# Round 1—Aff vs UNT AK

## 1AC

### 1ac species war

#### Every day, each and every one of us participates in a war which consists of endless genocide of the non-human. Every year, billions of nonhumans are slaughtered by humans. They are captured, detained, tortured and killed for the sake of consumption. This violence is rendered invisible by a normative understanding of war powers that excuses violence against the non-human as legitimate.

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

7. The idea that war and violence sits at the foundation of law and operates creatively has been expressed in differing ways by Heraclitus, Machiavelli, Hegel, Freud and Walter Benjamin. Here, I am merely taking this insight and developing it by reflecting upon the primary role played by human violence carried out against non-human animals. the protagonist Elizabeth Costello draws a comparison between the everyday slaughter of non-human animals and the genocide of the Jews of Europe during the twentieth century. “In addressing you on the subject of animals,” she continues, “I will pay you the honour of skipping a recital of the horrors of their lives and deaths. Though I have no reason to believe that you have at the forefront of your minds what is being done to animals at this moment in production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, in laboratories, all over the world, I will take it that you concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force, and leave it at that, reminding you only that the horrors I here omit are nevertheless at the center of this lecture.” 9

A little while later she states: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.” “And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical enterprise dedicated to nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the comfort of our own homes) is as little consolation to those victims as it would have been – pardon the tastelessness of the following – to ask the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body fat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses with.” Similar comparisons have been made before. Yer, when most of us think about the term “war” very seldom do we bother to think about non-human. A great deal of the contemporary discussion about the moral standing of animals and their treatment is owed to the work of Peter Singer. The purpose of my article is not to directly contribute to this debate. Rather, my focus is upon attempting to re-think some of the conceptual foundations of the Law of war by drawing the status of animal slaughter back into our legal categoryies. For this reason I will not attempt to discuss or survey the many arguments about the moral standing of non-human animals but will keep to a more historical, and perhaps sociological, discussion of the Law of war.

The term war commonly evokes images of states, armies, grand weapons, battle lines, tactical stand-offs, and maybe even sometimes guerrilla or partisan violence. Surely the keeping of cattle behind barbed wire fences and butchering them in abattoirs does not count as war? Surely not? Why not? What can be seen to be at stake within Elizabeth Costello’s act of posing the modern project of highly efficient breeding and factory slaughtering of non-human animals beside the Holocaust is a concern with the way in which we order or arrange conceptually and socially the legitimacy of violence and killing. In a “Western” philosophical tradition stretching at least from Augustine and Aquinas, through to Descartes and Kant, the ordering of the relationship between violence and legitimacy is such that, predominantly, non-human animals are considered to be without souls, without reason and without a value that is typically ascribed to humans. For example, for Augustine, animals, together with plants, are exempted from the religious injunction “Thou shalt not kill.” When considering the question of what forms of killing and violence are legitimate, Augustine placed the killing of non-human animals well inside the framework of religious and moral legitimacy. 12

Of relevance is the practice by which the question of legitimate violence is ordered – that is, the manner in which it is organised by philosophical, moral and cultural justifications in a way that sets out how particular acts of violence are to be understood within social-material life. Within a Western tradition the killing of animals is typically not considered a form of war because violence against animals is placed far within the accepted framework of legitimate killing. 12. Augustine, City of God against the Pagans, Dyson, R.W. tr. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 33, I, 21. This account expresses a particular religious-cultural form of valuing the lives of non-human animals in which non-human animals are placed below humans on a Judeo-Christian and Islamic cosmic hierarchy of creation. While there are other differing cosmic conceptions, such as those found within Hinduism and Buddhism and within various indigenous cosmologies within North America and Australia and within radical utilitarian conceptions expressed by Bentham and Peter Singer focused upon “suffering,” the model of a Judeo-Christian and Islamic hierarchy of creation remains dominant within “Western” (or North Atlantic) culture and its conceptions of law. Such a hierarchy of value is further backed in the West, in differing ways, by the secular cosmology of the theory of evolution, and scientific claims about the higher mental capacities of humans over the bulk of non-human animals. Owing to these hierarchies, for Western legal systems “animal rights” still stand far below and have not been extended from human rights and while the notion of human dignity takes centre stage, notions of “animal dignity” stand at the periphery. On various approaches to the extension of moral standing to non-human animals see: Bentham, J. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Burns, J.H. and Hart, H.L.A. eds. ( London: Methuen, 1982); Singer, P. Animal Liberation (New York: Random House, 1975); Regan, T. “The Case for Animal Rights” in Singer, P. ed. In Defence of Animals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Clarke, S.R.L. The Moral Standing of Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Hursthouse, R. Ethics, Humans and Other Animals ( London: Routledge, 2000).

#### This Western conception of war powers is grounded upon a hierarchy of values that regards nonhuman life as raw material for the preservation of human life.

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

The response of the lawyer, international lawyer, politician or philosopher to the account so far might be to say that this is all very interesting but that it still has little to do with “war.” Such figures might still argue that the term “war” refers to something carried out by states and governed by “national interest,” or guided by moral ideals like freedom and human rights, or by international law. This response, however, overlooks the way in which the typical and everyday use of the term war is itself conceptually and  historically ordered in a practice that differentially values forms of life. In what follows I look more closely at how arguments about legitimate violence within two contemporary conceptions or discourses of the law of war are ordered and of how this ordering is related to the foundational moment of species war. The dominant Western conceptions of the law of war rest upon two major conceptual and historical “foundations.” The first involves the way in which the monopoly upon the legitimacy of violence is vested in the sovereignty of the state and grounded upon the principles of preservation of life, domestic peace and security from external threat. This form which sometimes expresses a reason of state or national interest approach to questions of war is often called the Westphalian system of international relations and is ambiguously historically linked to the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The second dominant narrative or form of thinking about the laws of war is represented by contemporary international humanitarian law. This approach grounds the legitimacy of war upon the maintenance of peace and  security between nations bound together with the concern for the protection of human rights and the prevention of human rights abuses, war crimes and genocide via the establishment of the United Nations (1945). While this mode of thinking about war inherits much from the Westphalian system, it is historically grounded upon an international response to “world war” and the genocide of European Jews. The natural law theories of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes are often viewed as laying down the theoretical justifications for the  modern secular state, the legitimacy of sovereign violence, and the Westphalian international order. Within the context of bloody intra-state civil wars such as the Thirty Years War (1618–48) and moments of domestic chaos such as the English Civil War (1642–51) thinkers such as Grotius and Hobbes reacted to widespread social violence often motivated by actors party to differing Christian confessions all claiming adherence to a universal  religious, moral or political truth. Grotius and Hobbes, albeit in different ways, responded by producing a de-sacralized natural law that was grounded not upon  theological conceptions of right and justice but upon more earthly, “secular,” concepts of the preservation of human life and survival. For these thinkers the chaos of civil war and intra-state civil war could be nullified if the criteria of what counted as legitimate violence were determined by an institution that guaranteed peace and security. Roughly, Grotius and Hobbes attempted to theoretically re-order  territory and space around the figure of sovereignty and inter-sovereign relations. The legitimacy of human violence is no longer grounded upon a universal conception of divine authority but is instead located around the figure and office of the sovereign who maintains peace and security over a particular, limited territory. Such an approach to the chaos of civil war can be termed the juridical ordering of the concept of war. This de-legitimisation of the right to private violence in the name of peace  creates what Max Weber later describes as the “state’s monopoly upon the legitimacy of violence.” Modern war, juridically ordered, takes on the definition of a form of violence waged between sovereigns, who hold a particular status. By this definition violence carried out by the state against a non-sovereign group is excluded from the language of “war proper” as is private violence (including rebellion, sabotage and terrorism) which is defined as crime.Grotius and Hobbes are sometimes described as setting out a prudential approach, or a natural law of minimal content because in contrast to Aristotelian or Thomastic legal and political theory their attempt to derive the legitimacy of the state and sovereign order relies less upon a thick conception of the good life and is more focussed upon basic human needs such as survival. In the context of a response to religious civil war such an approach made sense in that often thick moral and religious conceptions of the good life (for example, those held by competing Christian Confessions) often drove conflict and violence. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that the categories of “survival,” “preservation of life” and “bare life” are neutral categories. Rather survival, preservation of life and bare life as expressed by the Westphalian theoretical tradition already contain distinctions of value – in particular, the specific distinction of value between human and non-human life. “Bare life” in this sense is not “bare” but contains within it a distinction of value between the worth of human life placed above and beyond the worth of non-human animal life. In this respect bare life within this tradition contains within it a hidden conception of the good life. The foundational moment of the modern juridical conception of the law of war already contains within it the operation of species war. The Westphalian tradition puts itself forward as grounding the legitimacy of violence upon the preservation of life, however its concern for life is already marked by a hierarchy of value in which non-human animal life is violently used as the “raw material” for preserving human life. Grounded upon, but concealing the human-animal distinction, the Westphalian  conception of war makes a double move: it excludes the killing of animals from its definition of “war **proper,” and**, **through rendering dominant the modern** juridical **definition of “war** proper” the tradition **is able to** further institutionalize and **normalize a particular conception** of the good life. Following from this original distinction of life-value realized through the juridical language of war were other forms of human life whose lives were considered to be of a lesser value under a European, Christian, “secular” natural law conception of the good life. Underneath this concern with the preservation of life in general stood veiled preferences over what particular forms of life (such as racial conceptions of human life) and ways of living were worthy of preservation, realization and elevation. The business contracts of early capitalism, the power of white males over women and children, and, especially in the colonial context, the sanctity of European life over non-European and Christian lives over non-Christian heathens and Muslims, were some of the dominant forms of life preferred for preservation within the early modern juridical ordering of war.

#### Anthropocentrism has been the foundational model for any and every form of discrimination. Any argument that attempts to claim superiority of the human over the nonhuman rests on the same justifications used by White European males to subjugate other humans

Best 7 – Associate Professor at the University of Texas in the Department of Humanities and Philosophy (Steven, “Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, by Charles Patterson” *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_7/bestpatterson.pdf>)

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal.1

In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions.

Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras

It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals.2 Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature.3 In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.”4

Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons.

The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females.

In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation.

As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means.

Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.”5 Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.”

Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals.6 The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.”7 Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.”8 For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command.

There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind.

#### The first step is a reorientation towards the meaning and language of war. The move to exclude speciesist exploitation from the category of war is the same move of other historical acts of genocide. Our aff demands the recognition of the unending violence against the nonhuman as war.

