### 1nc coloniality

**-The Mississippi Choctaw in Philedelphia, Mississippi**

**and the Mohegan in New York**

**What do the people of these places have in common? They are not murderers.**

**-Bad River Band of Indians in Odanah, Wisconsin**

**-Bois Fort Band of Chippewa Indians in Nett Lake, Minnesota.**

**What do the people from these places have in common? They are not western anthropocentric war mongers.**

#### The affirmative would call upon you to ethically renounce these people and reject them from their new ‘civilized community.’ The affirmative would label all of these people as being tantamount to the same violent war powers of a president whose predecessors forced the indigenous from their homelands, subjected them to mass slaughter and violence, and labeled them as a life-not-worth living. This is not to glorify the consumption of animals but that doesn’t give the affirmative the right to say a word about what native American people and farmers do on native American land.

#### Natives are excluded from discussions of human – Their focus on the binary of human and nonhuman omits the coloniality of the categorization. This is a simple uniqueness question that their approach to ethics does not have exclusivity for all beings.

Sylvia Winter, Stanford University, 2003, Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom  
Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument, *The New Centennial Review* 3.3 (2003) 257-337

THE ARGUMENT PROPOSES THAT THE STRUGGLE OF OUR NEW MILLENNIUM WILL be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves. Because of this overrepresentation, which is defined in the first part of the title as the Coloniality of Being/ Power/Truth/Freedom, any attempt to unsettle the coloniality of power will call for the unsettling of this overrepresentation as the second and now purely secular form of what Aníbal Quijano identifies as the "Racism/ Ethnicism complex," on whose basis the world of modernity was brought into existence from the fifteenth/sixteenth centuries onwards (Quijano *1999, 2000*), [2](http://libproxy.library.unt.edu:2355/journals/new_centennial_review/v003/3.3wynter.html#FOOT2) and of what Walter Mignolo identifies as the foundational "colonial difference" on which the world of modernity was to institute itself (Mignolo *1999, 2000*). [3](http://libproxy.library.unt.edu:2355/journals/new_centennial_review/v003/3.3wynter.html#FOOT3)¶ The correlated hypothesis here is that all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources (*20* percent of the world's peoples own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-thirds of its food, and are responsible for *75* percent of its ongoing pollution, with this leading to two billion of **[End Page 260]** earth's peoples living relatively affluent lives while four billion still live on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic of overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that of overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the South [4](http://libproxy.library.unt.edu:2355/journals/new_centennial_review/v003/3.3wynter.html" \l "FOOT4) )—these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle. Central to this struggle also is the usually excluded and invisibilized situation of the category identified by Zygmunt Bauman as the "New Poor" (Bauman *1987*). That is, as a category defined at the global level by refugee/economic migrants stranded outside the gates of the rich countries, as the postcolonial variant of Fanon's category of les damnés (Fanon *1963*)—with this category in the United States coming to comprise the criminalized majority Black and dark-skinned Latino inner-city males now made to man the rapidly expanding prison-industrial complex, together with their female peers—the kicked-about Welfare Moms—with both being part of the ever-expanding global, transracial category of the homeless/the jobless, the semi-jobless, the criminalized drug-offending prison population. So that if we see this category of the damnés that is internal to (and interned within) the prison system of the United States as the analog form of a global archipelago, constituted by the Third- and Fourth-World peoples of the so-called "underdeveloped" areas of the world—most totally of all by the peoples of the continent of Africa (now stricken with AIDS, drought, and ongoing civil wars, and whose bottommost place as the most impoverished of all the earth's continents is directly paralleled by the situation of its Black Diaspora peoples, with Haiti being produced and reproduced as the most impoverished nation of the Americas)—a systemic pattern emerges. This pattern is linked to the fact that while in the post-sixties United States, as Herbert Gans noted recently, the Black population group, of all the multiple groups comprising the post-sixties social hierarchy, has once again come to be placed at the bottommost place of that hierarchy (Gans, *1999*), with all incoming new nonwhite/non-Black groups, as Gans's fellow sociologist Andrew Hacker (*1992*) earlier pointed out, coming to claim "normal" North American identity by the putting of visible distance between themselves and the Black population group (in effect, claiming "normal" human status by distancing themselves from the group that is still made to occupy the nadir, **[End Page 261]** "nigger" rung of being human within the terms of our present ethnoclass Man's overrepresentation of its "descriptive statement" [Bateson *1969*] as if it were that of the human itself), then the struggle of our times, one that has hitherto had no name, is the struggle against this overrepresentation. As a struggle whose first phase, the Argument proposes, was first put in place (if only for a brief hiatus before being coopted, reterritorialized [Godzich*1986*]) by the multiple anticolonial social-protest movements and intellectual challenges of the period to which we give the name, "The Sixties."

multiple anticolonial social-protest movements and intellectual challenges of the period to which we give the name, "The Sixties."

#### The affirmative is a replication of a universal concept of humanity structured through ignorance of the colonial difference. They construct a new universal ethic which recreates a new savage to be civilized. Only delinking this epistemology solves

[**Mignolo**](http://muse.uq.edu.au.vortex3.ucok.edu:2050/journals/american_literary_history/v018/18.2mignolo.html#authbio) **2006** [Walter, Citizenship, Knowledge, and the Limits of Humanity *American Literary History* 18.2 (2006) 312-331 ]

