate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopoliti-­ cal rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, **power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence** (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of the threat that is now from the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for politi-­ cal modernity to function one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible**,** for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255). While kill- ing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’.Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of the most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is to con-­ stantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form (Agamben, 1995: 171). The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international rela-­ tions, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the inva-­ sion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal encounter. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.

#### The drone emperor has no cloths, cloaked in the language of the legal power/knowledge nexus, voting negative means interrupting the legal discourse of the 1ac.

**Krasman 2012** - professor, Dr, Institute for Criminological Research, University of Hamburg (Susanne Krasmann, “Targeted Killing and Its Law: On a Mutually Constitutive Relationship,” Leiden Journal of International Law (2012), 25, pg. 67)

The legal debate on targeted killing, particularly that referring to the US practice, has increased immensely during the last decade and even more so very recently, obviously due to a ‘compulsion of legality’.87 Once this state practice of resorting to the use of lethal force has been recognized as systematically taking place, it needs to be dealt with in legal terms. Whether this is done in supportive or critical terms, the assertion of targeted killing as a legal practice commences at this point. This is due to the fact that the law, once invoked, launches its own claims. To insist on disclosing ‘the full legal basis for targeted killings’; on criteria, legal procedures, and ‘access to reliable information’ in order to render governmental action controllable; or on legal principles to be applied in order to estimate the necessity and proportionality of a concrete intervention at stake,88 not only involves accepting targeted killing as a legitimate subject of debate in the first place. It requires distinctions to be made between, for example, a legitimate and an illegitimate target. It invokes the production of knowledge and the establishment of pertinent rules. Indeterminate categories are to be determined and thus established as a new reading of positive law. The introduction of international human rights standards into the debate, for example, clearly allows limits to be set in employing the pre-emptive tactic. As Wouter Werner has shown with regard to the Israeli High Court of Justice’s decision on the legality of targeted killing operations,89 this may well lead, for example, to recognizing the enemy as being not ‘outlaws’ but, instead, combatants who are to be granted basic human rights. Subsequently, procedural rules may be established that restrict the practice and provide criteria for assessing the legality of concrete operations.90 At the same time, however, targeted killing is recognized as a legitimate tactic in the fight against terrorism and is being determined and implemented legally.91 When framed within the ‘theatre of war’, targeted killing categorically seems to be justifiable under the legal principles of necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering. This is true as long as one presupposes in general terms, as the juridical discourse usually does, both a well-considered proceeding along those principles92 and, accordingly, that targeted killing, by its very nature, is a ‘calculated, precise use of lethal force’.93 Procedural rules, like the ‘proportionality test’, that are essentially concerned with determination, namely with specifying criteria of intervention for the concrete case or constellation, certainly provide reliability by systematically inciting and provoking justifications. Their application therefore, we may say, contributes to clarifying a controversial norm- ative interpretation, but it will never predict or determine how deliberation and justification translate into operational action. The application of procedural rules does not only notoriously remain ‘indeterminate’,94 but also produces its own truth effects. The question of proportionality, for example, is intrinsically a relational one. The damage that targeting causes is to be related to the anticipated military advantage and to the expected casualties of non-targeted operations. Even if there are ‘substantial grounds to believe’ that such an operation will ‘encounter significant armed resistance’,95 this is a presumption that, above all, entails a virtual dimension: the alternate option will never be realized. According to a Foucauldian perspective, decisions always articulate within an epistemic regime and thus ‘eventualize’ on the political stage.96 There is, in this sense, no mere decision and no mere meaning; and, conversely, there is no content of a norm, and no norm, independent of its enforcement.97 To relate this observation to our problem at hand means that, rather than the legal principles’ guiding a decision, it is the decision on how to proceed that constitutes the meaning of the legal principle in question. The legal reasoning, in turn, produces a normative reality of its own, as we are now able to imagine, comprehend, and assess a procedure and couch it in legal terms. This is also noticeable in the case of the Osama bin Laden killing. As regards the initial strategy of justification, the question of resistance typically is difficult to establish ex post in legal terms. Such situations are fraught with so many possible instances of ambiguous behaviour and risk, and the identification of actual behav- iour as probably dangerous and suspicious may change the whole outcome of the event.98 But, once the public found itself with little alternative but to assume that the prospect of capturing the subject formed part of the initial order, it also had to assume that the intention was to use lethal force as a last resort. And, once the public accepts the general presumption that the United States is at war with the terrorist organization, legal reasoning about the operation itself follows and constitutes a rationale shaping the perception of similar future actions and the exercise of governmental force in general.99 Part of this rationale is the assumption, as the president immediately pointed out in his speech, that the threat of al Qaeda has not been extinguished with bin Laden. The identification of a threat that emanates from a network may give rise to the question of whether the killing of one particular target, forming part of a Hydra, makes any sense at all.100 Yet, it equally nourishes the idea that the fight against terrorism, precisely because of its elusiveness, is an enduring one, which is exactly the position the United States takes while considering itself in an armed conflict with the terrorist organization. Targeting and destroying parts of a network, then, do not destroy the entire network, but rather verify that it exists and is at work. The target, in this sense, is constituted by being targeted.101 Within the rationale of the security dispositif, there continue to be threats and new targets. Hence, at work is a transformation of laws through practice, rather than their amendment. Giorgio Agamben maintains that a legal norm, because abstract, does not stipulate its application.102 ‘Just as between language and world . . . there is no internal nexus’ between them. The norm, in this sense, exists independent of ‘reality’. This, according to Agamben, allows for the norm in the ‘state of exception’ both to be applied with the effect of ‘ceasing to apply’103 – ‘the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception’104 – and to be suspended without being abolished. Although forming part of and, in fact, being the effect of applying the law, the state of exception, in Agamben’s view, disconnects from the norm. Within a perspective on law as practice, by contrast, there is no such difference between norm and reality. Even to ignore a pertinent norm constitutes an act that has a meaning, namely that the norm is not being enforced. It affects the norm. Targeted killing operations, in this sense, can never be extra-legal.105 On the contrary, provided that illegal practices come up systematically, they eventually will effectuate the transformation of the law. Equally, the exception from the norm not only suspends the norm, transforming it, momentarily or permanently, into a mere symbol without meaning and force, but at the same time also impinges upon the validity of that norm. Moreover, focus on the exception within the present context falls short of capturing a rather gradual transitional process that both resists a binary deciphering of either legal or illegal and is not a matter of suspending a norm. As practices deploying particular forms of knowledge, targeted killing and its law mutually constitute each other, thus re-enforcing a new security dispositif. The appropriate research question therefore is how positive law changes its framework of reference. Targeted killing, once perceived as illegal, now appears to be a legal practice on the grounds of a new understanding of international law’s own elementary concepts. The crux of the ‘compulsion of legality’ is that legality itself is a shifting reference. Seen this way, the United States does not establish targeted killing as a legal practice on the grounds of its internationally ‘possessing’ exceptional power. Rather the reverse; it is able to employ targeted killing as a military tactic, precisely because this is accepted by the legal discourse. As a practice, targeted killing, in turn, reshapes our understanding of basic concepts of international law. Any dissenting voice will now be heard with more difficulty, since targeted killing is a no longer an isolated practice but, within the now establishing security dispositif, appears to be appropriate and rational. To counter the legal discourse, then, would require to interrupt it, rather than to respond to it, and to move on to its political implications that are rather tacitly involved in the talk about threats and security, and in the dispute about targeted killing operations’ legality.