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals”

The meanings attached to the words we use are significant here. Many of our linguistic categories have been formulated along the distinction between human and non-human and offer different meanings based upon what object within this distinction a word denotes. Words like “killing” and “slaughter” evoke different meanings and different responseswhen applied to humans as opposed to chickens or cattle or insects. While most people would react in horror to the brutal killing of a child, they accept the daily slaughter of thousands of calves. Although there exists a bureaucratic language of regulation governing issues of efficiency, property rights, hygiene and cruelty, the breeding of animals for killing is widely accepted as a legitimate act. Such that, the killing of one animal is not considered murder and the killing of a geographical group of animals is not considered an act of genocide or species war. Yet, this ordering of the legitimacy of violence is not in anyway natural and eternal. Rather, it is contingent and both historically and cosmically temperamental. Consider a hypothetical situation where a group of “aliens” emerged from deep space with forms of technology that far surpassed our own and possessed levels of intelligence that humans could not imagine. These aliens considered humans to be without souls, they considered humans to be so devoid of reason that they made no effort to communicate with us. Our behaviour and language appeared to them just as the movements of ants, the song of birds, and the efforts of chimpanzees appear to us. Further, these aliens cared little for human suffering. If these aliens decided to enslave and breed humans for food, would this be an act of species war? Even if humans rallied together, Hollywood style, (or, like a swarm of bees protecting their hive) and called this an act of “war,” might not the aliens simply laugh, or grumble about how their new animals struggle and go on to devise new methods of capture and killing so that we humans might not bruise our flesh.13

While such an example appears at first bizarre, it is not out of the range of future possibility. Further, the example draws upon an already present heritage of anthropological, racial and colonial forms of thinking belonging to many Western traditions in which acts of violence were legitimised historically by those in positions of power and often never officially called “war.” Aspects of this historical comparison are made by Elizabeth Costello – the Nazi portrayal of Jews as “animals” playing a role in both 13. Similar hypothetical situations have been imagined within numerous science fiction stories in popular culture, most notably: Wells, H.G. The War of the Worlds (London: Heinemann, 1973). Wells makes the link between war, colonialism and the destruction of non-human animal life. At p. 4 he states:

And before we judge them too harshly, we must remember what ruthless and utter destruction our own species has wrought, not only upon animals, such as the vanished bison and the dodo, but upon its own inferior races. The Tasmanians, in spite of their human likeness, were entirely swept out of existence in a war of extermination waged by European immigrants in the space of fifty years. Are we such apostles of mercy as to complain if the Martians warred in the same spirit.

“ ‘They went like sheep to the slaughter.’ ‘They died like animals.’ ‘The Nazi butchers killed them.’ Denunciation of the camps reverberates so fully with the language of the stockyard and slaughterhouse that it is barely necessary for me to prepare the ground for the comparison I am about to make. The crime of the Third Reich, says the voice of accusation, was to treat people like animals.” 14

#### Thus, in response to the resolutional question of what constitutes legitimate Presidential violence, Dustin and I advocate for the recognition of species war as violence.

#### Voting aff acknowledges the existence of species war and the hidden war powers that legislate its existence. We must reject the hierarchy of species and the notion that violence against the nonhuman is legitimate.

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Although species war remains largely hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a Western variant. This variant, however, is one that may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence fall back upon the hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements about differential life-value and that these judgements are an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting upon the nature of law more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the “good”). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these functions of law resides a practice of making judgements about the life-value of particular “objects.” These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the “state,” “community,” etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative life- value of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes “legitimate violence.” Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision – it points to a moment at the heart of the law where distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law, at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor. 7

#### Understanding violence only in human terms reifies violent anthropocentric values – the affirmative is a claim to recognize species war and reconceptualize the human subject

**Collard 13**—Geography Department at the University of British Columbia [modified for ableist language, modifications denoted by brackets]

(Rosemary-Claire, “Apocalypse Meow”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 35-41, dml)

It is an easy point to make, that apocalypse is defined in almost totally human terms. Although environmental apocalypticism is tied to statistics about species loss and habitat destruction, it is only really an apocalypse once human beings (and capitalist production for that matter) are under threat. Occasionally nonhuman species deemed extraordinary in some manner (usually in the degree to which either they are most ‘‘like us’’ or useful to us) may enter into the apocalyptic calculus\* dolphins that can recognize themselves in the mirror, chimpanzees that use tools. This is further evidence of apocalypticism’s anthropocentrism. Leftist critiques of apocalyptic narratives, while not necessarily incompatible with the previous point, have focused instead on these narratives’ depoliticizing tendencies. Swyngedouw (and obscures how the human hubris creates the conditions for these scenarios 2010a; 2011) locates apocalypse within a general trend toward environmental populism and ‘‘post-politics,’’ a political formation that forecloses the political, preventing the politicization of particulars (Swyngedouw 2010b). He argues that populism never assigns proper names to things, signifying (following Rancie`re) an erosion of politics and ‘‘genuine democracy . . .[which] is a space where the unnamed, the uncounted, and, consequently, un-symbolized become named and counted’’ (Swyngedouw 2011, 80). Whereas class struggle was about naming the proletariat, and feminist struggles were named through ‘‘woman’’ as a political category, a defining feature of post-politics is an ambiguous and unnamed enemy or target of concern. As Swyngedouw (2010b; 2011) contends, the postpolitical condition invokes a common predicament and the need for common humanity-wide action, with ‘‘human’’ and ‘‘humanity’’ vacant signifiers and homogenizing subjects in this politics. I return to this idea soon. Over a decade earlier, Katz (1995) also argues that ‘‘apocalypticism is politically ~~disabling’’~~ [debilitating] (277). She writes: ‘‘contemporary problems are so serious that rendering them apocalyptic obscures their political ecology\*their sources, their political, economic and social dimensions’’ (278). Loathe to implicate ‘‘human nature’’ as one of these sources, Katz instead targets global capitalism, which is ‘‘premised on a series of socially-constructed differences that, in apocalyptic visions, take a universal character: man/woman; culture/nature; first world/third world; bourgeoisie/working class’’ (279). Towards the end of her short chapter, she remarks that ‘‘human beings are simultaneously different from and of a piece with bees’’ (280), calling subsequently for ‘‘a usable environmental politics [that] takes seriously the political responsibility implied by the difference between people and bees’’ (280). There is so much to agree with here. But Katz misses a big binary in her list: human/animal. On the other hand, she clearly if implicitly recognizes not only the productiveness of this binary and its role in environmental politics (the humans and the bees), but also the attention it deserves. The question then remains: Although according to Katz, apocalyptic politics underplays if not entirely ignores the production process, is this inherent to apocalypticism, or is there potential to train apocalypticism onto production, particularly of the human and the human/animal binary? Neither a natural order, nor a pre-given subject position, nor a category that exists beyond politics, the human is rather an intensely political category whose ongoing production is rife with violence, contestation, and hierarchy. The central mode of this production is the human/animal binary that Haraway (2008, 18) says ‘‘flourishes, lethally, in the entrails of humanism.’’ This binary is continually re-made and re-authorized politically, legally, scientifically, religiously, and so on. It is the product of particular epistemologies, ontologies, and power relations, and it also produces these same structures. The spatial, material and discursive inclusion and exclusion of animals construct the human/animal binary. Materially, animals are included in the ‘‘human’’ project as laborers, food, clothing, and so on, but are excluded from life itself should their dead bodies be of economic value. Animals work for us, for free, and are largely ‘‘disposable workers’’ in a manner similar to and different from the ‘‘disposable women’’ Wright (2006) observes are fundamental to the workings of capital and labor in Mexican maquiladoras. The similarity lies in how both animal laborers and these women factory workers are devalued as laborers, and this devaluing of their labor actually contributes to the formation of value in the commodities and capital of the production network. They are different in that of course the women are still paid\*albeit marginally\*and their labor is recognized as labor. Animals do not just labor for free. They also die for profit and power. The most obvious example of industrial meat production aside, capitalism and the liberal state derive significant profits from the ability to kill\*often in mass numbers\*wild animals. Killing wolves, bears, cougars, and other animals has been a predominant colonial project, with bounty often the first laws passed in the colonies. Not only domesticated but also wild animals have played and continue to play a central role, materially and symbolically, in capitalism and the formation of the nation state, as symbols, commodities, and spectacle. Discursively animals found the human subject by virtue of their exclusion: the human is what is not animal. This is a juridicopolitical, ethical exclusion that is always at the same time an inclusion. The human thus appears to be a neurological or biophysiological product rather than a result of specific histories, geographies, and social relations, between humans and also humans and animals. Certainly particular socio-natural properties do become essential to a thing’s power and geopolitical centrality (think opposable thumbs, cerebral cortexes, bipedalism, and so on). But as Huber (2011, 34, emphasis added) argues in the context of oil, ‘‘biophysical capacities are only realizable through particular uneven social relations of culture, history, and power.’’ Specific conditions and relations produce the human, which is entirely different than saying that humans are the same as each other or as other animals. Their differences should not be disregarded for a host of reasons, not the least of which is the political struggle various groups have made to claim both difference and not being animals. It is not my aim to ignore, then, the particularities of the human species, although I would emphasize that these particularities are not universal and are increasingly being shown to be far less particular than we imagined.

#### Understanding how the value of the nonhuman shapes violence is critical to a disavowal of the human subject and a new form of being

**Collard 13**—Geography Department at the University of British Columbia

(Rosemary-Claire, “Apocalypse Meow”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 35-41, dml)

While what counts as human shifts dramatically in time and space, what remains for the most part constant is the animal outside that founds this category. These are not meaningless exclusions, and in the context of environmental politics, of course, they have especially pronounced momentum and significance. The naturalization of a superior, distinct species category enables systematically and casually inflicted death and suffering on an inconceivable scale. What is outside the ‘‘human’’ is far more ‘‘killable,’’ like Haraway says, more easily ‘‘noncriminally put to death,’’ says Derrida, more ‘‘precarious’’ for Butler. Although Butler’s extensive work on the politics of the human has been criticized for anthropocentrism, in a recent interview (Antonello and Farneti 2009), she questions what it might mean to share conditions of vulnerability and precariousness with animals and the environment, and suggests it undoes ‘‘the very conceit of anthropocentrism.’’ Such an undoing is precisely what I advocate. While an entrenched and powerful category, the human is also changeable and fluid. As Derrida (2008, 5) says, ‘‘the list of what is ‘proper’ to man always forms a configuration, from the first moment. For that very reason, it can never be limited to a single trait and is never closed.’’ The human’s contingencies, dependencies and destructive, homogenizing effects should be front and center in environmental politics. To show its strangeness is to show that it could be otherwise. Ultimately, we might have to reconfigure subjectivity’s contours and topographies, allow for an apocalypse of the human subject. We might have to get naked in front of our pets.