When the idea of "citizenship" came into view—and was linked to the materialization and formation of the nation-state in secular north Europe—it enforced the formation of communities of birth instead of communities of faith. But at that time, the imperial and colonial differences were already in place, and both were recast in the new face of Western empires. The figure of the "citizen" presupposed an idea of the "human" that had already been formed during the Renaissance and was one of the constitutive elements of the colonial matrix of power. Henceforth, there was a close link between the concept of Man (standing for Human Being) and the idea of "humanities" as the major branch of higher learning both in European universities and in their branches in the colonies (the universities of Mexico and Peru were founded in the 1550s, Harvard in 1636).[1](http://muse.uq.edu.au.vortex3.ucok.edu:2050/journals/american_literary_history/v018/18.2mignolo.html#FOOT1) If *man* stood for *human being* (at the expense of women, non-Christians, people of color, and homosexuals), the humanities as high branch of learning was modeled on the concept and assumptions of the *humanity* which, at its turn, was modeled on the example of *man*. My goal in this article is, therefore, to explore the hidden connections between the figure of the citizen, the coloniality of being, and the coloniality of knowledge. I will describe the veiled connections as the logic of coloniality, and the surface that covers it I will describe as the rhetoric of modernity. The rhetoric of modernity is that of salvation, whereas the logic of coloniality is a logic of imperial oppression. They go hand in hand, and you cannot have modernity without coloniality; the unfinished project of modernity carries over its shoulders the unfinished project of coloniality. I will conclude by suggesting the need to decolonize "knowledge" and "being" and advocating that the (decolonial) "humanities" shall have a fundamental role to play in this process. Truly, "global citizenship" implies overcoming the imperial and colonial differences that have mapped and continue to map global racism and global patriarchy. Changing the law and public policies won't be of much help in this process. What is needed is that those who change the law and public policy change themselves. **[End Page 312]** The problem is how that may take place if we would like to avoid the missionary zeal for conversion; the liberal and neoliberal belief in the triumphal march of Western civilization and of market democracy; and the moral imperatives and forced behavior imposed by socialism. As I do not believe in a new abstract universal that will be good for the entire world, the question is how people can change their belief that the world today is like it is and that it will be only through the "honest" projects of Christians, liberals, and Marxist-socialists that the world could be better for all, and citizenship will be a benediction for all. The changes I am thinking about are radical transformations in the naturalized assumptions of the world order. The naturalized assumptions I am thinking about are imperial–colonial, and they have shaped the world in which we live in the past five hundred years when Christianity and capitalism came together and created the conditions for the self-fashioned narrative of "modernity." Hence, the transformations I am thinking about require an epistemic decolonial shift. Not a "new," a "post," or a "neo," which are all changes within the same modern colonial epistemology, but a *decolonial* (and not either a "deconstruction"), which means a delinking from the rules of the game (e.g., the decolonization of the mind, in Ngugi Wa Th'iongo's vocabulary) in which deconstruction itself and all the "posts-" for sure are caught. Delinking doesn't mean to be "outside" of either modernity or Christian, Liberal, Capitalist, and Marxist hegemony but to disengage from the naturalized assumptions that make of these four macronarratives "une pensee unique," to use Ignacio Ramonet's expression.[2](http://muse.uq.edu.au.vortex3.ucok.edu:2050/journals/american_literary_history/v018/18.2mignolo.html#FOOT2) The decolonial shift begins by unveiling the imperial presuppositions that maintain a universal idea of humanity and of human being that serves as a model and point of arrival and by constantly underscoring the fact that oppressed and racialized subjects do not care and are not fighting for "human rights" (based on an imperial idea of humanity) but to regain the "human dignity" (based on a decolonial idea of humanity) that has and continues to be taken away from them by the imperial rhetoric of modernity (e.g., white, Eurocentered, heterosexual, and Christian/secular). The conditions for citizenship are still tied to a racialized hierarchy of human beings that depends on universal categories of thought created and enacted from the identitarian perspectives of European Christianity and by white males. In the Afro-Caribbean intellectual tradition—from C. L. R. James to Frantz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter, and Lewis Gordon—the very concepts of the *human* and *humanity* are constantly under fire.[3](http://muse.uq.edu.au.vortex3.ucok.edu:2050/journals/american_literary_history/v018/18.2mignolo.html#FOOT3) Would indeed a black person agree with the idea that what "we" all have in common is our "humanity" and that we are "all equal" in being "different"? I would suspect that the formula would rather be of the type advanced by the **[End Page 313]** Zapatistas: "[B]ecause we are all equal we have the right to be different."[4](http://muse.uq.edu.au.vortex3.ucok.edu:2050/journals/american_literary_history/v018/18.2mignolo.html#FOOT4) The universal idea of humanity, believe me, is not the same from the perspective of black history, Indian memories, or the memories of the population of Central Asia. The humanities, as a branch of knowledge in the history of the university since the European Renaissance, have always been complicitous with imperial–colonial designs celebrating a universal idea of the human model. The moment has arrived to put the humanities at the service of decolonial projects in their ethical, political, and epistemic dimensions; to recast the reinscription of human dignity as a decolonial project in the hands of the *damnes* rather than given to them through managerial designs of NGOs and Human Rights Watch that seldom if ever are led by actors whose human dignity is at stake. Decolonial projects imply downsizing human rights to its real dimension: an ethical imperative internal to imperial abuses but not really a project that empowers racialized subjects and helps them to regain the human dignity that racism and imperial projects (from the right, the left, and the center) took away from them.

#### It is tempting to follow stereotype and assume that by the image of the ‘noble savage’ that all native americans have a very specific relationship to the environment. But this image is a double-edged sword used to strip native americans of their identity if they don’t assimilate to the environmental image of native americans. Do not evaluate the affirmative’s ethic in an abstract vacuum – it must be taken into context of its application – what would the affirmative say to the Makah Indians in the northwest who hunt for cultural reasons – they create a dogmatic rejection which becomes cultural imperialism

Tacoma news tribune 1998 [PROTECT MAKAHS FROM ECO-bULLIES Tacoma News Tribune, August 23, 1998, http://www.mail-archive.com/pen-l@galaxy.csuchico.edu/msg27290.html

The arrogant activists who have vowed to disrupt the Makah tribe's¶ resumption of whaling this fall can be proud of themselves.¶ With threats of physical obstruction and even murder, some of them have¶ succeeded in scaring a tiny Indian nation whose sole offense consists of¶ trying to revive its ancestral hunt for a non-endangered species of whale.¶ So virulent and vicious have been those threats that Gov. Gary Locke on¶ Friday granted the tribal council's plea for National Guard protection¶ during the annual Makah Days celebration next weekend. Meanwhile, a task¶ force of local, state and federal agencies has been making plans to protect¶ the Makahs who hope to revive a cherished cultural tradition by harpooning¶ a gray whale sometime this October.¶ That these precautions are necessary is proof that cultural imperialism is¶ alive and flourishing in the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, the Chicago¶ Animal Rights Coalition, the Progressive Animal Welfare Society and other¶ organizations that seek to block the Makahs' hunt.¶ Admittedly, it is not easy for non-Indians who have never paddled a dugout¶ canoe or heard an ancestral whaling song to understand why some Makahs feel¶ a deep yearning to renew this practice. Whales are majestic and mysterious¶ creatures; they are also appallingly vulnerable to modern whaling fleets.¶ International authorities were right to ban commercial whaling after many¶ species were driven to the brink of extinction years ago.¶ But it is sheer demagoguery to talk as if the Makah hunt were the¶ equivalent of the wholesale slaughter that was once carried out with sonar,¶ helicopters, high-powered catcher boats and harpoon guns. The tribe has¶ been allotted a maximum of 20 whales through the year 2002 - a quota that,¶ even if reached, wouldn't dent the increasing population of gray whales.¶ The Makahs want simply to renew a low-impact hunt that helped sustain their¶ tribe since the dawn of time. Anti-whaling activists have no business¶ lecturing them on what is or isn't important to their cultural identity.¶ More to the point, eco-bullies have no business using illegal tactics to¶ eviscerate the Makahs' treaty with the U.S. government. Many tribal¶ prerogatives - including casino gambling and access to private beaches -¶ are a matter of court interpretation, but the Makahs' right to whale is¶ explicitly guaranteed by their 1855 treaty. The Coast Guard, U.S. Marshals¶ Service and other federal agencies therefore have a profound obligation to¶ ensure that the Makahs are not physically obstructed or intimidated as they¶ resume whaling. If arrests and serious prison sentences are required to¶ protect the tribe and honor its treaty, so be it.

#### The affirmative universalism creates the conscious destruction of indigenous cultures, means our imperialism arguments are another disad to the aff.

