## 1nc

#### Interpretation—the aff should defend topical change in USFG policy in accordance with the resolution

#### The text of the rez calls for debate on hypothetical government action

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “Topic relevance” isn't enough—only a precise and limited rez creates deliberation on a point of mutual difference

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education withoutfinding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a **precise question** is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### It’s a prior question—otherwise there's nothing to require disagreement

Adolf G. **Gundersen,** Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M, **2000**

POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2000, p. 104-5. (DRGNS/E625)

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separation. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that **precedes the actual** taking and **implementation** of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators **require something to deliberate about and that** deliberation **presumes certain institutional structures** and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting partisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

#### Vote neg—

#### 1. Prep and clash—post facto topic change alters balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and use perms—key to engage a prepared adversary.

#### 2. Limits—specific topics are key to reasonable expectations for 2Ns—open subjects create incentives for avoidance—that overstretches the negative and turns participation.

#### 3. War powers debates are good—without topicality, there’s a competitive incentive to avoid them and the neg ground associated—

#### First, they give undergrads an opportunity to uncover a debate that would otherwise be stifled in public—that challenges conventional wisdom on a timely controversy

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Taken together, the connection between tournament competition and a public collaboration reorients the pedagogical function of debate. Gordon Mitchell and his colleagues comment on this possibility, “The debate tournament site’s potential to work as a translational pipeline for scholarly research presents unique opportunities for colleges and universities seeking to bolster their institutional infrastructure for undergraduate research” (Mitchell et al, 2010, p. 15). Indeed, the debate series affords competitors the opportunity to become part of the discussion and inform policymakers about potential positions, as opposed to the traditional reactionary format of hosting public debates at the season’s end. Empirically, these events had the effect of “giv[ing] voice to previously buried arguments” that “subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations” (Mitchell, 2010, p. 107). Given the timeliness of the topic, these debates provide a new voice into the ongoing deliberation over war powers and help make the fruits of competitive research have a public purpose.

The second major function concerns the specific nature of deliberation over war powers. Given the connectedness between presidential war powers and the preservation of national security, deliberation is often difficult. Mark Neocleous describes that when political issues become securitized; it “helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms.” (2008, p. 71). Collegiate debaters, through research and competitive debate, serve as a bulwark against this “short-circuiting” and help preserve democratic deliberation. This is especially true when considering national security issues. Eric English contends, “The success … in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security politics points to efficacy of academic debate as a training ground.” Part of this training requires a “robust understanding of the switch-side technique” which “helps prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies” (English et. al, 2007, p. 224). Hence, competitive debate training provides foundation for interrogating these policies in public.

Alarmism on the issues of war powers is easily demonstrated by Obama’s repeated attempts to transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay. Republicans were able to launch a campaign featuring the slogan, “not in my backyard” (Schor, 2009). By locating the nexus of insecurity as close as geographically possible, the GOP were able to instill a fear of national insecurity that made deliberation in the public sphere not possible. When collegiate debaters translate their knowledge of the policy wonkery on such issues into public deliberation, it serves to cut against the alarmist rhetoric purported by opponents.

In addition to combating misperceptions concerning detainee transfers, the investigative capacity of collegiate debate provides a constant check on governmental policies. A new trend concerning national security policies has been for the government to provide “status updates” to the public. On March 28, 2011, Obama gave a speech concerning Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya and the purpose of the bombings. Jeremy Engels and William Saas describe this “post facto discourse” as a “new norm” where “Americans are called to acquiesce to decisions already made” (2013, p. 230). Contra to the alarmist strategy that made policy deliberation impossible, this rhetorical strategy posits that deliberation is not necessary. Collegiate debaters researching war powers are able to interrogate whether deliberation is actually needed. Given the technical knowledge base needed to comprehend the mechanism of how war powers operate, debate programs serve as a constant investigation into whether deliberation is necessary not only for prior action but also future action. By raising public awareness, there is a greater potential that “the public’s inquiry into potential illegal action abroad” could “create real incentives to enforce the WPR” (Druck, 2010, p. 236). While this line of interrogation could be fulfilled by another organization, collegiate debaters who translate their competitive knowledge into public awareness create a “space for talk” where the public has “previously been content to remain silent” (Engels & Saas, 2013, p. 231).

Given the importance of presidential war powers and the strategies used by both sides of the aisle to stifle deliberation, the import of competitive debate research into the public realm should provide an additional check of being subdued by alarmism or acquiescent rhetorics. After creating that space for deliberation, debaters are apt to influence the policies themselves. Mitchell furthers, “Intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process” (2010, p. 107). With the timeliness of the war powers controversy and the need for competitive debate to reorient publicly, the CEDA/Miller Center series represents a symbiotic relationship that ought to continue into the future. Not only will collegiate debaters become better public advocates by shifting from competition to collaboration, the public becomes more informed on a technical issue where deliberation was being stifled. As a result, debaters reinvigorate debate.

#### Dialogue must be grounded in the resolution to be functional—this means they have to read a topical aff with a plan, but this can be justified through performative or discursive advantages—their lack of a role for the neg denies the possibility of a respected adversary and strengthens dogma

**Galloway, 07** – Ryan, Assistant Professor and Director of Debate at Samford University (“DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, vol. 28, 2007, Ebsco)