## 1nc solvency

#### Plan’s restrictions are a paper tiger that reinforces a Trumanite bureaucracy—obfuscates underlying ideologies that jack solvency

**Glennon 14**—Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University [Trumanites=“the network of several hundred high-level military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement officials within the Executive Branch who are responsible for national security policymaking”]

(Michael, “National Security and Double Government”, Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 5, pg 1-114, dml)

The first set of potential remedies aspires to tone up Madisonian muscles one by one with ad hoc legislative and judicial reforms, by, say, narrowing the scope of the state secrets privilege; permitting the recipients of national security letters at least to make their receipt public; broadening standing requirements; improving congressional oversight of covert operations, including drone killings and cyber operations; or strengthening statutory constraints like FISA545 and the War Powers Resolution.546 Law reviews brim with such proposals. But their stopgap approach has been tried repeatedly since the Trumanite network’s emergence. Its futility is now glaring. Why such efforts would be any more fruitful in the future is hard to understand. The Trumanites are committed to the rule of law and their sincerity is not in doubt, but the rule of law to which they are committed is largely devoid of meaningful constraints.547 Continued focus on legalist band-aids merely buttresses the illusion that the Madisonian institutions are alive and well—and with that illusion, an entire narrative premised on the assumption that it is merely a matter of identifying a solution and looking to the Madisonian institutions to effect it. That frame deflects attention from the underlying malady. What is needed, if Bagehot’s theory is correct, is a fundamental change in the very discourse within which U.S. national security policy is made. For the question is no longer: What should the government do? The questions now are: What should be done about the government? What can be done about the government? What are the responsibilities not of the government but of the people?

#### This causes authoritarianism and serial policy failure

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(Michael, “National Security and Double Government”, Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 5, pg 1-114, dml)

Enough examples exist to persuade the public that the network is subject to judicial, legislative, and executive constraints. This appearance is important to its operation, for the network derives legitimacy from the ostensible authority of the public, constitutional branches of the government. The appearance of accountability is, however, largely an illusion fostered by those institutions’ pedigree, ritual, intelligibility, mystery, and superficial harmony with the network’s ambitions. The courts, Congress, and even the presidency in reality impose little constraint. Judicial review is negligible; congressional oversight dysfunctional; and presidential control nominal. Past efforts to revive these institutions have thus fallen flat. Future reform efforts are no more likely to succeed, relying as they must upon those same institutions to restore power to themselves by exercising the very power that they lack. External constraints—public opinion and the press—are insufficient to check it. Both are manipulable, and their vitality depends heavily upon the vigor of constitutionally established institutions, which would not have withered had those external constraints had real force. Nor is it likely that any such constraints can be restored through governmental efforts to inculcate greater civic virtue, which would ultimately concentrate power even further. Institutional restoration can come only from an energized body politic. The prevailing incentive structure, however, encourages the public to become less, not more, informed and engaged**.**

To many, inculcated in the hagiography of Madisonian checks and balances and oblivious of the reach of Trumanite power, the response to these realizations will be denial. The image of a double national security government will be shocking. It cannot be right. It sounds of conspiracy, “a state within,” and other variations on that theme. “The old notion that our Government is an extrinsic agency,” Bagehot wrote, “still rules our imaginations.”603 That the Trumanite network could have emerged in full public view and without invidious intent makes its presence all the more implausible. Its existence challenges all we have been taught.

There is, however, little room for shock. The pillars of America’s double government have long stood in plain view for all to see. We have learned about significant aspects of what Bagehot described—from some eminent thinkers. Max Weber’s work on bureaucracies showed that, left unchecked, the inexorability of bureaucratization can lead to a “polar night of icy darkness” in which humanitarian values are sacrificed for abstract organizational ends.604 Friedrich Hayek’s work on political organization led him to conclude that “the greatest danger to liberty today comes from the men who are most needed and most powerful in government, namely, the efficient expert administrators exclusively concerned with what they regard as the public good.”605 Eric Fromm’s work on social psychology showed how people unconsciously adopt societal norms as their own to avoid anxiety-producing choices, so as to “escape from freedom.”606 Irving Janis’s work on group dynamics showed that the greater a group’s esprit de corps, “the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against out-groups.”607 Michael Reisman’s work on jurisprudence has shown how de facto operational codes can quietly arise behind publiclyembraced myth systems, allowing for governmental conduct that is not approved openly by the law.608 Mills’ 1956 work on power elites showed that the centralization of authority among officials who hold a common world view and operate in secrecy can produce a “military metaphysic” directed at maintaining a “permanent war economy.”609 One person familiar with Mills’ work was political scientist Malcolm Moos, the presidential speechwriter who five years later wrote President Eisenhower’s prophetic warning.610 “In the councils of government,” Eisenhower said, “we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”611

Bagehot anticipated these risks. Bureaucracy, he wrote, is “the most unimproving and shallow form of government,”612 and the executive that commands it “the most dangerous.”613 “If it is left to itself,” he observed, “without a mixture of special and non-special minds,” decisional authority “will become technical, self-absorbed, self-multiplying.”614 The net result is responsibility that is neither fixed nor ascertainable but diffused and hidden,615 with implications that are beyond historical dispute. “The most disastrous decisions in the twentieth century,” in Robert Dahl’s words, “turned out to be those made by authoritarian leaders freed from democratic restraints.”616