Peter Staudenmaier 2004 Ambiguities of Animal Rights, Institute for Social Ecology, <http://www.communalism.org/Archive/05/aar.html>

The unexamined cultural prejudices embedded deep within animal rights thinking carry political implications that are unavoidably elitist. A consistent animal rights stance, after all, would require many aboriginal peoples to abandon their sustainable livelihoods and lifeways completely. Animal rights has no reasonable alternative to offer to communities like the Inuit, whose very existence in their ecological niche is predicated on hunting animals. An animal rights viewpoint can only look down disdainfully on those peasant societies in Latin America and elsewhere that depend on small-scale animal husbandry as an integral part of their diet, as well as pastoralists in Africa and Asia who rely centrally upon animals to maintain traditional subsistence economies that long predate the colonial imposition of capitalism. These are not matters of “taste” but of sustainability and survival. Forsaking such practices makes no ecological or social sense, and would be tantamount to eliminating these distinctive societies themselves, all for the sake of assimilation to standards of morality and nutrition propounded by middle-class westerners convinced of their own rectitude. Too many animal rights proponents forget that their belief system is essentially a European-derived construct, and neglect the practical repercussions of universalizing it into an unqualified principle of human moral conduct as such. [(13)](http://www.communalism.org/Archive/05/aar.html#a13) Nowhere is this combination of parochialism and condescension more apparent than in the animus against hunting. Many animal rights enthusiasts cannot conceive of hunting as anything other than a brutal and senseless activity undertaken for contemptible reasons. Heedless of their own prejudices, they take hunting for an expression of speciesist prejudice. What animal rights theorists malign as ‘sport hunting’ often provides a significant seasonal supplement to the diets of rural populations who lack the luxuries of tempeh and seitan. Even indigenous communities engaged in conspicuously low-impact traditional hunting have been harassed and vilified by animal rights activists. The campaign against seal hunting in the 1980’s, for example, prominently targeted Inuit practices. [(14)](http://www.communalism.org/Archive/05/aar.html#a14) In the late 1990’s, the Makah people of Neah Bay in the northwestern United States tried to re-establish their communal whale hunt, harvesting exactly one gray whale in 1999. The Makah hunt was non-commercial, for subsistence purposes, and fastidiously humane; they chose a whale species that is not endangered and went to considerable lengths to accommodate anti-whaling sentiment. Nevertheless, when the Makah attempted to embark on their first expedition in 1998, they were physically confronted by the Sea Shepherd Society and other animal protection organizations, who occupied Neah Bay for several months. For these groups, animal rights took precedence over human rights. Many of these animal advocates embellished their pro-whale rhetoric with hoary racist stereotypes about native people and allied themselves with unreconstructed apologists for colonial domination and dispossession. [(15)](http://www.communalism.org/Archive/05/aar.html#a15) Such examples are far from rare. In fact, animal rights sentiment has frequently served as an entry point for rightwing positions into left movements. Because much of the left has generally been reluctant to think clearly and critically about nature, about biological politics, and about ethical complexity, this unsettling affinity between animal rights and rightwing politics — an affinity which has a lengthy historical pedigree — remains a serious concern.

### 1nc kritik

#### It is impossible to gain a non-simulated response when you tie your 1ac to an economy of exchange—the question of 1ac determines the answer of the ballot—the 1ac tries to change the content of debate while maintaining the form, maintaining the metastasis while enacting the simulation of radicality in response to the question of the ballot. This acts as a safety valve for the system of signification via ballots—the claim that the ballot could ever truly represent anyone or anything ultimately is the trick of the Congressperson

Baudrillard 76. Jean Baudrillard, *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, pg. 67

The problem of opinion polls, then, is not their objective influence at all. As far as propaganda and advertising are concerned, such influence is, as we know, largely annulled by individual or collective resistance or inertia. Their problem is the operational simulation that they institute across the entire range of social practices, the leukaemia infecting all social sub­ stance, replacing blood with the white lymph of the media.

The question/answer circularity runs through every domain. We are slowly beginning to notice that the whole domain of surveys, polls and statistics must be revised according to the radical suspicion brought to bear on their methods. The same suspicion bears, however, on ethnology Unless you admit that the natives are totally 'natural' and incapable of simulation, then the problem is the same with the above as it is here: it is impossible to obtain a non-simulated response to a direct question, apart from merely reproducing the question. It is not even certain that we can test plants, animals or inert matter in the exact sciences with any hope of an 'objective' response. As to how those polled respond to the pollsters, how natives respond to ethnologists, the analysand to the analyst, you may be sure that there is total circularity in every case: those questioned always behave as the questioner imagines they will and solicits them to. Even the psychoanalytic transference and counter-transference collapses today under the shock of this stimulated, simulated and anticipated response, which is simply a modality of the self-fulfilling prophecy 5 So we come up against the strange paradox where whatever those polled, analysands and natives say, it is irremediably short-circuited and lost. Indeed, it is on the basis of this foreclosure that these disciplines - sociology, psychoanalysis and ethnology - will be able to develop in leaps and bounds. Such amazing development is just hot air, however, since the circular response of those polled, the analysands and the natives is nevertheless a challenge and a victorious revenge: when they turn the question back on itself, isolating it by holding the expected mirror-image response up to it, then there is no hope that the question can ever get out of what is in fact the vicious circle of power. It is exactly the same in the electoral system, where 'representa­ tives' no longer represent anything, by dint of controlling the electoral body's responses so well: somewhere, everything has escaped them. That is why the controlled responses of the dominated are nevertheless somehow a genuine response, a desperate vengeance which lets power bury power

#### Sentimentality towards animals degrades their status and places them even farther below humans, as not even deserving our respect, justifying experimentation and destruction.

**Baudrillard in 81** [Jean, “Simulacra and Simulation” p. 134-136]

In particular, our sentimentality toward animals is a sure sign of the disdain in which we hold them. It is proportional to this disdain. It is in proportion to being relegated to irresponsibility, to the inhuman, that the animal becomes worthy of the human ritual of affection and protection, just as the child does in direct proportion to being relegated to a status of innocence and childishness. Sentimentality is nothing but the infinitely degraded form of bestiality, the racist commiseration, in which we ridiculously cloak animals to the point of rendering them sentimental themselves. Those who used to sacrifice animals did not take them for beasts. And even the Middle Ages, which condemned and punished them in due form, was in this way much closer to them than we are, we who are filled with horror at this practice. They held them to be guilty: which was a way of honoring them. We take them for nothing, and it is on this basis that we are "human" with them. We no longer sacrifice them, we no longer punish them, and we are proud of it, but it is simply that we have domesticated them, worse: that we have made of them a racially inferior world, no longer even worthy of our justice, but only of our affection and social charity, no longer worthy of punishment and of death, but only of experimentation and extermination like meat from the butchery. It is the reabsorption of all violence in regard to them that today forms the monstrosity of beasts. The violence of sacrifice, which is one of "intimacy" (Bataille), has been succeeded by the sentimental or experimental violence that is one of distance. Monstrosity has changed in meaning. The original monstrosity of the beast, object of terror and fascination, but never negative, always ambivalent, object of exchange also and of metaphor, in sacrifice, in mythology, in the heraldic bestiary, and even in our dreams and our phantasms-this monstrosity, rich in every threat and every metamorphosis, one that is secretly resolved in the living culture of men, and that is a form of alliance, has been exchanged for a spectacular monstrosity: that of King Kong wrenched from his jungle and transformed into a music-hall star. Formerly, the cultural hero annihilated the beast, the dragon, the monster-and from the spilt blood plants, men, culture were born; today, it is the beast King Kong who comes to sack our industrial metropolises, who comes to liberate us from our culture, a culture dead from having purged itself of all real monstrosity and from having broken its pact with it (which was expressed in the film by the primitive gift of the woman). The profound seduction of the film comes from this inversion of meaning: all inhumanity has gone over to the side of men, all humanity has gone over to the side of captive bestiality, and to the respective seduction of man and of beast, monstrous seduction of one order by the other, the human and the bestial. Kong dies for having renewed, through seduction, this possibility of the metamorphosis of one reign into another, this incestuous promiscuity between beasts and men (though one that is never realized, except in a symbolic and ritual mode). In the end, the progression that the beast followed is not different form that of madness and childhood, of sex or negritude. A logic of exclusion, of reclusion, of discrimination and necessarily; in return, a logic of reversion, reversible violence that makes it so that all of society finally aligns itself on the axioms of madness, of childhood, of sexuality; and of inferior races (purged, it must be said, of the radical interrogation to which, from the very heart of their exclusion, they lent importance). The convergence of processes of civilization is astounding. Animals, like the dead, and so many others, have followed this uninterrupted process of annexation through extermination, which consists of liquidation, then of making the extinct species speak, of making them present the confession of their disappearance. Making animals speak, as one has made the insane, children, sex (Foucault) speak. This is even deluded in regard to animals, whose principle of uncertainty; which they have caused to weigh on men since the rupture in their alliance with men, resides in the fact that they do not speak.