This journal previously (2004) addressed issues regarding the growing divide in policy debate. However, the role of the debate resolution in the clash of civilizations was largely ignored. Here, I defend the notion that activist approaches of critical debaters can best flourish if grounded in topical advocacy defined in terms of the resolution. This approach encourages the pedagogical benefits of debates about discourse and representations while preserving the educational advantages of switch-side debate. Debaters’ increased reliance on speech act and performativity theory in debates generates a need to step back and re-conceptualize the false dilemma of the “policy only” or “kritik only” perspective. Policy debate’s theoretical foundations should find root in an overarching theory of debate that incorporates both policy and critical exchanges. Here, I will seek to conceptualize debate as a dialogue, following the theoretical foundations of Mikhail Bakhtin (1990) and Star Muir (1993) that connects the benefits of dialogical modes of argument to competitive debate. Ideally, the resolution should function to negotiate traditional and activist approaches. Taking the resolution as an invitation to a dialogue about a particular set of ideas would preserve the affirmative team’s obligation to uphold the debate resolution. At the same time, this approach licenses debaters to argue both discursive and performative advantages. While this view is broader than many policy teams would like, and certainly more limited than many critical teams would prefer, this approach captures the advantages of both modes of debate while maintaining the stable axis point of argumentation for a full clash of ideas around these values. Here, I begin with an introduction to the dialogic model, which I will relate to the history of switch-side debate and the current controversy. Then, I will defend my conception of debate as a dialogical exchange. Finally, I will answer potential criticisms to the debate as a dialogue construct. Setting the Argumentative Table: Conceptualizing Debate as a Dialogue Conceiving debate as a dialogue exposes a means of bridging the divide between the policy community and the kritik community. Here I will distinguish between formal argument and dialogue. While formal argument centers on the demands of informal and formal logic as a mechanism of mediation, dialogue tends to focus on the relational aspects of an interaction. As such, it emphasizes the give-and-take process of negotiation. Consequently, dialogue emphasizes outcomes related to agreement or consensus rather than propositional correctness (Mendelson & Lindeman, 2000). As dialogue, the affirmative case constitutes a discursive act that anticipates a discursive response. The consequent interplay does not seek to establish a propositional truth, but seeks to initiate an in-depth dialogue between the debate participants. Such an approach would have little use for rigid rules of logic or argument, such as stock issues or fallacy theory, except to the point where the participants agreed that these were functional approaches. Instead, a dialogic approach encourages evaluations of affirmative cases relative to their performative benefits, or whether or not the case is a valuable speech act. The move away from formal logic structure toward a dialogical conversation model allows for a broader perspective regarding the ontological status of debate. At the same time, a dialogical approach challenges the ways that many teams argue speech act and performance theory in debates. Because there are a range of ways that performative oriented teams argue their cases, there is little consensus regarding the status of topicality. While some take topicality as a central challenge to creating performance-based debates, many argue that topicality is wholly irrelevant to the debate, contending that the requirement that a critical affirmative be topical silences creativity and oppositional approaches. However, if we move beyond viewing debate as an ontologically independent monologue—but as an invitation to dialogue, our attention must move from the ontology of the affirmative case to a consideration of the case in light of exigent opposition (Farrell, 1985). Thus, the initial speech act of the affirmative team sets the stage for an emergent response. While most responses deal directly with the affirmative case, Farrell notes that they may also deal with metacommunication regarding the process of negotiation. In this way, we may conceptualize the affirmative’s goal in creating a “germ of a response” (Bakhtin, 1990) whose completeness bears on the possibility of all subsequent utterances. Conceived as a dialogue, the affirmative speech act anticipates the negative response. A failure to adequately encourage, or anticipate a response deprives the negative speech act and the emergent dialogue of the capacity for a complete inquiry. Such violations short circuit the dialogue and undermine the potential for an emerging dialogue to gain significance (either within the debate community or as translated to forums outside of the activity). Here, the dialogical model performs as a fairness model, contending that the affirmative speech act, be it policy oriented, critical, or performative in nature, must adhere to normative restrictions to achieve its maximum competitive and ontological potential. This is not new. The notion of affirmative restrictions harkens back to the old controversies over switch-side debate, when proponents argued that debaters be required to argue against their own personal convictions in favor of topics they personally opposed, while opponents contended that debaters should never betray their personal convictions. Darin Hicks and Ronald Greene (2000) call this stance “rhetoric of commitment.” Initially, formats that require debaters to speak against their own personal convictions were considered unethical by opponents of switch-side debate. Defenders countered with an Aristotlean ethic that asked debaters to learn their positions from all sides. Current controversies replay elements of debates regarding switching sides. The primary addition to the discussion regards the role of speech acts and performance. Affirmative teams often defend their advocacy in the context of a larger critical project, often claiming that the benefits of their project supersede localized fairness norms so that topicality and other procedurals are outweighed. This approach powerfully challenges requirements that affirmatives be topical. Defending Debate as a Dialogue After having examined the current state of debate and the impetus for a change to a dialogical model, this section will defend three benefits to re-conceptualizing debate in a dialogic manner. First, unfettered affirmative options deny argumentative space to negative teams who become unable to meaningfully present a counter speech act to the affirmative speech act. Second, by placing a single immutable claim at the center of all debates on both sides of the topic as part of a greater project, debaters deny themselves, their opponents, and the judges the benefits of understanding the unique dynamics of contingent claims. Third, maintaining stable advocacy through both sides and on all topics, regardless of the resolution, prevents students from seriously engaging their perspective from any other position. This essay argues that re-conceptualizing fairness norms like topicality into a dialogue model will help to void these problems while licensing critical styles and modes of argumentation. Setting a Table: Fairness Norms as a Pre-Requisite for Argumentation Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate themselves to rules of discussion, are the best ways to decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy. A Siren’s Call: Falsely Presuming Epistemic Benefits In addition to the basic equity norm, dismissing the idea that debaters defend the affirmative side of the topic encourages advocates to falsely value affirmative speech acts in the absence of a negative response. There may be several detrimental consequences that go unrealized in a debate where the affirmative case and plan are not topical. Without ground, debaters may fall prey to a siren’s call, a belief that certain critical ideals and concepts are axiological, existing beyond doubt without scrutiny. Bakhtin contends that in dialogical exchanges “the greater the number and weight” of counter-words, the deeper and more substantial our understanding will be (Bakhtin, 1990). The matching of the word to the counter-word should be embraced by proponents of critical activism in the activity, because these dialogical exchanges allow for improvements and modifications in critical arguments. Muir argues that “debate puts students into greater contact with the real world by forcing them to read a great deal of information” (1993, p. 285). He continues, “[t]he constant consumption of material…is significantly constitutive. The information grounds the issues under discussion, and the process shapes the relationship of the citizen to the public arena” (p. 285). Through the process of comprehensive understanding, debate serves both as a laboratory and a constitutive arena. Ideas find and lose adherents. Ideas that were once considered beneficial are modified, changed, researched again, and sometimes discarded altogether. A central argument for open deliberation is that it encourages a superior consensus to situations where one side is silenced. Christopher Peters contends, “The theory holds that antithesis ultimately produces a better consensus, that the clash of differing, even opposing interests and ideas in the process of decision making…creates decisions that are better for having been subjected to this trial by fire” (1997, p. 336). The combination of a competitive format and the necessity to take points of view that one does not already agree with combines to create a unique educational experience for all participants. Those that eschew the value of such experience by an axiological position short-circuit the benefits of the educational exchange for themselves, their opponents, as well as the judges and observers of such debates. The Devil’s Advocate: Advancing Activism by Learning Potential Weaknesses Willingness to argue against what one believes helps the advocate understand the strengths and weaknesses of their own position. It opens the potential for a new synthesis of material that is superior to the first (Dybvig & Iverson, 2000). Serving as a devil’s advocate encourages an appreciation for middle ground and nuance (Dell, 1958). Failure to see both sides can lead to high levels of ego involvement and dogmatism (Hicks & Greene, 2000). Survey data confirms these conclusions. Star Muir found that debaters become more tolerant after learning to debate both sides of an issue (Muir, 1993). Such tolerance is predictable since debate is firmly grounded in respect for the other through the creation of a fair dialogue. Ironically, opponents of a debate as dialogue risk falling prey to dogmatism and the requisite failure to respect potential middle grounds. Perceiving the world through the lens of contingency and probability can be beneficial to real-world activism when its goal is creating consensus out of competing interests. The anti-oppression messages of critical teams would benefit from a thorough investigation of such claims, and not merely an untested axiological assumption.