The benefits derived by the United States from double government —enhanced technical expertise, institutional memory and experience, quick-footedness, opaqueness in confronting adversaries, policy stability, and insulation from popular political oscillation and decisional idiosyncrasy —need hardly be recounted. Those benefits, however, have not been costfree. The price lies in well-known risks flowing from centralized power, unaccountability, and the short-circuiting of power equilibria. Indeed, in this regard the Framers thought less in terms of risk than certainty. John Adams spoke for many: “The nation which will not adopt an equilibrium of power must adopt a despotism. There is no other alternative.”617

The trivial risk of sudden despotism, of an abrupt turn to a police state or dictatorship installed with coup-like surprise, has created a false sense of security in the United States.618 That a ~~strongman~~ [of the sort easily visible in history could suddenly burst forth is not a real risk. The risk, rather, is the risk of slowly tightening centralized power, growing and evolving organically beyond public view, increasingly unresponsive to Madisonian checks and balances. Madison wrote, “There are more instances of the abridgment of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power than by violent and sudden usurpations.”619 Recent history bears out his insight. Dahl has pointed out that in the 20th century—the century of democracy’s great triumph—some seventy democracies collapsed and quietly gave way to authoritarian regimes.620 That risk correlates with voter ignorance; the term Orwellian has little meaning to a people who have never known anything different, who have scant knowledge of history, civics, or public affairs, and who in any event have likely never heard of George Orwell. “If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization,” Thomas Jefferson wrote, “it expects what never was and never will be.”621 What form of government ultimately will emerge from the United States’ experiment with double government is uncertain. The risk is considerable, however, that it will not be a democracy.

#### Title 10 shift fails, it decreases oversight by shifting to JSOC and expands the worst aspects of drones

**Kaplan, 13** - Edward R. Murrow press fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Fred, “The Drones Are in the Details” Slate, 3/21, <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2013/03/john_brennan_wants_the_pentagon_to_take_command_of_the_cia_s_drone_strike.html>)

Given the intricate entanglements between the two in the past decade’s war on terror, does it matter whether a spymaster at Langley or a cabinet chief in the Pentagon is responsible for targeted assassinations on foreign terrorists from the sky?

Maybe. The shift could mean new restrictions and an extra layer of accountability on drone strikes, subjecting them to an entirely different command culture. Or it could have very little effect. It all depends on how the shift in power is written.

Let’s back up. Under today’s practice, the military controls the drones flying over Afghanistan because U.S. armed forces are officially at war in that country and drones are weapons in their arsenal. (The same was true of the drones over Iraq when U.S. troops were fighting there.) However, the CIA controls the drones flying over Pakistan, Yemen, and certain other countries because they are not official war zones; the drones are playing a role in covert operations (for that reason, the drone flights themselves are classified), and covert ops are the CIA’s business.

To put it in legal terms, drone strikes in Afghanistan fall under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which sets rules for the armed forces, while drone strikes in countries outside of official war zones fall under Title 50, which provides authority for covert operations. It defines covert actions as activities “to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad” without the appearance or acknowledgment of a U.S. government role—adding that these actions do “not include traditional military activities.”\*

Shifting control of drone strikes from the CIA to the military essentially means shifting authority for those drone strikes from Title 50 to Title 10. It places them under the rubric of “traditional military activities”—and the standards and practices of U.S. armed forces. One implication of this is that it will be harder to justify drone strikes in areas where U.S. troops are not openly at war. It also means that if a president contemplates stretching the limits of Title 10—that is, if he or she considers drone strikes outside war zones—the military’s lawyers will get involved, and they tend to be more scrupulous than CIA lawyers (who, after all, deal with overseas covert actions, which often skirt, or ignore, U.S. law). One pertinent provision of Title 10 is that, in order for U.S. armed forces to operate on foreign soil, they must get permission of the local government. If the military controlled drone strikes, they couldn’t be ordered without this permission.

However, there are two ways around these strictures. First, there have been occasions when presidents—including President Obama—have simply (and legally) declared that certain members of the armed forces are, for the moment, acting under Title 50. Most notably, when Navy SEALs raided Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, they were declared to be under CIA command. Therefore, they did not need the Pakistanis’ permission to cross the border. The same abracadabra could be recited for drone operators.

Or maybe the president wouldn’t even have to go that far. SEALs, like Delta Force and other “shadow” forces, are part of the Joint Special Operations Command. JSOC is part of the armed forces; it therefore falls under Title 10. However, under an executive order signed by President George W. Bush (and still in effect), it has authority to conduct secret operations against al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist networks worldwide.

So, if control of drone strikes is shifted from the CIA to the military and the military decides to assign the mission to JSOC, the strikes might be as frequent and far-flung as ever—maybe even more so, since Bush’s executive order allows JSOC to conduct its operations without consulting or notifying Congress. (By contrast, under Title 50, the CIA has to tell the congressional intelligence committees about its covert operations.)

The motive behind the shift may have less to do with the controversy over drone strikes than with the future of the CIA. John Brennan, the agency’s new director (and a career agency officer), said at his Senate confirmation hearings that the CIA “should not be doing traditional military activities and operations.” The statement’s meaning was ambiguous; it depends on how he defines “traditional military operations.” But he made it in the context of drone strikes. And as the White House counterterrorism chief during Obama’s first term, Brennan told several people that he would like to see the CIA pull back on some of its paramilitary operations and focus more on its original tasks of espionage and analysis.

The shift’s effect on drone strikes, then, is still a bit vague—all the more since the Wall Street Journal and The Daily Beast report that it will take place gradually. Whether this means over the course of weeks, months, or years isn’t said (or probably known). The New York Times, catching up with the story, further reports this afternoon that Obama hasn’t yet decided whether to order the shift—and that, in any case, the CIA might retain control of drone strikes on Pakistan, which, if true, would mean the shift wouldn’t be much of a shift after all.

It all depends, then, on what President Obama wants to be able to keep doing. Since presidents tend not to give up executive powers unilaterally, the shift—in terms of its actual effects on drone strikes—is likely to be slight.