‘‘A true political space,’’ writes Swyngedouw (2010b, 194), ‘‘is always a space of contestation for those who are not-all, who are uncounted and unnamed.’’ This true political space necessarily includes\*if only by virtue of their exclusion\*animals, the ‘‘constitutive outside’’ of humanity itself. How we respond to this dynamic ought to be a central question of critical scholarship and philosophizing. To be a philosopher, says Deleuze in the ‘‘A for Animal’’ entry to the ‘‘abecedary’’ (L’abe´ce´daire de Gilles Deleuze 1989), ‘‘is to write in the place of animals that die.’’ This is still an imperfect way of describing my objective (for one thing, I am also interested in animals that are still alive), but it is an improvement over being a ‘‘spokesperson’’ for animals, which are often characterized as speechless and may be rendered more so having spokespeople appointed to speak on their behalf. To write in the place of animals that die seems a preferable, though still fraught, characterization. This paper is therefore written in the place of those uncounted and unnamed non-subjects of political space, the animals that die, the nonhumans, the hundreds of millions of animals that are ‘‘living out our nightmares’’ (Raffles 2010, 120): injected, tested, prodded, then discarded. We have denied, disavowed, and misunderstood animals. They are refused speech, reason, morality, emotion, clothing, shelter, mourning, culture, lying, lying about lying, gifting, laughing, crying\*the list has no limit. But ‘‘who was born first, before the names?’’ Derrida (2008, 18) asks. ‘‘Which one saw the other come to this place, so long ago? Who will have been the first occupant? Who the subject? Who has remained the despot, for so long now?’’ Some see identifying this denial as a side-event, inconsequential, even sort of silly. The belief in human superiority is firmly lodged and dear to people’s hearts and senses of themselves. It also seems a daunting task, not a simple matter of inserting the excluded into the dominant political order, which as Zˇ izˇek (1999) writes, neglects how these very subversions and exclusions are the order’s condition of being.

But if the political is precisely, as Swyngedouw (2010b) suggests, the expansion of a specific issue into a larger universal demand against ‘‘those in power’’ (an elevation he argues is precluded by the post-political, which reduces an issue to a particular, contained, and very specific demand), then perhaps the universal demand we need to mobilize in the Left is humanity itself. We need to write in the place of animals that die, in the sense that our politics must undertake not only a re-writing of our histories of oppression, our constitutions, our global agreements (and who and what are included in them), but also, necessarily, a radical reconfiguring of how subjects are positioned in relation to each other. The human can in fact serve as the named subject of this political effort, perhaps most aptly in environmental struggles. Like Braidotti (2008, 183) argues, ‘‘sustainability is about decentering anthropocentrism.’’ It is about an ‘‘egalitarianism . . .that displaces both the old-fashioned humanistic assumption that ‘man’ is the measure of all things and the anthropocentric idea that the only bodies that matter are human’’ (183). In tackling the human category, I believe the Left would not only be more relevant, but also could bring a transformative sensibility to an environmental politics that often seems to want to blame ‘‘humankind’’ but fails to consider precisely how this material and symbolic category remains untroubled in such misanthropy**.**

#### The 1AC is an act of assuming a traitorous identity. The dynamics of different forms of privilege posits us all as in positions of both the oppressor and oppressed. In the species war, we are all human oppressors complicit with a cycle of tortuous violence. The only feasible solution is to work against the structures of our own culture, we must question the human subject. This does not mean we deny our identities or claim unity with the oppressed, but it does mean we adopt an ethic that attempts to minimize our own domination.

**Plumwood 2 –** (Val, “Environmental Ethics”, p.205-6)

There are, I have suggested, multiple bases for critical solidarity with nature. One important critical basis can be understanding that certain human societies position humans as oppressors of non-human nature, treating humans as a privileged group which defines the non-human nature, in terms of roles that closely parallel our own roles as recipients of oppression within human dominance orders. Our grasp of these parallels may be based upon imaginative or narrative transpositions into locations paralleling that of the oppressed non-human other: artistic representation has an important place in helping us make such transpositions. Literature has often played such a transposing role historically, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, in relation to the class system, slavery, women’s oppression, and animal oppression. In recent decades science fiction narrative that imaginatively position humans as colonized or exploited reductively as food by alien invaders have provided very powerful vehicles for such imaginative transpositions into a place that parallels that of the non-human food animal. So have those cartoonists whose ‘absurd’ humour depends upon exploiting parallels in the condition of the human and non-human oppressed. A chicken coming from a human house carrying a baby passes a women coming from a chicken coop carrying a basket of eggs, for example. A Larson elephant is outraged when he notices the ivory notes on a piano keyboard at an interspecies party and makes the connection to the fate of his own kind. The leap of recognition that is often described and explained in terms of an unanalysed and capricious emotion of ‘empathy’ or ‘sympathy’ is often better understood in terms of a concept of solidarity that is based on an intellectual and emotional grasp of the parallels in the logic of the One and the Other. Since most people suffer from some form of oppression within some dominance order or other, there is a widespread basis for the recognition that we are positioned multiply as oppressors or colonizers just as we are positioned multiply as oppressed and colonized. This recognition that one is an oppressor as well as an oppressed can be developed in certain cirvumstances to become the basis for the critical ‘traitorous identity’ which analyses, opposes and actively works against those structures of one’s own culture or group that keep the Other in an oppressed position. Traitorous kinds of human identity involve a revised conception of the self and its relation to the non-human other, opposition to oppressive practices, and the abandonment and critique of cultural allegiances to the dominance of the human species and its bonding against non-humans, in the same way that male feminism requires abandonment and critique of male bonding as the kind of male solidarity that defines itself in opposition to the feminine or to women, and of the ideology of male supremacy. These ‘traitorous identities’ that enable some men to be male feminists in active opposition to androcentric culture, some whites to be actively in opposition to white supremacism and ethnocentric culture, also enable some humans to be critical of ‘human supremacism’ and in active opposition to anthropocentric culture. “Traitorous’ identities do not appear by chance, but are usually considerable political and personal achievements in integrating reason and emotion; they speak of the traitor’s own painful self-reflection as well as efforts of understanding that have not flinched away from contact with the pain of oppressed others. What makes such traitorous identities possible is precisely the fact that the relationship between the oppressed and the ‘traitor’ is not one of identity, that the traitor is critical of his or her own ‘oppressor’ group as someone from within that group who has some knowledge of its workings and its effects on the life of the oppressed group. It depends on the traitor being someone with a view from both sides, able to adopt multiple perspectives and locations that enable an understanding how he or she is situated in the relationship with the other from the perspective of both kinds of lives, the life of the One and the live of the Other. Being a human who takes responsibility for their interspecies location in this way requires avoiding both the arrogance of reading in your own location and perspective as that of the other, and the arrogance of assuming that you can ‘read as the Other’ know their lives as they do, and in that sense speak or see as the other. Such a concept of solidarity as involving multiple positioning and perspectives can exploit the logic of the gap between contradictory positions and narratives standpoint theory applies to. The traitorous identity implies a certain kind of ethics of support relations which is quite **distinct from the ethics involved in claiming unity**. It stresses a number of counter-hegemonic virtues, ethical stances with can help to minimize the influence of the oppressive ideologies of domination and self-imposition that have formed our conceptions of both the other and ourselves. As we have seen, important among these virtues are listening and attentiveness to the other, a stance which can help counter the backgrounding which obscures and denies what the non-human other contributes to our lives and collaborative ventures. They also include philosophical strategies and methodologies that maximize our sensitivity to other members of our ecological communities and openness to them as ethically considered beings in their own right, rather than ones that minimize ethical recognition or that adopt a dualistic stance of ethical closure that insists on sharp moral boundaries and denies the continuity of planetary life. Openness and attentiveness are among the communicative virtues we have already discussed; more specifically, they mean giving the other’s needs and agency attention, being open to unanticipated possibilities and aspects of the other, reconceiving and re-encountering the other as a potentially communicative and agentic being, as well as ‘an independent creature of value and originator of projects that demand my respect’. A closely allied stance, as Anthony Weston points out, is that of invitation, which risks an offering of relationship to the other in a more or less open-ended way.

#### The ballot should decide between competing advocacies. Debates about war powers should not merely concern legal rules, but also the way our normative prescriptions of value infuse the law with meaning.

**Kochi 09** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called “war” rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and understand war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in which specific terms (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm of human action. In this paper I argue that the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation – species war. That is, at the foundation of the Law of war resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals. At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war. In contemporary public debates the “laws of war” are typically understood as referring to the rules set out by the conventions and customs that define the legality of a state’s right to go to war under international law. However, such a perspective is only a narrow and limited view of what constitutes the Law of war and of the relationship between law and war more generally. Here the “Law” of the “Law of war” needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term Recht denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of Gesetz which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws.

1 To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific (positive law) formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war contains at its heart arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence. The question of what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationrship between war and law, and, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out (positing) a particular answer to this question. In this respect the Law of war (and thus its particular laws of war) involves a practice of normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to such questions as: what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of “war,” who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? When we consider the relationship between war and law in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at the foundation of the Law of war resides species war. At present, the Law of war is dominated by two cultural-conceptual formulations or discourses. The Westphalian system of interstate relations and the system of international human rights law are held to be modern foundations of the Law of war. In the West, most people’s conceptions of what constitutes “war” and of what constitutes a “legitimate” act of war are shaped by these two historical traditions. That is to say, these traditions have ordered how we understand the legitimate use of violence. 2

## 2AC

### 2ac cap

#### You should vote for the team that best directly addresses speciesism—it comes prior to making any claims about violence or ethics

**Pugliese 13**—Research Director, MMCCS @ Macquarie U

(Joseph, *State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, Drones* pg 36-37, dml)

Here Foucault offers us an alternative point of entry of ‘life into history’ – an entry point in which life and the biological, and their exertion of pressure on history, are not anthropocentrically delimited and that, crucially, open up an historical vista that stretches back for ‘thousands of years.’ What Foucault provocatively suggests in his opening of a long historical vista that is not reductively qualifi ed in anthropocentric terms is the possibility to think through other historical conditions of emergence for his conceptualization of the biopolitical – specifi cally, of the pressure exerted by animals on the human historical or, more accurately, of the violent pressure exerted by the human historical on the animal biological. This violent pressure needs to be named for what it is: ‘a veritable war of the species.’ 14 Refl ecting soberly on this other biopolitical war, Derrida writes: ‘This war is probably ageless but . . . it is passing through a critical phase.’ Inscribed in the articulation of this critical phase is a call to assume ethical responsibility for the very terms of conduct of this war: ‘To think the war we fi nd ourselves waging is not only a duty, a responsibility, an obligation, it is also a necessity, a constraint that, like it or not, directly or indirectly, no one can escape. Henceforth more than ever.’ 15 Dinesh Wadiwel locates this biopolitical war in conditions of emergence that enunciate Western politics as always- already biopolitical: ‘In Agamben’s words: “the decisive political confl ict, which governs every other confl ict, is that between the animality and the humanity of man.” That is to say, in its origin Western politics is also biopolitics.’ ‘Western politics,’ Wadiwel concludes, ‘expresses the fact of war between human and animal life.’ 16

In what follows, I want to begin to suggest an anteriority or prehistory of biopolitics that is gestured to but remains unrealized in Foucault’s long historical vista; a prehistory of biopolitics that is concerned with political economies of the enslavement and slaughter of animals. Through this move, I hope to enact an ethical anteriority of responsibility for the animal other. This prehistory is doubly anachronic and doubly other: it is anachronic in that it retrospectively ruptures anthropocentric teleologies and the singular identity of a human- synthesizingsubject that presumes to occupy an originary ground; it is doubly other in that it is always- already animal to the human and, tautologically, to the historical. And, fi nally, it enunciates the possibility of ethics precisely by discerning ethics in the face of an animal other traditionally outlawed from the domain of the ethical and thus unrecognizable in terms of the very ethicity of ethics.