#### The affirmative commits the symbolic homicide of their 1ac when they read it and tie it to an economy of exchange.

Bifo 11. Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108

Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.

Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]

The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)

Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely. The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape:

Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)

In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:

all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)

This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:

No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)

In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.

In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed.

The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.

The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

#### The 1ac’s energetic activism only feeds into the system which allows animals to be rendered as exchangeable objects by forcing the exact same system on their speech act—the only solution is suicidal exhaustion of debate

Bifo 11. Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 114-116

The identification of desire with energy has produced the identification of force with violence that turned out so badly for the Italian movement in the 1970s and ’80s. We have to distinguish energy and desire. Energy is falling, desire has to be saved nevertheless. Similarly, we have to distinguish force from violence. Fighting power with violence is suicidal or useless, nowadays. How can we think of activists going against professional organizations of killers in the mold of Blackwater, Haliburton, secret services, mafias?

Only suicide has proved to be efficient in the struggle against power. And actually suicide has become decisive in the history of our time. The dark side of the multitude meets here the loneliness of death. Activist culture should avoid the danger of becoming a culture of resentment. Acknowledging the irreversibility of the catastrophic trends that capitalism has inscribed in the history of society does not mean to renounce it. On the contrary, we have today a new cultural task: to live the inevitable with a relaxed soul. To call forth a big wave of withdrawal, of massive dissociation, of desertion from the scene of the economy, of non-participation in the fake show of politics. The crucial focus of social transformation is creative singularity. The existence of singularities is not to be conceived as a personal way to salvation, they may become a contagious force.

“Yes we can”, the headline of the campaign of Barack Obama, the three words that mobilized the hope and political energies of the American people in 2008, have a disturbing echo just one year after the victory of the democratic candidate. These words sound like an exorcism much more than like a promise. “Yes we can” may be read as a lapse in the Freudian sense, a sign coming from the collective subconscious, a diversion from the hidden intuition that we can no more. The mantra of Barack Obama has gathered the energies of the best part of the American people, and collected the best of the American cultural legacy.

But what about the results? So far Obama has been unable to deal with the global environmental threats, the effects of the geopolitical disaster produced by Cheney-Bush, the effects of the powerful lobbies imposing the interest of the corporations (for instance, of the private health insurers). When we think of the ecological catastrophe, of geopolitical threats, of economic collapse provoked by the financial politics of neoliberalism, it’s hard to dispel the feeling that irreversible trends are already at work inside the world machine. Political will seems paralyzed in the face of the economic power of the criminal class.

The age of modern social civilization seems on the brink of dissolution, and it is hard to imagine how society will be able to react. Modern civilization was based on the convergence and integration of the capitalist exploitation of labor force and the political regulation of social conflict. The regulator State, the heir of Enlightenment and Socialism has been the guarantor of human rights and the negotiator of social balance. When, at the end of a ferocious class- struggle between work and capital – but also inside the capitalist class itself – the financial class has seized power by destroying the legal regulation and transforming the social composition, the entire edifice of modern civilization has begun to crumble.

Social Darwinist ideology has legitimized the violent imposition of the law of the strongest, and the very foundations of democracy have been reduced to rubble. This accelerated destruction of tolerance, culture and human feelings has given an unprecedented impulse to the process of accumulation and has increased the velocity and the extent of economic growth throughout the last two decades of the 20th century. But all this has also created the premises of a war against human society that is underway in the new century.

The war against society is waged at two different levels: at the economic level it is known under the name of privatization, and it is based on the idea that every fragment and every cell of the biological, affective linguistic spheres have to be turned into profit machines. The effect of this privatization is the impoverishment of daily life, the loss of sensibility in the fields of sex, communication, and human relationships, and also the increasing inequality between hyper-rich minority and a majority of dispossessed. At the social level this war is waged in terms of criminalization and in-securization of the territory and of economic life. In large areas of the planet, that are growing and growing in extent, production and exchange have become the ground of violent confrontation between military groups and criminal organization. Slavery, blackmail, extortion, murder are integral parts of the lexicon of Economy.

Scattered insurrections will take place in the coming years, but we should not expect much from them. They’ll be unable to touch the real centers of power because of the militarization of metropolitan space, and they will not be able to gain much in terms of material wealth or political power. As the long wave of counter-globalization moral protests could not destroy neoliberal power, so the insurrections will not find a solution, not unless a new consciousness and a new sensibility surfaces and spreads, changing everyday life, and creating Non-Temporary Autonomous Zones rooted in the culture and consciousness of the global network.

#### We are the animal terrorists, your fetishized objects, and we have taken you hostage. We affirm the ultimate indeterminacy between sacrifice and sacrificer, human and animal.

#### The only way to challenge the dominant order is to trigger a symbolic trap to render the system incapable of responding without losing face. All responses signal nothing more than impotence in the face of symbolic violence. Our action is the only way to be political, to rupture dominant political forces.

Baudrillard 76 [Jean, brilliant French philosopher, professor of sociology and philosophy at Université de Paris-IX Dauphine, Symbolic Exchange and Death, p. 36-38]