#### The plan is window-dressing at best – DOD control shifts to JSOC, which operates under the exact same authority as the CIA – it doesn’t improve oversight at all

**Turza, 13 -** Program Analyst at SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) (Nicholas, “Who’s Piloting the Drones? Shifting CIA Drone Operations to the DoD” 10/3, <http://ncjolt.org/whos-piloting-the-drones-shifting-cia-drone-operations-to-the-dod/>)

First, even if the DoD takes the reins, the effect could only be window dressing for those CT warriors at the controls. Under an executive order signed by the Bush administration immediately after 9/11 (and continued by the Obama administration), the CIA, under Title 50 and the Authorization for Use of Military Force to retaliate against Al-Qaeda, has a license for lethality that would make any hard-charging General jealous. In practice however, the CIA isn’t alone. DoD’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the command almost certain to helm the drone operations after the shift, operates their CT missions under Title 50. They did so, with the CIA, in the Abbottabad raid. In other words, these will not be those by-the-book Air Force operators flying under multiple layers of commanders, JAG, and sundry staff. As Fred Kaplan points out at Slate, “if control of drone strikes is shifted from the CIA to the military and the military decides to assign the mission to JSOC, the strikes might be as frequent and far-flung as ever—maybe even more so, since Bush’s executive order allows JSOC to conduct its operations without consulting or notifying Congress.” (Emphasis added). While it’s true that the conventional military is highly cautious in regards to targeting, such as with collateral damage concerns, “civil terrain” and “second and third order effects,” JSOC is not part of the conventional military and operates under far less rules-based culture than “Big Army.” Thus, many of the institutional restraints associated with military authority are not only deceptive legally but also deceptive culturally. (JSOC is, after all, the same component from which Delta Force operates; restraint is not their watchword.)

#### No impact to drone spread or US norms

Singh 12 (Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security. “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones. As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings. Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use. In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.” Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey. Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory. States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement. This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active. What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy. In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region. Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones: – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue. – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose. – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face. – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts. In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology. Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team. Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones. What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use. Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best. Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations. Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Norms fail and US can't create them

Max Boot 11, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/9/11, “We Cannot Afford to Stop Drone Strikes,” Commentary Magazine, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/10/09/drone-arms-race/

The New York Times engages in some scare-mongering today about a drone ams race. Scott Shane notes correctly other nations such as China are building their own drones and in the future U.S. forces could be attacked by them–our forces will not have a monopoly on their use forever. Fair enough, but he goes further, suggesting our current use of drones to target terrorists will backfire: If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the United States say? What if India uses remotely controlled craft to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, or Russia sends drones after militants in the Caucasus? American officials who protest will likely find their own example thrown back at them. “The problem is that we’re creating an international norm” — asserting the right to strike preemptively against those we suspect of planning attacks, argues Dennis M. Gormley, a senior research fellow at the University of Pittsburgh and author of Missile Contagion, who has called for tougher export controls on American drone technology. “The copycatting is what I worry about most.” This is a familiar trope of liberal critics who are always claiming we should forego “X” weapons system or capability, otherwise our enemies will adopt it too. We have heard this with regard to ballistic missile defense, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, land mines, exploding bullets, and other fearsome weapons. Some have even suggested the U.S. should abjure the first use of nuclear weapons–and cut down our own arsenal–to encourage similar restraint from Iran. The argument falls apart rather quickly because it is founded on a false premise: that other nations will follow our example. In point of fact, Iran is hell-bent on getting nuclear weapons no matter what we do; China is hell-bent on getting drones; and so forth. Whether and under what circumstances they will use those weapons remains an open question–but there is little reason to think self-restraint on our part will be matched by equal self-restraint on theirs. Is Pakistan avoiding nuking India because we haven’t used nuclear weapons since 1945? Hardly. The reason is that India has a powerful nuclear deterrent to use against Pakistan. If there is one lesson of history it is a strong deterrent is a better upholder of peace than is unilateral disarmament–which is what the New York Times implicitly suggests. Imagine if we did refrain from drone strikes against al-Qaeda–what would be the consequence? If we were to stop the strikes, would China really decide to take a softer line on Uighurs or Russia on Chechen separatists? That seems unlikely

given the viciousness those states already employ in their battles against ethnic separatists–which at least in Russia’s case already includes the suspected assassination of Chechen leaders abroad. What’s the difference between sending a hit team and sending a drone? While a decision on our part to stop drone strikes would be unlikely to alter Russian or Chinese thinking, it would have one immediate consequence: al-Qaeda would be strengthened and could regenerate the ability to attack our homeland. Drone strikes are the only effective weapon we have to combat terrorist groups in places like Pakistan or Yemen where we don’t have a lot of boots on the ground or a lot of cooperation from local authorities. We cannot afford to give them up in the vain hope it will encourage disarmament on the part of dictatorial states.

#### No arms race—even Zenko agrees

Zenko, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action – CFR, ‘13

(Micah, “U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, Council Special Report No. 65, January)

There are also few examples of armed drone sales by other countries. After the United States, Israel has the most developed and varied drone capabilities; according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Israel was responsible for 41 percent of drones exported between 2001 and 2011.57 While Israel has used armed drones in the Palestinian territories and is not a member of the MTCR, it has pre- dominantly sold surveillance drones that lack hard points and electrical engineering. Israel reportedly sold the Harop, a short-range attack drone, to France, Germany, Turkey, and India. Furthermore, Israel allows the United States to veto transfers of weapons with U.S.-origin technology to select states, including China.58 Other states invested in developing and selling surveillance drones have reportedly refrained from selling fully armed versions. For example, the UAE spent five years building the armed United-40 drone with an associated Namrod missile, but there have been no reported deliveries.59 A March 2011 analysis by the mar- keting research firm Lucintel projected that a “fully developed [armed drone] product will take another decade.”60 Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests. However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and cross- border adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingen- cies do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support. Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant investment required for armed drones in the near term.

## 1nc cia

#### Intelligence militarization inevitable - the Pentagon has its own network that beats the CIA

**Kumar, 12 -** The Independent's New York correspondent. He was formerly assistant editor on the foreign desk(Nikhil, “Pentagon builds military network to rival the CIA” The Independent, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/pentagon-builds-military-network-to-rival-the-cia-8374245.html>)

The Pentagon is planning a major expansion of America's international spy network, creating a new generation of undercover agents to get a better handle on critical issues such as China's growing military might and the rising influence of fundamentalist militants in Africa.

The enlarged military spy ring will rival the civilian Central Intelligence Agency in size, marking a major expansion in America's espionage network – something that reflects the Obama administration's preference for undercover operations over conventional force.

The US has conducted more than 300 drone strikes since Barack Obama took office in 2008, killing thousands in missions managed by the CIA and the military.

But with the CIA increasingly stretched, the Pentagon is planning to deploy hundreds of additional spies to work alongside civilian colleagues and elite military commando units, according to the Washington Post.