#### The perm solves—the 1AC represents a critical break from the status quo ideology they’re critiquing—our radical disavowal of the human subject functions to shatter the depoliticization of the status quo

**Bolman 12—**☺

(Brad, “Seeking Peace, Finding the Violence of the Real: Traumatic Ecologies and the PostPolitical Present”, International Journal of Zizek Studies vol 6 no 1, June 2012, dml)

Our response needs to find the critical middle between the absolute engagement of Treadwell and the awareness of Andrews: we have to be willing to give ourselves over absolutely to the possibility of a change that seems impossible, but only when this action is tempered, first, by a refusal of any meaning-ensuring big Other and second, by a firm engagement with the Real of nature itself. Among other things, this would mean insisting, against those who argue the United States should not meet emissions caps until other nations do, that the fault lies entirely with us. Not just because the United States is historically the largest producer and exports much of its environmental destruction to the Global South, but because our ethics need to take responsibility for our own actions, not disavowing that responsibility to some Other. It also means rejecting the shallow “Toms shoes” approach to ecology: recycling a few bottles but continuing to use high polluting technologies misses the point entirely. Until individuals begin to take responsibility as well and refuse the capitalist insistence to buy back into a system of production that gave rise to this “tragedy of the commons,” no true change will occur. These actions will always be, in some ways, violent. But, perhaps Fight Club is an ironic inspiration here: a little violence can be a good thing.

By viewing the journeys of the protagonists in the novel Butcher’s Crossing and the documentary film Grizzly Man through the lens of the psychoanalytic “passion of the Real,” I have argued that the distorted fantasies of Treadwell and Andrews about finding completeness in the magic of nature will remain harmful delusions until they – and we – confront and acknowledge the violent nature of reality. Both works emphasize that we cannot avoid this encounter: rejecting it and covering it up with fantasies of perfection and hopes for a different future merely delay the pain of the realization and harm us repeatedly and for longer periods of time. Both works offer up a potentially different lens through which we can evaluate our own realities and provide a compelling example of how continuously avoiding the difficult understandings in life can cause us to waste time seeking out delusions which, as we will inevitably learn, can never be more than delusions. When we begin to think about how this relation to nature is, in itself, political, we gain crucial new insights into the debates over ecology today. Otherwise, and by the time we finally know the catastrophe will happen, it will, by definition, be too late.

#### The net benefit is the aff—their failure to forefront the question of species exploitation in radical academic discussions guarantees its reification

Best No Date [Steven, Chair of Philosophy at UT-EP, “Animal Rights and the New Enlightenment”, <http://www.drstevebest.org/AnimalRightsandtheNewEnlightenment.htm>]

Western society has made rapid moral progress since the 1960s. The student, black, brown, feminist, and gay and lesbian movements advanced the universalization of rights process, overcame major barriers of prejudice, and deepened human freedom. During this turbulent period of social strife, riots, mass demonstrations against the U.S. war in Vietnam, and worsening problems with poverty, homelessness, and class inequality, Martin Luther King formulated a vision of a “world house.” In this cosmopolitan utopia, all peoples around the globe would live in peace and harmony, with both their spiritual and material needs met by the fecundity of the modern world. But to whatever degree this dream might be realized, King’s world house is still a damn slaughterhouse, because humanism doesn’t challenge the needless confinement, torture, and killing of billions of animals. The humanist non-violent utopia will always remain a hypocritical lie until so-called “enlightened” and “progressive” human beings extend nonviolence, equality, and rights to the animals with whom we share this planet. The next logical step in human moral evolution is to embrace animal rights and accept its profound implications. Animal rights builds on the most progressive ethical and political advances human beings have made in the last two hundred years. Simply put, the argument for animal rights states that if humans have rights, animals have rights for the same reasons. Moral significance lies not in our differences as species but rather our commonalities as subjects of a life. This is the challenge of animal rights: can human beings become truly enlightened and overcome one of the last remaining prejudices enshrined in democratic legal systems? Can they reorganize their economic systems, retool their technologies, and transform their cultural traditions? Above all, can they construct new sensibilities, values, worldviews, and identities? The animal rights movement poses a fundamental evolutionary challenge to human beings in the midst of severe crises in the social and natural worlds. Can we recognize that the animal question is central to the human question? Can we grasp how the exploitation of animals is implicated in every aspect of the crisis in our relation to one another and the natural world? Animal rights is an assault on human species identity. It smashes the compass of speciesism and calls into question the cosmological maps whereby humans define their place in the world. Animal rights demands that human beings give up their sense of superiority over other animals. It challenges people to realize that power demands responsibility, that might is not right, and that an enlarged neocortex is no excuse to rape and plunder the natural world. These profound changes in worldview demand revolutionizing one’s daily life and recognizing just how personal the political is. I teach many radical philosophies, but only animal rights has the power to upset and transform daily rituals and social relations. “Radical” philosophies such as anarchism or Marxism uncritically reproduce speciesism. After the Marxist seminar, students can talk at the dinner table about revolution while dining on the bodies of murdered farmed animals. After the animal rights seminar, they often find themselves staring at their plates, questioning their most basic behaviors, and feeling alienated from their carping friends and family. The message rings true and stirs the soul. Let’s be clear: we are fighting for a revolution, not for reforms, for the end of slavery, not for humane slavemasters. Animal rights advances the most radical idea to ever land on human ears: animals are not food, clothing, resources, or objects of entertainment. Our goal is nothing less than to change entrenched attitudes, sedimented practices, and powerful institutions that profit from animal exploitation. Indeed, the state has demonized us as “eco-terrorists” and is criminalizing our fight for what is right. Our task is especially difficult because we must transcend the comfortable boundaries of humanism and urge a qualitative leap in moral consideration. We are insisting that people not only change their views of one another within the species they share, but rather realize that species boundaries are as arbitrary as those of race and sex. Our task is to provoke humanity to move the moral bar from reason and language to sentience and subjectivity. We must not only educate, we must become a social movement. The challenge of animal rights also is our challenge, for animal rights must not only be an idea but a social movement for the liberation of the world’s most oppressed beings, both in terms of numbers and in the severity of their pain. As with all revolutions, animals will not gain rights because oppressors suddenly see the light, but rather because enough people become enlightened and learn how rock the structures of power, to shake them until new social arrangements emerge. Are we asking for too much? Justice requires only what is right, and is never excessive. Is the revolution remotely possible? In a thousand ways, the revolution is gaining ground. From the near nation-wide ban on cockfighting to making animal abuse a felony crime in 37 states, from eliminating the use of animals to train doctors in two thirds of U.S. medical schools to teaching animal rights and the law seminars at over two dozen universities, from increasing media coverage of animal welfare/rights issues to a 2003 Gallup Poll finding that 96% of Americans say that animals deserve some protection from abuse and 25% say that animals deserve “the exact same rights as people to be free from harm and exploitation” it is clear that human beings are beginning to change their views about other species. Human beings simply will have to reinvent their identities and find ways to define humanity and culture apart from cruelty. Whether people realize it or not, this is not a burden but a liberation. One no longer has to live the lie of separation and the opening of the heart can bring a profound healing. Animal rights is the next stage in the development of the highest values modern humanity has devised – those of equality, democracy, and rights. Our distorted conceptions of ourselves as demigods who command the planet must be replaced with the far more humble and holistic notion that we belong to and are dependent upon vast networks of living relationships. Dominionist and speciesist identities are steering us down the path of disaster. If humanity and the living world as a whole is to have a future, human beings must embrace a universal ethics that respects all life. Growth is difficult and painful,and the human species is morally immature and psychologically crippled. Human beings need to learn that they are citizens in the biocommunity, and not conquerors; as citizens, they have distinct responsibilities to the entire biocommunity. The meaning of Enlightenment is changing. In the eighteenth century it meant overcoming religious dogma and tyranny; in the late twentieth century, it demanded overcoming racism, sexism, homophobia, and other prejudices; now, in the twenty-first century, it requires overcoming speciesism and embracing a universal ethics that honors all life. We can change; we must. The message of nature is evolve or die.

#### Cap doesn’t exist

**Bryant 13—**Professor of Philosophy at Collin College

(Levi, “Onto-Cartography, Marx, and Abstraction”, <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/01/10/onto-cartography-marx-and-abstraction/>, dml)