#### Structured topic debate promotes substantive knowledge and critical skills to improve advocacy

Keller, et. al, 01 – Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago (Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

SOCIAL WORKERS HAVE a professional responsibility to shape social policy and legislation (National Association of Social Workers, 1996). In recent decades, the concept of policy practice has encouraged social workers to consider the ways in which their work can be advanced through active participation in the policy arena (Jansson, 1984, 1994; Wyers, 1991). The emergence of the policy practice framework has focused greater attention on the competencies required for social workers to influence social policy and placed greater emphasis on preparing social work students for policy intervention (Dear & Patti, 1981; Jansson, 1984, 1994; Mahaffey & Hanks, 1982; McInnis-Dittrich, 1994). The curriculum standards of the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) require the teaching of knowledge and skills in the political process (CSWE, 1994). With this formal expectation of policy education in schools of social work, the best instructional methods must be employed to ensure students acquire the requisite policy practice skills and perspectives. The authors believe that structured student debates have great potential for promoting competence in policy practice and in-depth knowledge of substantive topics relevant to social policy. Like other interactive assignments designed to more closely resemble "real-world" activities, issue-oriented debates actively engage students in course content. Debates also allow students to develop and exercise skills that may translate to political activities, such as testifying before legislative committees. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, debates may help to stimulate critical thinking by shaking students free from established opinions and helping them to appreciate the complexities involved in policy dilemmas. Relationships between Policy Practice Skills, Critical Thinking, and Learning Policy practice encompasses social workers' "efforts to influence the development, enactment, implementation, or assessment of social policies" (Jansson, 1994, p. 8). Effective policy practice involves analytic activities, such as defining issues, gathering data, conducting research, identifying and prioritizing policy options, and creating policy proposals (Jansson, 1994). It also involves persuasive activities intended to influence opinions and outcomes, such as discussing and debating issues, organizing coalitions and task forces, and providing testimony. According to Jansson (1984,pp. 57-58), social workers rely upon five fundamental skills when pursuing policy practice activities: value-clarification skills for identifying and assessing the underlying values inherent in policy positions; conceptual skills for identifying and evaluating the relative merits of different policy options; interactional skills for interpreting the values and positions of others and conveying one's own point of view in a convincing manner; political skills for developing coalitions and developing effective strategies; and position-taking skills for recommending, advocating, and defending a particular policy. These policy practice skills reflect the hallmarks of critical thinking (see Brookfield, 1987; Gambrill, 1997). The central activities of critical thinking are identifying and challenging underlying assumptions, exploring alternative ways of thinking and acting, and arriving at commitments after a period of questioning, analysis, and reflection (Brookfield, 1987). Significant parallels exist with the policy-making process--identifying the values underlying policy choices, recognizing and evaluating multiple alternatives, and taking a position and advocating for its adoption. Developing policy practice skills seems to share much in common with developing capacities for critical thinking. R.W. Paul (as cited in Gambrill, 1997) states that critical thinkers acknowledge the imperative to argue from opposing points of view and to seek to identify weakness and limitations in one's own position. Critical thinkers are aware that there are many legitimate points of view, each of which (when thought through) may yield some level of insight. (p. 126) John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28). The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### That outweighs and turns the aff

Christian O. **Lundberg 10** Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Mindsets change from research and prep, not rounds themselves. This proves limits and ground come first and means they don’t have a competition key warrant

**Goodin and Niemeyer 2003** – \*philosophy professor at Australian National University, editor of Oxford Handbooks of Political Science, founding editor of Blackwell's Journal of Political Philosophy, \*\*ANU political science research fellow (Robert and Simon, Political Studies, 51:627–649, “When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy”, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf)

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and procedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation –‘deliberation within’– will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: A citizens’ jury concentrates people's minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’– political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people's time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

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#### What is queer about queering Lincoln? What is queer about queer theory generally? The answer is that in today’s academic environment queer has become a stagnant concept. In focusing on opposition to heteronormative, queer theory has created itself largely based around the binary dyad of queer/heteronormative – this position is limiting and prevents us from challenging dominant power structures

