# Round 3—Neg vs Indiana MP

## 1NC

### 1nc iran

#### Their lieber and press ev is about China and doesn’t speak to US intentions, only capabilities—it doesn’t apply one whit in the context of Iran

#### If the U.S. would use nuclear strikes against Iran, that destroys the nuclear taboo—causes global nuclear war

**Rajaram 2**—Professor of Theoretical Physics (Ran, 22 April 2002, <http://www.hindu.com/2002/04/22/stories/2002042200431000.htm>, RBatra)

It is this taboo which will be broken if battlefield nuclear weapons, however small, begin to be used. Once the line dividing nuclear weapons and conventional bombs is crossed, it will become acceptable to use "baby nukes" and the radiation deaths that go with it. A gradual erosion of the feeling of abhorrence against nuclear weapons is bound to occur. The use of a sub-kiloton artillery shell in battle by one country will elicit a similar response with possibly a heavier yield weapon, if not in the same war, somewhere else. The ante will keep going up till eventually the use of bigger multi-kiloton and megaton weapons would be contemplated more seriously as realistic military alternatives. **The single largest universal deterrent against nuclear holocaust will be lost forever.**

#### Strikes turn terrorism, and cause CBW attacks and oil shocks

Michael Moran, 8-20-2010; Foreign Affairs columnist for GlobalPost, covering global economics, politics and U.S. foreign policy from New York; Moran ran CFR.org, the website of the Council on Foreign Relations, Opinion: The war over war with Iran http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/middle-east/100820/iran-war-nuclear-proliferation-israel

Yet U.S. military planners concluded long ago that Iran’s nuclear program has already developed beyond the point where air strikes could destroy it. At best, air strikes push back the day when Iran attains nuclear capability (whether it actually “tests” a warhead is another question). During the early days of the Iraq war in 2003, perhaps, such a mission might have successfully set back Iran’s nuclear weapons program a few years (though destroying it, frankly, would always have required an invasion and a sustained UNSCOM-style inspections regime). Right now, the frustrating UN sanctions route appears the best of a bad set of options. Few claim the air strikes would do long-term damage to Iran’s program. A recent assessment by James Phillips, a senior defense analyst from the conservative Heritage Foundation, concluded that Israeli air strikes could only “buy a little time” at this point. Phillips goes on to argue that it would be better for Israel to buy some time now than fight a nuclear war with Iran later – as if these are the only two options on the table. But Phillips, like other analysts of various political leanings, also lays out a series of harrowing consequences from such an attack, including possible chemical and biological counterstrikes by Iranian missiles on Israel, the unleashing of Hezbollah and Hamas against Israeli and U.S. interests, the activation of Iranian agents in Iraq to foil the American withdrawal and, in the darkest scenario, the closing of the Straits of Hormuz and attacks on Saudi oil facilities – in effect, precipitation of a global oil crisis like none ever seen. The fact is, in every year subsequent to our misguided Iraq invasion, both the expansion and “hardening” of Iran’s program, plus the political atmosphere in the Middle East, has lessened the potential for a successful preemptive air strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. The United States, left to its own devices right now, certainly would not take this route. The stakes in Iraq and the global economy simply are too high. For the United States, the best-case scenario would be for the conflict to ossify into a standoff reliant on Israeli and U.S. nuclear deterrence. Sanctions would continue to give incentives for Iran to stay away from taking the final, fateful step – testing a weapon.

#### Bio-terrorism leads to extinction.

**Singer 1** - professor of nuclear engineering and director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana (Clifford, Swords and Ploughshares, Volume XIII, Spring, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P\_Sp-2001.html)

There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more serious threat to human survival. The first and most immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is achieved.

#### Their Hezbollah scenario is wrong—

#### First, Hezbollah is declining—Syria

Nathan Guttman 6-9-2013; Jewish Daily Forward, “Israel Could Benefit From Syrian Civil War as Hamas and Hezbollah Face Setbacks” <http://forward.com/articles/178158/israel-could-benefit-from-syrian-civil-war-as-hama/?p=all>

In the meantime, however, recent developments have, among other things, degraded the standing of Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based, anti-Israel Shiite militia, which is fighting alongside Assad loyalists in Syria. The group has deployed thousands of fighters from their positions in Southern Lebanon into the Syrian battle theater, serving at times as the front force against the toughest opposition strongholds. For Israel, this is a welcome distraction of Hezbollah’s attention. The group had been Israel’s greatest threat and has proved its ability to hit all of northern Israel with its rockets and missiles. “There is no doubt that Hezbollah is being degraded,” said Shai Feldman, director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University. The organization, he added, is not only losing men and weapons in the Syrian combat, it is also coming under increasing attacks from political rivals in Lebanon and in the broader Arab world, which views the organization as taking the wrong side in the Syrian conflict. “For the short term,” Feldman said, “this means Israel is safer, because Hezbollah’s focus is in a completely different direction.”

#### Second, their Ayson impact card is about a terrorist group striking the U.S. not Hezbollah striking Israel—they have to read a real impact card in context of their scenario

#### Third, Iran would dump Hezbollah once they get nukes – no strategic utility

Sadr 2005 – Ehsaneh Sadr, grad student in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, Middle East Policy, “The Impact of Iran’s Nuclearization on Israel,” MEP, 12.2 - Summer 2005

There may, in fact, be reason to believe that a nuclearized Iran would be less likely to continue current levels of support for anti-Israeli terrorist organizations. The most obvious concern is that of nuclear escalation. As proliferation optimists have noted, "The presence of nuclear weapons makes states exceedingly cautious." (51) A frequently cited example is that of India and Pakistan, which some experts believe would have come to more serious blows if not for the introduction of nuclear weapons into their relationship. (52) There is no reason to think that the "nuclear magic" might not be as potent in the context of the Middle East. **The remedy of Iran's security dilemma might actually give it the confidence to forgo the use of Hezbollah as a strategic deterrent.** Although Hezbollah continues to launch a few missiles at Israel every year and provide some tactical support to terrorists within the Occupied Territories, its current level of activities is militarily more of an irritant than a serious challenge to Israel. Its visible presence and cross-border contacts, however, may serve as a potent reminder of the more serious trouble it could cause in response to Israeli actions it deems unacceptable. Iran may feel that Hezbollah serves as a useful deterrent against Israeli or U.S. military attacks. Were Iran to possess the more powerful deterrent of nuclear weapons, the cost of continued Hezbollah support might be perceived as unnecessary.

#### No impact to nuclear iran – doesn’t snowball or cause aggression

**Layne 9** – Int’l Affairs Prof, Texas A&M, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute (Christopher, America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq, Review of International Studies 35, Cambridge Journals, AG)

Of course, hard-line US neoconservatives reject this approach and argue that a nuclear-armed Iran would have three bad consequences: there could be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; Iran might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in the region, or to engage in aggression. Each of these scenarios, however, is improbable.24 A nuclear Iran will not touch off a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course, already is a nuclear power. The other three states that might be tempted to go for a nuclear weapons capability are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, each of these states would be under strong pressure not to do so, and Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously. Notwithstanding the Bush administration’s hyperbolic rhetoric, Iran is not going to give nuclear weapons to terrorists. This is not to deny Tehran’s close links to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. However, there are good reasons that states – even those that have ties to terrorists – draw the line at giving them nuclear weapons (or other WMD): if the terrorists were to use these weapons against the US or its allies, the weapons could be traced back to the donor state, which would be at risk of annihilation by an American retaliatory strike.25 Iran’s leaders have too much at stake to run this risk. Even if one believes the administration’s claims that rogue state leaders are indifferent to the fate of their populations, they do **care very much** about the survival of their regimes, which means that they can be deterred. For the same reason, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will not invest Tehran with options to attack, or intimidate its neighbours. Israel’s security with respect to Iran is guaranteed by its own formidable nuclear deterrent capabilities. By the same token, just as it did in Europe during the Cold War, the US can extend its own deterrence umbrella to protect its clients in the region – Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Turkey. American security guarantees not only will dissuade Iran from acting recklessly, but also restrain proliferation by negating the incentives for states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Given the overwhelming US advantage in both nuclear and conventional military capabilities, Iran is not going to risk national suicide by challenging America’s security commitments in the region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran hardly is desirable, neither is it ‘intolerable’, because it could be contained and deterred successfully by the US.

#### Iran prolif would stabilize the Middle East, contain regional aggression, and create bilateral deterrence with Israel

Michael Desch, 2009; professor of political science and fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, “Apocalypse Not”, The American Conservative, May 18, 2009; http://www.amconmag.com/article/2009/may/18/00006/

One could go further and suggest that a nuclear Iran might even be beneficial to the United States. The nuclear stalemate played an important role in American efforts to contain the Soviet Union, and containment, in turn, had the effect of “mellowing” the regime, as George Kennan predicted in his famous Foreign Affairs article. Why should we not expect a regional stalemate involving the United States, Israel, and Iran to have a similar effect by simultaneously bolstering each nation’s territorial security without providing any of them with the means of conquest against other states? Arguing that an Iranian nuclear capability could benefit Israel is admittedly a more controversial claim. But in addition to the possible mellowing of the Iranian political system, which would be a long-term benefit for Israeli security, there could be some immediate payoffs, too. A nuclear Iran would certainly change the dynamics of the Persian Gulf, with many Arab states desperately searching for a nuclear ally to balance against Iran. Aside from the United States, Israel is the only counterweight in the region. A nuclear Iran could warm relations between Israel and moderate Arab states throughout the region who regard a powerful Iran—Islamic or not—as a threat. I’m not arguing that an Iranian nuclear deterrent would have immediate transformative effects. It certainly would not, as more than 40 years of Cold War crises demonstrate. I also concede that the ideal situation would be a world without conflict in which nuclear weapons would be unnecessary. But we don’t live in that world. And so I am led to conclude, based upon our best theory of international relations and the perspective of Cold War history, that an Iranian nuclear deterrent would solve more problems than it creates. To paraphrase the subtitle of Stanley Kubrick’s great nuclear satire “Dr. Strangelove,” it might just be time to stop worrying and learn, if not to love, at least to tolerate the Iranian bomb.