So we ask “why is society organized as it is?” The m’aitre answers “because of capitalism!” You ask “what is capitalism?” The m’aitre responds, “the way society is organized!” It’s the same loop. You appear to be explaining something and, of course, everyone gets upset because, well, capitalism is bad. But you haven’t really explained anything at all. You’ve named the place where a ground should be, but have not yet provided that ground. So why is this problematic? First and foremost, it’s problematic because it transforms “capitalism” into what Derrida called a spectre. Capitalism is somehow the cause of everything, but it is also this elusive phlogiston that is everywhere and nowhere. Capitalism causes everything, without itself being a material or real agency. The whole problem with ghosts and spectres is that you can’t fight them. We thus end up in a position of theoretical and practical pessimism. We adopt the moral high-ground because we know that there’s this terrible thing called capitalism that we recognize and that is unjust, but because it is a purely formal ground we have no idea how to intervene in it.¶ The whole point of tracing the networks or onto-cartography is to examine how things are actually put together. Capitalism does not explain, but is what to be explained. Capitalism is the out-come explained by onto-cartographical explanation (as are many other things), but not the explanatory principle. In Hegelian terms, we are seeking real, not formal ground. And we only find real ground by tracing the networks, tracing the assemblages, investigating how machines actually interact in this historical setting and context. We investigate the work that is involved in producing this social structure– and all the entities or machines involved in that –rather than assuming it at the outset. “Society” explains nothing, but is what we’re supposed to explain. Of course, much of this goes unexplored in the humanities and social sciences because the concept of entropy is completely absent from their thought and there is almost no concept of work or energy at work in these theoretical frameworks. There are either concepts or brute material things, but no work to maintain them. No, the only agency is ideas. This is why Marx had to turn Hegel on his head– he understood fatigue –but us academics all forgot that. We forgot that everything is perpetually disintegrating, subject to entropy, precisely because things require energy and work. Who among us has written about fatigue save some spare pages in Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition that no one ever notices? Everything quickly became the crystalline idea once again. We worked, the “Marxists” first and foremost, to turn Marx on his head and forget all the things he said about production, energy, work, and so on. We forgot “the working day”.¶ The second point is that this multiplies our points of intervention at the level of practice. This is not a surprise, of course, because those of us in the humanities would like to think that everything is an idea, a text, a meaning. Then we would be important and masters of all! We could say “everything is Shakespeare!” It’s curious how we so seldom explore our own conditions of production, our own sociological conditions for our enunciations, our own “secondary correlations”. We dream of a world, instead, where our interpretive and conceptual skills are the most important things of all. However, knowing how things or machines are linked in such a way as to produce a particular negentropic social organization, knowing what actants are involved, we are now in a position to intervene in those interconnections and feedback loops. Where, hauntological thought leads us to behave like apes who believe an intervention consists in saying “capitalism sucks!” (which really accomplishes nothing beyond the delights of a beautiful soul that can feel superior to the way in which everyone else is a dupe), we now know how things are actually linked, why they hold together as they do, why people accept them (Reich/Spinoza’s question) while knowing they’re bullshit, and we can engage in interventions that blow these things up. We might be surprised as to what leads people to tolerate this bullshit and what organizes things. We might find that the clock– yes, I literally mean clocks –plays a crucial role or that the length of the working day plays a crucial role or something else besides. But we would know nothing about this because we already know what we’re going to find at the end of analysis. We already know the answer. As a result we see without seeing.¶ Yet if we bothered to actually trace networks and get out of our master-signifiers, we would discover that there are sites of resistance that we never before imagined because we bothered to trace the network. Sometimes a student in the first grade doesn’t learn not because he’s stupid but because he didn’t have glasses, for example. Sometimes it’s a clock that organizes people’s lives, not a belief. Sometimes it makes more sense to intervene in clocks or glasses, but you can only know that if you actually trace the networks or the concrete. Occupy Wall Street got the idea with rolling jubilee. They realized that maybe debt plays a bigger role in perpetuating capitalism than mistaken ideology or failing to have the right moral values. They then decided to start buying up that debt and then forgiving it. How many of you 101st keyboard revolutionary commandos have participated in that?

#### Alt fails—3 warrants—first it’s individualistic, second it doesn’t create the conditions for the oppressed to act, third it only transforms ideological relations, nothing material

**Robinson 10—**University of Nottingham

(Andrew, “Symptoms of a New Politics: Networks, Minoritarianism and the Social Symptom in Žižek, Deleuze and Guattari,” Deleuze Studies 4.2 (2010): 206–23, dml)

Hence, the concept is useful in making sense of contemporary conﬂict. On the other hand, there are difﬁculties with how Žižek deploys the concept. Firstly, Žižek’s approach retains the emphasis of clinical psychoanalysis on the individual patient. This is problematic when psychoanalytic categories have been transferred to the social ﬁeld. The transformation involved in a Žižekian Act is subjective and personal, rather than relational, yet is assumed to have wide-reaching socio-ideological effects. This approach fails to situate ideological relations in social relations, and hence exaggerates the effect which a simple ideological gesture can have. This personalised approach also risks reproducing a therapeutic, self-adapting approach in which, ‘under conditions we recognize as desperate, we are told to alter ourselves’, not the conditions (Nielsen 1978: 168–70). It risks producing adaptation to social ‘necessities’ rather than their transformation. The difﬁculty is that, while a personal fundamental fantasy can be traversed by an individual patient, a homologous social ideology could presumably only be shattered at the social or intersubjective level. Secondly, as a result of this personalised approach, Žižek does not attempt to formulate a politics of the excluded themselves. In his theory, the radical potential of the excluded derives from their structural position. Hence, it resides primarily in the excluded as they appear for others. This appearance is exploited for ideological disruption without being reconstructed as alternative social relations. Partly because he frames the question in terms of identiﬁcation rather than a politics of the excluded, Žižek does not attempt to reconstruct the political forms which could arise from the excluded acting for themselves. As a result, he does not progress from the idea of the social symptom to an exploration of alternative forms of social life emerging at points of exclusion. This precludes engaging with the difﬁculties of analysis of concrete exclusion, hiding complexities beneath the apparent simplicity of structural logic. What if the actually existing excluded do not identify with their position, but construct their identities within the dominant fantasy-frame, or within an alternative neurotic frame which re-conceives their own position as that of the ‘trunk’? What if a group is interpellated by the dominant fantasy-frame as a social symptom, but operates in its own fantasy-frame as the master-signiﬁer? One cannot simply overlay the distinct levels of the structural-cultural position of a phenomenon, the distinct identities and meanings immanent to a social group, and the structures of individual psyches, each with different fantasmatic connections into or ruptures with the wider social ﬁeld. Social fantasy and social symptoms doubtless impact on the other levels, but are not identical to them. In Žižek’s theory, no distinction is made between different types of movements of the excluded – between ethnic conﬂict, ‘terrorism’, innercity revolt, anti-capitalist protest and so on. This is not surprising given the choice of framing. In terms of their signiﬁcance for the gaze of the dominant system, phenomena such as the Bosnia war, the banlieue revolts and the 9/11 attacks are indeed isomorphic. In terms of their immanent construction and meaning for participants, however, the events are heterogeneous. Furthermore, while Žižek generally identiﬁes the social symptom with non-oppressive excluded groups such as immigrants, there is little structural reason why his theory should distinguish such groups from others, such as child abusers or suicide bombers, who are similarly subject to outrage and demonisation, but who are also engaged in harmful or oppressive actions. What is lacking, in short, is a clear account of how the radical potential of the excluded is, or can be, sometimes actualised and sometimes dissipated. Instead of a politics of the excluded, what Žižek provides is a problematically representational emphasis on identiﬁcation. This approach demands too little in terms of recomposition of social relations. Anyone can obtain the radical potential of the excluded subjectively, without relational transformations. Hence, for instance, a privileged academic such as Žižek can perform an authentic Act without at all altering their lifestyle or social inscription, simply by identifying with anathemas (Butler, Laclau and Žižek 2000: 122). A third limit to this framing of the social symptom is a certain theoretical conservatism, particularly as regards the possibility of overcoming alienation and hierarchy (see Robinson 2005). Indeed, Žižek seems to treat the analogically neurotic structure of reality as inevitable. While Lacanian theory may allow for a passage beyond the ﬁeld of neurotic desire through the concept of drive (Noys 2003), it is not apparent that any such passage occurs in the case of Žižek’s Act. Rather, the social ﬁeld is recomposed around a master-signiﬁer. Žižek is very clear on the point that an Act leads to the re-emergence of an arborescent social order, but one in which certain blockages are overcome (Butler, Laclau and Žižek 2000: 92; Žižek 1999: 90–1, 331, 368; 1997b: 72–3; 1989: 211). Žižek constructs his idea that lack is a feature of desire as such in opposition to the idea that alienation results from present, contingent capitalist conditions (Žižek 1990: 56). In particular, the master-signiﬁer is taken to be necessary (Žižek 1994: 43, 59, 1993: 49, 1992a: 103), and it is impossible to move beyond social exclusion or alienation (Butler, Laclau and Žižek 2000: 100–3). Hence, the change involved in a process of identifying with the symptom is rather limited. The speciﬁc characteristics of social life do not necessarily change; what changes is how one relates to these characteristics (Žižek 1994: 57, 61). Identifying with the symptom may disrupt a particular system and its particular master-signiﬁer, but it does not do away with the arborescent structure of the dominant society. One simply moves from neurotic incapacity to normal alienated subjectivity. The result – a change in perception which breaks blockages in the present order – falls well short of a recomposition of social relations. Ultimately, transformation remains subjective and ‘ideological’ (in the expanded Althusserian sense), and does not pass over into the overcoming of ‘ideology’. For all its radical pretensions, Žižek’s politics can be summed up in his attitude to neoliberalism: ‘If it works, why not try a dose of it?’ (Žižek and Salecl 1996: 32).

#### And this individual advocacy is important – publically rejecting institutionalized animal exploitation is critical to create a movement that can create change

**Francione 96** – professor at The Rutgers University School of Law (Gary, ‘Animal Rights: The Future’, http://www.animaladvocates.com/watchdog.pl?md=read;id=5128)

But there are signs that the pendulum may, as a general matter, be swinging back. People are starting to realize that democracy has been hijacked by corporate special interests. People are getting tired of the resurgence of racism and anti-semitism. People are getting tired of the rampant and disempowering sexism that has pervades our culture. People are becoming increasingly aware that our "representatives" in Congress are nothing but pawns of the highest bidder, and are so devoid of integrity that they will attack "welfare mothers" as a financial drain on an economy that spends more money on a few new war toys than it spends on the entire system of welfare on a yearly basis. People want change. More and more people are becoming concerned about matters of social justice and nonviolence generally. Many people opposed the Gulf War; we just were not told about them by media that just happened to be controlled by the same corporations that make the bombs that we dropped on a lot of people and animals. Change will come, sooner or later. We can only hope that it will be sooner rather than later. We can only hope that it will be nonviolent. We must ask ourselves, however, whether that hope is itself morally justifiable in light of the violence that we have caused and tolerated to be caused by others who claim to act on our behalf. If the animal rights movement is to survive the backlash of animal exploiters, and if the movement is going to harness both its own internal energy and the general level of political dissatisfaction, the movement needs to re-strategize and re-organize in light of the New World Order. Now is the time to develop a radical--nonviolent but radical--approach to animal rights as part of an overall program of social justice.

The solution will not be simple, but we must make a start. Consider the following suggestions:

We must recognize that if animal rights means anything, it means that there is no moral justification for any institutionalized animal exploitation. Many people believe that as long as a person "cares" about animals, that caring makes someone an advocate of animal "rights." But that is no more the case than merely "caring" for women makes one a feminist. Feminism requires justice for women, and justice means, at the very least, the recognition that women have certain interests that cannot be sacrificed. Rape is prohibited; it is not left to whether or not a potential rapist "cares" about women. Similarly, if animals have rights, then the interests protected by those rights must receive protection and cannot be sacrificed merely because humans believe that the beneficial consequences for humans of such sacrifice outweigh the detriment for animals. We cannot talk simultaneously about animal rights and the "humane" slaughter of animals.