The expansion will change the complexion of the Defence Intelligence Agency, the military intelligence body which is expected to end up with as many as 1,600 intelligence "collectors" around the world. Unlike the CIA, the DIA does not have the authority to conduct drone strikes.

#### The plan is a distinction without a difference – the old, pre-drone CIA was just as militarized the new CIA

**Goodman, 7 –** Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, was a Soviet analyst at the CIA from 1966 to 1990(Melvin, Old CIA, New CIA: A Distinction Without a Difference” Random Lengths [San Pedro, Calif] 13 July 2007: 8-9, Alt Press Watch)

Two weeks ago, the CIA declassified most of a huge 1973 file known as the "family jewels," which detailed domestic spying, assassination plots, and numerous CIA crimes from the 1950s to the early 1970s. In a speech to the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, CIA director Michael Hayden boldly proclaimed, "The documents provide a glimpse of a very different time and a very different Agency. I firmly believe that the improved system of intelligence oversight that came out of the 1970s gives the CIA a far. stronger place in our democratic system. What we do now to protect Americans we do within a powerful framework of law and review."

Nothing could be further from the truth.

The "family jewels" represent a depressing picture of national security crimes, including drug experimentation that was redacted from the release of the documents. These activities were put into play by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, who used the Cold War with the Soviet Union as justification for a series of intelligence abuses. These events took place when there were no Congressional oversight committees to monitor such crimes, and no statutory Inspector General at the CIA to demand in-house investigations. Interestingly, there were high-level CIA officials, particularly lawyers, who protested these actions, but their warnings went unheeded.

Most of the crimes of the past continue today, with no challenge from the oversight committees and no review from the Department of Justice. The ban on assassinations has been modified to exclude suspected terrorists. The National Security Agency's warrantless eavesdropping allows monitoring of international phone calls and e-mail of people inside the United States. Once again, antiwar activities are being monitored by the Pentagon and local police departments.

Additional CIA crimes include widespread torture and abuse at Abu Gharib and Guantanamo; secret prisons; and extraordinary renditions. The Bush administration opened the door to torture and abuse by the CIA and the military in February 2002, when the president decided to circumvent the Geneva Conventions. Military lawyers challenged the White House on these issues, and a significant number of lawyers resigned from the Department of Justice; CIA lawyers, however, welcomed the exemptions that permitted CIA operatives to engage in torture and abuse. Two CIA directors, Porter Goss and Michael Hayden, even joined Vice President Cheney in lobbying the Congress for an exception for the CIA on the Senate's amendment to ban torture. The lobbying efforts of Goss and Hayden were a violation of the Agency 's charter that prohibits policy advocacy.

In November 2005, The Washington Post confirmed a long rumored story that the CIA was operating 8-10 secret prisons in East Europe and Southeast Asia. Human Rights Watch confirmed that the East Euro-, pean prisons were in Hungary, Poland, and Romania, with a former Soviet airbase in Poland serving as the largest prison facility. Their collaboration was a violation of their membership in the European Union, which is now investigating charges of illegal and immoral behavior.

The CIA actually began the practice of extraordinary renditions, a form of kidnapping with terrorist suspects being "rendered" from one country to another without a court hearing or extradition process, in the wake of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York. The number of abductions increased significantly after the 9/11 attacks, and it is believed that nearly 200 people have been rendered since 2001. Most of these people have not been charged with any crime; they are denied lawyers and their families do not know their whereabouts. All of them are lowlevel, suspected terrorists who have been turned over to foreign intelligence services in the Middle East known to torture prisoners. Secretary of State Condi Rice disingenuously told a European press conference in December 2005 that terrorist suspects were not turned over to countries without assurance against torture. Once again, we are learning virtually nothing about renditions from our Congressional oversight committees, but criminal cases in Germany and Italy involving more than three dozen CIA operatives should bring us much needed information.

These activities point to the fact that the CIA has lost its moral compass. In a democracy, moreover, where laws are derived from broad principles of right and wrong and where those principles are protected by agreed procedures, it is not in the interest of the state to flout those procedures at home or abroad. CIA's crimes have allowed our enemies to taunt our hypocrisy, and encouraged our friends to doubt our integrity.

#### The CIA is incapable of accurate scenario planning – it’s a history of failed prediction

**Pipes, 95 -** Richard Pipes, Baird Professor of History at Harvard, served in 1981-82 at the National Security Council as Director, East European and Soviet Affairs (“What to do about the CIA” Commentary, Alt Press Watch)

The opponents of the CIA stress its recurrent intelligence failures as an argument for its liquidation. And undeniably, the Agency has had more fiascos than the law of averages would suggest. It misjudged from the outset both the pace and the magnitude of the Soviet nuclear effort, its main responsibility: its 1966 projection of Soviet ICBM's for 1970, for instance, was half of what they turned out, in fact, to be.(1) It minimized or ignored Soviet defensive measures, such as dispersal, hardening, and redundancy of command-and-control systems, as well as shelter provisions for the leadership--measures which told a great deal about Soviet strategic intentions. Year after year, it depicted the Soviet economy as healthier than it actually was and Soviet defense expenditures as considerably lower than they actually were. On President Kennedy's accession in 1961, the CIA provided projections of Soviet economic growth, based on Moscow's statistics, from which it emerged that by the year 2000 the USSR would have a gross national product (GNP) three times that of the United States!(2) At the same time, the Agency consistently underestimated the Soviet defense budget, placing it originally at 6 to 8 percent of GNP and then, in February 1976, inexplicably doubling that figure to 10 to 15 percent.(3) As has become known since, the true figure was close to double even the doubled figure.

The reasons for these misjudgments will be spelled out in due course. Here, suffice it to say that such absurd miscalculations had serious political consequences. For by depicting the Soviet Union as both stronger and less menacing than previously thought, they pushed the United States toward accommodation with it in the form of detente and an obsession with arms-control negotiations.

The Agency's record of predictions is hardly better than its estimates. In 1950, it failed first to anticipate North Korea's invasion of South Korea and then the intervention of China. In 1962, it denied that Russia intended to install missiles in Cuba up to the very moment when photographic imagery proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that the missiles were being deployed. It anticipated neither the Warsaw Pact aggression against Czechoslovakia in 1968, nor the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, nor the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that same year, nor even Iraq's assault on Kuwait in 1990. It was surprised by the crushing of Solidarity in Poland in 1981. Such instances of failure can be multiplied.