#### Nuclear Iran boosts the Russian economy, solves Chinese oil security, and solves nuclear strikes by Israel, turning Middle East stability—there’s no risk of adventurism or terrorist acquisition

Romulous 9 (Aetius, The benefits of a nuclear Iran, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/KK18Ak02.html, AMiles)

Iran could be building "the bomb". Iran would then be the second power in the region to possess the bomb, and would certainly be the first of what will soon be a rapid escalation of regional states with the wealth and wherewithal to acquire the bomb. In addition, this proliferation of bomb-owning states is a function of economics, and as such, is inevitable, its containment improbable by any rational measure. Finally, the "bomb" itself is nothing more than a bargaining chip among established bomb-owning states to advance their own self interests- all hinging around ... oil. Pakistan has a lot of nuclear bombs, and is one of the most unstable nation-states in the world. It has the bomb because its hated rival India has its own set of bombs. Israel has a whack of over 200 bombs, none of which are regulated in any way by anybody. It's a secret. Americans have the bomb. American has thousands of bombs, is the only nation to have ever used the bomb, and currently has a collection of the best of them scattered in and around their vassal state, Iraq. There are lots of bombs in the Middle East, their plurality irrelevant where the simple act of just firing a single one can and will do the job of melting down the Western world. All the bombs that do exist in the Middle East - or anywhere else there is land, sea, or space above - are in the possession of well advanced technological states with the enormous amounts of wealth needed to design, build, and maintain a weapon of unimaginable cost. Except Pakistan and North Korea, who simply stole their way in through the back door, and are the most poorly dressed members at the party. As it is the nature of our global economic system that wealth is power, and growth means wealth, the onward march of progress will bring more and more emerging nations into a position where they too can have the bomb. We have the first Muslim bomb in Pakistan, the first Jewish bomb in Israel, and we could soon have the first Persian bomb. We need an Arab bomb now, one would guess, to complete the set. Turkey will need the bomb, and will soon be able to afford one. That would be an unbroken chain of bomb-wielding states stretching from the Taiwan Strait to the Suez Canal, covering every major religion, culture, and form of politics. A veritable bomb "beltway" if you will. Poor Africa, no bomb for you. So, there are lots of bombs in the most unstable region of the world, and there are destined to be more. Iran could be one of them. Given the bigger picture, why does that matter? If Iran had the bomb - so what? In fact, Iran without a bomb makes the place just a smidgen less stable than Iran with the bomb, and a smidgen in the nuclear age is a lot. If nations feel compelled to carve gargantuan amounts of productivity out of their people for bombs, it is because of the lessons learned as worthless peons in the golden age of the Cold War. Money talks, and money is best represented by the bomb. Like feathered plumage, a radiating display of nuclear quills signals to everybody that there will be consequences to their most impolite actions. Far from being an offensive doomsday machine, the lesson of the Cold War is that the bomb is a superb defensive weapon. Fraught with the fear and danger of unknown futures, a parked nuclear warhead is a menacing threat. Once fired, it is useless, spent on well understood, mutual, and arithmetically assured destruction. To be effective, that parked nuke must have a threat of equal veracity to threaten it. Every nuke needs an enemy. The failure to provide a compensating catastrophic consequence for the use of a bomb makes it perfectly rational to use one. Want to add stability to the world? Give Iran the bomb. Just give them a bunch. That takes not just those, but all regional bombs off the table, turning a parcel of offensive weapons into a bushel of defensive ones. It's called "Game Theory", and is an essential component to every bomb-owner's manual. A perfectly rational series of mathematical equations that have ruled the atomic age since physicists played poker. A systems analysis of the range of decisions a bomb owner must make to maximize his position without breaking 21. Game Theory predicts that nuclear superiority rests on what the other guy is thinking about you. It insists that both parties must have a credible threat, each threat with consequences that each player feels is not in his long term interests. Mutually assured destruction rests on the balance and parity of each side's threat. Without that parity, imbalance makes the use of a nuke almost certain in circumstances where parity would otherwise prevail. This was, and is an American doctrine. However, it has come to develop into the basic architecture of deterrence in the nuclear age. When Americans struggle to insist that a nuclear Iran is bad for everybody, they understand perfectly the irrationality of the condemnation. Americans warn that an Iran with the bomb would use it on Israel, and is the sole reason Iran is possibly pursuing one at all. Israel argues it must stop Iran as it is an "existential" threat to their existence, and thus, an Iranian bomb the very end of that existence. Both know otherwise of course. Both know that should the Iranians get the bomb, they will not fire the one or two they have at Israel and the United States. That action has virtually no offsetting effect on their enemies to ever come close to the punishment they would suffer in return for the decision. They won't make that call, which explains why they have not invaded another country for 600 years and have a civilization that stretches back thousands. They are not a stupid people. So what's all the fuss about? Iran has oil. Iran is the world's fourth-largest crude exporter, a card carrying charter member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries that pumps in excess of two-and-a-half million barrels a day of clean, inexpensive black goo. Iran's reserves of clean crude are the third-largest in the world. Iran also controls the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40% of the Western world's oil flows, and is a long fly ball from Saudi Arabia's biggest oil export hub at Ras Tanura. Iran is wealthy enough to build a bomb because Iran has oil. Iran is a threat to the West's oil supply, as well as the Arab players who are traditional enemies of the Persians. Iran is also across the street from Iraq and thus, in America's backyard. Israel is in Iran's front yard, the home of 5,000 years of history between Persians and Jews. Iran sits atop a veritable sea of the world's most precious strategic commodity, and is surrounded by well-intentioned Western interests aligned with its enemies, all of whom possess the bomb. So Iran wants a bomb. No kidding. Iran sells 16% of its oil exports to China, about 411 million barrels a day and rising, and is China's second-largest source of crude after Saudi Arabia. China needs oil in quantities never before imagined to fuel its growth, and is scouring the world for wall flowers untouched by political ideology. China is buying up Africa under the noses of the squabbling Cold War warriors, and has no dog in the ancient races of the Middle East. It needs oil and that's all, and it has invested over $100 billion in Iran to prove it. China considers Iran a new friend in a formerly insular world. And a friend in need is a friend indeed. China has its own regional threats, and one of them is India, another of those traditional enemy types that drive Western sensibilities nuts. A China-friendly, oil-soaked Iran is a wonderful way to influence India from another direction. China, of course, has the bomb. India has the bomb as well, but is also one of the world's other great centers of progress. India needs as much oil as China for all the same reasons, and imports almost as much as China from Iran. A full third of Iran's oil exports go to the super developing economies of China and India. In addition, Iran imports back a great deal of its oil exports to India in the form of refined gasoline, making it the perfect stratified business model, and stupid profitable for all concerned. For both China and India, an Iranian bomb would mean security for their oil resources and investments. Without one, each would have to make decisions about threats to their oil supplies - as they do now. It also helps to have a well-defended oil head that is willing to defend their price point interests as well. Having access to oil is one thing, being able to pay for it is another. Russia does not want Iran to have the bomb. Russia is in the enviable position of being a world leader in both the bomb and oil. They have loads of each. By supplying Iran with technological support for their "civilian" nuclear program, the Russians are taking care of business on several different fronts. If a bomb were built in Iran, it would cause instability in the short run, and that would help support the oil prices Russia needs to maintain its own progressive economic agenda. Furthermore, Russia can mitigate the speed and scope of Iranian nuclear development, a fact not unknown to American statesmen. For Russia, the Iranian bomb thingy is a perfect bargaining chip for use in extracting both geographic security and open markets from the Americans. If the Iranians are going to develop a bomb, they figure, it might as well be with them. It's good business and it extends Russian influence into the Middle East through the regions latest hegemon. Russia shares nuclear proliferation concerns with America, however. It is absolutely essential that the former Cold War enemies contain the spread of bomb-equipped nations. Each is facing crippling expense in building and maintaining vast, unnecessary nuclear arsenals. Game Theory demanded an ever-increasing build up in arms to maintain the deterrent value and effect. The point at which theory left and insanity stepped in is hard to discern, however contemporary leaders in both America and Russia are learning that as long as each reduces arms at a rate that does not disturb the equilibrium, both can save a bunch of time, trouble and money. The increase in nuclear states threatens to keep this threat floor artificially high, and eat into projected billions of dollars saved. It would be tough to decide who needs oil more, America or China. Each is approaching the issue from different directions. China is quietly using its Goliath state industries to buy up the resources of the Earth necessary to power its future. It can do this because capitalism is becoming no match for state-controlled resource acquisition. At the same time, America has been foiled in its attempt to use its super power status and invincible military machine to project influence over the most important sources of ready oil in the world. Addicted to oil, America depends solely on the strength of free markets now to keep a tenuous grip on its future supply. America needs not just oil, however, but politically predictable prices for oil to defend its economy and the US dollar that the economy supports. America has an arsenal of bomb and bomb-like technology that has become so large it has made its investment pointless. Even an untoward glance towards the button, and an economic thermal nuclear explosion would blow through every household in America. $7.00 a gallon gasoline. War-making in America is approaching a trillion dollars a year and it has done nothing to protect America's most strategic asset, the oil it needs but doesn't have. America is also friends with both the Saudis and the Israelis, each of whom are sworn enemies of each other. America exchanges military hardware and their nuclear umbrella over the Saudis in exchange for oil, unfettered access to history's most epic sinkhole of energy, and simply scads of money. The Saudis need this protection from its neighbors, the late, great Saddam Hussein and his heretical secularist Islamic state, and the dreaded Persians. The shield is useless against a bomb-laden Israel though. Israel is justifiably nervous about the geographic reality the British left them in 1948. Israel imports absolutely everything of value, oil included. It also sits atop the most irrationally contested real estate in all of human civilization. Attacking threats without the bomb mercilessly has proven to be well worth the penalties on every occasion. That is because the penalty for attacking an existential threat that can unleash holy hell on its principal ally is several orders of magnitude greater. An Iranian nuclear response to an aggressive Israel would have ramifications that no theory of games could ever envision. Absolutely no one is in a position to imagine what may come next. What would China do about its investment in Iran? India? How would Pakistan react to India? What would the Russians do - sit back and watch the show, the price of their massive oil supplies rocketing skyward? What on earth would the Americans do? Who can tell and what's more, who wants to find out? Nobody. America should simply give Iran the bomb. That is the rational solution to the problem. Iran could most possibly get one regardless, and if it does it would lean on Russia for support. A nuclear Iran would restore parity to the insanity of nuclear gamesmanship, and provide everybody with the same rational consequence to its foreign policy decisions. Being supported by America, an Iranian nuclear program would be inoculated against a very real and probable Israeli threat. Iran would have no further use for its traditional tools of regional power like Hezbollah in Lebanon. This also guarantees China and India oil security, and checks the expansion of Russian influence over Iran which, incidentally, sits between Iraq and Afghanistan. America exchanges arms for oil market stability, and everybody wins.

#### Chinese oil security solves expansionism

**Kaplan 10**—National Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly (Robert D., Foreign Affairs, 00157120, May/Jun2010, Vol. 89, Issue 3, “The Geography of Chinese Power”, EBSCO Host, RBatra)

**China's internal dynamism creates external ambitions**. Empires rarely come about by design; they grow organically. As states become stronger, they cultivate new needs and--this may seem counterintuitive--apprehensions that force them to expand in various forms. Even under the stewardship of some of the most forgettable presidents--Rutherford Hayes, James Garfield, Chester Arthur, Benjamin Harrison--the United States? economy grew steadily and quietly in the late nineteenth century. As the country traded more with the outside world, it developed complex economic and strategic interests in far-flung places. Sometimes, as in South America and the Pacific region, for example, these interests justified military action. The United States was also able to start focusing outward during that period because it had consolidated the interior of the continent; the last major battle of the Indian Wars was fought in 1890.

China today is consolidating its land borders and beginning to turn outward. China's foreign policy ambitions are as aggressive as those of the United States a century ago, but for completely different reasons. China does not take a missionary approach to world affairs, seeking to spread an ideology or a system of government. Moral progress in international affairs is an American goal, not a Chinese one; China's actions abroad are **propelled by its need to secure energy**, metals, and strategic minerals in order to support the rising living standards of its immense population, which amounts to about one-fifth of the world's total.