We will not destroy the system by a direct, dialectical revolution of the economic or political infrastructure. Everything produced by contradiction, by the relation of forces, or by energy in general, will only feed back into the mechanism and give it impetus, following a circular distortion similar to a Moebius strip. We will never defeat it by following its own logic of energy, calculation, reason and revolution, history and power, or some finality or counter-finality. The worst violence at this level has no purchase, and will only backfire against itself. We will never defeat the system on the plane of the real: the worst error of all our revolutionary strategies is to believe that we will put an end to the system on the plane of the real: this is their imaginary, imposed on them by the system itself, living or surviving only by always leading those who attack the system to fight amongst each other on the terrain of reality, which is always the reality of the system. This is where they throw all their energies, their imaginary violence, where an implacable logic constantly turns back into the system. We have only to do it violence or counter-violence since it thrives on symbolic violence - not in the degraded sense in which this formula has found fortune, as a violence 'of signs' , from which the system draws strength, or with which it 'masks' its material violence: symbolic violence is deduced from a logic of the symbolic (which has nothing to do with the sign or with energy): reversal, the incessant reversibility of the counter-gift and, conversely, the seizing of power by the unilateral exercise of the gift. 25 We must therefore displace everything into the sphere of the symbolic, where challenge, reversal and overbidding are the law, so that we can respond to death only by an equal or superior death. There is no question here of real violence or force, the only question concerns the challenge and the logic of the symbolic. If domination comes from the system's retention of the exclusivity of the gift without counter-gift - the gift of work which can only be responded to by destruction or sacrifice, if not in consumption, which is only a spiral of the system of surplus-gratification without result, therefore a spiral of surplus-domination, a gift of media and messages to which, due to the monopoly of the code, nothing is allowed to retort; the gift, everywhere and at every instant, of the social, of the protection agency, security, gratification and the solicitation of the social from which nothing is any longer permitted to escape - then the only solution is to turn the principle of its power back against the system itself: the impossibility of responding or retorting. To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death. Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out, the hostage is the substitute the alter-ego of the 'terrorist' - the hostage's death for the terrorist's. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. The stakes are death without any possibility of negotiation, and therefore return to an inevitable overbidding. Of course, they attempt to deploy the whole system of negotiation, and the terrorists themselves often enter into this exchange scenario in terms of this calculated equivalence (the hostages' lives against some ransom or liberation, or indeed for the prestige of the operation alone). From this perspective, taking hostages is not original at all, it simply creates an unforeseen and selective relation of forces which can be resolved either by traditional violence or by negotiation. It is a tactical action. There is something else at stake, however, as we clearly saw at The Hague over the course of ten days of incredible negotiations: no-one knew what could be negotiated, nor could they agree on terms, nor on the possible equivalences of the exchange. Or again, even if they were formulated, the 'terrorists' demands' amounted to a radical denial of negotiation. It is precisely here that everything is played out, for with the impossibility of all negotiation we pass into the symbolic order, which is ignorant of this type of calculation and exchange (the system itself lives solely by negotiation, even if this takes place in the equilibrium of violence). The system can only respond to this irruption of the symbolic (the most serious thing to befall it, basically the only 'revolution') by the real, physical death of the terrorists. This, however, is its defeat, since their death was their stake, so that by bringing about their deaths the system has merely impaled itself on its own violence without really responding to the challenge that was thrown to it. Because the system can easily compute every death, even war atrocities, but cannot compute the death-challenge or symbolic death, since this death has no calculable equivalent, it opens up an inexpiable overbidding by other means than a death in exchange. Nothing corresponds to death except death. Which is precisely what happens in this case: the system itself is driven to suicide in return, which suicide is manifest in its disarray and defeat. However infinitesimal in terms of relations of forces it might be, the colossal apparatus of power is eliminated in this situation where (the very excess of its) derision is turned back against itself. The police and the army, all the institutions and mobilised violence of power whether individually or massed together, can do nothing against this lowly but symbolic death. For this death draws it onto a plane where there is no longer any response possible for it (hence the sudden structural liquefaction of power in '68, not because it was less strong, but because of the simple symbolic displacement operated by the students' practices). The system can only die in exchange, defeat itself to lift the challenge. Its death at this instant is a symbolic response, but a death which wears it out. The challenge has the efficiency of a murderer. Every society apart from ours knows that, or used to know it. Ours is in the process of rediscovering it. The routes of symbolic effectiveness are those of an alternative politics. Thus the dying ascetic challenges God ever to give him the equivalent of this death. God does all he can to give him this equivalent 'a hundred times over' , in the form of prestige , of spiritual power, indeed of global hegemony But the ascetic's secret dream is to attain such an extent of mortification that even God would be unable either to take up the challenge , or to absorb the debt . He will then have triumphed over God, and become God himself. That is why the ascetic is always close to heresy and sacrilege, and as such condemned by the Church, whose function it is merely to preserve God from this symbolic face-to-face, to protect Him from this mortal challenge where He is summoned to die, to sacrifice Himself in order to take up the challenge of the mortified ascetic. The Church will have had this role for all time, avoiding this type of catastrophic confrontation (catastrophic primarily for the Church) and substituting a rule-bound exchange of penitences and gratifications, the impressario of a system of equivalences between God and men. The same situation exists in our relation to the system of power All these institutions, all these social, economic, political and psychological mediations, are there so that no-one ever has the opportunity to issue this symbolic challenge, this challenge to the death, the irreversible gift which, like the absolute mortification of the ascetic, brings about a victory over all power, however powerful its authority may be. It is no longer necessary that the possibility of this direct symbolic confrontation ever takes place. And this is the source of our profound boredom. This is why taking hostages and other similar acts rekindle some fascination: they are at once an exorbitant mirror for the system of its own repressive violence, and the model of a symbolic violence which is always forbidden it, the only violence it cannot exert: its own death.

### 1nc case

#### The aff’s fetishization of nature obscures their own consumptive practices—negative on presumption

**SMITH ‘1** [Daniel Somers; Assistant Professor at Ramapo College, Carnegie Council Fellow; Place-Based Environmentalism and Global Warming: Conceptual Contradictions of American Environmentalism;*Ethics & International Affairs*; Volume 15, No. 2; 2001; http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108]

Given the long and continuing migration of political and economic power to urban and corporate centers, these views have had serious implications for people living in economically and politically marginal rural areas. If the best nature is pristine and endangered, then it must be "protected," which often means excluding materially productive land uses. In some cases, as in the Northern Forest, protection may also involve allowing certain prescribed land uses (usually those that are aesthetically pleasing) to continue in a similarly idealized vision of "traditional" working landscapes. Either way, the process of objectification is a form of conceptual power that helps to make this assertion of control over the places where others live politically feasible and morally palatable. This situation is by no means restricted to the United States or other developed countries. In places like the rainforests of Amazonia and Indonesia, or the Himalayas of Nepal, indigenous and other rural inhabitants who have little political clout are frequently overwhelmed by internationally funded conservation initiatives that, fueled by well-meaning desires to protect forests, mountains, and biodiversity, can be ignorant of or even hostile toward local subsistence needs and cultures[15](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote15#footnote15). Equally important is how these popular views of nature shape the awareness and definition of environmental problems. **Infatuation with wild**, **pristine nature tends to steer our attention away from our own impacts on the larger "nature" that surrounds us, especially where these impacts are indirect or subtle, as is the case with climate change.** As William Cronon points out, **"To the extent that we live in an urban-industrial civilization but** at the same time **pretend** to ourselves **that our *real* home is in the wilderness,** to just that extent **we give ourselves permission to evade responsibility for the lives we actually lead"** [2](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote2#footnote2). Thus, we "get back to nature" by driving on the interstate or flying in a plane and then using the latest high-tech outdoor gear. **We "get away from it all" by making a flurry of commercial transactions with travel agents, adventure outfitters, and ecotourism guides. Meanwhile, we define as "problems" those activities**, like development and clear-cutting, **that have obvious effects and can be attributed to others.** If our principal goal is to keep roads out of wilderness or protect scenery from rapacious timber corporations, **it becomes much easier to ignore the implications of our own personal and seemingly insignificant actions. Instead of emphasizing the role of consumer demand in driving the** degradation of wilderness, resource extraction in more mundane landscapes, and the **buildup of greenhouse gases that threaten rare and common places alike, we can point at the proximate destroyers of pristine nature** and confirm our personal sense of virtue by supporting environmental groups that seek to stop them. **Lost is consideration of the extraordinary amount of resources used and waste generated by Americans per capita.** Mathis **Wackernagel and** William **Rees** have developed a method for calculating the "ecological footprint" of individuals and communities based on the land area required to produce various goods, and including the estimated forest land that would be required to sequester carbon emitted from burning fossil fuels. They **estimate that there are approximately 1.5 hectares of productive land available for each human, and that the average North American uses the equivalent of between four and five hectares. "If everyone** on Earth **lived like the average** Canadian or **American, we would need** at least **three** such **planets to live sustainably"** [17](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote17#footnote17). Moreover, there is little reason to expect that middle- and upper-class environmentalists contribute any less to the problem than do others. Those who live in large homes on biologically impoverished suburban plots of land and travel to the mountains on weekends or to exotic "ecotourism" destinations for vacation, undoubtedly have a greater negative impact on the environment than do average citizens.