We need to reshape the movement as one of grassroots activists, and not "professional activists" who populate the seemingly endless number of national animal rights groups. For many people, activism has become writing a check to a national group that is very pleased to have you leave it to them. Although it is important to give financial support to worthy efforts, giving money is not enough and giving to the wrong groups can actually do more harm than good. For the most part, support local groups that you work with or that operate in your area. Significant **social change has to occur** on a local level**.**

We need to recognize that activism can come in many forms. Many people think that they cannot be good activists if they cannot afford to have big, splashy campaigns, often involving the promotion of legislation or big lawsuits. There are many forms of activism, and one of the most potent is education. We were all educated, and we need to educate others--one by one. If each of us succeeded in educating five people per year about the need for personal and social nonviolence, the results multiplied over ten years (including the people educated by those with whom we have contact, etc.) would be staggering. **Those of us inclined should reach out to greater audiences**--on radio or television talk shows, in print media, in the classroom, or in the context of peaceful demonstration--to teach about nonviolence as a paradigm of justice.

But it is important to realize that **these issues are too important to leave to anyone else**. We--each of us--has an obligation to seek justice for all persons, human and nonhuman. And we--**each of us--can help** effect that justice on a daily basis **by sharing our ideas** with those with whom we come in contact. Never underestimate the power of the individual and of small groups: Fidel Castro liberated Cuba with literally a handful of comrades.

If we decide to pursue legislation, we should stop pursuing welfarist solutions to the problem. Animal welfare seeks to regulate atrocity by making cages bigger or by adding additional layers of bureaucratic review to ensure that the atrocity is "humane." We should pursue legislation that seeks to abolish particular forms of exploitation. For example, a carefully focused campaign to end federal funding for animal use in psychological experiments, or for military purposes, may very well be received sympathetically by a public increasingly skeptical of continued public funding of animal use. And any campaign should be accompanied by the political message of ultimate abolition of all institutionalized exploitation. Animal advocates should always be up-front about their ultimate objective, and use all campaigns as an opportunity to teach about nonviolence and the rejection of all institutionalized animal exploitation.

We should recognize that there is a necessary connection between the animal rights movement and other movements for social justice. Animal exploitation involves species bias or speciesism, and is as morally unacceptable as other irrelevant criteria such as race, sex, sexual orientation, or class, in determining membership in the moral universe. But if we maintain that speciesism is bad because it is like racism, sexism, or homophobia, then we have necessarily taken a stand on those other forms of discrimination. And anyone who maintains that speciesism is morally wrong but that sexism or racism or homophobia are not, deserves the title of misanthrope. We need to recognize that the movement to achieve animal rights is a movement that is related to, but different from, the political left. The animal movement is related to the left because it necessarily supports other progressive and nonviolent struggles for human liberation. The animal movement is different because it emphasizes the concept of nonviolence.

Animal advocates should stop worrying about being "mainstream." How long will it take us to understand that the mainstream is irreversibly polluted. Animal advocates--indeed, many progressives--are afraid to be labeled as "extremists." But what does it mean to be an "extremist" when people like Newt Gingrich and Rush Limbaugh are revered by millions? When a man of color in Harlem has a lower life expectancy than a man living in the poorest of nations? When millions go without health care or even minimal shelter or adequate food in the wealthiest nation on earth? When billions of animals are slaughtered yearly for absolutely no reason other than "it tastes good."? Perhaps it is time that animal advocates learned to be proud to be called "extremists."

Perhaps we all need to be a bit more "extremist." In closing, I emphasize that the most important point is that we can no longer look to others to solve the enormous problems that we confront. We must work with other likeminded people, but we can never ignore or underestimate the ability--or the responsibility--of each person to affect significant change on a personal and social level. And we cannot wait any longer for "moderation" to work. Time is running out for us, for nonhuman animals, and for the planet.

### 2ac coloniality

#### The aff represents a fundamental assault on the humanist ideals they criticize—and their failure to forefront the question of animal liberation guarantees the reproduction of colonial hierarchies

Best No Date [Steven, Chair of Philosophy at UT-EP, “Animal Rights and the New Enlightenment”, <http://www.drstevebest.org/AnimalRightsandtheNewEnlightenment.htm>]

Western society has made rapid moral progress since the 1960s. The student, black, brown, feminist, and gay and lesbian movements advanced the universalization of rights process, overcame major barriers of prejudice, and deepened human freedom. During this turbulent period of social strife, riots, mass demonstrations against the U.S. war in Vietnam, and worsening problems with poverty, homelessness, and class inequality, Martin Luther King formulated a vision of a “world house.” In this cosmopolitan utopia, all peoples around the globe would live in peace and harmony, with both their spiritual and material needs met by the fecundity of the modern world. But to whatever degree this dream might be realized, King’s world house is still a damn slaughterhouse, because humanism doesn’t challenge the needless confinement, torture, and killing of billions of animals. The humanist non-violent utopia will always remain a hypocritical lie until so-called “enlightened” and “progressive” human beings extend nonviolence, equality, and rights to the animals with whom we share this planet. The next logical step in human moral evolution is to embrace animal rights and accept its profound implications. Animal rights builds on the most progressive ethical and political advances human beings have made in the last two hundred years. Simply put, the argument for animal rights states that if humans have rights, animals have rights for the same reasons. Moral significance lies not in our differences as species but rather our commonalities as subjects of a life. This is the challenge of animal rights: can human beings become truly enlightened and overcome one of the last remaining prejudices enshrined in democratic legal systems? Can they reorganize their economic systems, retool their technologies, and transform their cultural traditions? Above all, can they construct new sensibilities, values, worldviews, and identities? The animal rights movement poses a fundamental evolutionary challenge to human beings in the midst of severe crises in the social and natural worlds. Can we recognize that the animal question is central to the human question? Can we grasp how the exploitation of animals is implicated in every aspect of the crisis in our relation to one another and the natural world? Animal rights is an assault on human species identity. It smashes the compass of speciesism and calls into question the cosmological maps whereby humans define their place in the world. Animal rights demands that human beings give up their sense of superiority over other animals. It challenges people to realize that power demands responsibility, that might is not right, and that an enlarged neocortex is no excuse to rape and plunder the natural world. These profound changes in worldview demand revolutionizing one’s daily life and recognizing just how personal the political is. I teach many radical philosophies, but only animal rights has the power to upset and transform daily rituals and social relations. “Radical” philosophies such as anarchism or Marxism uncritically reproduce speciesism. After the Marxist seminar, students can talk at the dinner table about revolution while dining on the bodies of murdered farmed animals. After the animal rights seminar, they often find themselves staring at their plates, questioning their most basic behaviors, and feeling alienated from their carping friends and family. The message rings true and stirs the soul. Let’s be clear: we are fighting for a revolution, not for reforms, for the end of slavery, not for humane slavemasters. Animal rights advances the most radical idea to ever land on human ears: animals are not food, clothing, resources, or objects of entertainment. Our goal is nothing less than to change entrenched attitudes, sedimented practices, and powerful institutions that profit from animal exploitation. Indeed, the state has demonized us as “eco-terrorists” and is criminalizing our fight for what is right. Our task is especially difficult because we must transcend the comfortable boundaries of humanism and urge a qualitative leap in moral consideration. We are insisting that people not only change their views of one another within the species they share, but rather realize that species boundaries are as arbitrary as those of race and sex. Our task is to provoke humanity to move the moral bar from reason and language to sentience and subjectivity. We must not only educate, we must become a social movement. The challenge of animal rights also is our challenge, for animal rights must not only be an idea but a social movement for the liberation of the world’s most oppressed beings, both in terms of numbers and in the severity of their pain. As with all revolutions, animals will not gain rights because oppressors suddenly see the light, but rather because enough people become enlightened and learn how rock the structures of power, to shake them until new social arrangements emerge. Are we asking for too much? Justice requires only what is right, and is never excessive. Is the revolution remotely possible? In a thousand ways, the revolution is gaining ground. From the near nation-wide ban on cockfighting to making animal abuse a felony crime in 37 states, from eliminating the use of animals to train doctors in two thirds of U.S. medical schools to teaching animal rights and the law seminars at over two dozen universities, from increasing media coverage of animal welfare/rights issues to a 2003 Gallup Poll finding that 96% of Americans say that animals deserve some protection from abuse and 25% say that animals deserve “the exact same rights as people to be free from harm and exploitation” it is clear that human beings are beginning to change their views about other species. Human beings simply will have to reinvent their identities and find ways to define humanity and culture apart from cruelty. Whether people realize it or not, this is not a burden but a liberation. One no longer has to live the lie of separation and the opening of the heart can bring a profound healing. Animal rights is the next stage in the development of the highest values modern humanity has devised – those of equality, democracy, and rights. Our distorted conceptions of ourselves as demigods who command the planet must be replaced with the far more humble and holistic notion that we belong to and are dependent upon vast networks of living relationships. Dominionist and speciesist identities are steering us down the path of disaster. If humanity and the living world as a whole is to have a future, human beings must embrace a universal ethics that respects all life. Growth is difficult and painful,and the human species is morally immature and psychologically crippled. Human beings need to learn that they are citizens in the biocommunity, and not conquerors; as citizens, they have distinct responsibilities to the entire biocommunity. The meaning of Enlightenment is changing. In the eighteenth century it meant overcoming religious dogma and tyranny; in the late twentieth century, it demanded overcoming racism, sexism, homophobia, and other prejudices; now, in the twenty-first century, it requires overcoming speciesism and embracing a universal ethics that honors all life. We can change; we must. The message of nature is evolve or die.

#### This means the permutation is critical, it’s not just “do both”, it’s an example of relationality, the breaking down of modernist hierarchies—the anthropocentric elevation of the human subject over nature structures coloniality—the aff’s criticism of humanist dichotomies is critical to make their decolonial understanding effective

**Vazquez 12**—Roosevelt Academy, University of Utrecht [buen vivir=“living in plenitude”, a Latin American anti-colonialist ideology]

(Rolando, “Towards a Decolonial Critique of Modernity: Buen Vivir, Relationality and the Task of Listening”, Denktraditionen im Dialog:Studien zur Befreiung und interkulturalität, Vol 33, Wissenschaftsverlag Mainz: Aachen 2012, pp 241-252, dml)

Let us listen to the questions that the notion of buen vivir brings about vis-à-vis modern hegemonic knowledge. "The indigenous population of the Andean region .... conceive "sumak kawsay" or "buen vivir" as the participation of human beings in a vital collectivity of cosmic character, that is to say in close relationality, and also armory, with nature" (Cortez, 2009: 1) 34. This account of buen vivir already indicates **a different conception of the human**, where the human is always in relation with the cosmos and with nature. This relation designates a way of being in the world **that** does not follow **the modern modes of appropriation and representation**. To start with, it is not a mode in which the human becomes the center and the locus of explanation of the real. The notion of buen vivir challenges modernity's dichotomy between the human and nature, a dichotomy that **has been** central **to subordinate and objectify nature for the sake of appropriation**. 'The Andean and Amazonic “sumak kawsay” is grounded in conceptions that imply a close relation with nature, in contrast with the western traditions that **are based in a** strict separation **between human and non-human realities'** (Cortez, 2009: 5). The critique of the **separation between the** human**,** nature **and the** cosmos is an example of how **a thought grounded on the notion of relationality** brings to question **the dichotomic mechanisms of thinking that** characterizes modernity.