#### Global nuclear war

**Hunkovic 9 –** American Military University [Lee J, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict

Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential **to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war**, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

#### Russian economic decline causes civil war—escalates and goes nuclear

**David, 99** – Professor of Politics Science at Johns Hopkins (Steven, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, lexis)

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, *krais,* and *oblasts* grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

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#### Interpretation – Authority means “authorization” – topical affirmatives must remove the permission to act, not just regulate the President

**Hohfeld 19 –** Yale Law,1919(Wesley, <http://www.hku.hk/philodep/courses/law/HohfeldRights.htm>)

Many examples of legal powers may readily be given. Thus, X, the owner of ordinary personal property "in a tangible object" has the power to extinguish his own legal interest (rights, powers, immunities, etc.) through that totality of operative facts known as abandonment; and-simultaneously and correlatively-to create in other persons privileges and powers relating to the abandoned object,-e. g., the power to acquire title to the latter by appropriating it. Similarly, X has the power to transfer his interest to Y, that is to extinguish his own interest and concomitantly create in Y a new and corresponding interest. So also X has the power to create contractual obligations of various kinds. Agency cases are likewise instructive. By the use of some metaphorical expression such as the Latin, qui facit per alium, facit per se\* the true nature of agency relations is only too frequently obscured. The creation of an agency relation involves, inter alia, the grant of legal powers to the so-called agent, and the creation of correlative liabilities in the principal. That is to say, one party, P, has the power to create agency powers in another party, A,-for example, the power to convey P's property, the power to impose (so called) contractual obligations on P, the power to discharge a debt owing to P, the power to "receive" title to property so that it shall vest in P, and so forth. In passing, it may be well to observe that the term "authority," so frequently used in agency cases, is very ambiguous and slippery in its connotation. Properly employed in the present connection, the word seems to be an abstract or qualitative term corresponding to the concrete "authorization," the latter consisting of a particular group of operative facts taking place between the principal and the agent. All too often, however, the term in question is so used as to blend and confuse these operative facts with the powers and privileges thereby created in the agent. A careful discrimination in these particulars would, it is submitted, go far toward clearing up certain problems in the law of agency.

#### Violation—they don’t modify presidential discretion, they affect the funding mechanism for war which is distinct from authority –

**Paulsen, 10** - Distinguished University Chair & Professor of Law, The University of St. Thomas (Michael, “The War Power”, 114 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 33, <http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/paulsen.pdf>)

Some folks mistakenly take this to mean that Congress’s real war power is the appropriations power and that the “declare War” clause is either toothless, mere surplusage, or must mean something other than a war‐authorization power.51 Not at all. The power to declare war—or not—remains the relevant substantive power of Congress. The power over appropriations is merely Congress’s trump‐card, “shoot‐out” power—a different substantive power, but a powerful one that Congress may em‐ ploy to effectuate its other constitutional powers, including its substantive constitutional power to initiate war. But note that de‐funding does not de‐authorize; a resumption of funding would return to the President the practical ability to continue to wage war without need for re‐authorization. There remains a legitimate debate over the propriety of Congress using its appropriations power so as to leverage it into impairment of the President’s Commander‐in‐Chief Clause powers—but without having repealed a declaration or authorization of war. This may be unfair, but it too would seem to be a part of the separation‐of‐powers game. The branches may attempt to leverage the powers they have in order to press their respective positions with respect to the Constitution’s (sometimes debatable) allocations of the war power. And the branches may, and should, resist such leveraging by the others with the powers at their disposal. Put concretely, Congress may push but the President should push back.52

#### Vote neg—Destroys equitable ground and explodes limits by allowing any reassertion of a branches role instead of restricting what those branches have authorized the President to do.

Extra t is a voter – allows unpredictable advantage ground that we could never fairly debate

### 1nc 2

#### Facts are meaningless. Their internal link chains are factoids, which are worse. 1ac was detrimental to the cause of their position.

Schlag ’13 Pierre Schlag, “Facts (The),” his blog, 1/28/2013, http://brazenandtenured.com/2013/01/28/facts-the/

But let me explain about the facts. First, notice, that the most factish of facts (apologies to Latour) are actually factoids—trivial data bits shorn of any actual narrative. CNN had it down cold: “America has had five presidents who ate fish for breakfast.” What, I ask you, could you possibly do with that qua fact? Still, Americans like facts. It was Joe Friday on Dragnet who first said, “all we want are the facts, ma’am.” Really? That’s all? I don’t think so. He was on a mission. He wanted facts on a mission. And we, the viewers, did too. So I have to say, as a preliminary matter, things already don’t look too good for the facts. Indeed, the possibility that in their most prototypical factishisness, facts are nearly useless while in their most desirable state they are on a mission—well, that’s not an auspicious start. Things get worse. In law and social science (that’s my domain limit here—I feel really cramped) facts generally function as poseurs. The facts, are nearly always posing as the truth about “what-is-actually-going-on.” Facts are frequently presented as “the-real-story” or “the bottom line.” One is no doubt supposed to conclude from this that “facts are facts”—that they are the veritable bedrock of truth. But notice that this doesn’t make any sense. Notice that the “bottom line” is an accounting metaphor. Consider that, “the real story” is an oxymoron deliberately composed of both truth and fiction. Note that “what-is-actually-going-on” is a problematic state hanging precariously on the ungrounded and notoriously unreliable reality/appearance pair. All of this is to say, that the appeal of “getting down to the facts,” (or some such thing) often rests on situating the facts in some initially alluring rhetorical space (e.g. “the real story” “the bottom line”) that turns out, upon further inspection, to be constructed of images, metaphors or fictions of questionable philosophical countenance. (See, Nietzsche, On Lies and Truth in a Non-Moral Sense) Now, it’s not that these metaphors, images or fictions turn facts into non-facts. But still, I ask you: what could be more humbling to a fact then to learn that its appeal rests upon a fiction? Not only do facts frequently function as poseurs, but, when they are at their most factish, they’re often not all that interesting. Factish facts don’t really tell you much of anything you want to know. Imagine a party. Here are some exemplary factish facts: There were 19 people at the party. 9 were women. 10 were men. While the party was happening, gravity exercised a constant force of 32 feet per second/per second. Everyone standing stayed connected to the ground. Not the greatest narrative is it? And notice here that if you stick strictly to the facts (if you admit only of truly factish facts) adding more of these little items will not markedly improve your story line. (For you editors of university press books and law review articles, please pay special attention here.) The only time facts are really interesting (remember law and social science is the domain limit) is when they’re something more than just the facts. Go back to the party. Here’s another fact: Jill left the party with Tom. This fact is more interesting. Well, mildly so. With this sort of fact, you can start imagining possible implications (amorous, murderous, whathaveyou). But note that now we’re no longer talking about “just the facts.” We’re talking about facts with implications, facts with attitude. Why then are facts ever interesting? Well, ironically it’s because they’re not functioning as “just facts,” but something more.

#### There is no justification for reading the 1AC; the introduction of information turns humans into capital on the plane of symbolic exchange—voting issue

Fernando 11—once voted the sexiest philosopher in East Asia

(Jeremy, *Writing Death* pg 102-103, dml)

Read it from a book lol, email me if you need the full text—dustml94[at]gmail

### 1nc 3

#### The 1AC’s attempt to reign in targeted killing by placing faith in the law only serves to legalize the violent nature of the law itself

**Krasmann 2012** - professor, Dr, Institute for Criminological Research, University of Hamburg (Susanne Krasmann, “Targeted Killing and Its Law: On a Mutually Constitutive Relationship,” Leiden Journal of International Law (2012), 25, pg. 67)

The legal debate on targeted killing, particularly that referring to the US practice, has increased immensely during the last decade and even more so very recently, obviously due to a ‘compulsion of legality’.87 Once this state practice of resorting to the use of lethal force has been recognized as systematically taking place, it needs to be dealt with in legal terms. Whether this is done in supportive or critical terms, the assertion of targeted killing as a legal practice commences at this point. This is due to the fact that the law, once invoked, launches its own claims. To insist on disclosing ‘the full legal basis for targeted killings’; on criteria, legal procedures, and ‘access to reliable information’ in order to render governmental action controllable; or on legal principles to be applied in order to estimate the necessity and proportionality of a concrete intervention at stake,88 not only involves **accepting targeted killing as a legitimate subject of debate in the first place**. It requires distinctions to be made between, for example, a legitimate and an illegitimate target. It invokes the production of knowledge and the establishment of pertinent rules. Indeterminate categories are to be determined and thus established as a new reading of positive law. The introduction of international human rights standards into the debate, for example, clearly allows limits to be set in employing the pre-emptive tactic. As Wouter Werner has shown with regard to the Israeli High Court of Justice’s decision on the legality of targeted killing operations,89 this may well lead, for example, to recognizing the enemy as being not ‘outlaws’ but, instead, combatants who are to be granted basic human rights. Subsequently, procedural rules may be established that restrict the practice and provide criteria for assessing the legality of concrete operations.90 At the same time, however, targeted killing is recognized as a legitimate tactic in the fight against terrorism and is being determined and implemented legally.91 When framed within the ‘theatre of war’, targeted killing categorically seems to be justifiable under the legal principles of necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering. This is true as long as one presupposes in general terms, as the juridical discourse usually does, both a well-considered proceeding along those principles92 and, accordingly, that targeted killing, by its very nature, is a ‘calculated, precise use of lethal force’.93 Procedural rules, like the ‘proportionality test’, that are essentially concerned with determination, namely with specifying criteria of intervention for the concrete case or constellation, certainly provide reliability by systematically inciting and provoking justifications. Their application therefore, we may say, contributes to clarifying a controversial norm- ative interpretation, but it will **never predict or determine** how deliberation and justification translate into operational action. The application of procedural rules does not only notoriously remain ‘indeterminate’,94 but also produces its own truth effects. The question of proportionality, for example, is intrinsically a relational one. The damage that targeting causes is to be related to the anticipated military advantage and to the expected casualties of non-targeted operations. Even if there are ‘substantial grounds to believe’ that such an operation will ‘encounter significant armed resistance’,95 this is a presumption that, above all, entails a virtual dimension: the alternate option will never be realized. According to a Foucauldian perspective, decisions always articulate within an epistemic regime and thus ‘eventualize’ on the political stage.96 There is, in this sense, no mere decision and no mere meaning; and, conversely, there is no content of a norm, and no norm, independent of its enforcement.97 To relate this observation to our problem at hand means that, rather than the legal principles’ guiding a decision, it is the decision on how to proceed that constitutes the meaning of the legal principle in question. The **legal reasoning, in turn, produces a normative reality of its own**, as we are now able to imagine, comprehend, and assess a procedure and couch it in legal terms. This is also noticeable in the case of the Osama bin Laden killing. As regards the initial strategy of justification, the question of resistance typically is difficult to establish ex post in legal terms. Such situations are fraught with so many possible instances of ambiguous behaviour and risk, and the identification of actual behav- iour as probably dangerous and suspicious may change the whole outcome of the event.98 But, once the public found itself with little alternative but to assume that the prospect of capturing the subject formed part of the initial order, it also had to assume that the intention was to use lethal force as a last resort. And, once the public accepts the general presumption that the United States is at war with the terrorist organization, legal reasoning about the operation itself follows and constitutes a rationale shaping the perception of similar future actions and the exercise of governmental force in general.99 Part of this rationale is the assumption, as the president immediately pointed out in his speech, that the threat of al Qaeda has not been extinguished with bin Laden. The identification of a threat that emanates from a network may give rise to the question of whether the killing of one particular target, forming part of a Hydra, makes any sense at all.100 Yet, it equally nourishes the idea that the fight against terrorism, precisely because of its elusiveness, is an enduring one, which is exactly the position the United States takes while considering itself in an armed conflict with the terrorist organization. Targeting and destroying parts of a network, then, do not destroy the entire network, but rather verify that it exists and is at work. The target, in this sense, is constituted by being targeted.101 Within the rationale of the security dispositif, there continue to be threats and new targets. Hence, at work is a transformation of laws through practice, rather than their amendment. Giorgio Agamben maintains that a legal norm, because abstract, does not stipulate its application.102 ‘Just as between language and world . . . there is no internal nexus’ between them. The norm, in this sense, exists independent of ‘reality’. This, according to Agamben, allows for the norm in the ‘state of exception’ both to be applied with the effect of ‘ceasing to apply’103 – ‘the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception’104 – and to be suspended without being abolished. Although forming part of and, in fact, being the effect of applying the law, the state of exception, in Agamben’s view, disconnects from the norm. Within a perspective on law as practice, by contrast, there is no such difference between norm and reality. Even to ignore a pertinent norm constitutes an act that has a meaning, namely that the norm is not being enforced. It affects the norm. Targeted killing operations, in this sense, can never be extra-legal.105 On the contrary, provided that illegal practices come up systematically, they eventually will effectuate the transformation of the law. Equally, the exception from the norm not only suspends the norm, transforming it, momentarily or permanently, into a mere symbol without meaning and force, but at the same time also impinges upon the validity of that norm. Moreover, focus on the exception within the present context falls short of capturing a rather gradual transitional process that both resists a binary deciphering of either legal or illegal and is not a matter of suspending a norm. As practices deploying particular forms of knowledge, targeted killing and its law mutually constitute each other, thus re-enforcing a new security dispositif. **The appropriate research question** therefore is how positive law changes its framework of reference. Targeted killing, once perceived as illegal, now appears to be a legal practice on the grounds of a new understanding of international law’s own elementary concepts. The crux of the ‘compulsion of legality’ is that legality itself is a shifting reference. Seen this way, the United States does not establish targeted killing as a legal practice on the grounds of its internationally ‘possessing’ exceptional power. Rather the reverse; it is able to employ targeted killing as a military tactic, precisely because this is accepted by the legal discourse. As a practice, targeted killing, in turn, reshapes our understanding of basic concepts of international law. Any dissenting voice will now be heard with more difficulty, since targeted killing is a no longer an isolated practice but, within the now establishing security dispositif, appears to be appropriate and rational. **To counter the legal discourse**, then, would require to **interrupt it, rather than to respond to it**, and to move on to its political implications that are rather tacitly involved in the talk about threats and security, and in the dispute about targeted killing operations’ legality.