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**Queer has reached a political peak**. Its theoretical movements have become limited by its incessant investment in identity politics and its political outlook has in many ways attained dormant status due to its narrowed interest in heteronormativite. This is, of course, not to suggest the end of queer but instead a potential deterritorialization of queer as we know it today. Over the past two decades, a significant body of work has contributed to what is referred to as queer studies. Queer theorizations are at the heart of this anti-canonical genre where the intersection of bodies, identities, and cultures continue to be a central focus.1 Although queer theory informs much of this work vis-à-vis the queering of theory and the theories of queer, important feminist, postcolonial, and ability theorizations have more recently informed the body of queer studies. So while I consider queer studies and theories to be interconnected (and at times interchangeable), the theoretical and philosophical movements of queer studies are certainly not restricted to or by queer theories. What remains consistent amongst these various theorizations, however, is a shared politics embedded in significations, representations, and identifications where language has become somewhat of a unified trajectory for thinking through experience. These important works without question continue to offer many insightful ways to account for the intersection of bodies, institutions, cultural practices, social traditions, political movements, and economic initiatives. Michael Warner’s introduction of heteronormativiy in the early 1990s monumentally framed the ways in which we think about how subjects are subjected to the normative discourses of heterosexuality and in doing so created the important spaces to challenge and reimagine these productivities.2 As a result of this and many other significant contributions, **queer theory has become almost exclusively interested in challenging heteronormative ideologies** by examining and exposing how subjects come into being through discursive interactions. It offers a critical politics for thinking about how subjects are constituted through heteronormative discourses. Most notable, perhaps, is bringing to light how subjects become intelligible through binary identity categories such as male/ female, masculine/feminine, and straight/gay.3 It queers—disturbs, disrupts, and centers—what is considered “normal” in order to explore possibilities outside of patriarchal, hierarchical, and heteronormative discursive practices. We see this, for instance, in the works of Butler (1990), Fuss (1995), and Mufloz (1999) as they explore a shift from identities to (dis)identifications. I outline elsewhere (Ruffolo 2006a) how such readings confront binary identities so as to appreciate third spaces: fixed and stable identities are reconfigured as mobile and fluid identifications, where the “I” is no longer determined by the Other but is discursively negotiated through others. Queer theory critically redefines the relationships amongst bodies, identities, and culture through a particular commitment to subjectivity as seen through significations, representations, and identifications. The vigor of queer is its commitment to disrupt ideologies, practices, concepts, values, and assumptions that are essentially normal in order to expose what is normatively essentialized. **Having said this,** what, you might ask, are my post-queer intentions? In the Fall-Winter 2005 issue of Social Text, David Eng, Judith Halberstam, and José Esteban Munoz ask a necessary question of queer studies today: “**What’s queer about queer studies now?”**4 In the introduction, Eng, Halberstam, and Munoz provide an overview of queer that sets a foundation for my critique of queer: Around 1990 queer emerged into public consciousness. It was a term that challenged the normalizing mechanisms of state power to name its sexual subjects: male or female, married or single, heterosexual or homosexual, natural or perverse. Given its commitment to interrogating the social processes that not only produced and recognized but also normalized and sustained identity, the political promise of the term resided specifically in its broad critique of multiple social antagonisms, including race, gender, class, nationality, and religion, in addition to sexuality. (1) By asking the question “what’s queer about queer studies no” this edition explores the purpose and value of queer in a time of global economics marked by a post-9/ 11 politics embedded in war and terror. It offers a critical comparison between the “broad social concerns” of queer studies in the past with the more intensely interconnected focus of queer studies in the present—work interested in “theories of race, on problems of transnationalism, on conflicts between global capital and labor, on issues of diaspora and immigration, and on questions of citizenship, national belonging, and necropolitics” (2). Post- Queer Politics engages Eng, Halberstam, and Munoz’s call for a “renewed queer studies” by taking into consideration the various interconnections amongst the wide range of contributors of this edition. **It is well known that queer theory is interested in challenging binaries through an interrogation of heteronormative practices using queer as a verb** (a radical process of disruption) rather than a noun (an umbrella term encompassing multiple identities). My introductory comments on the peaking of queer are situated in this relationship between queer and heteronormativity. I make the argument here and throughout this book that **the queer/heteronormativity dualism is unproductive considering the contemporary complexities of neoliberal capitalism and globalizatio**n. PostQueer Politics is primarily interested in challenging the queer/heteronormative dyad that has informed much of the theorizations of queer and the queering of theories over the past few decades. I consider the “peaking” of queer as a plateau that negotiates contemporary queer theories and post-queer theorizations. Post-Queer Politics is interested in examining the current politics of queer and the queering of politics through a renewed sense of queer that is differentiated from queer’s current implications in subjecdvity Its vision is twofold: to consider what something post might do for queer and what queer might do for something post. I am interested in the doings of post-queer rather than the beings of it so as to avoid unnecessary binaries that have resulted in the current desire for something post. This project is about the politics around “post-” and “queer” rather than a post-identitarian landscape that would situate “post-” and “queer” as binaries. Despite my explicit intention to avoid a reading of “post-” as a definitive time and space that come after something, I must draw a somewhat stark delineation here: the “post-” of post-queer is in many respects post-subjectivity. I say this not because queer is subjectivity and post-queer is not. This, of course, would produce an unnecessary binary. Rather, as I will argue in the plateaus that follow, notions of becoming (Deleuze and Guattari) and dialogism (Bakhtin) can speak to the creativities and potentialities of contemporary politics that can not be accounted for in the representations, significations, and identifications inherent to subjectivity. I am therefore not suggesting that post-queer comes after subjectivity but that it functions within a creative terrain of potentialities that functions quite differently from subjectivity of which the queer/ heteronormative dyad is a part of. In other words, the current politics of queer, as seen through its relations to subjectivity, **are limiting for the future of queer studies because of its unequivocal commitment to the queer/heteronormative binary** **where the politics of such discourses are restricted by the endless cycle of significations** that reposition subjects on fixed planes—bodies that are either resituated in predetermined significations (moving from one identity category/ norm to another) or are represented through differentiated significations (new representations that differ from already emerged significations).

My use of bodies extends beyond the ways in which queer theories think about “the body,” embodiment, corporeality, and flesh in terms of subjectivity where, for instance, movement is often accounted for through resignifications. These readings more often than not limit bodies to physical or abstract binary representations. Consequently, my use of “bodies” reaches the virtualities of politics through a consideration of bodies of theoretical work, bodies of knowledge, institutional bodies, bodies of thought, systemic bodies, and cultural bodies. I am not so much arguing for the desire to maintain or favor the terms “body” and “bodies,” but instead to challenge how these terms are read through significations, representations, and identifications and therefore the overall privileging of subjectivity.