Less often mentioned are the CIA's successes. It has done an excellent job of tracking Soviet weapons developments. In the 1950's, it correctly downplayed the prospect of a Soviet attack on the United States which had many Washington politicians and generals worried. It set in motion a variety of programs to counter Communist propaganda, one of which, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, contributed powerfully to keeping alive dissent inside the Communist bloc. In the 1980's, under President Reagan and his Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), William Casey, it helped, by various covert economic, military, and political operations, to undermine Soviet authority in Poland and Afghanistan.

Many of the Agency's intelligence failures can be attributed to identifiable and remediable flaws of methodology. But even the best-functioning intelligence service cannot be counted upon reliably to predict the actions of foreign powers: divining political intentions is far and away the most difficult aspect of intelligence work. This holds especially true of dictatorial regimes, with which U.S. intelligence is particularly concerned, because their decisions are in the hands of unstable and impulsive individuals subject to few if any external controls. It is hard to predict the behavior of unpredictable personalities.

To place the CIA's performance in proper perspective, it helps to look at the record of other intelligence organizations. In the 1930's, the vaunted British secret service, notwithstanding excellent contacts in Germany, persistently misjudged Hitler's military capabilities as well as his intentions, having convinced itself that the Nazi rearmament program was purely defensive. After Hitler had gone to war in September 1939, British intelligence believed that economic exigencies would make it increasingly difficult for Germany to continue fighting beyond the spring of 1941.(4) British intelligence, which at the time, like its U.S. counterpart, lacked a center to collate secret data, firmly rejected the possibility of a Nazi-Soviet rapprochement, a German invasion of Norway, or a Wehrmacht assault on France by way of the (allegedly) impassable Ardennes Forest.(5)

Japanese intelligence, for its part, managed to persuade its superiors that once the American Pacific fleet had been crippled, the Americans, being prudent businessmen, would sue for peace rather than fight an unprofitable war. The German secret service assured Hitler that as soon as the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939 became public, Britain would renege on its pledge to defend Poland and abandon that country to its fate. Both misjudgments had catastrophic results for the countries concerned.

Intelligence failures, it thus transpires, are not a CIA monopoly; they are not even a monopoly of the intelligence community. Despite vast sums spent on armies of securities analysts who have the advantage of a great deal of reliable public information as well as access to managements, no brokerage firm seems to have found a way of gauging the direction of the financial markets. Indeed, the unmanaged Standard & Poor index fund has been beating three-quarters of the mutual funds run by experts. Even throwing darts at a list of securities has at times produced results as good as, if not better than, those of professional analysts. Nor have economists had notable success in forecasting the course of the nation's economy despite the abundance of indicators at their disposal.(6) What can one reasonably expect, therefore, of analysis which deals with concealed and often deliberately distorted data, and with decisions made in secret by inaccessible rulers, accountable only to themselves?(7)

It needs also to be borne in mind that the sins of the CIA with respect to the Communist bloc duplicated those of academic Sovietology. Proceeding from the same premises and employing the same methodology, the overwhelming majority of professors and think-tank specialists were just as guilty as the CIA of overestimating Soviet strength and stability and of interpreting Soviet actions in defensive terms.(8)

This much conceded, it is possible nevertheless to isolate certain recurrent blunders on the part of both intelligence producers and consumers, avoidance of which would go a long way toward improving the intelligence process. The two most common of these are "mirror-imaging" and political interference.

MIRROR-IMAGING

Mirror-imaging is the tendency to interpret the actions of others in one's own terms. The analyst looks at the situation which his subject confronts and asks himself, "What would I do if I were in his shoes?" The propensity to think in this way derives from a mixture of deficient imagination and, where other nations are concerned, ethnocentricity. The approach assumes that in every situation requiring choices, one choice is the most "rational" and therefore the most likely to be made.

The trouble with this premise is that "rationality" applies only to the means, not to the ends.(9) The person engaged in mirror-imaging, however, assumes that all human actions tend toward the same end--namely, his own--and that, by placing himself in the position of an adversary, he can anticipate the adversary's behavior. It is, without a doubt, the most common error of intelligence-estimating, much more prevalent in political affairs than in military ones, since in warfare the end is always the same--victory--and thus the means can be more reliably calculated in terms of their "rationality."(10)

#### They cook the books to suit political ends

**Pipes, 95 -** Richard Pipes, Baird Professor of History at Harvard, served in 1981-82 at the National Security Council as Director, East European and Soviet Affairs (“What to do about the CIA” Commentary, Alt Press Watch)

POLITICAL INTERFERENCE

Ideally, intelligence analysis should be strictly separated from politics: which is to say that it should arrive at assessments without paying attention to the uses to which they may be put and without taking sides in policy disputes. In practice, this ideal is rarely attained. For while the purpose of intelligence is to provide statesmen with objective information upon which to base their decisions, decision-makers are not detached observers but men of action with their own agendas. If reality clashes with their wishes, the wishes usually win out. They welcome intelligence that supports what they are inclined to do and they ignore all else, or, worse still, they exert pressure on the intelligence community to come up with more helpful estimates.

The most glaring example of the political misuse of intelligence was Stalin's refusal in 1941 to heed warnings of Hitler's impending invasion delivered to him both by his own and by Allied secret services. Stalin had entered into his pact with Hitler with open eyes. Like his patron and teacher, Lenin, he felt that German revanchism represented the best opportunity to get the capitalist powers fighting themselves to exhaustion, which would leave them prostrate and at the mercy of Moscow. To this end, he assured Hitler a safe Eastern front. Expecting a replay of World War I, he was stunned by the rapid collapse of France in 1940, and responded by appeasing Hitler, supplying him with food, rubber, tin, manganese, and everything else Germany required to pursue the war against England. The possibility of Hitler's turning around and attacking so faithful an ally struck him as preposterous and he dismissed reports to this effect as a British provocation. This, of course, represented a case of blatant mirror-imaging but also, and above all, of political interest overriding objective assessment. It nearly lost Russia the war, and caused millions of additional casualties.

In the United States, flagrant instances of ignoring or tampering with intelligence data occurred under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Shaken by Khrushchev's bullying at the Vienna summit conference of 1961, Kennedy chose to demonstrate his toughness by invading Cuba and intervening in Vietnam. In both instances he brushed aside warnings of the CIA. Johnson, too, ignored CIA admonitions about the risks of a massive involvement in Vietnam because he had made up his mind to pursue the war there until victory.