#### Nonviolence is an existential and ethical imperative—militaristic mindsets are the driving force for all forms of conflict and environmental destruction

**Burrowes 13**—Fellowship of Reconciliation

(Robert, “Life on the Line: Can Humanity Survive?”, <http://forusa.org/blogs/robert-j-burrowes/life-line-can-humanity-survive/12483>, dml)

As we approach the International Day of Nonviolence on October 2, which recognizes Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday, one challenge we face is to celebrate his life in a way that Gandhi himself would have found meaningful. Gandhi was not a man of token gestures. His life was dedicated to his search for the Truth and guided by his passionate belief that nonviolence was the means to reach it. He was a visionary who was profoundly aware of **the damage human violence is doing to** ourselves**,** each other **and** the Earth.

Despite his example, most of us are familiar with those horror lists that reveal the extent of our ongoing violence. Here is a sample just to refresh your memory.

Human beings spend $2,000,000,000 each day on military violence, **the sole purpose of which is to terrorize and kill fellow human beings**. And we are poised on the brink of dramatically expanding the war against Syria with unknown (and **possibly nuclear**) consequences for us all. Because we spend so many resources on military violence, one human being in Africa, Asia, or Central/South America **is starved to death every two or three seconds** — **that is** 35,000 people each day — and poverty and homelessness continue their relentless expansion in industrialized countries. In addition to this problem, “**water starvation**” is becoming a frequent reality for many people and **the collapse of hydrological systems is** now expected by 2020. Human activity drives 200 species of life (birds, animals, fish, insects) **to extinction each day** and 80% of the world’s forests and over 90% of the large fish in the ocean **are already gone**.

As polluters, humans are supreme: Eighty-one tons of mercury — the most toxic heavy metal in existence — is emitted into the atmosphere each year **as a result of electric power generation**; there are 46,000 pieces of floating plastic in every square mile of ocean; and each year we dump **billions of kilograms of pesticides** into the environment, which pollutes the groundwater and seriously damages human health. Moreover, as everyone knows, we pump vast quantities of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and release radioactive contaminants into the environment too.

How serious is this? According to James Hansen and colleagues, ongoing burning of fossil fuels at the current rate will cause **catastrophic levels of global warming** and burning all fossil fuels ‘**would make most of the planet** uninhabitable by humans**’**. (See “Climate sensitivity, sea level and atmospheric carbon dioxide”.) And, according to Layne Hartsell and Emanuel Pastreich, commenting on just one aspect of the radioactive contamination problem, “Radiation continues to leak from the crippled Fukushima Daiichi site into groundwater, threatening to contaminate the entire Pacific Ocean.” (See “Peer-to-Peer Science: The Century-Long Challenge to Respond to Fukushima.”)

Can humanity survive? **The odds are** now stacked heavily against us: despite the persistent warnings of visionaries, such as Gandhi, and scientists since the 1940s, **we have breached** far too many limits **that it would have been wise to respect**. And the forces still arrayed against us, particularly those corporations that profit from this violence as well as their political puppets, **are not going to give way without a struggle**. Moreover, **they can use** education systems and the corporate media to try to manipulate us into believing what they want, whether it is their denials of reality or that our resistance cannot work. In addition, they have the police, legal, and prison systems to inflict more violence upon us when we do find the courage to resist.

But there is good news too. The good news is that there are a lot of great people. And by “great people” I mean ordinary people like you and me **who are willing to** listen to the truth **and then do something tangible** to make a difference, sometimes by taking no risk at all and sometimes by taking a small, shared risk. So what can we do?

#### The alternative is a pedagogical commitment to non-violence—refuse the forced choice of the 1AC, interrogating the discursive frames through which its violence is justified is a prerequisite to any ethically tenable political action

**Evans 13**—Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds and Programme Director for International Relations [the word “a” has been added for correct sentence structure and is denoted by brackets]

(Brad, “INAUGURAL STATEMENT”, On Violence 1:1, 2-6, dml)

Violence is a complex phenomenon that defies neat description. It cannot be reduced to simple explanations, for as many of its victims tell, **there is no totalizing truth about violence**. Nor can the experience of violence be universalized or merely thought of **in terms of** **some** institutional breakdown **or** failure of State. Not only do the most abhorrent acts of violence seemingly happen **when the state system works all too well**; to speak of violence in such terms denies the personal account or at least renders **insignificant** what we may term **the subjective stakes** to the horrifying encounter. The “subject of violence” is always about violent and violated subjects. Violence then is not some objective condition or natural state of affairs. **It is a process that all too often appears to be reasoned and brutally calculated**. To begin theorizing and critiquing violence as such is to accept that the very form of the enquiry we have chosen to engage enters us **into the most dangerous and politically fraught terrain**. Violence is never is **[a] problem to be studied in some** objective **or** neutral **fashion**. It brings to the fore most clearly the realization that education **and** critical pedagogy **are by definition** forms of political intervention. In light of this, we can argue that any critique of violence is not a challenge that should be avoided; on the contrary, **it is the** ethical problem **that compels us to challenge all its multiple forms.**

The concept of violence is not taken lightly here. Violence **remains** poorly understood if it is accounted for simply in terms of **how and what it violates**, **the scale of its destructiveness**, or **any other element** of its annihilative power. **Intellectual violence is no exception** as its qualities point to a deadly and destructive conceptual terrain. Like all violence there are two sides to this relation. There is the annihilative power of nihilistic thought that seeks, through strategies of domination and practices of terminal exclusion, **to** close down the political **as a site for differences**. Such violence often appeals to the authority of a peaceful settlement, though it does so in a way that imposes a distinct moral image of thought **which already maps out what is reasonable to** think**,** speak**, and** act. Since the means and ends are already set out in advance, **the discursive frame is** never brought into critical question. And there is an affirmative counter that directly challenges authoritarian violence. Such affirmation **refuses to accept the parameters of the rehearsed orthodoxy**. **It** brings into question **that which is** not ordinarily questioned **in any given state of political affairs**. Foregrounding the life of the subject as key to understanding political deliberation, **it eschews intellectual dogmatism with a commitment to the open possibilities in thought.**

Hannah Arendt then was only partly correct when she famously contrasted violence with power. We may quite rightly accept her claim that people often resort to violence when power fails them. This is just as true for leaders of tyrannical States which are frequently shown to be powerless and impotent all the while they violently crush popular protest, as it is for those on the margins of existence who feel that all forms of empowerment have been denied and willfully suppressed. And yet as Michel Foucault would have argued, power without conflict is a misnomer for **without the capacity to resist there is no potential to create the world anew**. Not only are conflict and violence strategically different as it is possible to have the former in a way that challenges the latter. What is violence if it is not the attempt to **destroy something that** refuses to conform **to the oppressive model/standard?**

So rather than countering violence with a “purer violence” (discursive or otherwise) **there is a need, especially in the contemporary moment,** **to maintain** the language of critical pedagogy. That is a language that is necessarily conflictual and yet collaborative by definition. By criticality we may then insist here upon forms of thought **which do not have** war **or** violence **as its object.** If there is destruction, this is only apparent when the affirmative is denied. And by criticality we may also insist here upon forms of thought that **do not offer their intellectual soul to** the seductions of militarized power **and** the poverty of its political visions. Too often we find that while the critical gestures towards profane illumination; it is really the beginning of a violence that **amounts to a** death sentence **for critical thought.**

Perhaps **the most difficult task faced today** **is to avoid the false promises of violence** **and** demand a politics **that is** dignified **and** open **to the possibility of non-violent ways of living.** This demands new ways of thinking about and interrogating violence such that the value of critical thought becomes central to any mediation on global citizenry. As we all increasingly find ourselves in a position where the radical and the fundamental have been merged to denial of anything that may challenge the violent effects of contemporary regimes of control, the inevitable assault upon the university and all intellectual spheres **continues with** unrelenting force. **This is** not incidental **to the violence of our times.** It is one of its more pernicious manifestations. Our response, as the authors in this inaugural edition make clear, must be to counter this violence **with a commitment to the value of** criticality **and** public education. Hopefully “On Violence” will provide a modest counter to those who insist that violence may be reasoned for the greater good. Without this hope that **the world may be** transformed non-violently for the better**, the fight for dignity is** already lost**.**