#### The aff’s conception of queerness defines itself solely as that which is outside the norm – IE something is queer because it is *not* heteronormative. This definition makes it impossible to escape from dominant power structures

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Post-queer rhizomatic politics is one that is directed outwards rather than inwards. The continuous flows of dialogical-becomings--\_-the indefinite breaks and connections—are always moving forward where something new is always created out of something given. Unlike the arborescent-subject that is directed inwards, rhizomatic dialogical-becomings are always deterritorialized as they maintain an ongoing state of becoming a body without organs (BwO). The complex flows of desiring-machines described above persistently strive to become a BwO as their connections try to reach pure deterritorialization. In this section, I want to consider how the BwO is a virtual affect of dialogical-becomings. It does not encapsulate desiring-machines but is an additional (anti-)production together with desiring-machines. The BwO is a fundamental aspect of post- queer politics because it speaks to the production of intensities that emerge when the flows of desiring-machines stop. Deterritorializations are not finalized states or binary oppositions. They offer an important strategy for contemporary politics because they do not directly oppose a structure (such as the queer/ heteronormative dyad) but instead remap a system through creative lines of flight (the plateauing of queer and post-queer). We can think of the BwO as a limit that continuously seeks to deterritorialize without ever reterritorializing (even though, as you will see belo reterritorializations are often coupled with deterritorializations). As Brian Massumi writes: Think of the body without organs as the body outside any determinate state, poised for any action in its repertory; this is the body from the point of view of its potential, or virtuality. Now freeze it as it passes through a threshold state on the way from one determinate state to another. This is a degree of intensity of the body without organs. It is still the body as virmality but a lower level of virtuality, because only the potential states involved in the bifurification from the preceding state to the next are effectively superposed in the threshold state. (1992, 70) The BwO is therefore not opposed to desiring-machines but is instead in a constant tension with them. The term itself—Body without Organs—is not in opposition to the organism. It is against what the organism stands for: organization. We can think of the subject as such an organization where all meaning refers back to a central core and all movement corresponds with a central tendency. The BwO not only challenges the arboreal structures of life but also works within a different realm as that of the rhizome where it does not break flows (rhizomatic breaks and connections) but desires continuous flows. Unlike the subject that requires external agencies for meaning such as language structures or discursive realms, the BwO is pure intensity: The body without organs is nonproductive; nonetheless it is produced, at a certain place and a certain time in the connective synthesis, as the identity of producing and the product: the schizophrenic table is a body without organs. The body without organs is not the proof of an original nothingness, nor is it what remains of a lost totality. Above all, it is not a projection; it has nothing whatsoever to do with the body itself, or with an image of the body. It is the body without an image. This imageless, organless body, the nonproductive, exists right there where it is produced, in the third stage of the binary-linear series. It is perpetually reinserted into the process of production. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 8) We can think of the BwO as a plane of immanence rather than stratification.’3 It may seem as if desiring-machines and BwO are a part of two different systems. They are in fact two forms of the same principle: desiring-machines and BwO are both a part of the productions of productions of life. It is through the tension that they share that every production becomes an anti-production because dialogical-becomings, for instance, can not maintain a multiplicity of desiring-machines and are unable to fully become a BwO. Dialogical-becomings are schizo. Capital is perhaps the most widely referenced example of a BwO. It is the becoming-BwO of capitalism that creates the illusion that everything is produced through it. Although capital can be transformed into something concrete (i.e., money can purchase goods) it can not do anything on its own. Capital is a miraculating machine that creates the desire for a BwO to overcome the flows of desiring-machines: the BwO deterritorializes the organization of capitalism by opting for flows and smooth spaces. The capitalist machine transforms desiring- machines into BwO by creating the ultimate schizophrenic that “plunges further and further into the realm of deterritorialization, reaching the furthest limits of the decomposition of the socius on the surface of his own body without organs” (35). The capitalist-schizo becomes the surplus product of capitalism as it seeks the limits of capitalism itself. Although the BwO is unachievable, it becomes a seemingly preferred state: “You never reach the Body without Organs, you can’t reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 150). It is not a heightened awareness of the self, nor is it a fully embodied self. Unlike in significations, representations, and identifications, the BwO is no self at all. In fact, the BwO is prior to such a subjective capacity The tension between desiring-machines (reterritorializations) and BwO (deterritorializations) works within a different realm than, say, the subjective limits of identities categories where subjects become intelligible through their associations with identity norms. Everything for desiring-machines and BwO is pure difference. The intensities involved in such a relationship are before the coding structures of subjectivity that stratify subjects. It is the abovementioned intensities that make post-queer politics so creative because they challenge the structured organization of organs and biologically defined bodies. Desiring-machines and BwO offer a new language for thinking about life itself without reducing the experiences of such relationships to the stratification of language. The creativity of post-queer dialogical-becomings rests in the potential to deterritorialize stratified structures that limit life to predetermined organizations. Despite the BwO existing prior to the subjective capacities of, say, psychoanalysis and discursive norms, this certainly does not imply that deterritorializations can not offer strategies for rethinking life as it is accounted for through representations, significations, and identifications. We can, for example, think of the various codings of subjectivity that have permeated identity politics and subsequently the queer/heteronormative dyad as territorialized stratifications that are in concert with BwO. Stratifications, or strata, take hold of intensities by territorializing them. For instance, they appropriate the BwO’s flows of pure difference by organizing dialogical-becomings as subjects of reiterative norms. The strata codes and territorializes such becomings but the BwO constantly attempts to deterritorialize these territorializations. **Despite queer’s interest in a politics of identity that seeks to consider bodies as mobile and fluid, these movements can never escape the territorializations of identity norms because they are always in relation to heteronormative coding and the overall arboreal organization of bodies that are directed inwards**. Deleuze and Guattari describe three types of strata that help to think through the territorializations of the queer/heteronormative dyad: the organism, signifiance, and sub jectification. The surface of the organism, the angle of signiflance and interpretation, and the point of subjectification or subjection. You will be organized, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body—otherwise you’re just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted—otherwise you’re just a deviant**. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement—otherwise you’re just a tramp**. To the strata as a whole, the BwO opposes disarticulation (or n articulation) as the property of the plane of consistency, experimentation as the operation on that plane (no signifier, never interpret!), and nomadism as the movement (keep moving, even in place, never stop moving, motionless voyage, desubjectification). (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 159) This call to dismantle the organism does not imply that we just get rid of the subject or cut the body from stratification. We recall from above that the BwO and all its intensities comes before the subject and the organization of the body as an organism and so a politics of becoming calls for a return to these productive flows of desire: “opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the craft of a surveyor” (160). Post-queer dialogical-becomings seek to deterritorialize the three great strata that territorialize life through significations, representations, and identifications. This project is but one line of flight that can plateau subjugated sub jectivities. Its intent is to map various intensities so as to smooth these assemblages by moving towards a plane of immanence. The first step is to identify the strata involved and then consider the assemblages that constitute such strata. For example, the organism codes an aboreal life by creating various assemblages that define what it means to be “human”; sigmflance codes meaning through discourse where language has become the primary means for thinking about experience; and subjectification creates subjects by coding them through social norms. The purpose of this is to locate flows of intensities—not by discovering a BwO but by creating one in the process of deterritorializing the strata. The queer/heteronormativity dyad has resulted in an arboreal dyad. The extensions of an arboreal tree go through its central root that supports the whole tree. **The queer/heteronorrnative dyad is such a root where all politics emerge from it. Post-queer rhizomatic politics, in contrast, do not strictly move or extend from a main root such as the queer/heteronormative dyad**. With that said, dialogical-becomings can engage this binary by plateauing it through its rhizomatic connections that can spout from any point. The arboreal organization of queer/heteronormativity prohibits a politics of becoming because movement stops when there is a need to refer back to this dyad. In other words, the queer/heteronormative dyad halts queer politics when the politics of queer is predominantly concerned with disrupting heteronormative structures. Post-queer rhizomatic politics is about deterritorializing politics itself rather than opposing an a priori structure. This project is one line of flight amongst many that can remap contemporary politics as we know it today. Despite queer’s keen investment in a conceptualization of identity through mobilities and fluidities, **its politics can only go so far because of its arboreal references to heteronormativity**. Let me be clear that I am not demanding an outright rejection of the queer/heteronormative strata for, as we recall from above, this can result in further territorializations. I am also not suggesting an absolute denunciation of this relationship nor am I disputing the important developments that queer politics have made. I am instead calling for the production of different lines of flight and new assemblages that can smoothen the strata so as to not be limited by structural organizations.