The worst instances of politicization of the CIA occurred under President Nixon, who treated the Agency as a tool of White House policies. Irritated by its independent judgment, Nixon shifted much of the intelligence-estimating authority from the Agency to the office of his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. In this manner, assessments could be reached which justified White House policies. In 1973 Kissinger, now Secretary of State, abolished the prestigious Office of National Estimates, replacing it with an amorphous body of individual National Intelligence Officers, who, acting as individuals rather than as a group, were easier to manipulate. To attain an arms-limitation agreement with Moscow, Nixon and Kissinger disregarded the Agency's skepticism about U.S. ability to verify treaty compliance. According to one Agency veteran, the Nixon White House "brought strong pressure to bear on DCI Richard Helms to change the judgments of the National Intelligence Estimates."(16)

Nixon further politicized the CIA by firing Helms for his independence and refusal to involve the Agency in the Watergate cover-up.(17) Until then, the head of the intelligence agency, like that of the FBI, had been regarded as a civil servant rather than a political appointee. Historians of the CIA agree that these pressures greatly lowered both the quality of its intelligence estimates and its morale.

The practice of pressuring the Agency to come up with politically acceptable estimates continued under President Carter, whose DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner, is said to have interfered with the estimating process and to have provided his own private estimates to suit the President.(18)

A recent instance of politicizing the intelligence process occurred in connection with the Gulf war. Having decided in late 1989 that he could turn Saddam Hussein around and moderate him, President Bush did not request a CIA assessment of the prospects and risks of such a policy before going ahead with its implementation. According to the CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence, the NIE on Iraq was produced after the decision to appease Saddam Hussein had been taken and duly ratified it.(19) In order to support that policy, the NIE wrongly concluded that Iraq was too exhausted by its war with Iran to cause trouble before 1992.(20) This judgment was reached despite the fact that satellite imagery clearly indicated a massive build-up of Iraqi forces.

Finally, it is said that an NIE issued in 1990 or 1991 which predicted very accurately the violent break-up of Yugoslavia was ignored by policy-makers who did not even want to contemplate such a possibility.(21)

Thus, apart from the difficulties inherent in the process of assessing intelligence data and making forecasts on their basis, the CIA, like its counterparts in other countries, suffers from the added liability of having its estimates rejected or ignored when they do not fit the interests of politicians, their ultimate consumers.

#### Ending CIA drone use doesn’t improve human intelligence – organizational culture is civilian and controlled by the intelligence division – the paramilitary wing is separate

**Gerecht, 13 -** Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA case officer, is a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (“The Unchanging CIA” The Weekly Standard, 2/18, Alt Press Watch)

These criticisms followed an earlier and even more politically charged one: Espionage had fallen victim to "covert action" during the Reagan years, just as "HUMINT" had played second fiddle to "CA" when Allen Dulles was the central intelligence director in the 1950s. The 2007 best-seller Legacy of Ashes, by Tim Weiner, then intelligence reporter for the New York Times, advanced this narrative and suggested that George W. Bush and his Global War on Terrorism had led Langley, again, into a covert-action morass. Since the agency's paramilitary activity is a form of covert action, this critique, as Weiner himself recently put it in the Times, is still valid.

Neat, literarily appealing, and a bit harsher on Republicans than post-Vietnam Democrats, all these criticisms are wrong. Killer drones, reconnaissance satellites, the global array of electronic ears run by the military's National Security Agency, and covert action haven't hurt the CIA mission to find and run spies against the country's adversaries and enemies. The agency has often conducted espionage poorly, but that has a lot to do with the nature of the profession - our faults are common among foreign intelligence services - and the particularities of the bigger-is-better American character. Predators, high-tech "toys," and most profoundly covert action have, more often than not, pushed the CIA to collect better human intelligence.

Always remember: Espionage is cheap. A couple billion dollars can give anyone a global spy service. I have never heard an American case officer who was running an operation say that he no longer had the money to do what he needed for his job. This isn't true in the foreign service. American diplomats usually don't even have the pocket money to take their foreign counterparts to lunch with the regularity conducive to intimate, illuminating reporting. And truth be told, it is America's diplomatic cables, as routine as they often are, that give Washington analysts, including those stacked up like firewood inside Langley, the grist for their work.

Although the insolvency of the U.S. government may one day force beancounters to cut real muscle from the CIA's workforce, that hasn't happened yet. The Clandestine Service still has, like Langley's analytical wing, far too many officers feeding the bureaucratic beast. Given the reality of recruiting spies (the best intelligence sources usually volunteer their services), the CIA has too many operatives chasing too many mediocre targets. Thank God for satellites, intercepts, and the tens of billions of dollars spent on other forms of electronic intelligence. They have provided more golden insights than espionage.

And the agency's paramilitary officers and the paramilitary contractors hired since 9/11 have not changed Langley's bureaucratic structure. "Inside" staff - case officers who rise through the ranks working the espionage beat - still rule. The paramilitary corps, known often as "knuckle-draggers," like the more refined cadre of non-official-cover officers who never set foot inside an embassy or consulate, are still not considered fast tracks for promotion. As in any organization, find the fastest track for advancement, and you will find that institution's ethos. Throughout the Vietnam years, when case officers flooded into Southeast Asia, and the paramilitary contingent within the operations directorate grew enormously (far more than we've seen since 9/11), classic spy-hunting operatives never lost control of Langley.

#### No heg impact

**Preble 8/3/2010** (Christopher Preble, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, taught history at St. Cloud State University and Temple University, was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, Ph.D. in history from Temple University. “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” 8/3/10) [http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/](http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/" \t "_blank)

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions.

#### Decline causes retrenchment which solves their impact

MacDonald and Parent, 11 (Paul K., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, Spring 2011, pp. 7–44, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034)

These arguments have grim implications for contemporary international politics. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades. 8 Yet, if the pessimists are correct, politicians and interests groups in the United States will be unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments. Perceptions of weakness and declining U.S. credibility will encourage policymakers to hold on to burdensome overseas commitments, despite their high costs in blood and treasure. 9 Policymakers in Washington will struggle to retire from profitless military engagements and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits. 10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position. 11 In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. 12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

#### The aff’s hegemonic politics is maintained by a farce of legitimacy which justifies endless destruction

Gulli 13 [Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” pg. 5, 2013, http://academia.edu/2527260/For\_the\_Critique\_of\_Sovereignty\_and\_Violence]

*\*\*We disagree with the author’s use of gendered language*

I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: **The sovereign everywhere**, be it the political or financial elite, **fakes the legitimacy** on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they **rest on violence and terror**, or the threat thereof. This is an **obvious and essential aspect** of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by **the lack of hegemony**. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, **the United States**, whose hegemony has **diminished or vanished**. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the **sheer drive for domination** has to show **its true face**, its **raw violence**. The usual, traditional **ideological justifications for dominance** (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become **very weak** because of **the contempt** that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) **regularly show** toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. **Not so for the dominant nations**: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their **structural, ontological and historical, weakness**. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) **only heighten the brutality** in the exertion of **what remains of their dominance**. Although they rely on a **highly sophisticated military machine** (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has **traditionally** been and **increasingly** is an outpost for **military operations and global policing** (now excellently **incarnated by Africom**), **they know that they have lost their hegemony**.