### 1nc cmr

**Democracy doesn’t solve war**

**Mueller 9**—pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State, Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy, AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA (John, Faulty Correlation, Foolish Consistency, Fatal Consequence: Democracy, Peace, and Theory in the Middle East, 15 June 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/KENT2.PDF, AMiles)

In the last couple of decades there has been a burgeoning and intriguing discussion about the connection between democracy and war aversion.7 Most notable has been the empirical observation that democracies have never, or almost never, gotten into a war with each other. This relationship seems more correlative than causal, however. Like many important ideas over the last few centuries, the idea that war is undesirable and inefficacious and the idea that democracy is a good form of government have largely followed the same trajectory: they were embraced first in northern Europe and North America and then gradually, with a number of traumatic setbacks, became more accepted elsewhere. In this view, the rise of democracy not only is associated with the rise of war aversion, but also with the decline of slavery, religion, capital punishment, and cigarette smoking, and with the growing acceptance of capitalism, scientific methodology, women's rights, environmentalism, abortion, and rock music.8 While democracy and war aversion have taken much the same trajectory, however, they have been substantially out of synchronization with each other: the movement toward democracy began about 200 years ago, but the movement against war really began only about 100 years ago (Mueller 1989, 2004). Critics of the democracy/peace connection often cite examples of wars or near-wars between democracies. Most of these took place before World War I--that is, before war aversion had caught on.9 A necessary, logical connection between democracy and war aversion, accordingly, is far from clear. Thus, it is often asserted that democracies are peaceful because they apply their domestic penchant for peaceful compromise (something, obviously, that broke down in the United States in 1861) to the international arena or because the structure of democracy requires decision-makers to obtain domestic approval.10 But authoritarian regimes must also necessarily develop skills at compromise in order to survive, and they all have domestic constituencies that must be serviced such as the church, the landed gentry, potential urban rioters, the nomenklatura, the aristocracy, party members, the military, prominent business interests, the police or secret police, lenders of money to the exchequer, potential rivals for the throne, the sullen peasantry.11 Since World War I, the democracies in the developed world have been in the lead in rejecting war as a methodology. Some proponents of the democracy-peace connection suggest that this is because the democratic norm of non-violent conflict resolution has been externalized to the international arena. However, developed democracies have not necessarily adopted a pacifist approach, particularly after a version of that approach failed so spectacularly to prevent World War II from being forced upon them. In addition, they were willing actively to subvert or to threaten and sometimes apply military force when threats appeared to loom during the Cold War contest. At times this approach was used even against regimes that had some democratic credentials such as in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973, and perhaps Nicaragua in the 1980s (Rosato 2003, 590-91). And, they have also sometimes used military force in their intermittent efforts to police the post-Cold War world (Mueller 2004, chs. 7, 8). It is true that they have warred little or not at all against each other--and, since there were few democracies outside the developed world until the last quarter of the twentieth century, it is this statistical regularity that most prominently informs the supposed connection between democracy and peace. However, the developed democracies hardly needed democracy to decide that war among them was a bad idea.12 In addition, they also adopted a live-and-let-live approach toward a huge number of dictatorships and other non-democracies that did not seem threatening during the Cold War--in fact, they often aided and embraced such regimes if they seemed to be on the right side in the conflict with Communism. Moreover, the supposed penchant for peaceful compromise of democracies has not always served them well when confronted with civil war situations, particularly ones involving secessionist demands. The process broke down into civil warfare in democratic Switzerland in 1847 and savagely so in the United States in 1861. Democracies have also fought a considerable number of wars to retain colonial possessions--six by France alone since World War II--and these, as James Fearon and David Laitin suggest, can in many respects be considered essentially to be civil wars (2003, 76). To be sure, democracies have often managed to deal with colonial problems peacefully, mostly by letting the colonies go. But authoritarian governments have also done so: the Soviet Union, for example, withdrew from his empire in Eastern Europe and then dissolved itself, all almost entirely without violence. Thus, while democracy and war aversion have often been promoted by the same advocates, **the relationship does not seem to be a causal one**. And when the two trends are substantially out of step today, democracies will fight one another. Thus, it is not at all clear that telling the elected hawks in the Jordanian parliament that Israel is a democracy will dampen their hostility in the slightest. And various warlike sentiments could be found in the elected parliaments in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s or in India and then-democratic Pakistan when these two countries engaged in armed conflict in 1999. If Argentina had been a democracy in 1982 when it seized the Falkland Islands (a very popular undertaking), it is unlikely that British opposition to the venture would have been much less severe. "The important consideration," observes Miriam Fendius Elman after surveying the literature on the subject, does not seem to be "whether a country is democratic or not, but whether its ruling coalition is committed to peaceful methods of conflict resolution." As she further points out, the countries of Latin America and most of Africa have engaged in very few international wars even without the benefit of being democratic (for a century before its 1982 adventure, Argentina, for example, fought none at all) (1997, 484, 496). (Interestingly, although there has also been scarcely any warfare between Latin American states for over 100 years or among Arab ones or European ones for more that 50--in all cases whether democratic or not--this impressive phenomenon has inspired remarkably few calls for worldwide Arab colonialism or for the systematic transplant of remaining warlike states to Latin America or Europe.) And, of course, the long peace enjoyed by developed countries since World War II includes not only the one that has prevailed between democracies, but also the even more important one between the authoritarian east and the democratic west. Even if there is some connection, whether causal or atmospheric, between democracy and peace, it cannot explain this latter phenomenon. Democracy and the democratic peace become mystiques: the role of philosophers and divines Democracy has been a matter of debate for several millennia as philosophers and divines have speculated about what it is, what it might become, and what it ought to be. Associated with these speculations has been a tendency to emboss the grubby gimmick with something of a mystique. Of particular interest for present purposes is the fanciful notion that democracy does not simply express and aggregate preferences, but actually somehow creates (or should create) them. In addition, the (rough) correlation between democracy and war aversion has also been elevated into a causal relationship.

No backsliding card means advantage isn’t unique

#### Alt causes kill solvency or prove low risk

**Owens, 2010** [10/1, Mackubin, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I., and editor of the journal Orbis, WSJ, “The War on Terror and the Revolt of the Generals,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704654004575517791390249112.html]

There are few things more important to a democratic republic than a healthy relationship between its government and its military establishment. During the 1990s, many defense experts claimed that all was not well with civil-military relations in America. Nothing better illustrated the turbulent state of civil-military relations during this period than the hostility on the part of the uniformed military toward President Bill Clinton, whose antimilitary stance as a young man during the Vietnam War years did not endear him to soldiers. The tensions did not disappear with the election and re-election of George W. Bush. If anything, civil-military relations became more strained as a result of clashes between the uniformed services and President Bush's first secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, over efforts to transform the military from a Cold War force to one better able to respond to likely future contingencies, and over the planning and conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This tension was highlighted by the so-called revolt of the generals in the spring of 2006, which saw a number of retired Army and Marine Corps generals publicly and harshly criticize Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Rumsfeld's successor as secretary of defense, Robert Gates, has done much to improve the civil-military climate. But Mr. Gates's 2008 decision to force the retirement of the commander of U.S. Central Command, Adm. William Fallon, over disagreements on Iran policy, as well as President Obama's decision this June to fire the ground commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, make it clear that U.S. civil-military relations remain turbulent. Such turbulence is nothing new. From time to time throughout U.S. history, certain circumstances—political, strategic, social, technological, etc.—have changed to such a degree that the terms of the existing civil-military bargain become obsolete.

#### Here are all the things their authors conclude are necessary that the aff obviously doesn’t do

**Thomas and Dougherty their authors 13**—Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments AND Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

(Jim and Chris, “BEYOND THE RAMPARTS THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES,” <http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SOF-Report-CSBA-Final.pdf>, dml)

Although “humans are more important than hardware,” SOF have traditionally relied on specialized equipment that is not generally available to GPF. As SOF move beyond wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a need for SOF to focus research and development (R&D) efforts to address emerging A2/AD and WMD challenges in particular. High priority capability investments to meet these challenges include:

􀂇 Stealthy air transports to enable SOF to infiltrate A2/AD environments, execute high-risk WMD elimination operations, or conduct UW;

􀂇 Long-endurance dry submersibles to enable the stealthy insertion of SOF into denied littoral areas;

􀂇 Identity-masking technologies to enable SOF to counter proliferating biometric technologies and maintain their ability to operate clandestinely;

􀂇 Novel weapons systems such as directed energy (DE), high-power microwave (HPM), non-lethals, and small precision-strike munitions to achieve focused kinetic and non-kinetic destructive or disabling effects;

􀂇 Special systems to provide SOF with protected satellite communications

(SATCOM) and the ability to communicate without detection;

􀂇 Novel energy sources, such as solar cells and sodium-ion batteries, to lighten the load on operators and reduce logistical demands in remote and austere environments;

􀂇 Stealthy, long-range unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and conduct strikes in non-permissive air environments; and

􀂇 A next-generation gunship to replace aging AC-130s and provide gunship support in denied areas.

**Allies lock in naval power**

**Farley**, assistant professor of diplomacy and intl commerce – U Kentucky, 10/23/**’7**

(Robert, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the\_false\_decline\_of\_the\_us\_navy)

This compromise has allowed the Navy to build positive relationships with the navies of the world, a fact that Kaplan ignores. While asserting the dangers posed by a variety of foreign navies, Kaplan makes a **distortion** depressingly common to those who warn of the decline of American hegemony; he forgets that the United States has allies. While Kaplan can plausibly argue that growth in Russian or Chinese naval strength threatens the United States, the same cannot reasonably be said of Japan, India, France, or the United Kingdom. With the exception of China and Russia, **all of the most powerful navies in the world belong to American allies**. United States cooperation with the navies of NATO, India, and Japan has tightened, rather than waned in the last ten years, and the United States also retains warm relations with third tier navies such as those of South Korea, Australia, and Malaysia. In **any conceivable naval confrontation** the United States will have friends, just as the Royal Navy had friends in 1914 and 1941.

Robert Kaplan wants to warn the American people of the dangers of impending naval decline. Unfortunately, he’s almost entirely wrong on the facts. While the reach of the United States Navy may have declined in an absolute sense, its capacity to fight and win naval wars has, if anything, increased since the end of the Cold War. That the United States continues to embed itself in a deep set of cooperative arrangements with other naval powers only reinforces the dominance of the U.S. Navy on the high seas. Analysts who want to argue for greater U.S. military spending are best advised to concentrate on the fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Naval power resilient – no challengers to overwhelming U.S. power**

**Posen 3** (Barry R., Professor of Political Science – Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony”, International Security, 28(1), Ebsco)

Command of the commons is the military foundation of U.S. political preeminence. It is the key enabler of the hegemonic foreign policy that the United States has pursued since the end of the Cold War. The military capabilities required to secure command of the commons are the U.S. suit. They leverage science technology, and economic resources. They rely on highly trained, highly skilled, and increasingly highly paid military personnel. On the whole, the U.S. military advantage at sea, in the air, and in space will be **very difficult to challenge** –**let alone overcome**. Command is further secured by the worldwide U.S. base structure and the ability of U.S. diplomacy to leverage other sources of U.S. power to secure additional bases and overflight rights as needed.

#### Targeted killing’s vital to counterterrorism---disrupts leadership and makes carrying out attacks impossible

Kenneth Anderson 13, Professor of International Law at American University, June 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, Vol. 135, No. 6

Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities -- but much of the drone's contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties.

Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled means to strike directly at terrorist organizations without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens. It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply defensive measures, such as homeland security alone. Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership.

If one believes, as many of the critics of drone warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive -- including those that eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law enforcement and criminal law -- then the strategic virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists themselves will seem small. But that has not been American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration -- and not by the Congress of the United States, which has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight the war on terror aggressively. The United States has used many offensive methods in the past dozen years: Regime change of states offering safe havens, counter-insurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common enemies are examples of the methods that are just of military nature.

Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target -- one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten

, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

## 2NC

### cmr

#### CMR is high now and civilian control is firmly established

**Shanker, 9/13/13** (Thom, New York Times, “Pentagon in Back Seat as Kerry Leads Charge”

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/us/politics/syria-crisis-underlines-pentagons-move-to-the-back-seat.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&>

WASHINGTON — In the weeks of sometimes bewildering debate in Washington about what to do in Syria, one truth has emerged: President Obama has transformed his relationship with the Pentagon and the military. The civilian policy makers and generals who led Mr. Obama toward a troop escalation in Afghanistan during his first year in office, a decision that left him deeply distrustful of senior military leaders, have been replaced by a handpicked leadership that includes Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Through battlefield experience — Mr. Hagel as an infantryman in 1967 and 1968 in Vietnam, and General Dempsey as a commander during some of the most violent years in Iraq — both men share Mr. Obama’s reluctance to use American military might overseas. A dozen years after the Pentagon under Donald H. Rumsfeld began aggressively driving national security policy, the two have wholeheartedly endorsed a more restricted Pentagon role. “Hagel was not hired to be a ‘secretary of war,’ ” said one senior Defense Department official. “That is not a mantle the president wants him to wear.” The crisis in Syria is the most recent and most powerful example of how Mr. Obama, elected twice on a promise to disengage the United States from overseas conflicts, has moved the Pentagon to a back seat. In this case, it is Secretary of State John Kerry who is leading the charge, not the far less vocal Mr. Hagel and General Dempsey. “Whether you call it a reset of the Pentagon or a reflection of what our overall policy is,” the Pentagon official said, “the military instrument is not going to be the dominant instrument of our policy, particularly in an instance like Syria, where we are not looking at military force to solve the underlying civil war.”

**Prefer our evidence—backed by studies**

**Rosato**  – PhD PolSci, Chicago; conclusion of a statistical survey of democracies (Sebastian, The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory, The American Political Science Review 97.4, AG)

The causal logics that underpin democratic peace theory cannot explain why democracies remain at peace with one another because the mechanisms that make up these logics do not operate as stipulated by the theory's proponents. In the case of the normative logic, liberal democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution and do not treat one another with trust and respect when their interests clash. Similarly, in the case of the institutional logic, democratic leaders are not especially accountable to peaceloving publics or pacific interest groups, democracies are not particularly slow to mobilize or incapable of surprise attack, and open political competition offers no guarantee that a democracy will reveal private information about its level of resolve. In view of these findings there are good reasons to doubt that joint democracy causes peace.

**Empirically wrong**

**Nisley 8** (Thomas Jay Nisley, Prof. of International Studies, Southern Polytechnic State University, “The Pugnacious and the Pacific: Why Some Democracies Fight Wars” International Politics (2008) 45, 168–181)

Although there are many weaknesses to the logic of democratic peace, it is very difficult to find an exception to the rule that democratic states do not fight wars with other democratic states. Two possible exceptions to this rule are the Spanish–American War of 1898 and the Kargil War of 1999, between India and Pakistan. Proponents of the democratic peace can find reasons why these two wars do not count as wars between democracies. In the Spanish–American War, the argument is made that even though Spain had universal male suffrage and a bicameral legislature with an executive nominally responsible to it, there was not true party competition. Bruce Russett (1993) tells us, 'By mutual agreement, the Liberal and Conservative parties rotated in office; governmental changes proceeded rather than followed elections' (p. 19). The Kargil War is more difficult to explain away. In the important work on the democratic peace, Triangulating Peace, Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001) try to explain away this exception in a footnote. The authors conceded that the 'Polity data by Jaggers and Gurr label both countries as democratic' (Russett and Oneal, 2001, 19, fn6). Russett and Oneal recognize that battle deaths were high enough to allow the conflict to be labeled a war. Nevertheless, they dismiss this exception to the democratic peace by saying that many of the battle deaths 'were of Islamic guerrillas, not regular Pakistani troops; thus, the conflict may not qualify as a true interstate war' (Russett and Oneal, 2001, 19, fn6). The only problem with an exception to the democratic peace as a defining regularity in world politics is that its statistical significance rests on complete absence of any cases of wars between democracies. One exception breaks the rule. This is the problem with the phenomena that not all democracies are peaceful. In fact, **some democracies are thoroughly warlike.** To his credit Harald Müller has tried to provide us an explanation for this phenomenon by taking a state-level approach. According to Müller, the normative explanation for the democratic peace is the most persuasive. If we concede to Müller that norms are the most important explanation, we should look for differences in the domestic norms of militant and pacifist democracies. Militant democracies develop a hostile interpretation of the actions of non-democratic states, while pacifist democracies are more tolerant and have a higher threshold for military force. Therefore, we can understand the war-proneness of such democracies as Israel, the United States, India, and the United Kingdom from their prevailing political cultures. The analysis of this study has not tried directly to refute Müller's analysis or the idea of the democratic peace at the dyadic level. Rather, what I have sought to do is understand the militancy of some democracies by examining traditional variables (and in some sense Realist variables) for outcomes leading to conflict. I am comfortable with the assertion that conflict in world politics is attributable to major powers that seek at a minimum to maintain their power (Waltz, 1979) or at the maximum seek to get as much power as they can (Mearsheimer, 2001). Moreover, violence begets more violence. States, once locked into a pattern of violence, can continue in multiple iterations of violence called enduring rivalries. States that came into existence through violent conflict such as Israel and India will remain violence-prone for many decades.

**Democratic peace theory is flawed**

**Taner 2—**assistant prof pol sci, Hamline. PhD Syracuse(Binnur Ozkececi, “The Myth of Democratic Peace: Theoretical and Empirical Shortcomings of the "Democratic Peace Theory," Fall 2002, http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume1/number3/binnurozkececi.htm, AMiles)

Although "democratic peace" theory seems persuasive and relevant in the first place, one can criticize the "democratic peace" theory and the findings of its proponents from different angles ranging from mere definitional issues(19) to the existence of "democratic peace" at all.(20) One can argue in the first place that a clear definition of both democracy and war or the mere exemption of their definitions has allowed the "democratic peace" proponents to exclude numerous cases of democratic war.(21) Many "democratic peace" proponents use the concepts of democracy(22) and war differently and the value-laden and usually ambiguous character of these concepts makes it impossible to measure the nature of "democratic peace."(23) Spiro, for example, insists that the changing definition of democracy has made the proponents of the theory to exclude important incidences of "dyadic democratic war" such as the US Civil War, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. This definitional obscurity seems to have made the "democratic peace" appear more significant than it really is. Moreover, the aggregate data seems to provide insufficient support for the theory, since democracy is a relatively new phenomenon and interstate wars are generally rare occurrences.(24) Farber & Gowa have found no statistically significant correlation between democracy and war before 1914.(25) Instead, they have rightly argued that it is only after 1945 that the probability of war and serious disputes is significantly lower between democratic states, which, they have proposed, can be explained by neither institutional nor cultural explanations but rather by the Cold War.(26) One can, therefore, suggest that peace could be the result of foreign hegemony, mutual deterrence, or acquiescence to status quo and not necessarily the result of democracy.(27) This point has also been elaborated by Layne, a major opponent of the "democratic peace" theory, who criticized the "democratic peace" theory by incorporating in his study what he calls the "near misses," such as the 1861 Trent Affair the US and Great Britain, 1898 Fashoda crisis between France and Great Britain among others.(28) Layne claimed that the countries involved in these disputes acted in ways much closer to the realist view rather than behaving in accordance with the norms and structures that the "democratic peace" theory predicts. One can also dispute the fact that democracy produces peace by claiming that it is the peace that produces democracy.(29) This argument presents a new problem to the "democratic peace" theory, suggesting an unclear causal link. Furthermore, as Hermann and Kegley suggested,"democratic peace" theorists have overlooked instances of coercive actions short of formal war by suggesting that there were at least fifteen incidents of unequivocally democratic states intervening with military force against other democracies.(30) This is a result of "democratic peace" theorists not making any explicit claims about the sources of non-democratic war or peace, land their total negligence, if not ignorance, of constraints on the authoritarian leaders.(31) More seriously, however, "democratic peace" theorists cannot adequately account for the tendency towards was in democratizing countries, especially after the end of the Cold War. As it has been demonstrated many times since the late 1980s, democratizing states are most often very volatile and dangerous and, thus more inclined to fight wars "than are mature democracies or stable autocracies."(32) The "rocky transitional period" to democratization may make countries more aggressive and war-prone due to not only domestic competition but also utilization of nationalistic feelings by political leadership and mass public support for aggression. If the "democratic peace" theorists would want to make their cases more persuasive, then, those authors should be more attentive to what is going on in newly democratizing countries and modify, not necessarily change, some of their propositions. The 'democratic peace' theory also underemphasizes the role of the political leadership. The scholars of the 'democratic peace' theory do not ask the questions of how different leaders view national goals and how they try to achieve them. This neglect downplays the role that extraordinary individuals often play in war and peace decision-making.(33) Literature from political psychology has suggested that when we take into account what happens within the decision-making process in democracies, institutional and cultural obstacles may not always restrain what decisions are reached, "making democracy and peace more complex and nuanced than is conventionally pictured."(34) Although regime characteristics constantly push for the election of leaders who "respect and respond to democratic values," as Hermann & Kegley have argued, ideologically driven leaders can come to power, i.e., Reagan in the US, Thatcher in Great Britain. These leaders may either challenge institutional and cultural constraints or be less open to incoming information in order to maintain their positions and/or divert attention from more disturbing issues. Additionally, even if we accept that institutional and cultural explanations account for the "democratic peace," the questions of how these constraints and the nature of other countries, whether they are democratic or not, are perceived by the leadership are not answered by the "democratic peace" literature. Conclusion: The discussion above suggests that the most important drawback of the "democratic peace" theory is the essentialization of the political regime as the only factor contributing to international peace and war. The 'democratic peace' theory underemphasizes, and most often neglects, the importance of other domestic factors such as political culture,(35) degree of development, socio-economic and military considerations,(36) the role of interest-groups and other domestic constituencies,(37) strategic culture(38) among others in decision-making. In other words, it is easily the case that the "democratic peace theory" lacks sensitivity to context and decision-making process. Although one should not dispute the fact that domestic political structure/regime type is an important component of any analysis of war and peace, this should be seen as only one of domestic variables, not necessarily the variable. Devoid of an analysis that gives respect to a number of other factors, superficial and sweeping generalizations will leave many details in decision-making unaccounted for. Consequently, although "democratic peace" theory should not be discarded entirely, current emphasis on the importance of "democracy" in eliminating bloody conflicts in the world should not blind scholars and policy circles alike to the fact that "democratic peace" is theoretically and empirically overdetermined.