#### Vote negative to endorse a nomadic post-queer politics based on flux and fluidity. This strategy is a war machine opposing dominant structures of power largely by refusing to grant them to power of dominance.

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Post-queer is not to be considered the way out of queer. This could potentially position post-queer as a neocolonial body of work that is capable of accounting for all difference. We can turn to Robert McRuer’s critique of Davis’ work that claims disability studies as the post-identity project. In agreement with McRuer, this positions disability studies as “a global (or globalizing) body” (2006, 202). Post-queer, like McRuer’s crip theory, recognizes “a postidentity politics of sorts, but a postidentity politics that allows us to work together, one that acknowledges the complex and contradictory histories rather than transcending them.” Becoming post-queer is therefore a reading through, rather than an outright rejection, of subjectivity, discourse, and identity politics’ place in queer theorizing. Post-queer is clearly not an abandonment of queer but a new way to think about the future of queer using concepts that have not emerged out of or through queer. Post-queer is a deterritorialization of queer as a politics of dialogical-becomings: the discursive spaces of queer are deterritorialized using Bakhtin, Deleuze, and Guattari by creating post-queer lines of flight that are forever becoming-other. The notion “dialogical-becomings” is explored in the plateaus throughout Post,Queer Politics. It is a creative concept distinct from the relationship amongst queer, subjectivity, and discourse because post-queer politics are not directed towards the past (significations and representations) but the future (virtualities and actualities). Deleuze and Guattari’s “Treatise of Nomadology” (1987) informs the methodology used in Post-Queer Politics. Nomadology addresses a fundamental tension between the state apparatus and the war machine.43 I consider the queer/ heteronormative dyad to function as the state apparatus that conceptualizes politics through subjectivities and discourses. I see queer as functioning **within the realm of the state apparatus**, rather than outside and against it, because of **its binary nature** **that explicitly exposes and challenges heteronormativity: queer maintains its binary status** within the state apparatus because its disruptive politics and differentiated movements rely on heteronormativity. The war machine, while in tension with the state apparatus, is not its binary: “In every respect, the war machine is of another species, another nature, another origin than the State apparatus” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 352). In other words, **post-queer is a war machine because it is not in direct opposition to heteronormativity (**which would result in another binary) **but in tension with the queer/heteronormative dyad**. So **while it rejects the appropriations of the state apparatus it does not rely on it for its intelligibility because it opts for a more open politics that are highly contextualized and produced through dlialogic relations**. Although the nomad exists outside of the official it maintains a relation with it because it emerges through the tensions of the state apparatus and the war machine. The war machine can be characterized by two poles: the first assumes war with the state apparatus and the second upholds an ambition to create new lines of flight. The first pole is concerned with the indefinite deterritorialization of the state apparatus: it seeks the limits of the state apparatus by exposing the conditions attempting to reconstitute the war machine (i.e., challenging the queer/ heteronormative dyad). The second pole functions to create smooth spaces for the nomad to roam (i.e., the potential to articulate bodies in ways that are not possible within the queer/heteronormative dyad). Noble’s Sons of the Movement is an excellent example of this where, as Rinaldo Walcott reviews on the back cover, “[t]his move away from the medicalized discourse of trans communities to the social, political, and cultural context is a crucial and important one and opens up new terrain in trans studies.” The roaming nomad does not move out of choice but out of necessity. Nomadology is a science of becoming that challenges dominant and oppressive knowledges through direct associations with space: the nomad does not simply move from one space to the next nor does it follow specific routes created by the state apparatus that predate its movement. So while post-queer emerges out of and remains in conversation with the queer/heteronormative dyad **it does not rely on it for its intelligibility.** In contrast, it moves across open spaces that overlap, contradict, and resist the paths of the state apparatus. The necessity to think spaces otherwise comes from the tension between the state apparatus and the war machine that ultimately requires ethical choices to be made.