'Andean philosophy departs ... from the concept of "non-dualism" of reality which is not the same as a metaphysical monism. Reality –the whole of what exists and is imagined– is not conceived as divided in incomparable or even contradictory aspects and spheres: the divine and the humane, the true and false, the heavenly and the earthly, the religious and the profane, the masculine and the feminine, the living and the inert, the eternal and the temporal' (Estermann, 2009: 138).

The notion of buen vivir and its philosophical configuration brings to question, on the one hand modernity's anthropocentrism and on the other modernity's dichotomic thinking. **The separation between the human and nature** (between reason and nature, between civilization and barbarism, etc.) **is** one of the ruling dichotomies **of the modern/colonial order**. **This dichotomy posits an anthropocentric worldview**. **It** sets the grounds **for racial discourses, and production processes of ecological devastation**. In the natural sciences this dichotomy drives the encyclopedic enterprise of classifying the totality of the natural world in order to objectify it and bring nature under the anthropocentric control of modernity. The human-nature dichotomy means **the imposition of a hierarchy in which rational humanity** rules sovereign **in its opposition to the natural world**. **It is a** driving dichotomy **in the discourses of the Enlightenment and generally of** modern western thought. **Decolonial understanding** needs to engage **with a critique of modern dichotomic thinking**. It faces the task of bringing into question **a series of ruling dichotomies and their hierarchical mode of classification**, such as the dichotomies between the human and nature, the subject and the object, male and female. Dichotomic thinking in dialogue with the notion of buen vivir appears not only as a limited form of understanding and representation of the real, but most importantly, it appears in its coloniality as a functional mechanism **to** perpetuate the hegemony of modernity **and the disavowal of other forms of understanding.**

The principle of relationality advances from the outside a key philosophical question, namely the question of thinking relationality as prior to the subject, to the object, even ontologically, the challenge of thinking relationality prior to Being (Being as one or Being as difference). It is a question that extends itself from the formation of scientific discourses to their very metaphysical foundations. The notion of difference comes to the fore as being possible only in relation, **as non-dichotomic difference, as an always already relational difference**. Such a critique, would lead to **the negation** of the primacy of reason**,** of the subject**,** of males**,** of the human **and thus** the denial of validity **of the major hierarchical formations of modernity**. We sense here the possibility of a critical dialogue with for example the theological thinking of Raimon Panikkar and his notion of nonduality, that tells us "Reality is relation" (Panikkar, 2004: 89) "The person is relation" (Panikkar, 2004: 92).

#### And only the permutation can solve – recognizing the connections between all forms of domination is a prerequisite for meaningful resistance. Any exclusive focus leaves hierarchal structures in place

Best 7 – Associate Professor at the University of Texas in the Department of Humanities and Philosophy (Steven, “Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, by Charles Patterson” *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_7/bestpatterson.pdf>)

The construction of industrial stockyards, the total objectification of nonhuman animals, and the mechanized murder of innocent beings should have sounded a loud warning to humanity that such a process might one day be applied to them, as it was in Nazi Germany. If humans had not exploited animals, moreover, they might not have exploited humans, or, at the very least, they would not have had handy conceptual models and technologies for enforcing domination over others. “A better understanding of these connections,” Patterson states, “should help make our planet a more humane and livable place for all of us – people and animals alike, A new awareness is essential for the survival of our endangered planet.”40

The most important objective of the book, indeed, is to promote a new ethics and mode of perception. *Eternal Treblinka* affects a radical shift in the way we understand oppression, domination, power, and hierarchy. It is both an effect of these changes, and, hopefully, a catalyst to deepen political resistance to corporate domination and hierarchy in all forms. Given its broad framing that highlights the crucial importance of human domination over animals for slavery, racism, colonialism, and anti-Semitism, *Eternal Treblinka* could and should revolutionize fields such as Holocaust studies, colonial and postcolonial studies, and African American studies. But this can happen only if, to be blunt, humanists, “radicals,” and “progressives” in academia and society in general remove their speciesist blinders in order to grasp the enormity of animal suffering, its monumental moral wrong in needless and unjustifiable exploitation of animals, and the larger structural matrix in which human-over-human domination and human-over-animal domination emerge from the same prejudiced, power-oriented, and pathological violent mindset. Political resistance in western nations, above all, will advance a quantum leap when enough people recognize that the movements for human liberation, animal liberation, and earth liberation are so deeply interconnected that no one objective is possible without the realization of the others.

A truly revolutionary social theory and movement seeks to emancipate members of one species from oppression, but rather all species and the earth itself from the grip of human domination and colonization. A future “revolutionary movement” worthy of the name will grasp the ancient roots of hierarchy, such as took shape with the emergence of agricultural societies, and incorporate a new ethics of nature that overcomes instrumentalism and hierarchies of all forms.41 Humanism is a form of prejudice, bias, bigotry, and destructive supremacism; it is a stale, antiquated, immature, and dysfunction dogma; it is a form of *fundamentalism*, derived from the Church of “Reason” and, in comparison with the vast living web of life still humming and interacting, however tattered and damaged, it is, writ large, a *tribal morality* – in which killing a member of your own “tribe” is wrong but any barbarity unleashed on another tribe is acceptable if not laudable. Ultimately, humanism is pseudo-universalism, a Kantian quackery, a hypocritical pretense to ethics, a dysfunctional human identity and cosmological map helping to drive us ever-deeper into an evolutionary cul-de-sac**.**

#### **This argument relies on an anthropocentric hierarchy, the affirmative takes a stance against the marginalization of the nonhuman which relies on the same logic as the marginalization of any marginalized human body. To argue that we cannot reject animal exploitation because it is part of another group’s culture justifies defending slavery as a part of American culture**

TVL 11—This Vegan Life (2/15/11, “On Animal Rights, Racism and Elitism,” http://www.thisveganlife.org/on-animal-rights-racism-and-elitism/, RBatra)

As I see it, defending animal exploitation on the basis of tradition makes as much sense as defending American slavery as a tradition of colonists, or defending the oppression of women as a tradition of men. Just because something is a tradition doesn’t make it ethical or desirable.

“Issues of justice are issues of justice, ” remarks Gary Francione in Ms. Fox’s article. “And, as a matter of fundamental justice, we cannot morally justify animal use, however ‘humane.’ We ought, of course, always to endeavor to present issues of justice in a way that is culturally sensitive and not racist. But there are some who think that promoting the position that we cannot justify any animal use is inherently racist or culturally insensitive.” He continues:

Those in this group beg the question and assume that speciesism is justified. That is, their position amounts to the view that it is racist or culturally insensitive to seek to protect the interests of another marginalized and particularly vulnerable group, nonhuman animals. I would imagine that most of those who have this view would not object if the marginalized beings were other humans. But this is just another way of asserting human supremacy and exceptionalism. I find that as objectionable as asserting racial supremacy.

We can try to educate people who have this view, and we should do so. But in the end, if the choice is between maintaining an abolitionist position or not doing so in order to appease speciesism and human exceptionalism presented as cultural sensitivity or non-racism, I refuse to appease. I am sincerely sorry if my views offend anyone but throughout human history, there has not been an idea that has not offended someone.

Ms. Fox also quotes Francione as rejecting the charge of racism leveled at those who promote ethical veganism:

Racism is failing to include people as full members of the moral/legal community on the basis of race. How is taking the reasoned position that exploiting nonhumans cannot be morally justified racist?” he queries. “The only way that it can be racist is if the concept of a ‘person’ in ‘person of color’ includes a protected interest in exploiting nonhumans. As I said earlier, that begs the fundamental moral question in favor of human exceptionalism.

And on the presumption that veganism is elitist, he says:

I find the notion that a diet that rejects violence is elitist is bizarre. There is nothing more elitist – and I mean nothing – than the notion that it is morally acceptable to impose suffering and death on a sentient being because you like the taste.

It is true that there is a market for expensive, processed vegan foods. But so what? That does not make a vegan diet inherently elitist any more than a market for people who can buy designer clothes makes wearing clothes inherently elitist.

It remains incomprehensible to me how many people involved in other social justice work cannot see the connections between racism, classism, sexism and speciesism. As Nekeisha Alexis-Baker has so eloquently noted:

The same ideology that supports speciesism is present in ideologies that encourage and justify sexism and racism…As a black woman who is vegan, I am particularly sensitive to the ways in which forms of exploitation are intertwined… So rather than being concerned with animal liberation or women’s liberation or black and other people of color’s liberation, I think we need to understand how they are all tied together and to know that we can’t free one group if we allow the same kinds of oppressive ideologies to enslave another group. Liberation has to come for all.

#### The idea that meat eating is central to a culture is flawed and eurocentric

Deckha 7 – Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria, Canada (Maneesha, 2007 “Animal Justice, Cultural Justice: A Posthumanist Response to Cultural Rights In Animals” Animal L. & Ethics)

First, to suggest as Wenzel and Lynge do that Inuit seal hunting should be accepted because it is crucial to Inuit subsistence culture removes culture from the realm of the ethical. This is as problematic from a postcolonial animal justice perspective as removing nature from politics or basing ethics on biologism or ideas of the so-called natural. 147 Such a position assumes that because a practice is culturally crucial it is irreproachable. The logical extension of such a position would mean that all practices are beyond criticism, because we have always existed as cultural beings. In saying this I do not mean to dismiss this invocation of cultural relativism as quickly as cultural relativists usually do. 148 Nor do I mean to discount the importance of cultural survival and self-determination for Aboriginal peoples. Yet, recognizing the skewed cultural playing field does not necessarily mean abstaining from criticism. We encounter several conceptual problems if we construct cultural differences, or any other difference, as beyond scrutiny. A primary conceptual problem in immunizing culture involves authenticity. Receiving marginalized voices as truth-claims, as Wenzel and Lynge advocate, creates a new brand of authenticity problems. First, any resort to "cultural traditions" must grapple with the constructedness of traditions and their partly imagined nature. Lisa Stevenson has noted how the organization of "disparate Inuit groups in the Canadian Arctic" into the territory of Nunavut meant that Inuit "literally had to imagine themselves as a people, unified partially through their difference from the rest of Canada," claiming a common, unified future in the Arctic in a way that "would have been unthinkable" in the past. 149 And while the reality that cultural rights are based on imagined identities may not lead to an ethical conundrum, it does raise the question of who is excluded by the identity that is imagined? What are the threshold characteristics one needs to possess before one counts as an authentic cultural voice? For example, if hunting, sealing, and trapping are integral to establishing Inuit identity, is the Inuit person who does not engage in these practices and has never been "on the land" not or less Inuit? 150 Even if an unproblematic concept of authenticity could be reached based not on identity but on similarly circumscribed material life conditions, we would still encounter a second problem: if we equate marginalized experience with truth do we not assign Others a set of narrative authorities that enjoy immunity from the collective process of judgment? Moreover, how will we ever reconcile incommensurate stories within marginalized groups if we cannot question experience?15 1