**Democracies go to war**

**Layne 6—**pol sci prof, A&M (Christopher, “The peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present,” AMiles)

As a theory of international politics, the democratic peace theory carries little weight. 2 It rests on dubious grounds methodologically. 2 More important, it is not valid empirically. Democratic states have gone to war with other democracies, and in crises democracies are just as prone to making military threats against other democracies as they are against nondemocracies. 22 However, democratic peace theory has a lot of clout in policymaking because it plays to the Wilsonian predisposition of U.S. strategists and provides the United States a handy pretext for intervening in the internal affairs of regimes it considers troublemakers. Thus, far from being a theory of peace, democratic peace theory causes the United States to act like a “crusader state.” 23 America’s crusader mentality springs directly from liberalism’s intolerance of competing ideologies and the concomitant belief that—merely by existing—nondemocratic states threaten America’s security and the safety of liberalism at home. According to Wilsonian precepts, the best way to deal with such states is to use American power to bring about regime chance. 24 The belief that the United States can only be safe in a world of liberal democracies creates real, and often otherwise avoidable, friction between the United States and nondemocratic states.

#### ASB concept solves A2/AD

**Forbes 12** [March 2012, “America’s Pacific Air-Sea Battle Vision,” Randy, U.S. Representative, The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/03/08/americas-pacific-air-sea-battle-vision/>]

In short, the Air-Sea Battle Office aims to define initiatives to develop the capabilities and integration necessary to help Combatant Commanders conduct integrated, cross-domain operations in A2/AD environments. According to Schwartz and Greenert, Air-Sea Battle seeks to use “Networked, Integrated Attack-in-Depth” to “disrupt, destroy, and defeat” (NIA-D3) adversary capabilities. More specifically, the joint force (integrated air, ground, and naval forces) armed with resilient communications (networked) aims to strike at multiple nodes of an enemy’s system (attack-in-depth) along three lines of effort. If we can consider these lines in terms of an enemy archer, one could choose to blind the archer (disrupt), kill the archer (destroy), or stop his arrow (defeat).

#### Naval power fails – on the ground forces key

**Guardiano 9** (John, Marine – Iraq and Worker – Army’s Future Combat Systems, “Air Power Alone Cannot Win Wars”, New Majority, 8-12, http://www.newmajority.com/air-power-alone-cannot-win-wars)

One of the great lessons of recent military history is that wars cannot be won through air power alone; you need boots on the ground. Recall, for instance, the exaggerated claims of “shock and awe” prior to the 2003 liberation of Iraq. Exponents of air power had assured us that the decisive exercise of military power, principally through aerial bombardment, could paralyze the enemy, destroy his will to fight, and render him impotent. In fact, it was only after U.S. soldiers and Marines engaged the enemy in close combat that Iraqi government and Fedayeen forces surrendered and Iraq was liberated. Even then it took additional close combat over several years ─ in Fallujah, Mosul, Najaf, Baghdad, and elsewhere ─ before the military component of the Iraq War was truly won. And Iraq is hardly the only example that proves the crucial necessity of ground forces in modern-day conflicts. In Afghanistan, for instance, U.S. Marines are today engaging the enemy in close-quarters combat to protect the Afghan citizenry. Jets and air ordinance can’t do this; only soldiers and Marines can. The Israelis, too, have learned the hard way that ground forces are integral to victory. Indeed, their 2006 battle against Hezbollah made heavy use of air, naval, and rocket attacks, but **to little avail.** Israeli tanks, moreover, were destroyed by Hezbollah guerillas, who made effective use of advanced technology to fight the powerful Israeli military to a standstill. The lesson then and now is clear: In significant respects, air power is irrelevant to modern-day conflicts. Military success today requires small-scale infantry units who can fight lethally and with precision in populated areas filled with civilian non-combatants. And our infantry units had better be equipped with the latest and greatest technology: because our enemies certainly are, thanks to the internet, eBay, and other virtual bazaars. Yet, old habits die hard; the siren song of air power ─ the false allure of “shock and awe” ─ lives on. Its latest manifestation occurred last week in the Wall Street Journal, where retired Air Force General Chuck Wald argues that an American military “bombing campaign would set back Iranian nuclear development…”

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#### This comes first—problematizing the normative structures that shape how bodies are targeted by war is critical to understanding how and why violence occurs in concretized scenarios

**Lloyd 6**—Loughborough University

(Moya, “Who counts? Understanding the relation between normative violence and the production of political bodies”, paper presented to the panel: ‘Power, Violence and the Body’ Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Philadelphia, 31 August – 3 rd September 2006, dml)

It might be objected, of course, that extending the idea of violence any further in order to incorporate normative violence within it results in a proliferation of meaning that merely hampers the usefulness of ‘violence’ as a descriptive and evaluative political concept. 27 And, this is not just because the very idea of a normative violence may itself appear paradoxical, if not downright contradictory given that normative is conventionally used to designate something that ought to happen. It is also because it is not perhaps transparently obvious that some of the actions Butler identifies as sustaining normative gender (in the examples given) qualify as recognizable acts of violence in the first place (e.g. losing lovers and jobs). Moreover, given that **so many die in wars**, as a consequence of acts of internecine conflict, terrorism, random killings, and so many are brutalized in civil wars, in racially-motivated or homophobic assaults, through rape or acts of domestic violence, as a result of torture, not to mention the violence of child abuse, some critics will no doubt claim that **time is better spent** finding solutions **to deal with these instances of actual violence** rather than speculating about forms of figurative or categorical violence and how they do or do not relate to **what happens in the ‘real world’.** But what if what we recognize as physical violence depends on certain categorizations **that are**, in themselves, **normatively violent**, that operate, in other words, to exclude certain subjects and/or acts of violence? **What if physical violence occurs** precisely because **some people are apprehended as less valuable than others?** And, here we have only to think of homophobic or racist violence. **What if we** cannot see **the violence that certain peoples suffer as violence at all because those people are invisible** (‘unreal’, in Butler’s lexicon) to us; that is, fail to figure within our consciousness as human and are thus denied the rights, privileges, protections and help that accrue to the human? **Should we still argue for an** exclusive focus **on** actual, empirical **violence?** Or would we be better **evaluating** how **and** why **certain persons are construed as somehow deserving of**, or soliciting, **violence in the first place?** It is my contention in this section that an analysis of normative violence is, in fact, something we cannot do without **since it not only sheds** valuable light **on the kinds of political violence that characterize the contemporary world** (including war, ethnic conflict, terrorism, racist violence to mention only some of the most obvious) but also because it forces us to consider how our ability to recognize certain actions as violent **might itself depend on the effacement of other (violent) actions**. To illustrate how this argument works, I now want to turn to Precarious Life.

#### It’s try or die—the aff is a perfection of the military cooption of academic spaces—the role of the judge should be to dismantle the militarization of knowledge production—individual action is critical and the impact is extinction

**BondGraham and Hell 3**—PhD Sociology UC Santa Barbara AND UC Fiat Pax Research Project Group

(Darwin and Emily, “THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES”, <http://santacruz.indymedia.org/usermedia/application/5/ucsc_demil.pdf>, dml)

The militarization of knowledge is found **in its pure form in the university**. Militarized knowledge is a way of knowing the world and relationships between humans, characterized by an acceptance and promotion of violence and war. In militarized society we come to know the world and our fellow humans in terms of the hostile other. Other nations become enemies. Other peoples become dehumanized. The world becomes possess-able if we are strong enough, disposable if we so choose. **Militarized knowledge adopts a worldview of force** not understanding**, violence** not peace. Militarized society relies on knowledge to create technological solutions to our problems and conflicts. **This is** always **at the expense of humanistic knowledge** – the ways of knowing and relating to the world which find solutions in peace and organization, not violence and quantity.

Because **universities are** at the center **of knowledge creation** in our society, we find our institutions of higher learning **imbued with violence**. The militarization of universities leads to **a spiraling effect** further strengthening the forces of war.

Militarized universities produce: military technologies including – new weapons, warfare systems, ways of thought and organization distinct to the goals of coercion and force, and the permanent technological revolution of warfare itself. Universities in service of the warfare state also produce the human resources demanded by the militarized society. **Universities churn out the** politicians**,** technocrats**,** bureaucrats**, and** skilled workers demanded by the society which so **diligently** produces **and** executes **the means of destruction**. These graduates, having learned about the world, its society, and applied sciences **through the lens of warfare** go forth and recreate this calamity. The future politicians will lead the nation into future wars, and the future engineers will construct future combat systems, **while we all obey and simply "**do our jobs**." The system** further entrenches itself, war begets war, the institutions of knowledge produce destruction **at the expense of creation**.

The technologies meant to banish war as unimaginabley destructive, and obsolete **have only accomplished the former**. New technologies meant to make war more humane, and conductable have only accomplished the latter.

TechnoWar & How the University Makes War Possible

The greatest effect the militarization of universities has had is by **making war more conductable**. Modern America, being the “civilized” and “peaceful” society it is, will not conduct a war that extols to large a cost in innocent civilian lives, and the lives of US soldiers. The technological revolution in aerial bombardment, missile capabilities, and weapon accuracy since the Vietnam war was intended to address this very issue. By making weapons more accurate and deployable from a distance, the military and its partners in science hoped to remove the US soldier from combat equation, while making state violence humane and survivable. This **supposed injection of ethics into the arsenal of the United States was** lauded in the Gulf War, Afghan War, and now with unprecedented emphasis in the second war against Iraq. War becomes more automated, increasingly technology withdraws the soldier from the battlefield. The arsenal becomes deployable through computer interfaces, warfighters sit behind computer screens hundreds, even thousands of miles from where they wreak havoc. Soldiers who must still encounter the enemy face to face are made into superhumans with high tech body armor, night vision, network communications, advanced sensors, all intended to make the US soldier invulnerable.

Science in the service of warfare reinforces a political establishment more willing to use violence than diplomacy. US politicians become sure of their military’s capabilities to defeat the enemy, and to do so **in a manner that the American public can accept**. The population falls into a similar mindstate. The technological revolution to make war more effectively against the enemy leads us only to more war.

Does science, technology, and knowledge emanating from our universities produce an ethical and just form of warfare? **Can war be made humane through technological solutions?** Absolutely not – Historically we know this. New technology leveraged in war has had the **net effect of** more war **and** more killing. Most prominent are the examples of past weapons whose inventors claimed would make war impossible. The machine gun being the most famous case was said to have made warfare so destructive and technologically advanced that nations would no longer fight. World War I immediately ensued, and millions died. The technologies meant to banish war as unimaginabley destructive, and obsolete have only accomplished the former. New technologies meant to make war more humane, and conductable have only accomplished the latter.

**What is at Stake?**

The future, and everything. The university takes its namesake from this fact. In Latin, universum - "The whole of created or existing things regarded collectively." **The university is** the whole of human knowledge; the knowledge we have about our existence, past present and future. The university is the attempt of the scientific system of knowledge to understand the human condition, our place in the world, and the realm of possibility. The university is more: In its most worthy incarnation, the university makes room for, even thrives from nonscientific, non-rational forms of knowledge including the arts and humanities. It is inarguably the most powerful attempt humanity has made to understand and re-make the world.