For example, the nomad emerges as a result of encountering racism, sexism, ableism, and classism and so it does not come out of nowhere but surfaces through confficting tensions by envisioning alternatives to universalizations. The post-queer nomad considers the queer/heteronormative dyad to be one of these universalizations. To be clear, the nomad does not constitute the tension between the state apparatus and the war machine but it is the tensions that activate the nomad. The choices that the nomad makes are strategic political movements that are of great necessity. The tension created between the state apparatus and the war machine is intended to create new opportunities to think spaces otherwise: “theji can make war on/y on the condition that they simultaneously create something else” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 423). The ethical choices made by the nomad—for instance, the theoretical and philosophical movements of post-queer dialogical-becomings—are not made from deeplywithin or completely outside the state apparatus. For example, activism is not produced by the mechanisms that activists resist and it does not arise from spaces outside of oppressive processes. The choices that activists make result from the conflicting tensions between the state (i.e., oppressive processes) and the war machine (i.e., activist initiatives). The nomad and the spaces it encounters are produced simultaneously as dialogic relations where the tension between the state apparatus and the war machine create new ideas through nomadic becomings. **My use of nomadology is intended to challenge the functioning of queer as a subjugated subjectivity that reinforces heteronormativity as its binary.** Nomadology creates open and smooth spaces that function similar to the game Go where the strategy is to territorialize new spaces (without reinforcing and supporting them) in order to subsequently deterritorialize them: “make the outside a territory in space; consolidate that territory by the construction of a second, adjacent territory; deterritorialize the enemy by shattering his territory from within; deterritorialize oneself by renouncing, by going elsewhere” (D eleuze and Guattari 1987, 353). Deterritorializations always take us elsewhere and produce something new. Post-queer dialogical-becomings intend to create a “war without battle lines, with neither confrontation nor retreat, without battles even: pure strategy.” As Deleuze and Guattari state, “[all by itself a Go piece can destroy an entire constellation synchronically” (353). I am therefore less interested in creating “battles” with contemporary queer studies and more concerned with the production of intersecting points where all the “game pieces” work together in order to create new deterritorialized lines of flight. The theoretical and philosophical encounters in the plateaus that follow result from a nomadic necessity to create new political movements that are not limited by the relationship between official knowledges and decentering practices but are more creative and open as dialogical processes of becoming.

#### Our vision of queerness is not tied to status quo definitions – you should recognize that queerness is a future to come – we are not queer yet, only a line of flight that recognizes this can move forward Muñoz prof/chair of performance studies @ NYU 2k9 (José Esteban, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity)

**Queerness is not yet here. Queerness is an ideality**. Put another way, **we are not yet queer**. We may never touch queerness, but we can feel it as the warm illumination of a horizon imbued with potentiality. We have never been queer, yet queerness exists for us as an ideality that can be distilled from the past and used to imagine a future. The future is queerness’s domain. Queerness is a structuring and educated mode of desiring that allows us to see and feel beyond the quagmire of the present**. The here and now is a** **prison house**. We must strive in the past of the here and now’s totalizing rendering of reality to think and feel a *then and there*. Some will say that all we have are the pleasures of this moment, but we must never settle for minimal transport; we must dream and enact new and better pleasures, other ways of being in the world, and ultimately new worlds. Queerness is a longing that propels us onward, beyond romances of the negative and toiling in the present. Queerness is that thing that lets us feel that this world is not enough, that indeed something is missing. Often we can glimpse the world’s proposed and promised by queerness in the realm of the aesthetic. The aesthetic, especially, the queer aesthetic, frequently contains blueprints and schemata of a forward-dawning futurity. Both the ornamental and the quotidian can contain a map of the utopia that is queerness. Turing to the aesthetic in the case of queerness is nothing like an escape from the social realm, insofar as queer aesthetics map future social relations. Queerness is also a performative because it is not simply a being but a doing for and toward the future. Queerness is essentially about the rejection of a here and now and an insistence on potentiality or concrete possibility for another world.

#### Queerness is based on dyadic opposition. It creates a norm – heteronormativity – and all that oppose that norm becomes queer. This binaristic construction of identity results in violence

**Deleuze ’87**Gilles, famous philosopher, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, (two translations used) *The Opera Quarterly* 21.4 (2005) 716-724 AND Dialogues II, European Perspectives, with Claire Parnet, freelance journalist, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 2002 pgs.61-62