#### Speciesm isn’t a root cause – their mono-causal logic is simplistic and ignores history – their author

Best 7

(Steven, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume V, Issue 2, 2007)

The profound value of Patterson’s book is to raise the animal standpoint – analytically and ethically – and to show in clear and decisive ways its pivotal importance to the entire spectrum of human interests and politics. Yet while I endorse and share Patterson’s attempt to root hierarchy in the domination of humans over animals, and his goal to clarify the immense consequences of animal exploitation for human existence itself, I want to raise two critical points. First, Patterson’s attempt to root all forms of oppression in one primal source betrays an essentialist theory and metaphysical longing for clear origins and unambiguous beginnings. While there is no doubt that the domination of animals is fundamental to the domination of humans, as his book brilliantly and convincingly shows, perhaps the mythical “first” hierarchy came out of a more complex social matrix within which other proto- or early forms of hierarchy were stirring, coalescing, and taking shape. It could be the case, for instance, that speciesism and patriarchy emerged together and were coeval, or that an even more complex and varied system of power arose whose details remain shrouded in the mists of prehistoric time. Second, Patterson’s linkages between the oppression of animals and the oppression of humans often are too simplistic and unmediated, such that he ignores the forceful overdetermination of many forms of hierarchy. There is, for example. an important connection between speciesism and colonialism which Patterson draws out, but there are other conditioning factors responsible for bringing about and sustaining colonialism, such as stem from the fundamental logic of capitalism, which he fails to engage. Similarly, while Patterson brilliantly explores the relation between slaughterhouses and Nazi death camps, he fails to provide a more complex and multidimensional analysis that would ground the origins of Nazism in the rise of modernism, its hostile anti-modernism, and its opportunistic pursuit of the very capitalist values it condemned (while all the time being propped up in one way or another by numerous US corporations). When Patterson claims that “it was but one step from the industrialized killing of American slaughterhouses to Nazi Germany’s assembly-line mass murder” one detects a linear and simplistic logic.

#### Calling factory farming genocide and equating black and animal suffering trivializes anti-blackness and re-entrenches stereotypes of animal rights activists as elite, privileged activists – turns aff solvency

**Wise 5** [Tim, August 13, “Animal Whites: PETA and the Politics of Putting Things in Perspective,” http://www.timwise.org/2005/08/animal-whites-peta-and-the-politics-of-putting-things-in-perspective/]

Oh, and not to put too fine a point on it, but if the folks at PETA really think that factory farming and eating the products of factory farming are literally the equivalent to human genocide, then, to be consistent, they would have to argue for the criminal prosecution of all meat-eaters, and War Crimes Tribunals for anyone even remotely connected to the process. After all, if you consume a factory-farmed chicken, you are, by this logic, implicated in mass murder, the same way many whites were in the lynching of blacks, by purchasing the amputated body parts of the latest victims of white rage.¶ To draw any distinction at all — and to not support criminal incarceration of meat-eaters the way one would for a cannibal the likes of Jeffrey Dahmer, indeed, draws that distinction — is to admit, whether openly or not, that there is a difference between a cow and a person. That difference may be quite a bit smaller than we realize, and that difference certainly doesn’t justify cruelty to the cow — and it may indeed be so small that we really should opt for vegetarianism — but it is a difference nonetheless.¶ That PETA can’t understand what it means for a black person to be compared to an animal, given a history of having been thought of in exactly those terms, isn’t the least bit shocking. After all, the movement is perhaps the whitest of all progressive or radical movements on the planet, for reasons owing to the privilege one must possess in order to focus on animal rights as opposed to, say, surviving oneself from institutional oppression.¶ Perhaps if animal liberationists weren’t so thoroughly white and middle-class, and so removed from the harsh realities of both the class system and white supremacy, they would be able to find more sympathy from the folks of color who rightly castigate them for their most recent outrage. Perhaps if PETA activists had ever demonstrated a commitment to fighting racism and the ongoing cruelty that humans face every day, they would find more sympathy from those who, for reasons that are understandable given their own lives, view animal rights activism as the equivalent of fiddling while Rome burns, rather than as a struggle for greater compassion for all.

### 2nc death

#### Death functions in the reduction of things to inert objects of knowledge defined by their exchange value. Universal equivalence only proves no unique value. Information itself only serves as a testimony to the grand meaninglessness of our civilization. Buried under mountains of information, all the world has become a museum, death

Baudrillard 76 [Jean, “Symbolic Exchange and Death”, p. 185]

Pursued and censured everywhere, death springs up everywhere again. No longer as apocalyptic folklore, such as might have haunted the living imagination in certain epochs; but voided precisely of any imaginary substance, it passes into the most banal reality, and for us takes on the mask of the very principle of rationality that dominates our lives. Death is when everything functions and serves something else, it is the absolute, signing, cybernetic functionality of the urban environment as in Jacques Tati's film Play-Time. Man is absolutely indexed on his function, as in Kafka: the age of the civil servant is the age of a culture of death. This is the phantasm of total programming, increased predictability and accuracy, finality not only in material things, but in fulfilling desires. In a word, death is confused with the law of value -- and strangely with the structural law of value by which everything is arrested as a coded difference in a universal nexus of relations. This is the true face of ultra-modern death, made up of the faultless, objective, ultra-rapid connection of all the terms in a system. Our true necropolises are no longer the cemeteries, hospitals, wars, hecatombs; death is no longer where we think it is, it is no longer biological, psychological, metaphysical, it is no longer even murder: our societies' true necropolises are the computer banks or the foyers, blank spaces from which all human noise has been expunged, glass coffins where the world's sterilised memories are frozen. Only the dead remember everything in something like an immediate eternity of knowledge, a quintessence of the world that today we dream of burying in the form of microfilm and archives, making the entire world into an archive in order that it be discovered by some future civilization. The cryogenic freezing of all knowledge so that it can be resurrected; knowledge passes into immortality as sign-value. Against our dream of losing and forgetting everything, we set up an opposing great wall of relations, connections and information, a dense and inextricable artificial memory, and we bury ourselves alive in the fossilised hope of one day being rediscovered. Computers are the transistorised death to which we submit in the hope of survival. Museums are already there to survive all civilisations, in order to bear testimony. But to what? It is of little importance. The mere fact that they exist testifies that we are in a culture which no longer possesses any meaning for itself and which can now only dream of having meaning for someone else from a later time. Thus everything becomes an environment of death as soon as it is no longer a sign that can be transistorised in a gigantic whole, just as money reaches the point of no return when it is nothing more than a system of writing.