With this fact in mind there are two conclusions to be drawn from the militarization of the university. First, it can be described as simply a matter of fact that knowledge creation and the university serve the military. Humans make war with one another, and that universities are involved in this effort is a truism. Humans will continue to make war, and so the inclusion of the university should be expected. **This answer is of no value**. It assumes **a set of universal permanent truths** (a nature) about the human condition with no possibility of disproving. Furthermore it offers no future for humanity other than annihilation, and it completely betrays the fundamental idealogical basis of the university which is progress through enlightenment.

In contrast, it can be said that **the militarization of universities is a problem** directly related **to the condition of a society**. How much and in what ways a society’s institutions of knowledge creation serve the forces of war is a measure of that society’s worth. A nation that demands the enlistment of its knowledge base in the production of war and the perpetuation of violence is a nation not worthy of life. The only alternatives left would be the dismantling of that nation, or **a** radical reform **of its institutions and a fight against the forces of war**. This publication is dedicated to nothing less than **the** complete **and** radical **reform of our society’s** institutions of knowledge creation, from universities in service of the warfare state, to universities in resistance, in peace, and **toward the creation of a meaningful future**.

#### Targeted killing—the plan doesn’t end drone strikes, it just shifts authority—this is a ploy towards accountability that’s ultimately lip service—their accountability is in reality a colonial shell game that legitimizes more violence

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(Derek, “Drone geographies”, Radical Philosophy 183 (Jan/Feb 2014), dml)

Remote crews are perhaps most vulnerable to this form of post-traumatic stress disorder – a product not so much of what they have seen as what they have done, though the two are of course connected – and it must be aggravated by the constant switching between worlds. In George Brant’s play Grounded a pilot describes the difficulty of maintaining the separation necessary for her to decompress, and gradually and ever more insistently one space keeps superimposing itself over the other; the fixed, precise sensor of the Gorgon Stare yields to a blurred vision in which she finds it virtually impossible to know where (or who) she is. The two worlds begin to become one: the desert on the night drive home from Creech starts to look like the greyed-out desert landscape in Afghanistan, and the face of a little girl on the screen, the daughter of a High Value Target, turns into the face of her own child.10 Brant’s play is all the more powerful because public attention has been artfully orchestrated so that it does not make that connection: it too **is insulated by a ‘remote split’**. When critics of CIA-directed drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere **demand to know about their** legal basis **and the** rules **and** procedures **that are followed**, **they divert the public gaze** from Waziristan to Washington. Madiha Tahir has noted how what she calls the Obama administration’s ‘theatrical performance of faux secrecy’ over its drone war in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – a teasing dance **in which the veil of official secrecy is deliberately let slip** once**,** twice**,** three times – functions to draw its audience’s eye **towards the American body politic and away from the Pakistani bodies on the ground**. It has been a hideously effective sideshow, in which Obama and an army of barkers and hucksters – unnamed spokesmen ‘speaking on condition of anonymity’ because they are ‘not authorized to speak on the record’, and front-of-house spielers like Harold Koh and John Brennan11 – induce not only a faux secrecy but its obverse, **a faux intimacy in which public debate is focused on** transparency **and** accountability **as** the only ‘games’ worth playing. **Yet when you ask** people who live under the drones **what they want**, Tahir continues,

They do not say ‘transparency and accountability’. They say they want the killing to stop. They want to stop dying. They want to stop going to funerals – and being bombed even as they mourn. Transparency and accountability, for them, **are** abstract problems **that have little to do with the** concrete fact **of** regular**,** systematic **death**.12

#### The Trumanites disad—their restrictions replicates a Trumanite bureaucracy by placing its faith in illusionary legal restrictions—only the micropolitical action of the alt solves

**Glennon 14**—Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University [Trumanites=“the network of several hundred high-level military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement officials within the Executive Branch who are responsible for national security policymaking”]

(Michael, “National Security and Double Government”, Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 5, pg 1-114, dml)

The first set of potential remedies aspires to tone up Madisonian muscles one by one **with ad hoc** legislative **and** judicial **reforms**, by, say, narrowing the scope of the state secrets privilege; permitting the recipients of national security letters at least to make their receipt public; broadening standing requirements; improving **congressional oversight of** covert operations, including drone killings **and** cyber operations; **or strengthening** statutory constraints **like** FISA545 and **the War Powers Resolution**.546 Law reviews brim with such proposals. But **their stopgap approach has been tried repeatedly** since the Trumanite network’s emergence. Its futility is now glaring. Why such efforts would be any more fruitful in the future **is hard to understand**. The Trumanites **are committed to the rule of** **law** and their sincerity is not in doubt, but the rule of law to which they are committed **is** largely devoid **of meaningful constraints**.547 Continued focus on legalist band-aids merely buttresses the illusion that the Madisonian **institutions are alive and well**—and with that illusion, **an entire narrative** **premised on the assumption that it is merely a matter of** identifying a solution **and** looking to the Madisonian institutions to effect it. That frame deflects attention from the underlying malady. What is needed, if Bagehot’s theory is correct, is **a fundamental change in** the very discourse **within which U.S. national security policy is made**. For **the question is no longer**: What should the government do? The questions now are: What should be done about the government? What can be done about the government? **What are the responsibilities** not of the government **but** of the people?

#### The impact outweighs—the model of the Trumanite bureaucracy is empirically responsible for disastrous authoritarianism

**Glennon 14**—Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University [Trumanites=“the network of several hundred high-level military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement officials within the Executive Branch who are responsible for national security policymaking”]

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Bagehot anticipated these risks. Bureaucracy, he wrote, is “the most unimproving and shallow form of government,”612 and the executive that commands it “the most dangerous.”613 “If it is left to itself,” he observed, “without a mixture of special and non-special minds,” decisional authority “will become technical, self-absorbed, self-multiplying.”614 The net result is responsibility that is neither fixed nor ascertainable but diffused and hidden,615 with implications that are beyond historical dispute. “The most disastrous decisions in the twentieth century,” in Robert Dahl’s words, “turned out to be those made by authoritarian leaders freed from democratic restraints.”616

#### Consequentialism can’t be applied to scenario planning—the 1AC’s acceptance of violence is morally untenable independent of the validity of their predictions

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(James, “Tolstoj as analytic thinker: his philosophical defense of nonviolence”, Studies in East European Thought February 2011, Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 7-14, dml)

Tolstoj’s main objection to consequentialism is that **the future is** too unpredictable **to serve as the ground of moral judgments**; **one simply** cannot know in advance **what all the results of an action will be**. In The Law of Violence he heaps scorn on the idea that it is possible to foresee the future, calling it a ‘‘very crude’’ and ‘‘horrible’’ superstition (Tolstoj (1928) PSS 37: 203, 208). It may seem that you know the future because you have the power to control it by your action; but this is illusory, because **at best you control your immediate action, not everything expected or unexpected that results from it**. ‘‘**What an** immense amount of evil,’’ Tolstoj writes in The Kingdom of God Is Within You, ‘‘**flows from people’s assuming the right to anticipate’’ what will happen** (Tolstoj (1928) PSS 28: 29).

Tolstoj’s reasoning here brings to mind a notorious essay by Kant entitled ‘‘On the Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives.’’ Convinced that lying is wrong under any circumstances, Kant takes up a proposed counterexample. A murderous man comes to my door asking whether his intended victim is inside; in fact he is inside, but may I not lie to the villain so as to send him away? **No**, says Kant, for the consequentialist thinking I would be relying on **is** fraught with uncertainty: the victim, hearing his pursuer at the door, might have fled through another door, only to be spotted and killed by the pursuer I have turned away (Kant 1909, 362–363).

This idea of the indeterminacy of the future **is central to the rejection of utilitarianism in ethics** by both Kant and Tolstoj, and Tolstoj makes the point as effectively as any ethical thinker. In the letter to Crosby, where Tolstoj’s favorite variant of the classic counterexample has an evildoer about to kill an innocent and defenseless child, he points out that in such a case there are actually two future courses of events that must be forecast, and then weighed against each other, if you wish to justify deadly force by its results. You must calculate what would happen in this situation if you do use deadly force and what would happen if you do not use it, taking into consideration both what would become of the child you might save (the child could, after all, grow up to be a serial killer) and what would become of the villain you might spare (he could turn into a great benefactor of humanity) (Tolstoj (1928), PSS 69:19). Even most utilitarians now concede that, in the realm of experimental actions involving human subjects (experiments in psychology and medicine, for example), **the morality of the actions** cannot **be judged by their predictable consequences**, for if their consequences were predictable with assurance **they would not be experimental**.3 Tolstoj is arguing in effect that all human actions are experimental.

A likely retort to Tolstoj is that **some actions are less experimental than others**, so that their results can be predicted with reasonable confidence. Isn’t he ignoring degrees of probability? His point, however, is that no degree of future likelihood **is sufficient to cancel the** present **and** certain **violation** of the law of love that occurs whenever violence is used. **The** present**,** certain **evil** always **trumps the more or less cloudy future good**. The only weakening of Tolstoj’s maximalist position that I have found in this connection comes, somewhat strangely, in regard to using force on a young child to protect it from imminent harm. ‘‘I cannot,’’ he wrote in What I Believe in the early 1880s, ‘‘use force of any sort against any person whatever, with the exception of a child [rebe¨nok], and then only to save it from an evil immediately threatening it’’(Tolstoj (1928) PSS 23. 460); presumably he is thinking of something like snatching a child from the edge of a cliff. Note the emphasis on ‘immediately’, as if the future reference in such a case were so slight as to be negligible. But the future is the future, however imminent; force is allowed here only because of its presumably good results. Tolstoj’s principles should rule out this odd exception as well, and he never mentioned it again.

#### Treaties don’t solve—no coop

**Mckibben 10** – Foreign Policy writer, author, environmentalist, and activist. In 1988, he wrote The End of Nature, the first book for a common audience about global warming. (Bill, 11-22, “Sipping Margaritas While the Climate Burns” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/22/sipping\_margaritas\_while\_the\_climate\_burns?page=0,1) Jacome

In fact, I suspect it will be mostly holding pattern and very little landing in Mexico this December. The fundamental problem that has always dogged these talks -- a rich north that won't give up its fossil-fuel addiction, a poor south that can't give up its hope of fossil-fueled development -- has, if anything, gotten worse, mostly because the north has decided to think of itself as poor, too or at least not able to devote resources to changing our climate course.

It is possible -- indeed it has been possible from the start -- that this essential gulf will prevent action to slow greenhouse gas emissions at the pace that physics and chemistry demand before it's too late to reverse or contain the impacts of climate change. There's really only one way to build a bridge across the divide, and that's with big stacks of money. Theoretically, the rich countries pledged at Copenhagen that they would pony up $30 billion in "fast-start" financing to help poor countries get going on building renewable energy. And at last scrupulous count, according to the World Resources Institute, there's actually $28.34 billion on the table, more than half of it coming from Japan. Unfortunately, much of it isn't "new and additional" -- instead it's repurposed money from other development grants. None of that increases anyone's confidence in the $100 billion a year that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton projected in Copenhagen would be available by 2020 -- especially because the only news that has emerged this year as to its source is that it won't be coming from "public funds."