How does one "act" on something, and what is the act or actuality of this potential? The act is reason. Notice that reason is not a faculty but a process, which consists precisely in actualizing a potential or giving form to matter. Reason is itself a pluralism, because nothing indicates that we should think of matter or the act as unique. We define or invent a process of rationalization each time we establish human relations in some material form, in some group, in some multiplicity.[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT4" \t "_blank) The act itself, qua relation, is always political. Reason, as a process, is political**.** This may well be the case within a city, but it goes for other, smaller groups as well, or even for myself—and nowhere but in myself. Psychology, or rather the only bearable psychology, is politics, because I am forever creating human relationships with myself. There is no psychology, but rather a politics of the self. There is no metaphysics, but rather a politics of being. No science, but rather a politics of matter, since man is entrusted with matter itself. The same even applies to sickness: we have to "manage" it when we cannot conquer it, and thereby impose on it the form of human relationships. Consider the case of sonorous matter. The musical scale, or rather *a* musical scale, is a process of rationalization that consists in establishing human relationships via this matter in a manner that actualizes its potentiality and it itself becomes human. Marx analyzed the sense organs in this way in order to demonstrate through them the immanence of man and Nature: the ear becomes a human ear when the resonant object becomes musical. The very diverse group of processes of rationalization is what constitutes human becoming or activity, Praxis, or practices. We do not know in this regard if there is such a thing as a human unity, whether from the historical or the generic point of view. Is there a properly human matter, pure potential, distinct from actuality, that has the ability to fascinate us? There is nothing like "freedom" within us that does not also appear as its opposite: as something that "imprisons" us, as Châtelet is always saying. It would be quite obtuse of potentiality to oppose the act capable of realizing it—an inversion of reason, more than its opposite, a privation or alienation. It is as if there were a nonhuman relationship that nevertheless was internal or immanent to human relations, an inhumanity specific to humans: freedom that becomes the capacity of man to vanquish man, or to be vanquished.Potentiality is pathos, which is to say passivity or receptivity, but receptivity is first and foremost the power to receive blows and to give them: a strange kind of endurance. To be sure, one can draw up the history of systems of domination, in which the activity of the powerful is at work; but this activity is nothing without the appetite of those who aspire to give blows in the name of the blows they have received. They fight for their servitude as if it were their freedom, as Spinoza put it. Thus, whether exercised or endured, power is not merely the activity of man's social existence; it is also the passivity of man's natural existence. There is a unity of war [End Page 717] and land, the traces of which Châtelet detected in the work of Claude Simon—or in Marxism, which never separated the active existence of man as a historical being from its "double," the passive existence of man as a natural being: Reason and its irrationality: this was Marx's own theme, [and] it is also ours. . . . He wants to produce a critical science of the actual, fundamental passivity of humanity. Man does not die because he is mortal (any more than he lies because he is a "liar," or loves because he is a "lover"): he dies because he does not eat enough, because he is reduced to the state of bestiality, because he is killed. Historical materialism is there to remind us of these facts, and Marx, in *Capital*, lays the foundations for what might be a method enabling us to analyze, for a given period—quite a revealing period, in fact—the mechanisms at work in the fact of passivity. . . .[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT5" \t "_blank) Aren't there values specific to pathos? Maybe in the form of a despair about the world, something which is quite present in Châtelet, underneath his extreme politeness.If human beings are constantly in a process of mutual demolition, we might as well destroy ourselves, under pleasant, even fanciful conditions. "Of course all life is a process of breaking down," as Fitzgerald said.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT6" \t "_blank) This "of course" has the ring of a verdict of immanence: the inhuman element in one's relationship to oneself. Châtelet's only novel, *Les années de démolition* (*The Demolition Years*), has a profoundly Fitzgeraldian motif, an elegance in the midst of disaster. It is not a question of dying, or of a desire to die, but of investing the temptation to die in a sublime element like music. Once again, this has less to do with psychoanalysis than with politics. We must take account of this vector of destruction, which can traverse a community or a man, Athens or Pericles. *Périclès* was Châtelet's first book.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT7" \t "_blank)Pericles was always the very image of the great man, or great hero, for Châtelet—even in Pericles's "passivity," even in his failure (which was also the failure of democracy), even in spite of his disturbing trajectory [*vecteur* ]. Another value proper to pathos is politeness—a Greek politeness, in fact, which already contains an outline of human relationships, the beginnings of an act of reason. Human relationships begin with a reasoned system, an organization of space that undergirds a city. An art of establishing the right distances between humans, not hierarchically but geometrically, neither too far nor too close, to ensure that blows will not be given or received. To make human encounters into a rite, a kind of ritual of immanence, even if this requires a bit of schizophrenia. What the Greeks taught us, and [Louis] Gernet or [Jean-Pierre] Vernant reminded us, is to not let ourselves be nailed down to a fixed center, but to acquire the capacity to transport a center along with oneself, in order to organize sets of symmetrical, reversible relations established by free men. This may not be enough to defeat the despair of the world, for there are fewer and fewer polite men, and there must be at least two for the quality itself to exist. But François Châtelet's[End Page 718] extreme politeness was also a mask concealing a third value of pathos: what one might term goodness, a warm benevolence. The term is not quite right, even though this quality, this value, was deeply present in Châtelet. More than a quality or a value, it is a disposition of thought, an act of thinking. It consists in this: not knowing in advance how someone might yet be able to establish a process of rationalization, both within and outside himself. Of course there are all the lost causes, the despair. But if there is a chance [at establishing a process of rationalization], what does that someone need, how does he escape his own destruction? All of us, perhaps, are born on terrain favorable to demolition, but we will not miss a chance. There is no pure reason or rationality par excellence. There are processes of rationalization—heterogeneous and varied, depending on conditions, eras, groups, and individuals. These are constantly being aborted, receding, and reaching dead ends, and yet resuming elsewhere, with new measures, new rhythms, new allures**.** The inherent plurality of processes of rationalization is already the object of classic epistemological analyses (Koyré, Bachelard, Canguilhem), and sociopolitical analyses (Max Weber). In his late works, Foucault too pushed this pluralism toward an analysis of human relationships, which would constitute the first steps toward a new ethics from the standpoint of what he called "processes of subjectification": Foucault's analysis emphasized bifurcations and derivations, the broken historicity of reason, which is always in a state of liberation or alienation as it equates to man's relationship to himself. Foucault had to go back as far as the Greeks, not in order to find the miracle of reason par excellence, but merely in order to diagnose what was perhaps the first gesture toward a process of rationalization, and one that would be followed by many others, in different conditions, under different guises. Foucault no longer characterized the Greek polis in terms of the organization of a new space, but as a human relation that could take the form of a rivalry between free men or citizens (in politics, but also in love, gymnastics, or justice . . . ). Within this sort of process of rationalization and subjectification, a free man could not govern other free men, in principle, unless he were capable of governing himself. This is the specifically Greek act or process, which cannot be treated as a foundational act but rather as a singular event in a broken chain. It is undoubtedly here that Châtelet, having taken the Greek polis as his point of departure, meets Foucault. Châtelet defines the Greek polis with reference to the magistrate—not only in terms of how he differs from other functionaries, such as the priest or the imperial civil servant, but also with respect to his correlative duties, which belong to a corresponding process of rationalization (for instance, the drawing of lots). No one has analyzed how the process of drawing lots captures the gist of reason better than Châtelet. For Châtelet, rationalization is also a historical and political [End Page 719] process, in which Athens is its key event yet is also its failure and its erasure—namely, Pericles, from which other events spin off and are absorbed into other processes. Athens was not the advent of an eternal reason, but the singular event of a provisional rationalization, and is as such all the more striking. When we posit a single, universal reason de jure, we are falling precisely into what Châtelet calls presumption—a kind of metaphysical rudeness. He diagnoses this ailment in Plato: even when we recognize that reason is a human, solely human, faculty, a faculty tailored to human ends, we nevertheless continue to grant it theological transcendence. **We draw up a dualism of processes instead of a pluralism of processes; this dualism opposes discourse to violence, as if violence were not already concealed within discourse itself, providing it with its various impetuses and ins and outs**.For a long time, under the influence of Eric Weil[8](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT8" \t "_blank) and according to a Platonic and Hegelian model, Châtelet believed in the opposition between violence and discourse. But what he discovers, on the contrary, is the ability of discourse to give voice to man's distinct inhumanity. Indeed, it is the purview of discourse to engage the process of its own rationalization, but only in a certain becoming, and due to the pressure of certain motivations and events. This is of extreme importance in Châtelet's *La naissance de l'histoire (The Birth of History)*[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT9" \t "_blank) , because the image of discourse or Logos that he presents there is closer to Thucydides than to Plato or Hegel. Indeed, he **never ceases challenging the two corollaries of a doctrine of universal reason: first, the utopian need to invoke an ideal city or a universal State of right, which would prevent against a democratic future; second, the apocalyptic impetus to locate*the* moment, the fundamental alienation of reason that occurred once and for all, comprising in one stroke all violence and inhumanity.** It is one and the same presumption that grants transcendence to both reason and to reason's corruption, and, since Plato, renders the one the twin of the other.