### 2nc form/content

#### The 1ac duplicates the most violent of debate technologies in its own critique—it is the perfection of the system, its insulation from critique

Baudrillard 76. Jean Baudrillard, *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, pg. 74

The consummate enjoyment [jouissance] of the signs of guilt, despair, violence and death are replacing guilt, anxiety and even death in the total euphoria of simulation. This euphoria aims to abolish cause and effect, origin and end, and replace them with reduplication. Every closed system protects itself in this way from the referential and the anxiety of the referential, as well as from all metalanguage that the system wards off by operating its own metalanguage, that is, by duplicating itself as its own critique. In simulation, the metalinguistic illusion reduplicates and com­ pletes the referential illusion (the pathetic hallucination of the sign and the pathetic hallucination of the real).

### 2nc knowing the animal

#### Baudrillol

Baudrillard, ’10 (Jean, Carnival and Cannibal; Ventriloquous Evil, p. 70-73) [m leap]

IN THE PROMETHEAN PERSPECTIVE of unlimited growth, there is not merely the desire to make everything function, to liberate everything, but also the desire to make everything signify. Everything is to be brought under the aegis of meaning (and reality). In some cases we know that knowledge will forever escape us. But in the immense majority of cases we do not even know what has disappeared and has always already eluded us. Now, science makes a systematic effort to eradicate this secret area, this 'constellation of the mystery"' and to eliminate this demarcation line between the violable and the inviolable. All that is concealed must be revealed; everything must be reducible to analysis. Hence the whole effort (particularly since the death of God, who restrained this attempt to break open the natural world) leads to an extension of the field of meaning (of knowledge, analysis, objectivity and reality). Now, everything inclines us to think that this accumulation, this over-production, this proliferation of meaning constitutes (a little like the accumulation of greenhouse gases) a virtual threat for the species (and for the planet), since it is gradually destroying, through experimentation, that domain of the inviolable that serves us, as it were, as an ozone layer and protects us from the worst—from the lethal irradiation and obliteration of our symbolic space. Shouldn't we then, work precisely in the opposite direction, to extend the domain of the inviolable? To restrain the production of meaning the way they are trying to restrain the production of greenhouse gases, to reinforce that constellation of the mystery and that intangible barrier that serves as a screen against the welter of information, interaction and universal exchange. This countervailing work exists—it is the work of thought. Not the analytic work of an understanding of causes, of the dissection of an object-world, not the work of a critical, en-lightened thought, but another form of understanding or intelligence, which is the intelligence of the mystery.

### 1nr coloniality

**Method of double-critique challenges the stagnancy of readings of culture and history in an attempt to confront the epistemologies below them.**

Mignolo 2000 [Walter, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University Local Histories/Global Designs, 0691001405 69-70

At this point, double critique is a crucial strategy to build macronarratives from the perspective of coloniality. As such, these macronarratives are not predestined to tell the truth that colonial discourses did not tell. That step is already implied in double critique. Macronarratives from the perspective of c oloniality are precisely the places in which "an other thinking" could be implemented, not in order to tell the truth over lies, but to think otherwise, to move toward "an other logic"—in sum, to change the terms, not just the content of the conversation. Such narratives make it possible to think coloniality, and not only modernity, at large. The epistemological implications of these possibilities are enormous. I explore some of them here, specifically those that allow Khatibi to position himself in relation to the social sciences (e.g., his claim for the decolonization of sociology) and those that allow him to distance himself from his own allies (e.g., internal criticism ol Western metaphysics, as represented by Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, 01 Foucault). With respect to sociology, Khatibi underlines the fact that sociohistorical decolonization (with all its difficulties) did not produce a critical way of thinking. It did not result in, as Khatibi puts it, a decolonization that would have been, at the same time, a deconstruction. By playing decolonization together with deconstruction, and underlining that his is a perspective from the Third World (1983, 4 7 ) , Khatibi is indeed making a move of boundless significance. On the one hand, he distinguishes a critique of modernity from the perspective of modernity itself; on the other, he enacts a critique of modernity from the perspective of coloniality. Thus, he marks his alliance with Foucault or Derrida at the same time as his detachment. With sociology, however, Khatibi's position is one-sided: "We have still a lot to think about the structural solidarity linking imperialism, in all its dimensions (political cultural, military), to the expansion of what is called 'social sciences' ( 1 9 8 3 , 4 8 ) . The implications for double critique are these: ( 1 ) a decolonizing deconstruction (e.g., from a Third World perspective) of Western logo- and ethnocentrism that has been exported all over the planet, and that will com plement a postmodern deconstruction a la Derrida or in the form of Foucault's archaeology or Nietzsche's genealogy; and ( 2 ) a criticism, from the same perspective (e.g., a decolonizing deconstruction from the Third World) of the knowledges and discourses produced by the different societies of the Arab world. A decolonizing deconstruction could be better undet stood, perhaps, from Khatibi's positioning in relation to Nietzsche's criiici'.m of Christianity. At the same time that Khatibi finds in Nietzsche an ally lm his criticism of Christianity (from inside Nietzsche's own history, I would add), Khatibi realizes he has to depart from him. While he places Nietzsche in the enormous fight that the German thinker developed against Christianity, he also locates himself as a Arab/Islamic thinker against Christianity, a position that cannot be subsumed under the presumable universal location of Nietzsche's criticism: "Mais nous sommes aussi musulmans par tradition; ce qui fait changer la position strategique de notre critique" (1983, 21 We are *also* Muslims by tradition; a fact that changes the strategic position ol our critique).

#### Fun fact Spanos’ philosophy is hella anthropocentric

**Stanescu, 2006** (James, Grad Student at Binghamton, http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?t=974849&)

Humanism (for Spanos) is the idea of separating those that are "civilized" versus those that are "barbarians". For Spanos the ontological beginnings of this notion of humanism begins with the Roman Empire (he gets pissed if you imply that it begins with the greeks). For this, I suggest seeing Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism." Therefore there is a notion of training people into civility. This is where Foucault enters the picture for Spanos. Because though he doesn't have a strong enough ontological basis (that's why we need Heidegger) he allows us to both enter the world and at the same time understand this notion of training. However, this notion of imperial humanism is continued today within the projects of the colonized, which is why Spanos thinks introduces Said. So for Spanos, when he says that he is a humanist against humanism, he is fundamentally saying that we need a more expansive understanding of humanism. We need to expand the category of the human to all that are, well, human. Thus Spanos is not bothered by his strong anthropocentric investments that his philosophical work is doing. However, by not being concerned with this, he allows for everything he fights against (philosophically) **to be introduced again through the back door**. For example, all this discourse about being "burdened" that Spanos uses is reminiscent of the notion of White Man's Burden. Remember, the civilizing mission was always seen as a burden. Not as a sovereign violence, but as an act of caring. This idea is like the Christian pastoral, where the sovereign was seen as a shepherd, whose job was to be concerned, to care, for every member of his kingdom. Which is exactly what is being said that we as humans have to be the "shepherds of being." I could go on, my point is that we can't expand the notion of humanism, but rather we have to find a different registrar of being in the world, a different way to inhabit and act in the world. My suggestion is one of valorization of life.