#### The only reason that meat is more readily available is due to anthropocentric practices. Moreover, they ignore the fact that meat eating is a Western practice which should be rejected

Bailey 7 – Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Minnesota State University-Mankato (Cathryn, “We Are What We Eat: Feminist Vegetarianism and the Reproduction of Racial Identity” Hypatia 22.2 39-59

One of the problems with George's argument in Animal, Vegetable, or Woman? and in a 1994 article that received much criticism, is that many, if not all, of the reasons she cites for why vegetarianism may be out of reach for many poor women is precisely a result of the patriarchal system that devalues women and animals in the first place. It is not a randomly produced feature of the world that women and children make up the greatest poverty class or that the health of women and children is especially precarious. Nor is it an accident that "animal protein" in the form of cheap lunchmeat or fast food is often more readily available than vegetables in the United States. From the point of view of feminist ethical vegetarianism, these conditions result from the very racism, sexism, classism, and anthropocentrism that is being challenged. As Greta Gaard and Lori Gruen have pointed out, "What she [George] ignores is the well-known fact that, around the world, it is the men and boys who eat the first and most foods, while the girls and women eat last and least" (1996, 236). Moreover, moral ideals need not themselves be thought of as discriminatory or elitist in the ways George has suggested, despite the fact that, in some sense, exemplifying moral virtue may often be tied to some kind of privilege. Consider, for example, the poor mother who is paid to be complicit with fascist torturers. Certainly, resisting participating in such a moral atrocity is more difficult for her than for many others, but we do not thereby abandon the moral ideal of avoiding aiding and abetting torturers. We might be more understanding of her participation, but we should not use it as a basis for abandoning the moral ideal. George's suggestion that nearly all ethical vegetarians are moral elitists, however, threatens to slide into moral condescension, as if there ought to be a multiple-tier, separate-but-equal system of moral ideals. Not incidentally, George's suggestion that feminist vegetarianism is classist and ethnocentric ignores the fact that "most non-Western diets are largely vegetarian (perhaps by virtue of necessity): consider Chinese, Indian, and African traditional cuisines. If anything, it is meat-eating that is a Western norm that 'development' has imposed upon non-Western nations" (Donovan 1995, 227). Ironically, George's position erases the number of poor women who are vegetarians by ethical choice, revealing the hidden privileged perspective that serves the edifice of her argument. Often vegetarianism has been caricatured as epitomizing petty moral privilege, with the self-appointed morally empowered vegetarian depicted as lording it over others. As one character criticizes the vegetarian in Coetzee's novel, "It's nothing but a power-game. Her great hero Franz Kafka played the same game with his family. He refused to eat this, he refused to eat that, he would rather starve, he said. Soon everyone was feeling guilty about eating in front of him, and he could sit back feeling virtuous" (1999, 68). Similarly, George objects, ethical vegetarianism assumes that "a single definable class of persons is designated as better than—more morally virtuous than—all others simply because of its physiology and power" (2000, 2). What I suspect lurks below the surface of George's critique is the worry that ethical vegetarianism is somehow antihumanism (antiwomanism), that one must choose between animals and humans. As Donovan argues in the introduction to her co-edited book, it is a familiar strategy: "Just as feminists were charged with man-hating when we began to channel our energies and our theorizing to women's needs and experiences, animal activists now stand accused of people hating" (Donovan and Adams 1996, 4). Here, too, there is the suggestion that one cannot be both for poor women and children and for animal welfare. The response of the New Haven Register to the PETA exhibit described above further illustrates the point: "If you care about animals more than people, the comparison [in the PETA exhibit described above] may seem apt. . . . There is little common ground for agreement if PETA sees the slaughter of livestock for food as the same as the lynching of blacks or the extermination of millions of people in Europe" (quoted in Christie 2005). Not only is this analysis a speciesist objection to the comparison but it also implies that one who takes animals seriously is ipso facto demonstrating a failure to take humanity seriously; by George's parallel account, a feminist who takes animals seriously is failing to take women seriously. With respect to ethical vegetarianism, I think it is clear that such a divide-and-conquer strategy only works if one accepts the racist, sexist, classist terms of the discussion. Part of what is required to understand some of the resistance to vegetarianism is to appreciate the logic that undergirds it. We should not, of course, automatically dismiss those who resist vegetarianism as insensitive dupes. To that end, it helps to appreciate that whether one is a meat eater or a vegetarian would not carry such visceral moral and emotional impact if it were not experienced as deeply entwined with the production and reproduction of identity. That our identities are so constituted is not a neutral or inalterable fact, however. The perpetuation of the patriarchy depends, in part, on the fact that we understand our racial, gendered, and sexual selves as contingent upon eating practices in the ways described above. Only then can vegetarianism be used as a wedge to divide people along racial, sexual, or class lines. A context-sensitive feminist vegetarianism with a deep critique of the knotted relationship between racism, sexism, and anthropocentrism offers great promise. Certainly, no viable feminist vegetarianism can proceed without attempting to understand and dismantle such connections. As I have argued, this is so not only because of the complex ways that the philosophical ideas have been twisted and bound together, but also for practical reasons. As it stands now, many people still do not wish to be associated with the animal welfare and vegetarian movements. If white Western feminist vegetarians, even well meaning ones, overlook or trivialize the historical and conceptual ties between racism and anthropocentrism by failing to appreciate the connections between eating practices and racial identity, feminist ethical vegetarianism will be stalled at the class and color lines. However, we should not concede that ethical vegetarianism is an intrinsically racist, classist, or colonialist endeavor because doing so effectively allows the continued masking of the ways in which racism, classism, and imperialism have created foodways privileging the global elite. It also serves to divide and isolate the most oppressed, limiting human animals with respect to their ethical agency and access to quality food and leaving nonhuman animals where, for most of us, they have been all along—on our plates.

## 1AR

### f-word k

#### In every way the f word is patriarchical and heterosexualizes violence and power—proves their disobedience is problematic

Johnson 97 (Allan Johnson, sociologist with 30 yrs teaching experience, 1997,  “The gender knot: unraveling our patriarchical legacy “, p.150)

The patriarchal form of heterosexuality is male dominated, male identified, male centered and organized around an obsession with control. As such, its social significance goes beyond sexuality per se, because it also serves as a general model for male dominance and for dominance and aggression in general. Whether the authority figure is a father, lover, husband, or employer, the underlying dynamic of control typically involves cultural themes tied to sexuality in one way or another. The common expression, “Fuck you!” for example, heterosexualizes aggression by identifying the aggressor with men who fuck and the object of aggression with women who are fucked. Similarly, being hurt or taken advantage of is often linked to heterosexual imagery, as in “I’ve been screwed,” “had, “taken,” or “fucked.” The language of warfare is full of heterosexual imagery, from ditties chanted by recruits in basic training (“This is my rifle, this (my penis) is my gun; this is for fighting, this is for fun”) to high command metaphors for nuclear destruction such as “going all the way” and  “wargasm.” Power is also heterosexualized, as in “screwing the competition,” the use of  “fucking “ as an adjective indicating something of awesome proportions (as in “fucking fantastic”), or the idea that men have the right to sexualize all women, including employees, co-workers, strangers on the street, and daughters.37 There is a popular romanticized notion that fathers should guard the sexual integrity of their daughters and maintain their own proprietary interest until they turn it over, reluctantly and sometimes with displays of jealousy, to husbands. The film Father of the Bride, for example, shows how far a father will go to act out jealousy over his daughter's impending marriage. We're supposed to take this as cute foolishness in spite of its clear basis in cultural images of daughters as romantic sexual property, images rooted in core patriarchal ideas about heterosexuality and its relation to male privilege and women's oppression.

### coloniality

#### Yes, we make a claim that no one should devalue the nonhuman, that is not a universal truth claim that their evidence critiques

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Val was a significant thinker in philosophical debates about ethical relationships between humans and nonhumans not only for what she offered, but for how she side-stepped many approaches that may be defensible through logic but that do not lead us into ways of opening ourselves to an ethical involvement with our earth others. Her aim was to open ethics for action, not to offer further iterations of abstract analysis of the logic of ethics.

Most of her argument was laid out extensively in *Environmental Culture*. Here she put forward an interspecies ethic of recognition which depended on a particular stance toward the nonhuman world. That is, she was not making a set of truth claims about the world, but rather was asking what kind of stance a human can take that will open her to a responsive engagement in relation to nonhuman others. Her answer was that to recognise “earth others as fellow agents and narrative subjects is crucial for all ethical, collaborative, communicative and mutualistic projects, as well as for place sensitivity.”17 One effect of opening one’s self, as human, would be to dispel the myth of mindlessness, not through a logical account of mind, but through the experience of being one amongst many in a world already replete with mindfulness. In opening one’s self to others as communicative beings, one places one’s self in a position of being able to experience communication. She saw this as a step toward a post- Cartesian reconstruction of mind.18 It would recognise intentionality, and it would include communication, exchange, and agency.19

One of the things that is so remarkable about Val’s approach to ethics is that it avoids all those abstract questions of who or what is morally considerable, and what may be meant by that. Rather than querying others, it asks the human to query herself, and it seeks to open the human to the experience of others in the contexts of their own communicative and expressive lives. Here, as elsewhere, she was concerned with paths (toward others) rather than answers (about others). An approach that starts with recognition of expression is a ‘gateway’ through which we can find ourselves encountering the force of the fact “that the larger-than-human world counts for something in its own terms as well as in terms of our relationship to it.”20

This gateway (or ‘door’ as she described it in her definition of what philosophical animism does), entails interspecies communication. 21 Here again, she is not defining communication in strictly human terms; there is no suggestion that other creatures sit around debating philosophy, but she is asserting that as other creatures live their lives, so they communicate aspects of themselves. Amidst all this communication, one finds one’s self encountering expressiveness and mindfulness within the world of life.22 And amidst all this mindfulness, there arises a dialogical concept of self for both the human and for others.23

In sum, Plumwood’s philosophical animism “opens the door to a world in which we can begin to negotiate life membership of an ecological community of kindred beings.”24 Her use of the term ‘kindred’ means beings with whom we are kin; she was claiming an earth kindred, or kinship amongst those she called earth others. We tend to think of kinfolk as organic beings, but Val was open even to thinking about kinship with stones and other inorganic ‘beings.’25