#### Americacentrism causes extinction

**Willson, 02** [Brian – Ph.D New College San Fransisco, Humanities, JD, American University, “Hearts and Minds Veterans Show?]**<** http://www.brianwillson.com/?q=node/70

On September 20, 2002, the selected resident of the White House submitted his National Security Strategy to Congress, perhaps the first time our nation has so openly espoused a doctrine absolutely and explicitly imperialist. Its declaration of permanent global dominance "beyond challenge" over the 95 percent of humanity that is non-U.S. is indeed frightening. The coming egregious assault upon Iraq will be its first implementation, no matter whether the U.N. or other nations vigorously object. Even IF the Congress objects, resident Bush has argued that the Joint Resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force, overwhelmingly passed by Congress in the aftermath of September 11, authorizes military actions on his own volition. Call it what you will, but we are experiencing a virtual dictatorship ruled without respect for law, with one party comprising two right-wings preempting effective checks and balances. I believe a global imperial policy has its roots in our civilization's history. Its current boldness in a unipolar world is a logical and inevitable result of the collective Western and American Way Of Life (AWOL). The United States, with but 4.5 percent of the world's population, in fact consumes anywhere from 25 percent to nearly half the world's resources, and together with the West, comprises 25 percent of the world's population consuming 85 percent of resources. Thus, 75 percent of the world's human beings are impoverished with but 15 percent of the remaining finite resources. This grotesque injustice is further exacerbated by globalization's demands for ever-increasing production and consumption of limited resources, with life-destroying pollution a by-product. If we insist on continuing to rationalize business-as-usual with our insatiable addictions, expansion of our global hegemony is required to assure access to ever-more resources, markets, and cheap labor, as if they are infinitely exploitable. However, if we insist on continuing, know that **we are committing species suicide**. The seeds of our cultural ethos and mind-set originate in the extreme ethnocentrism and deep-seated racism of our European ancestors in the 1600s, when the white Puritans mandated their godly nature to reign supreme over the "savage" Indigenous inhabitants already living here. John Winthrop, governor of Massachusetts, wrote in 1630: "We shall find that the God of Israel is among us, when ten of us shall be able to overcome a thousand of our enemies; we shall be as a City upon a Hill." Expanding westward was a given, and by the 1840s, John L. Sullivan, editor of the *Democratic Review,* wrote that territorial additions were "the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions." By the end of the 19th Century, domestic production exceeded consumption capacities. Continued profitability demanded overseas economic expansion as the new frontier. Woodrow Willson lectured at Columbia University that "Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed must be battered down." The McKinley administration, with the Spanish-American War in 1898 that acquired Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, and annexation of Hawaii the same year, launched what some call "the American Century." Teddy Roosevelt soon took Panama from Colombia. The U.S. was becoming an imperial power. With victory in World War II and utilization of shocking new weapons of cosmic violence, the U.S. possessed a new cockiness. Its only obstacle was the Soviet Union, the product of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution that espoused socialism as the first comprehensive alternative to capitalism. Though the U.S. knew the Soviets were exhausted after the war, losing 15 percent of its population with much of its industrial and agricultural capacity destroyed, it was deemed important to eliminate the threat it posed for inspiring the impoverished of the world to revolt from centuries of colonialism. In 1948, George Kennan, director of the U.S. State Department's planning staff, secretly advocated an honest approach to our foreign policy: "We have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only 6.3 percent of its population. We cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our task is to.maintain this position of disparity. Our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere. We should cease to talk about unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts." Shortly thereafter, secret National Security Council study known as NSC-68 asserted that the U.S. had a unique right and responsibility to impose "order among nations," needing to "check the Kremlin" so that "our free society can flourish." U.S. policy, it said, "must foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system," assuring "belief in ourselves and in our way of life." It was framed in apocalyptic terms: "Fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself." From 1947 to the present, the U.S. militarily intervened over 200 times, covertly perhaps as many as 10,000 times, in more than 100 nations, thwarting the restiveness of aggrieved peoples. Virtually all interventions, if known, were couched in pretexts subsequently proven false. Hundreds of millions were murdered, maimed and impoverished. Today, we have military troops in over 100 countries, training programs in 180. This history was preceded by earlier genocides committed against the original Indigenous inhabitants and Africans, providing us a "free" land base and labor pool. Millions were murdered. Thus, the foundation for U.S. and Western civilization is systemic, **virtually incomprehensible injustice**, murder and plunder. Our fantasy lie exposed demands radical consciousness shifts toward justice and mutual respect. **We are living in view of our apocalyptic City on the Hill** that seeks to control everyone and everything everywhere. It is a fundamentalism that has no equals. We are living during an evolutionary opportunity to SEE the deleterious effects of our Way Of Life on all life, everywhere. Perhaps we are offered a cosmic Zen gift disguised as modern Puritan extremists that might enable us to comprehend the EXTREME danger our materialist values and policies pose for all. When serious threats are perceived, our species possesses an ancient survival mechanism able to motivate unprecedented responses. Our 8 million year evolutionary journey as a bi-pedal species has succeeded so far through many adaptations and much cooperation. Archaelogist V. Gordon Childe wrote, *Man (sic) Makes Himself.* What we have created we can uncreate. We are completely capable of identifying sustainable alternatives to the violence of civilization, while withdrawing our support from its oligarchic structures. To survive, we must take responsibility for extricating ourselves from complicity in the dangerous U.S. American civilization which, if not stopped, promises to destroy the Earth as we know Her, **accelerating our rapid extinction**. Gandhi prescribed nonviolent resistance to imperialism accompanied by living the local, self-reliant alternatives. The time is now!