**Their form of modernist politics privileges European culture at the center of world history subjecting the peripheral peoples to violence and genocides rendered inevitable and necessary in the name of rationality and philosophy. Their epistemology historically constructs guilt free motives to posit itself as the hero to the world thus justifying its redemptive sacrifice of guilty peoples**

**Mignolo 2000** [Walter, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University Local Histories/Global Designs, 0691001405 115-117

enriqueDussel, an Argentinian philosopher associated with the philosophy of liberation, has been articulating a strong countermodern argument. I quote from the beginning of his Frankfurt lectures: Modernity is, for many (for JurgenHabermas or Charles Taylor, for example), an essentially or exclusively European phenomenon. In these lectures, I will argue that modernity is, in fact, a European phenomenon, but one constituted in dialectical relation with a non-European alterity that is its ultimate content. Modernity appears when Europe affirms itself as the "center" of a World history that it inaugurates; the "periphery" that surrounds this center is consequently part of its self-definition. The occlusion of this periphery (and of the role of Spain and Portugal in the formation of the modern world system from the late fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries) leads the major contemporary thinkers of the "center" into a Eurocentric fallacy in their understanding of modernity. If their understanding of the genealogy of modernity is thus partial and provincial, their attempts at a critique or defense of it are likewise unilateral and, in part, false. (Dussel [19931 1995, 65) The construction of the idea of modernity linked to European expansion, as forged by European intellectuals, was powerful enough to last almost five hundred years. Postcolonial discourses and theories began effectively to question that hegemony, a challenge that was unthinkable (and perhaps unexpected) by those who constructed and presupposed the idea of modernity as a historical period and implicitly as *the* locus of enunciation—a locus of enunciation that in the name of rationality, science, and philosophy asserted its own privilege over other forms of rationality or over what, from the perspective of modern reason, was nonrational. I would submit, consequently, that postcolonial literature and postcolonial theories are constructing a new concept of reason as differential loci of enunciation. What does "differential" mean? Differential here first means a displacement of the concept and practice of the notions of knowledge, science, theory, and understanding articulated during the modern period.® Thus, Dussel's region alization of modernity could be compared with HomiBhabha's, both speak ing*from* different colonial legacies (Spanish and English respectively): "Driven by the subaltern history of the margins of modernity—rather than by the failures of logocentrism—I have tried, in some small measure, In *revise the known, to rename the postmodern from the position of the postcolonial"* (Bhabha 1994, 175; emphasis added). I find a noteworthy coincidence between Dussel and Bhabha, albeit with some significant differences in accent. The coincidence lies in the very iuiportant fact that the task of postcolonial reasoning (i.e., theorizing) is not only linked to the immediate political needs of decolonization (in Asia, Al rica, and the Caribbean) but also to the rereading of the paradigm of modii n reason. This task is performed by Dussel and Bhabha in different, although complementary ways. After a detailed analysis of Kant's and Hegel's construction of the idea of I nlightenment in European history, Dussel summarizes the elements that ionstitute the myth of modernity: (1) Modern (European) civilization understands itself as the most developed, the superior, civilization; (2) This sense of superiority obliges it, in the form of a categorical imperative, as it were, to "develop" (civilize, uplift, educate) the more primitive, barbarous, underdeveloped civilizations; (3) The path of such development should be that followed by Europe in its own development out of antiquity and the Middle Ages; (4) Where the barbarians or the primitive opposes the civilizing process, the praxis of modernity must, in the last instance, have recourse to the violence necessary to remove the obstacles to modernization; (5) This violence, which produces in many different ways, victims, takes on an almost ritualistic character: the civilizing hero invests his victims (the colonized, the slave, the woman, the ecological destruction of the earth, etc.) with the character of being participants in a process of redemptive sacrifice; (6) from the point of view of modernity, the barbarian or primitive is in a state of guilt (for, among other things, opposing the civilizing process). This allows modernity to present itself not only as innocent but also as a force that will emancipate or redeem its victims from their guilt; (7) Given this "civilizing" and redemptive character of modernity, the suffering and sacrifices (the costs) of modernization imposed on "immature" peoples, slaves, races, the "weaker" sex, el cetera, are inevitable and necessary. (Dussel 119931 1995, 75) the myth of modernity is laid out by Dussel to confront alternative interpietations. While Horkheimer and Adorno, as well as postmodernist think• is such as Lyotard, Rorty, or Vattimo, all propose a critique of reason (a v iolent, coercive, and genocidal reason), Dussel proposes a critique of the enlightenment's irrational moments as sacrificial myth not by negating reason but by asserting the reason of the other—thai is, by identifying postcolonial reason as differential locus of enunciation. The intersection between tbi idea of a self-centered modernity grounded in its own appropriation of greco-Roman (classical) legacies and an emerging idea of modernity from the margins (or countermodernity) makes clear that history does not begin in Greece, and that different historical beginnings are, at the same time, anchored to diverse loci of enunciation. This simple axiom is, 1 submit, a bind.internal one for and of postsubaltern reason. Finally, Bhabha's project in lename the postmodern from the position of the postcolonial also finds lis niche in postsubaltern reason as a differential locus of enunciation.

#### Voting negative is the act of disobedience being interjected into the aff. It changes the terms of the conversation instead of just the words we use.

Alvarez 2001[David, Of Border-Crossing Nomads and Planetary Epistemologies, CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 1, Number 3, Winter. 2001, pp. 325-343]

What exactly are border gnosis and gnoseology, and whence do they emerge? According to Mignolo, Border gnosis as knowledge from a subaltern perspective is knowledge conceived from the exterior borders of the modern/colonial world system, and border gnoseology as a discourse about colonial knowledge is conceived at the intersection of the knowledge produced from the perspective of modern colonialisms (rhetoric, philosophy, science) and knowledge produced from the perspective of colonial modernities in Asia, Africa, and the Americas/ Caribbean. () For Mignolo, border gnosis and gnoseology are not merely a form of knowledge and a mode of knowing that call in question received ideas about the constitution of modernity and coloniality and about the latter’s aftermath. Rather, they transcend the discourses from which those ideas sprang and which they have served to shore up. Moreover, they constitute the basis for a new macro-narrative constructed “from the perspective of coloniality” (), one told in “an other” way by such thinkers as Abdelkebir Khatibi, Edouard Glissant, Gloria Anzaldúa, Enrique Dussel, and Mignolo himself.8 This macronarrative does not merely seek to “tell the truth that colonial discourses did not tell.” (What that “truth” might be is left unspoken.) Rather, the coloniality that it denounces and the decolonization that it announces are of a discursive, and quite possibly mystical (one is tempted to say mystifying), kind: Macronarratives from the perspective of coloniality are precisely the places in which “an other thinking” could be implemented, not to tell the truth over lies, but to think otherwise, to move toward “an other logic”—in sum, to change the terms, not just the content, of the conversation. Such narratives make it possible to think coloniality, and not only modernity, at large (). Leaving aside for the moment Mignolo’s subsequent, and possibly immodest, claim that “the epistemological implications of these possibilities are enormous” (), it is important to note that the entire book turns on a pair of intertwined notions: “the colonial difference” and the “coloniality of power.”9 Here is Mignolo’s first extended invocation of the two concepts: The colonial difference is the space where the coloniality of power is enacted. It is also the space where the restitution of subaltern knowledge is taking place and where border thinking is emerging. The colonial difference is the space where *local* histories inventing and implementing global designs meet *local* histories, the space in which global designs have to be adapted, adopted, rejected, integrated, or ignored. The colonial difference is, finally, the physical as well as imaginary location where the coloniality of power is at work in the confrontation of two kinds of local histories displayed in different spaces and times across the planet. (ix)